"Neo-Ottomanism": Turkey's growing influence in Central and Southeast

Europe by means of "soft power" (diplomacy, culture, education)

Cosmin-Dan POPESCU*
Abstract: The foreign policy envisaged by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoan
comes amid preparations that lasted for more than a decade. Former Foreign Minister and current
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutolu has prided himself on bringing a new pax ottomanica to the
region, by practicing a type of policy called "zero problems with neighbours", an approach that
would have expanded Ankara's influence across the Caucasus and the Black Sea, the Middle East
and the Mediterranean. This vision disavowed any "neo-Ottoman" imperial ambitions. Rather, it
was described by its proponents as a matter of "soft power". Turkey, applying the concept of
"neo-Ottomanism", was aiming to take, in terms of economic, financial and cultural force, most
of the areas that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Benefiting from the war of secession of
the former Yugoslavia, Turkey has the advantage gained in the last 20 years to have what it has
been lacking since 1923: Muslim states in the former imperial territories (Bosnia, Kosovo and
partly Albania) and strong minority in others (Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria). The "Yunus
Emre" Institute, established in 2007 with the objective of spreading abroad Turkish culture,
society and language, already established centers in countries like Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The locations of the centres reflect the emphasis on
the Balkans, which is in line with the common cultural heritage. Including Dobrudja is part of the
projects to recovery the Ottoman memory, not few being the attempts to restore and highlight the
monuments with deep meanings. Ankara's policy in the Black Sea, including the South Caucasus
adds finishing touches to this picture, Turkey considering mare nostrum the aquatic area
dominated by the Straits which are under its suzerainty. Therefore, the inclusion of Turkey in the
European Union is a major continental decision that, if it will be realized, will deprive, at least in
this part, the "Huntington line" of its relevance.
Keywords: Ahmet Davutolu, "Yunus Emre" Institute, TKA, "Hizmet" movement,
Western Balkans.

* student, Universitatea "Ovidius" din Constana, Facultatea de Istorie i tiine Politice, specializarea Relaii
Internaionale i Studii Europene; e-mail: cosminpopescu22@gmail.com.

Modern Turkey, with a history of less than a century, is a synthesis of historical, ethnic
and cultural elements, European and Asian alike. 1 Since its founding in 1923, the Turkish
Republic has been the bridge between East and West, the meeting point between Europe and the
Middle East and belonged to the East and West, without being clearly part of any of the two
worlds.2 Formal negotiations for the country's accession to the European Union started in 2005,
with no concrete results yet, but certainly, over time, Turkey has focused its efforts on diplomatic
relations especially with Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance, so to the West. Even so,
nowadays this approach between Turkey and the West is no longer so certain for everyone. 3
The superiority of the secular Kemalist elite, concentrated in Istanbul and in the coastal
cities, was visible everywhere for a long time, because it was composed by the beneficiaries of
the best education and by the holders of the most important positions in the state. 4 But by 2002,
this secular elite was already heavily discredited and the parliamentary elections in November of
that year brought a substantial majority in Meclis (the Turkish Parliament) to the Justice and
Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi abbreviated AKP) of Recep Tayyip
Erdoan. AKP was voicing out to the aspirations of the Turkish poor population of devout
muslims in Anatolia, many of whom had migrated to Istanbul and other large cities in search of a
job and a better life.5
Since the AKP is leading, especially after winning the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary
elections and the presidential elections in 2014, by which the Islamist rooted party consolidated
its hold on power, Turkey pursues a "neo-Ottoman" vision in its foreign policy. Though
references to "neo-Ottoman" foreign policy ambitions have preceded the coming to power of the
AKP in 2002, "neo-Ottomanism" is a term associated especially with the foreign policy strategy
practiced by former Prime Minister (and current President) Recep Tayyip Erdoan and former
1 Liviu Iancu, Turcia n Uniunea European? Argumente pro i contra, n europunkt.ro, 31.03.2014,
disponibil la: http://europunkt.ro/2014/03/31/turcia-in-uniunea-europeana-argumente-pro-si-contra/,
accesat pe 07.12.2014.
2 Fatma Ruxandra Yilmaz, Turcia, aliat NATO. Lupta mpotriva terorismului. Relaia cu Afganistanul, n
Vasile Simileanu, Adrian Coroban (coord.), Evoluii geopolitice n spaiul islamic (coala de Var
Geopolitics, ed. a 2-a, 23 iulie-2 august 2012, Biblioteca Metropolitan Bucureti), Editura Top Form,
Bucureti, 2012, p. 198.
3 Miriam Cihodariu, Relaiile Turciei cu Uniunea European i posibile strategii viitoare.
Incompatibilitate de fond sau doar alteritate permanentizat?, n V. Simileanu, A. Coroban (coord.), op.
cit., pp. 45-46.
4 Sorin Aparaschivei, Turcia mutaii i tendine n rndul elitelor politico-militare, n Vasile Simileanu,
Gven Gngor (coord.), Turcia: de la Kemal Atatrk la Uniunea European (Sesiune de comunicri
tiinifice: 8-9 februarie 2013, Bucureti), Editura Top Form, Bucureti, 2013, p. 18.
5 Robert D. Kaplan, Rzbunarea geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare i lupta
mpotriva destinului, trad. Mihnea Gafia, Editura Litera, Bucureti, 2014, pp. 383-384.
2

Minister of Foreign Affairs (and current Prime Minister) Ahmet Davutolu.6 Unlike its use in
foreign policy, "neo-Ottomanism" has gained particular significance in domestic politics and
materialized in specific government policies such as the recent initiative of President Erdoan to
introduce mandatory religion classes and the study of Turkish-Ottoman language, precursor to
the modern Turkish language, with Arabic alphabet, to be studied in schools from the primary
level.7 The nostalgia for the Ottoman past is felt in Turkey, a feeling that was represented in the
media through movies and television series such as Kurtlar Vadisi, Fetih 1453, Muhteem Yzyl,
which enjoyed great popularity not only in Turkey, but also in countries with a rich Ottoman
heritage.8
"NeoOttomanism", which gives a prominent place to Islam and Turkeys imperial history as "soft
power" tools in the conduct of foreign policy, enters into a direct contradiction with the country's
secular Kemalist legacy and republican diplomacy tradition. 9 This new direction of Turkish
foreign policy contradicts the spirit of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, the founder of the Republic, who
postulated that Turkey should refrain from any grand designs in its foreign policy and instead
concentrate its resources on national development within the boundaries of Anatolia. 10 Atatrk
indicated that the only vocation for Turkey should be, henceforth, the process of
Europeanization. The founder of modern Turkey didn't insisted at all to reconquer the Ottoman
provinces in the Balkans and the Middle East, which were lost in World War I, his strategy being
to build an ethnic Turkish state in the heart of Anatolia, firmly anchored to the West, so to
Europe. But by focusing on Anatolia, he emphasized unwittingly the Islamic civilization, more
deeply rooted in Asia Minor than in the European part of Turkey. So, he endowed the electoral
masses of pious workers from the Anatolian hinterland with a great strength. By their vote, they
brought AKP to power and will likely continue to support the current leadership in Ankara. 11
6 Agnes Czajka, Edward Wastnidge, "The Centre of World Politics? Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign
and Domestic Politics", p. 11, disponibil la: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore
%202015/Archive/a1b05e35-80f6-40ae-9c56-b5708c5c321e.pdf, accesat pe 17.01.2015.
7 Viorica Marin, Preedintele Erdoan vrea ca religia i limba otoman s se studieze obligatoriu n
coal, n Adevrul, 09.12.2014, disponibil la: http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/presedinteleerdogan-vrea-religia-limba-otomana-studieze-obligatoriu-scoali1_5486d6d5448e03c0fd98d2a6/index.html, accesat pe 21.12.2014.
8 Florin Cristescu, Sleyman Magnificul, ntre istoria ca i telenovel i istoria ca adevr, n Historia,
27.12.2013, disponibil la: http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/suleyman-magnificul-ntreistoria-i-telenovel-i-istoria-adev-r, accesat pe 11.12.2014.
9 Alexander Murinson, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century", n Mideast Security and
Policy Studies, nr. 97, p. 1, disponibil la: http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS97.pdf, accesat pe 11.12.2014.
10 Ibidem, pp. 11-12.
11 Robert D. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 381.
3

The theoretical background of the

foreign policy practiced by AKP is Ahmet Davutolu's book, Strategic Depth (Turkish: Stratejik
Derinlik), published in 2001, very popular among Turkish military, politicians and academics, a
book which greatly increased its author prestige and influence. The basic idea of this work is
Davutolu's respect for his country's imperial past. He demonstrates that this past is not a burden
for Turkey, but a great advantage to affirm its regional and global importance. 12 "Strategic
Depth" doctrine presumes an active role for Turkey in diplomacy, a foreign policy based on a
sense of retrieved grandeur and a vision of Turkey as a country that can play a politically and
economically active role in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, so in the former Ottoman
space.13
Davutolu's geopolitical concept
called by himself "the self confidence of the nation" and by others "neo-Ottomanism" emerges
from the revolt of this intellectual and strategist against what he believes to be his country's
regress in importance throughout the 20th century.14 Thus, Davutolu considers that it has to be
changed the conception according to which "Turkey has strong muscles, a weak stomach, a
troubled heart, and a mediocre brain, in other words, has a strong army, but a weak economy, a
lack of self confidence and did not has a good strategic thinking". 15 In his view, Turkey should
take advantage of the end of the Cold War and East-West adversity, of its cultural-political
profile (as a secular and democratic Muslim state) and, especially, of the unique geostrategic
position a bridge between the Western and Islamic worlds, and also by its place on the
transportation road of hydrocarbons towards Europe. 16 The origins of Davutolu's geopolitical
approach can be found in the "neo-Ottomanism" of Turgut zal and in the multi-dimensional
foreign policy practiced by Necmettin Erbakan.17
If until the '90s Ankara was just "the
voice" through which Washington often expressed itself in the region, Turkey gradually began to
have its own interpretations, visions and claims.18 Benefiting from the war of secession of the
12 Adrian Cioroianu, Omul care vede n Turcia un nou imperiu, n Adevrul, 22.04.2010, disponibil la:
http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/omul-vede-turcia-nou-imperiu1_50acfc6c7c42d5a6638d25c1/index.html, accesat pe 08.12.2014.
13 Cristian Cmpeanu, Se ntorc (neo)otomanii n Balcani?, n Romnia liber, 09.06.2011, disponibil la:
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/international/se-intorc--neo-otomanii-in-balcani--227945, accesat
pe 17.01.2015.
14 A. Cioroianu, op. cit.
15 Cristina Dobreanu, Turcia i noul otomanism, n Revista 22, 08.11.2011, disponibil la:
http://www.revista22.ro/articol.php?id=11891, accesat pe 08.12.2014.
16 A. Cioroianu, op. cit.
17 A. Murinson, op. cit., p. 6.
18 F. R. Yilmaz, op. cit.
4

former Yugoslavia, Turkey has the advantage gained in the last 20 years to have what it has been
lacking since 1923: Muslim states in the former imperial territories (Bosnia, Kosovo and partly
Albania) and strong minority in others (Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria). Ankara's policy in the
Black Sea, including the South Caucasus adds finishing touches to this picture, Turkey
considering mare nostrum the aquatic area dominated by the Straits which are under its
suzerainty. Therefore, the inclusion of Turkey in the European Union is a major continental
decision that, if it will be realized, will deprive, at least in this part, the "Huntington line" of its
relevance.19
In the last decade, Turkey's foreign policy
was characterized by a paradigm structured on three distinct principles. In the first instance, we
notice a firm approach regarding tensions in the proximity. From trying to mediate the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, to Hosni Mubarak's immediate condemnation following the uprisings in
Egypt, Turkey has not only become more vocal in the regional policy, but established itself as a
model for political, economic and social stability in the turbulent climate of the Middle East. A
more diversified and open foreign policy, both with the European Union, the Balkans, North
Africa and the Middle East represented a second goal for Turkey. Thirdly, we notice the adoption
of a diplomatic discourse based on the principle of soft power, which has shifted its focus to
economic and cultural relations as a basis for cooperation. This was accompanied by a significant
economic growth: in 2010 Turkey recorded the third highest growth of G20 group. The
economist Jim O'Neill, author of the famous acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)
speaks, more recently, about MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey) as major emerging
economies.20
The Balkans are an important region
for Turkeys neighborhood. According to an official document issued by the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, "the Balkans is a priority for Turkey not only from the political, economical and
geographical perspectives, but also due to its historical, cultural and human ties with the region",
among the common objectives being "the preservation of peace and stability in the Balkans, high
level political dialogue, security for all, utmost economic integration and the preservation of the
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious social structures".21
For several hundreds of years, the Balkans were under
Ottoman rule. The Ottoman Empire is considered responsible for the backwardness of the
peoples of South-East Europe and of the delicate ethnic and religious issues in the Balkans, so
that mentally there are many barriers to be overcome.22 Difficult, especially economically, the
Ottoman rule left quite a lot of freedom in religious terms. Forced conversions to Islam were
quite rare, and the autonomy enjoyed by the Orthodox Church has allowed the preservation of
19 Mihail E. Ionescu, "Faliile de civilizaie i rile Romne", n Magazin istoric, an XLV, nr. 6 (531),
2011, p. 37.
20 F. R. Yilmaz, op. cit.
21 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affaires, Relations with the Balkan Region, disponibil la:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa, accesat pe 12.03.2015.
22 Gheorghe Florin Gheu, De ce nu va intra Turcia n Uniunea European, n geo-strategic.eu,
05.09.2011, disponibil la: http://www.geostrategic.eu/de-ce-nu-va-intra-turcia-in-uniunea-europeana.html,
accesat pe 07.12.2014.
5

traditional cultural values, especially in the spirit of Byzantium, which had finished its existence
in 1453. Most often, in extreme cases, and with concrete motivations for civil or military rise
occurred conversions to Islam, especially among the Albanians and the Slavs in Bosnia. 23 In the
first part of the 20th century, the region was marked by three wars the Balkan Wars, World War
I and World War II and in the second half by the Cold War. These conflicts, hot or cold, drew
dividing lines in the region, creating uncertainty, instability and losses. Tensions, to some extent,
have survived and the culture of violence developed during these decades still haunts the people
of the region.24
The founders of the Ottoman institutional system were able to impose a
regime of peace and order (pax ottomanica), a regime which has reached its peak in the XVIth
and XVIIth centuries. Ahmet Davutolu has prided himself on bringing a new pax ottomanica to
the region, by practicing a type of policy called "zero problems with neighbours", an approach
that would have expanded Ankara's influence across the Caucasus and the Black Sea, the Middle
East and the Mediterranean. This vision disavowed any "neo-Ottoman" imperial ambitions.
Rather, it was described by its proponents as a matter of "soft power".25
Since May 2009, when taking the office of Foreign Minister, Ahmet
Davutolu has begun to implement a proactive foreign policy, which fully manifested itself in
Southeast Europe. The Western Balkans has become the testing ground for his doctrine of
"strategic depth". Davutolu repeatedly rejected the label of "neo-Ottomanism" and wanted to
focus, referring to areas that once belonged to the Sublime Porte, to the positive aspects of the
shared past.26 In this regard we can subscribe the statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister
during his official visit to Bosnia: "Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were a success story. Now
we have to reinvent this story. (...) Turkey is back". 27 In July 2009, in Montenegro, Davutolu
was the first Turkish Foreign Minister to visit the region of the former sanjak after its loss by the
Ottoman Empire in 1912. In Lebanon, Russia, Romania, Iraq, Georgia, Iran, Syria, everywhere,
the Turkish foreign minister stressed his concern for a cultural hinterland for Turkey. 28 In
23 *** "Balcanii, eternul butoi cu pulbere", n Magazin istoric, an XXXVI, nr. 10 (427), 2002, p. 50.
24 Ahmet Davutolu, "Reintegrarea Balcanilor. O perspectiv turceasc asupra viitorului spaiului
balcanic", n Foreign Policy Romnia, nov.-dec. 2011, p. 63.
25 Cihan Tual, "Democratic Janissaries? Turkeys Role in the Arab Spring", n New Left Review, nr. 76,
2012, p. 6, disponibil la: http://sociology.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/tugal/Tugal-Democratic
%20Janissaries.pdf, accesat pe 18.12.2014.
26 Altin Raximi, Davutolu: I am not a neo-Ottoman, n Balkan Insight, 26.04.2011, disponibil la:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/davutoglu-i-m-not-a-neo-ottoman/2027/3, accesat pe 15.01.2015.
27 Dusan Stojanovic, Turkish economic activity in Balkans signal a comeback, n Hrriyet Daily News,
14.03.2011, disponibil la: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkisheconomic-activity-in-balkans-signal-a-comeback-2011-03-14, accesat pe 19.11.2014.
28 A. Cioroianu, op. cit.
6

December 2010, during an official visit to the United States, Davutolu said that "Turkey could
become a union of nations just like Britains union with its former colonies. () Why shouldnt
Turkey rebuild its leadership in former Ottoman lands in the Balkans, Middle East and Central
Asia?"29
Turkey
has its own cultural links and economic interests in the Balkans and has the resources and
military power to rival the influence of Russia or the West in this region. Turkish investments
match the level of financial investment Western powers and Russia commit to the Balkans. As
the gatekeeper to the Black Sea and as a NATO member, Turkey plays a significant role in
Romanian and Polish efforts to boost defense cooperation in response to the current crisis in
Ukraine.30
Turkey
is also attempting to grow closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Ankara means to enhance its
influence through cultural and historical ties. These connections are important: Muslim Bosniaks
started migrating to Turkey in the 17th century, and a few million Turkish citizens claim Bosniak
roots today. This ethnic affinity has prompted government initiatives to invest in Bosnia. Turkey
is among the top five investors in the country. In fact, Turkish officials claim that Turkey has
invested $1.1 billion in Bosnia since 1995 a significant sum for a country with a gross
domestic product of about $18 billion.31
The Turkish Stream pipeline,
if built, would no doubt empower Turkey. Ankara would play a central role in its construction,
and it would use that role to improve its relationships with countries that would receive Turkish
Stream natural gas, including Macedonia and Serbia.32
Since the '90s, Turkey has developed
close ties not only with the Balkan Muslims, but with the whole region of Southeast Europe.
Relations with countries in the region have grown and now covers various functional and societal
fields, not only security and diplomacy, as before, but also trade, investment, infrastructure
development, energy, tourism, culture and education. This intensification of relations we are
witnessing nowadays reflect large-scale changes that have taken place both in Turkey and in
broader Southeast Europe. They have to do with the end of communist regimes, the subsequent
transitions to democracy, the emergence of new states and, especially, the exponential increase of
mobility of goods, services, people and ideas in the context of Europeanization and globalization.
Robust economic growth, cultural attractiveness and the slowdown of the EU enlargement
process, all have pushed Ankara to pursue a proactive foreign policy and a greater commitment
to the area.33
The countries that once formed Yugoslavia are now either
within the European Union (Slovenia, Croatia), or are recognized as candidate countries
(Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). With the exception of Kosovo, they have all signed
Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU, while their citizens enjoy the right to
29 Cneyt lsever, Idealist foreign policy makes no progress, n Hrriyet Daily News, 24.01.2011,
disponibil la: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=idealist-foreign-policymakes-no-progress-2011-01-24, accesat pe 17.01.2015.
30 Stratfor analysis, The Problems Foreign Powers Find in the Balkans, 19.05.2015, available at:
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/problems-foreign-powers-find-balkans, accessed on 21.05.2015.
31 Ibidem.
32 Ibidem.
7

travel without visas to the Schengen area (unlike Turkish citizens). It should also be noted that
the Western Balkans are flanked, as of 2007, by EU territory. The accession of Romania and
Bulgaria has driven the borders of the Union deep into Southeast Europe. Although Bucharest
and Sofia are stuck in the EU's periphery, being excluded from the Schengen Area, barred from
labor markets in several member-states until 2014, and with limited prospects or indeed desire to
enter the Eurozone, their membership makes a difference. It strengthens the EU presence in the
area, creates additional momentum for further expansion, and inserts the Union as a territorial
conduit between Turkey and the Western Balkans.34
Given the political issues, such as Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence
(2008) and the dispute between Athens and Skopje on the official name of the Macedonian state,
it becomes clear why EU integration has stalled. The relative decline in Brussels' leverage has, in
turn, opened opportunity for other players such as Turkey, but also Russia and even China, to fill
in the gaps.35 In the Greek-Macedonian dispute, Turkey side has strongly supported the position
of Skopje and the immediate recognition by Ankara of Kosovo's independence has been
perceived in a negative way by Belgrade, who temporarily withdrew its ambassador.36
Turkey was able to withstand the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 by
diversifying its trade away from Europe towards the Middle East and North Africa. The crisis
also laid the foundations of Turkeys growing presence in Southeast Europe, the Turkish state
becoming an economic gravity pole and dispenser of soft power.37
Parallel to the official channels, Turkish presence has grown, as elsewhere, thanks to civil
society networks e.g. the schools associated with the Fethullah Glen, the local editions of the
"Zaman" newspaper etc.38 Glen is leading from exile an extensive network of private schools
(4,000 in Turkey and another 500 abroad), declared to be secular, which provide education for
the future elite in administration, politics and business. Although the Muslim cleric promotes
inter-religious dialogue, detractors accuse him of pursuing a secret Islamist agenda. 39 In
December 2013, following the outbreak of a corruption scandal in the government, Erdoan
declared that "We will not allow alleged religious organizations to be used as tools of foreign
countries, which operates in our country", obviously referring to Fethullah Glen's movement.
Leaders of the police and prosecutors with glenist sympathies conducted in secretly the
33 Dimitar Bechev, "Turkey in the Balkans: Taking a Broader View", n Insight Turkey, vol. 14, nr. 1,
2012, p. 133, disponibil la:
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_14_1_2012_bechev.pdf, accesat pe 17.03.2015.
34 Ibidem, p. 134.
35 Ibidem, p. 139.
36 Radu Gabriel Safta, Clin Felezeu, Turcia contemporan ntre motenirea kemalist i Uniunea
European, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2011, pp. 197-198.
37 D. Bechev, op. cit., p. 137.
38 Ibidem, p. 138.
8

investigation which led to the arrests that have dynamited the Turkish government. 40 In March
2014, the Turkish Parliament voted with an overwhelming majority a law providing for the
closure of "Hizmet" movement private schools until 1 September 2015.41 Moreover, a court in
Turkey has issued, in December 2014, a warrant for the arrest of Glen, considered an opponent
of President Recep Tayyip Erdoan. Ankara accuses the former ally of Erdoan that he
established and managed "an armed terrorist group", whose aim was to overthrow the current
regime.42 In parallel, there have been police raids that resulted in the arrest of 23 employees of
"Zaman" newspaper and "Samanyolu" TV station, which have close links with the "Hizmet"
movement.43 In this circumstances, Glen's movement and the associated media channels no
longer serve as a soft power tool for the Turkish government.
A special role is played by the Turkish Office of Religious Affairs (Turkish: Diyanet leri
Bakanl) due to its influence among Muslim communities in the Balkans. Along with Turkish
International Cooperation and Development Agency (Turkish: Trk birlii ve Kalknma daresi
Bakanl, TKA), founded in 1992, the Diyanet, owing to its influence over the official bodies
representing Muslims in Balkan countries, is funding the restoration of many Ottoman
monuments. Turkey is aware of the danger of non-traditional versions of Islam, above all those
promoted by the Salafist monarchies of the Persian Gulf (with Saudi Arabia in the foreground),
which undermine Turkey's positions in the Balkans, so that a key task of the Religious Affairs
Bureau is to reduce the influence of Wahhabi and Salafist groups in the region. TKA is involved
in building schools and universities in predominantly Muslim regions in the Balkans. In
Montenegro, for example, the most important part of the Turkish fundings were directed towards
the north of the country, populated by Muslims. The same institution has financed the
construction of a medrese in Tuzi, Montenegro's first Muslim religious school in the past 90
39 *** Luptele pentru putere dintre Erdoan i un cleric turc din SUA, la originea crizei din Turcia, n
Hot News, 28.12.2013, disponibil la: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16300776-luptele-pentruputere-dintre-erdogan-cleric-turc-din-sua-originea-crizei-din-turcia.htm, accesat pe 14.12.2014.
40 Costy Herold, "Premierul i acuz aliaii c i-au instrumentat scandalul de corupie", n Lumea, an
XX, nr. 2 (251), 2014, p. 62.
41 *** Turcia: Lovitura lui Erdoan pentru rivalul Glen colile private vor fi nchise, n Hot News,
02.03.2014, disponibil la: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16713721-turcia-lovitura-luierdogan-pentru-rivalul-gulen-scolile-private-vor-inchise.htm, accesat pe 14.12.2014.
42 Antonio Glodeanu, Justiia din Turcia a emis un mandat de arestare pe numele clericului Fetullah
Glen, considerat adversar al lui Erdoan, n Adevrul, 19.12.2014, disponibil la:
http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/justitia-turcia-emis-mandat-arestare-numele-clericului-fethullahgulen-considerat-adversar-erdogan-1_54948585448e03c0fde3c187/index.html#, accesat pe 10.01.2015.
43 Gabriela Ionescu, Raiduri ale poliiei turce la mass media apropiate de un oponent religios al
preedintelui Ergodan; 23 de arestri, n Agerpres, 14.12.2014, disponibil la:
http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2014/12/14/raiduri-ale-politiei-turce-la-mass-media-apropiate-de-unoponent-religios-al-presedintelui-ergodan-23-de-arestari-16-17-00, accesat pe 15.01.2015.
9

years.44
The
"Yunus
Emre" Institute, established in 2007 with the objective of spreading abroad Turkish culture,
society and language, already established centers in countries like Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The locations of the centres reflect the emphasis on
the Balkans, which is in line with the common cultural heritage.45
Turkey
is
present in the education sector in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Albania, Turkish schools
are considered to be among the best and in this moment there are about 3,000 students who
attend them. In addition, Turkish universities are open to Albanian citizens and, according to
some estimates, around 1,500 students are currently enrolled in Turkish institutions of higher
education. Approximately 100 students from Kosovo receive scholarships from the Turkish state
to study at universities in Turkey. In return, at the International University of Sarajevo, founded
in 2008 with the help of the Turkish government, chose to study about 1,000 young Turks, due to
lower costs of studies and life. In Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey provides scholarships for
undergraduate and graduate studies, and scholarships for studying the Turkish language. The fact
that there is no visa regime with the countries of the Western Balkans contributes to the intense
collaboration in education. 46
Poland has the most
favorable attitude towards Turkish accession among the old and new members of the EU. Polish
foreign policy generally holds a favorable view of Turkish accession as Poland hopes for an
increased role in the geopolitics of alternative energy supplies and routes that pass through
Turkey. Poland stands as a loyal ally of the United States alongside Turkey and both countries
cooperate closely within NATO structures. Despite these collaborations, at the start of the
Eastern Partnership project, which Poland launched along with Sweden in 2008 and whose
geographical scope includes nearly all of Turkeys northeast neighbors, including Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, Ankara was not consulted. Since its inception, the Eastern Partnership
has been a sore point between Ankara and Warsaw.47
Another
intriguing
case of the Ottoman legacy in Eastern Europe is Hungary. This "special relationship" can be seen
in the positive attitude of Hungarian foreign policy makers regarding Turkish entry into the EU.
It is also evidenced in public opinion surveys conducted by the Hungarian associations such as
the Hungarian Europe and the Eurobarometer, where the Hungarian population comes up as one
of the most favorable of all the member countries surveyed on Turkey's candidacy, which place
44 D. Bechev, op. cit., p. 138.
45 Selcen ner, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Challenges", n Euxeinos,
nr. 10, 2013, p. 12, disponibil la:
http://www.gce.unisg.ch/~/media/internet/content/dateien/instituteundcenters/gce/euxeinos/oener_euxeino
s%2010_2013.pdf, accesat pe 14.01.2015.
46 D. Bechev, op. cit.
47 Deniz Bingl McDonald, "Imperial Legacies and Neo-Ottomanism: Eastern Europe and Turkey", n
Insight Turkey, vol. 14, nr. 4, 2012, p. 105, disponibil la:
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_14_no_4_2012_mcdonald.pdf, accesat pe
12.03.2015.
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Turkey after only Croatia and before Ukraine in the countries they would favor joining the EU. 48
Romania is part of the category of EU
member states which declared their unreserved support for Turkey's candidacy. In this respect,
the Romanian foreign policy takes less into account the negative considerations of the Turkish
file and more the nature of bilateral relations, known to be friendly and even cordial. 49 There
were also tensions in the bilateral relations, marked, in particular, by Romania's willingness to
become a leader in the Black Sea region, which was not seen with good eyes by Turkey. The
increased volume of bilateral economic, relations, the cooperation between the two countries in
several international organisations and the signature, in 2011, of a Strategic Partnership are
pointing out once more Turkey's interest for Romania and viceversa. 50 The official position of
Romania is that the Balkans, Turkey, the Black Sea riveran states ought to become EU members,
to share the same values and interests in the region. Seen in this light, the position of the
Romanian state appears to be realistic and logical.51 Even if Romania is not in the first echelon of
voices in the EU, Turkey can count on Romania's support in Brussels.52
During an official visit to the Republic of
Turkey, in February 2014, Traian Bsescu reiterated Romania's support for Turkey's EU bid,
expressing hopes that negotiations will be completed successfully. "Sooner or later, Turkey will
have to be accepted in the EU because any political and geopolitical logic tells you it is much
better to have Turkey inside the EU than outside it", the president said. However, he explained to
the authorities in Ankara that Turkey will have to deal skillfully with the EU and not expect
immediate results, even after it is considered that it has closed certain negotiation chapters. 53
Including Dobrudja is part of the projects to recovery the
Ottoman memory, not few being the attempts to restore and highlight the monuments with deep
meanings (in Constana, Mangalia, Medgidia, Babadag, Isaccea, etc.). For example, Ali Gazi
48 Ibidem, p. 106.
49 tefan Nstsescu, Politica extern romneasc. nsemnri, Editura Niculescu, Bucureti, 2012, p.
151.
50 Cristina Dobreanu, Relaiile romno-turce: renaterea unei prietenii dup 1990, n V. Simileanu, G.
Gngor, op. cit., p. 83.
51 . Nstsescu, op. cit., p. 152.
52 Mdlin Necsuu, De ce are nevoie Romnia de Turcia n UE?, n karadeniz-press.ro, 09.02.2014,
disponibil la: http://karadeniz-press.ro/kara/de-ce-are-nevoie-romania-de-turcia-in-ue/, accesat pe
17.01.2015.
53 *** Traian Bsescu, ntlnire cu romnii din Turcia: "Orice logic politic i geopolitic arat c este
mai bine s ai Turcia n interiorul UE dect n afara ei", n calea-europeana.ro, 05.02.2014, disponibil la:
http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/traian-basescu-intalnire-cu-romanii-din-turcia-orice-logica-politica-sigeopolitica-arata-ca-este-mai-bine-sa-ai-turcia-in-interiorul-ue-decat-in-afara-ei/, accesat pe 08.12.2014.
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Paa mosque and the tomb of Sar Saltuk Baba in Babadag, Tulcea county, were restored through
funds allocated by the Turkish state via TKA and the Religious Affairs Bureau. President
Erdoan insisted during his visit from April 1, 2015 in Romania, on the role that the "Yunus
Emre" Turkish Cultural Centre in Constana should play in a region where there are more than
70,000 ethnic Turks and Tatars and he praised the example of coexistence in the province
between the Danube and the Black Sea.54
Perhaps "neo-Ottomanism" was a specific strategy practiced by
Ahmet Davutolu, but it was also the result of a natural political development: the culmination of
a geographically and economically dominant position of Turkey, abruptly brought forth by its
own process of intensified Islamization. The attractiveness of "neo-Ottomanism" lied in the
assumption, never formulated as such, that Turkey lacked the means and the will to build itself a
new empire in the Balkans and the Middle East, in this era of globalization. Moreover, lied in the
normalization of relations between Turkey and the former Arab possessions, which left far
behind the Ottoman rule, at least from the perspective of decades and centuries, for Turkey to be
readmitted into the "club", while the Turkish hostility toward Israel climbed a few degrees. 55
The nostalgia for the Ottoman period is proof of the fact that
Turkey began to feel the need to redefine its identity after it became clear that it may not be able
to rely on the European project as much as it originally hoped. 56 However, glorifying the
Ottoman era while devaluing the republican era and dwelling on the past through symbolic
messages will only hinder Turkeys capacity.57 In this regard, maintaining good relations with all
of the Western Balkans countries is very useful for the final goal of Turkey the EU
membership.58

54 Florin Anghel, Erdoan la Bucureti: Nimic despre Rusia, totul de Marea Neagr, n Info Sud-Est,
06.04.2015, disponibil la: http://www.info-sud-est.ro/erdogan-la-bucuresti-nimic-despre-rusia-totul-demarea-neagra/, accesat pe 10.04.2015.
55 R. D. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 393.
56 M. Cihodariu, op. cit., p. 47.
57 Bahar Senem evik, "Quest for Identity: Representations of Ottoman Images in the Turkish Mass
Media", n Atiner Conference Paper Series, nr. MED2013-0656, Atena, p. 15, disponibil la:
http://www.atiner.gr/papers/MED2013-0656.pdf, accesat pe 10.10.2014.
58 arko Petrovi, "Turkey in the Western Balkans. Goals and Means of the New Foreign Policy", ISAC Fund,
International
and
Security
Affaires
Centre,
Belgrad,
2011,
p.
9,
disponibil
la:
http://rs.boell.org/sites/default/files/new-turkish-foreign-policy1.pdf, accesat pe 17.03.2015.

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