Egypts identity crisis Global Public Square

By Sahar Aziz, Special to CNN

Editors note: Sahar Aziz is an associate professor at Texas Wesleyan School of Law and a fellow at
the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. She is also a member of the Egyptian American
Rule of Law Association. The views expressed are her own.
What started as a political battle for power between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypts liberal
parties has become an identity crisis for the country. For many Egyptians, particularly the
intelligentsia, the current conflict represents a struggle for the soul of Egypt that goes far beyond
the issue of electoral democracy. Will the nation remain secular in nature, or will it evolve into an
Islamist state, even if governed by a democratically elected regime?
For the millions of Egyptians that swarmed into Tahrir Square on June 30, their point was not merely
to show their displeasure with the Morsi regimes abysmal performance and its adoption of Mubarakstyle authoritarian tactics. Rather, it was a resounding rejection of what they perceived as a grave
transformation in the identity of the state.
While Egyptians are approximately 90 percent Muslim and ten percent Coptic Christians, of whom a
vast majority are devout, most are still content with the secular nature of their government. They
take seriously the Islamic proverb that there is no compulsion in religion, and object to the coercive
Saudi Arabian model. Thus, many Muslims and Copts alike have been alarmed by developments in
recent months that they saw as altering Egypts very identity.
By the end of Morsis first year in office, he and his Muslim Brotherhood backers were perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as imposing an agenda based on an international religious and political ideology
inconsistent with Egypts national interests. Not only was Egypts foreign policy in the region shifting
towards Islamist parties and regimes, but domestic policy in education and culture was also shifting
away from secularism.
For example, Morsis foreign policy became more sympathetic to Hamas the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood and less consistent with the Egyptian militarys long standing zero tolerance of alleged
Islamist extremists operating in Sinai. As a result, Egyptian military casualties and kidnappings were
increasing at an alarming rate, prompting some Egyptians to question their new presidents vision
for the country.
Even more troubling for Egyptians was a conference held by the Muslim Brotherhood a few weeks
before Morsis ouster, during which Egyptians were encouraged to lead a holy war in Syria. Morsis
silence when hardline clerics called for Egyptians to become martyrs in the Syrian civil war was
interpreted as the presidents consent to such views.
But the Brotherhoods overreach pre-dated the conference. Months earlier, the Education Ministry
altered textbooks to remove womens rights pioneers, such as Doriya Shafiq, who did not wear the
headscarf. Elementary school books, meanwhile, were amended to include more references to
religion. And Bahai children were reportedly prohibited from attending school because the 2012
constitution, drafted by an Islamist-dominated constituent assembly, only recognizes three
Abrahamic faiths. (Other constitutional articles also left the door open for a regression on womens
rights under the guise of protecting the Egyptian family).

In the cultural realm, where Egypt prides itself as the regions leader, the new culture minister
reportedly fired the heads of the Cairo Opera House, the Fine Arts Sector, and the Egyptian General
Book Authority, a move seen as a likely precursor to censorship of any work lacking a proper Islamic
orientation.
The induction of Muslim Brotherhood loyalists into the ministry spread fears that Morsi was looking
to continue Mubarak-era censorship over cultural works based not only on political ideology but also
religion. Its possible the firings were, as Morsi claimed, about rampant corruption within the Culture
Ministry. Yet taken with the governments other steps, the dismissals were seen as a further blow to
Egypts secular identity. And in a country where accurate information is in short supply, perception
matters as much as reality.
Ultimately, Morsis regime was perceived by large swathes of the public as exploiting the populist
demand for revolutionary reform to further a broader agenda to transform Egypt from a secular to
an Islamic state. It should therefore come as no surprise that the militarys narrative that it has
rescued Egypt from losing its very identity has been resonating.

Whatever comes of Egypts latest political crisis, one thing should by now be clear much of Egypts
devoutly Muslim and Coptic Christian population were not nearly as convinced as their former
president about the virtues of a religious state.