Understanding Modern Piracy:

Terrorists and their Maritime Campaign

A Global Analysis Briefing by the GreySide Group

Alex Popovic
2010 Corporate Ridge, Suite 700
McLean, Virginia 22102
Ph: 703.774.9567
Fx: 703.774.9568
www.GreySideGroup.com
www.Protectyourships.com

The last several years have seen an unprecedented growth in piracy worldwide,
particularly around failing or failed states, and states faced with internal political and
economical unrest. The Maritime environment has remained relatively unscathed from
terrorist acts against it, but a catastrophic and destructive campaign looms eerily on the
horizon.
Many analysts and experts have weighed in over how to deal with piracy as a standalone problem and asked the ubiquitous question, is there a connection between piracy
and terrorism? Pros and cons from both sides have been vehemently argued on how to
stem or curb piracy. However, one fact remains steadfast, the problem has become
more complex and multi-faceted from both internal and external pressures. Evidence
suggests there is no collaboration between pirates and terror groups within Somalia and
surrounding countries, only that the potential exists. However a recent US State
Department internal memo points to a marriage of convenience for pirates and
terrorists. The U.S. State Department has drawn links between Al-Qaeda-linked
terrorists and Somalia pirates, describing occasional marriages of convenience as well
as turf wars between the two over money received through ransom payments made by
ship-owners.1
The Progression
Afghanistan
Shortly after the departure of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan, the Taliban came to
power and immediately set up a strict state of Islam led by the interpretation of Sharia
Law that ruled and governed the majority of the populations day-to-day lives.
Afghanistan, at the time ranked amongst one of the worlds poorest countries with no
functioning government, and off shoots of different warlords commanding allegiance of
fighters scattered throughout the country. The Northern Alliance (NA) was the main
effort committed to fight and overthrow the Taliban, with quiet backing and monetary
support from the United States, however, they were isolated both geographically and in
numbers, much like the Transitional Federation Government (TFG) in Somalia. It had
the political and limited surreptitious backing of Western Governments but not much
else. The vacuum left by the departure of the Soviet Union and the fact that Afghanistan
was the poorest country and ranked last on the failed states index, much like Somalia
today, spawned a breeding ground for terrorists to carry out operations worldwide, the
ultimate nail in the coffin for the entire western world was the collaboration between Al
Qaeda and the Taliban.

As of today, we have been involved in Afghanistan longer than any war in history, and
the entire world is collectively committed to re-building the country. The rational being,
we cannot allow the country to slide back to its lawless ways that provided a staging
ground for attacks against the West. To date the Afghan war has cost the US alone,
which includes FY 2011 requests, $455.4 billion dollars.2

Lloyds List, 18 February, 2011,

www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article356560.ece
2
Belasco, Amy, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terrorism
Operations Since 9/11. September 2, 2010. PG 3.

Since March 2008, the greatest producer of opium in the world, ahead of Burma
(Myanmar) is Afghanistan. In 2007, 92% of the opiates on the world market, originated
in Afghanistan.3 This amounts to an export value of about $64 billion dollars, with
proceeds going to district officials, warlords, insurgents (Taliban and Al Qaeda) and drug
traffickers.4 This business model, has become a blueprint for terrorist affiliates and spin
off groups loyal to Al-Qaeda elsewhere in the world i.e. they utilize what ever they can
regionally to fund operations elsewhere globally, clearly ships cannot be pirated or
attacked from landlocked Afghanistan, however, Somalia, Yemen, Djibouti and other
geographical areas afford the opportunity to attack western interests and profit from such
activities both in terms of political clout and monetary gain.
Somalia
Al Shabaab (The Youth), a relatively unknown Islamic Militant Group, much like the
Taliban in the 1990s, came to prominence in Somalia in approximately 2002, since then
it has been designated a terrorist organization by several western countries and security
organizations and described as having pledged allegiance and ties to Al Qaeda (The
Base). 5 Because of its opinions and methods, Al Shabaab has been compared to the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As of the summer of 2010, the group controls most
of the southern and central parts of Somalia along with swaths of the capital, Mogadishu.
It has been actively fighting the Transitional Federation Government (TFG); which was
established in November 2004 and is backed by the United Nations, African Union and
United States, and has maintained that it will not stop fighting until Somalia is entirely
under the rule of strict Sharia law. The two countries juxtaposed are almost identical in
religious culture, political disposition, and ambitions of the pro Islamic fighters within their
borders.
According to recent IMB reports, Somali pirates took a record 1,181 crew hostage and
seized 53 vessels last year, all but four were taken off the coast of Somalia and
Yemen. Currently Somali pirates are holding 31 vessels and 713 crewmembers after
hijacking another 6 ships already this year, overall there were 445 pirate attacks
last year, a 10% rise over 2009, conservative numbers put the cost to the international
community at $12 billion dollars, eight crew members diedall attributed to Somali
pirates.6
Yemen
Today half the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay are from Yemen and the last two attacks
against the U.S. homeland have originated in Yemen. With U.S. focus elsewhere in the
world this remote, lawless country has now emerged as the main staging area for
attacks against the West, racked with internal strife, and political instability, there are no
easy fixes and few good options.

3 UNITED NATIONS Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007,
4 UNODC (2008-11-16). Opium Amounts to Half of Afghanistans GDP in 2007,
Reports UNODC.
5

Jon Lee Anderson, Letter from Mogadishu, the Most Failed State, The New Yorker,
December 14, 2009, p. 64
6
International Maritime Bureau, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, January 17, 2009

Yemen is a country of 23 million people and has a whole lot more guns, Yemens
beleaguered government has been fighting a tribal war in the North, an armed
secessionist movement in the South and a growing insurgency by Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), it is now the most active branch of the Al Qaeda network.
According to the former U.S. ambassador Edmund Hall, who served in Yemen as
ambassador immediately following 9/11, terrorists in Yemen are the most pressing
threat against the U.S. Homeland and western interests in the area.
Terrorists have made their presence felt far beyond their sanctuary in Yemen. The failed
suicide bombing of a jet liner in Detroit on Christmas, the bomber was trained and
outfitted with explosives sewn into his underwear in Yemen and then there were two
Chicago bound bombs that were supposed to blow up UPS and FedEx planes last
October, they too originated in Yemen and were highly sophisticated and concealed in
ink cartridges.
In many ways Yemen, just like Somalia and Afghanistan is a perfect safe haven for Al
Qaeda and its affiliates, there is a strong fraternity of former Jihadist who fought the
Russians in Afghanistan and it has the most porous borders and ports that make it very
easy to smuggle people and weapons in and out of. The government has little control of
the country outside of the capital, just like in Afghanistan, and Somalia being far worse.
Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world; there is a critical shortage of water, food
and jobs, making it a prime recruiting area for terrorists. The current autocratic
government of Ali-Abdullah Saleh has been described as completely powerless.
In the past 9 months there have been 2 terrorist attacks in the streets of Yemen against
British and US embassy personnel and one against the British ambassador.
The First Two Attacks
The first two documented attacks against ships were both aimed at US Military vessels.
On October 12, 2000, USS Cole, set into Aden, Yemen for a routine fuel stop at 1118
(local time) when a small craft approached the port side and an explosion occurred,
putting a 40 X 40 foot gash in the ships side. According to former CIA intelligence officer
Robert Finke the explosion appeared to be caused by explosives molded into a shape
charge against the hull of the ship.7 Around 400-700 pounds of explosives were used.8
One less known fact the general public may or may not be aware of was that on January
3, 2000, Al Qaeda attempted a similar attack on the US Navy destroyer USS The
Sullivans (DDG-68) while in port at Aden, Yemen. The plan was to load a boat full of
explosives and detonate it at the Sullivans hull at the water line. However the attack
boat was so overladen with explosives it sank. Al-Qaeda lethally demonstrated that it
had learned its lesson.910

Burden of proof, CNN May 27, 2010

Whitaker, Brian (August 21, 2003) Bomb type and tactics point to Al-Qaida
9
Terrorism 2000/2001. Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Government
Printing Office 2004, 306-694
10
Piszkiewicz, Dennis (2003). Terrorism's war with America: a history. Westport, Conn.:
Praeger. pp. 123.
8

The Third Attack and the First Against Commercial Shipping

On October 6, 2002, the Limburg was carrying 397,000 barrels of crude oil from Iran to
Malaysia, and was in the Gulf of Aden off Yemen to pick up another load of oil. It was
registered under a French-flag and had been chartered by the Malaysian petrol firm
Petronas. A dinghy laden with explosives rammed the commercial vessel on the
starboard side and detonated. The explosion caused massive damage and a fire
ensued, spilling 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden. Yemeni officials claimed the
explosion was the cause of an accident, however, further investigations found traces of
TNT on the damaged ship. It became apparent this was an intentional act, not an
accident.
The damage to the vessel was estimated at approximately $45 million USD, the vessel
was sold to Tanker Pacific in 2003 who renamed it the Maritime Jewel, an additional
$8.5 million USD was needed to repair the vessel.
This singular attack caused the short-term collapse to international shipping in the Gulf
of Aden. Ultimately, Al Qaeda accepted responsibility for the attack, and the mastermind
behind the USS Cole bombing was discovered to be the mastermind behind the Limburg
bombing. The attack was almost identical, but it wouldnt be the last.
The Fourth and Fifth Attacks
On August 19, 2005, the USS Ashland (LSD-48) and the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) were
targeted by 3 Katyusha rockets while in port in Aqaba, Jordan. The vessels were not hit,
but one Jordanian soldier was killed and another wounded after two rockets hit nearby
docks. The Abdullah Azzam Shaheed Brigade claimed responsibility, an Al Qaeda
associated terrorist group.11
The Sixth Attack Against Commercial Shipping
Early on the morning of July 28, 2010, the M Star, a supertanker operated by Mistui OSK
lines, was bound for China carrying 2.3 million barrels of oil. A crewmember reported
seeing a flash of light right before the explosion, shortly after midnight. Initial reports by
Mitsui OSK officials stated that a terrorist attack which could stir fears, was caused by
rouge wave of unusual strength, then by a mine remaining from the Iran, Iraq war and
finally a collision with a submarine.12 In the ensuing days amid a PR nightmare and an
attempt to assuage fears of a terrorist attack, the company further said that seismic
activity was the cause of the large square shaped dent on the starboard side at the
water line. The U.S. Geological Survey said it had no reports of earthquakes in the area
at all on the night of the attack.13

11

Gaoutte, Mark (2010). Cruising For Trouble: Cruise Ships as Soft Targets for Pirates,
Terrorists and Common Criminals ABC-CLIO. pp 66-67.
12
July 29, 2010: Reuters, http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/07/29/updatemitsui-osk-hires-military-specialist-tanker-check/
13
July 29, 2010: MSNBC.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38443382/ns/world_newsmideast/n_africa/

Over the next few days as the ship was inspected in the Port of Fujairah, it quickly
became apparent forensically that the vessel had been attacked. "An examination
carried out by specialized teams confirmed that the tanker had been the subject of a
terrorist attack," the official WAM news agency said, quoting a UAE coastguard. "UAE
explosives experts who collected and examined samples found a dent on the starboard
side above the waterline and remains of homemade explosives on the hull. Probably the
tanker had encountered a terrorist attack from a boat laden with explosives."14 Two days
later an Al Qaeda affiliate known as the Brigades of Abdullah Azzam claimed
responsibility for the attack. One website showed a photograph of the alleged bomber
pointing at an image of the tanker on a laptop.
Fortunately the double hull wasnt penetrated and no oil leaked out, the monetary
damage to the vessel remains unknown.
The International Role Against Piracy and Terrorism
As in World Wars I and II, the U.S. Navy has had a definite, significant and traditional
role, with missions on front lines, in fighting and defeating global threats. However the
clarity of its missions have become blurred with Pirates and Terrorists operating in the
same geographical area. Conversely, the intent of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in different
geographical regions is to attack U.S. and Western economic and military assets and the
large, lucrative targets maritime vessels present. The history of attacks described herein
clearly demonstrates a coming and expansive maritime terrorist campaign.
The current Naval Presence comprised of Task Force Atalanta, and Coalition Task
Force (CTF) 150/151 while notable, has for all practicality proven to be inept and an utter
failure at curbing or even deterring piracy, the statistics clearly demonstrate as much.
The Western Worlds Governments have assuaged the call for a limited military
presence to combat piracy, but their efforts are analogous to placing a Band-Aid on a
bleeding wound. The resources, money and political will needed to effectively thwart
piracy in a bad neighborhood are simply not viable options. This problem is viewed, as
one the industry collectively needs to deal with. Faced with a massive worldwide
recession, cut backs to spending, countries on the brink of economic collapse, resources
allocated in Iraq and Afghanistan and combating terrorists worldwide, there simply isnt
the fiscal or political will to do more. Nation rebuilding in Somalia isnt going to happen
any time soon and the problem will only get worse before it gets better. The U.S. and
the U.N. tried once already in 1993 and we all know that outcome. The pirates are
clearly taking advantage of this as will terrorists in the near future. The question to the
commercial shipping industry becomes, how long will you kick the can down the road,
before you finally pick it up and do something to protect your vessels, cargo but most
importantly your crews?

14

August 6, 2010: Guardian.co.uk,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/06/japanese-oil-tanker-terrorist-explosives

Conclusion
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have demonstrated glaring traits; patience, intricate planning
and refinement of attacks over long periods of time, rather than an irregular pattern of
attacks. In order to carry out a sustained effort of attacks financing becomes necessary.
The business model that Somali pirates have developed due to many factors in the
region makes them a ripe target for a violent takeover of their operations, or at a
minimum a collaborative effort. For the Task Forces in the area under fire for their
limited contributions to maintaining open and free Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC)
their presence has developed a false sense of security for the commercial shipping
world. Of greater concern should be the belief that these terrorist attacks against both
military and civilian ships are somehow sporadic incidents rather than an extensive
campaign that will intensify very shortly. Al-Qaeda has shown as much elsewhere in the
world and the Gulf of Aden will prove no different. In the end, ship owners and the
industry as a whole, must take proactive steps to protect their own interests against the
looming threat. The monetary loss, environmental impact, public relations fall out and
ensuing litigation will cost far more money than any proactive actions taken to prevent
such an attack in the first place, the cost benefit analysis is glaringly obvious. The
shipping companies rationale seems to be a crapshoot, hopefully they wont roll a seven
or eleven.

About GreySide Group, Inc.

GreySide Group, Inc. was founded by Alex Popovic in 2003 and specializes in threat
assessment and management solutions for companies. Mr. Popovic has personally
transited the Gulf of Aden providing security with his employees to witness the piracy
problem first hand aboard US and Foreign flagged vessels. He has spoken at numerous
events and written extensively about the cost benefit of outsourcing security. GreySide
Group is a full spectrum security company operating in high and low threat environments
both domestically and abroad. Selected by certain Lloyds underwriters and certain
shipping companies worldwide as their exclusive maritime security provider, Greyside
Group has established itself as the market leader for armed maritime security.
Corporate Headquarters
2010 Corporate Ridge Drive, Suite 700,
McLean, Virginia 22102
Ph: 703-774-9567
Fx: 703-774-9568
www.GreySideGroup.com
www.Protectyourships.com
2010 GreySide Group, Inc. All Rights Reserved Worldwide
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