Precautionary Principle Papers

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM
Mathematical Foundations for the Precautionary

Principle
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
This is a companion piece (in progress) to the Precautionary Principle by Taleb, Read, Norman, Douady, and
Bar-Yam (2014, 2016); the ideas will be integrated in a future version.
C ONTENTS
1
II
Principle of Probabilistic Sustainability
FT
I
On the Fallacy of Using State-Space Probabilities
for Path Dependent Outcomes
III
Why Increase in "Benefits" Usually Increases
the Risk of Ruin
IV
Technical definition of Fat Tails
References
RA
V
On the Unreliability of Hypothesis testing for
Risk Analysis
I. O N THE FALLACY OF U SING S TATE -S PACE

P ROBABILITIES FOR PATH D EPENDENT O UTCOMES
Remark 1. If you take the risk any risk repeatedly, the

way to count is in exposure per lifespan.
Commentary 1. Ruin probabilities are in the time domain for a single agent and do not correspond to statespace (or ensemble) tail probabilities. Nor are expectations fungible between the two domains. Statements on
the "overestimation" of tail events by agents derived from
state-space estimations are accordingly flawed (we note
that about all decision theory books have been equally
flawed). Many theories of "rationality" of agents from are
based on wrong estimation operators and/or probability
measures.
Fig. 1. Ensemble probability vs. time probability discussions, from Peters

and Gell-Mann [1]. The treatment by option traders is done via the absorbing
barrier. I have traditionally treated this in Dynamic Hedging and Antifragile
as the conflation between X (a random variable) and f(x) a function of the
r.v.; an option is path dependent and is not the underlying.
with support in the positive real numbers (R+ ) . The convergence theorems of classical probability theory
Pn address the
behavior of the sum or average: limn!1 n1 i Xi = m by
the (weak) law of large numbers (convergence in probability).
As shown in Fig.1, n going to infinity produces convergence
in probability to the true mean return m. Although the law of
large number applies to draws i that can be strictly separated
by time, it assumes (some) independence, and certainly path
independence.
Now consider (Xi,t )Tt=1 = (X1 , X2 , . . . XT ) where every
variable Xi is indexed by some unit of time t. Assume that
the "time events" are drawn from the exact same probability
distribution: P (Xi ) = P (Xi,t ).
We define a time probability the evolution over time for a
single agent i.
[ This is a special case of the conflation between a random

variable and the payoff of a time-dependent path-dependent
derivative function.
A. A simplified general case
Commentary 2. (Less technical translation)
Never cross a river if it is on average only 4 feet deep.
(Debate of author with P. Jorion, 1997 and [2] .)
Consider the extremely simplified example, the sequence
of independent random variables (Xi )ni=1 = (X1 , X2 , . . . Xn )
Correspondence: N N Taleb, email NNT1@nyu.edu
In the presence of terminal that is, irreversible, ruin, every

observation is now conditional on some attribute of the preceding one, and what happens at period t depends on t 1,
what happens at t 1 depends on t 2, etc. We now have
path dependence.
Theorem 1 (space-time inequality). Assume that 8t, P (Xt =
0) > 0 and X0 > 0, EN (Xt ) < 1 the state space expectation
for a static initial period t, and ET (Xi ) the time expectation
for any agent i, both obtained through the weak law of large
numbers. We have
EN (Xt )
(1)
ET (Xi )
Proof.
n
Xi,t
1 >0
1X
n i
Xi,t = m 1
Xi,t
1 0
(2)
where Xt 1 >0 is the indicator function requiring survival
at the previous period. Hence the limits of n for t show a
decreasing temporal expectation: EN (Xt 1 ) EN (Xt ).
We can actually prove divergence.
T
1X
T !1 T
t
8i, lim
Xi,t
1 >0
Xi,t = 0.
(3)
In Eq. 3 we took the

Pn ensemble of risk takers expecting
a return m 1 n1 i Xi,t 1 =0 in any period t, while
every single risk taker is guaranteed to eventually go bust.
Note: we can also approach the proof more formally in a

measure-theoretic way by showing that while space sets for
"nonruin" A are disjoint, time sets are not. For a measure :
0
1
!
[ \
[
@ At Aci A does not necessarily equal
At .
Commentary 5. In their magisterial paper, Peters and

Gell-Mann[1] showed that the Bernouilli use of the
logarithm wasnt for a concave "utility" function, but,
as with the Kelly criterion, to restore ergodicity. A bit of
history:
Bernouilli discovers logarithmic risk taking under
the illusion of "utility".
Kelly and Thorp recovered the logarithm for maximal growth criterion as an optimal gambling strategy. Nothing to do with utility.
Samuelson disses logarithm as aggressive, not realizing that semi-logarithm (or partial logarithm),
i.e. on partial of wealth can be done. From Menger
to Arrow, via Chernoff and Samuelson, everyone in
decision theory is shown to be making the mistake
of ergodicity.
Pitman in 1975 [7] shows that a Brownian motion
subjected to an absorbing barrier at 0, with censored absorbing paths, becomes a three-dimensional
Bessel process. The drift of the surviving paths is x1 ,
which integrates to a logarithm.
Peters and Gell-Mann recovers the logarithm for
ergodicity and, in addition, put the Kelly-Thorpe
result on rigorous physical grounds.
With Cirillo, this author [8] discovers the log as
unique smooth transformation to create a dual of
the distribution in order to remove one-tail compact
support to allow the use of extreme value theory.
We can show (Briys and Taleb, in progress) the
necessity of logarithmic transformation as simple
ruin avoidance, which happens to be a special case
of the HARA utility class.
RA
As we can see by making T < 1, by recursing the law of

iterated expectations, we get the inequality for all T .
Commentary 4. What we showed here is that unless one

takes a logarithmic transformation (or a similar smooth
function producing 1 with ruin set at X = 0), both
expectations diverge. The entire point of the precautionary principle is to avoid having to rely on logarithms or
transformations by reducing the probability of ruin.
FT
1X
8t, lim
n!1 n
i
other what is called ergodicity. In that sense, when analyzing

performance and risk, under conditions of ruin, it is necessary
to use a logarithmic transformation of the variable [4], [1],
or boundedness of the left tail[5] and [6] while maximizing
opportunity in the right tail.
Commentary 3. Almost all psychology papers discussing the "overestimation" of tail risk, see review in
[3] (for a flawed reasoning and historical of flawed
reasoning) are void by the inequality in Theorem 1.
Clearly they assume that an agent only exists for a single
decision. Simply the original papers documenting the
"bias" assume that the agents will never ever again make
another decision in their remaining lives.
The usual solution to this path dependence if it depends

on only ruin is done by introducing a function of X
to allow the ensemble (path independent) average to have
the same properties as the time (path dependent) average
or survival conditioned mean. ThePnatural logarithm seems
n
a good candidate. Hence Sn =
i=1 log(Xi ) and ST =
PT
log(X
)
belong
to
the
same
probabilistic
class; hence
t
t=1
a probability measure on one is invariant with respect to the
B. Adaptation of Theorem 1 to Brownian Motion

The implications of simplified discussion does not change
whether one uses richer models, such as a full stochastic
process subjected to an absorbing barrier. And of course in a
natural setting the eradication of all previous life can happen
(i.e. Xt can take extreme negative value), not just a stopping
condition.
The problem is invariant in real life if one uses a Brownianmotion style stochastic process subjected to an absorbing
barrier. In place of the simplified representation we would

have, for an process subjected to L, an absorbing barrier from
below, in the arithmetic version:
(
Xi,t 1 + Zi,t , Xi,t 1 > L
8i, Xi,t =
(4)
0
otherwise
or, for a geometric process
(
Xi,t 1 (1 + Zi,t ) Xi,t
8i, Xi,t =
0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
1e
Zi,t
Xi,t 1 > L
otherwise
(5)
0.2
2000
4000
6000
8000
10 000
Exposure
Fig. 2. Why Ruin is not a Renewable Resource. No matter how small the
probability, in time, something bound to hit the ruin barrier is about guaranteed
to hit it. No risk should be considered a "one-off" event.
Now, we do not have to take t ! 1 nor do is permanent

sustainability necessary. We can just extent shelf time. The
longer the t, the more the expectation operators diverge.
Consider the unconditional expected stopping time to ruin
in a discrete
and simplified
model: E( _ T ) E( ) =
P N p
p i 1
i
1
,
where
is the number of exposures
i=1
per time period, T is the overall remaining lifespan and p is
the ruin probability, both over that same time period for fixing
p. Since E( ) = p , we can calibrate the risk under repetition.
The longer the life expectancy T (expressed in time periods),
the more serious the ruin problem. Humans and plant have
a short shelf life, nature doesnt at least for t of the order
of 108 years hence annual ruin probabilities of O(10 8 ) and
(for a tighter increments) local ruin probabilities of at most
O(10 50 ). The higher up in the hierarchy individual-speciesecosystem, the more serious the ruin problem. This duality
hinges on t ! 1; hence requirement is not necessary for
items that are not permanent, that have a finite shelf life.
FT
where Z is a random variable.

Going to continuous time, and considering the geometric
case, let = {inf t : Xi,t > L} be the stopping time. The
idea is to have the simple expectation of the stopping time
match the remaining lifespan or remain in the same order.
Working with a function of X under stopping time: Let us
digress to see how we can work with functions of ruin as an
absorbing barrier. This is a bit more complicated but quite
useful for calibration of ruin off a certain known shelf life.
Assume a finite expectation for the stopping time E L ( ) <
1 for barrier level L < X0 . Let Af (X) be the infinitesimal generator for the one-dimensional Brownian motion:
2
1@ f
Af (t, x) = @f
@t (t, x) + 2 @x2 (t, x). Dynkins operator gives
the expected value of any suitably smooth statistic of X at a
stopping time, for a square integrable function f : R+ ! R:
Af (Xs ) ds .
RA
Probability of Ruin
EL (f (X )) = f (X0 ) + EL
For the more general Lvy process (i.e. fat tails), we

can obtain slightly more complicated results by the standard
subordination, i.e., adding a Poisson to the Brownian motion
above.
Commentary 6. We switched the focus from probability

to the mismatch between stopping time for ruin and
the remaining lifespan.
II. P RINCIPLE OF P ROBABILISTIC S USTAINABILITY
Principle 1. A unit needs to take any risk as if it were going to

take it repeatedly at a specified frequency over its remaining
lifespan.
The principle of sustainability is necessary for the following
argument. While academic studies are static (we saw the
confusion between the state-space and the temporal), life
is continuous. If you incur a tiny probability of ruin as a
"one-off" risk, survive it, then do it again (another "oneoff" deal), you will eventually go bust with probability 1.
Confusion arises because it may seem that the "one-off" risk
is reasonable, but that also means that an additional one is
reasonable. (see Fig. 2). The good news is that some classes
of risk can be deemed to be practically of probability zero: the
earth survived trillions of natural variations daily over 3 billion
years, otherwise we would not be here. We can use conditional
probability arguments (adjusting for the survivorship bias) so
back-out the ruin probability in a system.
Remark 2 (The fat tails argument). The more a system is

capable of delivering large deviations, the worse the ruin
problem.
We will cover the fat tails problem more extensively. Clearly
the variance of the process matters; but overall deviations that
do not exceed the ruin threshold do not matter.
A. Logarithmic transformation
Under the axiom of sustainability, i.e., that "one should take
risks as if you were going to do it forever", only a logarithmic
(or similar) transformation applies.
Fattailedness is a property that is typically worrisome under
absence of compact support for the random variable, less so
when the variables are bounded. But as we saw the need
of using a logarithmic transformation, a random variable
with support in [0, 1) now has support in ( 1, 1), hence
properties derived from extreme value theory can now apply
to our analysis. Likewise, if harm is defined as a positive
number with an upper bound H which corresponds to ruin, it
is possible to transform it from [0, H] to [0, 1) .
Cramr and Lundberg, in insurance analysis discovered the
difficulty in [TK]
III. W HY I NCREASE IN "B ENEFITS " U SUALLY I NCREASES

THE R ISK OF RUIN
Commentary 7. We show that the probability of ruin
increases upon an action to "improve" on a system as
the trade-off benefits-risk increases in the tails. In other
words, anything that increases benefits, if it increases
uncertainty, leads to the violation of the equality state
space-time expectations.
This is a general precautionary method for iatrogenics.
A. Scale vs. Location
Let (K) , @ @s(.) |x=K and (K)+ , @ @s(.) |x=K be the

"vega", that is sensitivity to scale and (K) , @ @l(.) |x=K
and (K)+ , @ @l(.) |x=K be the "delta" that is sensitivity to

location for positive and negative tail, respectively. Consider
the tail probabilities at level K, defined as P (x < K) , (K)
and P (x > K) , (K).
We have the "vega", that is sensitivity to scale
1
K l
K l
(1,0)
(K) =
(K
l)
,
Z
,
s2
s
s
K
l
K
l
+ (1,0)
, Z
,
s
s
(7)
FT
Why should uncertainty about climate models lead to a more

conservative, more cautious, "greener" stance, even or especially if one disbelieved the models?
Why do super-rich gain more from inequality than from
gains in GDP, in proportion to how rich they are?
Why do derivatives "in the tails" depend more on changes
in expected volatility than from changes in the mean (not well
known by practitioners of mathematical finance (derivatives)
who get periodically harmed by it)?
Why increase risk of deflation also necessarily increases the
risk of hyperinflation.
Why should worry about GMOs even if one accepted their
purported benefits?
It is a necessarily mathematical relation that remote parts of
the distribution the tails are less sensitive to changes in
the mean, and more sensitive to other parameters controlling
the dispersion and scale (which in the special case of class
of finite-variance distributions would be the variance) or those
controlling the tail exponent.
smooth and have the expressions above in either of the open

"tail segments" concerned, which we define as values below
(above) K.
For clarity we are using the slot notation: Z (1,0) (., .) refers
the first partial derivative of the function Z with respect
of the first argument (not the variable under concern), and
Z (0,1) (., .) that with respect of the second (by the chain ruke,
Z (1,0) Ks l , = s @Z(.,.)
@s ).
RA
(K) =
Definition 1. Let be a twice derivable continuous probability CDF with at least one unbounded tail 2 C 2 : D ! [0, 1],
with s > 0, where is a slowly varying function with respect
to x: 8t > 0, limx!1 (tx)
(x) = 1:
We have either
x l
x l
(x; l, s, ) , (
, ) Z
, ,D = [ 1, x0 ]
s
s
or
x l
x l
, ) Z
, ,D = [x0 , 1)
(x; l, s, ) , 1
(
s
s
(6)
where x0 is the (maximum) minimum value for the representation of the distribution, l is the location and s 2 (0, 1) the
scale.
Intuitively we are using any probability distribution and
mapping the random variable x 7! xs l and only focusing on
the tails. Thanks to such focus on the tails only, the distribution
does not necessarily need to be in the location-scale family
(i.e., retain their properties after the transformation). We are
factorizing the CDF into a two functions, one of which
becomes a constant for "large" values of |x|, given that we
aim at isolating tail probabilities and disregard other portions
of the distribution.
The distribution in (6) can accommodate x0 = 1, in
which the function is whole; but all is required is for it to
K l
, Z (1,0)
,
s
s
K l
K l
+ (1,0)
, Z
,
.
s
s
1
s
(8)
Thanks to the Karamata Tauberian theorem, we can refine

(.) and (.). given that (.) is a slowly varying function, we
have:
(
l
s
, ) ! ,
and
(1,0)
l
s
1
Hence: (K)
=
s2 (K
1
K l
(1,0)
(K) = s
s , Z
to prove the following theorem:
, ) ! 0.
l) Z (1,0) Ks l , and
, which allows us
K l
s ,
Theorem 2 (scale/location tradeoff). There exists, for any

distribution with an one unbounded tail, in C 2 , twice differentiable below (above) level K s.t. for the unbounded tail
(K)
(K)+
under concern, |K| |K |, r = (K)
= (K)
! Ks l .
+
The theorem is trivial once we set up the probability
distributions as we did in 6.
The physical interpretation of the theorem is that in the tail,
ruin probability is vastly more reactive to s, that is the ratio
of dispersion, than l, a shifting of the mean.
We note that our result is general some paper (cite) saw the
effect and applied to specific tail distributions from extreme
value theory when our result does not require the particulars
1) Examples: For a LogNormal Distribution with paramex l

ters and , we construct
a change
of variable s , ending
x l
log( s )
p
with a CDF: 12 erfc
. Now the right tail proba2
bility
(K) =
1
2
erf
log(K
l) + + log(s)
p
2
(
has for derivatives (K)+ =

(
log(K
l)++log(s))2
2 2
2 (K l)
l)++log(s))2
2 2
log(K
2s
, and the ratio r =
+1
, (K)+ =
K l
s .
B. Shape vs. location
!(K)+ =
@ (.)
|x=K
@
= (K
(0,1)
(K
l
s
l, )Z
,
K
Probability distributions range between extreme thin-tailed

(Bernoulli) and extreme fat tailed [?]. Among the categories
of distributions that are often distinguished due to the convergence properties of moments are: 1) Having a support that is
compact but not degenerate, 2) Subgaussian, 3) Gaussian, 4)
Subexponential, 5) Power law with exponent greater than 3, 6)
Power law with exponent less than or equal to 3 and greater
than 2, 7) Power law with exponent less than or equal to 2. In
particular, power law distributions have a finite mean only if
the exponent is greater than 1, and have a finite variance only
if the exponent exceeds 2.
Our interest is in distinguishing between cases where tail
events dominate impacts, as a formal definition of the boundary between the categories of distributions to be considered
as Mediocristan and Extremistan. The natural boundary between these occurs at the subexponential class which has the
following property:
Let X = (Xi )1in be a sequence of independent and
identically distributed random variables with support in (R+ ),
with cumulative distribution function F . The subexponential
class of distributions is defined by [9],[10].
(9)
RA
l, )Z (0,1)
IV. T ECHNICAL DEFINITION OF FAT TAILS
FT
Discussion: exponent determining the shape of the distribution, expression uncertainty by broadening the tails and having
an effect on the variance for powerlaws (except for the Lvy
Stable distribution).
As to the tail probability sensitivity to the exponent, it
is to be taken in the negative: lower exponent means more
uncertainty, so we reverse the sign.
"stochastic "
Theorem 3 (tail shape/location tradeoff). There exists, for a

distribution with an one unbounded tail, a level K* s.t. for an
unbounded tail, |K| |K |,

!(K)+
1
K l(s + 1)
r=
= (K l(s + 1)) log
1
(K)+
s2
Proof. For large positive deviations, with K > ls we can
write, by Karamatas result for slowly moving functions,
K l
(K)
, hence Z(.) = Ks l
.
s
sZ K l ,
sZ (0,1)
!(K)+
= (1,0) sK l
+ (1,0)
(K)+
Z
Z
s ,
K l
s ,
K l
s ,
(10)
C. Shape vs Scale
We note the role of shape vs scale:

(K)+
K
= cs(K l(s + 1)) log
(K)+
l(s + 1)
s2
1 (K
Commentary 8. We can show the effect of changes in

the tails on, say, "fragile" items, and the inaplicability of
the average. For instance, what matters for the climate
is not the average, but the distribution of the extremes.
Here average effect is l and extremes from s and, worse,
.
I am working on the distribution of risk based on
1 F 2 (x)
=2
x!+1 1
F (x)
lim
where F 2 = F 0 F is the cumulative distribution of X1 +X2 ,

the sum of two independent copies of X. This implies that the
probability that the sum X1 +X2 exceeds a value x is twice the
probability that either one separately exceeds x. Thus, every
time the sum exceeds x, for large enough values of x, the
value of the sum is due to either one or the other exceeding
xthe maximum over the two variablesand the other of
them contributes negligibly.
More generally, it can be shown that the sum of n variables
is dominated by the maximum of the values over those variables in the same way. Formally, the following two properties
are equivalent to the subexponential condition [11],[12]. For
a given n 2, let Sn = ni=1 xi and Mn = max1in xi
a) limx!1
P (Sn >x)
P (X>x)
b) limx!1
P (Sn >x)
P (Mn >x)
= n,
= 1.
l)
Thus the sum Sn has the same magnitude as the largest
sample Mn , which is another way of saying that tails play
the most important role.
Intuitively, tail events in subexponential distributions should
decline more slowly than an exponential distribution for which
large tail events should be irrelevant. Indeed, one can show that
subexponential distributions have no exponential moments:
Z 1
ex dF (x) = +1
0
for all values of " greater than zero. However,the converse isnt
true, since distributions can have no exponential moments, yet
not satisfy the subexponential condition.
We note that if we choose to indicate deviations as negative
values of the variable x, the same result holds by symmetry for
extreme negative values, replacing x ! +1 with x ! 1.
For two-tailed variables, we can separately consider positive
and negative domains.
PDF
10
n=5
n=10
n=15
n=20
n=25
V. O N THE U NRELIABILITY OF H YPOTHESIS TESTING FOR

R ISK A NALYSIS
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Fig. 3. The different values for Equ. 11 showing convergence to the limiting
distribution.
FT
The derivations in this section were motivated during the

GMO debate by discussions of "evidence", based on pvalues of around .05. Not only we need much lower
than .05 for any safety assessment of repeated exposure,
but the p-value method and, sadly, the "power of test"
have acute stochasticities reminiscent of fat tail problems.
Commentary 9. Where we show that p-values are unreliable for risk analysis, hence say nothing about ruin
probabilities. The so-called "scientific" studies are too
speculative to be of any use for tail risk (which shows in
their continuous evolution). The exception, of course, is
negative empiricism.
Earlier attempts for an explicit meta-distribution in the

literature were found in [13] and [14], though for situations
of Gaussian subordination and less parsimonious parametrization. The severity of the problem of significance of the socalled "statistically significant" has been discussed in [15]
and offered a remedy via Bayesian methods in [16], which
in fact recommends the same tightening of standards to pvalues .01. But the gravity of the extreme skewness of the
distribution of p-values is only apparent when one looks at the
meta-distribution.
For notation, we use n for the sample size of a given study
and m the number of trials leading to a p-value.
RA
Assume that we knew the "true" p-value, ps , what would its

realizations look like across various attempts on statistically
identical copies of the phenomena? By true value ps , we
mean its expected value by the law of large numbers across
an m ensemble of possible samples for the phenomenon
P
P
P
1
under scrutiny, that is m
m pi ! ps (where ! denotes
convergence in probability). A similar convergence argument
can be also made for the corresponding "true median" pM .
The main result of the paper is that the the distribution of n
small samples can be made explicit (albeit with special inverse
functions), as well as its parsimonious limiting one for n large,
with no other parameter than the median value pM . We were
unable to get an explicit form for ps but we go around it with
the use of the median. Finally, the distribution of the minimum
p-value under can be made explicit, in a parsimonious formula
allowing for the understanding of biases in scientific studies.
It turned out, as we can see in Fig. 4 the distribution is
extremely asymmetric (right-skewed), to the point where 75%
of the realizations of a "true" p-value of .05 will be <.05 (a
borderline situation is 3 as likely to pass than fail a given
protocol), and, what is worse, 60% of the true p-value of .12
will be below .05.
an in-sample .01 p-value has a significant probability of

having a true value > .3.
So clearly we dont know what we are talking about
when we talk about p-values.
Although with compact support, the distribution exhibits

the attributes of extreme fat-tailedness. For an observed
p-value of, say, .02, the "true" p-value is likely to be >.1
(and very possibly close to .2), with a standard deviation
>.2 (sic) and a mean deviation of around .35 (sic, sic).
Because of the excessive skewness, measures of dispersion in L1 and L2 (and higher norms) vary hardly with
ps , so the standard deviation is not proportional, meaning
A. Proofs and derivations

Proposition 1. Let P be a random variable 2 [0, 1]) corresponding to the sample-derived one-tailed p-value from the
paired T-test statistic (unknown variance) with median value
M(P ) = pM 2 [0, 1] derived from a sample of n size.
The distribution across the ensemble of statistically identical
copies of the sample has for PDF
(
'(p; pM )L for p < 12
'(p; pM ) =
'(p; pM )H for p > 21
'(p; pM )L =
s
(
1)
1
2(
n 1)
p p
2 (1
pM
0
B
B
@
1
p
1)
p
(1
p) p
pM
p
p
1
p pp
pM )
+1
1n/2
pM
1
pM
pM
1
1
pM
C
C
A
'(p; pM )H = 1
0
@
0
p
0
p
0
qp
1
pM ) + 2
1
2(
n 1)
1 (
pM
0
p
1)
p
0
(1
p
pM )
pM
+1
1
A
Proposition 2. Under the same assumptions as above, the

limiting distribution for '(.):
n+1
2
lim '(p; pM ) = e
erfc
(2pM )(erfc
(2pM ) 2erfc
(2p))
(12)
n!1
(11) where erfc(.) is the complementary error function and

erf c(.) 1 its inverse.
where p = I2p1 n2 , 12 , pM = I1 12pM 12 , n2 , 0p =
The limiting CDF (.)
I2p1 1 12 , n2 , and I(.)1 (., .) is the inverse beta regularized
1
function.
(k; pM ) = erfc erf 1 (1 2k) erf 1 (1 2pM ) (13)
2
Remark 3. For p= 12 the distribution doesnt exist in theory,
v
Proof. For large n, the distribution of Z = m
becomes that
s
pv
but does in practice and we can work around it with the
n
and the one-tailed survival function g(.) =
sequence pmk = 12 k1 , as in the graph showing a convergence of a Gaussian,

p
1
to the Uniform distribution on [0, 1] in Figure 5. Also note 12 erfc p2 , (p) ! 2erfc (p).
that what is called the "null" hypothesis is effectively a set of
measure 0.
=
f (; )
n+1
2
n
( )2 +n
p
nB n2 , 12
PDF/Frequ.
53% of realizations <.05
FT
Proof. Let Z be a random normalized variable with realizations , from a vector ~v of n realizations, with sample mean
mv , and sample standard deviation sv , = mvpsvmh (where mh
n
is the level it is tested against), hence assumed to s Student T
with n degrees of freedom, and, crucially, supposed to deliver
a mean of ,
0.15
0.10
2 +n
where I(.,.) is the incomplete Beta function.

We now look for the distribution of g f (). Given that
g(.) is a legit Borel function, and naming p the probability
as a random variable, we have by a standard result for the
transformation:
=
'(p, )
f g(
|g 0 g (
1)
(p)
1) (p) |
We can convert into the corresponding median survival

probability because of symmetry of Z. Since one half the
we can ascertain that
observations fall on either side of ,
= 1 , hence
the transformation is median preserving: g()
2
1
1
'(pM , .) = 2 . Hence we end up having { : 2 I 2n+n n2 , 12 =
pM } (positive case) and { : 12 I 2 12 , n2 + 1 = pM }
5%
p-value
cutpoint
(true mean)
Median
0.05
RA
where B(.,.) is the standard beta function. Let g(.) be the onetailed survival function of the Student T distribution with zero
mean and n degrees of freedom:
8
>
0
< 12 I 2n+n n2 , 12
g() = P(Z > ) = 1

1 n
>
<0
: 2 I 2 2 , 2 + 1
25% of realizations <.01
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Fig. 4. The probability distribution of a one-tailed p-value with expected

value .11 generated by Monte Carlo (histogram) as well as analytically with
'(.) (the solid line). We draw all possible subsamples from an ensemble with
given properties. The excessive skewness of the distribution makes the average
value considerably higher than most observations, hence causing illusions of
"statistical significance".
.025
.1
.15
0.5
2
2 +n
(negative case). Replacing we get Eq.11 and Proposition 1 is

done.
We note that n does not increase significance, since pvalues are computed from normalized variables (hence the
universality of the meta-distribution); a high n corresponds
to an increased convergence to the Gaussian. For large n, we
can prove the following proposition:
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 5. The probability distribution of p at different values of pM . We observe

how pM = 12 leads to a uniform distribution.
This limiting distribution applies for paired tests with known

or assumed sample variance since the test becomes a Gaussian
variable, equivalent to the convergence of the T-test (Student
T) to the Gaussian when n is large.
Remark 4. For values of p close to 0, ' in Equ. 12 can be

usefully calculated as:
s
p
1
'(p; pM ) = 2pM log
2p2M
e
1
log 2 log 2p
2 log(p)
2
log 2 log
1
2p2
M
2 log(pM )
+ O(p2 ).
(14)
The approximation works more precisely for the band of

1
relevant values 0 < p < 2
.
(X)
Proposition 4. Let c be the projection of the power of the

test from the realizations assumed to be student T distributed
and evaluated under the parameter . We have
(
( c )L for c < 12
( c) =
( c )H for c > 12
where
p
1
( c )L =
2
1
3
1 1
1)
n
2
1)
1+ 1
q
2
FT
From this we can get numerical results for convolutions of

' using the Fourier Transform or similar methods.
We can and get the distribution of the minimum p-value per
m trials across statistically identical situations thus get an idea
of "p-hacking", defined as attempts by researchers to get the
lowest p-values of many experiments, or try until one of the
tests produces statistical significance.
X,p,n
Proposition 3. The distribution of the minimum of m observations of statistically identical p-values becomes (under the
limiting distribution of proposition 2):
Outside the limiting distribution: we integrate numerically

for different values of m as shown in figure 6. So, more
precisely, for m trials, the expectation is calculated as:
Z p
m 1
Z 1
E(pmin ) =
m '(p; pM )
'(u, .) du
dp
0
Expected min p-val

0.12
0.08
n=5
( 2
10
p
)
p
1) 2 + 2
= I2 1c
n 1
2, 2 .
n
2
2)
1p
1
3
1+2
n 1
2, 2
1)
1
3
2B
= I2
n+1
2
1 n
,
2 2
1+2
(16)
( 2
1) 2
1
3
n 1
2, 2
1
c
A n+1
2
(17)
1 n
2, 2
, and
C. Application and Conclusion
One can safely see that under such stochasticity for

the realizations of p-values and the distribution of its
minimum, to get what people mean by 5% confidence
(and the inferences they get from it), they need a p-value
of at least one order of magnitude smaller.
The "power" of a test has the same problem unless one
either lowers p-values or sets the test at higher levels,
such at .99.
We showed the fallacies committed in the name of "rationality" by various people such as Cass Sunstein or similar
persons in the verbalistic "evidence based" category.
0.02
1)
2 (1
1
3
S UMMARY AND C ONCLUSIONS
0.04
1)
n=15
0.06
where
1
I(1,2p
s
0.10
RA
1
1
1
'm (p; pM ) = m eerfc (2pM )(2erfc (2p) erfc (2pM ))
m 1
1
1
erfc erfc 1 (2p) erfc 1 (2pM )
(15)
2
Tn
Proof. P (p1 > p, p2 > p, . . . , pm > p) =
i=1 (pi ) =
(p)m . Taking the first derivative we get the result.
( c )H =
1
3
12
14
m trials
Fig. 6. The "p-hacking" value across m trials for pM = .15 and ps = .22.
B. Inverse Power of Test

Let
be the power of a test for a given p-value p, for
random draws X from unobserved parameter and a sample
size of n. To gauge the reliability of as a true measure of
power, we perform an inverse problem:
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19 317, 2013.
Climate models and precautionary measures

New
Joseph Norman , Rupert Read , Yaneer Bar-Yam , Nassim Nicholas Taleb

England Complex Systems Institute, School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, School of
Engineering, New York University
Forthcoming in Issues in Science and Technology
HE POLICY DEBATE with respect to anthropogenic

climate-change typically revolves around the accuracy of models. Those who contend that models make
accurate predictions argue for specific policies to stem
the foreseen damaging effects; those who doubt their
accuracy cite a lack of reliable evidence of harm to
warrant policy action.
These two alternatives are not exhaustive. One can
sidestep the "skepticism" of those who question existing
climate-models, by framing risk in the most straightforward possible terms, at the global scale. That is, we
should ask "what would the correct policy be if we had
no reliable models?"
We have only one planet. This fact radically constrains
the kinds of risks that are appropriate to take at a large
scale. Even a risk with a very low probability becomes
unacceptable when it affects all of us there is no
reversing mistakes of that magnitude.
Without any precise models, we can still reason that
polluting or altering our environment significantly could
put us in uncharted territory, with no statistical trackrecord and potentially large consequences. It is at the
core of both scientific decision making and ancestral
wisdom to take seriously absence of evidence when
the consequences of an action can be large. And it is
standard textbook decision theory that a policy should
depend at least as much on uncertainty concerning the

adverse consequences as it does on the known effects.
Further, it has been shown that in any system fraught
with opacity, harm is in the dose rather than in the nature of the offending substance: it increases nonlinearly
to the quantities at stake. Everything fragile has such
property. While some amount of pollution is inevitable,
high quantities of any pollutant put us at a rapidly
increasing risk of destabilizing the climate, a system that
is integral to the biosphere. Ergo, we should build down
CO2 emissions, even regardless of what climate-models
tell us.
This leads to the following asymmetry in climate
policy. The scale of the effect must be demonstrated to
be large enough to have impact. Once this is shown, and
it has been, the burden of proof of absence of harm is
on those who would deny it.
It is the degree of opacity and uncertainty in a system,
as well as asymmetry in effect, rather than specific model
predictions, that should drive the precautionary measures. Push a complex system too far and it will not come
back. The popular belief that uncertainty undermines
the case for taking seriously the climate crisis that
scientists tell us we face is the opposite of the truth.
Properly understood, as driving the case for precaution,
uncertainty radically underscores that case, and may even
constitute it.
EXTREME RISK INITIATIVE NYU SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING WORKING PAPER SERIES
The Precautionary Principle

(with Application to the Genetic Modification of
Organisms)
Nassim Nicholas Taleb , Rupert Read , Raphael Douady , Joseph Norman ,Yaneer Bar-Yam
School of Engineering, New York University New England Complex Systems Institute
Institute of Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, C.N.R.S., Paris
School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia
PP states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk

of causing severe harm to the public domain (such as
general health or the environment), and in the absence
of scientific near-certainty about the safety of the action,
the burden of proof about absence of harm falls on those
proposing the action. It is meant to deal with effects of
absence of evidence and the incompleteness of scientific
knowledge in some risky domains.1
We believe that the PP should be evoked only in
extreme situations: when the potential harm is systemic
(rather than localized) and the consequences can involve
total irreversible ruin, such as the extinction of human
beings or all life on the planet.
The aim of this paper is to place the concept of
precaution within a formal statistical and risk-analysis
structure, grounding it in probability theory and the
properties of complex systems. Our aim is to allow
decision makers to discern which circumstances require
the use of the PP and in which cases evoking the PP is
inappropriate.
AbstractThe precautionary principle (PP) states that if an action

or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to the public
domain (affecting general health or the environment globally), the action
should not be taken in the absence of scientific near-certainty about its
safety. Under these conditions, the burden of proof about absence of
harm falls on those proposing an action, not those opposing it. PP is
intended to deal with uncertainty and risk in cases where the absence
of evidence and the incompleteness of scientific knowledge carries
profound implications and in the presence of risks of "black swans",
unforeseen and unforeseable events of extreme consequence.
This non-naive version of the PP allows us to avoid paranoia and
paralysis by confining precaution to specific domains and problems.
Here we formalize PP, placing it within the statistical and probabilistic
structure of ruin problems, in which a system is at risk of total failure,
and in place of risk we use a formal"fragility" based approach. In these
problems, what appear to be small and reasonable risks accumulate
inevitably to certain irreversible harm. Traditional cost-benefit analyses,
which seek to quantitatively weigh outcomes to determine the best
policy option, do not apply, as outcomes may have infinite costs. Even
high-benefit, high-probability outcomes do not outweigh the existence
of low probability, infinite cost optionsi.e. ruin. Uncertainties result in
sensitivity analyses that are not mathematically well behaved. The PP
is increasingly relevant due to man-made dependencies that propagate
impacts of policies across the globe. In contrast, absent humanity the
biosphere engages in natural experiments due to random variations
with only local impacts.
Our analysis makes clear that the PP is essential for a limited set
of contexts and can be used to justify only a limited set of actions.
We discuss the implications for nuclear energy and GMOs. GMOs
represent a public risk of global harm, while harm from nuclear energy
is comparatively limited and better characterized. PP should be used to
prescribe severe limits on GMOs.
MAKING AND TYPES OF
R ISK
Taking risks is necessary for individuals as well as for decision makers affecting the functioning and advancement
of society. Decision and policy makers tend to assume all
risks are created equal. This is not the case. Taking into
account the structure of randomness in a given system
can have a dramatic effect on which kinds of actions are,
or are not, justified. Two kinds of potential harm must be
considered when determining an appropriate approach
to the role of risk in decision-making: 1) localized nonspreading impacts and 2) propagating impacts resulting
in irreversible and widespread damage.
September 4, 2014
D ECISION
I NTRODUCTION
He
aim of the precautionary principle (PP) is to

prevent decision makers from putting society as a
wholeor a significant segment of itat risk from the
unexpected side effects of a certain type of decision. The
1. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development presents

it as follows: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
Corresponding author: N N Taleb, email NNT1@nyu.edu
Traditional decision-making strategies focus on the

case where harm is localized and risk is easy to calculate
from past data. Under these circumstances, cost-benefit
analyses and mitigation techniques are appropriate. The
potential harm from miscalculation is bounded.
On the other hand, the possibility of irreversible and
widespread damage raises different questions about the
nature of decision making and what risks can be reasonably taken. This is the domain of the PP.
Criticisms are often levied against those who argue
for caution portraying them as unreasonable and possibly even paranoid. Those who raise such criticisms
are implicitly or explicitly advocating for a cost benefit
analysis, and necessarily so. Critics of the PP have also
expressed concern that it will be applied in an overreaching manner, eliminating the ability to take reasonable
risks that are needed for individual or societal gains.
While indiscriminate use of the PP might constrain
appropriate risk-taking, at the same time one can also
make the error of suspending the PP in cases when it is
vital.
Hence, a non-naive view of the precautionary principle is one in which it is only invoked when necessary,
and only to prevent a certain variety of very precisely defined risks based on distinctive probabilistic structures.
But, also, in such a view, the PP should never be omitted
when needed.
The remainder of this section will outline the difference between the naive and non-naive approaches.
2.1
Precautionary Approach
systemic ruin
avoid at all costs
fragility based
probabilistic non-statistical
ruin
divergent probabilities
irreversible
interconnected factors
precautionary
fat tails
top-down engineered
human-made
Table 1: Two different types of risk and their respective

characteristics compared
Probability of Ruin
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
2000
4000
6000
8000
10 000
Exposure
Figure 1: Why Ruin is not a Renewable Resource. No

matter how small the probability, in time, something
bound to hit the ruin barrier is about guaranteed to hit
it.
What we mean by a non-naive PP
Risk aversion and risk-seeking are both well-studied

human behaviors. However, it is essential to distinguish
the PP so that it is neither used naively to justify any act
of caution, nor dismissed by those who wish to court
risks for themselves or others.
The PP is intended to make decisions that ensure
survival when statistical evidence is limitedbecause
it has not had time to show up by focusing on the
adverse effects of "absence of evidence."
Table 1 encapsulates the central idea of the paper and
shows the differences between decisions with a risk of
harm (warranting regular risk management techniques)
and decisions with a risk of total ruin (warranting the
PP).
2.2
Standard Risk Management

localized harm
nuanced cost-benefit
statistical
statistical
variations
convergent probabibilities
recoverable
independent factors
evidence based
thin tails
bottom-up, tinkering
evolved
Harm vs. Ruin: When the PP is necessary
The purpose of the PP is to avoid a certain class of what,

in probability and insurance, is called ruin" problems
[1]. A ruin problem is one where outcomes of risks
have a non-zero probability of resulting in unrecoverable
losses. An often-cited illustrative case is that of a gambler
who loses his entire fortune and so cannot return to
the game. In biology, an example would be a species
that has gone extinct. For nature, "ruin" is ecocide: an
irreversible termination of life at some scale, which could
be planetwide. The large majority of variations that
occur within a system, even drastic ones, fundamentally

differ from ruin problems: a system that achieves ruin
cannot recover. As long as the instance is bounded, e.g.
a gambler can work to gain additional resources, there
may be some hope of reversing the misfortune. This is
not the case when it is global.
Our concern is with public policy. While an individual
may be advised to not "bet the farm," whether or not he
does so is generally a matter of individual preferences.
Policy makers have a responsibility to avoid catastrophic
harm for society as a whole; the focus is on the aggregate,
not at the level of single individuals, and on globalsystemic, not idiosyncratic, harm. This is the domain of
collective "ruin" problems.
Precautionary considerations are relevant much more
broadly than to ruin problems. For example, there was
a precautionary case against cigarettes long before there
was an open-and-shut evidence-based case against them.
Our point is that the PP is a decisive consideration for
ruin problems, while in a broader context precaution is
not decisive and can be balanced against other considerations.
W HY R UIN
IS
S ERIOUS B USINESS
The risk of ruin is not sustainable. By the ruin theorems,

if you incur a tiny probability of ruin as a "one-off" risk,
survive it, then do it again (another "one-off" deal), you

will eventually go bust with probability 1. Confusion
arises because it may seem that the "one-off" risk is
reasonable, but that also means that an additional one
is reasonable. This can be quantified by recognizing that
the probability of ruin approaches 1 as the number of
exposures to individually small risks, say one in ten
thousand, increases (see Fig. 1). For this reason a strategy
of risk taking is not sustainable and we must consider
any genuine risk of total ruin as if it were inevitable.
The good news is that some classes of risk can be
deemed to be practically of probability zero: the earth
survived trillions of natural variations daily over 3 billion years, otherwise we would not be here. By recognizing that normal risks are not in the category of ruin
problems, we recognize also that it is not necessary or
even normal to take risks that involve a possibility of
ruin.
State
3.1
here is on the case where destruction is complete for

a system or an irreplaceable aspect of a system.
Figure 2 shows ruin as an absorbing barrier, a point
that does not allow recovery.
For example, for humanity global devastation cannot
be measured on a scale in which harm is proportional
to level of devastation. The harm due to complete destruction is not the same as 10 times the destruction
of 1/10 of the system. As the percentage of destruction
approaches 100%, the assessment of harm diverges to
infinity (instead of converging to a particular number)
due to the value placed on a future that ceases to exist.
Because the cost of ruin is effectively infinite, costbenefit analysis (in which the potential harm and potential gain are multiplied by their probabilities and
weighed against each other) is no longer a useful
paradigm. Even if probabilities are expected to be zero
but have a non-zero uncertainty, then a sensitivity analysis that considers the impact of that uncertainty results
in infinities as well. The potential harm is so substantial
that everything else in the equation ceases to matter. In
this case, we must do everything we can to avoid the
catastrophe.
PP is not Risk Management
It is important to contrast and not conflate the PP and

risk management. Risk management involves various
strategies to make decisions based upon accounting for
the effects of positive and negative outcomes and their
probabilities, as well as seeking means to mitigate harm
and offset losses. Risk management strategies are important for decision-making when ruin is not at stake. However, the only risk management strategy of importance
in the case of the PP is ensuring that actions which can
result in ruin are not taken, or equivalently, modifying
potential choices of action so that ruin is not one of the
possible outcomes.
More generally, we can identify three layers associated
with strategies for dealing with uncertainty and risk.
The first layer is the PP which addresses cases that
involve potential global harm, whether probabilities are
uncertain or known and whether they are large or small.
The second is risk management which addresses the case
of known probabilities of well-defined, bounded gains
and losses. The third is risk aversion or risk-seeking
behavior, which reflects quite generally the role of personal preferences for individual risks when uncertainty
is present.
3.2
Ruin is forever
A way to formalize the ruin problem in terms of the destructive consequences of actions identifies harm as not
about the amount of destruction, but rather a measure
of the integrated level of destruction over the time it
persists. When the impact of harm extends to all future
times, i.e. forever, then the harm is infinite. When the
harm is infinite, the product of any non-zero probability
and the harm is also infinite, and it cannot be balanced
against any potential gains, which are necessarily finite.
This strategy for evaluation of harm as involving the
duration of destruction can be used for localized harms
for better assessment in risk management. Our focus
20
40
60
80
100
Time
Absorbing
Barrier
Figure 2: A variety of temporal states for a process

subjected to an absorbing barrier. Once the absorbing
barrier is hit, the process terminates, regardless of its
future potential.
S CIENTIFIC
METHODS AND THE
PP
How well can we know either the potential consequences of policies or their probabilities? What does
science say about uncertainty? To be helpful in policy
decisions, science has to encompass not just expectations
of potential benefit and harm but also their probability
and uncertainty.
Just as the imperative of analysis of decision-making
changes when there is infinite harm for a small, non-zero
risk, so is there a fundamental change in the ability to
apply scientific methods to the evaluation of that harm.
This influences the way we evaluate both the possibility
of and the risk associated with ruin.
The idea of precaution is the avoidance of adverse consequences. This is qualitatively different from the idea of
evidentiary action (from statistics). In the case of the PP,
evidence may come too late. The non-naive PP bridges
the gap between precaution and evidentiary action using
the ability to evaluate the difference between local and
global risks.
4.1
Invalid Empirical Arguments Against Ruin
In the case of arguments about ruin problems, claims

that experience thus far has not provided evidence for
ruin, and thus it should not be considered, are not valid.
4.3
possible systemic consequences under real-world conditions. In these circumstances, efforts to provide assurance of the "lack of harm" are insufficiently reliable. This
runs counter to both the use of empirical approaches
(including controlled experiments) to evaluate risks, and
to the expectation that uncertainty can be eliminated by
any means.
Precautionary vs. Evidentiary Action
Statistical-evidentiary approaches to risk analysis and

mitigation count the frequency of past events (robust
statistics), or calibrate parameters of statistical distributions to generate probabilities of future events (parametric approach), or both. Experimental evidentiary
methods follow the model of medical trials, computing
probabilities of harm from side effects of drugs or interventions by observing the reactions in a variety of
animal and human models. Generally they assume that
the risk itself (i.e. nature of harm and their probability) is adequately determined by available information.
However, the level of risk may be hard to gauge as
its probability may be uncertain, and, in the case of
potential infinite harm, an uncertainty that allows for
a non-zero probability results in infinities so that the
problem is ill-defined mathematically.
While evidentiary approaches are often considered to
reflect adherence to the scientific method in its purest
form, it is apparent that these approaches do not apply
to ruin problems. In an evidentiary approach to risk
(relying on evidence-based methods), the existence of
a risk or harm occurs when we experience that risk or
harm. In the case of ruin, by the time evidence comes it
will by definition be too late to avoid it. Nothing in the
past may predict one fatal event as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Thus standard evidence-based approaches cannot work.
More generally, evidentiary action is a framework
based upon the quite reasonable expectation that we
learn from experience. The idea of evidentiary action is
embodied in the kind of learning from experience that is
found in how people often react to disastersafter the
fact. When a disaster occurs people prepare for the next
one, but do not anticipate it in advance. For the case of
ruin problems, such behavior guarantees extinction.
4.2
Unknowability, Uncertainty and Unpredictability
It has been shown that the complexity of real world

systems limits the ability of empirical observations to
determine the outcomes of actions upon them [2]. This
means that a certain class of systemic risks will remain
inherently unknown. In some classes of complex systems, controlled experiments cannot evaluate all of the
Figure 3: Thin Tails from Tinkering, Bottom-Up, Evolution. In nature no individual variation represents a large
share of the sum of the variations. Natural boundaries
prevent cascading effects from propagating globally.
Mass extinctions arise from the rare cases where large
impacts (meteorite hits and vulcanism) propagate across
the globe through the atmosphere and oceans.
Figure 4: Fat Tails from a Top-Down, Engineered Design In human made variations the tightly connected
global system implies a single deviation will eventually
dominate the sum of their effects. Examples include
pandemics, invasive species, financial crises and monoculture.
4.4
Distinguishing Global and Local Risks
Since there are mathematical limitations to predictability

of outcomes in a complex system, the central issue
to determine is whether the threat of harm is local
(hence globally benign) or carries global consequences.
Scientific analysis can robustly determine whether a risk
is systemic, i.e. by evaluating the connectivity of the
system to propagation of harm, without determining the
specifics of such a risk. If the consequences are systemic,

the associated uncertainty of risks must be treated differently than if it is not. In such cases, precautionary action
is not based on direct empirical evidence but on analytical approaches based upon the theoretical understanding
of the nature of harm. It relies on probability theory
without computing probabilities. The essential question
is whether or not global harm is possible or not. Theory
enables generalizing from experience in order to apply it
to new circumstances. In the case of the PP, the existence
of a robust way to generalize is essential.
The relevance of the precautionary principle today is
greater than in the past, owing to the global connectivity
of civilization that makes the spreading of effects to
places previously insulated.
5
5.1
FAT TAILS
AND
F RAGILITY
Thin and Fat Tails
To figure out whether a given decision involves the risk

of ruin and thus warrants the use of the PP, we must
first understand the relevant underlying probabilistic
structures.
There are two classes of probability distributions of
events: one in which events are accompanied by well
behaved, mild variations (e.g. Gaussian or thin tails), and
the other where small probabilities are associated with
large variations that have no characteristic scale (e.g.
power law or fat tails). Allegorically these are illustrated
by Mediocristan and Extremistan (Figs. 3 and 4), the
former being typical of human weight distributions, and
the latter of human wealth distributions. Given a series
of events (a sequence of measurements of weight or
wealth), in the case of thin tails the sum is proportional
to the average, and in the case of fat tails a sum over
them may be entirely dominated by a single one. Thus,
while no human being can be heavier than, say, ten
average adults (since weight is thin-tailed), a single
individual can be richer than the poorest two billion
humans (since wealth is fat tailed).
In thin tailed domains (Fig 3) harm comes from the
collective effect of many, many events; no event alone
can be consequential enough to affect the aggregate. It
is practically impossible for a single day to account for
99% of all heart attacks in a given year (the probability is
small enough to be practically zero), for an illustration).
Statistical distributions that belong to the thin-tailed
domain include: Gaussian, Binomial, Bernoulli, Poisson,
Gamma, Beta and Exponential.
In fat tailed domains of risk (Fig. 4) harm comes from
the largest single event. Examples of relevant statistical
distributions include: Pareto, Levy-Stable distributions
with infinite variance, Cauchy, and power law distributions, especially with larger exponents.
5.2
Why interdependence brings fat tails
When variations lead to independent impacts locally, the

aggregate effect of those variations is small according to
the central limit theorem, guaranteeing thin-tailed distributions. When there is interdependence, the central limit
theorem does not apply, and aggregate variations may
become much more severe due to mutual reinforcement.
Interdependence arises because of the coupling of behavior in different places. Under these conditions, cascades
propagate through the system in a way that can cause
large impacts. Whether components are independent or
dependent clearly matters to systemic disasters such as
pandemics and financial or other crises. Interdependence
increases the probability of ruin, ultimately to the point
of certainty.
Consider the global financial crash of 2008. As financial firms became increasingly interdependent during
the latter part of the 20th century, small fluctuations
during periods of calm masked the vulnerability of the
system to cascading failures. Instead of a local shock in
an independent area of the system, we experienced a
global shock with cascading effects. The crisis of 2008,
in addition, illustrates the failure of evidentiary risk
management. Since data from the time series beginning
in the 1980s exhibited stability, causing the period to be
dubbed "the great moderation," it deceived those relying
on historical statistical evidence.
6 W HAT
E ARTH ?
IS THE
R ISK
OF
H ARM
TO THE
At the systemic largest scale on Earth, nature has thin

tails, though tails may be fat at smaller length scales or
sufficiently long time scales; occasional mass extinctions
occur at very long time scales. This is characteristic of a
bottom-up, local tinkering design process, where things
change primarily locally and only mildly and iteratively
on a global scale.
In recent years, it has been shown that natural systems
often have fat tail (power law) behaviors associated with
the propagation of shocks [3]. This, however, applies to
selected systems that do not have barriers (or circuitbreakers) that limit those propagations. The earth has
an intrinsic heterogeneity of oceans/continents, deserts,
mountains, lakes, rivers and climate differences that
limit the propagation of variations from one area to
another. There are also smaller natural boundaries associated with organism sizes and those of local groups
of organisms. Among the largest propagation events we
commonly observe are forest fires, but even these are
bounded in their impacts compared to a global scale.
The various forms of barriers limit the propagation of
cascades that enable large scale events.
At longer time scales of millions of years, mass extinctions can achieve a global scale. Connectivity of oceans
and the atmosphere enables propagation of impacts, i.e.
gas, ash and dust propagating through the atmosphere
due to meteor impacts and volcanism, is considered a
scenario for these extinction events [4]. The variability
associated with mass extinctions can especially be seen
in the fossil record of marine animal species; those of
plants and land insects are comparatively robust. It is

not known to what extent these events are driven extrinsically, by meteor impacts, geological events including
volcanos, or cascading events of coupled species extinctions, or combinations of them. The variability associated
with mass extinctions, however, indicates that there are
fat tail events that can affect the global biosphere. The
major extinction events during the past 500 million years
occur at intervals of millions of years [5]. While mass extinctions occur, the extent of that vulnerability is driven
by both sensitivity to external events and connectivity
among ecosystems.
The greatest impact of human beings on this natural
system connectivity is through dramatic increases in
global transportation. The impact of invasive species and
rapid global transmission of diseases demonstrates the
role of human activity in connecting previously much
more isolated natural systems. The role of transportation and communication in connecting civilization itself
is apparent in economic interdependence manifest in
cascading financial crises that were not possible even a
hundred years ago. The danger we are facing today is
that we as a civilization are globally connected, and the
fat tail of the distribution of shocks extends globally, to
our peril.
Had nature not imposed sufficiently thin-tailed variations in the aggregate or macro level, we would not be
here today. A single one of the trillions, perhaps the trillions of trillions, of variations over evolutionary history
would have terminated life on the planet. Figures 1 and 2
show the difference between the two separate statistical
properties. While tails can be fat for subsystems, nature
remains predominantly thin-tailed at the level of the
planet [6]. As connectivity increases the risk of extinction
increases dramatically and nonlinearly [7].
6.1
Risk and Global Interventionism
Currently, global dependencies are manifest in the expressed concerns about policy maker actions that nominally appear to be local in their scope. In just recent
months, headlines have been about Russias involvement
in Ukraine, the spread of Ebola in east Africa, expansion
of ISIS control into Iraq, ongoing posturing in North Korea and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, among others. These
events reflect upon local policy maker decisions that
are justifiably viewed as having global repercussions.
The connection between local actions and global risks
compels widespread concern and global responses to
alter or mitigate local actions. In this context, we point
out that the broader significance and risk associated
with policy actions that impact on global ecological and
human survival is the essential point of the PP. Paying
attention to the headline events without paying attention
to these even larger risks is like being concerned about
the wine being served on the Titanic.
Figure 5: Nonlinear response compared to linear response. The PP should be evoked to prevent impacts
that result in complete destruction due to the nonlinear response of natural systems, it is not needed for
smaller impacts where risk management methods can
be applied.
F RAGILITY
We define fragility in the technical discussion in Appendix C as "is harmed by uncertainty", with the mathematical result that what is harmed by uncertainty has
a certain type on nonlinear response to random events.
The PP applies only to the largest scale impacts due
to the inherent fragility of systems that maintain their
structure. As the scale of impacts increases the harm
increases non-linearly up to the point of destruction.
7.1
Fragility as Nonlinear Response
Everything that has survived is necessarily non-linear to

harm. If I fall from a height of 10 meters I am injured
more than 10 times than if I fell from a height of 1 meter,
or more than 1000 times than if I fell from a height
of 1 centimeter, hence I am fragile. In general, every
additional meter, up to the point of my destruction, hurts
me more than the previous one.
Similarly, if I am hit with a big stone I will be harmed
a lot more than if I were pelted serially with pebbles of
the same total weight.
Everything that is fragile and still in existence (that
is, unbroken), will be harmed more by a certain stressor
of intensity X than by k times a stressor of intensity
X/k, up to the point of breaking. If I were not fragile
(susceptible to harm more than linearly), I would be
destroyed by accumulated effects of small events, and
thus would not survive. This non-linear response is
central for everything on planet earth.
This explains the necessity of considering scale when
invoking the PP. Polluting in a small way does not
warrant the PP because it is essentially less harmful than
polluting in large quantities, since harm is non-linear.
7.2
Why is fragility a general rule?
The statistical structure of stressors is such that small

variations are much, much more frequent than large
ones. Fragility is intimately connected to the ability to
withstand small impacts and recover from them. This
ability is what makes a system retain its structure. Every
system has a threshold of impact beyond which it will
be destroyed, i.e. its structure is not sustained.
Consider a coffee cup sitting on a table: there are
millions of recorded earthquakes every year; if the coffee
cup were linearly sensitive to earthquakes and accumulated their effects as small deteriorations of its form, it
would not persist even for a short time as it would have
been broken down due to the accumulated impact of
small vibrations. The coffee cup, however, is non-linear
to harm, so that the small or remote earthquakes only
make it wobble, whereas one large one would break it
forever.
This nonlinearity is necessarily present in everything
fragile.
Thus, when impacts extend to the size of the system, harm is severely exacerbated by non-linear effects.
Small impacts, below a threshold of recovery, do not
accumulate for systems that retain their structure. Larger
impacts cause irreversible damage. We should be careful,
however, of actions that may seem small and local but
then lead to systemic consequences.
7.3
Fragility, Dose response and the 1/n rule
Another area where we see non-linear responses to harm

is the dose-response relationship. As the dose of some
chemical or stressor increases, the response to it grows
non-linearly. Many low-dose exposures do not cause
great harm, but a single large-dose can cause irreversible
damage to the system, like overdosing on painkillers.
In decision theory, the 1/n heuristic is a simple rule
in which an agent invests equally across n funds (or
sources of risk) rather than weighting their investments
according to some optimization criterion such as meanvariance or Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), which dictates some amount of concentration in order to increase
the potential payoff. The 1/n heuristic mitigates the risk
of suffering ruin due to an error in the model; there
is no single asset whose failure can bring down the
ship. While the potential upside of the large payoff is
dampened, ruin due to an error in prediction is avoided.
This heuristic works best when the sources of variations
are uncorrelated and, in the presence of correlation or
dependence between the various sources of risk, the total
exposure needs to be reduced.
Hence, because of non-linearities, it is preferable to
diversify our effect on the planet, e.g. distinct types of
pollutants, across the broadest number of uncorrelated
sources of harm, rather than concentrate them. In this
way, we avoid the risk of an unforeseen, disproportionately harmful response to a pollutant deemed "safe" by
virtue of responses observed only in relatively small

doses.
T HE
LIMITATION OF TOP - DOWN ENGINEER ING IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
In considering the limitations of risk-taking, a key question is whether or not we can analyze the potential
outcomes of interventions and, knowing them, identify
the associated risks. Cant we just "figure it out? With
such knowledge we can gain assurance that extreme
problems such as global destruction will not arise.
Since the same issue arises for any engineering effort,
we can ask what is the state-of-the-art of engineering?
Does it enable us to know the risks we will encounter?
Perhaps it can just determine the actions we should,
or should not, take. There is justifiably widespread respect for engineering because it has provided us with
innovations ranging from infrastructure to electronics
that have become essential to modern life. What is not
as well known by the scientific community and the
public, is that engineering approaches fail in the face of
complex challenges and this failure has been extensively
documented by the engineering community itself [8].
The underlying reason for the failure is that complex
environments present a wide range of conditions. Which
conditions will actually be encountered is uncertain.
Engineering approaches involve planning that requires
knowledge of the conditions that will be encountered.
Planning fails due to the inability to anticipate the many
conditions that will arise.
This problem arises particularly for real-time systems that are dealing with large amounts of information
and have critical functions in which lives are at risk. A
classic example is the air traffic control system. An effort
to modernize that system by traditional engineering
methods cost $3-6 billion and was abandoned without
changing any part of the system because of the inability
to evaluate the risks associated with its implementation.
Significantly, the failure of traditional engineering to
address complex challenges has led to the adoption of
innovation strategies that mirror evolutionary processes,
creating platforms and rules that can serve as a basis
for safely introducing small incremental changes that
are extensively tested in their real world context [8].
This strategy underlies the approach used by highlysuccessful, modern, engineered-evolved, complex systems ranging from the Internet, to Wikipedia, to iPhone
App communities.
S KEPTICISM
AND
P RECAUTION
We show in Figures 6 and 7 that an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in the probability of ruin,
hence "skepticism" is that its impact on decisions should
lead to increased, not decreased conservatism in the
presence of ruin. More skepticism about models implies more uncertainty about the tails, which necessitates
Low model
uncertainty
Ruin
High model
uncertainty
Ruin
probability
-5
10
15
Figure 6: The more uncertain or skeptical one is of

"scientific" models and projections, the higher the risk
of ruin, which flies in the face of the argument of
the style "skeptical of climate models". No matter how
increased the probability of benefits, ruin as an absorbing
barrier, i.e. causing extinction without further recovery,
can more than cancels them out. This graph assumes
changes in uncertainty without changes in benefits (a
mean-preserving sensitivity) the next one isolates the
changes in benefits.
Hence skepticim about climate models should lead to

more precautionary policies.
In addition, such increase uncertainty matters far more
in Extremistan and has benign effects in Mediocristan.
Figure 7 shows th asymmetries between costs and benefits as far as ruin probabilities, and why these matter
more for fat-tailed domains than thin-tailed ones. In thintailed domains, an increase in uncertainty changes the
probability of ruin by several orders of magnitude, but
the effect remains small: from say 10 40 to 10 30 is not
quite worrisome. In fat-tailed domains, the effect is sizeable as we start with a substantially higher probability
of ruin (which is typically underestimated, see [6]).
10
SHOULD GMO S BE UNDER

NOT NUCLEAR ENERGY ?
more precaution about newly implemented techniques,

or larger size of exposures. As we said, Nature might
not be smart, but its longer track record means smaller
uncertainty in following its logic.
Mathematically, more uncertainty about the future
or about a model increases the scale of the distribution,
hence thickens the "left tail" (as well as the "right one")
which raises the potential ruin. The survival probability
is reduced no matter what takes place in the right tail.
PP
BUT
As examples that are relevant to the discussion of the

different types of strategies, we consider the differences
between concerns about nuclear energy and GM crops.
In short nuclear exposure in nonlinear and can be
local (under some conditions) while GMOs are not and
present systemic risks even in small amounts.
10.1
Figure 7: The graph shows the asymmetry between

benefits and harm and the effect on the ruin probabilities.
Shows the effect on ruin probability of changes the
expected benefit
Information Ratio, that is, uncertainty (or signal divided
by noise). Benefits are small compared to negative effects. Three cases are considered, two from Extremistan:
extremely fat-tailed ( = 1), and less fat-tailed ( = 2),
and one from Mediocristan.
W HY
Nuclear energy
Many are justifiably concerned about nuclear energy.

It is known that the potential harm due to radiation
release, core meltdowns and waste can be large. At the
same time, the nature of these risks has been extensively
studied, and the risks from local uses of nuclear energy
have a scale that is much smaller than global. Thus,
even though some uncertainties remain, it is possible
to formulate a cost benefit analysis of risks for local
decision-making. The large potential harm at a local scale
means that decisions about whether, how and how much
to use nuclear energy, and what safety measures to use,
should be made carefully so that decision makers and the
public can rely upon them. Risk management is a very
serious matter when potential harm can be large and
should not be done casually or superficially. Those who
perform the analysis must not only do it carefully, they
must have the trust of others that they are doing it carefully. Nevertheless, the known statistical structure of the
risks and the absence of global systemic consequences
makes the cost benefit analysis meaningful. Decisions
can be made in the cost-benefit contextevoking the PP
is not appropriate for small amounts of nuclear energy,
as the local nature of the risks is not indicative of the
circumstances to which the PP applies.
In large quantities, we should worry about an unseen
risk from nuclear energy and invoke the PP. In small
quantities, it may be OKhow small we should determine by direct analysis, making sure threats never cease
to be local.
In addition to the risks from nuclear energy use
itself, we must keep in mind the longer term risks
associated with the storage of nuclear waste, which are
compounded by the extended length of time they remain

hazardous. The problems of such longer term lifecycle
effects is present in many different industries. It arises
not just for nuclear energy but also for fossil fuels and
other sources of pollution, though the sheer duration of
toxicity effects for nuclear waste, enduring for hundreds
of thousands of years in some cases, makes this problem
particularly intense for nuclear power.
As we saw earlier we need to remain careful in
limiting nuclear exposure as other sources of pollution
to sources that owing to their quantity do not allow
for systemic effects.
10.2
GMOs
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and their risk

are currently the subject of debate [9]. Here we argue that they fall squarely under the PP because their
risk is systemic. There are two aspects of systemic
risk, the widespread impact on the ecosystem and the
widespread impact on health.
Ecologically, in addition to intentional cultivation,
GMOs have the propensity to spread uncontrollably, and
thus their risks cannot be localized. The cross-breeding of
wild-type plants with genetically modified ones prevents
their disentangling, leading to irreversible system-wide
effects with unknown downsides. The ecological implications of releasing modified organisms into the wild are
not tested empirically before release.
Healthwise, the modification of crops impacts everyone. Corn, one of the primary GMO crops, is not only
eaten fresh or as cereals, but is also a major component of
processed foods in the form of high-fructose corn syrup,
corn oil, corn starch and corn meal. In 2014 in the US
almost 90% of corn and 94% of soybeans are GMO [11].
Foods derived from GMOs are not tested in humans
before they are marketed.
The widespread impacts of GMOs on ecologies and
human health imply they are in the domain of the
PP. This should itself compel policy makers to take
extreme caution. However, there is a difficulty for many
in understanding the abstract nature of the engagement
in risks and imagining the many possible ways that harm
can be caused. Thus, we summarize further the nature
of the risks that are involved.
10.3
GMOs in detail
The systemic global impacts of GMOs arise from a

combination of (1) engineered genetic modifications, (2)
monoculturethe use of single crops over large areas.
Global monoculture itself is of concern for potential
global harm, but the evolutionary context of traditional
crops provides important assurances (see Figure 8). Invasive species are frequently a problem but one might
at least argue that the long term evolutionary testing
of harmful impacts of organisms on local ecological
systems mitigates if not eliminates the largest potential
Figure 8: A simplified illustration of the mechanism

behind the potato famine of the 19th C. showing how
concentration from monoculture increases the risk of
ruin. Inspired by Berkeleys Understanding Evolution.
risks. Monoculture in combination with genetic engineering dramatically increases the risks being taken.
Instead of a long history of evolutionary selection, these
modifications rely not just on naive engineering strategies that do not appropriately consider risk in complex
environments, but also explicitly reductionist approaches
that ignore unintended consequences and employ very
limited empirical testing.
Ironically, at a time when engineering is adopting
evolutionary approaches due to the failure of top-down
strategies, biologists and agronomists are adopting topdown engineering strategies and taking global systemic
risks in introducing organisms into the wild.
One argument in favor of GMOs is that they are no
more "unnatural" than the selective farming our ancestors have been doing for generations. In fact, the ideas
developed in this paper show that this is not the case.
Selective breeding over human history is a process in
which change still happens in a bottom-up way, and can
be expected to result in a thin-tailed distribution. If there
is a mistake, some harmful variation, it will not spread
throughout the whole system but end up dying out due
to local experience over time. Human experience over
generations has chosen the biological organisms that are
relatively safe for consumption. There are many that are
not, including parts of and varieties of the crops we do
cultivate [12]. Introducing rapid changes in organisms is
inconsistent with this process. There is a limited rate at
which variations can be introduced and selection will be
effective [13].
There is no comparison between tinkering with the
selective breeding of genetic components of organisms
that have previously undergone extensive histories of
selection and the top-down engineering of taking a gene
from a fish and putting it into a tomato. Saying that such
a product is natural misses the process of natural selection by which things become natural." While there are
claims that all organisms include transgenic materials,
those genetic transfers that are currently present were
subject to selection over long times and survived. The

success rate is tiny. Unlike GMOs, in nature there is no
immediate replication of mutated organisms to become a
large fraction of the organisms of a species. Indeed, any
one genetic variation is unlikely to become part of the
long term genetic pool of the population. Instead, just
like any other genetic variation or mutation, transgenic
transfers are subject to competition and selection over
many generations before becoming a significant part of
the population. A new genetic transfer engineered today
is not the same as one that has survived this process of
selection.
An example of the effect of transfer of biologically
evolved systems to a different context is that of zoonotic
diseases. Even though pathogens consume their hosts,
they evolve to be less harmful than they would otherwise be. Pathogens that cause highly lethal diseases
are selected against because their hosts die before they
are able to transmit to others. This is the underlying
reason for the greater dangers associated with zoonotic
diseasescaused by pathogens that shift from the host
that they evolved in to human beings, including HIV,
Avian and Swine flu that transferred from monkeys
(through chimpanzees), birds and hogs, respectively.
More generally, engineered modifications to ecological
systems (through GMOs) are categorically and statistically different from bottom up ones. Bottom-up modifications do not remove the crops from their long term
evolutionary context, enabling the push and pull of
the ecosystem to locally extinguish harmful mutations.
Top-down modifications that bypass this evolutionary
pathway unintentionally manipulate large sets of interdependent factors at the same time, with dramatic risks
of unintended consequences. They thus result in fattailed distributions and place a huge risk on the food
system as a whole.
For the impact of GMOs on health, the evaluation of
whether the genetic engineering of a particular chemical
(protein) into a plant is OK by the FDA is based upon
considering limited existing knowledge of risks associated with that protein. The number of ways such an evaluation can be in error is large. The genetic modifications
are biologically significant as the purpose is to strongly
impact the chemical functions of the plant, modifying its
resistance to other chemicals such as herbicides or pesticides, or affecting its own lethality to other organisms
i.e. its antibiotic qualities. The limited existing knowledge generally does not include long term testing of
the exposure of people to the added chemical, even in
isolation. The evaluation is independent of the ways the
protein affects the biochemistry of the plant, including
interactions among the various metabolic pathways and
regulatory systemsand the impact of the resulting
changes in biochemistry on health of consumers. The
evaluation is independent of its farm-ecosystem combination (i.e. pesticide resistant crops are subject to increased use of pesticides, which are subsequently present
in the plant in larger concentrations and cannot be
10
washed away). Rather than recognizing the limitations

of current understanding, poorly grounded perspectives
about the potential damage with unjustified assumptions
are being made. Limited empirical validation of both
essential aspects of the conceptual framework as well
as specific conclusions are being used because testing is
recognized to be difficult.
We should exert the precautionary principle here our
non-naive version because we do not want to discover
errors after considerable and irreversible environmental
and health damage.
10.4 Red herring: How about the risk of famine without GMOs?
An argument used by those who advocate for GMOs is
that they will reduce the hunger in the world. Invoking
the risk of famine as an alternative to GMOs is a deceitful
strategy, no different from urging people to play Russian
roulette in order to get out of poverty.
The evocation of famine also prevents clear thinking
about not just GMOs but also about global hunger. The
idea that GMO crops will help avert famine ignores
evidence that the problem of global hunger is due to
poor economic and agricultural policies. Those who care
about the supply of food should advocate for an immediate impact on the problem by reducing the amount
of corn used for ethanol in the US, which burns food
for fuel consuming over 40% of the US crop that could
provide enough food to feed 2/3 of a billion people [14].
One of the most extensively debated cases for GMOs
is a variety of rice"golden rice"to which has been
added a precursor of vitamin A as a potential means
to alleviate this nutritional deficiency, which is a key
medical condition affecting impoverished populations.
Since there are alternatives, including traditional vitamin
fortification, one approach is to apply a cost benefit
analysis comparing these approaches. Counter to this
approach stands both the largely unknown risks associated with the introduction of GMOs, and the need
and opportunities for more systemic interventions to
alleviate not just malnutrition but poverty and hunger
worldwide. While great attention should be placed on
immediate needs, neglecting the larger scale risks is unreasonable [10]. Here science should adopt an unyielding
rigor for both health benefit and risk assessment, including careful application of the PP. Absent such rigor,
advocacy by the scientific community not only fails to
be scientific, but also becomes subject to challenge for
short term interests, not much different from corporate
endorsers. Thus, cutting corners on tests, including tests
without adequate consent or approvals performed on
Chinese children [15], undermines scientific claims to
humanitarian ideals. Given the promotion of "golden
rice" by the agribusiness that also promote biofuels, their
interest in humanitarian impacts versus profits gained
through wider acceptance of GMO technology can be
legitimately questioned [16].
11
We can frame the problem in our probabilistic argument of Section 9. This asymmetry from adding another
risk, here a technology (with uncertainty attending some
of its outcomes), to solve a given risk (which can be
solved by less complicated means) are illustrated in
Figures 6 and 7. Model error, or errors from the technology itself, i.e., its iatrogenics, can turn a perceived
"benefit" into a highly likely catastrophe, simply because
an error from, say, "golden rice" or some such technology
would have much worse outcomes than an equivalent
benefit. Most of the discussions on "saving the poor from
starvation" via GMOs miss the fundamental asymmetry
shown in 7.
10.5 GMOs in summary
In contrast to nuclear energy (which, as discussed in
section 10.1 above, may or may not fall under the
PP, depending on how and where (how widely) it is
implemented), Genetically Modified Organisms, GMOs,
fall squarely under the PP because of their systemic risk.
The understanding of the risks is very limited and the
scope of the impacts are global both due to engineering
approach replacing an evolutionary approach, and due
to the use of monoculture.
Labeling the GMO approach scientific" betrays a very
poorindeed warpedunderstanding of probabilistic
payoffs and risk management. A lack of observations of
explicit harm does not show absence of hidden risks.
Current models of complex systems only contain the
subset of reality that is accessible to the scientist. Nature
is much richer than any model of it. To expose an
entire system to something whose potential harm is
not understood because extant models do not predict a
negative outcome is not justifiable; the relevant variables
may not have been adequately identified.
Given the limited oversight that is taking place on
GMO introductions in the US, and the global impact
of those introductions, we are precisely in the regime
of the ruin problem. A rational consumer should say:
We do not wish to payor have our descendants pay
for errors made by executives of Monsanto, who are
financially incentivized to focus on quarterly profits
rather than long term global impacts. We should exert
the precautionary principleour non-naive version
simply because we otherwise will discover errors with
large impacts only after considerable damage.
10.6 Vaccination, Antibiotics, and Other Exposures
Our position is that while one may argue that vaccination is risky, or risky under some circumstances, it does
not fall under PP owing to the lack of systemic risk.
The same applies to such interventions as antibiotics,
provided the scale remains limited to the local.
11
P RECAUTION AS
TERVENTION
P OLICY
AND
N AIVE I N -
When there is a risk of ruin, obstructionism and policy

inaction are important strategies, impeding the rapid
headlong experimentation with global ruin by those

with short-term, self-centered incentives and perspectives. Two approaches for policy action are well justified.
In the first, actions that avoid the inherent sensitivity of
the system to propagation of harm can be used to free the
system to enable local decision-making and exploration
with only local harm. This involves introducing boundaries, barriers and separations that inhibit propagation of
shocks, preventing ruin for overly connected systems. In
the second, where such boundaries dont exist or cannot
be introduced due to other effects, there is a need for
actions that are adequately evaluated as to their global
harm. Scientific analysis of such actions, meticulously
validated, is needed to prevent small risks from causing
ruin.
What is not justified, and dangerous, are actions that
are intended to prevent harm by additional intervention.
The reason is that indirect effects are likely to create
precisely the risks that one is intending to avoid.
When existing risks are perceived as having the potential for ruin, it may be assumed that any preventive
measure is justified. There are at least two problems
with such a perspective. First, localized harm is often
mistaken for ruin, and the PP is wrongly invoked where
risk management techniques should be employed. When
a risk is not systemic, overreaction will typically cause
more harm than benefits, like undergoing dangerous
surgery to remove a benign growth. Second, even if the
threat of ruin is real, taking specific (positive) action in
order to ward off the perceived threat may introduce
new systemic risks. It is often wiser to reduce or remove
activity that is generating or supporting the threat and
allow natural variations to play out in localized ways.
Preventive action should be limited to correcting situations by removing threats via negativa in order to
bring them back in line with a statistical structure that
avoids ruin. It is often better to remove structure or
allow natural variation to take place rather than to add
something additional to the system.
When one takes the opposite approach, taking specific
action designed to diminish some perceived threat, one
is almost guaranteed to induce unforeseen consequences.
Even when there appears to be a direct link from a
specific action to a specific preventive outcome, the
web of causality extends in complex ways with consequences that are far from the intended goal. These
unintended consequences may generate new vulnerabilities or strengthen the harm one is hoping to diminish.
Thus, when possible, limiting fragilizing dependencies is
better than imposing additional structure that increases
the fragility of the system as a whole.
12
FALLACIOUS
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
PP
In this section we respond to a variety of arguments that

have been made against the PP.
12.1
Crossing the road (the paralysis fallacy)
Many have countered the invocation of the PP with

nothing is ever totally safe. I take risks crossing the
road every day, so according to you I should stay home
in a state of paralysis. The answer is that we dont cross
the street blindfolded, we use sensory information to
mitigate risks and reduce exposure to extreme shocks.
Even more importantly in the context of the PP, the
probability distribution of death from road accidents at
the population level is thin-tailed; I do not incur the risk
of generalized human extinction by crossing the street
a human life is bounded in duration and its unavoidable
termination is an inherent part of the bio-social system
[17]. The error of my crossing the street at the wrong
time and meeting an untimely demise in general does
not cause others to do the same; the error does not
spread. If anything, one might expect the opposite effect,
that others in the system benefit from my mistake by
adapting their behavior to avoid exposing themselves to
similar risks. Equating risks a person takes with his or
her own life with risking the existence of civilization is
an inappropriate ego trip. In fact, the very idea of the
PP is to avoid such a frivolous focus.
The paralysis argument is often used to present the PP
as incompatible with progress. This is untrue: tinkering,
bottom-up progress where mistakes are bounded is how
progress has taken place in history. The non-naive PP
simply asserts that the risks we take as we innovate must
not extend to the entire system; local failure serves as
information for improvement. Global failure does not.
This fallacy illustrates the misunderstanding between
systemic and idiosyncratic risk in the literature. Individuals are fragile and mortal. The idea of sustainability is
to stike to make systems as close to immortal as possible.
12.2 The Psychology of Risk and Thick Tailed Distributions
One concern about the utility of the PP is that its evocation may become commonplace because of risk aversion.
Is it true that people overreact to small probabilities
and the PP would feed into human biases? While we
have carefully identified the scope of the domain of
applicability of the PP, it is also helpful to review the
evidence of risk aversion, which we find not to be based
upon sound studies.
Certain empirical studies appear to support the existence of a bias toward risk aversion, claiming evidence
that people choose to avoid risks that are beneficial,
inconsistent with cost-benefit analyses. The relevant experiments ask people questions about single probability
events, showing that people overreact to small probabilities. However, those researchers failed to include the
consequences of the associated events which humans
underestimate. Thus, this empirical strategy as a way
of identifying effectiveness of response to risk is fundamentally flawed [18].
12
The proper consideration of risk involves both probability and consequence, which should be multiplied
together. Consequences in many domains have thick
tails, i.e. much larger consequences can arise than are
considered in traditional statistical approaches. Overreacting to small probabilities is not irrational when the
effect is large, as the product of probability and harm
is larger than expected from the traditional treatment of
probability distributions.
12.3
The Loch Ness fallacy
Many have countered that we have no evidence that

the Loch Ness monster doesnt exist, and, to take the
argument of evidence of absence being different from
absence of evidence, we should act as if the Loch Ness
monster existed. The argument is a corruption of the
absence of evidence problem and certainly not part of
the PP.
The relevant question is whether the existence of the
Loch Ness monster has implications for decisions about
actions that are being taken. We are not considering a
decision to swim in the Loch Ness. If the Loch Ness
monster did exist, there would still be no reason to
invoke the PP, as the harm he might cause is limited
in scope to Loch Ness itself, and does not present the
risk of ruin.
12.4
The fallacy of misusing the naturalistic fallacy
Some people invoke the naturalistic fallacy, a philosophical concept that is limited to the moral domain.
According to this critique, we should not claim that
natural things are necessarily good; human innovation
can be equally valid. We do not claim to use nature to
derive a notion of how things "ought" to be organized.
Rather, as scientists, we respect nature for the extent of
its experimentation. The high level of statistical significance given by a very large sample cannot be ignored.
Nature may not have arrived at the best solution to a
problem we consider important, but there is reason to
believe that it is smarter than our technology based only
on statistical significance.
The question about what kinds of systems work (as
demonstrated by nature) is different than the question
about what working systems ought to do. We can take
a lesson from natureand timeabout what kinds of
organizations are robust against, or even benefit from,
shocks, and in that sense systems should be structured in
ways that allow them to function. Conversely, we cannot
derive the structure of a functioning system from what
we believe the outcomes ought to be.
To take one example, Cass Sunsteinwho has written
an article critical of the PP [19]claims that there is a
"false belief that nature is benign." However, his conceptual discussion fails to distinguish between thin and fat
tails, local harm and global ruin. The method of analysis
misses both the statistical significance of nature and the
fact that it is not necessary to believe in the perfection of
nature, or in its "benign" attributes, but rather in its track

record, its sheer statistical power as a risk evaluator and
as a risk manager in avoiding ruin.
12.5
The "Butterfly in China" fallacy
The statement if I move my finger to scratch my nose,

by the butterfly-in-China effect, owing to non-linearities,
I may terminate life on earth," is known to be flawed. The
explanation is not widely understood. The fundamental
reason arises because of the existence of a wide range
in levels of predictability and the presence of a large
number of fine scale degrees of freedom for every large
scale one [20]. Thus, the traditional deterministic chaos,
for which the butterfly effect was named, applies specifically to low dimensional systems with a few variables
in a particular regime. High dimensional systems, like
the earth, have large numbers of fine scale variables for
every large scale one. Thus, it is apparent that not all
butterfly wing flaps can cause hurricanes. It is not clear
that any one of them can, and, if small perturbations
can influence large scale events, it happens only under
specific conditions where amplification occurs.
Empirically, our thesis rebuts the butterfly fallacy with
the argument that, in the aggregate, nature has experienced trillions of small variations and yet it survives.
Therefore, we know that the effects of scratching ones
nose fall into the thin tailed domain and thus do not
warrant the precautionary principle.
As described previously, barriers in natural systems
lead to subsystems having a high-degree of independence. Understanding how modern systems with a highdegree of connectivity have cascading effects is essential
for understanding when it is and isnt appropriate to use
the PP.
12.6
The potato fallacy
Many species were abruptly introduced into the Old

World starting in the 16th Century that did not cause
environmental disasters (perhaps aside from diseases
affecting Native Americans). Some use this observation
in defense of GMOs. However, the argument is fallacious
at two levels:
First, by the fragility argument, potatoes, tomatoes
and similar "New World" goods were developed locally
through progressive, bottom-up tinkering in a complex
system in the context of its interactions with its environment. Had they had an impact on the environment,
it would have caused adverse consequences that would
have prevented their continual spread.
Second, a counterexample is not evidence in the risk
domain, particularly when the evidence is that taking
a similar action previously did not lead to ruin. Lack of
ruin due to several or even many trials does not indicate
safety from ruin in the next one. This is also the Russian
roulette fallacy, detailed below.
13
12.7 The Russian roulette fallacy (the counterexamples in the risk domain)
The potato example, assuming potatoes had not been
generated top-down by some engineers, would still not
be sufficient. Nobody says "look, the other day there
was no war, so we dont need an army," as we know
better in real-life domains. Nobody argues that a giant
Russian roulette with many barrels is "safe" and a great
money making opportunity because it didnt blow up
someones brains last time.
There are many reasons a previous action may not
have led to ruin while still having the potential to do
so. If you attempt to cross the street with a blindfold
and earmuffs on, you may make it across, but this is not
evidence that such an action carries no risk.
More generally, one needs a large sample for claims
of absence of risk in the presence of a small probability
of ruin, while a single n = 1" example would be sufficient to counter the claims of safetythis is the Black
Swan argument [27]. Simply put, systemic modifications
require a very long history in order for the evidence of
lack of harm to carry any weight.
12.8
The Carpenter Fallacy
Risk managers skeptical of the understanding of risk

of biological processes, such as GMOs, by the experts
are sometimes asked "are you a biologist?" But nobody
asks a probabilist dealing with roulette sequences if he is
a carpenter. To understand the gamblers ruin problem
by roulette betting, we know to ask a probabilist, not
a carpenter. No amount of expertise in carpentry can
replace rigor in understanding the properties of long
sequences of small probability bets. Likewise, no amount
of expertise in the details of biological processes can be
a substitute for probabilistic rigor.
The context for evaluating risk is the extent of knowledge or lack of knowledge. Thus, when considering
GMO risks, a key question is what is the extent to
which we know the impacts of genetic changes in organisms. Claims that geneticists know these consequences
as a basis for GMOs do not recognize either that their
knowledge is not complete in its own domain nor is
genetics complete as a body of knowledge. Geneticists
do not know the developmental, physiological, medical,
cognitive and environmental consequences of genetic
changes in organisms. Indeed, most of these are not part
of their training or competency. Neither are they trained
in recognizing the impact of the limitations of knowledge
on risk.
Some advocates dismiss the very existence of risk due
to the role of scientific knowledge in GMOs. According
to this view scientists from Monsanto and similar companies can be trusted to provide safe foods without risk
and even a question about risk is without basis. Scientific
knowledge as a source of engineering innovation has a
long tradition. At the same time, engineering itself is a
different discipline and has different imperatives. While
14
construction of bridges and buildings relies upon well

established rules of physics, the existence of risks does
not end with that knowledge and must be considered
directly in planning and construction as it is in other
forms of engineering. The existence of risk in engineering even where knowledge is much better established
than genetics is widely recognized. That proponents
dismiss the very existence of risk, attests to their poor
understanding or blind extrinsically motivated advocacy.
The FDA has adopted as a policy the approach that
current scientific knowledge assures safety of GMOs,
and relies upon Monsanto or similar companies for
assurances. It therefore does not test the impact of
chemical changes in GMO plants on human health or
ecological systems. This despite experiments that show
that increased concentrations of neurotoxins in maternal
blood are linked to GMOs [21]. A variety of studies show
experimental evidence that risks exist [22], [23], [24],
[25] and global public health concerns are recognized
[26]. We note that it is possible that there are significant
impacts of neurotoxins on human cognitive function as
a result of GMO modification, as FDA testing does not
evaluate this risk.
Consistent with these points, the track record of the
experts in understanding biological and medical risks
has been extremely poor. We need policies to be robust to
such miscalculations. The "expert problem" in medicine
by which experts mischaracterize the completeness of
their own knowledge is manifest in a very poor historical
record of risks taken with innovations in biological products. These range from biofuels to transfat to nicotine,
etc. Consider the recent major drug recalls such as
Thalidomide, Fen-Phen, Tylenol and Vioxxall of these
show blindness on the part of the specialist to large scale
risks associated with absence of knowlege, i.e., Black
Swan events. Yet most of these risks were local and not
systemic (with the exception of biofuel impacts on global
hunger and social unrest). Since systemic risks would
result in a recall happening too late, we need the strong
version of the PP.
12.9 The technological salvation fallacy
Iatrogenics is harm done by a healer despite positive
intentions, see Appendix A for a list of innovations
in care that have extensive documentation of adverse
consequences. Each of these underwent best practices
testing that did not reveal the iatrogenic consequences
prior to widespread application. The controlled tests
that are used to evaluate innovations for potential harm
cannot replicate the large number of conditions in which
interventions are applied in the real world. Adverse
consequences are exposed only by extensive experience
with the combinatorial number of real world conditions. Natural, i.e. evolutionary, selection implements as
a strategy the use of selection of lack of harm under
such conditions in a way that bounds the consequences
because the number of replicates is increased only gradually during the process in which success is determined.
In contrast, traditional engineering of technological solutions does not. Thus, the more technological a solution to
a current problemthe more it departs from solutions
that have undergone evolutionary selectionthe more
exposed one becomes to iatrogenics owing to combinatorial branching of conditions with adverse consequences.
Our concern here isnt mild iatrogenics, but the systemic case.
12.10
The pathologization fallacy
Today many mathematical or conceptual models that

are claimed to be rigorous are based upon unvalidated
and incorrect assumptions. Such models are rational
in the sense that they are logically derived from their
assumptions, except that it is the modeler who is using
an incomplete representation of the reality. Often the
modelers are not familiar with the dynamics of complex systems or use Gaussian statistical methods that
do not take into account fat-tails and make inferences
that would not be acceptable under different classes of
probability distributions. Many biases, such as the ones
used by Cass Sunstein (mentioned above), about the
overestimation of the probabilities of rare events in fact
correspond to the testers using a bad probability model
that is thin-tailed. See Ref. [6] for a deeper discussion.
It has became popular to claim irrationality for GMO
and other skepticism on the part of the general public
not realizing that there is in fact an "expert problem"
and such skepticism is healthy and even necessary for
survival. For instance, in The Rational Animal, the authors
pathologize people for not accepting GMOs although
"the World Health Organization has never found evidence of ill effects," a standard confusion of evidence
of absence and absence of evidence. Such pathologizing
is similar to behavioral researchers labeling hyperbolic
discounting as "irrational" when in fact it is largely the
researcher who has a very narrow model and richer
models make the "irrationality" go away.
These researchers fail to understand that humans may
have precautionary principles against systemic risks, and
can be skeptical of the untested consequences of policies
for deeply rational reasons, even if they do not express
such fears in academic format.
13
C ONCLUSIONS
This formalization of the two different types of uncertainty about risk (local and systemic) makes clear
when the precautionary principle is, and when it isnt,
appropriate. The examples of GMOs and nuclear energy
help to elucidate the application of these ideas. We hope
this will help decision makers to avoid ruin in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Gloria Origgi, William Goodlad, Maya Bialik, David
Boxenhorn, Jessica Woolley, Phil Hutchinson...
C ONFLICTS
OF I NTEREST
One of the authors (Taleb) reports having received monetary compensation for lecturing on risk management
and Black Swan risks by the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations, INPO, the main association in the United
States, in 2011, in the wake of the Fukushima accident.
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16
Medical Intervention
Intended Effects
Unintended Effects
Rofecoxib (Vioxx, Ceoxx, Ceeoxx)

Thalidomide (Immunoprin, Talidex, Talizer, Thalomid)
Fen-phen (Pondimin)
relieve osteoarthritis, dysmenorrhoea

sedative
myocardial infarctions [1]

severe birth defects [2]
weight loss
Diethylstilbestrol
(Distilbene,
Stilbestrol, Stilbetin)
Cerivastatin (Baycol, Lipobay)
reduce miscarriage
lower cholesterol, reduce cardiovascular
disease
improve mental disorder
antidiabetic, antiinflammatory
valvular heart disease, pulmonary hypertension [3]

cancerous tumors in daughters exposed
in utero [4]
Rhabdomyolysis leading to renal failure
[5]
loss of personality, intellect [6]
drug-induced hepatitis [7]
antihistamine
cardiac arrhythmia [8]
appetite suppressant, stimulant, decongestant

patient treatment and monitoring
increased stroke [9]
lobotomy
Troglitazone
(Rezulin,
Resulin,
Romozin, Noscal)
Terfenadine (Seldane, Triludan, Teldane)
Phenylpropanolamine (Accutrim)
hospitalization
antibiotics
antidepressants
Encainide (Enkaid), flecainide (Tambocor)
Acetaminophen (Tylenol)
coronary angioplasty
clear bacterial infections

relieve depression
reduced arrhythmia
cosmetic surgery
improved aesthetics
obsessive hygiene
ear-tubes
keeping safe from germs

otitis media with effusion
pain relief
increased blood flow
nosocomial infection; medication errors

[10]
treatment-resistant bacteria [11]
increased suicide risk [12]
increased mortality [13]
liver damage [14]
increased risk of death/myocardial infarction [15]
infection, death, deformity, other malfunction [16]
autoimmune disorders [17]
tympanosclerosis [18]
Table 2: Examples of iatrogenics in the medical field. The upper portion of the table shows medications and
treatments whose use has been significantly reduced or completely discontinued due to their undesired effects
(which were discovered only after significant damage had been done). The lower portion of the table lists examples
where unintended side effects are significant but treatment continues to be applied due to expected benefits.
A PPENDIX A
A S AMPLE OF I ATROGENICS , "U NFORESEEN " C RITICAL E RRORS
17
A PPENDIX B
D EFINITION OF FAT TAILS AND DISTINCTION
BETWEEN M EDIOCRISTAN AND E XTREMISTAN
Probability distributions range between extreme thintailed (Bernoulli) and extreme fat tailed [6]. Among the
categories of distributions that are often distinguished
due to the convergence properties of moments are: 1)
Having a support that is compact but not degenerate, 2)
Subgaussian, 3) Gaussian, 4) Subexponential, 5) Power
law with exponent greater than 3, 6) Power law with
exponent less than or equal to 3 and greater than 2, 7)
Power law with exponent less than or equal to 2. In
particular, power law distributions have a finite mean
only if the exponent is greater than 1, and have a finite
variance only if the exponent exceeds 2.
Our interest is in distinguishing between cases where
tail events dominate impacts, as a formal definition of
the boundary between the categories of distributions
to be considered as Mediocristan and Extremistan. The
natural boundary between these occurs at the subexponential class which has the following property:
Let X = (Xi )1in be a sequence of independent and
identically distributed random variables with support in
the positive real numbers (R+ ), with cumulative distribution function F . The subexponential class of distributions is defined by [19],[20].
1 F 2 (x)
=2
x!+1 1
F (x)
lim
where F 2 = F 0 F is the cumulative distribution of

X1 + X2 , the sum of two independent copies of X.
This implies that the probability that the sum X1 + X2
exceeds a value x is twice the probability that either
one separately exceeds x. Thus, every time the sum
exceeds x, for large enough values of x, the value of
the sum is due to either one or the other exceeding x
the maximum over the two variablesand the other of
them contributes negligibly.
More generally, it can be shown that the sum of n
variables is dominated by the maximum of the values
over those variables in the same way. Formally, the
following two properties are equivalent to the subexponential condition [21],[22]. For a given n
2, let
Sn = ni=1 xi and Mn = max1in xi
a) limx!1
P (Sn >x)
P (X>x)
b) limx!1
P (Sn >x)
P (Mn >x)
= n,
= 1.
Thus the sum Sn has the same magnitude as the

largest sample Mn , which is another way of saying that
tails play the most important role.
Intuitively, tail events in subexponential distributions
should decline more slowly than an exponential distribution for which large tail events should be irrelevant.
Indeed, one can show that subexponential distributions

have no exponential moments:
Z 1
ex dF (x) = +1
0
for all values of " greater than zero. However,the converse isnt true, since distributions can have no exponential moments, yet not satisfy the subexponential
condition.
We note that if we choose to indicate deviations as
negative values of the variable x, the same result holds
by symmetry for extreme negative values, replacing
x ! +1 with x ! 1. For two-tailed variables, we
can separately consider positive and negative domains.
A PPENDIX C
M ATHEMATICAL D ERIVATIONS
OF
F RAGILITY
In this Section we provide a formal definition of fragility

as the detrimental (negative) expected response from
increasing uncertainty. Uncertainty itself arises from deviations from expected conditions. We also show why
fragility is necessarily linked to increasing impact of
larger deviations, i.e. how size matters. The derivations explain, among other things,
How risk associated with events that spread across
the system are much more dangerous than those
that are limited to local areas; the derivations characterize risk spreading as a non-concave response.
Why errors of analysis are a problem in the presence
of nonlinearity.
Why polluting "a little" is qualitatively different
from pollution "a lot."
Why fat tails can arise from accelerating response.
Our analysis is designed to characterize the response
of a system to a distribution of environmental perturbations. It differs from traditional response theory that
considers a systems behavior resulting from a single
precisely defined perturbation [23], and from stochastic
system dynamics that typically considers noise as a well
characterized Normal or other thin tailed distribution
[24], or thermodynamics which considers contact with a
reservoir at a specified temperature [25]. These analyses
do not adequately characterize a system in a far from
equilibrium real world environment often having fat
tailed distributions of perturbations, and whose distributions may be poorly characterized.
In order to describe the system response we assume a
single dimensional measure of the structural integrity of
the system, s. The damage, dissolution or destruction of
the system is measured by the deviation from a reference
value, described by negative values of s of increasing
magnitude. No assumption is made of the existence
of corresponding positive values of improvement in
structure, though such may exist.
We note that this mathematical framework enables
physical system damage to be mapped onto a single
dimension, as is done in market pricing of value, and
18
Prob Density
!K, s" # $s" " % #
"&
!K, s " % #
"
"&
!x " '" f
!x " '" f
!s_ "
!s_ #$s" "
!x" ) x
!x" ) x
Figure 9: A definition of fragility as left tail-vega sensitivity, in other words how an increase in uncertainty
(which includes errors) affects adverse outcomes. The
figure shows the effect of the perturbation of a mesure of
the lower semi-deviation s on the tail integral of (x
) below K, being a centering constant. Centrally, our
detection of fragility does not require the specification of
f the probability distribution.
thus we adopt for fragility the terminology, vega, of
price sensitivity to uncertainty associated with derivatives contracts.
Intrinsic and Inherited Fragility: Our definition of
fragility is two-fold. First, of concern is the intrinsic
fragility, the shape of the probability distribution of a
variable and its sensitivity to s- , a parameter controlling
the left side of its own distribution. But we do not often
directly observe the statistical distribution of objects,
and, if we did, it would be difficult to measure their
tail-vega sensitivity. Nor do we need to specify such
distribution: we can gauge the response of a given object
to the volatility of an external stressor that affects it. For
instance, an option is usually analyzed with respect to
the scale of the distribution of the underlying security,
not its own; the fragility of a coffee cup is determined
as a response to a given source of randomness or stress;
that of a house with respect of, among other sources, the
distribution of earthquakes. This fragility coming from
the effect of the underlying is called inherited fragility.
The transfer function, which we present next, allows
us to assess the effect, increase or decrease in fragility,
coming from changes in the underlying source of stress.
Transfer Function: A nonlinear exposure to a certain
source of randomness maps into tail-vega sensitivity
(hence fragility). We prove that
Inherited Fragility , Concavity in exposure on the left
side of the distribution
and build H, a transfer function giving an exact mapping of tail vega sensitivity to the second derivative
of a function. The transfer function will allow us to
probe parts of the distribution and generate a fragilitydetection heuristic covering both physical fragility and
model error.
Taking z as a stress level and (z) the harm function,

it suffices to see that, with n > 1,
(nz) < n (z) for all 0 < n z < Z
where Z is the level (not necessarily specified) at
which the item is broken. Such inequality leads to (z)
having a negative second derivative at the initial value
z.
So if a coffee cup is less harmed by n times a
stressor of intensity Z than once a stressor of nZ, then
harm (as a negative function) needs to be concave to
stressors up to the point of breaking; such stricture is
imposed by the structure of survival probabilities and
the distribution of harmful events, and has nothing to
do with subjective utility or some other figments. Just
as with a large stone hurting more than the equivalent
weight in pebbles, if, for a human, jumping one millimeter caused an exact linear fraction of the damage
of, say, jumping to the ground from thirty feet, then the
person would be already dead from cumulative harm.
Actually a simple computation shows that he would
have expired within hours from touching objects or
pacing in his living room, given the multitude of such
stressors and their total effect. The fragility that comes
from linearity is immediately visible, so we rule it out
because the object would be already broken and the
person already dead. The relative frequency of ordinary
events compared to extreme events is the determinant.
In the financial markets, there are at least ten thousand
times more events of 0.1% deviations than events of
10%. There are close to 8,000 micro-earthquakes daily
on planet earth, that is, those below 2 on the Richter
scale about 3 million a year. These are totally harmless,
and, with 3 million per year, you would need them to
be so. But shocks of intensity 6 and higher on the scale
make the newspapers. Accordingly, we are necessarily
immune to the cumulative effect of small deviations, or
shocks of very small magnitude, which implies that these
affect us disproportionally less (that is, nonlinearly less)
than larger ones.
Model error is not necessarily mean preserving. s- ,
the lower absolute semi-deviation does not just express
changes in overall dispersion in the distribution, such
as for instance the scaling case, but also changes in
the mean, i.e. when the upper semi-deviation from to
infinity is invariant, or even decline in a compensatory
manner to make the overall mean absolute deviation
unchanged. This would be the case when we shift the
distribution instead of rescaling it. Thus the same vegasensitivity can also express sensitivity to a stressor (dose
increase) in medicine or other fields in its effect on either
tail. Thus s (l) will allow us to express the sensitivity
to the "disorder cluster" in Antifragile: i) uncertainty,
ii) variability, iii) imperfect, incomplete knowledge, iv)
chance, v) chaos, vi) volatility, vii) disorder, viii) entropy,
ix) time, x) the unknown, xi) randomness, xii) turmoil,
xiii) stressor, xiv) error, xv) dispersion of outcomes.
19
C.1
Tail Sensitivity to Uncertainty
The analysis of ruin problems led in the main paper to

a number of conclusions based upon considering events
causing destruction above a well defined level K, the
ruin threshold, and their cumulative probability F (K).
Here we show that the same conclusions apply to the
case of events with different levels of damage where
the extent of that damage matters. We continue to apply
a threshold that differentiates events that do not cause
high levels of devastation from those that do. The analysis thus also applies to "near ruin" problems, i.e, the
difference between destruction of 20% and 30% of the
worlds forests matters and our conclusions apply to this
case as well. This will also allow us to examine how
systems approach ruin.
Formally, we consider a system where events cause
a certain level of losses, X. The losses can be anything
that can be quantified and is undesirable. The variable
X can be an economic measure (a P/L for a portfolio,
unemployment or GDP for a country, value of a companys assets), or epidemiological (number of victims
of a pandemic), ecological (deforestation, biodiversity
loss), or other measures consisting of a single measure
for which larger values correspond to an undesirable
outcome. For consistency with conventions in economic
value, we treat the increasing levels of loss to be represented by negative numbers.
We construct a measure of "vega", that is, the sensitivity to uncertainty, in the left tails of the distribution
that depends on the variations of s the semi-deviation
below a certain level W , chosen in the L1 norm in order
to ensure its existence under "fat tailed" distributions
with finite first semi-moment. In fact s would exist as
a measure even in the case of undefined moments to the
right side of W .
Let X be a random variable, the distribution of which
is one among a one-parameter family of pdf, f , 2 I
R. We consider a fixed reference value and, from this
reference, the "raw" left-semi-absolute deviation:2
Z
s ( )=
( x)f (x)dx
(1)
1
We assume that
! s ( ) is continuous, strictly increasing and spans the whole range R+ = [0, +1),
so that we may use the left-semi-absolute deviation
s as a parameter by considering the inverse function
(s) : R+ ! I, defined by s ( (s)) = s for s 2 R+ .
This condition is for instance satisfied if, for any given
x < , the probability is a continuous and increasing
2. We use a measure related to the left-semi absolute deviation, or

roughly the half the mean absolute deviation (the part in the negative
domain) because 1) distributions are not symmetric and might have
changes on the right of that are not of interest to us, 2) standard
deviation requires finite second moment.
Further, we do not adjust s by its probability with no loss of
generality. Simply, probability in the negative domain is close to 12 and
would not change significantly in response to changes in parameters.
Probabilities in the tails are nonlinear to changes, not those in the body
function of . Indeed, denoting

F (x) = Pf (X < x) =
(2)
f (t) dt,
1
an integration by parts yields:

Z
s ( )=
F (x) dx
1
This is the case when is a scaling parameter, i.e., X

+ (X1 ) indeed one has in this case
x
F (x) = F1 +
,
@F
x
(x) =
f (x) and s ( ) = s (1).
2
@
It is also the case when is a shifting parameter, i.e.
X X0
, indeed, in this case F (x) = F0 (x + ) and
@s
(x)
=
F
().
@
For K < and s 2 R+ , let:
Z K
(K, s ) =
( x)f (s ) (x)dx
(3)
In particular, (, s ) = s . We assume, in a first

step, that the function (K,s ) is differentiable on
( 1, ] R+ . The K-left-tail-vega sensitivity of X at stress
level K < and deviation level s > 0 for the pdf f
is:
V (X, f , K, s ) =
@
(K, s ) =
@s
!
Z
@f )
ds
( x)
dx
@
d
1
(4)
As in the many practical instances where threshold

effects are involved, it may occur that does not depend
smoothly on s . We therefore also define a finite difference
version of the vega-sensitivity as follows:
1
V (X, f , K, s ) =
(K, s + s)
2 s
Z K
f (s + s)(x) f (s
=
( x)
2 s
1
(K, s
s)(x)
s)
dx
(5)
Hence omitting the input s implicitly assumes that

s ! 0.
Note that (K, s ) = E(X|X < K) Pf (X < K). It
can be decomposed into two parts:
K, s ( ) = ( K)F (K) + P (K)
Z K
P (K) =
(K x)f (x) dx
1
(6)
(7)
Where the first part ( K)F (K) is proportional to the

probability of the variable being below the stress level
K and the second part P (K) is the expectation of the
amount by which X is below K (counting 0 when it is
not). Making a parallel with financial options, while s ( )
20
These consequences are even more amplified when the

risk measure applies to a variable that is derived from
that used for estimation, when the relation between the
two variables is strongly nonlinear, as is often the case.
C.2.1
Definition of Fragility: The Intrinsic Case
The local fragility of a random variable X depending on

parameter , at stress level K and semi-deviation level
s ( ) with pdf f is its K-left-tailed semi-vega sensitivity
V (X, f , K, s ).
Figure 10: The different curves of F (K) and F 0 (K)

showing the difference in sensitivity to changes at different levels of K.
is a put at-the-money, (K,s ) is the sum of a put struck
at K and a digital put also struck at K with amount
K; it can equivalently be seen as a put struck at with
a down-and-in European barrier at K.
Letting = (s ) and integrating by part yields
K, s ( ) = (
K)F (K) +
F (x)dx =
1
F K (x) dx
(8)
@
(K, s )
@s
=
For finite differences

V (X, f , K, s ,
s) =
1
2
@F K
(x) dx
1 @
R @F
(x) dx
1 @
C.2
(9)
s( +
s
K
Where
and s are such that
s( s ) = s
s and F K, s (x) = F
+
s
Definition of Fragility: The Inherited Case
Next we consider the particular case where a random

variable Y = '(X) depends on another source of risk X,
itself subject to a parameter . Let us keep the above
notations for X, while we denote by g the pdf of
Y ,Y = '() and u ( ) the left-semi-deviation of Y.
Given a strike level
L = '(K), let us define, as in the case of X :
L, u ( ) =
(Y
(11)
y)g (y) dy
The inherited fragility of Y with respect to X at stress

level L = '(K) and left-semi-deviation level s ( ) of X
is the partial derivative:
(10)
F K, s (x)dx
C.2.2
Where F K (x) = F (min(x, K)) = min (F (x), F (K)),

so that
V (X, f , K, s ) =
The finite-difference fragility of X at stress level K and

semi-deviation level s ( ) s with pdf f is its K-left-tailed
finite-difference semi-vega sensitivity V (X, f , K, s , s).
In this definition, the fragility relies in the unsaid
assumptions made when extrapolating the distribution
of X from areas used to estimate the semi-absolute
deviation s ( ), around , to areas around K on which
the risk measure depends.
) = s + s,
(x)
F K (x).
+
s
Mathematical Expression of Fragility
In essence, fragility is the sensitivity of a given risk measure to an error in the estimation of the (possibly onesided) deviation parameter of a distribution, especially
due to the fact that the risk measure involves parts of the
distribution tails that are away from the portion used
for estimation. The risk measure then assumes certain
extrapolation rules that have first order consequences.
@
VX Y, g , L, s ( ) =
L, u ( ) =
@s
!
Z K
@g
ds
(Y Y )
(y)dy
@
d
1
(12)
Note that the stress level and the pdf are defined
for the variable Y, but the parameter which is used
for differentiation is the left-semi-absolute deviation of
X, s ( ). Indeed, in this process, one first measures the
distribution of X and its left-semi-absolute deviation,
then the function ' is applied, using some mathematical
model of Y with respect to X and the risk measure is
estimated. If an error is made when measuring s ( ), its
impact on the risk measure of Y is amplified by the ratio
given by the inherited fragility.
Once again, one may use finite differences and define
the finite-difference inherited fragility of Y with respect to
X, by replacing, in the above equation, differentiation by
finite differences between values + and , where s ( + )
= s + s and s ( ) = s s.
21
C.3
Effect of Nonlinearity on Intrinsic Fragility
Let us study the case of a random variable Y = '(X); the

pdf g of which also depends on parameter , related
to a variable X by the nonlinear function '. We are
now interested in comparing their intrinsic fragilities.
We shall say, for instance, that Y is more fragilefragile
at the stress level L and left-semi-deviation level u ( )
than the random variable X, at stress level K and leftsemi-deviation level s ( ) if the L-left-tailed semi-vega
sensitivity of Y is higher than the K-left-tailed semivega sensitivity of X :
V (Y, g , L, ) > V (X, f , K, s )
(13)
One may use finite differences to compare the

fragility of two random variables:V (Y, g , L, ) >
V (X, f , K, s). In this case, finite variations must be
comparable in size, namely u/u = s/s .
Let us assume, to start, that ' is differentiable, strictly
increasing and scaled so that Y = '() = . We also
assume that, for any given x < , @F
@ (x) > 0.
In this case, as observed above,
! s ( ) is also
increasing.
Let us denote Gy (y) = Pg (Y < y) . We have:
G ( (x)) = Pg (Y < (y)) = Pf (X < x) = F (x).
(14)
Hence, if (L, u ) denotes the equivalent of (K), s
with variable (Y, g ) instead of (X, f ), we have:
Z
d
L, u ( ) =
F K (x) (x)dx
(15)
dx
1
Because ' is increasing
'(min(x,K)). In particular
( ) = , ( ) =
and
min('(x),'(K))
F K (x)
1
d
(x) dx
dx
(16)
The L-left-tail-vega sensitivity of Y is therefore:
V Y, g , L, u ( ) =
For finite variations:
@F K
(x) ddx (x) dx
1 @
R @F
(x) ddx (x) dx
1 @
d
(x)dx
dx
1
(18)
+
Where +
and
are
such
that
u(
)
=
u
+
u,
u
u
u
K
K
K
u( +
)
=
u
u
and
F
(x)
=
F
(x)
F
(x).
+
, u
u
u
u
Next, Theorem 1 proves how a concave transformation
'(x) of a random variable x produces fragility.
V (Y, g , L, u ( ),
u) =
(17)
2 u
F K,
u (x)
Fragility Transfer Theorem

Theorem 1: Let, with the above notations, ' : R ! R
be a twice differentiable function such that '() =
and for any x < , d'

dx (x) > 0. The random variable
Y = '(X) is more fragile at level L = '(K) and pdf g
than X at level K and pdf f if, and only if, one has:
Z
d2 '
H K (x) 2 (x)dx < 0
dx
1
Where
H K (x) =
@P K
(x)
@
@P K
@P
()
(x)
@
@
@P
()
@
(19)
and where
P (x) =
F (t)dt
(20)
is the price of the put option on X with strike x

and
Z x
P K (x) =
F K (t)dt
1
is that of a "put option" with "strike" x and "European

down-and-in barrier" at K.
H can be seen as a transfer function, expressed as the
difference between two ratios. For a given level x of
the random variable on the left hand side of , the
second one is the ratio of the vega of a put struck at
x normalized by that of a put "at the money" (i.e. struck
at ), while the first one is the same ratio, but where puts
struck at x and are "European down-and-in options"
with triggering barrier at the level K.
The proof is detailed in [26] and [6].
Fragility Exacerbation Theorem
Theorem 2: With the above notations, there exists a
threshold < such that, if K then H K (x) > 0
for x 2 (1, ] with K < l ambda < .As a consequence, if the change of variable ' is concave on
( 1, ] and linear on [ , ], then Y is more fragile
at L = '(K)than X at K.
One can prove that, for a monomodal distribution,
< < (see discussion below), so whatever the
stress level K below the threshold , it suffices that the
change of variable ' be concave on the interval ( 1, ]
and linear on [l ambda, ] for Y to become more fragile
at L than X at K. In practice, as long as the change of
variable is concave around the stress level K and has
limited convexity/concavity away from K, the fragility
of Y is greater than that of X.
Figure 11 shows the shape of H K (x) in the case of
a Gaussian distribution where
is a simple scaling
parameter ( is the standard deviation ) and = 0.
We represented K = 2 while in this Gaussian case,
= 1.585 .
D ISCUSSION
Monomodal case
We say that the family of distributions (f ) is leftmonomodal if there exists K < such that @f
> 0 on (
@
@P
1, ] and @f
6
0
on
[
,
].
In
this
case
is
a convex
@
@
function on the left half-line (1, ], then concave
22
x
P (x) = P1 +
and s ( ) = s (1).
Hence
Figure 11: The Transfer function H for different portions
of the distribution: its sign flips in the region slightly
below
(K, s ( )) = (
K)F1 +
+ P1 +
@
1 @
(K, s ) =
(K, )
@s
s (1) @
1
=
P (K) + ( K)F (K) + (
s ( )
Figure 12: The distribution of G and the various derivatives of the unconditional shortfalls
after the inflexion point . For K , the function

@P K
coincides with @P
on (1, K], then is a linear
@
@
extension, following the tangent to the graph of @P
in
@
@P K
K (see graph below). The value of @ () corresponds
to the intersection point of this tangent with the vertical
axis. It increases with K, from 0 when K ! 1 to a
@P
value above @ () when K = . The threshold
@P K
corresponds to the unique value of K such that @. () =
@P
@P
@P
then G (x) = @ (x) @ ()
@ () . When K <
.
@P K
@P K
and GK (x) = @ (x) @ () are functions such that
G () = GK () = 1 and which are proportional for x
K, the latter being linear on [K, ]. On the other hand,
@P K
@P
if K < then @ () < @ () and G (K) < GK (K),
which implies that G (x) < GK (x) for x K. An
elementary convexity analysis shows that, in this case,
the equation G (x) = GK (x) has a unique solution
with l ambda < < . The transfer function H K (x)
is positive for x < , in particular when x and
negative for < x < .
Scaling Parameter
We assume here that is a scaling parameter, i.e. X =
+ (X1 ). In this case, as we saw above, we have
f (x) =
f1 +
, F (x) = F1 +
(21)
K) f (K)
(22)
When we apply a nonlinear transformation ', the

action of the parameter is no longer a scaling: when
small negative values of X are multiplied by a scalar ,
so are large negative values of X. The scaling applies to
small negative values of the transformed variable Y with
a coefficient d'
dx (0), but large negative values are subject
to a different coefficient d'
dx (K), which can potentially be
very different.
C.4
Fragility Drift
Fragility is defined at as the sensitivity i.e. the first

partial derivative of the tail estimate with respect to
the left semi-deviation s . Let us now define the fragility
drift:
VK0 (X, f , K, s ) =
@2
(K, s )
@K@s
(23)
In practice, fragility always occurs as the result of

fragility, indeed, by definition, we know that (, s ) = s ,
hence V(X, f , , s ) = 1. The fragility drift measures the
speed at which fragility departs from its original value
1 when K departs from the center .
Second-order Fragility
The second-order fragility is the second order derivative
of the tail estimate with respect to the semi-absolute
deviation s :
Vs0 (X, f , K, s ) =
@2
(@s )
2 (K, s
As we shall see later, the second-order fragility drives the

bias in the estimation of stress tests when the value of
s is subject to uncertainty, through Jensens inequality.
23
C.5
Definitions of Robustness and Antifragility
Antifragility is not the simple opposite of fragility, as we

saw in Table 1. Measuring antifragility, on the one hand,
consists of the flipside of fragility on the right-hand side,
but on the other hand requires a control on the robustness
of the probability distribution on the left-hand side.
From that aspect, unlike fragility, antifragility cannot be
summarized in one single figure but necessitates at least
two of them.
When a random variable depends on another source
of randomness: Y = '(X ), we shall study the antifragility of Y with respect to that of X and to the
properties of the function '.
D EFINITION OF R OBUSTNESS
Let (X ) be a one-parameter family of random variables with pdf f . Robustness is an upper control on the
fragility of X, which resides on the left hand side of the
distribution.
We say that f is b-robust beyond stress level K < if
V(X , f , K, s( )) b for any K K. In other words, the
robustness of f on the half-line (1, K] is
R(
1,K] (X
, f , K, s ( )) = max
V (X , f , K 0 , s ( )),
0
K 6K
(24)
so that b-robustness simply means

R(
1,K] (X
, f , K, s ( )) 6 b
We also define b-robustness over a given interval [K1 , K2 ]

by the same inequality being valid for any K 2 [K1 , K2 ].
In this case we use
R[K1 ,K2 ] (X , f , K, s ( )) =
max
K1 6K 0 6K2
V (X , f , K 0 , s ( )).
(25)
Note that the lower R, the tighter the control and the
more robust the distribution f .
Once again, the definition of b-robustness can be transposed, using finite differences V(X , f , K, s ( ), s).
In practical situations, setting a material upper bound
b to the fragility is particularly important: one need to
be able to come with actual estimates of the impact
of the error on the estimate of the left-semi-deviation.
However, when dealing with certain class of models,
such as Gaussian, exponential of stable distributions,
we may be lead to consider asymptotic definitions of
robustness, related to certain classes.
For instance, for a given decay exponent a > 0,
assuming that f (x) = O(eax ) when x ! 1, the aexponential asymptotic robustness of X below the level
K is:
Rexp (X , f , K, s ( ), a)
a( K 0 )
0
= max
e
V
(X
,
f
,
K
,
s
(
))
0
(26)
K 6K
a( K 0 )
when K ! 1, then Rexp = +1 and X is considered as

not a-exponentially robust.
Similarly, for a given power > 0, and assuming that
f (x) = O(x ) when x ! 1, the -power asymptotic
robustness of X below the level K is:
Rpow (X , f , K, s ( ), a) =
max
( K 0 )
0
K 6K
If one of the two quantities e

f (K ) or
0
ea( K ) V (X , f , K 0 , s ( )) is not bounded from above
V (X , f , K 0 , s ( ))
If one of the two quantities
K 0 )
K 0 ) f (K 0 )
(
2
V (X , f , K 0 , s ( ))
is not bounded from above when K 0 !

1, then
Rpow = +1 and X is considered as not -power robust.
Note the exponent 2 used with the fragility, for
homogeneity reasons, e.g. in the case of stable distributions, when a random variable Y = '(X ) depends on
another source of risk X .
Definition 1: Left-Robustness (monomodal distribution). A payoff y = '(x) is said (a, b)-robust below
L = '(K) for a source of randomness X with pdf
f assumed monomodal if, letting g be the pdf of
Y = '(X), one has,for any K 0 K and L = '(K):
VX Y, g , L0 , s ( ) 6 aV X, f , K 0 , s ( ) + b (27)
The quantity b is of order deemed of negligible
utility (subjectively), that is, does not exceed some
tolerance level in relation with the context, while a is
a scaling parameter between variables X and Y.
Note that robustness is in effect impervious to changes
of probability distributions. Also note that this measure
robustness ignores first order variations since owing to
their higher frequency, these are detected (and remedied)
very early on.
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[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
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24
Precaution and GMOs: an Algorithmic

Complexity Approach
Yaneer Bar-Yam , Joseph Norman ,and Nassim Nicholas Taleb
New England Complex Systems Institute,
Real World Risk Institute
SUMMARY: This is a supplement to our Precautionary Principle paper presenting the problem from the
perspective of Computational/Algorithmic Complexity,
which can clarify the risks of GMOs. The point is that
in additional to the change in risk classesthe difference
between conventional breeding and transgenics may
change the complexity class associated with the problem
of harm evaluation.
Our PP approach
Our analysis of the risk of GMOs in the preliminary
version of the PP paper [1] was probabilistic, based upon
the conjunction of three problems
the opacity of tail risks: the difficulty of obtaining information now about potential deferred future harm
to health or the environment
the systemic consequences of fat tailed events in
GMO risks that are not present in conventional
breeding and agricultural technology innovation
the difference lies in the absence of passive barriers
or reactive circuit-breakers (a term also used in market regulation) that limit the propagations of errors
for GMOs to prevent wider damage.
that measures of harm scale nonlinearly with measures of impact, e.g., a reduction of 10% in crop
production or genetic diversity can multiply the
harm to social systems or ecologies by orders of
magnitude.
The problem of identifying the harm analytically arises

because of the many ways that, e.g., insertion of a gene
from another species, can affect molecular, cellular, physiological, and other organismal aspects of the organism,
and those modifications may impact long term health or
agricultural and ecological systemsimpacts that may
be unobserved due to the complexity of societal changes
in the absence of monitoring. Unintended effects arise
from the many interactions that are possible, and increasing global connectivity that converts local to systemic
risks. The ecosystem and civilization are at risk due
to the absence of boundaries of GMO use in human

consumption or ecological systems globally.
Boundedness of conventional breeding
Counter to the idea that GMOs are similar to natural
evolution or breeding, the viability and other qualities
of offspring from the mating of two members of the
same species implies the range of outcomes of breeding
is bounded. Offspring that arise within a species must
have high probability of long term compatibility with
other members of the species and contextual ecology.
Otherwise the species and the ecosystem of which it is
part would not have persisted over many generations.
The same statement need not be true of GMOs.
Indeed the reason that GMOs are being introduced
is that (1) GMOs depart significantly from the set of
organisms that can arise through breeding, (2) Many
of the advantages of breeding have been explored and
exploited.
Unfortunately, the FDA does not require testing of
GMOs as it has accepted industry claims that GMOs
are no different from conventional breeding. This means
there are few, and surely insufficient, tests of the harm
that might be causedor monitoring of the effects.
Some believeand have convinced othersthat they
can "figure out" what the effect of GMO modifications
is and consider that unintended consequences will not
occur. This is a stretch: "Figuring out" the impact of GMO
modifications may very well not be possible. We do not
mean unlikely due to current computational restrictions
and the state of science, but literally impossible.
NP computational limits and impossibility
There are many problems that are intractable because
the level of effort to solve them grows rapidly with the
dimension of the problem. Thus, for example, it is widely
believed by mathematicians that NP-complete problems
(e.g. traveling salesman problem, boolean satisfiability
problem) cannot be solved for large enough problems
because the level of effort grows more than polynomially
in the size of the system. We may check a solution if we

know it in polynomial time but cannot guarantee that
we can derive it. Whether NP-complete or not, there is a
wide range of problems whose computation time grows
exponentially.
These problemsthose exponential rather than polynomial growthare deemed impossible to solve for
large systems.
Is the determination of harm from GMOs such a
hard" problem? Identifying all of the possible consequences of GMO modifications may very well involve
combinatorially many effects to consider in the interaction of one (or more) new genes with the other genes,
other organisms, agricultural and ecological processes.
(The need for combinatorial numbers of observations
for behavioral characterizations of such complex systems
has been previously discussed [2].) On the other hand,
the limitations that exist on the traits of members of
the same species suggest that the probability of harm
in breeding is constrained, and the generally incremen-
tal impact of breeding suggests a much lower if not

well characterized computational effort to determine it.
Therefore outcomes of breeding are more amenable to
testing or analysis in comparison to GMOs, including
the projection of future harm.
Advanced complex systems science methodologies exist that can identify large scale impacts without characterizing all details of a system [3]. However their
application to the system of harm and risk in the context
of genetic modification that is pervasively present in the
system has to be established, and is not yet available to
address the current risks being taken.
R EFERENCES
[1] N. N. Taleb, R. Read, R. Douady, J. Norman, and Y. Bar-Yam, The
precautionary principle (with application to the genetic modification of organisms), arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.5787, 2014.
[2] Y. Bar-Yam, The limits of phenomenology: From behaviorism to
drug testing and engineering design, Complexity, 2015.
[3] Y. Bar-Yam and M. Bialik, Beyond big data: Identifying important
information for real world challenges, ArXiv, 2013.

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FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

Mathematical Foundations for the Precautionary

Principle of Probabilistic Sustainability

Technical definition of Fat Tails

I. O N THE FALLACY OF U SING S TATE -S PACE

Remark 1. If you take the risk any risk repeatedly, the

Fig. 1. Ensemble probability vs. time probability discussions, from Peters

[ This is a special case of the conflation between a random

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

In the presence of terminal that is, irreversible, ruin, every

In Eq. 3 we took the

Note: we can also approach the proof more formally in a

Commentary 5. In their magisterial paper, Peters and

As we can see by making T < 1, by recursing the law of

Commentary 4. What we showed here is that unless one

other what is called ergodicity. In that sense, when analyzing

The usual solution to this path dependence if it depends

B. Adaptation of Theorem 1 to Brownian Motion

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

barrier. In place of the simplified representation we would

Now, we do not have to take t ! 1 nor do is permanent

where Z is a random variable.

For the more general Lvy process (i.e. fat tails), we

Commentary 6. We switched the focus from probability

Principle 1. A unit needs to take any risk as if it were going to

Remark 2 (The fat tails argument). The more a system is

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

III. W HY I NCREASE IN "B ENEFITS " U SUALLY I NCREASES

A. Scale vs. Location

Let (K) , @ @s(.) |x=K and (K)+ , @ @s(.) |x=K be the

and (K)+ , @ @l(.) |x=K be the "delta" that is sensitivity to

Why should uncertainty about climate models lead to a more

smooth and have the expressions above in either of the open

Thanks to the Karamata Tauberian theorem, we can refine

Theorem 2 (scale/location tradeoff). There exists, for any

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

1) Examples: For a LogNormal Distribution with paramex l

has for derivatives (K)+ =

, and the ratio r =

B. Shape vs. location

Probability distributions range between extreme thin-tailed

IV. T ECHNICAL DEFINITION OF FAT TAILS

Theorem 3 (tail shape/location tradeoff). There exists, for a

We note the role of shape vs scale:

Commentary 8. We can show the effect of changes in

where F 2 = F 0 F is the cumulative distribution of X1 +X2 ,

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

V. O N THE U NRELIABILITY OF H YPOTHESIS TESTING FOR

The derivations in this section were motivated during the

Earlier attempts for an explicit meta-distribution in the

Assume that we knew the "true" p-value, ps , what would its

an in-sample .01 p-value has a significant probability of

Although with compact support, the distribution exhibits

A. Proofs and derivations

FAT TAILS RESEARCH PROGRAM

Proposition 2. Under the same assumptions as above, the

(11) where erfc(.) is the complementary error function and

53% of realizations <.05

where I(.,.) is the incomplete Beta function.

We can convert into the corresponding median survival

pM } (positive case) and { : 12 I 2 12 , n2 + 1 = pM }

g() = P(Z > ) = 1

25% of realizations <.01

Fig. 4. The probability distribution of a one-tailed p-value with expected