Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Department of Justice
A 200-154-729
Date of this notice: 3/21/2016
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Doruu...
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
(1/Vu
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Guendelsberger, John
0 1 Leary, Brian M.
Grant, Edward R.
Userteam: Docket
Date:
MAR t
2 015
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se
APPLICATION: Reopening
The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed _from the United States
in absentia on January 14, 2014, after not appearing at a hearing. He appeals from the
Immigration Judge's decision dated October 9, 2014, denying his June 13, 2014, motion to
reopen. The Board defers to the factual findings of an Immigration Judge, unless they are clearly
erroneous, but it retains independent judgment and discretion, subject to applicable governing
standards, regarding questions of law and the application of a particular standard of law to those
facts. 8 C.F.R. 1003. l(d)(3)(i), (ii). Under the totality of the circumstances, we are persuaded
by the respondent's argument that the Immigration Judge should have exercised his sua sponte
authority to reopen these proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(l). See also Matter of J-J-,
21 I&N Dec. 976 {BIA 1997).
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained, the in absentia order of removal is rescinded, these
proceedings are reopened, and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
foregoing opinion.
FOR TlIEBO
Cite as: Israel Francisco Lagunas, A200 154 729 (BIA March 21, 2016)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE MATTER OF
LAGUNAS, ISRAEL FRANCISCO
FILE A 200-154-729
COURT
Qlvu40
IMMIGRATION COURT
CC:
I
FF
A 200154 729
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
CHARGE:
APPLICATION:
Motion to Reopen
ON BEHALF OF THE DBS:
Office of the Chief Counsel- ICE
Department of Homeland Security
606 South Olive Street, Eighth Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90014
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The affidavit supporting the pending motion loosely describes a bout of depression
during which the affiant, Juan Carlos Aburto, called the respondent while scrolling through his
cellphone directory. He claims the respondent helped calm him down until his wife got home.
Several months later, the affiant alleges that the respondent told him that he missed his
Immigration Court date as a result of their telephone conversation and the affiant agreed to write
the affidavit.
The facts, even taken as true, do not meet the requirements of section 240(e){l) of the
INA. The section has four enumerated categories: (1) battery; (2) extreme cruelty to the alien,
child of alien, parent of alien; (3) serious illness of alien; (4) serious illness or death of the
spouse, child, or parent of the alien. The Ninth Circuit has largely rejected excuses other than
those enumerated as less than exceptional circumstances. Valencia-Fragoso v. INS, 321 F.3d
1204 (9th Cir. 2003) (misunderstanding about time); Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1996)
(traffic and parking issues); In re B-A-S-, 22 l&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1998) (minor sickness or injury).
Here, the respondent clearly does not fit into the first three enumerated categories. The
affiant is not a family member of the respondent suffering from serious illness or injury as
contemplated by section 240(e)(l) the INA. The affiant's relationship with the respondent
cannot even be analogized to a close family relationship: the affiant did not recognize the voice
of the respondent when he called or know the respondent's last name, and admits they only came
into contact occasionally as members of the same apartment complex.
The affiant does not even state whether the alleged conversation actually extended to the
time of the respondent's hearing. In addition, the respondent failed to personally substantiate,
summarize, or explain the allegations contained in the affidavit and as a result has not met his
burden of providing "specific detailed evidence" to prove exceptional circumstances. See Celis
Castellano, 298 F.3d at 890. Finally, the affiant's statements directly contradict the statements
2
An alien may seek to rescind an in absentia order of removal within 180 days of the
issuance of such order if she can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances prevented her
appearance at the hearing. Exceptional circumstances refer to situations beyond the respondent's
control, such as serious illness of the respondent or serious illness or death of the spouse, child,
or parent of the respondent,but not including less compelling circumstances. Section 240(e)(l)
of the Act. In determining whether a respondent's absence is due to exceptional circumstances,
the Court looks at the ''totality of the circumstances." See Matter of W-F-, 21 l&N Dec. 503
(BIA 1996); Matter of Shaar, 21 l&N Dec. 541 (BIA 1996). A motion to reopen based on
exceptional circumstances must be supported by specific, detailed evidence. Celis-Castellano v.
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court may also weigh the alien's probability of
obtaining relief from deportation. Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037,1038-1040 (9th Cir. 2002); In re
B-A-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 57, 59 (1998). Because motions to reopen are reviewed without further
factual hearing, facts alleged in accompanying affidavits are regarded as true unless "inherently
unbelievable." Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977,987 (9th Cir. 2005),Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d
710,213 (9th Cir. 1991).
of the respondent's own counsel during the January 14, 2014, in absentia hearing when he stated
that the respondent could not be present because he was "on the computer."
Accordingly, the following order shall be entered:
ORDER
DATE:
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Immigration Judge
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