Process used for identification and

management of hazards associated with

hot work in a hazardous zone.

Austar Coal Mine

Located approximately 10kms south west of Cessnock.

Mines the Greta seam of coal.
Owned by Yancoal Australia Pty Ltd .
Introduced the top coal caving technology to Australia in 2006
(LTCC).
Seam gas content of the Greta Seam is 0.4m3 / tonne, of this 90%
CO2 and 10% CH4.Therefore very small amounts of methane
detected.

b1

Roof Shield Repair Area

CHPP

PROPOSED
SHAFTS +
KITCHENER
FACILITY

PIT TOP

#1 SHAFT
Vent + 2nd Egress

#3 and #4
VENT
SHAFTS

MINING AREA
WHERE
REPAIRS
OCCURRED

PROPOSED WORKINGS
OLD ABANDONED WORKINGS
#2 SHAFT - Flooded

Slide 3
b1

bmckay, 3/11/2010

Repair Background
Recently, an incident occurred on the longwall face, where damage was
caused to two of the 6 legged tailgate shields (Number 122 and 123). The
shield clevises were subjected to excessive tensile forces resulting in a
ductile failure when the shield canopy was raised to the roof in a localised
cavity.
Due to the unique operation of the shields, the middle two hydraulic
cylinders (legs), were raised by the outer legs extending them into this
cavity. This caused severe damage to the shield canopy middle clevises.
A decision was made by Austar management to repair as soon as
possible. The ongoing operation of these shields and possibly the
adjacent shields, was definitely not sustainable. This was due to an
estimated 50% reduction in roof support density (estimated by OEM
Design Engineer) above any one shield that was not operating as it was
designed.

Longwall Equipment

Damaged Clevis of 123

Shield

Top Cylinder Pin Locating

Bore

Top of a Typical Shield Leg

Methodology
Identification of Repair Options and Risk Assessment
A group of employees including mine workers, tradesmen,
engineers, management, OEM representatives and a local
check inspector were involved in an options evaluation. A risk
assessment to determine the best options available to repair the
shield, included the following 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Continue to operate the longwall with the damaged clevis

Remove the canopy and repair at the workshop
Remove the entire shield and repair at the workshop
Replace the shield
Install a bolt on clevis
Weld the clevis

Considerations
Adherence to and compliance with relevant guidelines, standards and
legislation were considered throughout the process, with particular
focus on:

OHS Act 2000

CMHSR 2006
MDG 25 removal or coverage of flammable materials.
All loose coal removed inclusive of accumulations on the canopy.
AS1674.1 Safety in Welding & Allied Processes
Part 1: Fire Precautions
AS1674.2 Classification of Welding Environment
Part 2: Category C environment
AS1674.2 Safety in Welding & Allied Processes
Part 2: Electrical

Considerations
Audit check lists were developed for MDG25 and were included in all
site Safe Work Procedures

Repair Option Evaluation

Option

Major Advantage

Major Disadvantage

1/ Use hot work to

repair the clevis

Would result in the

Required an
normal shield operation exemption for hot work
The quickest solution
in the hazardous zone
Dust explosion

2/ Install a bolt on
fork clevis

Eliminated the
welding process from
hot work activities

Hot work was still

required
As a result of drilling
processes the OEM
identified that the
structural integrity of
the shield canopy
would result

Repair Option Evaluation

Option
3/ Remove the
damaged
canopies and
transport to a
workshop

Major Advantage

Major Disadvantage

A full repair would be

completed
Repairs undertaken in
a normal environment

No roof support while

the canopy was
removed
Hot work may be
required for lemniscate
pin removal
Risks associated with
the removal of a 7
tonne canopy
underground

Repair Option Evaluation

Option

Major Advantage

Major Disadvantage

4/ Continue to
operated with the
damaged clevis

No underground
repairs required

Uncontrolled canopy
movement during
operation
Reduced support
density
Shield operation
slower

5/ Remove the
shields for
workshop repairs

No hot work required

underground

No roof support the

beginning and end of
this process

6/ Replace the
No hot work required
shield with a similar underground
unit

A very complex
operation

Evaluation Outcome
The group believed with the appropriate controls in place,
welding on the LW face had the lowest level of risk.

Notification to I&I NSW

Notification of a High Risk Activity
CMH&S Reg 2006
Clause 49 High Risk Activities.
Cutting or welding in a hazardous zone underground required the following:
Risk Assessments.
Consultation and meetings with all stakeholders including DII
representatives.
Review of the Austar Cutting and Welding Management Plan.
Guidance Note GNC-009 requirements to be adhered too.
A summary of risks identified and controls to be implemented.
A drawing displaying the location where the hot work was to be
undertaken and the associated equipment required for the task.

Exemption
Austar Coal Mine applied for an exemption under
CMHSR2006 clause 19 (1) (c). Specifically this was for the use
of non Gazetted electrical equipment in the hazardous zone.
The exemption was time limited therefore Austar could not
allow for any major delay during the repair process. A detailed
time line was developed which included contingencies.

Major Hazards and Issues

Identified for Hot Work
Issue
Hot material

Consequence
Damages hydraulic hoses which
could lead to high pressure fluid
being released
Electrical equipment damaged

Welding in a wet / damp

environment

Personnel receive electric shock

during welding

Non explosion proof equipment

Gas Ignition

Ineffective welding

Another clevis failure

Dust

Explosion

Further Details

The Mig welder powered from a 1000 to 415 volt transformer. The
primary welding machine was a MIG Kempi Master 5001.

The 415 volt outlets of this transformer provided earth leakage

protection. This was achieved by using 10mA earth leakage circuit
breakers.

This transformer was powered via a 50mm squared cable from the
longwall substation.

A spotter was positioned at an emergency stop while ever welding

occurred. This emergency stop tripped the 1000 to 415 volt
transformer.

Existing tailgate methane detectors were configured to trip the

welding transformer and the shield electrics if 0.25% was detected.

A spotter was positioned at emergency oxygen acetylene shut off

valves when this equipment was being used.

WELDING
SITE

415v TO
1000v
TRANSFORMER

AIR
FLOW

A3 Block
Retreat Direction

HAND HELD GAS

MONITORING DEVICE SET
TO ALARM AT 0.25%
ADJACENT TO WELDING
SITE

WELDING POINTS

124

X
X

PROPSETTERS & BRATTICE

TIGHT ROOF TO FLOOR

X
OXY ACETYLENE BOTTLES
MINIMUM 3m APART

DCB

TX

0.9
LnL

MIG GAS

T/G

WELDING POD

WING TO BE ADJUSTED FOR

VENTILATION REGULATION

BRATTICE WINGS

AIR
FLOW

5m

0.9
LnL

0.9
LnL

GOAF

0.9
LnL

0.9
LnL

9ct

EXISTING
QUIKSEAL
PARTIALLY
REMOVED
FOR
VENTILATION

PERMANENT GOAF
STREAM SAMPLE POINT
TUBE BUNDLE POINT No 5

Instruction

16 site specific Safe Work Procedures were developed. These

procedures ranged from the preparation of the site right through to
the recommissioning of the shields.

#124

Prop Setters
x 2 off

Link n lock
packing
CST DRIVE

Safe work procedures were formatted in a way that allowed

individuals to sign off as each step was completed.

Special Preparation
The Boilermakers and equipment needed to meet Austar and
OEM competency requirements. A trial welding programme using
these people and equipment was undertaken in the OEMs
workshop.
Welding equipment and compliance to MDG25 & AS 1674.2.
Non Destructive Testing personnel competence Australian
Institute for Non Destructive Testing.
Site preparation had to be audited prior to hot work commencing.
This was undertaken by the MME, MEE & MME.
I&I instructed the Austar MME, MEE & MME or their nominated
delegates to audit the site every 24 hours.
I&I randomly audited the welding site during the project.
Continuous monitoring of the atmosphere was undertaken by a
mine official.

Application of the
Hierarchy of Controls
During the hot work repairs
The OEM designed and supplied a shear pin to be installed on
the bottom leg clevis. This was rated at 33.6 tonnes and was
designed to fail, prior to any structural damage occurring.
During the subsequent longwall relocation
The capabilities of the top clevis were increased during the
longwall relocation. This still incorporated the shear pin.
Longer Term
Continued mechanical and structural improvements with the six
legged shields.
Replace the six legged shields with four legged types

Summary of Shield Repairs

All personnel involved contributed positively and professionally.
The repairs were completed as per plans and without an incident.
A failure of one welding machine occurred during the repair
process.
No extra ordinary hazards or conditions were encountered during
the entire repair process.