LABREL Week 5 Digests INC

121
-------------------------------------------------122 Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC

GR NO./ SCRA NO. 170287
Date: February 14, 2008
Digest by: Anna Beatrice S. Tarrosa
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
Respondent: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AZCUNA,*
COMMISSION, ALABANG TINGA, and
COUNTRY CLUB INDEPENDENT VELASCO, JR., JJ.
EMPLOYEES UNION,
CHRISTOPHER PIZARRO,
MICHAEL BRAZA, and Promulgated:
NOLASCO CASTUERAS,
Respondents.
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J
Topic: a. Valid discrimination: union security clause requisites
FACTS:
1. petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit
corporation with principal office at Country Club Drive, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. Respondent Alabang Country Club Independent
Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
Clubs rank-and-file employees. In April 1996, respondents Christopher
Pizarro, Michael Braza, and Nolasco Castueras were elected Union
President, Vice-President, and Treasurer, respectively.
2.On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Union entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which provided for a Union shop and
maintenance of membership shop.
ARTICLE II
the Club shall dismiss a regular rank-and-file employee on any

of the following grounds: (f) Malversation of union funds;
3. Subsequently, in July 2001, an election was held and a new set of
officers was elected. Soon thereafter, the new officers conducted an
audit of the Union funds. They discovered some irregularly recorded
entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected
loans from the Union funds. The Union notified respondents Pizarro,
Braza, and Castueras of the audit results and asked them to explain the
discrepancies in writing. Union found them guilty of malversation of
union funds.
4. In a letter dated October 18, 2001, the Union, invoking the Security
Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss respondents
Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union.
On December 26, 2001, said respondents received their notices of
termination from the Club.
5. Respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras challenged their
dismissal from the Club in an illegal dismissal
6. LA: Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Club, and found that there was
justifiable cause in terminating said respondents. He dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
7. NLRC: NLRC ruled that there was no justifiable cause for the
termination of respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras. According to
the NLRC, said respondents expulsion from the Union was illegal since
the DOLE had not yet made any definitive ruling on their liability
regarding the administration of the Unions funds.
8. CA: the appellate court rendered a Decision, denying the petition and
upholding the Decision of the NLRC. The CAs Decision focused mainly
on the Clubs perceived failure to afford due process to the three
respondents. It found that said respondents were not given the
opportunity to be heard in a separate hearing
UNION SECURITY
SECTION 4. TERMINATION UPON UNION DEMAND. Upon
written demand of the UNION and after observing due process,
ISSUE/S:
1. whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed
RULING: No. Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly

terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2)
authorized causes under Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under
Art. 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art.
285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment
due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here,
Art. II of the CBA on Union security contains the provisions on the
Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. There is union shop
when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a
certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees who are union
members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter
become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for
continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the
bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. Termination of
employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens
the union and prevents disunity in the bargaining unit within the
duration of the CBA. By preventing member disaffiliation with the threat
of expulsion from the union and the consequent termination of
employment, the authorized bargaining representative gains more
numbers and strengthens its position as against other unions which
may want to claim majority representation.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union
security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting
for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3)
there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the
employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for
terminating an employee based on the CBAs union security provision.
DISPOSITIVE: In favor of Alabang Country Club. Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we are constrained to rule that there is
sufficient cause for the three respondents termination from
employment
DOCTRINE: Termination of employment by virtue of a union security
clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our
jurisdiction.
123
124
125 H.G. Henares & Sons v. National Labor Union,
the latter alone was dismissed. Frio was given a suspension term only.
Gr No. L-17535
Digest by: Jen Balmeo
6. The Industrial Court concluded that there was discriminatory motivation

behind the dismissal of Pablo Fernandez. Contrary to petitioners claim,
substantial evidence is not wanting to support said finding of the
court. Hence, liable for unfair labor practice
Petitioner: H.G Henares & Sons
ISSUE: WON there was discriminatory motivation behind the dismissal?
Respondent: National Labor Union
RULING: Yes. Decision appealed affirmed.
Ponente: J. J.B.L Reyes
The action of the employee in exchanging shifts with another, who was
performing the same kind of work in the company, without prior authorization
of the company, in order to testify before the Court of Industrial Relations on
a case against the company, does not by itself show any wanton disregard of
the companys rule of discipline. On the contrary the dismissed employee did
his best to avoid impairing the normal business operation of the company by
exchanging shifts with another. There is more reason to believe that the
dismissal was due to the employees union activities; that is, in testifying
unfavorable against the company in an unfair labor practice case.
December 28, 1961
Topic: Retaliation: Testimony against Employer/Indirect discrimination
FACTS:
1. Pablo Fernandez was employed by H. G. Henares & Sons as laboratory
assistant in the quality control section whose job was "to conduct tests on the
percentage of solidity of ink and other products" of the company.
2. His regular working hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. daily. One day,
he approached Francisco Frio, another laboratory assistant working on the
night shift, and arranged to take over the latters shift from midnight to 8:00
a.m., of the next day.
3. Francisco Frio, on the other hand, was to work on Fernandez shift from
7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m The arrangement was without the companys prior
approval, however it enabled him to testify in the hearing of the case filed
with CIR of unfair labor practice case filed against the company on behalf of
one of its employees.
4. The evidence adduced shows that Martinez who was their immediate
superior, learned of the unauthorized exchange of shift from Francisco Frio
whom she questioned after she allegedly discovered evidence of poor quality
control work on the night shift.
5. When this fact was brought to the attention of the production manager, the
latter issued a memorandum recommending Fernandez discharge from the
company. Both Francisco Frio and Pablo Fernandez were investigated, but
DISPOSITIVE: Company lost. Decision appealed affirmed.

DOCTRINE: Exchanging shifts with another, who was performing the same
kind of work in the company, without prior authorization of the company, in
order to testify before the Court of Industrial Relations on a case against the
company, does not by itself show any wanton disregard of the companys
rule of discipline.
126
127
128
-------------------------------------------------CASE 129 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. BERSAMIRA

G.R. No. 87700 / 186 SCRA 496
June 13, 1990
Digest by: Thea Denilla
--------------------------------------------------
Petitioner: San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTGWO, Daniel S.L.

Borbon II, Herminia Reyes, Marcela Purificacion, et al.
8
9
Respondent: Hon. Jesus G. Bersamira, in his capacity as Presiding Judge

of Branch 166, RTC, Pasig and San Miguel Corporation
10
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.
11
Topic: Management Prerogative and Unfair Labor Practice
FACTS:
1
2
3
4
5
6
SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon

and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
SanMig entered into those contracts to maintain its competitive position
and in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and
diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was expressly understood
and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid
by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or
agents of SanMig.
There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors
and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union,
for brevity) is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rankand-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides
that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are
excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of
this Agreement."
The Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had
signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC.
The Union alleged that this group of employees, while appearing to be
contractual workers supposedly independent contractors, have been
12
13
14
continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months
to fifteen (15) years and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as
they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a
"labor-only" contracting situation. It was then demanded that the
employment status of these workers be regularized.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from
SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA
violations, and union busting.
the Union again filed a second notice of strike for unfair labor practice.
Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were
staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and
offices.
SanMig filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before
respondent Court.
Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance
and issued a Temporary Restraining Order for the purpose of maintaining
the status quo, and set the application for Injunction for hearing.
The Union went on strike.
Apparently, some of the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite had
been laid off. The strike adversely affected thirteen (13) of the latter's
plants and offices.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1
Whether or not there is unfair labor practice
RULING: 1. Yes there is unfair labor practice

Yes, because the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees
contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the
working unit of SanMig.
This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said
employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their
employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing
the matter within the purview of a labor dispute.
Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed
up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig,
for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no
employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because
the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that
representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions

of employment are also involved.
In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such
representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a
labor dispute.
DISPOSITIVE: We find the Petition of a meritorious character.
WHEREFORE, the Writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the Orders of
respondent Judge of 25 March 1989 and 29 March 1989 are SET ASIDE.
The Writ of Prohibition is GRANTED and respondent Judge is enjoined from
taking any further action in Civil Case No. 57055 except for the purpose of
dismissing it. The status quo ante declaration of strike ordered by the Court
on 24 May 1989 shall be observed pending the proceedings in the National
Conciliation Mediation Board-Department of Labor and Employment,
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-02189 and NCMB-NCR-NS-01-093-83. No
costs.
DOCTRINE: We recognize the proprietary right of SanMig to exercise an
inherent management prerogative and its best business judgment to
determine whether it should contract out the performance of some of its work
to independent contractors. However, the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law (Section 3,
Article XIII, 1987 Constitution) equally call for recognition and protection.
Those contending interests must be placed in proper perspective and
equilibrium.
-------------------------------------------------------------
In answer, the union officers disclaimed any massive disaffiliation or

resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its
members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.
GMC dismissed Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of

incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the
matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however,
advised the union to refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.
Union filed a complaint for ULP on the part of GMC for refusal to bargain
collectively.
LA dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for

certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the
support of the workers.
130. GENERAL MILLING CORP. v. CA,

[G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004]
Digested by: Olive Cachapero
Topic: Violation of Duty to Bargain
------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
1
Petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190

workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling
Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified
bargaining agent.
10 NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining

agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the
CBA. Consequently, it was ULP for GMC not to enter into negotiation
with the union.
GMC and the union concluded a CBA which included the issue of
representation effective for a term of three years.
On the day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a
proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted
within 10 days.
11 CA: set aside the decision of the NLRC
On December 16, 1991, or a month before the expiration, however,

GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who
stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds
of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union
no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any
counter-proposal.
ISSUES:
A month after the expiration of the CBA, GMC wrote a letter to the unions
officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union
which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always
willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was
open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations.
WON GMC is guilty of ULP for violating the duty to bargain collectively
and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. YES
Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the
draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the
expiration of the original CBA? YES
RULING:
1
YES. Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any

CBA that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years.
No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election
shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry
of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All
other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for
five years. The relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable
that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of
the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining
agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five
(5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The
unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from
the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said
period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in
good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the
union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company
committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to
bargain collectively, thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to
bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his
statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
individual case.
Under Article 252, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the
effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article
252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence
of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union
is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse
that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory
as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a
counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication
of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer
to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty
to bargain collectively.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the

unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it
liable for ULP.
The Code provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective

bargaining agreement. ....It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date]
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
General rule: is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue
to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed
upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That
is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith.
Exception: However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by
purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule
is warranted.
It would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions
contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs
employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not
inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted
to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated
the duty to bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or
renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor

controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But
an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes
feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposing on
GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the
interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both parties
regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations
for new economic terms of the CBA.
Dispositive: GMC lost.
Doctrine: Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to

the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it
liable for ULP.
131
-------------------------------------------------132 St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John Academy Faculty and Employees
Union
Date October 27, 2006
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: St. John Colleges, Inc
Respondent: St. John Academy Faculty And Employees Union
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
Topic: Violation of Duty to Bargain
FACTS:
1. Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which
owns and operates the St. Johns Academy (later renamed St. John
Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a
secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching
and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy
Faculty & Employees Union (Union).The CBA between SJCI and the Union
was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining
negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in
workers benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the
holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997.In order to end
the strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed to
refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for
assumption of jurisdiction. After which, the strike ended and classes
resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January19, 1998
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the
Labor Code. The partieswere required to submit their respective position
papers. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board
of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution
recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by the
stockholders on even date.
2. Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students and the
Union of the impending closure of the high school which took effect on March
31, 1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the
high school agreed to the closure. Some 51 employees had received their
separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the
same. Instead, these employees conducted a protest action within the
perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike.
3. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the
NLRC. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural
requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code. Subsequently,
the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the
NLRC, alleging that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in
order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on
the CBA deadlocked issues.
4. LA: Dismissed the Unions complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while
granting SJCIs petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration
of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.
[SOLE: Union filed a manifestation to maintain the status quo on March 30,
1998 praying that SJCI be enjoined from closing the high school. It claimed
that the decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLEs
assumption order and the agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory
action against the other. For its part, SJCI filed a motion to dismiss with entry
of appearance on October 14, 1998 claiming that the closure of the high
school rendered the CBA deadlocked issues moot. The SOLE denied SJCIs
motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC] After
the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high
school for school year 1999-2000. However, it did not restore the high school
teaching and non-teaching employees it earlier terminated. That same school
year SJCI opened an elementary and college department.
5. NLRC: Rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It

found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the
25 employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits, and with full backwages. It also required SJCI to pay moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and two (2) months
summer/vacation pay. Moreover, it ruled that the mass actions conducted by
the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 could not be considered as a strike since,
by then, the employer-employee relationship had already been terminated

due to the closure of the high school.
6. CA: Affirmed the Decision of the NLRC
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioner is guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal
RULING: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of UPL and illegal dismissal.
The two decisive factors in determining whether SJCI acted in bad faith are
(1) the timing of, and reasons for the closure of the high school, and (2) the
timing of, and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college and
elementary department, and, ultimately, the reopening of the high school
department by SJCI after only one year from its closure.
Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the parties agreed to refer the
1997 CBA deadlock to the SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction under Article
263 of the Labor Code. As a result, the strike ended and classes resumed.
After the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, it required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. However, instead of filing its position paper, SJCI
closed its high school, allegedly because of the "irreconcilable differences
between the school management and the Academys Union particularly the
safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA
negotiations." Thereafter, SJCI moved to dismiss the pending labor dispute
with the SOLE contending that it had become moot because of the closure.
Nevertheless, a year after said closure, SJCI reopened its high school and
did not rehire the previously terminated employees.
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure was
done to defeat the parties agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE;
to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render nugatory any decision
of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Unions right to collective bargaining and
its members right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure was due
to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management,
specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in
effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate
the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is precisely what
the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net
effect is to defeat the Unions right to collective bargaining.
When SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members.
Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union
members.
Evidence provides that subsequent reopening of the high school after only
one year from its closure further show that the high schools closure was
done in bad faith.
Thus, the SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on
May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and give
a notice of strike. However, the High Court finds for the findings of the NLRC
and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike
because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to
exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and
its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down, show that
the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the
Unions right to collective bargaining and its members right to security of
tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
DISPOSITIVE: the Union Won. the petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.

DOCTRINE: the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice
when the net effect is to defeat the Unions right to collective bargaining
133
134
135 San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. SMC Employees Union-PTGWO

Gr No. 168569
October 5, 2007
Petitioner: San Miguel Foods
Respondent: SMC Union(PTGWO)
Ponente: J.Carpio Morales
Topic: Gross Violation of CBA
FACTS:
At the time material to the case, San Miguel Corporation Employees Union
PTWGO (the Union), was the sole bargaining agent of all the monthly paid
employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Incorporated (SMFI).
Almost nine months after the grievance meeting was held, SMFI rendered a
"Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that it was still in the process of
completing the "work management review," hence, the Union's requests
could not be granted.
The Union filed a complaint before the NLRC Arbitration branch against
SMFI, its president and Montesa for "unfair labor practice, [and] unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion . . . " It prayed that SMFI et al. be
ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding
pay increases or adjustment including payment of salary differentials plus
attorney's fees[,] and to cease and desist from committing the same unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion."
Instead of filing a position paper as is required for step 2, SMFI filed for a
motion to dismiss instead on the ground that that the issues raised in the
complaint were grievance issues and, therefore, "should be resolved in the
grievance machinery provided in [the] collective bargaining agreements of
the parties or in the mandated provision of voluntary arbitration which is also
provided in the CBA."
The union opposed the motion to dismiss.
Some employees of SMFI's Finance Department, through the Union

represented by Edgar Moraleda brought a grievance against Finance
Manager Montesa for "discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices, not
flexible, harassment, promoting divisiveness and sectarianism, etc.," before
SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of
the grievance machinery adopted in the CBA forged by SMFI and the Union.
LA: Granted MTD and remand the case to grievance machinery
The Union sought:
Hence this petition.
1. Review, evaluation & upgrading of all Finance staff and
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the terms of the CBA?
2. Promotion of G.Q. Montesa to other SMC affiliates & subsidiaries.
RULING: Yes. Petition denied. LA has jurisdiction.
Then a grievance meeting was held by SMFI informing the Union that
a work management review to be completed and would be done
to address the grievence, asking the finance personnel to give it their
attention. The "work management review" was not completed, however,
prompting the Union to elevate the grievance to Step 2.
NLRC: Granted, LA should continue.

CA: Denied petition for certiorari filed by company. LA has juris. they having
violated the seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting certain
employees which amounted to a ULP.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security
provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI appointed
less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department, consequently
intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said
appointment.
Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that All doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. Since the seniority rule in
the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it may,
following a liberal construction of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be
considered an economic provision of the CBA.
As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior
employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or
more qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or
flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE: Union won. Petition denied
DOCTRINE: It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or
flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
136
137
138
--------------------------------------------------
That notwithstanding representations made by complaint union for and in

behalf of its members, respondent failed and refused and continues to
fail and refuse to reinstate them to their jobs.
That since their mass dismissals and/or lock out, the dismissed
employees have not found any substantial and/or equivalent employment
for themselves, in spite of diligent efforts to that effect
Respondent court through Associate Judge Amando C. Bugayong:

rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of unfair labor practice.
Respondents filed an MR and Petitioner Union filed a motion to

dismission.
Respondent Court: ordered the reopening of the case and to include

Benito Estanislao as party respondent to determine his liability under the
complaint.
CASE 139 NATIONAL LABOR UNION v. CIR

G.R. No. L-31276 / 116 SCRA 417
September 9, 1982
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: National Labor Union
Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations, Everlasting Manufacturing, Ang
Wo Long and Benito S. Estanislao
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Topic: Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions; 2. Parties Liable for Acts b.
Labor Organization
FACTS:
1
The Acting Prosecutor of this Court filed a formal complaint with this
Court charging respondent Everlasting Manufacturing of unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraphs 1, 4 and 6 in
relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act 875 (An Act to
Promote Industrial Peace and for other Purposes, repealed by P.D. 442).
A Collective bargaining agreement by and between complainant union
and respondent Everlasting Manufacturing, a business establishment
which manufactured paper cups, water cups, and other allied products,
through its general manager Benito Estanislao Alias Cha Wa began
hiring 24 new workers.
It was alleged in the complaint that in order to avoid the implementation
of the collective bargaining contract, to bust complainant union, to
discourage membership with complainant union, on the pretext of selling
and closing its business, and without any justifiable reason respondent
company, by its general manager Benito Estanislao and proprietor Ang
Wo Long, dismissed and/or locked out all the members of complainant
union.
Continuously thereafter, respondent company continued with its business
operations by availing of the services of the above-mentioned 24 new
workers who are non-union members, using the same premises,
business name, machineries, tool and implements, same officials and
supervisors, including its assistant manager Tan Hoc;
10 Benito Estanislao was issued summons at his last known address

requiring him to answer the complaint.
11 The summons was, however, returned by the counsel for respondent Ang
Wo Long on the ground that Benito Estanislao did not reside and was not
found at the premises of the former.
12 Hence, the respondent court issued an order to the effect that Estanislao
be issued summons by publication. Despite summons by publication,
however, Estanislao did not answer the complaint. Neither did Estanislao
appear in court.
13 The respondent court, therefore, conducted hearings of the case without
the presence and representation of Estanislao.
14 Respondent court issued an Order finding Benito Estanislao guilty of
unfair labor practice and he is hereby ordered to pay backwages to the
twenty-one (21) complaining workers during the full duration of the
collective bargaining contract.
15 Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1
Whether or not the respondent court was justified in completely overturning its March 22, 1966 ruling on the liability of Ang Wo Long (finding
guilty of unfair labor practice) under the May 3, 1963 collective
bargaining contract.
RULING: 1. No, the respondent court was not justified in completely overturning the said ruling.
No, because it must be noted that the respondent court modified its decision
and absolved Ang Wo Long of responsibility for and liability under the May 3,
1963 collective bargaining contract because of its finding that there was a
lack of evidence which would show knowledge not only of the CBA but of the
existence of the union itself on the part of Mr. Ang Wo Long.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and inner
state of consciousness, cognizance, and information. Whether or not Mr. Ang
Wo Long knew the labor problems of the firm he purchased, the existence of
a union, the on-going CBA negotiations, and the efforts of the employees
he later dismissed to reach an agreement with management on the terms
and conditions of their employment can be determined only from an
admission of Mr. Ang himself or from the surrounding facts and
circumstances indicative of knowledge. or awareness.
Under the facts are circumstances of this case, it is irrational if not specious
to assume that Mr. Ang bought a business lock, stock, and barrel without
inquiring into its labor-management situation and that his dismissal of all the
union members without retaining a few experienced workers and their
replacement with a completely new set of employees who were strangers to
the company was anything other than an attempt to rid the firm of unwanted
union activity.
There is substantial evidence to sustain a finding of Mr. Ang's
knowledge of the bargaining negotiations and the resulting CBA and,
consequently, of unfair labor practice on his part.
The former owner, Benito Estanislao alias Cha Wa, sold Everlasting
Manufacturing to Ang Wo Long on April 29, 1963 while CBA negotiations
were going on and about to be concluded. The firm had a recent history of
labor problems and the bargaining negotiations came about only after a
strike.
According to the respondent court, the acts of Ang Wo Long his filing an
application for registration with the Bureau of Commerce on April 21, 1963,
his securing the mayor's permit, and his other acts of management were
only acts preparatory to taking over the firm and not acts indicating
knowledge of union activity and the CBA negotiations. We rule otherwise.
Precisely because Mr. Ang performed acts indicative of normal care and
caution on the part of a man buying a manufacturing firm, We rule that the
same care and caution was also extended to a more sensitive aspect of the
business, one attracting the greatest degree of concern and attention of any
new owner, which was the relationship of the workers to management, their
willingness to cooperate with the owner, and their productivity arising from
harmonious relations. Benito Estanislao signed the CBA no longer as owner
but as "general manager." The new owner used the same premises, the
same business name, machineries, tools and implements and the same
officials and supervisors including the assistant manager, Mr. Tan Hoc The
only change was the replacement of the 21 union member with a completely
new set of employees hired from outside the firm. As stated by Judge
Amando C. Bugayong in the court's March 22,1966 decision, the respondent
Ang Wo Long did not show any just cause for dispensing with the services of
all the 21 union members. We agree with Judge Bugayong that "the
conclusion becomes inescapable that he (Mr. Ang) dismissed the
complainants in order to break the union and do away with the existing
collective bargaining agreement which it has obtained only after a strike and
bargaining negotiations."
Another mystifying aspect of the questioned order and resolution was the
placing of full responsibility on the shoulders of Mr. Benito Estanislao whom
the court funny knew had already conveniently disappeared even as it
absolved the only person who could grant affirmative relief and whose liability
had earlier been determined to be founded on substantial evidence. The
summons issued to Benito Estanislao was returned by Ang Wo Long's
counsel who stated that Benito Estanislao was no longer at his former
address. Summons had to be effected through publication. The person found
guilty of unfair labor practice did not show up at the reopened hearings and
as far as the records before US show, had disappeared. The concatenation
of circumstances clearly indicates the participation of both Mr. Estanislao and
Mr. Ang in the unfair labor practice. Hence, Ang Wo Long should be jointly
and severally liable with Benito S. Estanislao for the payment of backwages
to the complaining employees.
Hence, the Court held that they grant three (3) years backwages without
deduction or qualification to the dismissed employees. Following the same
considerations and in fairness to Ang Wo Long, reinstatement of the
complaining employees should be made on the basis of the latter's physical
fitness for the respective jobs from which they were illegally ousted.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
1) Ang Wo Long and Benito S. Estanislao are hereby ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the complaining employees three (3) years backwages
without deduction or qualification.
2) Ang Wo Long is hereby ordered to reinstate the complaining employees
and he may require certifications of their physical fitness by a government
physician; and
3) Ang Wo Long and Benito S. Estanislao shall pay the costs.
DOCTRINE: Appreciation of facts and conclusions drawn from facts must be
such as would be acceptable to a reasonable mind. The reconsidered
conclusions of the respondent court not only fly against the dictates of reason
and common sense but are out of touch with the grounds of public policy
implicit in the Industrial Peace Act and in the constitutional mandate on
protection to labor.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and inner
state of consciousness, cognizance, and information.
------------------------------------------------------------140. CCLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION v. NLRC

May 30, 1988
Topic: Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions; Compromise
-----------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
1
2
3
4
5
8
9
Petitioner CCLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union is a local chapter of

the Central Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC), a legitimate labor federation
duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), while
the individual petitioners are former employees of private respondent
who were officers and members of the petitioner union.
Majority of the rank and file employees of respondent firm organized the
e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of the CLLC.
Union filed a petition for certification
CLLC national president wrote the general manager of respondent firm
informing him of the organization of the union and requesting for a labor
management conference to normalize employer-employee relations
Union sent a written notice to respondent firm requesting permission for
certain member officers and members of the union to attend the hearing
of the petition for certification election. The management refused to
acknowledge receipt of said notice
Private respondent preventively suspended the union officers and
members who attended the hearing. The common ground alleged by
private respondent for its action was "abandonment of work on February
27, 1980." On the same date, all the gate passes of all the abovementioned employees to Clark Air Base were confiscated by a Base
guard.
Claiming that private respondent instigated the confiscation of their gate
passes to prevent them from performing their duties and that respondent
firm did not pay them their overtime pay, 13th month pay and other
benefits, petitioner union and its members filed a complaint for
constructive lockout and unfair labor practice against private respondent.
private respondent filed an application for clearance to dismiss the union
officers and members
Petitioner Ricardo Dormingo who was preventively suspended, filed a
complaint for ULP. Services of 9 more union members were terminated
by private respondent on the ground that its contract with the U.S. Air
Force had expired. The 9 employees filed a complaint for illegal

dismissal against private respondents
10 Private respondent filed with MOLE a Notice of Termination of Contract
together with a list of employees affected by the expiration of the
contract, among them, the 39 individual petitioners herein.
11 LA ordered: To reinstate all the suspended/dismissed employees to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with
full backwages including cost of emergency living allowance from the
date of their suspension/dismissal up to the supposed date of actual
reinstatement
12 NLRC: set aside the decision of the LA; granted the application for
clearance to terminate the services of individual complainants-appellees
filed by respondent-appellant.
ISSUE: WON petitioners waived their their economic demands, as alleged by
private respondent, by way of compromise.
RULING
NO.
We are convinced that the respondent company is indeed guilty of an ULP. It
is no coincidence that at the time said respondent issued its suspension and
termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of a certification election
preliminary to a labor management conference, purportedly, "to normalize
employer-employee relations." It was within the legal right of the petitioners
to do so, the exercise of which was their sole prerogative, and in which
management may not as a rule interfere. In this connection, the respondent
company deserves our strongest condemnation for ignoring the petitioners'
request for permission for some time out to attend to the hearing of their
petition before the med-arbiter. It is not only an act of arrogance, but a
brazen interference as well with the employees right to self-organization,
contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair labor practices.
In finding the petitioners' suspension illegal, with more reason do we hold

their subsequent dismissal to be illegal. We are not persuaded by the
respondent firm's argument that final termination should be effected as the
contract has expired." What impresses us is the Solicitor General's
submission that the petitioners were regular employees and as such, their
tenure did not end with the expiration of the contract.
The Court rejects the claims of an alleged waiver by the petitioners of their
economic demands, in the light of an alleged order issued by Labor Arbiter
Aquino in connection with another case(s) involving the same parties. (It was
Labor Arbiter Federico Bernardo who penned the unfair labor practice/illegal
dismissal case.)
The Honorable Aquino's disposition reads:

The records show that a "Waiver of Claims, Rights and Interest" was filed
by above-named petitioners stating, among other things, that said
petitioners are waiving their claims, rights and interests against the
respondents.
ACCORDINGLY, let the above-entitled cases be DISMISSED in view of

the waiver made by the petitioners.
allegedly took over the presidency of complainant-appellee union after the

disappearance of the former president, Mr. Ficardo Alconga, Sr. And
besides, the waiver of rights and interests were personally executed by
the signatories therein and all that Atty. Solomon did was to assist them.
xxx xxx xxx
We find this puzzling for clearly, Labor Arbiter Aquino's resolution refers to
other cases and not the instant unfair labor practice controversy. The
Commission cannot feign simple mistake for such a lapse. In any event, we
have held that ULP cases are not, in view of the public interest involved,
subject to compromises. Furthermore, these alleged waivers do not appear
to have been presented in the first instance. They cannot be introduced for
the first time on appeal.
Dispositive: Petitioner won.

Doctrine: ULP cases are not, in view of the public interest involved, subject
to compromises.
Acting on these allegations, the respondent Commission, baring its clear

bias for management, ruled that the petitioners had waived their claims.
Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the second issue, that is, whether or not the waiver of
rights and interests executed by Fernando do so, 6 The G Lising, Odilon
do so, 6 The G Lising, Jose C. Tiamzon, Ernesto Tuazon, Pedro Santos,
Ruben Buela, Eduardo Alegado, Estrael Vino, Rogelio Manguerra,
Edilberto Bingcang, Olimpio Gumin, Leo Tropico, Orlando Nacu, Rodolfo
T. Capitly and Juanito Suba, are valid, the alleged president of
complainant-appellee union Benigno Navarro, Sr., contends that Id Atty.
Solomon has no authority to appear floor and in behalf of individual
complainants-appellees who waived their rights and interests in these
cases since there was no authority from him. Records, however, disclose
that said Atty. Solomon had been the attorney of record for complainantsappellees since the inception of these cases, and, therefore, is authority to
represent them cannot be questioned- not even by Ministry. Navarro who
141
--------------------------------------------------
142 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC

Date: September 16, 1993
5
6

--------------------------------------------------
Petitioner: Bisig Ng Manggagawa Sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc., (Bimcai)

Fsm, And Its Union Officers & Members, Etc
Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V.
Pealosa And Concrete Aggregates Corp
Ponente: PUNO, J
Topic: Basis of Right to Engage in Concerted Activities- Constitution
FACTS:
1
6 Apr 1992 The union picketed several (6) premises of their employer
(Bagumbayan and Longos in Q.C.; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San
Fernando, Pampanga; and San Pedro Laguna.)
a The union was protesting : ULP and Union Busting.
8 Apr Employer FILED : Injunction to stop the illegal strike, with the
NLRC alleging among others:
a The April 6 strike was a Wild-cat strike, in that there was no notice of
strike, it did not comply with the cooling off period, and there was a
pending mediation proceeding scheduled on 10 Apr.
b That during the strike the union impeded the ingress and egress to
the premises by setting up makeshifts, tents, banners, streamers,
and other man-made obstructions.
c That the union had (and still is) doing other illegal acts such as
threats, intimidation, and coercions against persons with lawful
business with the employer.
13 Apr NLRC heard the petition ex parte, for failure of the union to
appear, NLRC issued a TRO
a Apparently the union was not notified of the petition, the company
misrepresented its address
b Neither did the union get a copy of the TRO, it only learned of it when
it was posted on 15Apr in the premises of the company
24 Apr the Union in turn FILED: Injunction, to enjoin the company from
asking the aid of police and military to escort scabs (Case really said
scabs, but it should probably have been people and vehicles) from
entering the establishment.
30 Apr the employer filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction alleging: that the union was still committing illegal
acts complained of despite the TRO.
4 Mar : Union was notified of the motion.
a Next day (5 Mar) the union opposed the motion on the ground that
they were never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction.
NLRC (Same day that union opposed, just one day after the union was
notified): issued the disputed order, GRANTED Employers Preliminary
Injunction against the union, based on testimonies, that:
a Despite TRO strike continued
b By forming a human blockade, the union prevented vehicles from
entering the premises
c By force and intimidation prevented the non striking employees from
going to work
d Wala kaming pakielem sa TRO ninyoBubugbugin namin kayo pag
kayo nagpilit
e Ramon Bana, Union President: sisimentuhin naming ang gates ng
Concrete Aggregate na kahit ipis as hindi makakpasok
8 Union filed the instant petition for certiorari
ISSUE/S:
1. : WON the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction against the union was
proper?
RULING: NO. It violated their right to strike, and it did not comply with the
LCs requirements for the issuance of an injunction
1
NLRCs Preliminary injunction was improper. Non-compliance with

218(3) subpar 4 and 5
a Affidavits used by the company in proving the continued strike
despite the TRO was controverted upon presentation to the labor
abiter.
b No less than the companys operations manager, Mr.Mercado,
further testified that after the issuance of the TRO, the barricades
were removed.
c Mr. Mercado and Atty. Jolo(personnel manager) also testified that
public authorities charged to protect the companys properties were
neither unwilling nor unable to furnish adequate protection. As a
matter of fact, police assistance was never requested.
Records reveal continuing misuse of unfair strategies by the

company to secure the ex-parte TRO.
a The union was never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction
b They were denied the right to attend the 13Apr hearing where the
TRO was issued
Issuance of ex-parte TRO is not per se prohibited BUT it must be
clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity.
a Because imprudently issues TROs can break the back of employees
engaged in a legal strike.
b The deleterious effects of such a TRO on the rights of striking
employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simple
monetization.
c As such it behooves officers receiving evidence to support ex-parte
evidence to take a more active stance seeing to it that the right to
social justice is in no way violated.
Nor does the court find baseless the allegation by the union that NLRC
had neglected to resolves their injunction.
a The companys prayer for ex-parte TRO was heard and granted on
the same day.
b The companys petition for preliminary injunction was filed april 30
and was granted less than a week after May5.
c On the other hand, the unions petition has not yet been heard nor
decided.
d The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering the subject
matters of their petition are of similar importance to the parties and to
the public.
DISPOSITIVE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (against striking workers)

ANNULED & SET ASIDE
Further: NLRC is ordered to hear and resolve with deliberate speed
unions petition for injunction filed on 30 April 1992.
DOCTRINE: The restoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain of
labor after the EDSA revolution. It is the employees sole weapon. In
recognition of its importance, our Consti has accorded this right a distinct
status while our laws have assured that its rightful exercise will not be
negated by the issuance of unnecessary injunctions
143
144
145 G&S Transport Corp. v. Tito S. Infante

GR No.160303
September 13, 2007.
Petitioner: G & S Transport Corp.(Company)
Respondent: Tito S. Infante
Ponente:J.Tinga
Topic: Strike definition
FACTS:
1. Company was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the NAIA by
virtue of a five-year concession contract awarded by the MIAA.
2. Under the terms of the contract, the coupon taxi units assigned to service
arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at
the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units assigned to service
departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage
dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after
taking arriving passengers to their destination.
3. Infante and others had been taxi drivers of the company, and before they
were dismissed, they were assigned at the Domestic Airport on two the
shifts: morning and afternoon shift. .One was assigned to the morning shift [
and Infante and the other were assigned to the afternoon shift.
4. The Company claimed to have received from the Union a lettermemorandum demanding the dismissal from employment of two drivers of r
on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty,
conduct unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of
the Union. The Union based its action on a petition filed by said employees
calling for a local election. So the two were terminated.
5. When the drivers found out about the incident, they stopped driving their
taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. Thus the
Company alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the
work premises. Also they averred various illegal acts, such as stopping,
barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work premises,
were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of the
Company.
6. So the Company ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of
the drivers, including Infante and others, refused to do so. Then the
Company filed an action for illegal strike before the Labor Arbiter against
thirty-seven (37) drivers. Two days later, said drivers filed a case for illegal
dismissal against them.
7. In a Joint Affidavit Infante and Borbo denied joining the alleged
strike. They narrated that they reported to work at the domestic airport but
did not find their taxi in the area. They proceeded to the garage at the Duty
Free shop. The dispatcher and the counter sales clerk were likewise not
around. Thereafter, they learned about the protest of their co-workers over
the dismissal of Gonzales and Alzaga. They soon found out that the
management had stopped company operation that afternoon but they stayed
until before lunch. They did not report for work on the following day because
it was their day-off. When they came back to report for work, they were
refused entry by the guard because their names did not appear on the list of
drivers allowed to work on that day. They soon received a copy of the
complaint filed by petitioner charging them with illegal strike
Out of the 37 complaining drivers, only seven remained as complainants
when the case reached the Labor Arbiter. Others executed their respective
affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to dismiss.
LA: illegal strike, but the drivers who did not participate in the strike were
declared illegally dismissed. Pay separation in lieu of reinstatement without
backwages.
NLRC: affirmed
CA; Annulled. Remanded to LA.
ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal?
RULING: YES, According to Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as
any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute.
A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute. The
strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more
aptly termed as a sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no
demands or grievances of their own, but they strike for the purpose of directly
or indirectly aiding others, without direct relation to the advancement of the
interest of the strikers. It is indubitable that an illegal strike in the form of a sitdown strike occurred in petitioners premises, as a show of sympathy to the
two employees who were dismissed by petitioner. Apart from the allegations
in its complaint for illegal strike filed before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner
presented the affidavits and testimonies of their other employees which
confirm the participation of respondents in the illegal strike. Petitioner has
sufficiently established that respondents remained in the work premises in
the guise of waiting for orders from management to resume operations when,
in fact, they were actively participating in the illegal strike.
The office telegram sent to individual respondents informing them to return
to work went unheeded. Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain their
conspicuous absence following the day of the purported illegal strike. No
record whatsoever was presented by Borbo and Infante to prove that 17 May
1990was their day-off. It was convenient to pass the buck on petitioner by
alleging that proof of their alibi is in petitioners file. Castaeda could not even
present a sick leave form to attest to his absence from 11-15 May 1990.
Moreover, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals appeared unanimous in
sustaining the findings of the Labor Arbiter with respect to respondents
participation in the illegal strike. The appellate courts decision dwelt on the
fact that no illegal activities were committed by respondents in the course of
the illegal strike, hence, reinstatement is proper.
DISPOSITIVE: Company won. Petition granted.
DOCTRINE: The Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute.
146
147
148
-------------------------------------------------CASE 149 STA. ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION v.

CCBP
G.R. Nos. 164302-03
September 9, 1982
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union, Donrico V.
Sebastian, Eulogio G. Batino, Samuel A. Atanque, Manolo C. Zabaljauregui,
Dionisio Tenorio, Edwin P. Rellores, Luis B. Natividad, Myrna Petingco,
Feliciano Tolentino, Rodolfo A. Amante, Jr., Cipriano C. Bello, Ronaldo T.
Espino, Efren Galan and Jun Carmelito Santos
Respondent: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
Topic: Picketing; Nature and Purpose of Picket Line
FACTS:
1. Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and
the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The
individual petitioners are Union officers, directors, and shop stewards.
2. The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
3. Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its
desire to renegotiate its terms.
4. The CBA meetings commenced, where the Union and the Company
discussed the ground rules of the negotiations.
5. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon
sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings.
The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based
on their work shift rates.
6. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the
Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a
mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various plants; and
is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.
7. The Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a "Notice of
Strike" with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
Regional Office in Southern Tagalog, Imus, Cavite. The petitioners relied
on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair labor
practice arising from the companys refusal to bargain.
8. The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the reasons cited by
the Union were not valid grounds for a strike.
9. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike on September 17,
1999 on the following grounds: (a) unfair labor practice for the companys
refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b) interference with the exercise of
their right to self-organization.
10. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the Companys
premises.
11. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore gears, red tag
cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on the different
parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
12. The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to
conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola
plant.
13. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front
perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel of
the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71
production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three
bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were
operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours
due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume
of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical case[s] versus
budget.
14. The Company filed a "Petition to Declare Strike Illegal".
15. The Union filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Suspend
Proceedings alleging therein that the mass action conducted by its
officers and members was not a strike but just a valid exercise of their
right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as guaranteed
by the Constitution
16. Labor Arbiter: rendered a Decision granting the petition of the Company.
He declared that the mass leave was actually a strike under Article 212
of the Labor Code. The strike conducted by the Union was illegal since
there was no showing that the Union conducted a strike vote, observed
the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to
the DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly
participating in the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were
considered to have lost their employment status.
17. The Union appealed the decision to the NLRC. On July 31, 2002, the
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with the modification that
Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on bereavement leave at
the time, should be excluded from the list of those who participated in the
illegal strike. She was thus ordered reinstated to her former position with
full backwages and benefits.
18. CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

19. Petitioner Union filed an MR but was denied.
20. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of

the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the September 21, 1999 mass action staged by the Union
was a strike;
2. if, in the affirmative, whether it was legal;
3. Whether or not the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner
Union should be dismissed from their employment.
RULING: 1. Yes, The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on
September 21, 1999, and not merely a picket is correct.
Yes, because The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayors permit is
not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a strike.
The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were allowed to conduct
is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action staged
by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the situation.
2. Records reveal that the said strike did not comply with the requirements of
Article 263 (F) in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code for a valid strike.
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership,
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken.
The Ministry may at its own initiative or upon the
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a
strike or lockout without first having bargained
collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
without first having filed the notice required in the
preceding article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to
the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption
of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory
or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence or an unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in
a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.
In the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that respondents

had complied with the above mandatory requirements of law for a valid
strike. Particularly, there is no showing that respondents had observed the
prescribed cooling-off period, conducted a strike vote, much less submitted a

strike vote report to the Department of Labor within the required time. This
being the case, respondents strike on September 21, 1999 is illegal. In the
recent case of CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, 2999 (sic) SCRA
410, the Supreme Court had said: "It bears stressing that the strike
requirements under Article 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory
requisites, without which, the strike will be considered illegal. The evidence
(sic) intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report as
mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to strike which is
essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the
law. Verily, substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice.
Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.
3. The ruling of the CA affirming the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter ordering the dismissal of the petitioners-officers, directors and shop
stewards of petitioner Union is correct.
It bears stressing, however, that the law makes a distinction between union
members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike
may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal
acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status.
For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer
may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option
of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost
his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union
officers from service.
Finally, the contention of petitioners Elenette Moises, Almira Romo, Louie
Labayani, Ricky Ganarial, Efren Galan and Jun Carmelito Santos who were
appointed as shop stewards of the Union that they were mere members and
not the officers of petitioner Union is barren of merit.
We agree with the observation of respondent that under Section 501(a) and
(b) of the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959, 4shop stewards are officers of the
Union.
DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
DOCTRINE: It bears stressing that this is a finding made by the Labor Arbiter
which was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. The settled rule is that the
factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as long as they are based on

substantial evidence, are conclusive on this Court. The raison detre is that
quasi-judicial agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, have acquired a
unique expertise since their jurisdictions are confined to specific matters.
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the factual issues raised by the
petitioner are inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari. Whether
petitioners staged a strike or not is a factual issue.
Strike v. Picket
Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that "the fact
that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling." The term "strike" encompasses not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to
damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar
activities.
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the
employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs
making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor
dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe
and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion
Shop Steward
A shop steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant
serves as representative of the Union, charged with negotiating and
adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer.
He is the representative of the Union members in a building or other
workplace. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official
who represents members in a particular department. His duties include the
conduct of initial negotiations for settlement of grievances.
He is to help other members when they have concerns with the employer or
other work-related issues. He is the first person that workers turn to for
assistance or information. If someone has a problem at work, the steward will
help them sort it out or, if necessary, help them file a complaint. In the
performance of his duties, he has to take cognizance of and resolve, in the
first instance, the grievances of the members of the Union. He is empowered
to decide for himself whether the grievance or complaint of a member of the
petitioner Union is valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the supervisor
failing which, the matter would be elevated to the Grievance Committee.
------------------------------------------------------------150. ESCARIO v. NLRC

G.R. No. 160302, September 27, 2010
and if reinstatement is not feasible, company is directed to pay

respondents separation pay at one (1/2) half month per year of service.
11 CA: affirmed the NLRC. In denying the petitioners claim for full
backwages, the CA explained that Article 264 was silent on the award of
backwages to employees participating in a lawful strike.
12 Petitioners contend that they are entitled to full backwages by virtue of
their reinstatement, and submit that applicable to their situation is Article
279, not the third paragraph of Article 264(a), both of the Labor Code.
Topic: Strike; Effect on Work Relationship

-------------------------------------------------------------
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled to backwages.
FACTS:
RULLING:
YES.
The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent

Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation engaged in
manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were members of
petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced
Foods (Union).
2 On March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the Union
walked out of PINAs premises and proceeded to the barangay office to
show support for Juanito Caete, an officer of the Union charged with oral
defamation by Aurora Manor and her secretary. It appears that the
proceedings in the barangay resulted in a settlement, and the officers
and members of the Union all returned to work thereafter.
3 As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of
the Union and terminated the officers of the Union.
4 PINA filed a complaint for ULP and damages.
5 LA ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and
that all the Unions officers, except Caete, had thereby lost their
employment.
6 Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union
busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers. The Union held
a strike vote, at which a majority of 190 members of the Union voted to
strike. The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15, 1993.
7 PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment
of work, stating that they had violated provisions on strike of the CBA.
8 NLRC issued a TRO, enjoining the Unions officers and members to
cease and desist from barricading and obstructing the entrance to and
exit from PINAs premises, to refrain from committing any and all forms of
violence, and to remove all forms of obstructions such as streamers,
placards, or human barricade.
9 LA found that the strike was illegal.
10 NLRC sustained the finding that the strike was illegal, but reversed the
LAs ruling that there was abandonment; directed the company to
reinstate respondents to their former positions but without backwages,
The third paragraph of Article 264(a) states:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) xxx Any worker whose employment has
been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status; Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxx
Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is:
a unlawful lockout; and
b participation in an illegal strike,
the third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages
only when the termination of employment is a consequence of an unlawful
lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision distinguishes
between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to
have lost his employment status, but a union member who is merely
instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly
treated. Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for the union
member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who are misled into
supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed
illegal acts during the period of the illegal strikes.
left his employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue
to him from the employment.
The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to
be illegal. The NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement,
the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file
workers whom the Unions officers had misled into joining the illegal strike.
They were not unjustly dismissed from work. Based on the text and intent of
the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain that
Article 264(a) is the applicable one.
That backwages are not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike

simply accords with the reality that they do not render work for the employer
during the period of the illegal strike. The petitioners herein do not deny their
participation in the June 15, 1993 strike. As such, they did not suffer any loss
of
earnings
during
their
absence
from
work.
Their
reinstatement sans backwages is in order, to conform to the policy of a fair
days wage for a fair days labor.
Petitioners argue that the finding of no abandonment equated to a finding of

illegal dismissal in their favor. Hence, they were entitled to full backwages.
The petitioners argument cannot be sustained.
The petitioners participation in the illegal strike was precisely what prompted
PINA to file a complaint to declare them, as striking employees, to have lost
their employment status. However, the NLRC ultimately ordered their
reinstatement after finding that they had not abandoned their work by joining
the illegal strike. They were thus entitled only to reinstatement, regardless of
whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employers
ULP, considering that a strike was not a renunciation of the employment
relation.
As a GENERAL RULE, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed
employee for his loss of earnings during the whole period that he is out of his
job. Considering that an illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have
Under the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor, the petitioners
were not entitled to the wages during the period of the strike (even if the
strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike.
Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate
against their employer on the latters time. Thus, the Court deleted the award
of backwages and held that the striking workers were entitled only to
reinstatement in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond
Hotel) v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, considering that the
striking employees did not render work for the employer during the strike.
Dispositive: In lieu of reinstatement, the petitioners are granted backwages
equivalent of one month for every year of service.

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121

-------------------------------------------------122 Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC

the Club shall dismiss a regular rank-and-file employee on any

RULING: No. Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly

125 H.G. Henares & Sons v. National Labor Union,

Digest by: Jen Balmeo

6. The Industrial Court concluded that there was discriminatory motivation

Petitioner: H.G Henares & Sons

ISSUE: WON there was discriminatory motivation behind the dismissal?

Respondent: National Labor Union

RULING: Yes. Decision appealed affirmed.

Ponente: J. J.B.L Reyes

December 28, 1961

Topic: Retaliation: Testimony against Employer/Indirect discrimination

DISPOSITIVE: Company lost. Decision appealed affirmed.

-------------------------------------------------CASE 129 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. BERSAMIRA

Petitioner: San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTGWO, Daniel S.L.

Respondent: Hon. Jesus G. Bersamira, in his capacity as Presiding Judge

Topic: Management Prerogative and Unfair Labor Practice

SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon

Whether or not there is unfair labor practice

RULING: 1. Yes there is unfair labor practice

representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions

In answer, the union officers disclaimed any massive disaffiliation or

GMC dismissed Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of

LA dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for

130. GENERAL MILLING CORP. v. CA,

Petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190

10 NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining

11 CA: set aside the decision of the NLRC

On December 16, 1991, or a month before the expiration, however,

YES. Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, states:

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the

The Code provides:

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective

Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor

Dispositive: GMC lost.

Doctrine: Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to

5. NLRC: Rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It

by then, the employer-employee relationship had already been terminated

DISPOSITIVE: the Union Won. the petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.

135 San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. SMC Employees Union-PTGWO

Some employees of SMFI's Finance Department, through the Union

LA: Granted MTD and remand the case to grievance machinery

The Union sought:

Hence this petition.

1. Review, evaluation & upgrading of all Finance staff and

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the terms of the CBA?

2. Promotion of G.Q. Montesa to other SMC affiliates & subsidiaries.

RULING: Yes. Petition denied. LA has jurisdiction.

NLRC: Granted, LA should continue.

That notwithstanding representations made by complaint union for and in

Respondent court through Associate Judge Amando C. Bugayong:

Respondents filed an MR and Petitioner Union filed a motion to

Respondent Court: ordered the reopening of the case and to include

CASE 139 NATIONAL LABOR UNION v. CIR

10 Benito Estanislao was issued summons at his last known address

------------------------------------------------------------140. CCLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION v. NLRC

Petitioner CCLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union is a local chapter of

Force had expired. The 9 employees filed a complaint for illegal

In finding the petitioners' suspension illegal, with more reason do we hold

The Honorable Aquino's disposition reads: