POLITICAL

PAPER COAD 1.2

COLLECTIVE SECURITY
SYSTEM
Submission To: -

Submitted By:-

Prof. Rajni khandewal

ANKIT SHARMA

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

II SEM (A)
ROLL NO. 10

CERTIFICATE
This to certify that ANKIT SHARMA, student of B.A LL.B of S.S Jain Subodh Law College,
Jaipur has completed his project on COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM under the guidance of
Prof. Rajni khandewal, Assistant Professor of political science, College of Law, S.S Jain Subodh
Law College.
This project is an original, independent work to the best of my knowledge and has not been
published anywhere and has been pursued solely for academic interest.

SIGNATURE OF TEACHER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This project is incomplete without thanking a few people who have been my pillar of support
throughout this work. I owe my gratitude to all those people who have made this project
possible.
I take this opportunity to express our humble gratitude and personal regards to Prof. Rajni
khandewal, inspiring me and guiding me during the course of this project work and also for his
cooperation and guidance from time to time during the course of this project work on the topic.
Finally, I would like to thank everybody who was important to the successful completion of my
dissertation, as well as expressing my apology that I could not mention everyone personally.

ANKIT SHARMA
SEM: - II

INDEX

1. INTRODUCTION..
2. COLLECTIVE SECURITY: NATURE & ESSENTIAL IMPICATIONS..
3. BASIC ASSUMPTION & REQUIREMENTS..
4. OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS..
5. COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER LEAGUE OF NATIONS
6. GUARANTEES AGAINST AGGRESSION
7. ACTION IN CASE OF WAR OR THREAT OF WAR..
8. DISPUTES TO BE SUBMITTED FOR SETTLEMENT
9. ARBITRATION OR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT..
10. SANCTIONS OF PACIFIC SETTLEMENT
11. EFFORTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
12. CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY BY THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS.
13. COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS..
14. WORKING OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS.
15. THE CHIFE DEFECTS OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION:

While collective security cannot be secured in an armed world by unilateral disarmament, it is

built on arms alone. Competing power alliances may for a time deter armed conflict, but, over a
longer period, they tend to create fears and antagonism which undermine security. Collective
security must be linked with a regime of law which, as a minimum, requires states to settle their
disputes by peaceful means and not resort to the use of force without first invoking processes
provided by a regime of law to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
If the problem of world peace cannot find its lasting solution in the system of balance of power,
as discussed in the preceding chapter, another, and rather a more effective, way it collective
security. It is for this reason that the leading statesmen of world not only, looked whit anxiety at
the failure of the balance of power system in the first world war, they also look into account the
effectiveness of an alternative mechanism in the form of collective security and incorporated it
first in the covenant of the league nations framed in 1919 and then in charter of the united
nations draft in 1945. Apart from this, the practical statesmen of the major powers not only
examined the weakness of this arrangement in the covenant of this league, they made
improvement upon it so as to convert it into a really supporting pillar of the edifice of peace.
The American secretary of state, in his report to the president on the result of the san Francisco
conference of 1945, confidently asserted that the revised arrangement of collective security
provides the teeth of the united nations.

Collective Security: Nature and Essential Implications

In very simple terms, the term collective security has been defined as a machinery for joint
action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order. That
is, it implies a collective action of many peace-loving states to check an act of aggression that
might become a source of menace to all. Thus, it suggests the concern of all nations which will
take care collectively of the security of each of them as though their own collective security were
at stake.In order words, a collective action of the peace-loving states for the prevention of war
amounting to the maintenance of international peace is known by the name of collective
security. In essence, collective security is an arrangement among states in which all promise, in
the event any member of the system engages in certain prohibited acts against another member,
to come to the latters assistance. It may, in addition, aim to prevent or punish attacks by nonmembers on one another, members on non-members, and non-members on one of its own
members.
If so, the term collective security has some important implications that may be enumerated as
under:
1. The rock bottom principle upon which collective security is founded provides that an attack on
any state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the simple doctrine of
one for all, and all for one.
2. It should be obvious that resorts to the courses of either self-helpor neutrality are the antitheses of the arrangement of collective security. The states taking to the way of neutrality are
impartial when a conflict breaks out, they may give blessings to the combatants to fight it out; or
they may defer their judgments regarding the justice or injustice of the cause involved. Similarly,
the recourse to self-help, as occurred in the pre-War period, stands against the principle of
collective security. The peace-loving states are expected to abandon the ways of neutrality and
self-help in view of the fact that in a more integral world environment, a conflict occurring
anywhere has its definite effon the conditions of peace everywhere. A disturbance at one point
upsets the equilibrium at all other points, and the adjustment of a single conflict restores the
foundations of harmony at other points throughout the world.
3. Through the action of police or fire brigades on a world scale, the collective security has as its
goal two comparable objectives. It would prevent war by providing a deterrent to aggression. It
would defend the interests of the peace-loving states in war, if it came, by concentrating a
preponderance of power against the aggressor. If war comes, the security system, by pooling

resources, defends its interests against any nation which threatens to undermine it, by swallowing
up one of its members. Besides suggesting the inherent characteristics of the theory of collective
security, Thompson also tells us about its basic assumptions and requirements.

Basic assumptions and requirements:

1. Collective enforcement assumes a status quo, or a situation of peace, about whice the nations
with predominant strength agree. In practical terms, the peace which a collective system must
defend is the territorial status quo existing at the time the system is brought into being. There is
nothing in past experience to indicate that all nations, or even a combination sufficiently
powerful to defy the rest, will agree on the meaning of a particular status quo. Following every
war, the defected powers, who feel that they have suffered most by the term of peace, come to
oppose the established status quo. In the aftermath of world war II, however, the question of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo has largely been superseded by an earlier and
prior question.
2. Collective security demands that nations subscribing to the status quo shouil be wiling and be
able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defenses at successive points of
inflict. In theory the supporters of the status quo might be capable in particular emergencies of
mobilizing effective and decisive power against the single aggressor who sought to defy them.
Or, by pooling the resources of all the nations in a permanently organized international force,
collective enforcement could be made automatic, instantaneous, and preponderant. The former
condition, however, is practically impossible of fulfillment, inasmuch as the threat to the status
quo comes historically from more than one dissatisfied power or aggressor. The second condition
would call for the unprecedented practice of international contingents operating under an
international agency empowered to decide conclusively when and how they should be used.
3. It is essential for collective security in a world of unequal powers that at least the major powers
enjoy a minimum of political solidarity and moral community.
It all boils down to this point that the basic purpose of collective security is to prevent the growth
of a formidable conflict, or, failing that, to protect the intended victim by means of collective
action of the peace-loving members of the international community. The essence of the whole
idea is a mutual insurance contract among the states. Each state undertakes to guarantee the
security of all the others and for this premium presumably receives coverage for its may say that
such an attempt of the peace-loving states amounts to a war against the aggressor, but the correct

interpretation is that it is a war against an aggressor so as to restore the conditions of peace. As

such, it is not a war in the strict sense of the term, it may be described as police action The
temptation, or yielding to temptation, to employ force as an instrument of national policy will be
deterred or frustrated by the overwhelming power of the peace-loving members acting on
behalf of the security community to protect the innocent. That is not war, but police action,
similar to law enforcement within an orderly domestic society.
1. All states should believe and practice indivisibility of peace which means that war anywhere in
the world is a danger to peace.
2. The states must be guided by the idea of world community.
3. States must renounce war as an instrument of national policy, but should be prepared to wage
war for the fulfillment of international obligation;
4. States must be willing to sacrifice their freedom of action.
5. Force should be used under international authority.

Objectives Requirements
1. For collective security, there must be many powerful states.
2. Collectives security demands universal membership of all the states.
3. It demands compulsory membership of the major power.
4. It demands disarmament for equal distribution of power.
5. It demands greater economic interdependence among states.
6. It demands a legal institution empowered to enforce collective security.
7. Such an institution or organization should be based on the principle of peace.

Collective Security under the League of Nations

The doctrine of collective security was given legal basis by the Covenant of the League of
Nations, which imposed an obligation on the members to refrain from action which threatened
international peace and security, as well as accept the competence of international authority to
take concerned counter measures. The provisions of collective security in the Covenants of
League of Nations are as follows:

Collective Security Distinguished with System of Alliances and Balance of

Power
The idea of collective security stands on the assumption that any act amounting to the
disturbance of international peace by a state on account of resorting to the course of violence for
the alleged protection of its rights or claims or for any plea whatsoever should be treated as an

offence against the world community and thus all should be equally interested in and committed
to penalising the offender. In the civilized international society it is not expected of the states to
rely on their own physical power so as to enforce their rights or to protect their rightful claims. In
fact, the use of private force for the enforcement of ones claims is treated as something which is
in itself a serious crime against the community as it strikes at the root of civilized life. The
disturbance of public peace by resort to private force, whatever the rights and wrongs of a
particular dispute may be, is an offence against the community. For this very sake, the principle
of collective security has been decised that, in very clear terms, implies commitments to resist
aggression on the part of all states, regardless of whether their immediate national interests are
affected. Unless the aggressor is faced with the united opposition of the whole community of
nations, he will not be deterred from aggression, nor can his aggression be stopped.
The implementation of the principle of collective security may assume different forms keeping
which in view some theories have been formulated as under.
1 The ideal theory of collective security {as given by Omganski} rests on five assumptions. First,
in any armed conflict, all nations will agree on which combatant is the aggressor. Thus, rapid and
united action will follow against the aggressor. Second, all nations are equally interested in a
topping aggression from whatever source it comes. Third, all nations are equally free and able to
join in action against the aggressor. Fourth, combined power of collectivity, i.e., of all the peaceloving states of the world should be mobilized against the aggressor. Last, an overwhelming
power should stand ready to be used against the aggressor.
2 The diplomatic theory of collective security defines the norms, procedures and aims in terms of
the consensus among the countries. Collective security is thus a united concert of the major
powers. Modern attempts to deal with the problems of war by means of collective security
represent an alliance upon the principle of consensus in international relations. This principle
may be defined as recognition that conflict among the members of a group affects the entire
group and that a unilateral resort to violence against any member constitutes an offence against
all members. It involves the idea of organization to preserve peace.

3 The operational theory of collective security signifies the Orel of the bargaining process
involving other issues as well in this important task. It lays emphasis on international distribution
of power and convergence of widely conflicting private interests.

Collective security under the League of Nations

The doctrine of collective security was given legal basis by the Covenant of the League of
Nations, which imposed an obligation on the members to refrain from action which threatened
international peace and security, as well as accept the competence of international authority to
take concerned counter measures. The provisions of collective security in the covenants of
league of nation are as follow:
Guarantees against aggression:
The member of league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independent of all member of the league. In case of any
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise
upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
Action in case of war or threat of war:
(1) Any war of threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any
action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nation. In case any such
emergency should arise, the secretary-general shall on the request of any member of the league
forthwith summon a meeting of the council.
(2) It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention
of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international peace or
relation which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.

Disputes to be submitted for Settlement

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to

inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the
award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the Council.
2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made
within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the
submission of the dispute.

Arbitration or Judicial Settlement

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which
they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which
cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject the whole
subject matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.
2. Dispute as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the
existence of any face, which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international
obligation or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are
declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial
settlement.
3. For consideration of any such dispute the court to which the case is referred shall be the
Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any
tribunal agreed on by parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between
them.
4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or
decision that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a of any failure to carry
out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give
effect those to.

Sanctions of Pacific Settlement (Art 16)

1. Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its Covenant under Articles 12,
13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed on act of war against, all other
Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all
trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their national and the
nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or

personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of
any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.
2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League.
3. The Members of the League agree, further that they will mutually support one another in the
financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the
loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support
one another in resisting any special measures, aimed at one of their members by the Covenantbreaking state and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory
to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the
Covenants of the League.
4. Any member of league which has violated any convent of the league may be declared to be no
longer a member of the league by a vote of the council concurred in by the representative pf all
the other the member of the league represented thereon.
The obligations of the league were also to apply to non-member. In case a
non-member did not accept the procedure for peaceful settlement laid down by covenant, the
council could take such measures and make such recommendations which prevented hostilities
and resulted in settlement of disputes. Thus, the covenant of the league was a pioneer move in
the direction of evolving the principal of collective security.
Jacob and Atherton pointed out the following two shortcomings;
1. Members of the league strictly limited the circumstances in which they would consider forceful
action by a state a violation of the convent and hence, unlawful. This lift large area of
permissible hostility extending to full-scale war, for which the League of Nations had no
responsibility.
2. The league lacked clear legal authority to undertake enforcement action until an act of war,
violating the covenant had actually occurred.

Efforts for collective security after establishment of the League of Nations:

After the establishment of the league of nation, five major efforts were made for establishment of
the system of collective security.
1. The assembly of the league approved the treaty of mutual assistance, 1923. The treaty declared
that an aggression was an international crime. Under the terms of treaty, the league council was

expected to name the aggressor within four days of the outbreak of hostilities. It was also to
indicate the measures of financial or military assistance to be given to the victim of aggression.
2. A general protocol of 1924 was signed agreeing not to resort to war except with the consent of
council or assembly. The council of the league was to decide the aggressor in doubtful case and
also apply sanctions against the aggressor.
3. The Locarno pact of 1925 provided that powers collective and severally guarantee both the
maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and
Belgium and Germany and France as fixed by the treaty of Versailles. All the signatories to the
pact also pledged themselves to help the state which was the victim of aggression.
4. The Kellogg-Briand pact, (1928) solemnly declared in the name of their respective people that
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce
relations with one another.
5. The general act of 1928 was considered as the most important single effort of the league to
establish a system of collective security.
The principal of collective security can be no permanent solution to the problem of the
prevention of war. However, the principal of collective security operates to prevent recourse to
war for the solution of disputes between states and to compel recourse to pacific means. Thus,
collective security, at best, is a temporary stoppage against the immediate menace of ear.

Causes of the failure of collective security by the League of Nations

Although the provisions of the league regarding collective security were quite bold, they failed in
actual operation due to the following causes:
1. The league failed to take any action against Italy when she attacked Corfu in 1923.
2. The league was rendered ineffective and cared not to take any action against Japan when she
occupied central Manchuria in 1931 when chine demanded action against Japan.
3. When china again demanded action against Japan in 1932, as Japan had occupied shanghai, the
assembly passed a resolution which Japan ignored and kept her control over Manchuria, though
vacated shanghai. In this case too, the league was to be blamed for not taking any action against
Japan.
4. The league failed to check Germany. The league once again failed to act with force against Italy,
when she attacked Ethiopia. These instances make it clear without any doubt that the league
successively failed to keep peace and maintain security as was expected of it.

5.

The security provisions the covenants of the league were irksome to great powers that were not

willing to subordinate their national interests to the interests of the world-peace.

6. The shortcoming of the structure of league itself made it ineffective to take action due to
weakness of member states that showed utter lack of courage and determination, where they
were vital.

Collective security under the United Nations

Like the covenant of the League of Nations, the charter of United Nations too contains elaborate
provision regarding collective security. These provisions are contained in chapter VII of the
charter. They are:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures security
(art. 39). In order to prevent an aggression of the situation, the Security Council may, before
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.
The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures. (art. 40) the Security Council may decide that measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the
U.N. to apply such measures. These may includes complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraph, radio, and other means of communities, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. (Art.41). In case the measures so recommended by the
Security Council are considered inadequate or proved to be inadequate, the Security Council may
take such action by air, sea or land as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operation by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the U.N. (Art.42).
All Members of the U.N. in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special arrangements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rites of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or
agreements shall Goethe numbers and types of forces. Their degree of readiness and general

location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The agreement or
agreement shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They
shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council
and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes. (Art.43). When the Security Council has decided to
use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in
fulfillment, of the obligations invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the
decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of the Members
armed forces. (Art. 44). In order to enable the U.N. to take urgent military measures, Measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined
international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and
plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special
agreement or agreements, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee. (Art.45). Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security
Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. (Art.46). \
There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council
on all questions relating to the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council
on all questions relating to the Security Councils military requirements for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the employment and command of forces at its disposal, the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmaments. The military Staff Committee shall consist
of the Chief of Staff of the permanent Members of the Security Council or their representatives.
Any member of the U.N. not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the
Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committees
responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. The Military Staff
Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any
armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command
of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. The Military Staff Committee, with the
authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies,
may establish regional sub-committees. (Art.47).
If preventive or enforcement measures against any State are taken by the Security Council, any
other state, whether a member of the U.N. or not, which finds itself confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to

consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems .(Art 50 ). But, probably
the most important provision of the U.N. Charter regarding Collective Security is its Article 51
which lays down, Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the U.N. until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right to self-defiance shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Working of Collective Security under the United Nations

In July, 1950, the Security Council set up a united Command under the U.N. flag as the North
Korean authorities failed to comply with the directions, sixteen states offered forces for the U.N.
Command. This was a historic decision because for the first time organized community of
nations employed armed forces against an aggressor.
To ensure that a permanent member does not block any action of Security Council a
Uniting Peace Resolution was passed on November 3, 1950 by which it was decided:
(1) if the Security Council failed to take any action, the General Assembly could meet within 24
hours to consider any situation threatening international peace and security;
(2) a Peace Observation Committee of 14 member states was constituted to observe and report the
areas of international tension;
(3) it impressed on member states to keep special contingents ready to be made available to the U.N.
promptly;
(4) it established a 14 State Collective measure Committee to study and make report to the Security
Council and the General Assembly on the methods which might be used to maintain peace and
security.
(5) It urged members to meet and discuss problems which were likely to threaten international peace
and security.
By this resolution the General Assembly became the ultimate custodian of collective security. In
order cases such on Suez Canal case, Congo case, Hunger case, the U.N. used the collective
security measures. Thus, on the whole collective security was effective against danger to peace
from middle powers and small states, but no action could be taken against big powers or states
backed by big powers.

The Chief Defects of the Collective Security System

1. Neutrals have no place under the collective security because the system presumes that all
parties are either subverters of peaceful order or a party to collective enforcement
2. It concedes the right of self-defense to members, which curtails the need of collective security.
3. The Cold War between West and East has made the collective security less effective and
unworkable.
4. In collective security small states should have greater say because they depend more on
collective security than their own forces. The big powers on the other hand are normally
reluctant to put their power behind an effort which does not conform to their national interests.
5. All nations are not able to oppose aggression and also it is difficult to locate an aggression.
Morgenthau considers the collective security system as unworkable be localized that every war
would became a World War. In actual working, the system of Collective Security has failed to
work effectively in many cases.

Bibliography
Book

S.R. Meyni