PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA(A.C. No.

5128)
31 March 2005The Case
: Complaint against Atty. Elias A.
Pontevedra with malpractice and
misconduct with prayer for disbarment
Facts:
Respondent was the Pormento familys
legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The
familys relationship with the
respondentextends beyond the mere
lawyer-client relations.The rift between
complainant and respondent began when
the complainants counterclaim in a
civil case filed with the RTCof Bacolod City
was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform
complainant Pormento of the dismissal of
his counterclaim whichresulted to the
latter being deprived of his right to appeal.
In order to recover his ownership over a
parcel of land, Pormento wasforced to hire
a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused
to institute an action to recover the subject
property.In a separate incident, In 1967, he
bought a parcel of land located at Negros
Occidental. The Deed of Declaration
of Heirship and Sale of said land was
prepared and notarized by
respondent. Since there was another
person who claims ownership of the
property, complainant alleges that he heeded
respondents advice to build a small house on
the property and to allow his(complainants)
nephew and his family to occupy the house
in order for complainant to establish his
possession of the said
property.Subsequently, complainants
nephew refused to vacate the property
prompting the former to file an ejectment
case with theMunicipal Trial Court of
Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent
acted as the counsel of complainants
nephew
Held/Ruling:Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of thefacts.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a
representation of conflicting interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will

requirethe attorney to do anything which

will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also
whether hewill be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their
connection.
Another testto determine if there is a
representation of conflicting interests
is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent anattorney from
the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness ordouble dealing in the
performance thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client
when the subject matter of the
presentcontroversy is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for
the formerclient. Conversely, he may
properly act as counsel for a new client,
with full disclosure to the latter, against a
former client in amatter wholly unrelated
to that of the previous employment, there
being in that instance no conflict of
interests. Where, however,the subject
matter of the present suit between the
lawyers new client and his former client
is in some way connected with that of the
former clients action, the lawyer may
have to contend for his new client that
which he previously opposed as counsel
for theformer client or to use against the
latter information confided to him as his
counsel.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY.
CARLOS SAGUCIO
Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
industries,Inc. until his appointment
as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.Employees
of Taggat filed a criminal complaint, they
alleged that complainant, who took
over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father,
withheld payment of their salaries and
wages without valid cause. Complainant
now charges respondent with the
1

violationsRule 15.03 of CPR and engaging

in the private practice of law while working
as a govt prosecutor.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of
CPR. WON being a former lawyer of
Taggatconflicts with his role as Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor
HELD:
The Supreme Court finds no conflict of
interests when respondent handled
preliminaryinvestigation of criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminalcomplaint
pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from April 1 1996 to July 15,
1997.Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period
since he resignedsometime in 1992. In
order to change respondent for
representing conflicting interests,
evidencemust be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former
client, any
confidential information acquired thru his
previous employment. It does
not necessarily followthat respondent used
any confidential information from his
previous employment withcomplainant or
Taggat in resolving the criminal
complaint.As the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved asgovt prosecutor was laborrelated is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representingconflicting
interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactionsthat occurred
beyond the lawyers employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to
imposeupon the lawyer the duty to protect
the clients interests only on matters that
he previouslyhandled for the former client and
not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationshiphas terminated.
Thus, respondent is NOT guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
As to the second issue, respondent clearly
violated the prohibition in Ra 6718 which
constitutes aviolation of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.. The

respondent here performed acts that are
usuallyrendered by lawyers with the use of their
legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit
of theterm practice of law. Respondents
admission that he received from Taggat fees for
legalservices while serving as a govt
prosecutor is unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
JOSEFINA M. ANION, COMPLAINANT,
VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA,
JR.,RESPONDENT.
Facts:Josefina M. Anion (
complainant
) had previously engaged the legal services of
Atty. Sabitsanain the preparation and execution in
her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land
owned byher late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated
herconfidence when he subsequently filed a civil
case against her for the annulment of the Deed
of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal
wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainantaccused
Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential
information he obtained from her in filing thecivil
case.Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the
complainant in the preparation and execution of
theDeed of Sale. However, he denied having
received any confidential information. Atty.
Sabitsanaasserted that the present disbarment
complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino
Velasquez,Jr., the notary of the disbarment
complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty.
Sabitsana)and had instigated the complaint for
this reason.
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004,
the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report
andRecommendation of the IBP
Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on
record andRespondent was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of
one year.Atty. Sabitsana moved to
reconsider the above resolution, but the
IBP Board of Governors denied his motion.
The Issue
Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
The Courts Ruling
2

The SC agreed with the findings and

recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors. The SC rules that
t
he relationship between a lawyer and
his/her client should ideally be imbued
withthe highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full
disclosure of the clients most confidential
information to his/he
r lawyer for an unhampered exchange
of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyerbased on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his
part, is duty-bound toobserve candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings
and transactions with the client.
Part of the lawyers duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in
determining whether a violation of the
above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound
to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time,to oppose
that claim for the other client.
Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client
has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
is a violation of the rule.Another test of
inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyers duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty.
Still another test is whether the
lawyer wouldbe called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through
theirconnection or previous employmentOn

the basis of the attendant facts of the

case, substantial evidence proved
to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of
the above rule:
first , he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete;
second , he impleaded thecomplainant as
the defendant in the case; and
third , the case he filed was for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale thathe had
previously prepared and executed for
the complainant.By his acts, not only did
Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one
client against another client in the same
action; healso accepted a new
engagement that entailed him to contend
and oppose the interest of his other client
in a propertyin which his legal services
had been previously retained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of theCommission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana,
Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from
the practice of law.
HILADO vs. DAVID
Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an
action against
Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale
of several houses and lot executed during
the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's
deceasedhusband.2. Attorneys
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita file an answer
on behalf of the defendant; and
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodri
go
registered their appearance as counsel for
the plaintiff.These attorneys filed
an amended complaint by including Jacob
Assad as party defendant.3.
Attorney Francisco entered his appearance
as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, et al.
who had withdrawn from the
case.4.Attorney Dizon (counsel for plaintiff)
3

, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney

Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground
that their client had consulted with him
about her case, on which occasion, it was
alleged, "she turned over the papers" to
Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her
a written opinion
.5. Not receiving any answer to this
suggestion, Attorneys Dizon et al, filed
a formal motion with the court TO
DISQUALIFY Francisco
.6. In his answer, Attorney Francisco
alleged that, a real estate broker told him
that there was apending suit brought by
Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to
annul the sale of a real estate andthat this
woman asked him if he was willing to
accept the case if the Syrian should give it
the casehim.
7.Atty. Francisco accepted the case.8.
One month after, Mrs. Hilado came to see
him about the suit, he wanted to take it
away fromAttys. Dizon et al. ;
that as he had known the plaintiff's
deceased husband he did not hesitate
totell her frankly that hers was a lost
case for the same reason he had told
the broker.
9.Assad requested Atty. Francisco to
handle his case stating that his American
lawyer left for theUS leaving the case
in the hands of other attorneys.10
Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer and
entered his appearance.11.The judge
trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez
David, dismissed the complaint. He
believedand concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the
respondent did not attain the point of
creating the relation of attorney and client.
ISSUE:
Is Atty Francisco guilty of representing
conflicting interest?
YES.
HELD:
That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed
to the plaintiff a written opinion over his
signature onthe merits of her case; that

this opinion was reached on the basis of

papers she had submitted at hisoffice; that
Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those
papers was to secure Attorney
Francisco's professional services.
SC agrees with petitioner's counsel that
THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
BETWEEN ATTORNEY FRANCISCO AND
MRS. HILADO ENSUED .In order to
constitute attorney and client relation a
professional one and not merely one of
principal and agent , the attorneys must
be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend
anaction in court of Justice, or to prepare
and draft, in legal form such papers as
deeds, bills, contracts andthe like."
(Atkinson vs. Howlett) To constitute
professional employment it is NOT
essential that the client should have
employed theattorney professionally on
any previous occasion . . . It is NOT
necessary that any retainer should
havebeen paid, promised, or charged for;
NEITHER IS IT MATERIAL that the attorney
consulted did notafterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was
had. If a person, in respect to his
businessaffairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view
toobtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in suchconsultation,
then the professional employment must be
regarded as established
. . ." (JonesCommentaries on Evidence)
FORMALITY IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN
ATTORNEY
. Thecontract may be express or implied
and it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of the attorney issought and
received, in matters pertinent to
his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting in behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request by the
latter ." (HirachBros. & Co. vs. R. E.
Kennington Co
Where it appeared that an attorney,
representing one party, in litigation, had
formerly represented theadverse party
4

with respect to the same matter involved

in the litigation, THE COURT NEED
NOT INQUIRE AS TO HOW MUCH KNOWLE
DGE THE ATTORNEY ACQUIRED FROM HIS F
ORMERCLIENT
during that relationship, before refusing to
permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party.(
Brown vs. Miller )
This rule has been so strictly enforced that
it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating hisemployment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client
in the same general matter, even
though,while acting for his former client,
he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client'sdisadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment
. (P ierce vs. Palmer ) Communications
between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated
affair,consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In
the complexity of what issaid in the
course of the dealings between
an attorney and a client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice
thecomplainant's cause
. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results.
SC nevertheless CANNOT SANCTION
his taking up the cause of the adversary of
the party who hadsought and obtained
legal advice from his firm SC believes that
upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient . It had the tendency to bring
theprofession, of which he is a
distinguished member, " into public
disrepute and suspicion and underminethe
integrity of justice. " The fact remains that
his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which,
asheretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. THIS
LETTER BINDS AND STOPS HIM IN THE
SAME MANNER AND TO THE SAME DEGREE
AS IF HE PERSONALLY HAD WRITTEN IT. An
information obtained by a client by a
member or assistant of a law firm is
information imparted to the firm.

DEE vs. CA [1989]NAKPIL vs. VALDES

[1998]
Facts:

1965 Nakpil became interested in

purchasing a summer residence in
Baguio(Moran property). For lack of funds,
he requested Valdes to purchase
theproperty for him. They agreed that
Valdes would keep the property in trust
for the Nakpils until they could buy it
back. Valdes obtained 2 loans from a
bankwhich he used to purchase and
renovate the property and the title was
issued inthe name of Valdes.

July 8, 1973 Nakpil died and Valdes acted

as legal counsel and accountant of the
Imelda Nakpil (widow)

Ownership of the Moran property became

an issue in the intestate
proceedingsbecause Valdes excluded the
Moran property from the inventory of the
estate.

February 13, 1979 Nakpil sought to

recover the property by filing an action
for reconveyance with damages. During
the pendency of the action she filed acase
in order to disbar Valdes She charged that
Valdes violated theprofessional ethics
when:
o
Assigned to his family corporation the
Moran property which belongedto the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and
auditor
o
Excluded the Moran property from the
"inventory of real estateproperties" he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the
same time,charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as
aliability of the estate, all for the purpose
of transferring the title to thesaid property
to his family corporation.
o
Prepared and defended monetary claims
against the estate thatretained him as its
counsel and auditor
5


Defense of Valdes
o
He claims that he did not hold the property
in trust
o
He denied preparing the list of claims
against the estate whichincluded his loans
of 65,000 and 75,000 for the purchase
andrenovation of the Moran property. He
stressed that the list drawn upby his
accounting firm merely stated that the
loan was in the name of Valdes were
applied probably for the purchase of the
Moran property.He claims that probably for
purchase did not imply
consummatedtransaction but a projected
acquisition. He adds that he has
resignedfrom law and accounting firm as
early as 1974 and that it Atty.Cendana who
filed the intestate proceedings in court.
o
He denied that there was a conflict of
interest when his law firmrepresented the
estate in the intestate proceedings while
hisaccounting firm served as accountant of
the estate and prepared theclaims of
creditors of Nakpil and Enorn.

1963 CFI of Baguio dismissed the action

for reconveyance. Lower Court heldthat
the Moran property was held in trust but
found that Nakpil waived her rightover it.

CA reversed the ruling of the court.

February 18, 1986 (during the pendency of

the complaint) OSG found thatthere was
no trust agreement over the property
and that Valdes was theabsolute
owner. OSG recommended the dismissal
of the administrative case.Issue: WON the
demeanor of Valdes would warrant his
disbarment from the profession?NO, Valdes
is suspended from the practice of law for
one year with a warning that asimilar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely
in the future.Ratio:

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from

dealing with his client but the
businesstransaction must be characterized
with utmost honesty and good

faith. Themeasure of good faith which an

attorney is required to exercise in his
dealingswith his client is a much higher
standard than is required in business
dealingswhere the parties trade at "arms
length. Business transactions between
anattorney and his client are disfavored
and discouraged by the policy of the
law.Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage
istaken by a lawyer over his client. This
rule is founded on public policy for,
byvirtue of his office, an attorney is in an
easy position to take advantage of
thecredulity and ignorance of his client.
Thus, no presumption of innocence
or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorney's favour.

In violation of the trust agreement,

respondent claimed absolute ownership
over the property and refused to sell the
property to complainant after the death
of Jose Nakpil. Valdes initially
acknowledged and respected the trust
nature of theMoran property. His bad faith
in transferring the property to his
familycorporation is well discussed in this
Court's Decision.

Respondent's act of excluding the Moran

property from the estate which his lawfirm
was representing evinces a lack of fidelity
to the cause of his client. If respondent
truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he shouldhave at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim.
If they could not agreeon its ownership,
respondent should have formally
presented his claim in theintestate
proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporationand
concealing it from complainant and the
judge in the estate
proceedings.Respondent's misuse of his
legal expertise to deprive his client of the
Moranproperty is clearly unethical.

Respondent, through his accounting firm,

charged the two loans of P65,000.00and
P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after
said loans were obtained byrespondent for
the purchase and renovation of the
6

property which he claimed for himself.

Respondent seeks to exculpate himself
from this charge by disclaimingknowledge
or privity in the preparation of the list of
the estate's liabilities.Respondent violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility whichprovides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to his client's cause and
enjoins him to bemindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.

Respondent is guilty of representing

conflicting interests. It is generally the
rule,based on sound public policy, that an
attorney cannot represent
adverseinterests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an
issue. Theproscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds
applicationwhere the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general
matter andis applicable however slight
such adverse interest may be. It applies
althoughthe attorney's intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.However, representation of conflicting
interests may be allowed where theparties
consent to the representation, after full
disclosure of facts. Disclosurealone is not
enough for the clients must give their
informed consent to suchrepresentation.
The lawyer must explain to his clients the
nature and extent of the conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly
understood byhis clients.
HECTOR TREAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES[G.R. No. 195002. January
25, 2012.]
FACTS:Sometime in December 1999,
Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a houseand-lot in Iloilo CitY. It was thenmortgaged
with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended Atty. Hector Treas
toElizabeth, who was an employee and
niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the
transfer of the title inthe latter's name.
Hector informed Elizabeth that for the
titling of the property in the name of her
auntMargarita, expenses would be
incurred.Thereafter, Elizabeth gave
P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a
corresponding receipt but the

lattermisappropriated and converted it to

his own personal use.RTC rendered a
Decision finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa. CA affirmed.ISSUE:
jurisdiction of RTC.RULING:There being no
showing that the offense was committed
within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.Court sees it
fit to note that the Code of Professional
Responsibility strongly militates against
thepetitioner's conduct in handling the
funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02
of the Code provides such.When a lawyer
collects or receives money from his client
for a particular purpose, he should
promptlyaccount to the client how the
money was spent. His failure either to
render an accounting or to returnthe
money constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.Moreover, a lawyer has the
duty to deliver his client's funds or
properties as they fall due or upondemand.
His failure to return the client's money
upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he hasmisappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by
theclient.The case is thus referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
the initiation of disciplinaryproceedings
against petitioner.

NEVADA v. CASUGA
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:
1.
That Atty. Casuga acquired several
pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries
include diamond earrings and diamond
rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex
gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga
assured her that he will sell them; but
despite repeated demands, Casuga never
remitted any money nor did he return said
jewelries.
2.
That in 2006, Casuga, taking
advantage of his close relationship with
7

Nevada (they belong to the same religious

sect), Casuga represented himself as the
hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest)
that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga
was able to enter into a contract of lease
with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an
office space with Chul in said Hotel for
P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said
agreement; that he forged the signature of
Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never
remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
1.
That Nevada actually pawned said
jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later
advised Casugas wife to redeem said
jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife; that
Casuga can sell said jewelries and
reimburse herself from the proceeds; that
he still has possession of said jewelries.
2.
That he never received the
P90,000.00; that it was received by a
certain Pastor Oh; that he was authorized
as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into
said contract of lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in
Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of
the following:
1.
Gross
Misconduct: Casuga
misrepresented
himself
as
a
duly
authorized representative of Nevada when
in fact he was not. He never adduced
evidence showing that he was duly
authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He
also dialed to adduce evidence proving
that he never received the P90k from Chul.
On the contrary, a notarized letter showed
that Casuga did receive the money. His
misrepresentations
constitute
gross
misconduct and his mere denial does not
overcome the evidence presented against
him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: It is his

duty as a lawyer to account for all moneys

and property of his client that may come to
his possession. This is still applicable even
though said property/money did not come
to his possession by virtue of a lawyerclient relationship. He failed to adduce
evidence to prove his claim that Nevada
pawned said jewelries. He never presented
receipts. Further, even assuming that
Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was
still duty bound to return said jewelries
upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He
signed a document (contract of lease) in
behalf
of
another
person
without
authorization. His forgery made him an
actual party to the contract. In effect he
was notarizing a document in which he is
party in violation of the notarial rules
(Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation
of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty
of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is
punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, the Supreme
Court deemed that disbarment is too
severe a punishment against Casuga. He
was suspended for 4 years from the
practice of law. His notarial commission
was likewise revoked and he is disqualified
to be a notary public while serving his
suspension.
The
Supreme
Court
emphasized: the penalty of disbarment
shall be meted out only when the lawyers
misconduct borders on the criminal and/or
is
committed
under
scandalous
circumstance.
METROBANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86100-03 [1990]
FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for
review on certiorari as appellate court
affirms the decision of the trial court
expressing its view that petitioner should
8

pay the charging lien on the civil case filed

against them which result into a dismissal.
Based upon subsequent dismissal of the
said case, private respondents filed a
motion to fix its attorneys fees based on
quantum meruit, resulting to an exchange
between the parties. Petitioners aver that
they have paid services of its lawyers in
full but the latter contends that partial
amounts forwarded to them did not consist
of payment. To avoid adverse
confrontation, petitioners offered to pay
P600,000 in which case respondents
refused. Both trial court and appellate
court commanded petitioner to pay the
amount of P936,000 based on the charging
liens of the dismissed civil case against
them.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is
entitled to the enforcement of its charging
lien to satisfy attorneys fees;
(2) Whether or not a separate civil suit is
necessary for the enforcement of such
lien;
(3) Whether or not private respondent is
entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual and current market values of the
litigated properties on a quantum meruit
basis.
HELD:
Court holds that respondent cannot charge
a lien due to the dismissal of the civil case.
Such enforceability is only applicable to
money claims and only to dismissed
judgments if there is an applicable law or
pre-existing agreement between the
parties (7A CJS 756). In addition, the fixing
of attorneys fees are determined in a
separate civl action. Accordingly, in fixing
compensation based on quantum meruit,
three conditions are to be considered: (1)
the importance of the subject matter in
controversy, (2) the extent of the services
rendered, and (3) the professional standing
of the lawyer.
Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal
professions manifest mandate for public
service instead of capital gain. Its aim is to
uphold public interest and not
profiteering.
Court grants petition on a review for
certiorari and reverses the decision of

inferior courts. Appropriate proceedings

may be commenced by respondent to
establish attorneys fees.
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was
filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentinofor solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional
services. Complaint alleged
thatrespondent, with the help of paralegal
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to
transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them fi nancial
assistance and expeditious collection
on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called themand
sent them text messages. To support
his allegations, complainant
presented the swornaffidavit of James
Grogorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever hislawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead,
inexchange for a loan of P50, 000.00.
Complainant also attached
respondents calling
card.Respondent, in his defence, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing andcirculation of the said calling
card.Issue
:
Whether the respondent encroached
the professional practice
of complainant.Held:Yes. Rule 2.03 of
the CPR provides that a lawyer shall
not do or permit to be done any
actdesigned primarily to solicit legal
business. Hence, lawyers are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.
Suchactuation constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be
read inconnection with Rule 1.03 of
the CPR which provides that lawyer,
shall not for any corruptmotive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any mans cause. This
ruleproscribes ambulance chasing (the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by anattorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain
9

employment) as a measure toprotect the

community from barratry and
champerty. In the case at bar,
complainantpresented substantial
evidence (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very samepersons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondents offi ce) to prove that
respondentindeed solicited legal
business as well as profi ted from
referrals suits. Through
Labianosactions, respondents law
practice was benefi ted. Hapless
seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of
Labianos word that respondent could
produce a morefavourable result. Based on
the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violatingRule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act
of solicitations constitutes malpractice
which calls for the exercise of theCourts
disciplinary powers. Violation of antisolicitation statues warrants serious
sanctionsfor initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment. Thusin this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
protect the public from the
Machiavellianmachinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.Canon 2 : A
lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and
convenientmanner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness
of the profession.Rule 2.03: A lawyer
shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal
business

the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned

by

complainants

relatives. Respondent

accepted the task to be completed within a

period of eight (8) months and received
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial
payment; the remaining balance of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be
paid

when

certificate

complainant
of

title

received

to

the

the

property.

Respondent has not filed any petition for

registration over the property sought to be
titled up to the filing of this case. In the
Complaint,

Position

documentary

Papers

evidence

complainant

claimed

that

and

submitted,
he

tried

to

contact respondent to follow-up on the

status of the case six (6) months after he
paid the initial legal fees. He did this
through phone calls and text messages to
their known acquaintances and relatives,
and, finally, through a letter sent by
courier to the respondent. However, he
did not receive any return communication.
Complainant sought the disbarment of
respondent

for

violations

of

Rule

16.01, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 of the

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility

involving negligence in handling a case.

Complainant

argued

that

he

had

no

intention of reneging from his obligation,

as he already had prepared the draft
petition, and he failed to file it because it

ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, complainant,

vs.
ATTY.

RAMIL

E.

MACALALAD, respondent.

needed

documentary

requirements that his clients should have

furnished

him.

Commissioner

of

The
IBP

Investigating

made

finding

This was affirmed by the IBP Commission

FACTS:
through

the

negligence on the part of the respondent.

[A.C.8158. February 24, 2010]

Complainant,

lacked

mutual

acquaintance asked respondent to handle

on Bar Discipline.
ISSUE:
10

Legal Ethics

16.01

(1)

Responsibility which requires

Whether or not the respondents

of

the

Code

of

Professional
a lawyer

excuse is exculpatory.

to account for all the money received from

RULING:

the client. In this case, respondent did not

Legal Ethics

immediately account for and promptly

(1)

No.

Respondents

not

return

the

complainant even after he failed to render

(modified) penalty of suspension for six (6)

any legal service within the contracted

months from the practice of law and was

time of the engagement.

exculpatory.

He

excuse

was

is

imposed

the

money

he

received

from

ordered to return to the complainant the

amount

of

Fifty

(P50,000.00)

Thousand

with

interest

Pesos

of

twelve

percent (12%) per annum from the date of

promulgation of the Decision until the full
amount is returned.
In administrative cases against lawyers,
the

quantum

of

proof

required

of

evidence

which

the

has

the

burden

to

preponderance
complainant
discharge. We
evidence

fully

is

considered

presented

and

we

the

are

fully

satisfied that the complainants evidence,

as

outlined

above,

fully

satisfies

the

required quantum of proof in proving

respondents

negligence.

Rule

18.03,

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility provides for the rule on
negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
The

Court

has

consistently

held,

in

construing this Rule, that the mere failure

of the lawyer to perform the obligations
due to the client is considered per se a
violation. (underscoring provided)
In

addition

negligence,

to

the

above
[Court]

finding

of
also

[found] respondent guilty of violating Rule

ABIERO vs. JUANINO

Facts: abiero engaged the services of the
respondent as counsel de parte in NLRC
NCR OCWcase by ordering the respondents
to pay his unpaid wages.
( employer).Complainant tried to follow
up the status of the case but Juanino
advised him to call later. Thelawyer filed with
CA a motion for extension of time to file Petition
for Review but Abiero foundout that his lawyer
never filed a petition for Review.The respondent
delayed the filing of the comment for more
than 2 yrs. and despite
numerousextensions which were all
granted, the 12th extension was even filed
one day late.Held: yes, Canons 17&18 and
18.03 which states that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. A lawyersduty is to exert best
judgement & exercise reasonable & ordinary care
or defense on his case. Heis not required to seek
prior approval from the labor arbiter before he
could file a motion for execution. Failure to
appeal in CA despite instructions by
the client constitutes
inexcusablenegligence. Once he consents to
defend the cause of his client, he owes fidelity to
such cause andmust at all times be mindful
to the trust and confidence reposed in him.
It is not enough that alawyer possess the
qualification, he must also give adequate
attention to his legal work.
ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006
FACTS : 1 9 7 7 , t h e N a t i o n a l H o
u s i n g A u t h o r i t y ( N H A ) fi l e d
e x p r o p r i a t i o n proceedings agai
11

nst the Zuzuarreguis for parcels

o f l a n d b e l o n g i n g t o them situated in
Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1,
790, 570.36- The Zuzuarreguis engaged
the legal services of Attys. Romeo G.
Roxasand Santiago N. Pastor- They executed a
Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983
which indicatedthat the contingent fees
that the lawyers will receive at P11 or
more persquare meter is thirty percent of
the just compensation- The appropriate
proceedings thereafter ensued and on
October 29, 1984,a Partial Decision was
rendered fixing the just compensation to
be paid tothe Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square
meter- T h e N H A fi l e d a M o t i o n f
or Re considera tion for the low
e r i n g o f t h e amount of just
compensation in accordance with
applicable laws- Pending the resolution of
the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special
powerof attorney was executed by the
Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas
andPastor- O n D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 5
, a Le t t e r- A g re e m e n t w a s
e x e c u t e d b y a n d between the
Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which
fixed the justcompensation due the
Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in
excess of thats h a l l b e t h e
c o n t i n g e n t f e e s of At t y s . Rox a s
a n d Pa s t o r f o r t h e i r l e g a l servicesRe s o l u t i o n N o. 1 1 7 4 d a t e d
December 16, 1985, issued by
t h e N H A , stated that the property would
be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per
squarem e t e r a n d t h a t i t w i l l b e
paid in NHA Bonds which the
y i e l d w o u l d b e based on the Central
Bank rate at the time of the
payment- A s a r e s u l t o f t h e N H A
Res olution, a Compromise Agr
e e m e n t w a s executed and it was
approved by the Court in a Decision dated
December20, 1985.- Computed at P19.50
per square meter, the property of the
Zuzuarreguisw a s e x p r o p r i a t e d a t
a total price of P34, 916,
1 2 2 . T h e t o t a l a m o u n t released by
the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference
of P19, 583, 878 is,undoubtedly, the yield
of the bonds.- The amount turned over to the
Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted toP30,

520, 000 in NHA bonds- On August 25,

1987, a letter was sent by the
Zuzuarreguis new
counselt o A t t y s . R o x a s a n d P a s t
or demanding that the latter
d e l i v e r t o t h e Zuzuarreguis the
yield corresponding to bonds paid by
the NHA within aperiod of 10 days
from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal
action- Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered
stating that the amount that they goseems
huge from the surface but it just actually
passed their hands.- O n S e p t e m b e r
29, 1987, a letter was again sent
t o A t t y s . R o x a s a n d Pastor formally
terminating
their services- T h e Z u z u a r r e g u i s
t h e n fi l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r
S u m o f M o n e y a n d Damages,
they demanded that the yield on the NHA
bonds be turned over
to them- The RTC dismissed the complaint- The
Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal- The
Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas
and Pastor to return to theplaintiffs the
amount of P12, 596, 425, already
deducting the reasonableattorneys fees in
the amount of P4,4 76,426.275- Attys. Roxas
and Pastor filed a MFR- The Zuzuarreguis also
filed a MFR- The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a
MFR- All MFRs were denied for lack
of merit- Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a
petition for certiorari
ISSUES
1. WON the letter-agreement executed by
the parties should stand as lawbetween
them2. WON the contingent fees were
reasonable
HELD
1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds
between two persons wherebyo n e b i n d s
h im self, with re spec t to the
other, to give something or
tore n de r s ome se rv ic e. Th e
Zuzuarreguis, in entering into
t h e L e t t e r- Agreement, fully gave their
consent thereto. In fact, it was them who
sentthe said letter to Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, for the purpose of confirming
allmatters which they had agreed
upon previously. There is absolutely
noevidence to show that anybody was
12

forced into entering into the LetterAgreement. It is basic that a contract is the
law between the parties.
2. No. Under the contract
i n q u e s t i o n , At t y s . Rox a s a n d
Pa s t o r a r e t o receive contingent fees
for their professional services.
Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states: a contract
for contingent fee, where sanctioned by
law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the
risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject t o the
supervision of a court, as to
its reasonablenessCanon 20, Rule 20.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
statest h e g u i d e l i n e s b y w h i c h a
lawyer should determine his f
e e s ( s e e original)
- Indubitably entwined with the
lawyers duty to charge only
reasonablefees is the power of this
Court to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees if the same is excessive
and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). Attorneys fees are
unconscionable if they affront ones sense
of justice, decency or reasonableness. The
refore, the power to determinethe
reasonableness of attorneys fees
stipulated by the parties is a matterfalling
within the regulatory prerogative of
the courts.- In the instant case, Attys.
Roxas and Pastor received an amount
which
ise q u a l t o 4 4 % o f t h e j u
s t c o m p e n s a t i o n p a i d b
y t h e N H A t o t h e Zuzuarreg
uis. Considering that there was no
full blown hearing in the expropriation
case, ending as it did in a Compromise
Agreement, the 44%is undeniably
excessive. In the opinion of the Court,
87.17% of the yieldsof the bond should
go to the Zuzuarreguis computing
from the amounts
stipulated in the Letter-Agreement. The
remaining amount is what is duet o
A t t y s . R o x a s a n d P a s t o r. T h e S
C a ffi r m s t h e d e c i s i o n o f C A

w i t h modification in the computation

of the attorneys contingent fees.
QUILBAN V ROBINOL
PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989 (sarah
cabrera)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme
Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- The Colegio de San Jose, through its
administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold
a land to the Quezon City Government as
the site for the Quezon City General
Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743
square meters as a possible development
site. Squatters, however, settled in the
area since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the
Colegio, through Father Escaler gave
permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to
build on the reserved site a house for his
residence and a training center for the
Christian Social Movement. Seeing the
crowded shanties of squatters,
Congressman Taruc suggested to Father
Escaler the idea of donating or selling the
land cheap to the squatters. Congressman
Taruc then advised the squatters to form
an organization and choose a leader
authorized to negotiate with Father
Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with
Bernabe Martin asPresident.
- But instead of working for the welfare of
the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo
Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived
to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the
other Samaban members. The land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price
of PI5 per square meter or a total
consideration of P41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity
then was P1 00 to P1 20 per square meter.
Father Escaler had been made to believe
that Rivera represented the squatters on
the property.
- In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of
the Samahan filed the case against Rivera,
et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the
case. - To prosecute the appea in the CAl,
the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which
13

the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's

fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given
by the members a part of the land, subject
matter of the case, equal to the portion
that would pertain to each of them. What
was initially a verbal commitment on the
land sharing was confirmed in writing.
- On 14 November 1978, the Court of
Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. - To raise the
amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the
Court of Appeals, plus expenses for
ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying
the property, conveyance, documentation,
transfer of title etc., the five officers of the
Samahan collected, little by
little, P2,500.00 from each head of family.
The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the
proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00
was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the
officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of
P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and
on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a
total of P75,000.00.
- After almost a year, the five officers
discovered that no payment had been
made to Rivers. When queried, Atty.
Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that
a Writ of Execution bad not yet been
issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However,
it turned out that the motion for
intervention had already been dismissed.
After confronting Atty. Robinol with that
fact, the latter gave other excuses, which
the officers discovered to have no basis at
all.
- On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs
arrived at a "first consensus" to change
their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of
the Samahan thereafter approached Atty.
AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be
their counsel, after he was shown the
document containing the consensus of the
Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol
as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's
advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a
letter informing the latter of their decision
to terminate his services and demanding
the return of the P75,000.00 deposited
with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to
the demand. A subsequent letter of the

same tenor was similarly disregarded by

Atty. Robinol.
- On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor
formally entered his appearance in a civil
case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty.
Robinol, on the strength of the authority
given him by plaintiffs in said civil case
through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor
then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants
and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion
for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that
he had no objection to the appearance of
and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor.
- Because Atty. Robinol, however, still
questioned the first consensus, another
document labelled the a second
consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs
during a meeting held for the purpose on
24 November 1980 to the effect that they
had decided to change Atty. Robinol as
their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in their
favor.
- Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15
April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this
Administrative Complaint before this Court
requesting the investigation of Atty.
Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00
and praying that the Court exercise its
power of discipline over members of the
Bar unworthy to practice law.
- Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty.
Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
alleged gross unethical conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty.
Montemayor readily accepted the case
without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal
and conformity and knowing fully well that
there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs
to discharge him as their counsel.
- Court referred administrative cases to the
Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1. That Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three
months for refusing to deliver the funds of
the plaintiffs in his possession, with the
warning that a more severe penalty will be
imposed for a repetition of the same or
similar act, and that he be ordered to
14

return to the plaintiffs, the sum of

P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed,
since he has not committed any
misconduct imputed to him by Atty.
Robinol.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended
2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be
disbarred
HELD
1. YES Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact,
been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to
continue in the practice of the profession.
After the CA had rendered a Decision
favorable to his clients and he had
received the latter's funds, suddenly, he
had a change of mind and decided to
convert the payment of his fees from a
portion of land equivalent to that of each
of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he
alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right
to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because, under
the circumstances, it was highly unjust for
him to have done so. His clients were mere
squatters who could barely eke out an
existence. They had painstakingly raised
their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per
family with which to pay for the land only
to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money,
heartlessly took advantage of them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that
since he was unjustly dismissed by his
clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession. Firstly, there was
justifiable ground for his discharge as
counsel. His clients had lost confidence in
him for he had obviously engaged in
dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to pro.
tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid
ground, he is bereft of any legal right to
retain his clients' funds intended for a
specific purpose-the purchase of land. He
stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that complainants' evidence on

this is the more credible. And that he had,

in fact, received the total sum of P75,00000. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion
that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself
unfit to continue in the practice of law. He
has not only violated his oath not to delay
any man for money and to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. He has
also brought the profession into disrepute
with people who had reposed in it full faith
and reliance for the fulfillment of a lifetime ambition to acquire a homelot they
could call their own.
2. NO Reasoning In so far as Atty.
Montemayor is concerned, we agree with
the findings of the Solicitor General that he
has not exposed himself to any plausible
charge of unethical conduct in the exercise
of his profession when he agreed to serve
as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no
doubt that clients are free to change their
counsel in a pending case at any time
(Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may
then enter his appearance. In this case,
the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided
to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for
loss of trust and confidence. That act was
well within their prerogative. In so far as
the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty.
Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is
concerned, therefore, the same is
absolutely without merit. Disposition - Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED
for having violated his lawyer's oath to
delay no man for money, broken the
fiduciary relation between lawyer and
client, and proven himself unworthy to
continue in the practice of law. By reason
of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to
attorney's fees and is ordered to return the
amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ORCINO v. GASPAR
Orcinos husband was murdered and she
was zealous in prosecuting the suspects.
She hired Atty. Gaspar as her counsel and
they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorneys fee
15

which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his

duty
religiously
from
interviewing
witnesses to attending hearings and the
preliminary investigation. But on the day
bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar failed to
appear. Bail was granted in favor of the
suspects and this enraged Orcino. She
then went to Gaspars residence where
Gaspar reasoned out that he did not
receive a notice of hearing hence his
absence. Finding his reason to be
insufficient, Orcino demanded the records
of the case and advised Gaspar that shell
be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied
and thereafter he filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel. The court did not
grant his motion because the same was
without Orcinos written consent. Perhaps
changing her mind, Orcino refused to give
her consent. Gaspar, however, did not
attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino
then filed an administrative complaint
against Gaspar for abandoning the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar
violated his duties to his client.

HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino

towards Gaspar is understandable and is
attributed to her over zealousness to bring
justice to the death of her husband. When
she uttered that shes terminating
Gaspars services, she did so in a burst of
passion. She did not really mean to
terminate Gaspar at all as evidenced by
her refusal to give consent to Gaspars
motion.
At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally
terminate his legal services to his client.
Unlike the other way around where a client
has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relationship with or without
just cause. Atty. Gaspar has no reason to
presume that his motion shall be granted
by the court. He should have not left
Orcino in the cold and should have
continued appearing for her until there is a
withdrawal of record and a successor
placed
in
his
stead.
Gaspar
was
admonished accordingly. He was also
directed to return half of what was paid
him.

16