Eminent

Domain
A. General Considerations
1. Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation (Fictitious OCT No.994 Set of
lands disputed)

Facts: This case is to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim ownership
over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was disputed
between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of
DImson.

It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity of OCT No. 994.
However, the Court in its resolution in 2007 held that OCT 994 was inexistent. Nonetheless, the court
has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of evidentiary proofs.
On Dimsons claim: the Court adopts the finding of the Special Division on the validity of Jose Dimsons
titles, which he obtained consequent to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due
legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon
the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge Munoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge
Sayo.
The titles held by Araneta and the Manotoks must prevail considering that their titles were issued much
earlier than the titles of the Dimsons and CLT.
On the other hand, the Special Division was also tasked to ascertain the validity of the titles held by
Manotok and Araneta since these were annulled by the lower courts.
By the analysis made by the Special Division, it was held that Aranetas claim to its title was wholly
valid; The origin and the proprietary claim of Araneta had been well substantiated by the evidence on
record and on this note, said titles deserve validation.
Titles derive from OCT No.994, which Dimson had submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim,
pertain to properties wholly different from those covered by Araneta titles.
On the validly of the Manotoks claim it appears that it is somewhat controversial. However, the
significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines in
1947. At least some of the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic.
Six certificates of titles were individually issued to Francisco Gonazales 6 children and was
issued in favor to all the children. The properties covered by the TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were
expropriated by the RoP and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Seven
properties covered from the disputed lands were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite
Housing Corporation which were later consolidated and subdivide into 77 lots for resale to
tenants. No sign of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point.
The fact that expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by
way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have
attended these titles.
After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent
title; thus by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
provide a judicial process for securing better title against al the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
In annulling the Manotok tiles, focused was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No.4211 issued
in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was
expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended that particular title would have
been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through
eminent domain.

2. Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes (Para sa TOURISM)

Facts: Tis case is challenging the constitutionality of PD No.564 of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) and Proclamation No. 20152 declaring 4 barangays, 1 city, and 4
municipalities as tourist zone in Cebu.
The petitioner alleges that the taking is allegedly not impressed with the public use under the
Constitution. They also contend that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes.
The PTA deposited with the PNB an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to PD no. 1533.

ISSUES: 1. Non-compliance with the Public Use requirement under the eminent domain
provision of the Bill of Rights.
2.of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated.
3. Impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Ruling:
1. It is for public use notwithstanding the fact that there is absence of the word tourism
in the Constitution since the policy objectives of the framers of the Constitution can be
expressed only in general terms. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. The petitioners also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately
accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of
national policy are found in the revised charter of the PTA. And the power of eminent
domain is expressly provided under Sec. 5 B(2).
2. Second argument relies on the land Reform Program. No. the petitioner have failed to
show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected
persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
3. The invocation of non-impairment clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has
never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain.
parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws
intended for the public good.
4. Issue of prematurity is untenable under PD No. 42 (10% deposit rule)
5. Forcible ejectment contention is also not valid there is no showing that they are tenants
of disputed lands. They are also not included in the master list of the Ministry of
Afrarian Reforms.

3. Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Exports Processing Zone (Lot 1406-B, PEZA
rescinded to the compromise agreement)
Facts: PEZA initiated before the RTC of avite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of
irrigated Riceland in Rosario, Cavite which are registered by the petitioner herein, Salud
Jimenez. More than 10 years later, the said trial court in a n Order dated July 11, 1991 upheld
the right of PEZA to expropriate lot 1406-B. Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private
respondent offering two proposals. This proposal was approved and agreed upon the
petitioner and respondent. However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
(for swapping of the land equivalent to just compensation) to petitioner inasmuch as it was
not the registered owner of the lot. In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled
the said compromise agreement entered into between parties and directed PEZA to peacefully
turn over the Lot 1406-b. In CA decision,, it upheld the rescission of the compromise
agreement under Art.2041 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: I. CA committed grave abuse of discretion. II. Wrongly interpreted the phrase original
demand.
RULING: In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July Order of
expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to
abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind

the same. Obviously, the trial court could only validly order the rescission of the compromise
agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise. However, the trial court gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the return
of the disputed lot. It, in effect, annulled the Order of the expropriation which was already final
and executory.
Second issue: It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to petitioner. Therefore, CA did
not err in interpreting original demand to mean fixing of just compensation and not the
return of the lot. The authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been
put to rest when the Expropriation Order became final and was duly admitted petitioner in the
compromise agreement. The only issue for consideration is the manner and amount of
payment due to petitioner.
The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and building terminals
was not expressly mentioned in the original charter of PEZA and that it was only after PEZA
devoted the lot to said purpose is not impressed with merit. PD 66 created PEZA to be viable
commercial, industrial, and investment area. PEZA can vary the purpose for which condemned
lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public purpose. Petitioner cannot impose
or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are for public
purpose. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within
reasonable time from its taking.
WHEREFORE, RTC Cavite is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing for expropriation
proceeding.

4. Ortega v. City of Cebu (3 million to 31 million; SQUATTERSh)
Facts: Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered owners of parcel of land known
as Lot No. 310-B in Hipodromo, Cebu City. On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cebu City enacted the Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate
one-half (1/2) of the said land and appropriating for that purpose the amount of P3, 284,400
which was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee.
Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain in the RTC. On March 13, 1998 the RTC issued
an order that Cebu City has the lawful right to take the property for public purpose upon
payment of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the Appointed Commissioners the RTC issued another Order
dated May 21, 1999 fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at P31, 416,000.
The decision of the RTC became final and executory because Cebu failed to perfect an appeal
on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the Courts judgment.
Cebu City filed Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the case
contending that the price set by the RTC is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries
for its socialized housing program. Motion denied.
During the pendency of the case the Cebu City filed before the RTC motion to Dissolve, Quash,
or Recall the Writ of Garnishment contending that the account mentioned in Ordinance 1519
does not actually exist.
The Spouses on the other hand filed Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Philippine Postal Bank to
Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which was granted by the RTC.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebus Omnibus Motion to
Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdrawal from Expropriation Proceedings. (2)
Whether the deposit of the Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a
different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment
for the expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.
Both petitions DENIED. (LOL)

First Issue: CA did not err since the expropriation case had long been final and executory.
Consequently, both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation by the
RTC can no longer be modified. In short, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the expropriation
proceedings. An order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect the order of
expropriation.
Cebu can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint,
after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceeding.
The determination of just compensation is judicial prerogative.
Second Issue: In favor of CA disquisition. The RTC cannot , by itself, order the City Council of
Cebu City to enact an appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy its judgment. The proper
remedy for them is to file a Mandamus case against the City of Cebu. It is settled rule that
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy judgment, based on obvious consideration of public policy. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

B. Taking

5.Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
Facts: This is a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen Castellvi, judicial admistratix
over a parcel of land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga and against Maria Gozun over the
two parcels of land. In its, complaint the Republic alleged that the fair market value of the said
lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga was not more
than P2000 per hectare, and that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of
the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. The trial
court issued then an order fixing the provisional value of he lands at P259,669.
In her motion to dismiss, Catellvi alleged that the land under her administration, being a
residential land had a total market value of P15 per square meter so it had the total market
value of P11, 389,485; and that the Republic, through the AFP, had been, despite repeated
demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956 thereby preventing from using
and disposing it. thereby, she is asking for damages.
After the Republic ahd deposited the provisional value with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The
Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.
In her motion to dismiss, Toledo Gozun alleged that her two parcels of land were residential
areas and that the total fair market value of her land was P15 per square meter and shes
asking for payment plus interests.
After the parties-defendants and intervenors, the republic had filed whatever necessary
actions they need to do, the trial court rendered its decision: setting the value of the land at
P10.00 oer square meter, and in respect of the land of Castellvi, interests at 6% per annum will
also be paid from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959. The Republic opposed and the trial court issued
an order stating in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly
determined by the Supreme Court.
Hence this motherfucking petition. Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower
court erred:
(1) In the finding of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings at
just compensation;
(2) In holding that the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the
filing of this action;
(3) In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest in the adjudged value of the Castellvi
property to start from July 156;

(4) In denying plaintiff-appellants motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.
1 In the issue of taking.
Republic argues that the taking should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of
special lease agreement between the RoP and Catellvi, the former was granted the right
and privilege to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease.
Castellvi on the other hand, maintains that the taking of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential elements namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Supreme Court number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for
purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This is present by virtue of the lease
agreement.
Second, the entrance must be for a momentary period. The aforecited lease contract was
for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry of the property, under the
lease, is temporary and considered transitory. It might really have been the intention of
the RoP to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice
much less an implied notice- of such intention on the part of the Republic the lands in
future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The
expropriation must be actually commenced in court.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This
is present, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to public use which was present as well.
Fifth, the utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial and enjoyment of property use. Not present on the standpoint
of Castellvi. Castellvi remained as the owner of the land and the lessor are bound to pay to
which she enjoyed. (lol).
It is clear therefore, that the taking of Castellvi property for the purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof.
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to
secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate it would first
negotiate with the owner of the land (for lets say 20-30 years) then expropriate the same
when the lease is about to terminate and upon expropriation it would consider the
reckoning date of taking at the time it was a lessee. This is a deceptive scheme (madaya).
The taking of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the
Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property as of that year.
It is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property,
by authority of the Court, on August 10, 1959.
Second Issue.
The value of just compensation. Several considerations was taken by the Court, wherein
Republic, Castellvi, Commissioner presented their own evidence and standpoints on
determining the just compensation. However, the Supreme Court considered that the fair
valuations of the land in question is P5.00 per square meter.
In arriving in the conclusion, they have taken into consideration the resolution of the
Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga.
Third issue payment of interest.
If Castellvi, had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956-August 10,1959 she
should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the Republic until August

10, 1959, and she should not at the same time be entitled of interest during the same
period.
Fourth issu denial of motion for a new tria. Forgotten evidence, is not newly-discovered
evidence.
Sawakas.
6. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. (TAKING IS
NOVEMBER 21, 1989 WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIS STOCK ACTION PLAN)
FACTS: This is a motion to clarify and reconsider resolution of November 22. 2011 filed by
Hacienda Luisita Inc. and by private respondents collectively referred as Mallari et al.
The 2011 resolution, recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original
farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that
all the benefits and homelots received by all FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to
refund or return them.
HLI invokes the following grounds: (1) determination of the date of taking; (2) propriety
of the revocation of the option on the part of the original FWBs to remain as stockholders
of HLI;(3) propriety of distributing to the qualified FWBs the proceeds from the sale of the
converted lang and of the 80.51-hectare SCTEX; and (4) just compensation for the
homelots given to the FWBs.
1 and 4:
HLI contention: taking should be reckoned from the finality of the Decision of the SC or,
at the very least, the reckoning period may be tacked to January 2, 2006, the date when the
Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution recalling/revoking
the approval of the SDP.
Mallari: cannot be based on Nov 1989, the date of the approval of the SDP. Instead, the
taking for valuation purposes is a factual issue best left to the determination of the trial
courts.
AMBALA (Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Haciena Luisita): HLI should no longer
be paid just compensation for the agricultural land that will be distributed to the FWBs,
since the RTC already rendered a decision ordering the Cojuangcos to transfer the control
of Hacienda Luisita to the MINistry of Agrarian Reform.
Supreme Court Ruling: Maintain that the date of taking is November 21, 1989, the
datePARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution, in view of the fact that this is the time
that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda
Luisita.
To be precise these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the
stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is November 21, 1989.
Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition.
Further any doubt should be resoled in favor of the FWBs: Agrarian reform is a perceived
solution to social instability.
It is the official act of the Government, that is, the PARCs approval of the SDP, which
should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural lands of HL.
Although the transfer of ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs
approval, it is the Courts consistent view that these lands became officially became subject
to the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon approval
of the SDP.
Even if it is the government which will pay the just compensation to HLI, this will also
affect the FWBs as they will be paying higher amortizations to the government if the
taking will be considered only on January 2, 2006.
This will put the land beyond the capacity of the FWBs to pay Justice Leonardo-De Castro.

C. Taking and Questions of Necessity and Valuation

7. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (CEMETERY)

Facts: The City of Manila presented a ppetition in the Court of First Instance, praying that
certain land, particularly the Chinese Cemetery, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement.
Chinese community of Manila: denied that that it was either necessary or expedient that
said parcels be expropriated for steet purposes; that there are other routes available which
would satisfy the purpose; that the land is being use for cemetery purposes; it would
disturb the resting place of dead; and that it has no right to expropriate said cemetery or
any part thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, is not necessary as
a public improvement.
Defendant Tambunting: same with the abovementioned but with additional: that the land
had become quasi-public property of benevolent association dedicated for the burial of the
dead..
In short: (a) that no necessity existed; (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, that
have become significant to the public.
From the theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law that it
has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only
function of the court is to ascertain the amount of just compensation; that neither the court
nor the owners can inquire concerning the necessity of the expropriation. That the courts
are mere appraisers of the land involved. And the job of the court is to ascertain the value
and render judgment favorable to the defendant.
ISSUE: In expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila, may the court inquire into, and
hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
RULING: The Charter of the City of Manila contains no procedure by which said authority
may be carried into effect. Then the Court scrutinize the Act No. 190 to ascertain how the
right to eminent domain may be exercised. It was stated there that municipality has the
right to condemn private property for public use. Also, sections of the said Act contended
that and if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists means simply that if the
courts find some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, the courts have no other
function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the
land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is legislative and not judicial
question.
However the court did not just settle here.
The Court examined it further and it cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper
authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the
pupose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a
municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the court
should have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provision of Act. No. 190, to
make inquiry and hear proof upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not
the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact public.
And it was held that:
Whther it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon municipality the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when
that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their
property, the courts are not authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to
hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through
cemetery.

8. Masikip v. City of Pasig (Playground for small private community eh may

rainforest park naman, kinginuuhhhh. Defines what constitute genuine necessity)
Facts: Petitioner Masikip (Sherep!) is the registered owner of a parcel of land at Caniogan,
Pasig City. The respondent sent letters notifying the petitioner on its intention to
expropriate her property to be used for sports development and recreational activities.
Respondent replied that it is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive. Subsequently,
respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss.
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that there is genuine necessity. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Then another MR was denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: the arguments may be synthesized into two main issues one substantive and one
procedural.
PROCEDURAL: The rule on expropriation was governed by Sec.3, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court which constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an
answer in the expropriation. Pursuant to this rule, what the trial court should have done
was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a
genuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding
that the taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to fix the just compensation.
This rule was now reapealed to which it expressly mandates that any objection or defense
to the taking of the property of a defendant must set forth in an answer. However, the new
provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.
SUBSTANTIVE: Petitioner, insists that there must be genuine necessity on the proposed
use and purposes. According to her, there is already an established sports development
and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of a public character.
In City of Manila v. Arrellano College of Law it was ruled that necessity within the rule that
the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but a reasonable or practical necessity, such would benefit to the public wit the least
convenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit.
Applying this standard, the Pasig City failed to show the genuine necessity. Also, the record
shows that the intended beneficiary is a private community and not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of said Association are desirous of having
private playground and recreational facility.
The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be a public character, must also be shown
to exist.
9. De Knecht v. Bautista (Alignment 2 less social impact)
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Cristina De Knecht against
Judge Bautista.
He petitioner here is one of the owners of the residential houses that will be affected.
The petitioner alleges that more than ten years, through the Department of Public Woks
and Ministry of Public Highways prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard, an
adjunct of another road-building program. The original plan was to extend it passing
through Cuneta Ave. up to Roxas Boulevard. (Alignment 1) Howeverthen Secretary
Baltazar Aquino of the Deprtment of Public Highways directed the City Engineer of Pasay
City not issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction of the proposed
extension through Cuneta Ave.
Then the Department decided to make the proposed extension to Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets (Alignment 2), which are lined with old substantial houses.

Upon learning of the said proposal, the owners including the petitioner filed a formal
petition to President Marcos asking him to stick on the original plan.
Marcos directed Minister Aquino to explain why the proposed plan should not be
extended; and that he referred the matter to Human Settlement Commission to conduct
hearings and give recommendations.
That the said recommendation was to retain the original plan, but notwithstanding the
recommendation they insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
In February 1979, the government filed, in the Court of First Instance presided by the
respondent Judge, a complaint for expropriation.
The respondent Judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the decision of the properties sought to be condemned.
The petitioner contends that the judge lacked or exceeded in his jurisdiction or gravely
abuses its discretion in issuing the order. It assails the choice of Alignment 2 and that the
choice must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness, or capriciousness of due process
requires the determination WON the proposed location was proper in terms of the public
interest.
The respondent maintain that the respondent court did not act without or exceeded its
jurisdiction because they all complied to the proper requirements. Also, they states that
there is no suddedn change of plan and that both lines meet satisfactorily planning and
design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. What they only did on choosing the
Alignment 2 was to minimize social impact factor or problem involved.
RULING:
There is no question as to the right of the Republic to take private property for public use
upon the payment of just compensation.
It is recognized, however, that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose
what private property should be taken.
It is doubtful whether the extension along the Alignment 1 can be objected to on the
ground of social impact. The improvemnts and building along Alignment 1 are mostly
motels. Assuming, arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements
Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National
Housing Authority in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected.
From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendation of the HSC (the assessment
where they considered the Functionality and Social Impact) it is clear that the choice of
the Alignment 2 is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the RoP to
take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

10. Republic v. De Knecht (Supervening evets that changed the factual basis of the
decision and that the present appropriation is no long arbitrary. B.P. Blg. 340 is not a
reversal of the previous court decision which was decided under a different set of facts.
Genuine necessity: completion of the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project,
alleviate the worsening traffic problem)
Facts: Subsequently, B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted in Feb 17, 1983. On the basis of the said law
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case before the trial court and this was granted.
On Appeal, it was held that the decision of the SC hving become final and should no longer be
disturbed. Therefore, it said aside the questioned order of the trial court and issued another
order dismissing the expropriation proceeding pursuant to the riling of the De Knecht Case.
Supreme Court Ruling:
When B.P. Blg was passed, expropriating the very properties subject of the present
proceeding, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on the supervening
gevents that occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980.

The social impact that persuaded the Court to consider their extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared.
All the residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of
the EDSA outfall and 30% have been completed. Only private respondents remains as the
solitary obstacle to the project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control
problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.
BP Blg. 340 effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of the court.
Moreover, said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the government. The court
agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting the BP Blg 340. Thus the anterior decision
of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
11. Republic v. Gingoyon (NAIA 3; Its payment,ho, payment. Its not deposit.)
Facts: This case is rooted in the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan v. Piatco wherein
the contracts which the government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to
law and public policy.. The present case now involves the matter of just compensation due to
the contractor for the terminal complex it built.
The 2003 Decision nullified the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and Transfer
Arrangement of NAIA III entered into between the Philippine Government and the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). At the time the 2003 Decision was promulgated
the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing the completion.
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the
possession of PIATCO.
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay
City RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of
possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities. The
Government also declared that it had already deposited 3 billion in Cash with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to the respondent judge (Gingoyon). On the same day the complaint was
filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of writ of possession to the Government,
authorizing it to take or enter possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Also, on the same day it
issued the writ of possession.
However, on January 4,2005 RTC issued an order to supplement its Dec 21, 2004 Order that its
earlier issuance of the writ of possession was pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the 199 Rules on
Civil Procedure.
However, it was observed that RA No. 8974.
Now, the petition praying for nullification of the RTC Orders.
Accordingly, on the basis the RA 8974, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances.
Firs, it direct the Lanbank to immediately release the amount of 62 billion to PIATCO; Second,
Government was directed to submit certificate of availability of funds; Third, Government was
directed to maintain, preserve, and safeguard the NAIA 3 or perform such acts or
preparation for their direct operation of the airport terminal. However, the Government was
prohibited from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part
of NAIA.
Thus the Government is imputing grave abuse of discretion to the court.
ISSUE: (1) Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case. (IT IS THE RA 8974)
(2) Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of the $62 million.
(ERRONEOUS ON THE PART OF RTC)
(3) RTC could not have prohibited the Gov. from enjoining the performance of acts of
ownership. (AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NAIA; ESSENTIAL ACTS)
Ruling:
This case is highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building
complex constructed on land which the State already owns.

First we need to look back the pronouncement in the 2004 resolution which is law of this case
generally permits expropriation. The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially
significant to this case in two aspects: (1) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (2) that the government is
barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid.

Difference between the statute and the procedural rule. The crucial difference concerns the
particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of
possession:
Sec. 2,Rule 67: merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government
depository the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled for the writ
of possession.
RA No. 8974: More favorable to the property owner since it requires the Government
make a direct payment to the property owner before a writ of possession may be acquired.
Here, Sec. 2, Rule 67 does not satisfy the requirement laid down in 2004 Resolution
Instead, RA No.8974 Fits to the Situation at Bar and Complements the 2004 Agan Resolution.
This law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects.
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had
financed and constructed. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain
proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCOs ownership.
Government insists that the only properties that may be expropriated under RA 8974 are
parcels of land.
Both the land itself and the improvements (real property) thereupon are susceptible to private
ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the
owner considered as a deprivation of property.
We see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that RA 8974.
SECOND ISSUE: There is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of
the improvements and structures since valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet RA
No. 8974 permits expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession
of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation.
Sec 4 (c) states that in case the completion of government infrastructure project is utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the are concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property of its proferred value.
This court recognize the initial deposited money of 3 Billion as the proferred value under the
said law since the amount was based of comparative values made by the City Assessor.
Also the Writ of Possession may not be implemented until actual receipt by PIATCO of
proffered Value. The court has duty to implement RA8974 and to direct compliance with the
requirement of immediate payment in the case. Therefore, The Writ of Possession was held in
abeyance.
RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT UPON ISSUSANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.
RA 8974 Sec. 4 states that the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an
order to take possession and start the implementation of the project.
The Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of
NAIA.
Final determination of just compensation is within 60 days from finality of this decision; RTC
will be the one who will determine.
12. Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (Determining just compensation is a
judicial prerogative; the root)
Facts: This case is about the constitutionality of four Presidential Decrees which determines
just compensation of property in expropriation case, only on the basis should be its market
value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, WHICHEVER IS LOWER.

On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving
certain parcel of land situated in Lapu-Lapu City for the establishment of the Export
Processing Zone.
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. Four parcels of land were registered by
private respondent. The petitioner offered to purchase the parcels of land but did not reach an
agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with CFI with a prayer of writ of possession to expropriate the said lands
pursuant to PD No. 66 for purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
Respondent issued the writ but the private respondent filed its answer.
During the pre-trial, parties agreed that the sole issue here is the determination of just
compensation.
The respondent judge issued an order that the first phase of expropriation was met. And
issued second order appointing commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
Commissioner recommended that the value is P15.00 per sq/m.
Petitioner filed MR and Objection on the grounds that PD 1533 has superseded Sec. 5 to 8 of
Rule 67 of the RoC. (Denied)
ISSUE: is exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 valid
and constitutional?
Ruling:
Petitioner contention: Under PD 1533, which is the applicable law here, the compensation is
determined by the market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor,
WHICHEVER IS LOWER.

SC: The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional and void.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment of
judicial prerogatives.
Also, when it comes to valuation, it only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts judgment. Tax values can
serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function.
The other branches of the government may make initial determinations but the moment a
party claims a violation of the guarantee of Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the courts finding.

PD No. 1533, which eliminates the courts discretion to appoint commissioner pursuant to
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.