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Ummah in Zomba: Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in

Malawi
Willemijn Van Kol

To cite this Article Van Kol, Willemijn(2008) 'Ummah in Zomba: Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in
Malawi', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 28: 3, 435 — 452
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13602000802548102
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602000802548102

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 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 3, December 2008

Ummah in Zomba: Transnational Influences

on Reformist Muslims in Malawi

WILLEMIJN VAN KOL

Abstract
This paper aims to explore the transnational aspects that have influenced ideological
and organizational changes of Islam within Malawi. It is impossible to review these
changes from an isolated position, like the national context. In order to truly
understand the reasons and elements of change, the national situation of Islamic
reformation in Malawi has to be placed within the context of worldwide Islamic
reformation. Changes within the transnational arena have affected and influenced
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financial, social, political, ideological and cultural processes and organization in

local situations. This paper presents an analysis of the Muslim community in
Malawi beginning from a historical perspective working towards the economical,
social and political situation of Muslims in Malawi today. It focuses on the
transnational influences that have affected these changes in religious and social
identification of a small group of reformist Muslims in Malawi.

Introduction
It is the beginning of February, sticky and hot in the minibus. The slumbering heat at the
end of the rainy season is still in the air. The driver skillfully maneuvers his vehicle over
the road between Monkey Bay and Zomba. With a childlike excitement I enjoy the first
time I travel this route. Squeezed in between two people I manage to look outside over
my neighbor’s shoulder through the broken plastic window. Every couple of kilometers,
small mosques, built in a particular standard format, catch my attention. The simple, yet
impressive buildings in between the cornfields have a certain loneliness about them. I am
thinking to myself. “That is odd; I only see mosques and no churches, while the large
majority of Malawian citizens are Christians”. During my research I discovered that a
lot of these mosques were built between 1994 and 2004, Bakili Muluzi’s presidential
period. After the fall of Dr Banda’s regime, Muluzi was Malawi’s first Muslim president
in the multiparty system.1 It is not accidental that these mosques are built on prominent
places next to one of the most important roads in Malawi. They are positioned with a
purpose, namely to show that the presence of Muslims in the country can no longer
be ignored. Muslims, after a long period of being socially, economically and politically
marginalized in their national environment, now finally have the feeling they really are
part of society. The visibility of this religious minority within the physical organization
of the state plays an important role in this feeling.
For an extended period of time Muslims have been a relatively invisible group within
the religious organization of life in Malawi. Not only on an ideological level were they
isolated from the wider Islamic world, but also socially, economically and politically
marginalized within their national community. This situation has its roots in the
arrival and settlement of Islam in the area we now call Malawi. Although Islam was

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/08/030435-18 # 2008 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/13602000802548102
 436 Willemijn Van Kol

the first foreign religion to reach “the land of the lake”, it did not structurally make its
way into the organization of life and state – as did Christianity, only a few years later.
The main reason for this was their educational structure. The madrassah2 system
provided a basic learning of Quran and Hadith while Christians, on the other hand,
introduced a combination of secular and religious education, which opened up job
opportunities in the paid sector of the colonial society.
However, in the last thirty to forty years there has been a major change in the way
Malawi’s Muslims view and organize themselves within society. This change is the
result of conscious and unconscious choices they made under the influence and within
constraints of ideas, pressures and events on an (inter)national level.3 Islam now
enjoys representation within civil society, politics and media in Malawi. In this article
I aim to take a closer look at transnational aspects that have influenced ideological and
organizational changes of Islam within the state. I think it is impossible to review these
changes from an isolated position, like the national context. In order to truly understand
the reasons and elements of change, the local situation of Islamic reformation has to be
placed within the context of worldwide Islamic reformation. Changes within the transna-
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tional arena have affected and influenced financial, social, political, ideological and cul-
tural processes and organization in local situations. For this reason I choose to focus on
the impact of transnational influences4 on Islam in Malawi. The concept I will use to
approach the positioning of Muslims within the state of Malawi is “the politics of recog-
nition”5 that has contributed to a more equal position of Muslims within the state of
Malawi.
For my research I spent four months in the southern region of Malawi, with Zomba as
my home base. I interviewed mostly elite Muslims, because theirs is the main social class
that practices a reformed version of Islamic faith. By reformed Islam I mean a way of
practicing in which followers try to make a clear separation between cultural and reli-
gious elements and in which the holy scripts are the basis of religious practice. The
main question I want to explore in this article is: how have transnational influences
affected the reformation process that Islam has gone through within Malawi and what
does this mean for the position of Muslims in a Christian dominated nation state?
I will start by creating a historical perspective of Islam in Malawi. Subsequently, I will
describe the development and organization of Islam in contemporary times, shedding
light on the dynamics within Muslim civil society to create a picture of its fields of
struggle. I will outline transnational influences that have had an impact on the way
Islam moved from a traditionalist to a more universal way of practicing for a growing
number of Muslims within the state. I will conclude by outlining the changing position
of Muslims within the national context by stressing the challenges and opportunities
Muslims have experienced and are experiencing.

Transcultural Influences from a Historical Perspective

Religious communities are the oldest transculturalists,6 and movements in the name of
religion have existed for centuries. Examples of this are pilgrimages, crusades and the
movement of students and scholars, refugees and migrants over borders of countries
before these were even called nation-states. The spread of religion was often
accompanied by the first and probably strongest forms of globalization: commerce, con-
quering and colonial rule.7 This was also the case in Malawi, where Islam as well as
Christianity reached the area with trade and conversion as its main motivations.
Although Islam arrived in the area before Christianity did, there is not much information
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 437

available about the history of Islam in the area that is now called Malawi. This coincides
with the marginalized position Muslims have been in for a long time.
The origin of Islam lies in influences from the east coast of Africa. The Swahili Arab
traders8 brought the first signs of Islam to contemporary Malawi. At the end of the nine-
teenth century there was a visible influence of Swahili-Arabs on Yao communities. Dr
Livingstone who visited the area in 1866 writes in his field reports about the visibility
of Arab influence in the way the Yao communities plated their crops, the way they
dressed and their style of house building.9 Dale F. Eikelman and James Piscatori10
underline the importance of movement in the light of development within Islam. They
see religious traffic, next to the influence of physical exchange by trade and pilgrimage,
as an imaginary travel, in which the imagined connection with holy centers plays a sig-
nificant role in the notion of religious belonging over distance, collective identity with
people on different places and the spreading of ritual practice. This notion of religious
belonging seems to be one of the most important reasons for first conversions to
Islam, initially by distinguished Yao chiefs. These chiefs saw in conversion a possibility
to strengthen relations with their prestigious trading partners. Conversion to Islam
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meant upward social mobility and enhanced their position and status as traditional
leaders in their communities. Other motivations were the ambition to gain literacy and
modernization, and the need to keep authority and power over other traditional
leaders in the region.11
To be able to understand the impact of introduction of Islam in Malawi in the early
days, we need to take a closer look at the way this happened. At first Sufi brotherhoods
found their way to Yao communities in the region due to trade with the Swahili-Arabs
from the East coast. Sufism is seen as a mystical movement within Sunni Islam that is
not so much based on the holy scriptures but more on rituals and practices and thus
seems more tolerant to local traditions and beliefs. Quadriya and Shadihiya (Muslim
brotherhoods within the Sufi tradition) are the main branches that influenced the Yao
community’s way of life at that time. The timeframe of introduction of Sufism12 in
Malawi is not entirely clear. Greenstein13 dates the emergence of Sufism in Nyasaland
back to the early 1920s. Wile Bone,14 who in his work focused on the contact between
the Swahili Arabs and the Yao communities, states that at least as early as 1700 CE
Islamic elements played a role in Yao settlements. Dr. Shareef Mahomed declares that
it is generally agreed that there were two phases in which Islamic impact was felt in
Malawi. The first phase was during the pre-colonial period where due to trade of the
Yao, Chewa and Nkhonde people with the Swahili-Arabs, the first Islamic centre was
founded in Nkhotakota in 1840. The second phase is associated with the active prosely-
tizing, which took place after the declaration of Nyasaland as a British protectorate in
1891.15 This I will focus on later.
Many authors16 claim that the success of Islam in Malawi lies in its tolerance of local
practice and traditions. The Swahili Arabs did not introduce Islam as a non-tolerant,
fixed religious structure, but rather in terms of customs and practices.17 Among these,
the initiation rites became major vehicles of Islamization. Islamic elements were intro-
duced into traditional Yao ceremonies which were turned into religious initiations.
The introduction of Islam must also be attributed to the fact that the caravans usually
had, what has been termed mwalims (Muslim teachers), with them.18 These usually
more educated mwalims joined the caravans as secretaries to the heads of the caravans,
but they also helped to spread with messages that local chiefs might wish to send to
each other or to their contacts on the coast. It was not so much these mwalims that
worked on directly training Malawian men in the word of Islam, but rather they inspired
 438 Willemijn Van Kol

teachers as Sheikh Abdallah Haji Mkwanda and his pupil Sheikh Thabit Muhammad
Ngaunje. Due to their extensive travelling in the country, these sheikhs instructed
people in Islamic beliefs and practices and encouraged literacy in Arabic and Swahili
along the coastal Yao settlements. They also became involved in training young men—
particularly the sons and nephews of the chiefs—as mwalimu. Some of these young
men went to the coast for further training.19 With the arrival of these mwalims and
sheikhs, the educational system of madrassah was introduced. However elementary,
this learning system gave the Yao Muslims a sense of spiritual and moral orientation,
which contributed to their cultural identity.20 While the exploratory trips of Dr Living-
stone and the following missionaries established Christianity in the country, Islam had a
head start, especially in communities around the lake. Even though Islam was not devel-
oped on a large scale, its influence and strategic relations were a fact.
The first contact of Christian missionaries with these Islamic Yao communities was
described as opportunistic instead of hostile. Resistance to this contact came mainly
from the side of the Swahili trading partners. They feared that the Europeans would
try to end the lucrative trade in slaves and ivory.21 Around 1880, these relationships
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were influenced by events on a larger scale: the European scramble for colonial
control in African countries. This resulted in hostile sentiments all over East-Africa.
Eventually, this led to an armed conflict in Malawi in 1891 between the Swahili-Arabs
and the British colonizers. In this atmosphere of hostility and violence, Yao chiefs
chose the side of their political and economic trading partners, the Swahili Arabs. The
conflict ended in 1895 when the British regime established a Protectorate. This military
defeat was a major setback for Yao communities. Their leaders lost their economic and
political power. Arguing from the fact that Yao’s chose the side of Swahili Arabs during
the years of struggle, substantial conversion to Islam within Yao communities during this
period can be seen as a political reaction to the British rulers.22 During these years of
confusion and conflict, the connection with the Swahili-Arabs and resistance to the
British colonizers gave the Yao a distinct identity.23 With the departure of the Swahili
Arabs this sense of identity stayed behind, and by the practice and organizational struc-
tures of Sufism, it developed from mainly a political to a more religious movement.24
As noted earlier, the madrassah education system seemed a good move initially.
However, with the British protectorate in place and the Christian missions settled, it
became clear that the Christian educational system was more lucrative and gave access
to the paid sector of the colonial society. The fear of Christian indoctrination, by attend-
ing Christian schools, stayed within the Islamic community until president Banda and
even president Muluzi’s government period. This led to a situation in which Muslims
were stigmatized as illiterate and not very intelligent people. For a long time some
Muslims hid their Islamic identity because of this. If a Muslim was to take a place in a
higher section of society, he would often change his name to avoid the stigma attached
to his religious orientation. An example of this is Dr Baliki Muluzi, Malawi’s second
president, who changed his name to Edison Muluzi during his years at college.25

Muslims in Malawi Today

If we take a close look at the Muslim community in Malawi in 2007, we can distinguish
two main groups: a more traditional, usually older group, that still practices Quadriya
Islam;26 and a more universally orientated, younger group, that often practices a
reformed version of Islam. While many Muslims, mainly in higher circles of society,
want to hide this division within their religious community, tensions are visible on a
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 439

political, social and economic level within society. This polarization is the logical effect of
a modernization process. During the Islamic revival in the 1980s, the younger part of the
Islamic community, that had access to secular education, started longing for a purer way
of practicing Islam, than was practiced by the older generation, who were usually illiter-
ate and did not have access to secular education. Whereas the older generation mainly
practices a form of Islam that was historically intertwined with the Yao’s cultural identity,
the younger generation started supporting a version that is intrinsically connected to a
more universal way of practicing Islam. Language is found to be a dividing factor,
whereas the older generation uses ChiChewa and ChiYao27 as their main form of
communication, English and to a lesser extent Arabic are becoming more popular
within the younger reformists circles.
The resistance to change in the practice of Islam from the side of the Quadriya commu-
nity is mainly based on fear of losing social and cultural status. With the introduction of
reform Islam, the ascribed status of respect for and power of elderly is changing into an
achieved status, gained by the amount of effort an individual puts into being a good
Muslim. Abdul Wahid, a young sheikh in a small community near Zomba, told me how
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his father never supported his academic ambitions and rejected the ways he views
Islam. “What is trusted in the heart is difficult to change” describes the emotions
shared by many members of the traditionally older generation regarding this “new
Islam”. Since education became more accessible—also in the lower socio-economic
classes of society—many followers of the reformist movement stated that Quadriya
would slowly disappear: “with the new knowledge of Islam they would realize that their
way of practicing of Islam was “impure”. These “impure” practices would be replaced
by the “purer” new Islamic values and norms from a universal acknowledged Islam”.28
But this has not entirely happened. Quadriya Islam—with the existence of Quadriya
Muslim Association (QMAM), AQSA (At-Tariqatul Qadria Sunni Association) and
ASUM (Association of Sunni Madrassah’s)—obtained legal representation in civil
society. However, this development contributed to further polarization of the two
Islamic groups within the state. This polarization was no longer based only on a genera-
tional conflict, but also takes place on an ideological, gerontocratic, social cultural and
even political level. For the Quadriya Muslims, religion is intertwined with feelings of
loyalty to local factors and traditions. For this reason, it creates feelings of resistance
to factors hostile to these cultural traditions and practices.

Reform of Islam in Malawi

One of the first signs of reform within the Islamic community in the region dates back to
1937, when the term “sukuti” (to be quiet)29 was noted in research by Clyde Mitchell.
He wrote about a dispute in the Jalasi’s chiefdom in which Jalasi stated “The lord
does not like dancing at funerals and we don’t want Sukuti in this land, Islam is of the
flag and came a long time ago”. Jalasi didn’t want the reformed “sukuti” (silent) way
of practicing Islam since this was not the way it was passed on by their fore elders.30
An even earlier historical incident mentions the term “sukuti” in the Malawian
context. During the funeral of Muhammad Masudi Ntaula in 1934, Sheikh Mufti Ali
bin Salim led the funeral procession. While Sheikh Muhammad Masudi Ntaula ident-
ified with the Shadihiya Islam; Mufti Ali bin Salim called upon the people to be
“sukuti”.31 “Sukuti” is mentioned as a way of practicing a reformed version of Islam.
Sheikh Mufti Ali bin Salim spent some time on the east coast where he had access to
different knowledge on Islam that he in his way tried to pass on. This incident can be
 440 Willemijn Van Kol

seen as the introduction of “sukuti” in Malawi. Alan Thorold states that sukuti is a
scriptural reform process that came up as an anti-Sufi movement.32 He states that the
practice of Islam in the light of sukuti was more based on the religious scripts than the
Sufi traditions, Quadriya and Shadihiya, were. It was only in the 1970s that sukuti was
being used to refer to anything remotely reformist within Islam in Malawi. The main
points of argument for division where based on specific practices like sikiri,33 specific
food habits and prayer on Friday, the holy day of Islam. From this time on sukuti
became a concept used for everything that is reformist within the Islamic community
in Malawi, while on itself it is not a “true” path within the Islamic tradition.
The next phase of reform in Malawi started to take shape in the 1970s. One of the
most important developments that contributed to the revival of Islam in Malawi was
the new trend of Muslim students to go abroad for educational purposes. This develop-
ment started from 1964 onwards when President Banda wanted to end the “marriage
between religion and education”, as he called it. Although this did not remove the
Christian bias from the educational system, a small group of Muslim students were given
the opportunity to follow higher secular education. The academic qualifications gained
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provided them access to the paid sector of society and turned them into role models for
the Muslim community in Malawi. An even smaller group went to study in Islamic as
well as non-Islamic states abroad. When these students returned to Malawi, they were
full of ideas and inspiration to make a change in the position of Muslims in their home
country. Their experiences abroad gave them insight in the double marginal position
of their Muslims compatriots, who were not only the underdog of society on a socio-
economic level, but were also on an ideological level cut off from the wider Islamic
world. They saw many differences in the practice of Islam between the countries they
visited and their home country. To bring about change, these young students shared
the ambition to pass on their new knowledge and experiences. Sometimes, their enthu-
siasm made them bluntly undermine the respect and traditional authority of elder
members in their community. As some of my respondents stated, this can be seen as
the starting point of the intergeneration conflict which led to the existing polarization
in the Islamic community. The rise of the Muslim Students Association in 1982 was a
significant event in this revival and with their slogan “No Qadiriyya! No Sukutiyya!
Islamiyya!” they set their reform agenda in the country.
The revival of Islam in Malawi is also in a way connected to the arrival of Bakili Muluzi
as president in 1994. For the first time Muslims felt they could openly voice their opinion
and express their needs. During his presidential term, much of the existing Islamic infra-
structure in Malawi was built. Islam became more visibly present in the country; a devel-
opment that provoked reaction. President Bakili Muluzi also caught the attention of
many Islamic states in the Middle East as a Muslim president in a predominantly
Christian country, and diplomatic relations with states such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait were thus established. These developments opened up the public debate
on themes as halal food, fair representation within the educational system and legal
representation in other important decision-making bodies in society. This can be seen
as politics of recognition for a religious group whose members for a long time were
not able to practice their rights as citizens.

An Islamic Identity
The trend in Malawi is that students develop an Islamic orientation and identity by
following secular education. After graduation, they can fulfill important positions
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 441

within society that reflect their Islamic identity. As I observed, a large portion of the
young reformist Muslims follow a similar path in life. They usually come from a lower
middle class family and follow secondary and tertiary education through funding from
one of the main Islamic education foundations like Islamic Zakaat Fund (IZF) and
the African Development and Educational Fund (ADEF). By studying in one of the
many Islamic boarding schools in the country, their Islamic orientation and identity is
strengthened. A small number get the opportunity to study abroad and usually end up
in positions of importance in the secular or religious spheres in society. The ones that
obtain advanced religious education usually find a job as a sheikh in one of the many
village mosques in the country.
Hefner writes:
Formal education, the written word, abstract ethical codes, universal prophets,
and holy land for all of humankind serves to elevate their appeal above more
restricted terrains. They provide the discourse for the elaboration of a second-
ary moral and ideological identity beyond that given in the immediacy of local
groupings.34
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In access to further education, young Malawian Muslims find the opportunity to create
their own moral and ideological identity that gives them the courage to break free from
the social and cultural structures of community and family. Through contact with differ-
ent cultures, for example teachers from Arab states, they are put in an alienated position
that creates the space and possibility to think critically and be self-conscious about their
own culture and religion. This position challenges them to “play” with their own identity
and develop a personal style and gave them the freedom to choose their own path in life,
more often a path paved by the words of Quran and Hadith.

The Call for Purification

When this process is observed from a broader perspective, the growth of pietistic move-
ments calling for “purification” of Islam is a regular African trend. The existence of these
movements is mainly based on the ambition of a younger generation to make a clear cut
distinction between religion and culture. Raymond Williams states:
The critical assumption here is that there are some aspects associated with past
religious practice that are fundamental and essential to the continuation of the
religion and others that are cultural accoutrements that are not so fundamental.
Thus, the process of searching for an adaptive strategy becomes the attempt to
distinguish what is essential in the religion and what is not.35
Jaques Waardenburg talks about a growing trend, where young people reject national or
regional traditions to take Quran and Sunnah as their main vehicles of orientation, in
order to make a clear distinction between primary religion and secondary traditions.36
Based on her findings in rural Sudan, Bernal states that transnational and fundamental37
ways of Islam give a moral base that challenges local traditions.38 The scriptural knowl-
edge is seen as superior to the local tradition, and is connected to and associated with
Western civilization and formal education.
This desire for modernization and call for purification of Islam was part of the quest
for legal and moral representation of Islam within the public discourse of the Malawian
society; a quest I call the politics of recognition. Within this quest, participation in the
secular field played an essential role for uplifting the image of Islam. Image building
 442 Willemijn Van Kol

combined with the need for unity, are main points on the reformist agenda. A good
example of this came to me during an MSA conference with the central theme: “The
role of Muslim university and college students in the promotion of Islam in Malawi”
in which promoting equal representation and uplifting of the image of Islam came
forward as points of central focus. During the conference, speakers concentrated on
physical representation of Islam within society by way of dressing. Examples would be
the wearing of hijab for women or jeleba for men within a secular position in society, at
university as well as in their further careers. Muslims students were told that they,
being role models for the Islamic community in Malawi, are the ones that have the
power to make Islam a more prominent part of Malawian society.
Through the development of a better educated and internationally oriented Islamic
elite in Malawi and their proclamation of Islamic identity, they cleared the way for the
quest for recognition and equal representation within their national environment. This
caused an upsurge of public representation and awareness of Islam within the state of
Malawi. It resulted in a campaign for legal tolerance and civil rights—as freedom of
religious expression and access to public means. A good example of this struggle for
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the politics of recognition is the 1998 public fatwa against anti-Islamic propaganda
machineries.39

Transnational Influences
Globalization
I feel that I belong to a worldwide community. I see Islam as a body. . . if an arm
gets hurt. . . the whole body feels the pain.40
This statement comes from a young MSA member I talked to on a dawah meeting at
Masongola secondary school. The reaction came up during a conversation on the hosti-
lity towards Islam due to events around the world, and one-sided world media coverage
of these events, mainly from a Western Christian point of view. We live in a global social
reality where borders of communication fade out, and the maintenance and extension of
transnational religious communities becomes easier. New ways of personal and interper-
sonal communication make the exchange of ideas, images and thoughts as well as finan-
cial and ideological support over national boarders easier. Haynes points out that
globalization stimulates the growth of transnational religious networks.41
Until the mid 1970s, the Muslims in Malawi were, apart from a couple of contacts,
isolated from the worldwide Islamic community. With a president like Hastings
Kamuzu Banda, who wanted to keep modernity on the other side of the border, this
did not really change until 1994, when Bakili Muluzi came to power through a referen-
dum. The opportunity for new diplomatic and economic relations with different
countries opened up the society and no longer halted influences from outside. The
event of the so called five Al Qaeda suspects illustrates all different transnational influ-
ences I will describe in the following paragraph. In 2003, five foreign Muslims who
were respected members of the Islamic community in Malawi were taken out of the
country by the CIA on suspicion of being involved with the Al Qaeda network,
without being able to exercise their right for a legal process. This event caused much
commotion within the Islamic community and left many Muslims disappointed in
their government and the role of MAM (Muslim Association Malawi) in dealing with
these events. This tension demonstrates the diversity of transnational influences within
the Malawian Muslim community.
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 443

Media and Literature

The first transnational influence I would like to lay out is media and literature. The
Islamic community was and is aware of the negative image Islam has been carrying for
a long time. Biased international media do not help in bringing about a balance and
changing this image. Nevertheless different forms of media in Malawi, like Radio
Islam, play an important role in promoting a better image of Islam and creating an
understanding about the religion within the nation. Next to promoting a better image
of Islam, the radio station and other forms of media—columns in newspapers and
Islamic magazines—have a programmatic way of presenting Islam. It focuses mainly
on the do’s and don’ts of being a good Muslim. In short, this can be seen as the pro-
motion of reform Islam brought by modern media. The Islamic Information Bureau is
another example of the growth of accessibility of Islamic literature and text in Malawi.
The rise of institutions like this and the growing number of Islamic media knowledge
about Islam is becoming more widespread within the society.
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Human Exchange
Another very important transnational influence on the reformation process of Islam in
Malawi is human exchange. The first generation of what we now call new reformists,
which in the early 1980s returned to Malawi after studying abroad, were the frontrunners
in the reform process. They were the ones who received foreign education in the secular
as well as the Islamic field. With the international connections made during this time,
more funds found their way to Malawi. The people of influence on the reformation
process were not only teachers and scholars from abroad, who came to Malawi for con-
ferences or to teach, but also students who came back after their time abroad. Both
parties brought along new knowledge about Islam which had an extensive influence
on the growth of organizations and projects within the civil society of Malawi. Dr
Shareef Mahomed told me,
The Islamic Revival of the Middle East reflects in all the areas of the world. In
Malawi it was mainly students who have been abroad, who brought back new
knowledge and understanding on Islam. They really made a difference and
contributed to the changes within the Malawian Islamic Community.42
This form of human exchange had a great effect on the transfer of ideas and images that
enforced an imagined connection with Islam around the world, and made the marginal
position of Muslims in the country painfully clear and the need to make a change more
urgent. This knowledge contributed largely to creating a background to the struggle for
the politics of recognition of Islam in Malawi.
The rise of human exchange has also contributed to a feeling of belonging to a world-
wide Islamic community. Robertson notes that:
Even for relatively remote groups, transnational narratives construct and
negotiate the relationships between multiple identities by tying individuals
and communities into larger common constituencies.43
Judging from my personal observation, I state that only for a relatively small group of
Muslim elite, this exchange created a feeling of belonging to a worldwide Islamic
community. For most Malawian Muslims who have the opportunity to follow higher
education, it is merely the ambition to study and work in different countries that
 444 Willemijn Van Kol

creates a desire to be a part of transnational community or to be able to use the possibi-

lities this community offers. The loyalty of this group seems closer to the nation state and
their religious community within the state, than to a transnational religious community.

Financial Flows
This brings us to the importance of financial flows as a transnational influence on the
reform movement of Islam in Malawi. In the 1970s, the wealth of the oil boom in the
Middle East brought countries like Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait the financial means
to develop and support different Islamic organizations, projects and initiatives world-
wide.44 Malawi also profited from these large amounts of money flowing from those
oil-booming countries. Money coming from the Middle East, Indian communities in
South Africa, Pakistan and also Malaysia, was channeled into the country through
MAM. Munawwarah Islamic Dawah45 claims in their situational report from 2005,
that ninety percent of the money for development of the Islamic community in
Malawi was donated by foreign agencies. Most of the money that arrived in the
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country during this time was invested in Islamic infrastructure like the building of
schools, mosques, Islamic centre but also in basic needs such as the development of
water wells and providing food support. When the physical infrastructure was in place
the focus of investment shifted to education. From halfway into the 1980s, most of
the financial support was invested in providing study funds and the development
of Islamic centers and boarding schools throughout Malawi. The regional coordinator
of the African Development and Educational Fund (ADEF) states
The Muslim community is developing in terms of education, and they are
becoming more and more visible in the society. Education is the main vehicle
for development and reformation of the Islamic community in Malawi.46
Due to international conflict, like the Kuwait war from 1990 until 1991, the financial
flow from mainly the Middle-East dried out. Dr Shareef Mahomed claims that there
is no funding coming from abroad at the moment. Islamic organizations and projects
in Malawi at the moment are mainly funded by rental of real-estate and to a lesser
extent from the Asian Islamic community within Malawi.

Changes in the World Order and Global Events

The last transnational influence on the changing Islam I identified is changes in the
World Order and events on a global scale. The downfall of the USSR and the disappear-
ance of the two major power structures (East and West) are seen by many authors as a
turning point in the globalization process.47 The flow of money, images, ideas, media
and commodities intensified. One of my respondents whom I will call Ali claimed that
the United States needed a new enemy to keep up their economic development which
mainly depended on the firearms industry—and trade.48 In Islam they found their
new enemy, and the anti-Islamic propaganda machinery was activated. The war in
Iraq, the bombings in Pakistan and the controlling function of the United States after
11 September 2001, have intensified.
This declaration of the “war on terror” had an indirect effect on the stagnation of devel-
opment within the Islamic community in Malawi. A good example of Malawi’s connection
to these global events is the non-active status of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth
(WAMY) that had their regional office in Zomba. In a conversation with its former
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 445

director he told me that his organization was forced to stop its activities under the pressure
of the United States.49 The reason for this was that WAMY received its funding from the
Middle-East, being a worldwide organization with its head office in Saudi-Arabia. Also the
African Muslim Agency (AMA), an organization that can be seen as one of the most
important organizations in the physical development of Islamic civil society in the
1980s and beginning of the 1990s, has minimized its activities in Malawi. This organiz-
ation was on a list, put together by the US government, of organizations that have ties
with militant and extremist Islamist organizations in the Middle East.50 The United
States has a dominant position in monitoring money flows from this region and with
their powerful financial position in Malawi, as one of the largest foreign donors for
development aid, they had the power to put pressure on the Malawian government.
Nina Glick Shiller states that it would be naı̈ve to view all states as sovereign actors in
the world, because this rules out the financial and military power that some nation states
have over others.51 This position of power of a territorial regime over the political, econ-
omic and social life of other states we can call imperialism. Marxist theorists saw financial
capital as an instrument of intervention in sovereign states. In today’s world this financial
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capital takes the form of loans, investments and foreign aid. This leads to the following
conclusion: Imperialistic domination can, through military power and global financial
reach, influence less powerful states in their actions and policies. When J.F. Kennedy
stated ‘Foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of
influence and control around the world’, he openly acknowledged the power relations
that are connected to foreign aid.52 Coming back to the example of the Al Qaeda
Five, one can see that the financial imperialist position of the United States, in this
situation, undermines the sovereignty of Malawi’s nation-state.

Changing Position of Muslims within the State

A Question of Unity
We all believe in the fundaments of Islam, the five pillars. We practice Ramadan
together, pay Zakaat if we can, we pray five times a day and all wash our feet and
body before we enter the mosque. It is only minor differences about small
unimportant things. We are all united in our faith and that’s what’s most
important.53
This I often heard from Muslims who practice a reformed version of Islam in Malawi. If
we look closer at the Islamic community in Malawi there lies a paradox in this statement.
On the one hand many Muslims make an effort in media and politics to focus on unity
within the Islamic community in Malawi, while on the other hand most of my respon-
dents gave me a similar reaction on questions regarding Quadriya Islam in Malawi.
The answer was usually something in the spirit of “Quadriya’s are ignorant, they
haven’t learned about the true Islam yet”. This statement shows a patronizing attitude
towards Muslims who follow the Quadriya Islam. So on the one hand reformers want
the Islamic community to be united, while on the other hand they do not really take
seriously Muslims who have a different view on the practice of Islam.

Levels of Loyalty
The crux of this paradox lies within levels of loyalty. To whom are you loyal in different
social situations and circumstances? Evans-Pritchard developed a model of loyalty based
 446 Willemijn Van Kol

on his research on modes of livelihood and political institutions within Nuer commu-
nities in Sudan.54 He concludes: the smaller the group, the stronger the sentiment
that is binding. As social distance grows, feelings of loyalty change. The common
denominator is the binding factor in the question of loyalty. If we take this social distance
theory to analyze the Islamic community in Malawi, we can see that ideological differ-
ences play an important role at a micro-level. But these differences become less import-
ant when moving to a meso-level, that of the state. Could it be that Muslims are,
regardless of their differences among themselves, more loyal to Muslims on a national
level, than they are to Christians?
Reviewing the theory of social distance on the Malawian situation this seems not true if
we look at the differences in presidential support. I have observed that many Quadriya
Muslims have strong sentiments towards current president Mutharica, while the
reform Muslims mainly support the former president Muluzi. The reason for this is
mainly speculative. It could be that Quadriya Muslims, during President Muluzi’s
time, felt excluded from his politics, because they were exhorted towards reformed or
as he called it united Islam. The Quadriya Muslims felt that he did not acknowledge
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the Quadriya community as a separate Islamic group to have different points of interest.
The reform Muslims on the other hand, felt more at ease and understood by a president
with the same religious background, who made major contributions to the politics of
recognition of their religious denomination and propagated the idea of one united
Islamic community in Malawi. So in this case social distance, even at the level of the
state, and polarization within the Islamic community still exist.
If we review the position of Muslims within the state to get an idea of the factors of
identification and loyalty that are of importance, it soon becomes clear that the civil
society is a main body of representation for all religious denominations within the
state. Internal factors from within the Muslim community, external factors from the
Christian part of society and transnational factors affect the positioning of Muslims
within Malawian context.

Islamic Organizations and Infrastructure

The development of many Islamic organizations, projects and initiatives within the social
field of civil society of the state have had a large impact on the politics of recognition of
Muslims within the state. Since 1957, MAM has been the main umbrella body of
Muslim representation within the state that binds Muslims of all walks of life. Political
statements, official reactions in media and, for a long time, financial flows, have been
organized and monitored by this Muslim body. MAM aims to represent the whole
Muslim community in Malawi but focuses mainly on reform range of thoughts. From
riots during the time of for example the Al Qaeda Five we can see that many Muslims
do not feel represented by this body and there is a certain feeling of being left out in
their focus of development and attention.
The Muslim Students Association, founded in 1982, was very active the first few years
of its existence. Many camps, volunteer activities, discussion meetings and dawah’ activi-
ties were organized to actively carry out their mission of encouraging Muslim youth in
various educational institutions to stay in touch with their Islamic identity. But, as
Matter states in his dissertation on the National Muslim Students Association, this
development slowed down in the last ten years.55 The organization still exists, but
with the decrease in financial support, the number of activities slowed down as well.
MSA together with the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) had a big impact on the
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 447

promotion of the importance of secular education and madrassah education in Malawi.

They contributed for example to the development of the integrated religious syllabus for
primary and secondary schools.
Next to these two important organizations there are many international, national,
regional and community based Islamic organizations, projects and initiatives in
Malawi that together form civil representation of Muslims in the state. Most of these
organizations focus on the central and southern regions of the country, since this is
where most Muslims live. There are organizations that focus on the arrangement of phys-
ical space (like building projects), on vulnerable groups (like women, children and
youngsters) and on propaganda through madrassahs and dawah56 in which programs
such as breaking the fast or halal slaughtering are organized to propagate the “true
way” of practicing Islam. In 2007, the main focus in almost all programs lies on
education, since this is seen as the main way towards development and reformation of
Islam in Malawi.
Reformed Islam is often seen as a rejection of the Western World or a fight between
East and West, while “modern Islam” and reform Islam in particular, is intrinsically
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intertwined with Western institutions such as education. Simone states, referring to

her research in rural Sudan, reformists often use Western intellectual tools to achieve
their goals.57 People such as Ibrahim Milazi—former high commissioner for Malawi in
the United Kingdom and Ambassador to Libya—are concrete examples of this strategy.
Mr Milazi is the product of Western, secular education and a role model within the
Islamic community in Malawi. To promote social, economic and political development
within the Muslim community, the reformist wing focuses on a form of secular education
in which devotion and Islamic orientation are seen as essential for development.58 “If you
develop one side it means that they can’t contribute to their religion, if you develop the
other side it means they can’t contribute to their society. The combination makes it
complete” was a comment from a teacher of Islamic studies at Blantyre Islamic
Mission that supports this assumption.59
Since many Muslims students follow their secondary education at one of the many
Islamic boarding schools in the country, this has an effect on their religious identity.
An anonymous Muslim who followed his education on an Islamic boarding school
near Zomba explains: “The importance of my faith changed by acquiring more knowl-
edge about Islam, it encouraged me to be a good Muslim and to learn about Allah
and Mohammed”. But the social impact of this development lies not only in the individ-
ual; also their home communities and families are touched by this new input and
exposure to the practice of Islam. A young Malawian man who studied abroad stated
the following: “When I came back from my study in Iran people were very interested
in what I learned, especially people from my home community, my friends and broth-
ers”. One could say that reform Islam affects students as well as their families and
communities due to a trickle down effect of information that contributed to the
changes in Islam in Malawi during the last thirty to forty years. This change is visible
on the streets, at colleges and on universities all over Malawi. A teacher at Chancellor
College stated that the number of girls walking around campus dressed in hijab has
grown extensively in the last five years.
With the rise of Islamic organizations and infrastructure in the early 1980s, there was a
growing feeling of fear within the Christian society. A Roman Catholic newspaper talks
about the sudden outburst in the spread of Islamic literature, Muslim youth meetings
and the use of mass media, a development that alarmed Christian churches.60 This
feeling of Islamophobia and the difficultly in making progress as a religious minority
 448 Willemijn Van Kol

group in a Christian dominated society comes up clearly in the story of the burning
mosques in the North.61 Many Muslims I spoke with were offended by the fact that
after this disturbing event, organizations focusing on conflict resolution were setup in
places like Mangochi, where Christians were the victims; while in the North, where
the mosques were burned, only financial assistance for reparations was offered. No
further social assistance in interfaith dialogue and conflict resolution was even con-
sidered in the North where the Muslims were the victims. This, for many Malawian
Muslims, is a clear example of the Christians bias in Malawi. A Muslim I met at the
Islamic Information Bureau in Mangochi voiced his opinion regarding this development:
“Interfaith dialogue is good, but is has to be on an equal ground, not only towards
Muslim[s], also towards Christians”.
Muslims from different walks of life are on the one hand united within civil society rep-
resentation; while on the other hand, this exacerbates polarization within the Muslim
community. But a stronger sentiment is the pain from their historic marginalization.
They still experience resistance from many sections of their society. The fact that the
main societal structure is based on Christian norms and values, and most media estab-
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lishments and organizational structures have a majority of Christians, makes it hard for
Muslims to feel as equal participants in their national community. Although the politics
of recognition have improved the position of Malawian Muslims within their society,
there is still a long way to go before true equality, for each social and religious group,
will be achieved.

Conclusion
Local Islam in Malawi has undergone a metamorphosis through influences from the
transnational field. Economical, political as well as social connections have opened up
opportunities for the development of a reformed Islam in Malawi. Discussing transna-
tional connections and local changes, it was Dr Shareef Mahomed who gave me a
good example of this. Not long ago he attended a conference in Beirut, Lebanon, on
the “Cartoon issue”.62 Muslim participants from Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, Sudan, and other Islamic countries attended the conference because
they were concerned about the global interaction between Islam and Christianity and
the contradictions of Western freedoms, such as freedom of expression, when they
offend others.
This kind of association with the wider Islamic world does not make a significant
difference for the larger Muslim community in Malawi. But through this example it is
evident how technological development and economic connections, symbols of globali-
zation and transnationalism, can create a notion of an imagined transnational religious
community. Looking at the religious identity of Malawian Muslims I conclude that
there is no sense of a transnational religious identity. Rather I would say that transna-
tional influences played an important role in creating the ambition, shared by many
young Muslims, to study or work in Islamic as well as non-Islamic countries abroad.
These are mainly young Muslims from lower middle class families, who, with the
support of scholarships and grants, completed their education in Islamic boarding
schools. These young Muslims are taught Western secular education in an Islamic
environment that strengthens their religious identity. Their contact with foreign tea-
chers, sheikhs and sponsors stimulates them to become aware of their own identity.
This more often creates a notion of “transnational religious longing to be” rather than
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 449

“transnational religious belonging”, a longing to expand their personal horizons, through

academic and work experience abroad.
The reason why the reformist movement of Islam is mainly attracting young Malawian
Muslims is, on the one hand, connected to the feeling of wanting to break free from ger-
ontocratic social structures of family and community; and on the other hand, the need to
make individual choices in life. Without a doubt there is a materialistic ambition that
plays a part as well, with the opening up of new possibilities and opportunities in life.
The reformist movement has developed into a growing religious group in Malawi
through the enthusiasm and fighting power of young urban Muslims. The politics of rec-
ognition created a larger social base within the public space of society due to the devel-
opments within civil society, and contributed to the fact that Islam has a more equal and
recognized place within the religious sphere in Malawi. The growing visibility of Islam on
the streets, in schools and in workplaces and the fact that there are more Muslims in
important decision making bodies in society, are proof of this. The politics of recognition
as a strategy for the future has been the main building block for progress of reformed
Islam in Malawi.
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These developments would not have been possible without help from the transnational
Islamic community. This basically refers to the influences of media and literature, human
exchange, financial support and world events, all of which have changed loyalties and
identifications of Muslims within the state of Malawi. Transnational influences contrib-
uted to the development of a larger Islamic civil society and influenced the practice of
Islam. These transnational influences, mentioned above, contributed to large-scale
developments within the religious infrastructure and accessibility of information and
education for a growing number of Muslims. But as seen before, it was not only transna-
tional but also national influences like polarization within the Islamic community as well
as the Christian bias in society that affected this development.
However much has been achieved for equal and respectful representation of Islam
within the state, there is still a long way to go. Mainly in the rural areas, where the illit-
eracy rate of Muslims is still about ninety percent, there is still the feeling of being second
class citizens in a large part of the Muslim community. With the Quadriya being loyal to
the local community and structure, and the reform movement mainly loyal to the new
ideologies of a universal Islam, there is indeed still a long way to go.
To conclude, I state that transnational influences on the reformist Muslims in Malawi
have not created a notion of transnational religious identity, but mainly reinforced a
stronger religious identity within the national context of Malawi. Furthermore, we can
conclude that transnational influences on all mentioned levels—media and literature,
human exchange, financial flows and changes in the world order through events on a
global scale—have played an important role in the changes in the way Islam is being
practiced and taught in the country. In concluding, I would like to make the following
statement that describes the position of Islam within today’s Malawi: “Islam is not
growing in numbers but in visibility and influence”.63 With the support of a transnational
community, a minority religion in a small country in Africa found the strength to battle
for practice of their religious right within the national context of their society.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the respondents and professionals who assisted me in conducting
and processing this research. Additionally, I would like to thank David Bone for
sharing his knowledge and wisdom and his challenging way of thinking; Alan Thorold
 450 Willemijn Van Kol

for his enthusiastic reactions and critical view on my research and writings; Imuran
Shareef Mahomed whom by his trust, outspokenness and knowledge, gave me access
to very valuable information and contacts within my research community; Ibrahim
Milazi for his inexhaustible patience in sharing his personal knowledge and experience
with me during some of the long talks we had; and to many others whom in their friend-
ship, understanding and way of thinking, kept me sharp and critical during my research
and writing process.

NOTES
1. In 1994, the first real democratic government in Malawi was put in place. The multi-party system was
introduced under the guidance of President Bakili Muluzi.
2. Madrassah is an Islamic school that teaches Quran and Hadith and related Islamic subjects including
basic Arabic writing and reading.
3. D. S. Bone, “Malawi’s Muslim communities in their local and global context”, Unpublished Masters
Thesis, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Chancellor College, University of Malawi,
2007, p 1.
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4. Transnationalism can be seen as the actual, ongoing exchange of information, money and resources,
as well as regular travel and communication, which members of diasporas undertake with others in
the homeland or elsewhere within the globalized ethnic or religious community. See S. Vertovec,
“Religion and Diaspora”, Conference Paper presented at: New Landscapes of Religion in the West,
School of Geography and the Environment, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University
of Oxford, 2000, p. 3.
5. The politics of recognition is the campaign for legal tolerance or cultural rights surrounding specific
practices, freedom from discrimination, and access to public resources offered to other groups. See
S. Vertovec and C. Peach, Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1997, pp. 3 –47.
6. Transculturalists are cultural units that consciously implement elements of their own culture, for
example their religion, in other geographical communities.
7. S. Vertovec, “Religion and Diaspora”, op. cit., p. 3.
8. Swahili Arabs were traders from Arab settlements like Kilwa and Zanzibar on the East coast of Africa.
Through intermarriages between local African woman and Arabs, Swahili culture and language
developed.
9. D.S. Bone, Malawi’s Muslims; Historical Perspectives, Blantyre: Christian Literature Association in
Malawi, 2000, p. 15.
10. S. Vertovec, “Religion and Diaspora”, op. cit., p. 9.
11. M. Mumisa, “Islam and Proselytism in South Africa and Malawi”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 22, No. 2, 2002, p. 281.
12. Sufism is a stream of the mystical Sunni Islam. The most important brotherhoods introduced in
Malawi are Quadriya and Shadihiya.
13. R.C. Greenstein, “The Nyasaland Government’s Politicy toward African Muslims 1900–25”, in
From Nyasaland to Malawi, ed. R.J. Macdonnald, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975,
pp. 144–168.
14. D.S. Bone, “Malawi’s Muslim communities in their local and global context”, op. cit., p. 2.
15. I.S. Mahomed, “The Development of Tariqas in Malawi: Qadriyah, Shadhiliya and Sukuti”, Religion
in Malawi, Vol. 10, 2000, pp. 19– 24.
16. A.J. Matiki, “The Social and Educational Marginalization of Muslim Youth in Malawi”, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999, pp. 249–258; A. Thorold, “The Politics of Mysticism:
Sufism and Yao Identity in Southern Malawi”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1,
1997, pp. 107– 117; S.v. Sicard, “The Arrival of Islam in Malawi and the Muslim Contribution to
Development”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2000, pp. 291– 304.
17. A. Arberry quoted in: A. Thorold, “The Politics of Mysticism”, op. cit, pp. 108– 109.
18. Mwalim is a Quran teacher. His rank is lower than a sheikh who is also in charge of running the
mosque.
19. S.v. Sicard, “The Arrival of Islam in Malawi”, op. cit., p. 296.
20. A.J. Matiki, “The Social and Educational Marginalization”, op. cit, p. 250.
 Transnational Influences on Reformist Muslims in Malawi 451

21. Johnson quoted in: D.S. Bone, Malawi’s Muslims; Historical Perspectives, op. cit, p. 104.
22. A. Thorold, “The Politics of Mysticism”, op. cit, p. 108.
23. D. S. Bone, “Malawi’s Muslim communities in their local and global context”, op. cit, p. 3.
24. A. Thorold, “The Politics of Mysticism”, op. cit, p. 108.
25. Personal communication, Dr. Chakanza, Head of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies
at Chancellor College, Zomba, 12 February 2007.
26. Quadriya is a tariq (path) of the Sufism brotherhood within Islam.
27. These are two of the main indigenous languages in Malawi whereby ChiChewa is also an official
national language.
28. Personal communication, anonymous sheikh, Al-Nidau Foundation, Zomba, 27 February 2007.
29. Sukuti is derived from the ChiYao verb “to be quiet” and became the term used to refer to processes of
reformation within the Islamic community in Malawi.
30. A. Thorold quoted in: L. Brenner, Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993, p.1.
31. I.S. Mahomed, “The Development of Tariqas”, op. cit., p. 22.
32. A. Thorold quoted in: Brenner, Muslim Identity and Social Change, op. cit., p. 1.
33. Dkhir or sikiri is a ceremony held at funerals, weddings and other celebrations whereby participants
dance, sing and carry flags. This is one of the central practices of Quadriya Islam in Malawi.
34. Hefner, “Religious Conversion in Indonesia: the Karo Batak and the Tengger Javanese”, Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2001, pp. 23 –38.
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35. R. Williams, A New Face of Hinduism: The Swaminarayan Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984.
36. Jaques Waardenburg, “The institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands”, in The New Islamic
Presence in Europe, eds. T. Gerholm & Y.G. Lithman, London: Mansell, 1984, pp. 8–31.
37. Transnational and fundamental ways of Islam as approached by V. Bernal is the practice of Islam
influenced by transnational knowledge from mainly Saudi Arabia and is based on the holy scriptures
of the Quran and Hadith. Fundamental Islam is based on the fundaments, five pillars of faith and the
articles of belief. See V. Bernal, “Islam, Transnational Culture, and Modernity in Rural Sudan”, in
Gendered Encounters; Challenges, Cultural Boundaries and Social Hierarchies in Africa, eds. M. Grosz-
Ngata & O. H. Kokole, New York & London: Routledge, 1997.
38. Ibid., p. 40.
39. A fatwa is an opinion from a scholar based on the Quran and Sunnah, answering a question of a case of
public order. This particular fatwa on anti-Islamic machineries was directed towards government,
state, media, religious and cultural leaders and the general public.
40. Personal communication, Muslim Student Association member during dawah meeting, Masongola
Secondary School, Masongola, 10 March 2007.
41. J. Haynes, “Transnational religious actors and international politics”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22,
No. 2, 2007, pp. 143 –158.
42. Personal communication, Imuran Shareef Mahomed, Deputy Director of the Department of Theol-
ogy and Religious Studies, Chancellor College, Zomba, 16 April 2007.
43. R. Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage, 1992.
44. N. Hijab, Woman Power: The Arab Debate on Women at Work, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1988; Sanad and Tessler, “Women and Religion in a Modern Islamic Society: The case of
Kuwait”, in Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World, ed. Emile Sahliyeh, Albany,
NY: SUNY Press, 1990, pp. 195– 218; Mehden Von Der, Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction Between
Southeast Asia and the Middle East, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1993.
45. Munawwarah Islamic Dawah (MID) is an Islamic dawah organization. The literal translation of
dawah is “inviting people”.
46. Personal communication, Director of African Development and Education Fund (ADEF), Zomba,
16 March 2007.
47. J. Gross, D. McMurray & T. Swedenburg, “Arab Noise and Ramadan Nights: Rai, Rap and Franco-
Maghrebi Identities”, in The Anthropology of Globalization, eds. J.X. Inda & R. Rosaldo, Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2002, pp. 198–231; M. Juergensmeyer, “The Paradox of Nationalism in a
Global World”, in The Postnational Self; Belonging and Identity Public World, eds. U. Hedentoft &
M. Hjort, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, pp. 3–17.
48. Personal communication, anonymous individual at the Islamic Information Bureau, Mangochi, 19
April 2007.
 452 Willemijn Van Kol

49. Interview with Ibrahim Milazi, prominent member of the Muslim community in Malawi, Blantyre,
23 February 2007.
50. J. Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2005, pp. 1321–
1339.
51. Nina Glick Shiller, “Transnational social fields and imperialism; Bringing a theory of power to Trans-
national Studies”, Anthropological Theory, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2005, pp. 439–461.
52. Ibid.
53. Personal communication, anonymous active sheikh in Zomba, 27 February 2007.
54. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
55. V.K.M. Matter, “Its Role and Impact on Muslim Students in Malawi from 1982–2005”, Unpub-
lished BA Dissertation, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Chancellor College, Univer-
sity of Malawi, 2006.
56. The literal translation of dawah is “inviting people”.
57. Simone quoted in: Bernal, “Islam, Transnational Culture, and Modernity”, op. cit., p. 137.
58. D.S. Bone, “Malawi’s Muslim communities in their local and global context”, op. cit., p. 13.
59. Personal communication, teacher of Islamic studies at Blantyre Islamic Mission (BIM), Blantyre, 26
April 2007.
60. “Christian churches alarmed”, Odini (monthly Catholic newspaper in Malawi), June 2000.
61. In the aftermath of the 1999 elections, during riots in the country, eighteen mosques were burned
down or damaged in the Northern region and some church windows scattered in the Southern
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region. See I. Milazi, “The Burning of Mosques in the North: Is it the beginning or climax of political
fanaticism or Christian fundamentalism in Malawi”, Religion in Malawi, Vol. 9, 1997, p. 42.
62. Massive global indignation regarding the content of a series of cartoons that appeared in a conserva-
tive Danish newspaper. The discussion was mainly about collective values like freedom of speech and
press.
63. Personal communication, Dr. Chakanza, Head of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies
at Chancellor College, Zomba, 12 May 2007.