The Dawn of Mexico's Dirty War

Lucio Cabaas and the Party of the Poor

by Kate Doyle

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB105/index.htm
Research assistance by Isaac Campos Costero, Eli Forsythe and Emilene Martnez
Morales
Special thanks to Suboh Suboh for his technical assistance
Posted - December 5, 2003
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The Dawn of Mexico's Dirty

War
Lucio Cabaas and the Party of the Poor
by Kate Doyle

Lucio Cabaas Barrientos - a native son of Guerrero, school

teacher-turned-revolutionary and chief of the small rebel force
dubbed the Party of the Poor - was nothing more than an
ordinary bandit, according to the government he so fiercely
opposed during the 1970s.
A thug, a criminal, a gang leader, said Defense Secretary
Hermenegildo Cuenca Daz. Working "for very dark
interests," hinted President Luis Echeverra ominously,
"trying to provoke regressive or conservative tendencies.
American military, intelligence and political officers viewed
Cabaas in a somewhat different light.
"The most important single leader" of the Mexican armed
opposition, wrote the State Department in 1972. "Mexico's
best known guerrilla," agreed the CIA in a top secret analysis
in 1974. "He enjoys widespread support and sympathy among
the peasants."
Not that the United States government actually feared a leftwing coup against the Echeverra regime. To the contrary throughout the darkest years of Mexico's dirty war,
Washington rarely worried about the stability of its southern
neighbor. Confident of the overwhelming power of the
Mexican presidency to control dissent, American policy
makers tended to view the opposition in Mexico as an irritant
rather than a significant threat.
But Cabaas and his followers - along with the fractured
gangs of urban terrorists and student revolutionaries operating
in Mexico in the late 1960s and 70s - represented more than
the sum total of their armed attacks, kidnappings for profit,
bombing attempts and murders.
For many U.S. analysts, they suggested the troubling
possibility that impoverished Mexicans were waking up to the
oppressive bonds of a stultified one-party system that no
longer offered hope for change.
In telling the tale of Lucio Cabaas's brief career as a guerrilla
leader, declassified U.S. documents released under the

Freedom of Information Act and held in the National Archives

indicate that the United States perceived the popularity of the
Guerrero rebels as a sign of the further disintegration of the
legitimacy of the Mexican regime during the 1970's,
following the Tlatelolco and Corpus Cristi massacres.
The documents also make clear that Echeverra used the hunt
for the radical left to mollify a disgruntled army and bolster
his standing with the right. They describe how given the
choice between repression and negotiation, political stasis or
change the regime predictably, inexorably chose violence to
preserve the status quo.
A Dispirited Military

Along with Genaro Vzquez Rojas, fellow teacher-turnedrebel, Lucio Cabaas launched an armed rebellion in the
mountains of Guerrero during the late 1960s against what
they considered a brutal and unresponsive regime.
Government efforts to defeat Guerrero's tiny guerrilla forces
began under Daz Ordaz. By early 1971, the Mexican army
had stepped up its campaign. All four military battalions
stationed in Guerrero were operating against the rebels.
At the time, the military as an institution was struggling to
combat declining morale. Low pay, scant resources, an aging
upper echelon and rusting equipment all contributed to
discontent and restlessness within the armed forces under
Echeverra.
Its public image was also suffering. There was lingering
resentment at the tarnishing of the military's image in the
wake of the massacre at Tlatelolco in 1968, when army troops
were used to crush student demonstrators, sparking national
and international outrage. To make matters worse, the
counterinsurgency campaign against the guerrillas in Guerrero
was faltering, despite ever-increasing commitments of
manpower and resources.
In 1971, a massive new assault dubbed "Operacin Telaraa"
had been launched by the military with much fanfare but with
very little to show for it. Given the publicity surrounding the
effort, one United States embassy report pointed out in
December, "the failure must be even more galling."
Failure in the field prompted increasing secrecy, obfuscation
and cover-up by the regime on the occasions when it
discussed the rebels in public. But while General Cuenca Daz

continued to refuse to acknowledge the existence of the

guerrillas, the occasional successes scored by the rebels
against the government made them impossible to ignore.
Rebel forces carried out three spectacular kidnappings in
1971, reaping millions of pesos in ransom as a result. U.S.
intelligence also indicated that guerrillas may have been
behind the shoot-down of a helicopter in April of that year
belonging to Guerrero Governor Caritino Maldonado Prez,
killing him and others on board.
The developments caused concern in Washington, where State
Department analysts wondered in September 1971 if Mexico
had an "emerging internal security problem."
Although intelligence sources indicted that "Echeverra is
taking a direct interest in security force operations," the
combination of a disgruntled military and the rising challenge
from the left was worrisome. One solution, observed the State
Department, would be for Echeverra to give the military
more resources and freedom to operate. "The troops," stated
the same secret intelligence report, "would probably be
willing to forget their difficulties temporarily if given the
chance to crack a few heads.
The President, apparently, agreed. It is clear from the
documents that Mexican armed forces were given increasing
freedom to operate in Guerrero, whatever the consequences
for Mexican civilians caught in the crossfire.
Dirty War Tactics

The intensification of dirty war tactics in the

counterinsurgency campaign against rural guerrillas and
Mexico's urban terrorists was one of the inevitable results of
Echeverra's desire to tamp down military dissatisfaction by
giving the army and the security forces carte blanche to attack
the left.
The year 1972 opened with the death of Genaro Vazquez on
February 2 in an automobile crash while fleeing the
authorities. There were mass detentions in Guerrero: at least
ten members of Vzquez's National Civic Revolutionary
Association (ACNR) and 69 people "linked to Lucio
Cabaas" were arrested by security forces in late January and
early February. By mid-1972, after two separate ambushes
carried out by Party of the Poor forces against army troops
operating in Guerrero killed 26 soldiers and captured more
than 50 weapons, the U.S. embassy was describing reports of

mass detentions in Guerrero and the extensive use by security

forces of torture during interrogations.
"In dealing with the terrorist problem, the government has
relied heavily on the security forces, which are reasonably
competent and have been increasingly effective," observed
the State Department in November 1972. Guerrero posed
special problems, however.
The terrain there inhibits the maneuvers of the security
forces, and on the most recent occasions the guerrillas have
been able to engage army units at times and places of their
choosing, inflicting heavy casualties. The army has responded
with sweeping roundups on a fairly indiscriminate basis, and
recently there have been reports in the Mexican press that
prisoners were interrogated under torture.
Illegal detentions, torture and, increasingly, disappearance
were used as weapons against not only armed combatants, but
Cabaas family members and suspected subversives as well.
Embassy reporting in 1974 indicated a growing hard line on
the part of the government toward the guerrillas and anyone
linked to them.
There are recurrent reports of detention of "suspects" whose
only connection with anti-governmental activity may be blood
relationship with wanted guerrillas; of persons detained
extra-constitutionally by military authorities, [] and of
prisoners tortured while in detention. Lately, there have been
indications also that GOM [Government of Mexico] has
murdered some prisoners after extracting all information they
have to give
The newly savage techniques would have devastating effects.
Today, Mexican human rights groups say they have collected
evidence of some 650 cases of civilians who disappeared
from Guerrero during the dirty war - more than 400 of them
from Atoyac de Alvarez alone, the village where Lucio
Cabaas lived, and where his surviving family members still
live.
The Legacy of Violence

Although American officials agreed with the Mexican

government's imperative to defeat the rebels, they also viewed
with mounting skepticism and dismay Echeverra's decision to
rely exclusively on force to do so. As United States
intelligence analysts observed in 1971, prolonged repression
on the part of the government "would greatly reduce the

President's ability to work out solutions to Mexico's more

fundamental problems of rural and urban poverty, a veritable
population explosion, and the growing disillusionment of the
younger generation."
Echeverra, claimed the State Department one year later,
is aware of the political/economic and social inequities
imposed by Mexico's closed economic system and its oneparty power monopoly. He has instituted changes in tax,
labor and social security law and has taken pains to create
the impression that vigorous steps are underway to improve
the lot of the lower income sectors. However, few tangible
benefits have filtered down to the masses...
Throughout 1973 and much of 1974, government efforts to
stop Cabaas continued to falter, and embassy reports to
Washington reflected the U.S. perception that the regime's
failure was due not simply to the incompetence of the security
forces. The army was not succeeding because the campesinos
in Guerrero supported Cabaas, analysts believed.
In April 1973, following yet another announcement of a
stepped-up assault on the Guerrero "bandits," the United
States embassy cabled, "It is apparent that Cabaas and his
group operate freely in Guerrero. Implications are that local
populace, for whatever reasons, continues to afford Cabaas
cover. It therefore is problematical whether announced new
campaign will be any more successful than were previous
efforts to capture Cabaas."
The chase finally came to a head after Cabaas and his Party
of the Poor kidnapped state Senator Ruben Figueroa and four
aides in May 1974. Echeverra's security apparatus mounted
an enormous manhunt to track down the guerrillas which
culminated in the staged "rescue" of the senator and his
companions. While the regime touted the rescue as a daring
operation that took place during a shoot-out with rebel forces,
in fact it was due to a secret payment to Cabaas - part of a
ransom he had demanded for Figueroa's liberation.
The CIA was pessimistic about the significance of the army's
victories in late 1974. On September 10, the agency published
an article in its top-secret internal newsletter, the National
Intelligence Daily, in which it emphasized the Echeverra
regime's failure to address the underlying causes for dissent
and armed opposition in Mexico:
A large part of the government's response to political violence

consists of intensive police work and, as in the Cabaas case,

the massive application of military manpower. The rest of the
response is a mix of public spending - and political rhetoric.
The Figueroa kidnapping, for example, brought forth a huge
publicity effort to demonstrate how much the Echeverra
government has done for Guerrero.
Although the security forces may improve, none of the other
measures holds much hope for success any time soon. The
government's social and economic programs cannot be
expected in the near term to ameliorate the conditions that
gave rise to the terrorist and the guerrilla.
The CIA's assessment of the future was no less pessimistic
after the death of Cabaas in a shoot-out with soldiers in
December 1974.
Lucio Cabaas, Mexico's premier rural guerrilla chieftain,
was killed in a battle with Army troops on December 2. Some
20 of Cabaas' band also were reported killed in the clash.
Cabaas had eluded authorities for years, but the Army
began to close in after he kidnapped a wealthy senator last
May. The senator was freed during a gun battle in September.
Cabaas' death will be a severe blow to his "Party of the
Poor," but the mountains of Mexico's southern Guerrero state
are a traditional spawning ground of bandits and guerrillas
that may produce new leaders to take up the cause.
Such was the inevitable legacy of Lucio Cabaas and of the
dirty war created to destroy him. That legacy continues today,
as the government of Mexico tries to prosecute the crimes of
the dirty war in Guerrero, an attempt that, as of this writing,
has come to nothing.
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Documents
Document 1
May 27, 1971
Defense Secretary Denies Existence of Guerrillas in Mexico
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Mexican Defense Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Daz

denies that guerrillas are operating in the state of Guerrero

and instead attributes recent guerrilla-type activity in the
region to ordinary "bandits." Although the government has
deployed four army battalions in Guerrero against the rebels,
Cuenca emphasizes the military's role in civic action, which
he claims are being welcomed by the locals. In the Embassy's
assessment, Cuenca's comments are intended to "play down
the guerrilla issue" in the wake of other recently publicized
revelations about leftist groups opposed to the regime.
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2476
Document 2
September 23, 1971
Mexico: An Emerging Internal Security Problem?
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret
intelligence note
The State Department cites continuing student dissatisfaction
along with emerging guerrilla activity as potential threats to
Mexican security. Particularly worrisome is the possibility
that the students and the rebels might join forces. The result,
State warns, could be a vicious circle where the Echeverra
Administration is forced to dedicate ever-increasing resources
to the armed forces and thus neglect crucial social programs
that could ameliorate the material sources of discontent.
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 15 Mex, Box 2475
Document 3
December 9, 1971
Mexico: Ransom Payoffs Will Encourage More Political
Kidnapping
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
confidential intelligence note
Following two highly publicized kidnappings (both personal
friends of the Mexican President) for which ransom was paid
by the Mexican Government, this analysis warns that antigovernment groups might be more encouraged to use
abduction to obtain funds for their activities. The report
observes that although Echeverra "is taking a direct interest
in security force operations," he is dissatisfied with the
counterinsurgency measures taken by his military so far.

Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73

Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2476
Document 4
December 30, 1971
The First Year of the Echeverra Administration
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram (extract)
This assessment of Echeverras first year in office describes
the so-far failed efforts to stamp out guerilla activity in the
state of Guerrero. After listing the major guerrilla groups
active in Mexico the Embassy notes that "the combined
membership of these organizations probably does not exceed
a few hundred persons, but the rate at which they have come
to light during the year, their geographic dispersion, the extent
of their activities, and the evidence of coordination among
some of them all suggest that they constitute more than a
mere nuisance to the GOM [Government of Mexico]."
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 15 Mex, Box 2475
Document 5
August 5, 1972
Internal Security: Arrest of Guerrero Ambush Suspects and
Other Developments
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
More than a month after an Army truck is ambushed in
Guerrero, the Embassy reports that the Mexican military has
arrested suspects who clearly hail from the low ranks of the
Cabaas organization. The telegram also states that federal,
state and military officials continue to adhere to the position
that the ambush was not politically motivated since Mexico
"has only bandits not guerrillas." The Mexican government
has shown that it knows where to look for these "bandits"
through its ongoing military search operations in Guerrero
and the detention of several of Cabaas' relatives for
questioning.
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 23-9 Mex
Document 6
October 2, 1972
Chamber of Deputies Decides Not to Call Defense Secretary

U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram

After overwhelming opposition by the ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) defeats a motion by the National
Action Party (PAN) to force Secretary of Defense Cuenca
Daz to testify before Congress about Mexico's security
situation, the Embassy observes that the Echeverra
Administration seeks to avoid discussing the guerrilla issue in
order to evade a "potentially embarrassing public airing of the
problems." However, the Embassy notes that "some might
interpret the denial as an indication that Administration is
trying to cover up situation which is more serious than public
has been led to believe."
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 15 Mex, Box 2475
Document 7
November 29, 1972
Mexico: Terrorism Still on the Rise
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret
intelligence note
An assessment from the INR reports that "the dimensions and
seriousness of the terrorist guerrilla problem in Mexico are
only now becoming evident" and that individual incidents
have become "increasingly embarrassing" to the government.
Lucio Cabaas is mentioned as the most important leader of
the insurgent movements. Given the magnitude of the
problem, Echeverra has been relying heavily on security
forces, which are conducting "sweeping roundups on a fairly
indiscriminate basis" in an attempt to disrupt the guerrillas.
Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2476
Document 8
January 2, 1973
The Second Year of the Echeverra Administration
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram (extract)
Assessing the second year of Echeverra's sexenio, the
Embassy expresses concern over the continued refusal of the
Mexican government to publicly admit that a guerrilla
problem exists. Although Genaro Vzquez was killed in a car
accident, the armed opposition is far from defeated now that
Lucio Cabaas has replaced Vzquez as the country's best-

known guerrilla leader.

Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73
Pol 2 Mex, Box 2472
Document 9
April 15, 1973
Another Search for Lucio Cabaas
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret cable
According to Guerrero Attorney General Guillermo Romn
Romn, the Lucio Cabaas group, while still armed and
dangerous, has been isolated and has lost the support of the
countryside. The Attorney General argues that this turn of
events will translate into greater campesino cooperation with
the government's efforts to track down Cabaas. The Embassy
questions the accuracy of this assessment, commenting
internally that "Cabaas and his group operate freely in
Guerrero. Implications are that local populace, for whatever
reasons, continues to afford Cabaas cover."
Source: National Security Archive FOIA Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 10
April 19, 1973
Assassination of Kidnapping Victim by Lucio Cabaas Group
in State of Guerrero
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, cable
After his family fails to pay a ransom demanded by the
Cabaas group, kidnapping victim Francisco Snchez Lpez
is killed by members of the Party of the Poor. The Embassy
comments that the "assassination of Snchez Lpez indicates
that Cabaas' group is still very much alive and active."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 11
April 19, 1974
FAA Section 32 - Political Prisoners
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret cable
The U.S. Embassy describes the "uncompromising" attitude

of the Mexican government towards "persons who have taken

up arms against the state". Security forces appear "frequently
to overstep legally prescribed procedures" while engaging
pursuing members of armed opposition groups or urban
terrorists, relying on extra-constitutional detention and
torture, among other violations of basic constitutional rights.
The Embassy also reports evidence that "the GOM has
murdered some prisoners after extracting all information they
have to give."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.13024
Released October 1997
Document 12
June 3, 1974
PRI Gubernatorial Candidate in Guerrero Reportedly
Abducted by Cabaas Guerrilla Organization
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential cable
Unconfirmed reports in the press indicate that PRI Senator
Rubn Figueroa has been kidnapped by the Cabaas group.
The Embassy speculates that this will represent the first real
test of Echeverrias "no deal" policy on kidnappings.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 13
June 5, 1974
Kidnaping Tests Mexican Policy
CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article
In its analysis of the Figueroa kidnapping, the CIA National
Intelligence Daily explains that the Echeverra Administration
has been placed in an awkward position. "The kidnaping by
leftist guerrillas of a well-known Mexican Senator will test
the Echeverra government's policy of not giving into
kidnapper's demands." Interior Minister Moya has stated that
"the Federal Government will make no decision on how it
will react until it is certain that the victims are alive and
Cabaas' demands are made more precise."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970

Released July 2001

Document 14
June 14, 1974
Mexico: Rural Discontent
CIA Directorate of Intelligence, top secret review
While reporting on the continued captivity of Senator
Figueroa in Guerrero, this intelligence review also
summarizes some of the roots of unrest in Mexico. "The
unrest is partly a result of corruption and exploitation, but
ignorance, population pressures, a shortage of good land, and
the concentration on industry during the last 30 years also
play a part."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18961
Released June 2000
Document 15
June 26, 1974
Cabaas Issues Third Communiqu with "Outrageous"
Demands; GOM Mounts Military Operation Against Him
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential cable
Lucio Cabaas issues a communiqu setting conditions for
the release of Ruben Figueroa. US intelligence information
indicates that the Mexican Government has no intention of
complying with Cabaas' demands and is mounting an
intensive anti-guerrilla operation to hunt him down and kill
him, accepting the risk that Figueroa may be killed in the
process.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released November 2002
Document 16
June 27, 1974
Echeverra Orders Military Operations Against Guerrillas
CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article
The National Intelligence Daily reports that President
Echeverra has ordered a military operation against Lucio
Cabaas in order to secure the release of Senator Figueroa.
The guerrilla leader's demands with respect to the Senator's

release were deemed "impossible" by the Echeverra

Administration. The report also comments that a successful
operation will likely mean the death of Cabaas.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970
Released July 2001
Document 17
July 8, 1974
Mexican Guerrilla Leader has Eluded Military Operations
CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article
The CIA describes the failure of Mexican army operations to
free Figueroa and speculates that the Senator has likely
already been killed by the guerrillas. While the capture of
Cabaas looks unlikely, President Echeverra nonetheless
appears to be planning a permanent military deployment in
Guerrero.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970
Released July 2001
Document 18
July 19, 1974
Mexico: The Figueroa Case
CIA Directorate of Intelligence, top secret review
After three weeks of operations of unprecedented scale,
efforts to capture Lucio Cabaas and secure the release of
Senator Figueroa have been unsuccessful. The Figueroa
situation has forced the Mexican Government to comment on
the guerrilla problem with Echeverra claiming that "guerrilla
movements are not working for revolutionary interests but are
trying to provoke regressive tendencies." In the CIA's
estimation, "the government's inclination to dismiss a problem
with slogans will not ease the situation".
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970
Released July 2001
Document 19
July 27, 1974
Guerrilla Leader Evades Operation by Mexican Army

CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article

In another comment on the Figueroa case, the CIA reports that
there are still no substantive results after a month of
operations and expects that the "army's poor showing" will
lead to changes in the high command.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970
Released July 2001
Document 20
August 20, 1974
Government Efforts to Capture Lucio CABAAS
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence
information report
After unsuccessful attempts to capture Lucio Cabaas, the
DIA receives information that a district commander has
resigned in Guerrero. The agency's source states that that he is
not optimistic about the government's chances of success
given the difficult condition of the terrain and the number of
guerrillas that remain at large.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18972
Released January 2003
Document 21
September 9, 1974
Alleged Military Discontent with President Echeverra
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret cable
Embassy sources report increasing dissatisfaction with the
leadership of President Echeverra within military circles.
Although the Embassy predicts that this resentment will
eventually die down, the recent campaign to free Senator
Figueroa highlighted important disagreements between
military and civilian authorities. Nevertheless, the Embassy
concludes that beyond these recent grumblings "there is no
serious evidence of serious discontent within Armed Forces."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released November 2002

Document 22
September 10, 1974
Figueroa Kidnapping
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential cable
Assessing the liberation of Figueroa, the Embassy expresses
some doubt about the Mexican Government's official version
of events which they label "almost too much of a happy
ending." Noting that Echeverra Administration claims not to
have negotiated with rebels, yet freed Figueroa without a
single military casualty, the Embassy raises the possibility
that a secret deal was reached to release the PRI Senator.
Furthermore, the Embassy suggests that "there were more
casualties on both sides than published."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 23
September 10, 1974
Guerrillas Are Nuisance to Mexican Government
CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article
In a heavily excised version of this top secret article, the CIA
argues that guerrillas "do not threaten the stability of the
Echeverra Administration," but are capable of great acts of
terror and violence.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18961
Released June 2000
Document 24
September 10, 1974
Guerrillas Are Nuisance to Mexican Government
CIA National Intelligence Daily, top secret article
Under an NSA appeal, Document 23 was released without
excisions. Previously deleted sections include details on the
organization of Cabaas's group and the Mexican
government's response to guerrilla activities. According to the
CIA, the government has responded to political violence
primarily with "intensive police work and, as in the Cabaa's
case, the massive application of military manpower."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information

Request No.18970
Released on appeal July 2001
Document 25
September 13, 1974
Figueroa Kidnapping Case
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential cable
Following the first appearance of Ruben Figueroa since his
"rescue," the Embassy continues to express doubt about the
official explanation of his liberation. American officials are
convinced that the official version of the events has been
modified to maximize political benefit for both the
government and the armed forces.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 26
December 3, 1974
[Army Kills Lucio Cabaas]
CIA Directorate of Intelligence, secret message
In this brief message, the CIA informs of the killing of Lucio
Cabaas in a clash with army troops, noting that "Cabaas'
death will be a severe blow to his Party of the Poor." The CIA
comments that Guerrero might nevertheless produce other
guerrilla leaders to take up Cabaas' cause.
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18970
Released July 2001
Document 27
December 4, 1974
Death of Lucio Cabaas Barrientos
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use cable
In the wake of the death of Lucio Cabaas, the Embassy
argues that the Mexican Government's political position has
thus improved, at least in the Guerrero area. American
officials now believe that rural guerrilla activities represent a
minimal threat to political stability and that the "anonymous
violence of urban terrorist groups is cause for greater concern

than Cabaas ever was."

Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000
Document 28
December 27, 1974
Trend of Terrorism in Mexico
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential cable
After the newspaper El Universal reports Rubn Figueroa's
admission that a ransom was in fact paid for his release, the
Embassy concludes that events have proven the Government
of Mexico is pragmatic and "willing to play as rough a game
as the terrorists." Embassy officials conclude that a
government "which refuses to be bound by constitutional
limitations is in too strong a position for political kidnappings
to succeed."
Source: National Security Archive, Freedom of Information
Request No.18971
Released June 2000