Management Accounting Research 19 (2008) 149162

Transferring knowledge across sub-genres of the ABC

implementation literature
Hans Englund, Jonas Gerdin

Department of Business Administration, Orebro

University, SE-701 82 Orebro,
Sweden

Abstract
In the last decade, a continuous stream of empirical articles has investigated how various implementation process factors (including,
top management support, adequate resources, and ABC training) influence ABC implementation success. However, at the same time,
a growing number of researchers have criticised this mainstream approach for, among other things, neglecting issues of power
and politics and for viewing ABC implementations as something inherently positive. Based on Lukka and Granlunds [Lukka,
K., Granlund, M., 2002. The fragmented communication structure within the accounting academia: the case of activity-based
costing research genres. Acc. Organ. Soc. 27, 165190] call for communication between various streams of ABC research, the
purpose of this paper is to discuss how the mainstream implementation literature may benefit from insights made in the politically
oriented literature. A key conclusion is that such an analysis not only provides us with enriched explanations of the relatively strong
and coherent findings in the mainstream ABC implementation literature, but has also the potential to explain unexpected and
contradictory results found in this stream of research. Based on these observations, a number of directions for future research are
proposed.
2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Management accounting; ABC; Implementation; Process factor; Power; Politics

1. Introduction
In recent years, a growing body of research has analyzed the success of activity-based costing (ABC) system
adoption and implementation and the determinants of that success (see, e.g. Anderson, 1995; Baird et al., 2004, 2007;
Brown et al., 2004; Foster and Swenson, 1997; Krumwiede, 1998; McGowan and Klammer, 1997; Shields, 1995).
One substantial line of research in this area focuses on the impact of ABC implementation process factors on ABC
implementation success, i.e. characteristics of the procedures involved in system implementation (McGowan and
Klammer, 1997, pp. 221222). Examples of this type of factors include the level of top management support, the
degree of user involvement in implementation, the adequacy of training and resources, and the degree to which the
ABC project is linked to competitive strategies. An overall finding is that ABC implementation success is positively
related to an emphasis on several of these processual factors (see, e.g. Baird et al., 2007; McGowan and Klammer,
1997; Shields, 1995), although the degree of importance for each factor may vary by ABC implementation stage (see,
e.g. Krumwiede, 1998) and by the evaluation criteria of ABC implementation success (Anderson and Young, 1999;
Foster and Swenson, 1997).

Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 19 30 30 00; fax: +46 19 33 25 46.

E-mail addresses: hans.englund@esi.oru.se (H. Englund), jonas.gerdin@oru.se (J. Gerdin).

1044-5005/$ see front matter 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.mar.2008.01.002

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Other scholars have criticized this stream of research for, among other things, neglecting issues of conflict, power
and politics (e.g. Major and Hopper, 2005; Malmi, 1997). The argument is that the adoption of ABC (Drennan and
Kelly, 2002; Malmi, 1997) and management accounting systems in general (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Burns, 2000) has a
political dimension which should be acknowledged if we are to more fully understand these implementation processes.
For example, Malmi (1997, p. 461) argued that although the sources of resistance to ABC may be numerous, they
are fundamentally structural and are unlikely to be dealt with by implementation-based strategies, such as participant
involvement, while Granlund (2001, p. 145) argued that such explanations [based on a factors approach] fail to
capture the interrelationships between the factors and the inherent complexity originating in the different incentives
and aspirations of the people involved with accounting practice.
Given these two rather contrasting views on how to understand ABC implementations (henceforth referred to in
terms of mainstream research and political research), it comes as no surprise that Lukka and Granlund (2002, p.
183) find that the ABC literature as a whole is rather fragmented and that the dialogue between different schools does
not appear to flourish. Rather, they conclude that results from different discussion circles tend to have limited effects
on each other, and that researchers from different genres and sub-genres tend to draw only on within-genre research,
resulting in an unfruitful development of knowledge, both in terms of theory-construction and practical concerns
(2002, p. 186). Elaborating on the same underlying problem, Merchant et al. (2003, p. 251) argue that research progress
in accounting has been significantly hindered by the fact that most researchers focus their theories and perspectives on
a single research discipline.
As an attempt to increase the communication between different research camps in the ABC-area, this paper explores
how the mainstream implementation literature may benefit from insights made in the politically oriented literature. We
take this approach because the mainstream area is presently more mature than the politically oriented area in the sense
that it consists of a substantive number of empirical studies, which build on each other in a systematic and cumulative way
(see the literature review in Section 3). Notwithstanding these merits, however, we do believe that the political literature
may well contribute to the mainstream field in the following ways. First, we argue that the insights made about power and
politics in implementation processes may be used to re-contextualize the mainstream results. That is, by using one of
the strengths of political implementation research the use of qualitative methods richer and to some extent alternative
explanations of the general patterns found in mainstream-type of research can be offered (see also Modells (2005)
discussion about the benefits of triangulation in management accounting research). Second, a theoretical perspective
focusing on power and politics has the potential to shed additional light on unexpected and seemingly inconsistent
mainstream results. The premise is that such a perspective sometimes makes other assumptions and predictions.
Note, however, that the elaboration on the results provided in the mainstream ABC implementation research is not
intended to reinforce the existing critique towards this body of knowledge. Rather, the aim is to tone down the apparent
conflict between the two literatures and to show how a dialogue between them could enhance our general understanding
of ABC implementation processes.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section explains how the two streams of research have been
identified and the studies have been selected. After that, existing mainstream literature on ABC implementation
process factors is presented and the underlying purpose and theoretical arguments that underpin predictions made in
this literature are identified. Next, the political stream of research on ABC implementation is presented, followed by a
discussion of the purpose and arguments underlying this research. In the following section, the insights from the political
research are used to re-contextualize and reinterpret some of the theory-consistent mainstream research findings, and
to propose some tentative explanations of unexpected and contradictory results. Finally, the paper highlights some of
the key conclusions and extracts implications for future research.
2. Dening sub-genres and selecting studies of ABC implementation
As this paper seeks to transfer knowledge from one stream of ABC implementation research to another, an important
question is what constitutes the streams in question. True, it could be argued that the mainstream literature and the
political literature resemble what Lukka and Granlund (2002) referred to as two sub-genres of basic research,
namely, statistical studies and case studies. However, given that the purpose of the present study is to transfer
theoretical insights between research areas, a classificatory scheme based on research methods seems less relevant.
But what criterion/criteria could be used then? Well, judging from the more general literature on genres and sub-genres,
there seems to be little agreement as to what constitutes a (sub-)genre and what does not. Indeed, on a general level, a

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151

genre or sub-genre has some properties which connect some pieces while, at the same time, separate them from others
(see, e.g. Paltridge, 1997). And, in the literature, a number of such properties have been proposed, including subject,
structure of the text (see, e.g. Paltridge, 1997; Stamboltzis and Pumfrey, 2000), content, form (see, e.g. Chandler,
1997), and rhetorical structure (see, e.g. Rosso, 2005). However, as stated by Askehave and Swales (2001, p. 195),
Ever since the new genre movement began to gather momentum in the early 1980s, there has been a widely shared
view that genres are best conceptualized as goal-directed or purposive, thereby avoiding a view on genres as stable
and fixed forms (cf. Chandler, 1997). That is, a number of scholars have emphasized a more purpose-based view on
genres and sub-genres, whereby the communicative intent and the intended audience behind the text are stressed (see,
e.g. Askehave and Swales, 2001; Stamboltzis and Pumfrey, 2000; Swales, 1990). Adopting this latter approach, we
argue that the purpose and theoretical point of departure for mainstream research differ significantly from those of
political research, and hence, can be used as distinguishing criteria.
Based on these grounds, we identified the two literatures in terms of discussion circles (cf. Lukka and Granlund,
2002). That is, we tried to narrow down those papers which explicitly explored ABC implementations empirically and
which built on each other through cross-referencing. In the following sections, the two streams of literature identified
will be described in detail and the purpose and theoretical foundations underpinning their classification are pinpointed.
However, before doing so, at least two remarks about the classification procedure should be made. The first one is about
whether the literature referred to as critical research by Lukka and Granlund (2002) should be part of, or theoretically
separate from, what we in this study term political research. One argument in favour of including these studies is that
they (obviously) deal with issues of power and politics within organizations. However, based on the more general
genre-literature referred to above, emphasizing the purpose and communicative intent of the text (Stamboltzis and
Pumfrey, 2000; Swales, 1990), we argue that there is a distinct difference between these research traditions. That is,
while the main ambition in (social) critical research is emancipatory, resulting in a value-laden and ideological analysis
of ABC as a phenomenon (typically aiming at increasing the readers awareness of the suppressing effects of ABC),
the main purpose of the politically oriented studies within the basic research genre is to keep a neutral position towards
ABC as a phenomenon. As argued by Lukka and Granlund (2002, p. 169), researchers in this genre do not try to sell
the ideas around ABC, but they do not tend to fundamentally criticise them either. Given these essentially different
communicative intents, social critical research on ABC implementation will thus not be part of the politically oriented
sub-genre dealt with in the current paper.
The second remark relates to the actual categorization of individual studies into the two sub-genres. Again, drawing
upon the more general genre-literature, it is clear that a text within a genre or sub-genre rarely shows all of the
characteristics of that genre, and that genres often overlap (Chandler, 1997). Hence, the referral of individual articles
to specific sub-genres is not a neutral and objective procedure (Chandler, 1997, p. 1). Rather, the categorization is
largely dependent upon the characteristics that are emphasized. While the classification was relatively unproblematic for
most articles reviewed in this study, two notable exceptions are used to illustrate this issue. The first one is Andersons
(1995) study, which could both qualify as mainstream and political. The premise is that, on the one hand, her study
has a research interest and a style of argumentation (cf. Lukka and Granlund, 2002) which, to a large extent, resemble
those of a typical mainstream study. On the other hand, however, Anderson explicitly recognizes and describes power
games involved in the ABC implementations in question. However, given her intended purpose (as we understand it),
i.e. to identify factors important for ABC implementation success from a top management perspective, we decided to
classify her study as part of the mainstream tradition.
The second notable exception is the study by Major and Hopper (2005). On the one hand, it could be argued that
since Major and Hopper use Labour process theory emphasizing class relations and conflicts between organizational
groups their study is part of the critical genre (cf. the classification of previous studies using Labour process theory
as critical made by Lukka and Granlund, 2002). On the other hand, however, we argue that the purpose of the Major
and Hopper paper is not primarily emancipatory, but rather to further our understanding of ABC implementation and
the reasons underlying its failure. Hence, based on their relatively neutral position towards ABC as a phenomenon, we
decided to classify their paper as part of the political stream of research.
3. Prior mainstream research on ABC implementation process factors
While the ABC literature provides no single and uniform definition of what constitutes an implementation process
factor, several authors argue that process factors are related to the procedures involved in ABC system implementation

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Table 1
Prior research on ABC implementation process factors
Explanatory factor

Literature source(s)a

Found effect on ABC implementation successb

1. Support from
(a) Top management
(b) Local management
(c) Local union
(d) Informal sponsors/champions

A, B, C, D, E, Fc , Gd , H, I
G
G
A, D

+, +, +, +, +e , +, +, +
0
+
+, +

2. Adequacy of resources
3. Adequacy of training

B, C, D, E, F, G
A, B, D, E, F, I

+, +, +, +, 0f , +
+, +, +, +, 0f , +

4. ABC system linkage to

(a) Performance evaluation and compensation
(b) Competitive strategies

B, D, E, F, I
A, B, D, F, G

+, +, +, f , 0
+, +, +, 0f , 0

5. ABC objectives
(a) Clear
(b) Shared

B, E, F
B, E, F

0, +, 0f
0, +, 0f

6. Nonaccounting ownership/user involvement

7. External expert/consultant engagement

A, B, E, F, H
B, H

g , +, +, f , 0
0, 0

Source legend: (A), Anderson (1995); (B), Shields (1995); (C), Innes and Mitchell (1995); (D), Foster and Swenson (1997); (E), McGowan and
Klammer (1997); (F), Krumwiede (1998); (G), Anderson and Young (1999); (H), Innes et al. (2000); (I), Baird et al. (2007).
b + = positive effect, = negative effect, 0 = no effect. For studies that employed multiple outcomes of ABC implementation success, only the
relationship between the explanatory factor and the main/overall measure is reported. For studies that distinguished between different stages of ABC
implementation, the research focus in this study implies that only factors that influence the implementation stages are included, i.e. not factors that
influence the adoption stages (cf. Anderson, 1995; Krumwiede, 1998).
c Krumwiede (1998) used composite organizational variables where TOPMGT included the factors top-management support, linkage to competitive strategies and adequacy of resources; NONACCTG included nonaccounting ownership and linkage to performance evaluation and compensation;
OBJECT included the clarity and consensus for the objectives of ABC; TRAIN included the level of training related to the design, implementation
and use of the ABC system. In the table, the individual factors that form the composite variables are reported.
d Anderson and Young (1999) not only investigated the effect of the explanatory factors on the respondents overall evaluation of the ABC system,
but also the relations between some of them. These interrelations will be dealt with below when the results exhibited in the table are discussed in
more detail. Furthermore, Anderson and Young found that the model was stable across firms and respondents, but sensitive to the maturity of the
ABC system (see below for further details).
e For Krumwiedes (1998) study, the primary dependent variable is the stage of ABC implementation.
f Further descriptive evidence provided by Krumwiede (1998) suggests that these factors may play a positive and important role in reaching the
highest level of ABC implementation (i.e. integrated system), but may not be critical for lower stages of implementation.
g Note that Anderson (1995) reports a positive effect of nonaccounting ownership and user involvement in the initiation and adoption stages.
However, during the adaptation stage a high degree of nonaccounting ownership and user involvement had a negative effect because committed
users resisted initiatives to standardize their locally developed ABC models.

(Anderson and Young, 1999; McGowan and Klammer, 1997) and the goal is to identify features of the process that
are most likely to lead to successful implementation. Table 1 summarizes prior studies relating to this type of ABC
implementation process factors.1
Interestingly, and unlike many other accounting research areas, the list of results in the upper part of Table 1 (Factors
14) provides a very coherent picture of the direction and importance of the explanatory factors (see also the literature
review in Anderson and Young, 1999). That is, most studies of these factors report a positive and significant relationship
between the processual factors in question and ABC implementation success. And, notably, this is so despite the fact
that disparate measures of ABC implementation success have been used, including overall ABC success (Shields,
1995), satisfaction with ABC implementation (McGowan and Klammer, 1997), and the stage of ABC implementation
(Krumwiede, 1998). In addition, these results seem to hold fairly well across research sites and respondents (see, e.g.
Anderson and Young, 1999; Krumwiede, 1998).

1 Note that most of these articles also examine the impact of contextual factors such as the characteristics of the organization, the task technology,
the existing IT system and the people involved in the implementation efforts. Given the focus on processual issues in this study, however, these
factors are not included in the analysis although, undoubtedly, they are potentially important for explaining ABC implementation success.

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153

Of equal interest is, however, that the lower part of Table 1 (Factors 57) shows that many studies fail to come up
with significant results in the predicted direction (e.g. Innes et al., 2000; Krumwiede, 1998), or even find results in the
opposite direction (e.g. Anderson, 1995). Below, we shall discuss how a political perspective may contribute to our
understanding of these unexpected results (and also of the strong and coherent results in the upper part of Table 1).
However, before doing so, we must first make explicit the underlying arguments provided in this sub-genre that explain
the expected positive influence of the processual factors listed in Table 1 on ABC implementation success.
Starting from the top of the table, many authors (Anderson and Young, 1999; Baird et al., 2007; Innes and Mitchell,
1995; Krumwiede, 1998; Shields, 1995) find that support from top management (Factor 1a) is likely to influence the
perceived level of ABC implementation success. This is so, they argue, because such support provides the vehicle
through which ABC implementation objectives are set and monitored and, accordingly, determines what is deemed
important to employees. Related, McGowan and Klammer (1997) propose that top managers support for a new system
influences users personal stakes in the system and may also increase the appreciation of the users for the potential
contribution of the system to meeting the information requirements of the subunits. Consequently, they propose that
employees who perceive strong support for the ABCM system by top management may be more likely to view the
change favorably (p. 222).
Furthermore, while most studies listed in Table 1 find that top management support is associated with implementation
success in general, some of these studies indicate that the impact of such support differs between implementation stages
(but see Baird et al. (2007) who found no such differences). For example, Anderson and Young (1999) found that top
management support has a smaller influence for recent implementations than for mature sites. One possible explanation,
they argue, is that top management typically invests much time in promoting the ABC program in its early existence (i.e.
the adoption phase), but becomes less visible as implementation proceeds. However, when the site becomes mature,
top managements pressure on employees to actually use the ABC data increases. These suggestions are in line with
Krumwiedes (1998) findings, which indicate that top management support is important during the adoption phases,
decreases in importance during the early implementation stages and then becomes important again for achieving higher
levels of implementation.
Less investigated in the literature are the linkages between top management support (Factor 1a), local management
support (Factor 1b) and local union support (Factor 1c) and their relationships with implementation success. However,
Anderson and Young (1999) predicted and found that local management support is positively associated with top
management support and that local union support of the ABC project is positively associated with local management
support. They also found that the degree of top management support and union support had a direct and positive effect
on implementation success while the effect of local management support was indirect, i.e. operated through the level
of union support. According to the authors, these results provide a good face validity of the proposed associations:
Top management support is directly associated with local management awareness of and involvement in the ABC
implementation project. Local management plays a gatekeeper role in assuring local union support and there is
no evidence that top management intervenes in this relation. (Anderson and Young, 1999, p. 544).
Also the importance of support from informal internal sponsors/champions (Factor 1d) has been sparsely investigated
in the empirically oriented literature. However, Anderson (1995) found strong support for their role in all implementation
stages investigated. In short, she proposed that internal sponsors were deemed important because they were tireless
advocates of ABC. Furthermore, the fact that they also made their company known in the business community as a
leader in ABC implementation may also have contributed to solidified internal support for ABC.
As illustrated in Table 1, it has been argued that an adequate level of resources (Factor 2) is also important for
achieving high levels of ABC implementation success (see, e.g. Krumwiede, 1998; McGowan and Klammer, 1997;
Shields, 1995). The premise is that resource adequacy has the potential to prevent employees from feeling pressured
by the implementation process, i.e. prevent them from believing that an ABC initiative will force them to put a lot of
effort into the project without an adequate reduction in their normal work tasks. Furthermore, if resources provided
are insufficient, then normal implementation procedures may not be undertaken which, consequently, increase the risk
of failure (McGowan and Klammer, 1997).
It has also been proposed that training in using ABC (Factor 3) is likely to increase ABC implementation success
by creating efficient use of the information provided by the system (Baird et al., 2007; McGowan and Klammer, 1997;
Shields, 1995). Furthermore, Shields (1995) argued that ABC training may also improve implementation success
indirectly by providing consensus about and clarity of the objectives among system designers and users (Factor 5).

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Shields also suggested that training is an efficient means for creating nonaccounting ownership (Factor 6) insofar as a
training program that includes information on the logic, design and use of the ABC system provides a good basis for
nonaccountants to accept, understand and use the system.
According to several authors (Baird et al., 2007; Foster and Swenson, 1997; McGowan and Klammer, 1997; Shields,
1995), motivational theory gives us reason to expect a positive relationship between ABC system linkage to performance
evaluation and rewards (Factor 4a), and overall ABC implementation success. That is, individuals who believe that
rewards are associated with the successful implementation of ABC are expected to be more motivated to work towards
that goal. This reasoning corresponds well with Argyris and Kaplan (1994) who argued that the degree to which a users
personal stake is connected to the ABC system will affect his or her attitude towards the system. On the same grounds,
a linkage to competitive strategies (Factor 4b) is deemed important because of its motivational effect on employees to
use ABC information to improve their firms competitive position (Shields, 1995).
As suggested above, clear and shared ABC objectives (Factors 5a and b) are also deemed important for the degree
of implementation success. The main argument is that with a high level of congruence between the goals of the new
costing system and those of the organization, users are more likely to accept the system (McGowan and Klammer,
1997; Shields, 1995).
Compared with the above mentioned factors, the literature is considerably less explicit about the assumptions that
underpin the expected positive relationship between nonaccounting ownership/user involvement (Factor 6) and ABC
implementation success. However, one exception is the study of McGowan and Klammer (1997) in which it is proposed
that employee involvement typically increases satisfaction by (i) providing a more accurate and complete assessment
of users information needs, (ii) providing knowledge about the users of the system, (iii) promoting the development
of realistic expectations about the project, (iv) improving user acceptance and understanding of the system, and (v)
fostering system ownership by the users.
Also the rationales behind the expected positive effect of external experts/consultants (cf. Factor 7), on implementation success are less well articulated in the empirically oriented literature (see, e.g. Innes et al., 2000; Shields,
1995). However, in their conceptual paper, Argyris and Kaplan (1994) suggested that consultants and other experts
(often representatives from companies that have voluntarily implemented ABC) are potentially important because they
can describe their experiences typically successful with ABC implementation in different organizations (see also
Anderson, 1995).
To sum up, the literature review shows that some of the research findings are remarkably consistent and in line
with expectations (Factors 14), while some are less so (Factors 57). Importantly, however, as argued above there
is consensus among researchers as to the underlying purpose of the studies and also the rationales behind the predictions (whether confirmed or not in the empirical tests). That is, the main purpose is to identify the behavioural and
organizational factors which lead to successful implementation (see also Lukka and Granlund, 2002). This, in turn,
implies that it is assumed that the implementation of ABC is related to progress, i.e. the change of information system is
conceived as an inherently positive phenomenonas something that changes the present towards the better (cf. Burns
and Vaivio, 2001). Or more specifically, the ABC system is seen as enhancing functionality by providing more accurate
decision-making information. And, importantly, such a change is regarded as positive since it is assumed to increase
organizational profits and, accordingly, shareholder value. In other words, while not explicitly stated in the papers, the
proprietor is the centre of attention insofar as the very meaning of ABC implementation success is formulated with the
owner in mind (cf. Foster and Swensons (1997) article on measuring ABC implementation success).
Another fundamental argument which underpins the mainstream literature is that ABC implementation is a consensual and neutral activity (cf. Hardy and Cleggs (1996) analysis of mainstream management literature), although
a few exceptions can be found (see Section 5 below). In particular, this neutral view on information system change
becomes evident when we look closer at the sources of resistance identified in the literature and at the discussions
on how resistance can (should) be prevented. For example, resistance arising from employees feeling pressured and
overwhelmed by the implementation process can typically be decreased by providing them with adequate resources,
e.g. in terms of money, competence and employee time. Another source of resistance stems from a lack of acceptance
and understanding of the ABC system, which, according to the literature, can be handled by means of adequate training
in the design and use of the ABC system. Such training efforts are also likely to improve consensus about and clarity of
the objectives of the ABC project among employees, which further increases the likelihood of implementation success.
Finally, there is an assumption that lack of employee interest in and commitment to the ABC project can be managed
by linking its progress to the reward system and to the organizations overall goals.

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As will be argued in the next section, the politically oriented literature takes a fundamentally different stance
regarding the principal purpose of the research as such and the mainstream core assumptions of progress and neutrality.
4. Prior political research on ABC implementation
Drawing upon other theoretical grounds, a number of researchers have questioned the underlying arguments of the
mainstream research presented above (e.g. Malmi, 1997; Granlund, 2001). For example, based on case study evidence,
it has been argued that the sources of change, or resistance towards change, are fundamentally structural, and that
the type of process-based implementation strategies referred to above have very little influence on implementation
success (Malmi, 1997; see also Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). Furthermore, it is typically argued that the adoption of
ABC (Drennan and Kelly, 2002; Granlund, 2001; Malmi, 1997) is inherently political. That is, this type of management
accounting change always involves power and politicseven when denied. And given the importance of this dimension
of organizational life, they argue, it should be explicitly taken into account if we are to more fully understand these
processes.
Indeed, it may not be obvious that an effort to improve cost information accuracy is likely to have decisive political
implications. However, from a political perspective actors are assumed to act in order to maintain or even further
their own interests when implementing a new costing system. Accordingly, a new ABC system may be considered by
some powerful coalitions as an opportunity to extend their existing power base, while others may comprehend it as a
serious threat. In either way, it can be expected that these different stakeholders will take political actions during the
implementation process in order to defend their interests.
An increasing number of studies emphasize how these clashes of interests affect how ABC implementation processes
evolve. For example, an early study of Bhimani and Pigott (1992) found that an ABC implementation increased the
power base of factory managers at the expense of sales managers and sales representatives. According to the authors,
one important source of this shift in power was that the production managers who, unlike the sales personnel took
active part in the ABC implementation, found that the use of an accounting argumentation and reasoning enjoyed ready
legitimacy within the organization.
Another example where it became obvious that the ABC project affected the power bases of different parties is
that of Major and Hopper (2005). In their case, ABC was set up with an explicit focus on the needs of commercial
managers as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of the existing management accounting system. However, while
commercial managers were satisfied with the new costing system, the production managers and engineers who had
previously been the most powerful professional group in the company found this emphasis on commercial managers
needs unacceptable and subsequently resisted the project. Or more precisely, drawing upon their strong production
orientation and their beliefs that the organizations survival depends more on the efficiency of internal operations than
on a fast response to the markets demands (p. 218), the engineers continued to base their decisions on non-financial
data from other information systems. Furthermore, resistance was manifested in the engineers reluctance to submit
data to the new ABC system, or submitting data late, thereby obstructing the use of timely data by others.
In a similar vein, Malmi (1997) found that factory managers opposed an ABC project because the knowledge of
true cost of products would have increased the bargaining power of buying subunits in transfer pricing and resource
allocation negotiations. Interestingly, however, Malmi also argued that the new ABC system would have negatively
affected the position of the factory managers also without any impacts on transfer prices. The premise is that Malmi,
in line with Scapens and Roberts (1993) case study observations, found that employees resisted the costing system
change also because it would make the economics of their operations visible. And such a visibility was considered
a threat because it created opportunities for the management to exert direct control of operations and thus increased
subunit accountability. Notably, these findings are also in line with some of those reported in the mainstream tradition.
For example, Innes and Mitchell (1995, p. 143) found that a substantial number of users disliked having to maintain
time sheet type of records to support the ABC system and expressed some anxiety over the increase in personal
accountability which resulted from activity analysis. Furthermore, several studies indicate that employees may fear
that they would lose their jobs altogether (Drennan and Kelly, 2002; Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Major and Hopper,
2005; Soin et al., 2002).
Colliers (2006) study of the politicization of an ABC implementation project in the police force is also interesting
insofar as it brings the different uses of ABC information to the fore. Indeed, and in line with the underlying assumption
in the mainstream research tradition, he finds that the data were used to inform management decisions, leading to

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efficiency improvements. However, he also noted a number of other uses (see also Drennan and Kelly, 2002). For
example, he found that certain units deliberately set up the ABC system to retain a degree of invisibility about their
performance in order to assert and retain independence from political control. Furthermore, he noted that the ABC
calculations could be used to justify whatever argument a user wanted to make. In fact, a set of data could be used to
demonstrate both efficiency and inefficiency depending on the political perspective of the user of those numbers. As a
result, Collier concluded that the forces implementing activity costing are explicitly more concerned with technical
aspects of its implementation rather than with any concern over how the data may be used. This is either nave or a
deliberately political act (p. 83).
As we see it, the principal purpose of the politically oriented literature is to problematize typical mainstream
assumptions (see the previous section), by providing a more complex and, in their view, realistic picture of the
phenomenon under examination (see also Lukka and Granlund, 2002). In particular, the literature in this sub-genre
shows that ABC implementations may encounter resistance simply because they may threaten different stakeholders
power base within the organization. Importantly, however, this literature also shows that actors may welcome a change
for similar reasons, i.e. because they see opportunities of strengthening their own position (cf. the production managers
reported in the Bhimani and Pigott (1992) study and also the findings of Drennan and Kelly (2002)). Hence, the political
perspective repudiates the mainstream assumption that ABC implementations are related to progress and thus are
inherently positive. Rather, from this angle, ABC implementation processes have to be understood in terms of how
the new costing technique is affected by and affects more or less subtle power relations between stakeholders and
coalitions in the organization. That is, an explicit focus on political issues of implementation processes brings to the
fore a number of issues of how existing power bases may or may not be threatened by the implementation of ABC,
and how these political games affect how implementation processes evolve. Accordingly, and unlike the mainstream
assumption about consensus and neutrality, the political stream of research sets out from the idea of conflicting interests
among stakeholders.
5. Lessons learned from a political perspective on ABC implementation processes
Based on the literature reviews above, we will now turn to the issue of how our general understanding of ABC
implementation could potentially benefit from incorporating the results and underlying assumptions of the political
perspective in the mainstream area. Indeed, some mainstream ABC implementation papers have already acknowledged
the political dimension. For example, Shields (1995, p. 150) argued that the role of top managers support for ABC
implementation success is important because, amongst other things, they can deny resources for innovation they do
not support, and provide the political help needed to motivate or push aside individuals and coalitions who resist the
innovation (see also Baird et al., 2007; McGowan and Klammer, 1997). However, these types of explanations are
given little room in the overall explanatory models and more detailed discussions on the nature of power and its effects
on the implementation process are not provided (but see Anderson, 1995). Below, we will therefore use the insights
from the political research on ABC implementation both to re-contextualize and reinterpret some of the mainstream
research findings (i.e. Factors 14 in Table 1), and to propose a number of explanations of unexpected and contradictory
results (Factors 57).
5.1. Lesson 1: a re-contextualization and reinterpretation of theory-consistent mainstream results
In the above section on the mainstream ABC implementation literature, it was argued that top managers support
(Factor 1a) is one of the most important means of achieving ABC implementation success, at least in some implementation stages (cf. Anderson and Young, 1999; Krumwiede, 1998). The premise is, the mainstream literature argues, that
by demonstrating their own commitment to and involvement in the ABC implementation project, other organizational
members are likely to follow their lead (see, e.g. Foster and Swenson, 1997; McGowan and Klammer, 1997). However, from a political perspective, which brings conflicting interests between stakeholders to the centre of the analysis,
merely expressing their commitment to and being involved in the implementation process is probably not enough to
explain top managers importance for implementation success. Rather, drawing upon the general literature on power
and politics in organizations, an alternative interpretation would be to emphasize top managers ability to overcome
diverging interests through the mobilization and deployment of a number of critical resources on which others depend
(cf. Hardy and Clegg, 1996; Hardy, 1996). That is, powerful coalitions may use key resources as carrots and sticks to

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157

influence behaviour, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they
would not otherwise do (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 30).
Transferred to the findings in the mainstream ABC implementation literature presented in Table 1, therefore, the
mobilization of resources such as employee time (cf. Factor 2 in Table 1) is necessary to make it possible to realize
the project while the projects linkage to different kinds of rewards (cf. Factor 4a) represents carrots used to modify
employee behaviour towards the realization of the project. Note, however, that a political perspective not only recognizes
the governing effect of pecuniary incentives, but also that actors embracing the new system may be rewarded in terms of
increased attention and prestige within the organization. According to Bhimani and Pigott (1992, p. 129), this became
the case when factory managers in the studied company decided to take an active part in the implementation of an
ABC system:
Under ABC, top management increasingly directed their attention on factory knowledge, concerns and issues
and this had provided a sense of significance and satisfaction which factory managers cherished.
The production managers also felt encouraged to actually use the ABC information because it could be used to
justify desired changes in terms which could be understood by powerful actors outside the factory and gave credibility
and legitimacy to their actions. Intentionally or not, therefore, the factory managers active role in the ABC project
was rewarded by top management in terms of an increased power base.
As suggested above, however, top managers can also exert power through the use of sticks (coercion). For example,
top managements power to fire employees can be used as a means of imposing a new system (cf. Drennan and Kelly,
2002; Major and Hopper, 2005; Soin et al., 2002). Although we have not found any studies focusing specifically on
ABC implementation to support such claim, Burns (2000) study of a management accounting change initiative showed
that while it was not explicitly stated by the managing director that jobs were at stake, he declared at several occasions
that he was unsure whether the organization had the right people to realize the changes. This, in turn, led to the general
belief amongst employees that they were increasingly under pressure to implement the new accounting system.
However, the more general literature on power and politics also shows that power over resources may have a
limited impact because it is task oriented and the continual deployment of carrots and/or sticks may be necessary
to ensure that the desired behaviour is sustained (see, e.g. Hardy, 1996). Moreover, there is case study evidence from
the management accounting change literature which suggests that the use of coercion may engender a backlash in the
people over whom power is exercised (e.g. Burns, 2000). Therefore, analysts of power and interests in organizations
have for long argued that powerful actors may also exert power from behind the scenes by preventing conflict and
resistance from emerging in the first place, i.e. by exerting power over meaning (Lukes, 1974; Hardy and Clegg, 1996).
This way of exercising power involves influencing actors perceptions, cognitions and preferences so that they accept
the suggested change (or existing state of affairs) either because they cannot imagine any alternative courses of action,
or because they are convinced that the change is legitimate, rational and desirable. As such, this way of exerting
power is more subtle, broad sweeping and long-term compared with that of using scarce resources as carrots and sticks.
Applied on an ABC implementation context, this way of exerting power suggests that it is of vital importance for
top management to make sure that the motive behind the change project is understood and, importantly, perceived as
legitimate and rational by the users (cf. the implementation strategy suggested by Argyris and Kaplan (1994)). In
support of such a claim, Table 1 shows that training efforts in ABC (Factor 3) can be viewed as a means of exercising
this power (cf. Chua (1996) and McPhail (2001) who discuss the potential effects of training in accounting in general).
The table also shows that a clear linkage between the ABC project and the companys competitive strategies (cf. Factor
4b) is typically related to ABC implementation success. From a political point of view, this means that an ABC change
effort which reinforces the prevailing power structure, manifested in terms of organizational goals and strategies, is
likely to be successfully implemented (Malmi, 1997; Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). Furthermore, Anderson and Youngs
(1999) finding that ABC implementation success is related to support from both local management (cf. Factor 1b)
and labour unions (1c) suggests that the exertion of power over meaning can be reinforced by mobilizing support from
other powerful and legitimate stakeholders within the organization. This is also in line with reasoning arguing for the
importance of having internal ABC champions (1d) (Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Brown et al., 2004; Shields and
Young, 1989), not least when these champions receive external legitimacy, e.g. as a leader in ABC implementation
by the surrounding business community (cf. Anderson, 1995).
To sum up, factors such as support from management, unions and informal champions, training and linkage to rewards
and strategies may prevent conflict from emerging in the first place by portraying ABC as a rational, desirable and

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perhaps unavoidable solution to the problems identified, and by de-legitimizing the demands of other stakeholders.
Unlike the mainstream literature, which principally claims that consensus about the importance and content of the ABC
initiative is necessary to ensure that the new system is effectively implemented and used (cf. McGowan and Klammer,
1997; Shields, 1995), the political framework thus also sheds some light on the mechanisms by which such a state of
consensus may be brought about.
5.2. Lesson 2: tentative explanations of unexpected or contradictory results
As illustrated by the lower part of Table 1 (Factors 57), there are a number of results which can be considered as
unexpected or contradictory. One such result is the surprisingly low importance of clear and shared ABC objectives
for the successful implementation of the system (cf. Factors 5a and 5b). Again, the mainstream literature predicts that
these ingredients are crucial as they ensure efficient design and effective use of the information system (McGowan and
Klammer, 1997; Krumwiede, 1998).
However, Major and Hoppers (2005, p. 222) case study showed that even though the goals of Marconi for ABC
were clear and consistent throughout, the project was resisted by production managers because the goal was to improve
information for pricing and investment decisions by commercial departments. Hence, the explicit focus on the commercial departments downgraded the production engineers, thereby making the ABC project a symbol of the increasing
dominance of commercial departments over production departments. In other words, when considering potential rivalry
between various groups within the organization, clear goals may even strengthen resistance in some groups.
In a similar vein, Collier (2006) suggested that the existence of rational-economic ABC objectives was of only
secondary importance for the decision to adopt and implement the new system. Instead, he found that the ABC
implementation was primarily guided by another more politically laden objective, namely, to cast policing in a
rational discourse at the same time as the performance of the police is hidden by disguised calculability and a
politically constructed interpretation of performance (p. 82). This is also in line with Bhimani and Pigotts (1992)
study which showed that the rationales underpinning some actors behaviour towards the new ABC system were
expressed more in terms of whether or not they benefited politically from the implementation than in terms of the
systems technical advantages. These findings also receive support from the case study of Arnaboldi and Lapsley
(2004, p. 17) which concludes that at best ABC is part of an exercise in legitimacy (see also Drennan and Kelly,
2002).
A second category of unexpected and, to some extent, contradictory results in Table 1 is the mixed findings concerning
the impact of nonaccounting ownership and user involvement (cf. Factor 6 in Table 1). According to the mainstream
literature (Krumwiede, 1998; McGowan and Klammer, 1997; Shields, 1995), these factors should be positively related
to ABC implementation success as a high degree of participation in the implementation process provides more accurate
and complete assessment of the users information requirements. It is also argued that a high degree of involvement is
likely to improve user acceptance and understanding of the system.
From a political perspective, however, the link between user participation and implementation success is less
straightforward. The reason is that this literature emphasizes that the motivation for getting involved typically varies
between organizational stakeholders (Collier, 2006; Drennan and Kelly, 2002; Malmi, 1997). Accordingly, it could be
expected that some stakeholders will choose to get involved and take actions which are different from, and possibly
competing with, those expected by top management. In support of such claim, Scapens and Roberts (1993) observed
that when subordinates recognized that a costing change project was going to go ahead (with or without them), they
chose to get involved in it because that enhanced their ability to exert an influence on the direction of the projectin
this way the project, which had begun primarily as an accounting project and which had attempted to redefine production
control in accounting terms, was transformed into a production control project with a much more overt production
orientation (p. 25). From a political perspective, therefore, a high level of user involvement in a change project may
actually decrease the likelihood of ABC implementation success in some situations (where success is defined from
the top managements point of view). Arguably, this may explain Krumwiedes (1998) contradictory finding that the
higher the degree of nonaccounting ownership, the lower the odds of routinizing ABC (cf. also Anderson (1995) who
reported that local ABC owners at General Motors opposed initiatives to standardize their models).
As we see it, the observation that different stakeholders typically have different agendas for the ABC project may
also provide additional insights into Foster and Swensons finding that broader-based success measureswhich include
details on the extent of ABC data usesignificantly improve the explanatory power of models using more narrow

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measures reflecting only the economic goal of the firm such as dollar improvements resulting from ABC. This is so
because ABC data use may be just as much about strengthening individuals power base within the organization as
making better operational and strategic decisions (cf. Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Collier, 2006; Drennan and Kelly,
2002).
Another explanation of the different results between these different measures of implementation success is that there
may be a considerable gap between the public formal acceptance of a new costing system and the private attitudes
that informed the way in which subordinates dealt with it (Scapens and Roberts, 1993). For example, Major and
Hopper (2005, p. 220) showed how some actors, who opposed the new ABC system, still produced data and fed it into
the system. However, since they feared that it might curtail their autonomy, threaten job tenure, and anyway it was
irrelevant to their job, they only made rough approximations of how much time was spent on various activities and
often delayed the reporting of data. Hence, in the end the ABC system failed to generate cost data on time. (p. 220).
In a similar vein, accounting systems which are imposed on subordinates may merely lead to ceremonial use:
It was the accounts (e.g. the time sheets and the development report) rather than the accounting (i.e. using the
information) which had become routine. Routines, especially mechanical routines repetitive rote behaviour
with minimal accompanying thought process and/or reflexive monitoring are normally easy to achieve. This is
particularly so when new routines are underpinned by the mobilization of appropriate and sufficient resources.
However, resource mobilisation does not by itself ensure that the new accounting practices will be routinely used
in the manner by which their champion intends. (Burns, 2000, p. 583, emphasis in original).
Accordingly, an apparently high level of ABC information use may merely mean that mechanical routines have
been implemented, typically as the result of top management coercion. And, thus, high level of use may not necessarily
be associated with high economic returns.
Finally, Table 1 reveals that there is a surprisingly little impact of external parties such as consultants and experts
(Factor 7) for the successful implementation of ABC systems. One possible explanation is, however, that while external
consultants typically know the rhetoric of ABC and also have deep knowledge about ABC software packages (cf.
Granlund, 2001), they may lack basic knowledge about the existing power structures. That is, given the limited time
they normally have at their disposal to implement the new system, they are not likely to fully understand the significance
and implications of these typically subtle and longstanding institutionalized power relations between stakeholders. And
such a lack of knowledge makes it difficult to earn the necessary status and legitimacy amongst different organizational
members (cf. Scapens and Roberts, 1993). It could also be argued that, unlike top management, external parties possess
substantially less resources which can be used to bring about the desired behaviour although, indeed, they typically
have support from top management.
6. Conclusions and suggestions for future research
Our analysis, using insights from a political perspective on ABC implementations to discuss the results of mainstream research, suggests that at least the following lessons can be learned. A first conclusion is that through making an
assumption of non-neutral processes of ABC implementation, the political literature highlights that conflict of interests
typically exists between different parties within organizations. These conflicting interests may be expressed hierarchically, through the interests of management (owners) vs. employees, but also in terms of varying interests among
functional units and/or professional groups (Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Major and Hopper, 2005). Consequently, from
this perspective, it is assumed that actors have widely different motives for getting involved in an ABC project, and
that they will act upon these in order to preserve or enhance their interests (e.g. Drennan and Kelly, 2002; Major and
Hopper, 2005). That is, while some stakeholders are likely to resist the new costing system, because they perceive it as
a threat, others may consider it as favourable because it enhances their power base within the organization (cf. Bhimani
and Pigott, 1992; Malmi, 1997).
With this in mind, we propose that future research should seek to more systematically investigate how different
organizational stakeholders view and act in ABC implementation processes. Indeed, the mainstream literature has
investigated some central differences between subgroups such as those between prepares and users (Anderson and
Young, 1999; McGowan and Klammer, 1997). However, considering the empirical evidence presented in the political
literature (e.g. Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Major and Hopper, 2005), other ways of grouping actors seem to be of equal
importance.

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Furthermore, highlighting the various motives of different groups of actors also points to the need for future
research to build on and further develop the meanings of implementation success (cf. Baird et al., 2007; Foster
and Swenson, 1997) to also include the idea that success is relative, and ultimately decided through the eyes of the
beholder(s) (see also Malmi, 1997). As Drennan and Kelly (2002, p. 329) argued; Whilst the success or otherwise
of any organizational change can best be assessed in terms of its objectives [. . .], those objectives may differ between
management levels and different parts of the organization, with some being clearly articulated and others remaining
implicit.
A second and related conclusion is that a political perspective on ABC implementations can be used to interpret
and reinterpret some of the findings in the mainstream literature. For example, the assumption of conflicting interests
implies that top managers may have to get some employees to do things they otherwise would not do through the
deployment of critical resources. Accordingly, the importance of top management support, adequate resources and
connections to reward systems found in the mainstream literature can thus be viewed as sticks and carrots used to
modify employees behaviour against their will, while training and support may be important means of exerting power
over meaning, i.e. preventing conflict from emerging in the first place. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the fact
that the political literature also suggests that the deployment of sticks and carrot coercion or persuasion is mainly
needed for those organizational stakeholders whose power base is threatened (Granlund, 2001; Malmi, 1997).
Based on these insights, we propose that the general assumption made in the mainstream literature, i.e. that factors
such as top management support and linkage to evaluation and reward systems are generally needed for a successful
implementationshould probably be revised in future research to recognize important differences between intraorganizational coalitions and groups. Furthermore, when critical resources are needed to bring about desired behaviour,
future research should address the question of how these resources, not least informal ones, are deployed to influence
ABC implementation processes.
A third conclusion from the literature review is that a political perspective may provide additional insights into
unexpected or contradictory mainstream results. For example, it has been argued that clear ABC objectives may be
unimportant, or may even decrease the likelihood of a successful implementation because they fuel existing conflicts
between interests in the organization (Major and Hopper, 2005). In a similar manner, the political literature suggests
that user involvement may have the same effect on implementation success because some actors get involved in ABC
projects more for political reasons than for rational-economical ones (Collier, 2006).
As we see it, an interesting task for future research would thus be to more systematically explore under what
circumstances and why clear ABC objectives, user involvement and the use of external experts/consultants, lead to
implementation success (in the mainstream sense) and vice versa.
A fourth and final conclusion from the review is that the political ABC implementation literature has much to
say about non-success factors beyond mainstream explanations in terms of not enough top-management support,
adequate resources, etc. In particular, it is highlighted that ABC systems as such not only entail technical advantages,
e.g. the capability of providing managers with more accurate product cost information, but also that such information
may change power relations between organizational stakeholders (Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Major and Hopper, 2005;
Malmi, 1997). It is also shown that the increased visibility that follows from the activity analysis may trigger resistance
as it creates opportunities to exert direct control of operations or risks leading to employee layoffs (Drennan and Kelly,
2002; Soin et al., 2002).
An interesting and rewarding path for future research would thus be to include more politically oriented features
of ABC systems into the mainstream models. The premise is that such an inclusion has the potential to significantly
improve the explanatory power of the mainstream implementation models. Or as argued by Major and Hopper (2005,
p. 225); If factor and process studies are to make inroads into understanding when ABC is prone to fail, then it must
address sociological work that identifies factors relating to resistance and conflict. Considering how this may enrich
the current understanding of ABC implementations, it seems important that future research more than today (Lukka
and Granlund, 2002) seeks to use different theoretical perspectives and research methods. In this way, interchange
between different sub-genres and genres of ABC research would be enhanced, which could potentially lead to the
development of a new integrated sub-genre of ABC implementation research.
However, it could also be argued that the results and implications of this study may well apply to other areas
in the management accounting literature. True, features such as the detailed activity and cost driver analysis (in
particular of non-production areas within the firm) are likely to have decisive political implications that are more or
less specific for ABC implementations. However, the more general conclusions and implications for future research,

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161

i.e. the problematization of the ideas of consensus and progress typically assumed in the mainstream tradition, may
well apply to the implementation of other management accounting innovations as well.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the useful comments made by the two anonymous reviewers, Robert W. Scapens, and

participants in workshops at CEROC (Centre for Empirical Research on Organizational Control) at Orebro
Univer
sity. Financial support for this project was provided by Orebro
University and the Jan Wallander och Tom Hedelius
foundation.
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