Sie sind auf Seite 1von 65

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128540. April 15, 1998]

EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of


Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused
to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only
to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal
act.Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability
for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability.
The Case
This is the gist of this Courts resolution of the petition for review on certiorari ,
assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals [2] in CA-GR SP No.
41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which set aside the April 12, 1996
Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, [4] reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12,


1996 of the respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered
to set anew the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to
serve imprisonment for the duration stated in the decision of the said
respondent Court dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of
the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds


that the Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation filed by the accused
thru counsel, is meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby
granted.
The Facts
The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are
reproduced below:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial


Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond
reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as
[m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as
[m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by
law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount ofP30,000.00 and the
heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with
the modification that the civil indemnity was increased
to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court
dated July 30, 1991 reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to
indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00
and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as


G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition
on December 1, 1993.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br.
39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge
promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals]
only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not
commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the
Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed
with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7,
1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August
17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in
pertinent portions thereof:
In the dispositive portion of this Courts decision, We simply
modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one
respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the
appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in
Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.
In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed
by the lower court was not touched on at all by this Court
especially in the light of [o]ur [o]bservation in the said decision, as
follows:
After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no
doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of
Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the following
findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight
and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:
Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or


manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that
the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the
same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 127129)
Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares
that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The
accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the
following grounds:
1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4
April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the
accuseds constitutional right against jeopardy.
In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the
aforestated motion holding:
Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court
of Appeals promulgated on 17 August 1995 which clarified the
dispositive portion of its original decision, be considered as an
amendment, alteration or modification of the decision? Here, we
must not forget the basic rule that in the execution of the
judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the decision which
controls. We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned
above, we have already promulgated the said decision by
reading to the accused the dispositive portion, and that to the
best of our knowledge, he had already complied therewith by
paying the damages which were awarded. It may be relevant at
this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme
Court in the case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of
Appeals, 237 SCRA 393 that

Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and


precise in quoting data from the records, it would have
arrived at the right conclusion
The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216
SCRA 692, that:
Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision,
the Supreme Court may clarify such ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment has become
final. (emphasis supplied)
The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan vs. Court of
Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the Supreme Court said:
x x x Thus the respondent Court stated, it is undisputed
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x had
become final and executory. Taken in this light the
respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the
issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable
and conclusive.
But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is
beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if
strict adherence to procedural rules were to be
followed. It should be remembered that rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of
the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend its operation. (emphasis supplied)
It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable
Supreme Court therefore, that it may suspend the operation of

the rules of procedure by virtue of its rule-making


power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court has the power
to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the power
to suspend its operation in order to promote substantial
justice. Unquestionably, however, the Honorable Court of
Appeals does not have that rule[-] making authority.Therefore it
may not suspend the operation of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the
same doctrines apply to criminal cases as in the cases before
us? The accused thru his counsels raised the issues of the effect
of a promulgation already once made arguing in the process that
another promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the
constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will
not be violated.
We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which
the Honorable Supreme Court has imposed, i.e., to accept with
modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate
courts. However, we feel that we must equate this with another
injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with the
jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant
of the law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a
dilemma. Since the very jurisprudential authority relied upon by
the Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the power of
the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this Court
therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of Appeals does not
have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision
which has not only become final, but has already been previously
promulgated?
Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the
observation made by counsel for the accused in paragraph 4 of
their motion which we quote:
4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to
promulgate as the same had already been promulgated

on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise, nothing to


promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated
February 2, 1996 and much less in the alluded August
17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this
Court to re-promulgate the Decision.
On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the
Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a] petition
for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge
seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute
the penalty of imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals] Decision of
July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the
Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent Judge be nullified and the
penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.[6]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:

Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of


imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it
increased the civil liability fromP30,000.00 to P50,000.00. He failed to
recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of
Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would
not have been imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the
charge. Had he looked carefully into the text of the decision he would
have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of
conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said decision:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court
entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accusedappellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The
Court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision,
to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect
such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy ... was proven by the following circumstances:


1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the
same table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at
the terrace upon the arrival of Leo Petete and his companions;
2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes
after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and
Agardo Reyes and boarded the same yellow car owned and
driven by accused Eduardo Cuison.
3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a
resident of Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested
witness in the evening of May 27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house
of said accused Eduardo Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car,
proceeded to his house and after coming out of his house was
seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo
Cuison called for his brother Warling to whom he handed the
carbine pistol and received by the latter.
Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When
Bot Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two
others inside the car proceeded towards the north. Obviously,
these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.
4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling
Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the
driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the car of accused
Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their respective
firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the air;
5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to
[sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic]
Sapigao;

6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo


Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously
to see to it and make sure Sapigao was already dead;
7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused
Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the
restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged at the door, accused
Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison, Domy Cuison and
Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo
Castro hitting the latter;
8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and
uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being a
kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his brother Warling and
his two nephews Bot and Domy;
9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each
other before the incident;
10.After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went
away from the scene of the crime on board the same car.
The following circumstances showing the sequence of events,
the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses were perpetrated
taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and
helped each other in the attainment of the same
aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560),
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of
the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved
by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be
accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons

aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the


same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them for concerted means is proved (People vs.
Colman, et. al., 55 O.G. 2393).
In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accusedappellant to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount
of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the heirs of Rulo Castro also the
amount of P30,000.00 (Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the
new policy of the Supreme Court on this matter, the abovespecified amount of P30,000.00 should be increased
to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).
It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil
liability in accordance with new rulings of the Supreme Court without
finding that the accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus,
the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission of the criminal
liability is an error.
Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the
dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which
categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the
respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed
upon the accused.
This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or
alteration to an already final decision. It is conceded that such cannot
be done anymore. The Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical
terms what it obviously meant in its decision - - that the conviction of
the accused is affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is
increased. The dispositive portion of the decision may not have used
the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead to no other
conclusion.

It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after


paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his
participation in the act of killing the two (2) victims in these cases,
because of a wrong interpretation of a decision.[7]
'

Hence, this appeal.[8]


The Issues
In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following assignment of errors:

I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its


discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to establish the
requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari .
II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to show the
existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot
be modified, over objection of the accused.
IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the Solicitor
General violates the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in
deciding as it did and in denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration. [9]
Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs
of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and (2)
whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified


A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the
following requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Grave abuse of discretion
x x x implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[11]
Petitioner
points
out
that
the
solicitor
generals
petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the said
Resolution, the trial court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and, thus,
effectively refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which, in turn,
clarified that the CAs earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount
of indemnity but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order,
the trial court insisted that it had already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision
when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues
that the trial courts Order, far from being whimsical, capricious or malevolent, [was] valid
and substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after a
careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and points of applicable law. [12]
We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite obvious
that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision convicting Petitioner Eduardo
Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot
be construed to mean that the appellate court merely imposed an indemnity and deleted
the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision in
no way communicated that the appealed Decision of the trial court was modified only in
regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that the penalty of
imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the entire records of this case
contain no legal or factual basis for acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases
against him.
In granting petitioners motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily
decided not to promulgate the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision. [13] He had no
discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his jurisdiction.

We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of
Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of petitioner. The trial
courts assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution was therefore tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of the land affirming the judgment of
conviction of respondent Court and unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. [14]
Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judges justification that he has previously
promulgated the Court of Appeals Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil
indemnity. In ordering only the payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute
the CA Decision in its entirety. Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying -and this Courts dismissal of the petition questioning -- the said earlier CA Decision, the
trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent refusal of the trial court is a
clear display of grave abuse of discretion.
We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself
acknowledged that the latters July 30, 1991 Decision was ambiguous and obscure.
[15]
Such claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its Resolution[16] did the CA so
describe its previous Decision. It merely restated the import of its July 30, 1991
Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or distorted by the trial court, which
stated that it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched
on at all by [the Court of Appeals] x x x.[17]
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of mandamus,
in view of the trial courts refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating the
appellate courts Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
a petition for mandamus is warranted [w]hen any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x. [18] Obedience to a superior courts
order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals was improper, because the People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed trial court Order.[19] This contention is bereft of merit. A motion for
reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where the questioned
resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case.[20]
Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction
Not Barred by Double Jeopardy

Petitioner submits that the trial courts promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4,
1995 cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered [21] because to do so
would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy.[22] He contends that the
judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final [23] and that courts have thus
lost jurisdiction over the case.[24]
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:

x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations
omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has]
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).[25]
Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the
Respondent Courts decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has
effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x x.[26] In other words,
petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action
for the recovery of indemnity.[27] Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the
criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only
the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact
and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of
its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April
4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that
grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void.
[28]
Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. [29]

We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not modify or
amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
Cases Cited Not Applicable
People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, cited
by petitioner, are not applicable because they refer either to the lower courts proceeding
that is not void or to errors of judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of
jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando,[30] the Court ruled that the questioned
proceedings of the court a quo were not an absolute nullity as to render the judgment of
acquittal null and void, considering that the prosecution was not denied due
process. In Ramos vs. Hodges[31] the Court found that the trial judges erroneous
conclusion merely constituted errors of fact or of law, and not of jurisdiction. Lastly,
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals[32] the Court held that the lower court committed merely
an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as there was no clear showing [that
it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that its act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Epilogue
This Court takes this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise in
their ponencias, most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and clarity in
substance and in language are revered objectives in decision-making.
Having said that, we also lament the trial courts convoluted attempt at sophistry,
which obviously enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his imprisonment and to
unnecessarily clog the dockets of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honors
expressed desire to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate court
was, in truth and in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled rejection of the superior
courts order modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his refusal to
obey for fear of being found to be grossly ignorant of the law does not deserve one whit
of sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be blindfolded but she is neither blind
nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious argument from
common sense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing , JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127772. March 22, 2001]

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.


FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
November 21, 1996[1] and of January 7, 1997,[2] in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, which denied the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by
petitioner against the Hon. Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
139, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC),
and the People of the Philippines. [3] Involved in said petition were the orders of Judge Jaime D.
Discaya and Judge Tuason dated October 25, 1995[4] and April 11, 1996,[5] respectively, issued in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62 which petitioner claimed were violative of his constitutional
right against double jeopardy but which respondent appellate court upheld.
The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru
falsification of public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with
respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases.
The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioners arraignment on
March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21,
1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and
in January and February 1995, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding
Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed/detailed thereto.

The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private
prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioners counsel, postponed to July
24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioners three coaccused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were
reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due
notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioners counsel, respondent court issued the
following order:
When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in Court despite
notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case
against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is
entitled to a speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby dismissed. With
respect to accused Spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao, 1st
warrant be issued for their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner,
respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of
September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:
In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme
Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when
the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e) lapse without the
party having his case tried. At least this right is relative, taking into (the) account the
circumstances of each case.
There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified
postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case, violation of
the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial

was set and the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June 21, 1995,
the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service of the
notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the
accused did not interpose objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone due to
absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint
trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused were not present. There were only
three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to
present evidence and the same were postponed with valid reasons.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of
the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its
dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no double
jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1995 dismissing
the charge/case against the accused Roberto Almario is reconsidered and set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his assailed Order
of April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 November
1995 is hereby denied for lack of merit considering that, based on the foregoing facts,
the proceedings in this case have not been prolonged unreasonably nor were there
oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in violation of the Accuseds
constitutional right to speedy trial.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge of
Branch 139 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the People of the
Philippines. In a resolution dated November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied the
petition due course and dismissed it for lack of merit. Petitioners motion to reconsider it was
likewise denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 7, 1997.

Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court
which, in turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it
reconsidered the order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner asserts that this
reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially
dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioners constitutional right to a speedy trial.[7]
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases, double jeopardy had set in so that
petitioners constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated.
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3)
after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.[8]
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of
the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a
criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. [9] Double

jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the
accuseds right to speedy trial.[10]
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so
that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be
recalled that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
[11]
Both the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioners case was
terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and
January and February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the
presiding judge was promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not
immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala.
Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to
the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the
private prosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995
was reset, despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service
of notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.[12]
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances
beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were
clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another
was made without objection from petitioners counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel
for petitioner moved for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private prosecutor
due to a severe attack of gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable
to the court.[13] All in all, there were only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer
analysis of these successive events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were
transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the
cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of
the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the
appellate courts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the
trial and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious
and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial
as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable
lengths of time.[15]
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably
sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioners right to

speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been
violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when
that order was reconsidered seasonably.[16] For as petitioners right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused was not met. The trial courts initial order of dismissal was upon motion of
petitioners counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case,
despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had
occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,[17] where
we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy
trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right
of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this
reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed
reinstatement of the cases against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated
November 21, 1996 and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,


SPOUSES
MARCELINO
NICOLAS
and
MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago,
Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the
trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On
appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino
Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son,
Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing
Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while
along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and
ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person
and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence
said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing
plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said
automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court, showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that
they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also
from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera butsaid that the accused
also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the
accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they
proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then
at about 2:00 or 3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and
(Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a
duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate
and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused
who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley
they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became
vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had
drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go
home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the
front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the
deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of
about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles
Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the]
wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a
passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the
car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he was not able
to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road.
xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side
of the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic
while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the
lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from
the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the
following morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal
Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside the
car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the
deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased
who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit B)
while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs. [2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of
the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not
drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:

The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center
of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was
coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the
cars lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the
right edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by
a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn by the
accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result
of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured
while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for
treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided
Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioners favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
trial courts judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses
prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay
indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the
Nicolas spouses, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee


is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which
was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify
plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all, a total of
at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m. [6] It found that petitioners act of
driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, [8] a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the Traffic Code is
negligence in itself because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be
prevented by the regulation.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24,
1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:

FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE


PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSEDS
(PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY
THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR

AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA,


BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONERS
ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS
WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT
SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES
MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND
RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME
WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL
CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS
VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine
to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of
determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial courts finding that he was neither
imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits
that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioners guilt had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that
petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted
him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.

Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity
placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
[10]
When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense. [11] This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by
the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the
Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense
identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being
imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did
not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak
of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
[14]
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. [15] This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for damages is for
the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the
judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish
any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. [17] The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence
are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the
criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment shows that the
judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioners
negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on
reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion
of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not
discount the possibility that the accused was really negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court and since said
hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.
[18]
The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages
and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their
claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988. [19] He avers that
since Manchester held that The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of
the prescribed docket fees, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing
fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24,
1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the
civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the
filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is
applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first
lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions
with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. [20] As
correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the
damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. With the
adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action
as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time
private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in
1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects
pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or
if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. [21] Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering
that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of
damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact
to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the
criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioners allegations that the
filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as
its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136258. October 10, 2001]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
FELICIANO, accused-appellant.

vs. CARLOS

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

From being the subject of moral condemnation, the Kiss of Judas appears to attain a
different dimension in criminal procedure. Indeed, by entering into an "unholy" contract with an
accused, so that the latter might betray his partner in crime in exchange for an acquittal, the State
demonstrates how far its efforts could go to vindicate crime. That the State should agree to
become a party to setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should reward conduct from
which an honorable man would ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically illustrates the
perceived necessity of such kind of an arrangement in criminal procedure. [1] It is this doggedness
of purpose on the part of the State which herein accused-appellant, in one of his assignment of
errors, decries -

The trial court [has] erred in discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to be the state
witness against co-accused Carlos Feliciano despite strong objections from the
defense.[2]
The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a security guard detailed by the Atlantic
Security Agency at the Kingsmen building, also popularly known in the small community as the
hub of four disco pubs located on four floors of the edifice, in Kalibo, Aklan. He was assigned to
the "Superstar" disco pub and his duties ranged from refusing entry to dubious characters to
making certain that no customer would leave without first paying his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a
security guard from another agency, the Rheaza Security Agency, was stationed at the parking lot
of the same building. In keeping with the nocturnal business hours of the establishments at
Kingsmen, the two security guards would report for duty at 7:00 in the evening until the wee
hours of the next morning or when the last customer would have by then left the premises. In the
early morning of 05 June 1995, Feliciano and de la Cruz centrally figured in the investigation
over the grisly death of an unidentified woman whose body was found sprawled in Barangay
New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.

Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby Barangay Buswang was big news to
the small community of Kalibo. The radio news about an unidentified lifeless female lying in the
Sampaton Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie Ricarto. The dead woman, so described
as wearing a red jacket emblazoned with the words "El-Hassan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and
maong pants, fit the description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer, shared a stall with
Teresita, a vendor of spices, condiments and fruits, at the Yambing Building. Rosalie last saw
Teresita on the afternoon of 04 June 1995. Teresita, who regularly went to Iloilo twice a week to
buy goods to sell, was scheduled to leave the following morning of 05 June 1995. According to
Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would take the 2:00 a.m. trip to Iloilo, should already be back at
Kalibo by about 4:00 p.m. of the same day. But Teresita did not return that afternoon. Rosalie
said that Teresita wore pieces of jewelry - a necklace, a pair of earrings, a bracelet, four rings and
a Seiko wristwatch - all of which, except for the timepiece, were eventually recovered. Anna
Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of Teresita, was able to identify the bag recovered by Myca
Banson from the crime scene, as well as all its contents, to be those belonging to her
mother.Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were twelve P100.00 bills, seven P5.00 bills and
the broken windshield of the tricycle owned by Ruben Barte. Turned over to the police by the
manager of the Superstar Disco Club was the sum of P1,000.00.
The autopsy report showed that whoever bludgeoned the hapless Teresita Fuentes to death
had used a blunt instrument, inflicting twelve different wounds on her head and face. The cause
of death was noted to be severe hemorrhage secondary to lacerated wounds and skull fracture.
On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano
-

"That on or about the 5th day of June 1995, in the early morning, in Barangay New
Buswang, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, while armed with a
handgun, by means of force and violence, and with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal, rob and carry away cash money in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine currency, more or less, belonging to TERESITA
FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the aforesaid
amount; that by reason or in the occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of
enabling the accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the abovenamed accused with intent to kill and conspiring with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation and under the

cover of darkness, treacherously attack, assault and wound TERESITA FUENTES Y


OSORIO, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds, to wit:
1. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length left chin.
2. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower lip.
3. Fracture of the left mandible.
4. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and the left upper canine.
5. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length and about 1 in depth left face.
6. Punctured wound in diameter and about 1 inches in depth mid-portion base nose bridge left.
7. Lacerated wound about 2 inches in length and about 1 inches in depth left cheek.
8. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear medially.
9. Lacerated wound about inch in length left face near the left ear.
10. Lacerated wound about 1 in length below the left eyebrow.
11.Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and about 5 inches in depth left parietal
12.Skull fracture occiput right.

"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of the Rural Health Unit,
Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached and forming an integral part hereof which wounds
directly caused the death of said TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO.
"That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim suffered
actual and compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS."[3]
The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could
testify against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the
motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08 February 1996. The two
accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a quo granted the motion of the
prosecution and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith
stricken off from the Information.[4]

A detailed account of the incident presented at the trial by the prosecution was narrated by
the Office of the Solicitor General.

"In the early morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock, appellant went to the guard
post of Dela Cruz to tell the latter to assist him in going after a customer who did not
pay the bill. It was not the first time that they had to run after a non-paying
customer. Dela Cruz thus accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a tricycle
from its driver, Ruben Barte, who stayed behind.Appellant initially drove but about
twenty meters past Kingsmen Building, he asked Dela Cruz to take over while he
stayed inside the passenger sidecar of the tricycle. Somewhere between the Ceres and
Libacao terminals, appellant alighted from the tricycle after instructing Dela Cruz to
stop and wait for him. Appellant subsequently informed Dela Cruz that they shall wait
there for the customer they were after. About a half hour later, however, appellant
decided to leave the place, apparently because the person he was looking for was
nowhere in sight. As they passed Banga, New Washington crossing, they saw a
woman walking alone. Appellant waved at her, giving Dela Cruz the impression that
they knew each other. Dela Cruz stopped the vehicle, as he was told by appellant, who
then jumped out. Drawing his service gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the
neck and at the same time poked his gun at her face. He dragged her towards the
tricycle and ordered her to board it. The woman would later be identified as Teresita
Fuentes. Dela Cruz was shocked with what appellant did and was at a loss on what to
do. Still stricken with panic, Dela Cruz asked appellant what was going on and said he
was leaving as he did not want to be part of whatever plans appellant had. Appellant
retorted that Dela Cruz was already involved. Dela Cruz was about to alight from the
tricycle when appellant poked his gun at him and ordered him to drive. Thinking that
appellant was in a position to easily shoot him, Dela Cruz did as he was ordered.
"Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive back to the public market. When they
reached the junction of Toting Reyes and Roxas Avenues, appellant told Dela Cruz to
turn right at Rizal Memorial College of Arts and Trade (RMCAT). They noticed at this
point that another tricycle, which came from the direction of Kingsmen Building, was
following them. This prompted appellant to order Dela Cruz to turn left at Magdalena
Village instead and to drive faster. During the ride, appellant held Fuentes, who was
crouching, by her hair, pressing her head down. He also kicked her and struck her
head with the butt of his gun whenever she struggled. Dela Cruz asked appellant to
stop hurting Fuentes and to have pity but his entreaties fell on deaf ears. Appellant
even threatened to shoot Dela Cruz if he does not stop complaining.

"When they reached New Buswang, they noticed that the other tricycle they saw
earlier was still trailing them by about 15 meters. As they approached Magdalena
Village after passing Camp Martelino, Fuentes struggled so appellant hit her
again. Dela Cruz told appellant to desist from striking her. Appellant did not take
kindly to the unsolicited advice and fired his gun in the air.Seeing an opportunity for
escape, Dela Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle towards Magdalena Village until the
vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle was lifted from its fallen state, Dela Cruz
immediately jumped out of it and ran towards a feeder road leading to the Cooperative
Rural Bank. He was resting at the back of the bank for a few minutes when appellant
also arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his service firearm and aimed it at
appellant, demanding from the latter an explanation why he had to involve him (Dela
Cruz). With an assurance that he would own up the responsibility for everything that
had happened, appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After returning his service
gun to the holster, Dela Cruz headed back to the road. Behind him following was
appellant. Then, they saw Barte, from whom appellant rented the tricycle earlier,
trying to start the engine thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in the other
tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael. Appellant assured Barte that he will pay for all the
damages of the rented tricycle.
"Meanwhile, Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building aboard Yael's tricycle to
look for his dancer girlfriend, Myka (or Mika) Banzon (or Vanson), but she was not
there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his tricycle, were about to go to Banzon's boarding
house when appellant approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to
Magdalena Village. Afraid of appellant, Yael agreed. When they got there, particularly
where Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant walked towards a mango
tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed him. Dela Cruz saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the
head with his gun. She was lying down face up, groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and
pushed appellant away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes. Since he did not want to
get involved further nor did he want to see any more of what appellant was up to, Dela
Cruz walked back to the tricycle. He took a last look back and saw appellant getting
something from the pocket of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of
his chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with Dela Cruz and Yael as they were
about to leave and they all went back to Kingsmen Building.
"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the building and informed her
that he was going to bring her home already. She passed by the ladies' room while he

stood watch outside.Appellant arrived and told Dela Cruz and Banzon that they had to
talk inside the ladies' room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00 each, but
they declined to accept the money.Appellant threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal
whatever he knows or appellant will kill him and his family. When appellant insisted
in giving the money, Dela Cruz took it only to place it on the sink, then, he and
Banzon left.
"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding house aboard Yael's tricycle
when appellant caught up with them again and ordered Yael to first take him to Ceres
terminal. As they passed the Tumbokan Memorial Hospital, they came across Barte
driving his tricycle. After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant gave him money. Dela
Cruz and Banzon quickly transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take
appellant to the terminal. In the course of the transfer to the other tricycle, appellant
placed something inside the pocket of Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he was
in a hurry to go home. In Banzon's boarding house, Dela Cruz found out that what
appellant had put in his pocket was a blood-stained necklace wrapped in a piece of
paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she found at the place where Barte's tricycle
turned turtle. Dela Cruz planned to return the necklace and the bag the next day.
"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for work. Appellant asked him for
the necklace so that he could pawn it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give the
necklace back because in the morning of June 6, 1995, the police raided the boarding
house of Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his wallet where he
placed the necklace. The police invited Dela Cruz to the police station to shed light on
what he knew about a murder committed in Magdalena Village. The police had earlier
confirmed an anonymous call that a dead woman was found at New Buswang. Twelve
100-peso bills were found at the scene, as well as a broken windshield that was traced
to the tricycle rented by Barte to appellant. The dead person was identified as Fuentes
by her daughter, Analiza Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz revealed everything that
appellant had done. The police asked Dela Cruz to go with them to Lalab, Bataan
where appellant was arrested.Appellant was then brought to the Kalibo Police Station
for investigation."[5]
Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the asseverations of state witness de la Cruz. He
claimed that the accusations were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility
between them due to work-related differences. An altercation arose between him and de la Cruz
two months before the incident, on 06 April 1995, when a customer had complained to the

Kingsmen Building manager that the toolbox of his tricycle, parked near the building, was
missing. The manager then ordered Feliciano to go to the parking lot and summon de la
Cruz. Feliciano reported back to say that he did not find de la Cruz in his designated post, a fact
that de la Cruz later resented. The next incident happened the following month. On the evening
of 01 May 1995, Myca Banson, the live-in girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be "taken out" by a
customer. Feliciano, upon orders of the management, refused de la Cruz entry within the
premises of the pub house, in order to avoid any possible trouble, which culminated in a physical
tussle between the two men and ended with de la Cruz aiming his gun at Feliciano. The third
incident occurred when a motorcycle parked at the Kingsmen parking lot could not be located
and de la Cruz again was not at his post. Feliciano reported the matter to the manager and, two
days later, de la Cruz was fired from work. Feliciano admitted having seen de la Cruz at about
9:30 on the evening of 04 June 1995 escorting Myca Banson to the pubhouse. De la Cruz stayed
at the billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while waiting for Myca to finish work, often at 4:00 in
the early morning of the next day. Feliciano said that he knew Ramon Barte, the driver, being a
habitue of the Kingsmen premises. It was Barte who would often fetch Rodel de la Cruz and
Myca Banson from work during early mornings.
The defense placed at the stand two additional witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette
vendor at the Ceres terminal, testified that on the late evening of 04 June 1995, de la Cruz went
to see him at the Ceres Terminal to inquire whether Teresita Fuentes had already
arrived. Magsangya responded in the negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking for
Teresita four times that night. Magsangya knew Teresita as being a biweekly passenger of the
2:00 a.m. bus for Iloilo and de la Cruz as a security guard at Kingsmen where he would at times
sell his wares.Jefferson Arafol, a pahinante of Ideal Trucking, testified that at approximately 2:30
on the early morning of 05 June 1995, he and truck driver Oca, were transporting coconut lumber
to Iloilo, when, at the vicinity of Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle running at high
speed, eventually overtaking them. Its fast pace caused the vehicle to turn turtle. When Arafol
approached, the tricycle driver, Rodel de la Cruz, pointed a gun at him and told him not to come
any closer. Arafol was acquainted with Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano because he
frequented Kingsmen on Sundays after getting his salary. The pahinante saw two more persons
with de la Cruz, one male and the other female. Arafol was certain that the male companion of de
la Cruz was not Carlos Feliciano. While de la Cruz was pointing his gun at him, his male
companion was dragging an unidentified woman towards the nearby mango tree.
When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, found for the
prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death -

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO Y MARCELINO guilty


beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 x x x, with

three aggravating circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said accused the
supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Teresita Fuentes the sum of
P50,000.00.
"The caliber .38 revolver Squires Bingham with SN # 14223 (Exhibit J) used by
Feliciano is hereby forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed in accordance with law.
"Costs against the accused."[6]
In an automatic review before this tribunal, appellant Carlos Feliciano raised the following
assignment of errors "I.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE ACCUSED RODEL


DE LA CRUZ TO BE THE STATE WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED
CARLOS FELICIANO DESPITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE
DEFENSE.
"II.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE WELLREHEARSED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"III.

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT


CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM."[7]
The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to
be far from being the inculpable young man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant
accomplice to a gruesome crime. Several incidents militate against his innocence. The events,
related by him, make tenuous the purported threat and intimidation exerted by appellant over
him.
The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and immediately after the crime could not be that
of a threatened, frightened man. If he indeed wanted to escape, he had in his possession his own
service gun, and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough advantage and chances to

escape, if he really wanted to, from Feliciano who was at that time engrossed at restraining a
struggling victim. In fact, it was de la Cruz who was caught in the possession of the dead
womans necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz was the letter introduced by
police inspector Winnie Jereza, Chief of Intelligence of the Philippine National Police of Kalibo,
Aklan, who, after taking the witness stand for the prosecution, testified for the defense. The
letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one Roger R. Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security
Agency, addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo Police Station, to the effect that
the detail order of Rodel de la Cruz to the Kingsmen Disco pub had expired as of 31 May
1995. According to Zaradulla, de la Cruz was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts were
unknown.Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone on AWOL without first surrendering to the
agency the firearm issued to him, Zaradulla sought the arrest of de la Cruz by the police.
The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state witness to mitigate his own
culpability did not adversely affect his discharge nor did it render completely weightless the
evidentiary value of his testimony.
The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the
state[8] is not a home grown innovation but is one with a long and interesting history. It has its
origins in the common law of ancient England where faithful performance of such an agreement
with the Crown could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a recommendation for
executive clemency. The practice, soon recognized through widespread statutory enactments in
other jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own criminal procedure in a short and
compact military General Order No. 58 issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis
placed by the new system on the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, on the
requirement that the State must first establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an
accused can be called upon to defend himself, and on the proscription against compelling an
accused to be a witness against himself as well as against drawing inferences of guilt from his
silence.[9] Underlying the rule is the deep-lying intent of the State not to let a crime that has been
committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who appears not to be the most guilty to
testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed at
achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest
number among the accused for an offense committed.[10]
In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring
that the conditions prescribed by the rules exist.[11] This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but
rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct
dispensation of criminal justice.[12] But that there would be the possibility of error on the part of
the judge is understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may develop in the course of
the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint.[13] If that were possible, the judge would conveniently rely on large part

upon the suggestion and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to the
conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony" of the accused whose discharge is requested, as
to the "availability of other direct or corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused
is the "most guilty," and so the like. [14] Then, there would be little need for the formality of a trial.
[15]
Thus, here, even while one might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on
the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as, and not less than, guilty in
conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court
must assure the exemption of the witness from punishment.
It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same
effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his
immunity from prosecution.[16] A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in
double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the
discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his coaccused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the
same offense.
In US vs. de Guzman,[17] one of the earlier cases discussing this issue, Justice Carson had
occasion to briefly touch on the immunity clauses in the Acts of the United States Congress and
some States. In Wisconsin, the immunity clause contained a proviso providing that persons
committing perjury when called upon to testify could be punished therefor.[18] Oklahoma law
suffered from the absence of any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson

"x x x. We have no such reservation in our constitutional provision; and, as before


said, if we should follow the precedents, when the witness does not speak the truth,
the State would be left without redress, although the witness had violated the purpose
and spirit of the constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the
intelligent and justice-loving people of Oklahoma, when they voted for the adoption
of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man, based upon a lie, or, in other words,
that they intended that the commission of perjury should atone for an offense already
committed. It is a familiar rule of common law, common sense, and common justice
that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We therefore hold that the witness who
claims immunity on account of self-incriminatory testimony which he had been
compelled to give must act in good faith with the State, and must make truthful replies
to the questions which are propounded to him, and which he had been compelled to
answer, and that any material concealment or suppression of the truth on his part will

deprive him of the immunity provided by the constitution; and the witness must testify
to something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This immunity is only
granted to those who earn it by testifying in good faith. In our judgment any other
construction would be an insult to and a libel upon the intelligence of the people of
Oklahoma, an outrage on law, and a prostitution of justice." [19]
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de
la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime,
enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano,
by the trial court. On significant points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant
was corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the incident, Feliciano hired
his vehicle and drove it himself while De la Cruz was seated on its passenger seat. When the two
did not return at the appointed time, Barte asked Ramon Yael, another tricycle driver who
happened to be at the Kingsmen parking area, to accompany him to look for them. Myca Banson
decided to come with them. After a while, the trio spotted Bartes tricycle being driven by de la
Cruz, and followed it. Barte testified how the first tricycle turned turtle at the junction towards
Magdalena Village. When the tricycle tilted, he saw a person in red falling from the vehicle,
while another person who was in white, lifted the first person. When the first tricycle
precariously lurched, its occupants hurriedly abandoned the vehicle. The obfuscating foliage,
however, blocked his view so Barte was not able to identify who was with appellant and de la
Cruz nor ascertain where the two men were later headed. When the three of them approached the
overturned tricycle they found no one. Near the vehicle, they saw an abandoned bag which Myca
Banson hastily retrieved. While Barte struggled to turn his vehicle upright, Myca left with
Ramon Yael. Later, while riding his vehicle on his way back, Ruben Barte was forced to stop
because its engine stalled. While inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la Cruz
approached him, and the former told him not to worry as he would pay for the damages. After a
while, at the parking lot of the Kingsmen Building, appellant told him to take his vehicle to a
dark place where he wiped off the blood from the tricycles seats. When they met again several
hours later, appellant gave him P450.00 for the damages sustained by the vehicle. Much later,
Yael handed him another P250.00 given by appellant as additional payment. Ruben Barte kept
quiet about the incident because appellant warned him against reporting the matter to
anyone. Ramon Yael corroborated the testimony of Barte, adding that while they were chasing
appellant and de la Cruz, one of the two fired a gun in the air, constraining them to decrease their
speed. Militating against the unbiased nature of the testimony of these two witnesses was their
admission of having willingly accepted the blood money which appellant gave them that could
well qualify them as being themselves accessories to the crime.[20]
Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently dispute his participation
therein. Neither his blanket denial nor his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was amply
proved.

Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides -

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death [shall be imposed], when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson." (Italics supplied.)
Given the evidence in this case, heretofore narrated, the Court is not convinced that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt any of the aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information that can warrant the imposition of the maximum of the
penalty prescribed by law. Evidence is wanting that appellant has especially sought nighttime to
perpetrate the crime or that the criminal act has been preceded, required in evident premeditation,
by cool thought and reflection. Not only is treachery an aggravating circumstance merely
applicable to crimes against persons but neither also has the mode of attack on the victim of the
robbery been shown to have been consciously adopted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED except insofar as it
imposed on appellant Carlos Feliciano the penalty of death which is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, YnaresSantiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, and Panganiban, JJ., on official leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002]

LETICIA R. MERCIALES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO
NUADA, PAT. EDWIN MORAL, ADONIS NIEVES, ERNESTO
LOBETE,
DOMIL
GRAGEDA,
and
RAMON
POL
FLORES, respondents.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37341, denying her petition to annul the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8,[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312, which dismissed the
charge of rape with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents, accused therein.
The antecedent facts as succinctly synthesized by the respondent court are as
follows:
On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310, 6311, and 6312, for
rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales,
were filed against the private respondents, Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis
Nieves, Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol" Flores, before the Regional
Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legaspi City. The said cases were consolidated in
Branch 8, presided over by the respondent judge.
During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion
for the discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state
witness. However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been
admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of
Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for
failure of the prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition [3] for certiorari [G.R. No.
113273-78] before the Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's denial of
the motion to discharge the accused Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not
contain a prayer for a temporary restraining order, the trial judge did not set the case
for further hearing so as to give the prosecution time to secure such temporary
restraining order from the Supreme Court.
On July 13, 1994, herein private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing,
invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the
motion, and set the case for hearing on July 29, 1994.

On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, instead of
presenting further evidence. The respondent Judge postponed the hearing and reset the
same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, again the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking
its pending petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The private respondents,
thru counsel, objected to any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of
their right to a speedy trial. The respondent judge called for a recess so as to let the
prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to
prove the due execution of the accused Nuada's extrajudicial confession.
However, after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI agent, and
instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence. The defense then
moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to
file a demurrer to evidence.
On August 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed [in G.R. No. 113273-78] a motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order with the
Supreme Court, to enjoin the respondent judge from proceeding with the resolution of
the case. However, on September 19, 1994, the motion was denied by the Supreme
Court.
In due time, the accused filed their demurrer to evidence x x x. [4]
On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, all the accused in all these cases are hereby ACQUITTED and the cases filed
against them are hereby DISMISSED. The accused in all these cases, being detention
prisoners, are hereby ordered RELEASED from detention, unless they are being
detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said criminal
cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the foregoing

Order of the trial court.However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
October 4, 1995.
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 6, 1996. Hence, the instant
petition based on the ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REFUSED TO NULLIFY THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 21,
1994 OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR BEING NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED AND/OR
COMMITTED INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE
PROSECUTION TO PRESENT ALL THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF
SUPPRESSING THEM APPARENTLY TO FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
DUE PROCESS, OUSTING THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION.
[6]

The case was set for oral argument on December 11, 2001. Counsel for petitioner
and the Solicitor General appeared. During the oral argument, the Solicitor General
manifested that he was joining the cause of petitioner in order to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. The Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda in
amplification of the points raised during the oral argument.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the
accuseds right to double jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes prosecutorial and
judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the prosecutions premature
resting and the trial courts grant of the demurrer to evidence when the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed.
Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum, arguing that petitioner,
being the private complainant in the criminal case below, has no legal standing to
appeal the acquittal of private respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse of
discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant either a petition for annulment of
judgment or certiorari; and that the reopening of the criminal case will violate the
accuseds right against double jeopardy.
It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a judgment
of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is concerned. [7] In

the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when the
Solicitor General, in representation of the People, changed his position and joined the
cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[8]
In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of offended
parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has
always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse
ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.[9]
The criminal case below was for rape with homicide. Although the public
prosecutor presented seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the commission of
the crime. It was only Joselito Nuada, one of the accused, who came forward and
expressed willingness to turn state witness. His testimony was vital for the
prosecution, as it would provide the only eyewitness account of the accuseds
complicity in the crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor to present
evidence to justify Nuadas discharge as a state witness, but the latter insisted that there
was no need for such proof since Nuada had already been admitted into the Witness
Protection Program of the Department of Justice. The public prosecutors obstinate
refusal to present the required evidence prompted the trial court to deny the motion to
discharge Nuada.
The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari. Meanwhile, the accused moved to set the case for hearing, invoking their
constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial court granted the motion. The public
prosecutor moved for a continuance, and the trial court acceded. At the next scheduled
hearing, however, the trial court denied a similar motion by the prosecution in view of
the objection of the accused. The trial court directed the public prosecutor to present
Atty. Carlos S. Caabay, the NBI Agent who took Nuada's extrajudicial confession. At
the resumption of the hearing, the public prosecutor declared that he was resting the
prosecutions case, knowing fully well that the evidence he has presented was not
sufficient to convict the accused. Consequently, the ensuing demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused was granted by the trial court.
It is clear from the foregoing that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious
nonfeasance. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to bring the criminal proceedings

for the punishment of the guilty.[10] Concomitant with this is the duty to pursue the
prosecution of a criminal action and to represent the public interest. A crime is an
offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that all criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal x x x. As the representative of the State, the public
prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the People
in the trial of an accused.[11] If the public prosecutor commits a nonfeasance in refusing
to perform a specific duty imposed on him by law, he can be compelled by an action
for mandamus.[12]
In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient
evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused for the
trial court to continue hearing the case, he deliberately failed to present an available
witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its
case. In this sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended
parties. More specifically, the public prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error
and abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended party.Indeed, the
family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales, could do nothing during the
proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in the hands of the said
prosecutor. All they could do was helplessly watch as the public prosecutor, who was
under legal obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, renege on that obligation
and refuse to perform his sworn duty.
Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9 (now Section 17) of the Rules of Court expressly
requires the presentation of evidence in support of the prosecutions prayer for the
discharge of an accused to be a state witness, viz:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or
more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses
for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge,
xxx xxx xxx.
By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to present evidence, the public
prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor

violated his bounden duty to protect the interest of the offended party, at least insofar
as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion to discharge
Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to complete the evidence of the
prosecution by other means. Instead, he willfully and deliberately refused to present
an available witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and
time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to
establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against the
injured party.
Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Notwithstanding its
knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially
after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the
trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court
was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that
have so far been presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them
himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues
involved in the case.[13]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in
court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to
due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a
quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as
if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double
jeopardy.[14]
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not
violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double
jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are
charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned
and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed
without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had

acted without jurisdiction.Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. [15]
Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a
fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process. [16] In rendering the judgment of
dismissal, the trial judge in this case acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a
judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.[17] Indeed, jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine, not to determine
without hearing.[18]
Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts.
[19]
Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was correct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312 is ANNULLED, and
this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, for
further proceedings. The public prosecutor is ORDERED to complete the presentation
of all available witnesses for the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, and Mendoza, JJ., in the result.

THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 143547. June 26, 2002]

JOEY POTOT y SURIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


and LOLITO DAPULAG, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

After the accused has filed with the trial court a manifestation that he is not
appealing its Decision convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to serve his
sentence, can the same court, upon motion by the private complainant with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and remand the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the
evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge? This is the issue raised in the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. The
information against him, filed on December 12, 1999, alleges:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the early
morning in the public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife locally called dipang, with deliberate intent
to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there wifully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @ PILI with the use of
said weapon which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby
inflicting upon said Rodolfo Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound which caused the death
of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein the information was read to him
in his own dialect, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge.
[2]
Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, but
also the circumstance of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he
surrendered voluntarily to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters
immediately after the commission of the crime. The public prosecutor did not raise
any objection. Instead, he manifested that there is no aggravating circumstance which
attended the commission of the crime.

Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied that petitioner understood the
meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its
Decision[3] in open court convicting him of homicide, with the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts the plea of guilty of Joey Potot y Sorio, and finds
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from two (2) years four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo
Dapulag y Conge, also known as Pili, in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
deducted in full from the foregoing sentences involving deprivation of liberty should
the records reveal that he expressly agreed in writing to abide by the same rules and
regulations governing convicted prisoner during his entire detention period and if the
records show that he is entitled to the privilege under the law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed a manifestation with
motion[5] informing the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and
praying that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately serve his
sentence. Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he does
not intend to appeal from its Decision.[6]
However, on February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife
of the victim), filed through counsel, a motion for reconsideration/retrial [7] praying that
the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because there were
irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of
justice. The motion, which bears the conformity of the public prosecutor, alleges,
among others, that:

The true facts surrounding the commission of the crime as revealed by the
eyewitnesses, EDUARDO BOYSON and JIMUEL MARQUITA, on December 8,
1999 is that RODOLFO DAPULAG, private offended partys deceased husband, was
killed on that fateful morning by accused JOEY POTOT with the aid of DOMING
JARILLA and MARLITO NAZAM who respectively held the right and left arm of
Rodolfo Dapulag to ensure the commission of the crime by accused Joey Potot.
This information was deliberately withheld by the said eyewitnesses, especially
EDUARDO BOYSON, during the investigation conducted by the police and the
preliminary investigations conducted by the presiding judge of MCTC of
Mondragon-San Roque and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor upon the
solicitations of Mayor Elito Dapulag, who in good faith believed that the inclusion of
Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam would make the prosecution of the case more
difficult. The eyewitnesses, who are likewise in the belief that indeed the inclusion
of the above-named persons would complicate the case, withheld the said
information until witness Jimuel Marquita revealed the same to the private offended
party on December 8, 1999.
xxxxxxxxx
The private offended party (not in her capacity as such, but as a citizen) has the right
to demand from the State the punishment of heinous crimes in accordance with
law. And such right is now in jeopardy of being lost for some causes not attributable
to her.
xxxxxxxxx
Hereto attached and made integral parts hereof are the affidavits of eyewitnesses
JIMUEL MARQUITA and EDUARDO BOYSON. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner opposed[8] the motion, asserting that there was no irregularity in the
preliminary investigation of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court; and
that the decision can no longer be modified or set aside because it became final when
he formally waived his right to appeal.
The trial court, in its order dated May 3, 2000, [9] granted private complainant's
motion and set aside its February 1, 2000 Decision as proceeding from a rigged,
hence, sham hearing. It likewise ordered that the records of the case be remanded to

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge, thus:
From the records are gathered that the case, as originally referred to the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, was for murder. In the conduct of the preliminary investigation,
said court determined that aprima facie case exists and recommended the accused be
held for trial on the charge. In his resolution reviewing the records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal court, the prosecutor
entirely missed discussion of the participation of two others allegedly in
conspiracy with the accused. The exclusion of the two others identified as
Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam was orchestrated by the Municipal Mayor
who, in good faith, prevailed upon the witnesses not to implicate them. To these
foregoing, the Provincial Prosecutor is in conformity.
Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court shall remand the records hereof to the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge supported by the same. The motion or manifestation requesting
for the issuance of a commitment order filed by the defense is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [10] contending that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to issue the February 1, 2000 order as the Decision had become final,
and that the said order would place the accused in double jeopardy. In the order of
May 26, 2000,[11] the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration for the reason
that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence,
jeopardy does not attach.
Petitioner now assails the orders of May 3 and 26, 2000.
The Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that the challenged orders should
be set aside and that the February 1, 2000 Decision should be reinstated. [12]
We find the petition meritorious.
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of


the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphasis ours)
It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of
a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes
final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the
following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case
of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; [13] (b) when he has
partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to
appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he
applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court
which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or
revoke it.[14]
It is an undisputed fact that on February 3, 2000, or three days after the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly
waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further indicated
by his prayer in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of a commitment
order so he could serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the
judgment to become final and unalterable. [15] Thus, it was beyond the authority of the
trial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its February 3, 2000
Decision which had attained finality.
In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City [16] and in a long line of cases, this
Court (En Banc) held that a judgment which has acquired the status of finality
becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the judgment, will
not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.
It is likewise procedurally impermissible for the trial court to grant private
complainant's motion for reconsideration of its Decision. Section 1, Rule 121 of the
same Rules provides:

SECTION 1. New trial or reconsideration. - At any time before a judgment


of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own
instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
(1a) (Emphasis ours)
Since the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction was not initiated
by the accused (petitioner) or at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the
same should have been denied outright as being violative of the above provision.
At any rate, the records do not show any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation of the case before the Provincial Prosecutors Office. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the private complainant questions the (1) alleged failure of the
Provincial Prosecutor to appreciate the sworn statements of two prosecution witnesses
implicating two other individuals in the commission of the crime; and the (2)
downgrading by the Provincial Prosecutor of the initial charge of murder to
homicide. But the motion for reconsideration itself reveals that the supposed vital
information from two witnesses implicating two other persons in the crime was
deliberately withheld by the said witnesses during the police investigation and the
preliminary investigation conducted by the MCTC Judge and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Hence, the Provincial Prosecutor who reviewed the records
could not have possibly appreciated the alleged vital facts. Besides, the complainant
did not appeal from the Provincial Prosecutors finding of probable cause for the crime
of homicide against petitioner. It bears stressing at this point that the public prosecutor
has the quasi-judicial prerogative to determine what crime should be filed in court and
who should be charged therefor. He always assumes and retains full discretion and
control of the prosecution of all criminal actions. [17] As held by this Court in People vs.
Vergara:[18]
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides
that [a]ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. It must be remembered
that as public prosecutor he is the representative not of the ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. Hence, the fiscal or public

prosecutor always assumes and retains full direction and control of the
prosecution of the case. The institution of a criminal action depends upon his
sound discretion. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court; whether a prima facie case exists to
sustain the filing of an Information; whether to include in the charge those who
appear to be responsible for the crime; whether to present such evidence which he
may consider necessary. (Emphasis ours)
Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.[19] Such right prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety
of a second charge against him for the same offense. [20]
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.[21]
These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged
with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial
court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the
charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding
penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he
cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. [22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders
dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued in Criminal Case No. 2739 by the trial
court are SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated February 1, 2000 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141518. April 29, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO,


CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG or ENTENG, HILARIO
ASTUDILLO, alias BODA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, convicting appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto
Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo of the crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the
penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to
the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr.
[1]

The Information filed against the appellants reads:


That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at Zone 7,
Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and
while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter,
the accused rode on an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate
No. 7077, which they used in escaping from the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
[3]

The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At around 7:00
p.m., of November 12, 1995, brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to
house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted
Alberto and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to
go with him. Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras Store, where they
were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had
an argument.
[4]

[5]

At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata,
12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were selling balut in front of Floras Store. They
saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the
wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim
until the latter fell to the ground. Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle.
[6]

Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he
was pronounced dead on arrival. The Autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Milagros
Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and 1 abrasion, as
follows:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Stab wound 2 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, neck, [r]ight
Stab wound #2, penetrating 3 cm., each. Antero-lateral aspect, neck, left [2
cm.], penetrating , 3rd Intercostal space, paresternal area, left
2 cm., 7th mid axillary line, left
1.5 cm., anterior superior iliac spine, left
1.5 cm., upper outer quadrant, left
1.5 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, middle third thigh, left
2.0 cm., infrascapular area, left
3.0 cm., dorsolateral aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2 cm., dorsomidial aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2.0 cm., suprascapular area, right

1.5 cm., infrascapular area, paravertebral area, right


1.5 cm., paravertebral area, right
2.5 cm., Level of T8, midscapular area, right
#2, 1.5-2.0 cm., lumbar area, paravertebral area, right
Abrasion #2 1.0 2.0 cm., Level T7, paravertebral area, left and right
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Pericardium, 1.5 liter
LW, Right atrium traversing the right ventricle Hemothorax, left 1
liter
LW, 1.0 cm., posterior lobe, lung left
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound.

[7]

On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On November 12, 1995
at around 7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre
and several others were playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which
he declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to leave the
house. However, Silvestre followed him in front of Floras Store and pushed him twice,
causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre struck him on the head and arm with
an empty one-liter softdrink bottle.
[8]

Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter attacked him. As he
retreated, he saw a knife which he then swung at the victim. Silvestre was hit but
continued to attack him. Left with no choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3
times. When the latter collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder
brother, Clarence. Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from shock and remained seated on
the ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the roadside and called for help.
The appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house of
Clarences in-laws. On the same night, they surrendered to the Philippine National
Police, stationed at Bangued, Abra.
[9]

[10]

[11]

On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the
crime of Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. Appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, not having been alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated
against them. Appellants motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July
13, 1998. However, an Amended Decision was rendered where the phrase abuse of
superior strength was replaced with TREACHERY in the body of the Decision and in the
decretal portion thereof, which reads:
[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Rep Act No. 7659, qualified by TREACHERY AND for having conspired
together and helping one another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, [which is] however, offset by the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentences them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino, Jr.,
the amount of P65,288.50 [as] actual damages, P50,000.00 for his death and suffering
plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.

[16]

Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT
ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE
DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND
DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM
PENALTY.
[17]

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. The
settled rule is that the matter of assigning value to a declaration on the witness stand is
more competently performed by a trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to
personally evaluate the witnesses demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. In
the absence of a clear showing that some fact or circumstance of weight or substance
had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, the trial judges assessment of the
witnesses testimonies shall not be disturbed on appeal.
A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not
miss any such material circumstance, nor did it commit any palpable error in upholding
the facts as established by the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and
Eduardo Bata, that the appellants ganged up on the defenseless victim. These
witnesses were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against
the appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
[18]

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the prosecution


witnesses and their affidavit are too inconsequential to merit consideration. Specifically,
appellants point to the failure of Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn statement that
appellants Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, as
well as the alleged unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny Bareng with the Ilocano
words bagsol and binagsol (which mean stab and stabbed, respectively), in his sworn
statement.Suffice it to state that inconsistencies between the sworn statement and
direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since an
affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as
inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the
fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those
stated in sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of
reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific
inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not
infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct and categorical declarations on the
witness stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements. This is especially so
because their testimony to the effect that Crisanto and Hilario held the victims wrists
while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even under cross-examination.
[19]

The trial court correctly rejected the appellants self-defense theory. When an
accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden of
proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
[20]

In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of aggression came from the
deceased, still the appellants plea of self-defense will not prosper. As stated above, the
evidence overwhelmingly shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able to
restrain the victim by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful aggression or danger on the
lives of the appellants ceased, hence, it was no longer necessary for appellant Clarence
to repeatedly stab the victim. Verily, their act could no longer be interpreted as an act of
self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill. Furthermore, the number of wounds
sustained by the victim negates self-defense. It certainly defies reason why the victim
sustained a total of 15 wounds on the different parts of his body if appellants were only
defending themselves. Parenthetically, the number of wounds was eloquently
established by the physical evidence, which is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks
high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
[21]

[22]

From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that appellants collective and


individual act of holding the victims wrists and delivering several stab blows
demonstrated the existence of their common design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not
necessary.Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be inferred from the acts of the three
appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a common intent or design
to commit a crime.
[23]

Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants


contention that the trial cannot validly appreciate the same in its amended decision
because the attendance of treachery was not one of the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants posit that the reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction should be limited only to the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence and/or the propriety of appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the
information.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated
by the court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, a
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused.
These provisions changed the previous rulings of the Court to the effect that such
modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before
a judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected. The requisite consent
of the accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect
[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

the latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties
which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. Accordingly, once the
judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a
manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through
oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the consent or
upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the
decision.
[29]

[30]

It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the
foregoing rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or
consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by
filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to
reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable
with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison
detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid
unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or
modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for
the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as
the taking of additional proof.
[31]

[32]

[33]

Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the
judgment of conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for
reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the
lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and
effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open for the review of the trial court. At
any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in the case at bar was
squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser
offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the information. Hence, the
court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of
treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a qualifying
circumstance if the complaint or information did not allege such facts. Even before the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying
circumstances were required to be so specified in the complaint or information,
otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused.
[34]

[35]

In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the

safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means,
method, or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. Here, it is clear that treachery qualified the killing of the deceased to murder,
considering that the appellants deliberately restrained the victim so as to enable one of
them to successfully deliver the stab blows without giving the latter a chance to defend
himself or to retaliate.
[36]

As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the trial
court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that
the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the
crime or that the crime could not have been committed without it. The use of motor
vehicle is not aggravating where the use thereof was merely incidental and was not
purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of
the offender easier and his apprehension difficult.
[37]

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated in


favor of appellants. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven,
namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture.
[38]

In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same
night of the incident when they learned that the authorities were looking for them.
Though they did not give a statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should nonetheless be considered in their
favor. What matters is that they spontaneously, voluntarily and unconditionally placed
themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law indicates a
moral disposition favorable to their reform.
[39]

[40]

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating
circumstance and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance with Article 63 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.
[41]

With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the award of moral and exemplary
damages cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial court. These kinds of

damages are different in nature, and require separate determination. Moral damages
are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the felonious act. The award of exemplary
damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In People v.
Catubig, we explained:
[42]

[43]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission
of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order
and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to
a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.
[44]

As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death of her husband brought grief
and emotional suffering to their family. Hence, they are entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, pursuant to current jurisprudence. Likewise, the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of the deceased justifies the
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
[45]

[46]

[47]

The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order that actual
damages may be recovered, the amount actually expended in connection with the death
of the victim must be substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the
instant case, the records show that the amount of P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court
as actual damages is not fully substantiated by receipts. However, as the heirs of the
deceased actually incurred funeral expenses, they are entitled to temperate damages.
In the recent case of People v. Abrazaldo, we ruled that where the amount of actual
[48]

[49]

[50]

damages cannot be determined because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the


amount claimed, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded.
Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In murder, the
grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires
no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
responsibility therefor.
[51]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence
Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo @ Anteng or Enteng, and Hilario Astudillo @ Boda, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil
liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the
deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen