Borders of violence boundaries of

identity: demarcating the Eritrean

nation-state
Kjetil Tronvoll
Abstract
This article explores the concepts of borders and boundaries in the formation of an Eritrean national identity. The dialectical relationship between
the State of Eritrea and its borders towards the Sudan and Ethiopia are
addressed in order to analyse how this relationship inuences the formation
of a formal national identity. The cultural, political, religious and historical
conguration of the Eritrean frontiers makes it difcult to demarcate a particular Eritrean identity, distinguishing it from Sudanese ethnic and religious
identities or historical-politico and ethnic Ethiopian identities. The Eritrean
border conicts with the Sudan and Ethiopia are used as empirical cases to
show how state violence through the mobilization of the multi-ethnic
national army is employed in order to manifest a signicant other that the
formal Eritrean national identity may be contrasted against. The article
concludes that the Eritrean boundaries of identity and borders of territory
are still in the making, and what they will eventually embrace and contain
remains to be seen.
Keywords: Eritrea; conict; borders; boundaries; nationalism; identity.

Introduction
Eritrea is the newest state in Africa, gaining formal independence from
Ethiopia and international recognition as recently as 1993, after thirty
years of liberation war. Since independence, Eritrea has had armed conicts on all borders demarcating her from the neighbouring states of the
Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti and, most recently, Ethiopia. All these countries
have during the post-independence period accused Eritrea of initiating
armed incursions and border violations, and of exhibiting an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. The Eritrean President, and former
liberation leader, Isaias Afwerki, on the other hand, has repeatedly
explained that Eritrea is a peace loving nation which seeks cordial
Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 22 Number 6 November 1999 pp. 10371060
1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd ISSN 0141-9870 print/ISSN 1466-4356 online

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Kjetil Tronvoll

relationships with her neighbours, and blames the conicts on the

ambiguousness of borders and boundaries in the region which facilitates
expansionists aspirations of her neighbouring states.
This article addresses the conicts on the Eritrean borders towards the
Sudan and Ethiopia, and shows how they relate to, and inuence, the
boundaries of an Eritrean identity.1 The apparent contradiction exhibited in the Eritrean governments foreign relations policy of peace and
praxis of war will be analysed, in order to reach an understanding of the
Eritrean governments position. Rather than portraying Eritrea as a
stereotype of a repressive regime which exercises violence and goes to
war on a habitual basis, this article seeks to present a possible explanation within a scientic framework, employing theories of identity
negotiation and nationalism. It must be emphasized from the outset,
however, that the Eritrean border conicts cannot be reduced to the
issue of negotiating national identity alone. A complex pattern of historical, political, economic, cultural and social factors has also contributed to the outbreak of the conicts. Thus, one must view the border
conicts both as an expression, or manifestation, of an array of deeper
factors, and as a means of demarcating an Eritrean national identity. This
study, however, will concentrate on the latter explanation.
The political scene in Eritrea today is totally dominated by the
Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice [PFDJ], the re-named
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front [EPLF]. PFDJ holds a monopolistic
political position, constituting the government and being the only legal
political party in the country. The Eritrean government also severely
restricts the development and activities of a civil society, and very few, if
any, non-governmental organizations are allowed to operate independently of governmental scrutiny and control. Neither are organized
political opposition activities allowed, and the views and policies presented by President Isaias Afwerki, who is simultaneously secretarygeneral of PFDJ, are seldom publicly contested. Thus, in this article
citations by President Isaias Afwerki will be employed to explain the ofcial Eritrean perspectives on the different conicts. At the same time, this
will give insight into how the leadership in PFDJ/EPLF perceives and
understands the formation of a formal Eritrean nationalist ideology, an
ideology which is connected with the demands of the modern nationstate, including bureaucratic organization and meritocratic ideology, cultural uniformity and political consensus among the inhabitants (Eriksen
1993, p. 1).2 The formal nationalist ideology pursued by the Eritrean
government may not nd resonance among all segments of the Eritrean
population. However, Isaias Afwerkis voice will stand uncontested both
by internal dissident voices and by his military adversaries, since it is the
ofcial Eritrean position and outlook that this article attempts to explain
and understand.3 Isaias Afwerkis stories will, though, be contextualized
in a manner which discloses the ambiguity of his narratives, and thus shed

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1039

some light upon the abstruseness of the policies and praxis of the
Eritrean government.
Borders and boundaries
In recent years, there has been a growing interest within social anthropology, and social sciences in general, in exploring the concepts of
borders and boundaries within the context of states (and nation-states)
(see, for instance, Donnan and Wilson (eds) 1994; Alvarez 1995; Nugent
and Asiwaju (eds) 1996; Michaelsen and Johnson (eds) 1997; Wilson and
Donnan (eds) 1998). Nevertheless, this is still a eld of study which
demands more empirical and theoretical work, before a sound and broad
academic basis is established. Therefore, any reference to the terms
borders or boundaries, particularly in an African context, is destined
to face contestable interpretations of the contents that the terms are supposed to embrace.4 Moreover, translating local sentiments and understandings of borders and boundaries into a scientic framework and
language demands in-depth empirical research. In particular, it must be
focused on what Nugent and Asiwaju describe as the interplay between
ofcial intentions and popular perceptions between policy and the ow
of everyday life [which] is part of what imparts a paradoxical quality to
all boundaries (1996, p. 1). In few places is this more present than in the
Horn of Africa, where different kinds of border/boundary concepts are
infused with cultural notions, social validity and political importance,
which in turn are intensely contested by competing groups and factions
(see Sorensen 1992; Triulzi 1993; Clapham 1996).
It is obvious that the concepts of border/boundary mean different
things to different persons in different contexts, and various factors are
employed to dene their meaning and contents based on varied intentions. On different levels borders and boundaries are infused with social,
cultural, economic and political importance, hence an ongoing process of
creation, denition and manipulation of these demarcations is taking
place. For example, within the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopian/Eritrean
highlands (the Abyssinian plateau) with its indigenous plough-based
agricultural system has throughout history placed great importance on
the control of land and hence on the demarcation of land between that
which is controlled by one person, kin group, or village and that controlled by another (Nadel 1946; Hoben 1973; Pausewang 1983; Clapham
1996; Tronvoll 1998a). Frequent border disputes over agricultural land
between neighbours, kinsmen, lineages and villages have been common
for centuries which have continuously imbued the concept of boundary
with a concrete and metaphorical importance. This notion is also partly
reected in a proverbial Amhara denition of a good neighbour, which
reads One who does not attempt to shift the boundary markers
(Clapham 1996, p. 238).

1040

Kjetil Tronvoll

Whereas the sedentary agriculturists on the Horn exhibit a keen interest in border demarcations, the lowland pastoral groups tend to approach
the concept of borders in a different manner. The Somali pastorals, for
instance, although having broadly dened territories, do not have clearcut borders demarcating ones own land from that of ones neighbouring
kin or group. There are overlapping zones of interest, where the borders
are permeative to humans and animals alike. During the Somali nationalist struggle of dening where the borders of a united Somalia should be
drawn, a Somali border concept was illustrated by the popular slogan
Wherever the camel goes, that is Somalia (Clapham 1996, p. 240).
On another contextual level, the historian Harold Marcus (1994) views
the 2,500 years history of Abyssinia/Ethiopia as a series of cyclical expansions from its component parts to empire and back again, thus a continuous ux in physical as well as cultural and political borders and
boundaries. Moreover, the particular ethnic-territorial development of
contemporary Ethiopia, rooted in the new constitution of 1995 which
established Ethiopia as an ethnic federation, has entailed that few issues
are so politically and symbolically loaded as the notions of borders and
boundaries in this region.
The challenge of social science therefore will be to develop conceptual
tools which manage to incorporate and reect the diversied notions of
borders and border demarcations, and how they connect or relate to
boundaries of identity and boundary markers, in Barths sense of the
term (1969). Interestingly, as pointed out by Donnan and Wilson (1994),
anthropologists in general have conducted much more work on cultural
and symbolic boundaries between groups, than on the concrete, physical
borders between them, which to a large extent have been overlooked.5
This neglect should be addressed, since, according to Alvarez, the crossing of borders and the myriad dimensions of shifting human accommodation in this context illustrates some of the most important elements in
the anthropological canon community, culture, gender, identity, power,
and domination (1995, p. 450).6
In an attempt to develop some conceptual tools of an anthropology of
borders, Wilson and Donnan (1998, p. 9) argue that borders have three
elements: a) a legal borderline which simultaneously separates and joins
states; b) the physical structures of the state which exist to demarcate and
protect the borderline, composed of people and institutions which often
penetrate deeply into the territory of the state; and c) frontiers that is,
territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from
borders within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and
meanings associated with their membership in nations and states. In
other words, these three elements of borders respectively demarcate and
negotiate the territory, the state, and the identity related to an existing, or
nascent, nation-state. What we need to keep in mind, however, is that
borders are always domains of disputed and contested power, in which

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1041

local, national and international groups and factions negotiate relations
of subordination and control.
Moreover, borders of a nation-state are never homogeneous, in the
sense that a border reects the same status and content vis--vis different neighbouring states, or even within different sections towards one
state. Local contexts of ethnicity, politics and geography, also inuenced
by forces from adjacent states and other relevant international relationships, give specic borders specic political and cultural congurations
which again dene their relationship with the central government. As the
case of Norway aptly illustrates, one border may be as good as invisible,
in a physical, cultural and political sense, as is the Norwegian-Swedish
border, where almost no restrictions are put on the ow of people, goods
and cultural inuence across the border. The Norwegian-Russian border,
on the other hand, is from a physical, political, and cultural viewpoint
solidly demarcated by state institutions and representatives from both
sides, which prohibits, or strongly regulates, all trafcking of goods and
people across the border. This symbolical and concrete representation of
the two borders, surely affects the negotiation of identities in the Norwegian frontiers, or borderlands: the invisible Swedish-Norwegian
border encourages the creation of a Scandinavian supra-identity, an
identity which builds on the common political, linguistic and cultural congurations of the Scandinavian countries. The solid Russian-Norwegian
border, on the other hand, has not only been a bilateral border, but has
also formed the border between the West and the East as part of the Cold
War scenario, thus restricting the development of a Norwegian-Russian
commonness and identity, and cementing instead an image of Russia as
a political and cultural adversary.
National borders are thus the tool used by governments to create a distinction between the in-group, namely the nation, and the out-group,
those who belong to other communities and nations, the others.
Analysing the Eritrean border conicts within such a perspective of
borders and boundaries, will shed light upon the dialectical relationships
between borders and their states, relationships in which, argue Wilson
and Donnan, border regions often have a critical impact on the formation of nations and states (1998, p. 3). However, to understand the
present dialectical relationships between the Eritrean borders and her
state, some knowledge about the making of Eritrean territory is needed,
before we proceed to discuss the contemporary border conicts.
Crafting the Eritrean territory
The Eritrean borders as they appear today were crafted by Italian
colonialism. At the advent of the Italians in the 1870s, the territory which
was to become the colony of Eritrea constituted parts of four regions with
wider dimensions and with different characteristics and people. The

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Kjetil Tronvoll

Mereb Melash (The Land of the [river] Mereb)7, as it was called by the
Abyssinians, consisted of the central highland (kebessa) region. The
people of the highlands were Tigrinya-speaking, mainly Orthodox Christians from the three plateau districts of Hamasien, Seraye, and AkeleGuzai, which formed an integral part of the Abyssinian kingdom. These
three districts were, and to a certain degree still are, kinship-based territorial units with distinct geographical borders and boundaries of identity
(Nadel 1944; Tronvoll 1998a, 1998b). The fringes of this region were also
inhabited by Saho-speaking agro-pastoralist Muslims. The Jeberties,
Tigrinya-speaking Muslims, were to be found in scattered groups in the
urban centres of the highland, as they still are today.
The three other regions which were to be integrated into the colonial
entity of Eritrea were lowland areas. The Western lowlands of Barka and
Gash-Setit were dominated by various Tigre-speaking groups and BeniAmer clans. These nomadic pastoral groups had little contact with the
highlanders, except occasional mutual livestock raids. Smaller groups of
sedentary agriculturists and hunters and gatherers, such as the Kunama
and Nara, were also to be found here. The coastal and inland areas north
of Massawa constituted the third region, which since the rise of Islam had
been under Arabic/Muslim inuence. During the Ottoman Turk period
from the sixteenth century this district had developed its own identity,
distinguishing it from the neighbouring areas. The fourth region of
present-day Eritrea, the Afar land of Dankalia, was the coastal area and
inland plains extending southwards from the Gulf of Zula (south of
Massawa) down to Djibouti. This area was mainly part of the Sultanate
of Assua, and the pastoral Afar clans which inhabited the region had
never been ruled by any outside power until the arrival of the Italians.
After the colonial scramble for the Horn was over, however, the Afars
found themselves divided by new borders and fragmented between two
new-born states, Eritrea and Djibouti, and the old Empire of Ethiopia.
The Italians thus carved out the Eritrean borders by means of violence
during the period 18691896. On 1 January 1890 Eritrea was ofcially
proclaimed an Italian colony. But it was not until the Ethiopian victory
over the Italian army in the battle of Adwa in 1896, that Italy temporarily ceased its expansionist policy and sought neighbourly relations with
Ethiopia (Negash 1987).
During the last phase of Italian colonial history in Eritrea, Italy once
again planned for an expansion of Eritrean borders to include the
Ethiopian empire. Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, but their
attempt to establish a greater Italian East-African empire was thwarted
by the British/Allied forces as a consequence of World War II. During
this last phase of Italian colonialism, Tekeste Negash (1997) argues that
a combination of three factors contributed towards a development of
what may rightly be called a separate and distinct Eritrean identity and
consciousness among major parts of the population; a territorial identity

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1043

which distinguished them from the old greater-Ethiopia identitysphere. The rst factor was the growing racist ideology of the Italian colonial policy, which began to draw a distinction between Eritreans that
is, people settled within the colonial borders as subjects under their
civilizing umbrella, and the rest of the inhabitants of the Ethiopian
empire.8 This policy which was intended to enhance the Italian colonial
ego, appeared also to have been employed by the Eritrean literati in their
shaping of Eritreanness. A second factor was the economic boom that
the Italian war preparation against Ethiopia created in Eritrea. A huge
indigenous wage-labour market was created thereby effecting Eritrean
citizens inclusion in a modern money-economy which distinguished
them further from their Ethiopian neighbours. Finally, the third factor,
mentioned by Tekeste Negash, behind the emergence of an Eritrean
identity was the Italio-Ethiopian war itself and the vital role that Eritreans were made to play. With slightly more than 50,000 Eritrean troops
ghting alongside the Italians in the occupation force, whose role was
pivotal in the conquering of Ethiopia, and later its pacication, helped to
broaden the division between the two peoples. These three factors
created a boundary between the inhabitants of Eritrea, as the core colony
of Italy, and the natives of Ethiopia, and thus contributed to the formation of an Eritrean identity; an identity whose main characteristic was
based on the notion that the Eritreans and their land were more developed than the rest of the Ethiopian empire a notion which was later to
be sustained during the war of liberation, and added to the nationalist
feelings created by the war itself.9
After Italys defeat in World War II, Eritrea was put temporarily under
British trusteeship, before the UN decided to federate it with Ethiopia
in 1952. Repeated Ethiopian violations of the federal agreement, and the
subsequent annexation of Eritrea as the countrys fourteenth province in
1962, triggered Eritrean armed resistance. The Eritrean Liberation Front
[ELF] commenced its armed struggle in 1961, but in 1970 a small faction
of the ELF broke away and established its own competing liberation
movement, which, by 1975, took the name of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front [EPLF]. Internal disagreements and ghting between the
ELF and the EPLF ended in 1982, when the ELF was driven off Eritrean
soil and the EPLF could thus direct all its efforts against the Mengistu
regime. With growing tension within Ethiopia as a consequence of the
military activities of Tigray Peoples Liberation Front [TPLF] and
Oromo Liberation Front [OLF], the EPLF managed to liberate the
capital Asmara, and thus Eritrea on 24 May 1991.
One can say that it was during this last decade of the liberation war
that an Eritrean national identity took root, since the EPLF was uncontested in shaping the struggle to put an end to the Ethiopian hegemonic
control of Eritrean society. Eritrea thus ceased to be a mere dream and
became a reality, writes Ruth Iyob, and continues, because those who

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Kjetil Tronvoll

shared in its construction attained the capabilities needed to counter

those of its main opponent, Ethiopia (1995, p. 3). One should realize,
however, that many people from ethnic minority groups in Eritrea hold
ambivalent sentiments towards the EPLF as liberators, as for instance
do people from the Kunama and Afar groups. Many perceived the liberation fronts as local opponents and oppressors, and do not necessarily
feel at home within the newly constructed Eritrean identity,10 a point
which will be elaborated below.
After the fall of the Derg regime in June 1991, the coalition resistance
movement, Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
[EPRDF], took power in Ethiopia, and the EPLF proclaimed a two-year
transitional period which would end in a referendum on independence.
In April 1993 the Eritreans went to the polls and voted overwhelmingly
in favour of independence.11 Hence on 24 May 1993 the EPLF declared
Eritrea as an independent sovereign state. With this, the last chapter of
the colonial history of Eritrea ended, and the new independent State of
Eritrea had been established within the colonial borders demarcated by
Italy a century earlier.
As this brief history of the territory shows, the Eritrean borders were
rst born out of violence, then subdued under violence, and later reestablished by violence. The use of violence by the EPLF to re-establish
the status of Eritreas borders as an independent state and a nationto-be, was a considered option to challenge the Ethiopian hegemony, as
Isaias Afwerki explained:
The military initiative which we took last March [1988] must have
demonstrated to Ethiopias rulers that the path of confrontation, the
language of brute force and coercion leads nowhere but to their peril.
[. . .] From the outset, we have accepted the war, the military path to
assert ourselves as a people and a nation, because all other avenues
were and remain closed to us.12
The strategically and intermediate location of Eritrean territory has
entailed that its borders have been contested and negotiated by external
and internal forces for centuries. Christopher Clapham underlines such
a thesis, and describes Eritrea as a classic borderland which explains its
uctuating territorial history because it has been pulled this way and that
by the Ethiopian empire to its south, the Sudanic states and peoples to
its west, and the Red Sea trade and associated religious and political ties
to the east (1996, p. 24142).
Defending national unity: closing the window of peace?
The territorial, cultural and political unity of Eritrea forms the basis of
all ideological and practical thinking within the EPLF, aptly described by

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1045

Isaias Afwerki in the following manner as a comment on a possible
emerging opposition to the implementation of the new regional divisions
(zoba) of the country in 1995:
The history of regional boundaries in Eritrea does not go back more
than 100 years. All Eritreans are born equal. No ethnic group is
superior or inferior to any other group. Eritrea belongs equally to
every Eritrean. No social group is more closely related to land than the
rest. There was a time when people thought in terms of we and
they using religion and regional boundaries as bases. However, such
notions have been put aside during the 30-years long struggle, and it is
because the ghters struggled as one person by uniting their hearts that
we were able to achieve our goal of liberation. A person should be
judged not by his place of origin but by his mental capacity, good
manners and sense of altruism. Those who think otherwise are mentally sick and we should not allow them to impose their will on us. The
government will not restrain itself from taking appropriate measures
regarding those who misinterpret and misconstrue any administrative
or developmental policies in order to create religious and regional conicts.13
The ideological basis for the political development of post-war Eritrea
has been outlined in the National Charter for Eritrea, approved by the
Third Congress of the EPLF/PFDJ in February 1994.14 The Charter,
which summarizes EPLF/PFDJs vision of future Eritrea, declares that
national unity is the paramount guideline to which all work and policies
should be aligned. The Charter thus rejects all divisive attitudes and
activities [and] places national interest above everything else (EPLF
1994, p. 13). One of the prime policies of the EPLF/PFDJ government,
in order to imbue a sense of nationhood and national identity among the
diversied Eritrean citizens, is the implementation of compulsory military national service for all men and women when they reach the age of
eighteen. By putting youth from the Kunama, Afar, Beni Amer, Tigrinya
and other ethnic groups together under military order to prepare to ght
for their common motherland Eritrea, will, the EPLF/PFDJ believe,
enhance and cement the national spirit created during the liberation
struggle.
The efforts put into reconstruction and development in post-war
Eritrea were, however, soon to be distorted by the re-emergence of
border violence. The opening sentence of a statement from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, issued on 6 December 1994,15 runs:
Ever since the day of complete liberation and the declaration of sovereign and independent Eritrea, the Government of Eritrea has been
working diligently to establish brotherly and friendly relations with all

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Kjetil Tronvoll

neighbouring countries, and in particular with the Government of the

Republic of Sudan.
The statement makes public what has been rumoured for a long time
that Eritrea and her people have entered into their rst border conict
since gaining independence a year and a half earlier. Since then, Eritrea
has had continuous small-scale border conicts, of varying length and
intensity, with her neighbours, leaving a window of peace for the warstruck Eritrean nation of only about one year, from 19931994.
On a later occasion, Isaias Afwerki commented upon the EritreanSudanese conict in a manner which, in retrospect, might be read as the
new Eritrean border doctrine: If countries are to coexist peacefully, they
should show mutual respect. If, for example, my neighbour destroys my
fence and there is nothing I can obtain by taking him to the magistrate,
then I will be obliged to destroy his fence.16 A closer look at the political, historical and ethnic conguration of Eritrean borders and frontiers
will help to explain this border doctrine.
The Eritrean-Sudanese conict: demarcating politico-religious
boundaries?
The Eritrean-Sudanese border contains a multifaceted dialectical
relationship with the Eritrean state, since it simultaneously demarcates,
and thus is permeable to, religious, ethnic and political interference.
Eritreas main concern, however, is the religious signicance of their
border towards Sudan, as voiced by Isaias Afwerki:
We have been since 1991 working for cooperating and working
together without intervening in the NIF [National Islamic Front, the
Sudanese ruling party] policies, but unfortunately we found ourselves
in confrontation with it because of its hostility, enmity and its intervention in our internal affairs. How many a time did I say to the friends
in the NIF and repeated saying: Why dont you keep your Islam to
yourselves? Ideological fanaticism does not work in the societies with
multi ethnicities, cultures and religions. But what happened was the
insistence of the NIF on disseminating and propagating its extremist
ideology and on imposing it over all.17
The Eritrean-Sudanese frontier area is predominantly inhabited by
people from Beni Amer clans. The Beni Amer formed a united group
until the end of the last century. At that time the Mahdist uprising in the
Sudan (18821898) and the establishment of Italian Eritrea, split the
group into two unequal parts, whose living area became divided by the
new political border line (Nadel 1943, p. 51). The territorial border has
not, however, necessarily cut the bonds of loyalty which exist between

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1047

the Beni Amer groups in Eritrea and Sudan. Kinship-based alliances
between clans in Eritrea and Sudan may thus still operate independently
of the territorial and political border, as well as pastoral nomadic activities across the border line. Since the Beni Amer, and other groups at the
frontiers, such as the Tigre and Rashida, are adherents of Islam, the
Eritrean government fears that these kinship alliances may also facilitate
the ow of political Islam spearheaded by the Khartoum regime into
Eritrea.
The Eritrean-Sudanese conict illustrates well the paradox of international borders in the context of violence: the border may simultaneously work as a closure from one side, and as a channel from the
other. During the Eritrean liberation war, the EPLF had rear bases
within Sudan and established cross-border operations, both to engage
the Ethiopian forces in battle, and to channel people and goods in and
out of EPLF-controlled territories.18 The borderline demarcated a safe
haven for Eritrean resistance, since they were accepted and partly
backed by Sudanese authorities. Today, the situation is reversed. Due to
the Sudanese governments religious and political interference in
Eritrean affairs, the EPLF felt pressured to sever the diplomatic relations
with Sudan.19 This has entailed new groups of Eritrean opposition forces
establishing bases in Sudan such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad and ELF
fractions and conducting military cross-border operations into Eritrean
territory to promote their own policies and destabilize the EPLF regime.
To balance the asymmetrical relationship of having opposition groups
across the border in Sudan, the Eritrean authorities have reciprocally
invited the National Democratic Alliance [NDA] (a coalition force composed of the southern and northern Sudanese opposition movements) to
make Asmara their headquarters in their struggle to topple the NIF
regime in Khartoum, a strategy of tit for tat.
The Eritrean government is faced with the challenge of demarcating a
border against what they view as destructive politico-religious inuence.
This must necessarily imply that the Eritrean government tries to restrict
the contact between the Eritrean Muslims in the Western lowlands and
their ethnic and religious brothers on the Sudanese side of the border; a
situation which might seem unfeasible. But with military mobilization of
the people along the borderline, the Eritrean government is confronting
the politico-religious inuence from Sudan with a national based strategy of violence, as commented by Isaias Afwerki: It [Sudanese border
incursions] has never been a serious military threat small sorties,
mining and killing across the border it just serves to consolidate
national feelings.20
Since Beni Amer clansmen and women in Eritrea have to serve in the
Eritrean army, and thus may be confronting their ethnic brothers and
cousins from Sudan in battle, the Eritrean government depends upon this
enhancing and cementing their Eritrean belongingness. Whether the

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Kjetil Tronvoll

nationalistic sentiments created by the violence will override the religious adherence and ethnic sentiments among the western lowlanders
in the long term is, however, still an open question.
The Eritrean-Ethiopian conict: demarcating political, historical and
ethnic boundaries?
In retrospect, the border conicts with the Sudan, Yemen and Djibouti
appear to be a prelude to the conict which would follow. In the beginning of May 1998, Eritrea was once again thrown into an armed conict
with its old adversary Ethiopia, a border conict which has the potential
to ignite a full-scale war between the two countries. The conict on the
ground started in a barren desert area called Badme on the western
border between Eritrea and Tigray, the northern regional-state in
Ethiopia. Eritrean armed forces established control over the district in
the second week of May 1998, a move which was looked upon as a territorial annexation by the Ethiopian authorities. The Eritrean government
claims that the initially disputed district is part of Eritrea, whereas
Ethiopian authorities state that the area is an integral part of Tigray.
Both countries defend their position by referring to borders dened by
historical treaties and maps drafted by the turn of the century between
the colonial powers and Ethiopia, in addition to the local inhabitants
national identity. The incident triggered off a conict between the two
countries which rapidly escalated into a war on several fronts, notably in
the western lowlands, the highlands, and in Afar territory along the
south-eastern border. Issaias Afwerki explains the start of the border
conict in the following manner:
It all started with the demarcation of new boundaries from the
Ethiopian side along the areas that border Eritrea with the Tigray and
Afar zone. This denition of boundaries was followed by successive
border violations from the Ethiopian army and militia including the
destruction of administrative posts and mistreatment of the Eritrean
people living there.21
At the time of writing,22 the conict is still in a state of stalemate as both
sides mobilize huge military forces in the region. Several attempts to
negotiate the conict have been futile, and both parties are seemingly not
willing to enter into a dialogue and make any compromises, or as
depicted by Isaias:
Insisting on pulling out of Badme may be likened to insisting that the
sun [will] not rise in the morning.23 [. . .] Its unthinkable. Its like
telling the government in this country to migrate somewhere else with
its own people and leave this land and its sovereign territory to

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1049

someone else who is threatening to use force. Morally its not acceptable. Physically its never going to happen.24
The rationale behind the border conict is complex and embedded in historical, political, economic and cultural factors, and an elaboration of
these issues would take us beyond the scope of this article.25 I shall here
merely examine some aspects of the political and cultural congurations
of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conict, in order to achieve a clearer understanding of the crucial importance of this border in the Eritrean nationbuilding process, which again will shed light upon the understanding of
the border conict.
In order to explain the conict, some observers have emphasized the
economic problems faced by Eritrea after the introduction of the new
Eritrean currency, the Nakfa, in November 1997. This reason has been
rejected by Isaias Afwerki:
The question of economic problem behind this crisis does not make
any sense at all because there are no sound economic bases in both
countries. [. . .] It is a speculation inuenced by foreign culture where
every conict should involve money and where every problem does
involve resources. That is not the case in this part of the world. [. . .] It
is a problem of culture.26 [. . .] We might be more concerned about
pride, integrity, respect, trust, condence. When you lose that, it
becomes a big problem for us in this region. It is not always money and
resources.27
Broadly speaking, one may divide the political and cultural signicance
of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border into three sections: the Afar border in
the south-east; the Tigrinya highland border in the centre, and the desert
border of the western lowlands.
As noted previously, after the colonial scramble for the Horn of Africa,
the Afars found themselves divided between the three countries Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Traditionally, the Afars were rather loosely
organized, and as Nadel (1944, p. 51) observed, the group represented a
political rather than an ethnic unit. Most of the people are pastoral
nomads and the camel and goat owners often migrate over long distances
deep into Ethiopia. Although the Afar people are divided into various
segments according to political, territorial and kinship criteria, I.M.
Lewis noted that the Afar tribal boundaries are never static, but constantly change as the power of tribes waxes and wanes (1994, p. 160).
The borders of Afar territory were also used by the Derg regime in a
divide and rule tactic against the Eritrean liberation movements. In
1978 Afar territory, including both Ethiopian and Eritrean Afars, was
proclaimed a separate administrative region, called Assab, with the
prospects of achieving cultural autonomy. The objective of this

1050

Kjetil Tronvoll

re-drawing of Ethiopian province borders was to divide and dismantle

the natural unity of Eritrean territory (cf. Pateman 1990, pp. 1819).
The military victory of the EPLF, however, re-established the former
Eritrean borders.
Before the referendum on independence in Eritrea in April 1993, the
Afar issue was strained because of emerging opposition to the EPLF
regime. Three different Eritrean Afar resistance movements were established after the liberation in 1991, later to form the umbrella organization
the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front [ARDUF].28 ARDUF is
advocating an armed struggle against the Eritrean government with the
aim of forming an independent pan-Afar land with recognition of the
traditional political institutions of Afar society. The ARDUF spokesperson Mahmooda Gaas explained his opposition to Eritrean independence
on the ground that it would divide the Afar people yet again. He has
expressed no hope in a future democratic Eritrea, since the EPLF has
ruled out any political party based on ethnic or religious distinctiveness.
Even if political parties are allowed, as the EPLF has promised,
ARDUF will not cooperate with the EPLF unless the regime in Asmara
recognizes the right of the Afars to self-determination, is his intractable
answer to why the Afars cannot accept the outcome of the referendum
and, as a consequence, Eritreas independence.29
In Ethiopia, on the other hand, the Ethiopian Afars have been granted
an own autonomous regional state, under the new ethnic federal system
which divides the country into nine regional states that, to a large extent,
is based on ethnic boundaries.30 This new model of governance in
Ethiopia has created concern among the Eritrean authorities for a possible spill-over effect to their Eritrean ethnic cousins for a demand of
greater ethnic autonomy in the strongly centralist, unitary Eritrean
state.31 This has forced the Eritrean government to strengthen in a
physical, political and cultural manner their national borders towards
Ethiopia, to withstand the growing processes of ethnogenesis created
among the Ethiopian ethnic groups as a consequence of the new ethnic
federal system. This is also conrmed in the rst statement by the
Eritrean government after the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conict
erupted in May 1998, where they explain that the recurrent border incursions that continue to be perpetuated by Ethiopian forces basically
emanate from the narrow perspectives of the Administrative Zones [that
is, ethnic regions].32
The scepticism and fear of the Eritrean authorities of an Afar resurrection have seemingly been well-founded. A few weeks after the border
conict between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted, ARDUF issued a statement which outlines a change in their political, as well as military, strategy for achieving a united Afar land. Since the primary objective of their
struggle is to liberate the Western Red Sea Afars [Eritrean Afars] from
the military occupation of the EPLF and incorporate the region with its

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1051

motherland, it had also necessitated a ght against Ethiopian authorities, since, prior to the current Eritrean-Ethiopian conict, the two
governments had coordinated their military actions against ARDUF.33
As a consequence of the new war, however, ARDUF seized the opportunity to establish new alliances on the old principle my enemys enemy,
is my friend. Thus, they have declared a unilateral ceasere with the
Ethiopian government, and setting aside its political differences with the
TPLF/EPRDF regime, ARDUF invites the Afar National State for constructive dialogue to seek means and ways to protect the Afar people.34
The Eritrean-Ethiopian border which runs through Afar territory is thus
challenged by opposing forces from within and without Eritrea, and an
intense negotiation of territorial borders as well as boundaries of identity by means of violence is taking place. Which group of Eritrean Afars,
if any, will manage to dene the identity hegemony of the western Red
Sea Afars the ARDUF ghters ghting the Asmara government, or the
Afars in the Eritrean army ghting ARDUF/EPRDF remains to be
seen.
The Eritrean-Ethiopian border running through the Abyssinian highlands has become the most politically potent border section of all
Eritrean borders. This section of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border signies
the ancient history of this region, since the city-state of Axum, with its
peak inuence between A.D. 100 and A.D. 600, was located in this area.
Later, the polity of Mereb Melash (the Eritrean highland) was established as a region under the Abyssinian kingdom. Crossing the river
Mereb meant that one was under the jurisdiction of the Bahir Negus, the
Sea King, namely the Eritrean ruler. The river Mereb was the old
demarcation line, as it is the border demarcating this section of Eritrea
from Ethiopia today. This ancient history of the territory and some of its
borders, infuse the highland border of Eritrea and Tigray with a symbolism probably not found among other borders on the continent.
The highland border divides the Tigrinya-speaking block of sedentary
peasants into two sections, leaving around 1.7 million on the Eritrean
side, whereas just over 3 million are living in Tigray regional state.35 The
Tigrawi people in Tigray and the Tigrinya in Eritrea are of particular
political importance for the understanding of the border, since the
Eritrean president and the Ethiopian prime minister and core members
of both governments (that is, EPLF and TPLF) are drawn from these
population groups. The peoples on the frontiers are also connected by
kinship and inter-marriage, which strengthen the commonness between
the Tigrinya-speaking people of Eritrea and Ethiopia (see Abbay 1997).
Moreover, historically these groups formed constituent parts of the
Abyssinian kingdom, and have been engaged in rival power-struggles
throughout the centuries (see Zewde 1991; Marcus 1994; Erlich 1996).
In many areas along the Eritrean-Ethiopian frontier, the border line is
not properly demarcated on the ground. The absence of state institutions

1052

Kjetil Tronvoll

and representatives which can visualize and manifest the borderlines,

thus create zones of no-mans-land of overlapping, and/or neutral, authority. When TPLF was established as a resistance movement in the
mid1970s, the location of their activity was Shiraro, a small village adjacent to the initially disputed area of Badme (or Yirga-triangle). The presence of the state and its institutions and representatives in this frontier
area were at that time weak, and clear-cut border demarcations on the
ground between the provinces of Eritrea and Tigray did not exist. In
1984, EPLF and TPLF drafted an agreement about the ambiguity of the
borders in the area, and recommended that they should let the question
of border demarcation rest until they had managed to topple the Derg
regime.36
In the shadows of the focal political, historical and cultural border of
the highlands, lies the marginal and triing border of western lowlands,
following the Setit river which ows into Sudan. The Kunama, a minority group, live in small scattered communities in this area, on both sides
of the border. The anthropologist Dominique Lussier describes the consequences of their location as: The advent of Eritrea as a newly created
state has put the Kunama in the position of a double periphery now that
the national borders have divided them on the ground (1997, p. 441).
The consolidation of nationalist sentiments in Eritrea and the construction of a centralist, unitary state after independence, have led to a
growing tension between the dominating nationalist ideology which
partly reects the cultural sentiments of the Tigrinya majority group
and minority groups. The Kunama have in particular been exposed to
these processes. During the liberation war, the Kunama were accused of
being the only group which have largely and consistently supported the
Ethiopian Administration (Gilkes 1983, p. 203; see also Bondestam
1989, pp. 18384; Markakis 1990, p. 116), even though one saw Kunama
recruits to the EPLF in the last phase of the war (Pateman 1990, pp.
2021). More than being ideologically motivated, the support for the
Derg was probably pragmatically oriented, as a Kunama elder explained:
We had no choice, we joined whoever came: when these came we said
father, when those came we said father and we just stayed alive
(Lussier 1997, p. 443).
The Kunama history of supporting the Derg during the liberation war
is a stigma they still carry and which sustains their vulnerable position
within the nationalistic Eritrean development policies. But by including
the Kunamas in the national service, the Eritrean government is, inter
alia, trying to persuade them to shift their loyalties to the Eritrean state.
During a trip to the Badme frontline in October 1998, the author met
Kunamas who declared their support for the Eritrean government in the
conict against Ethiopia, and who seemingly were proud to serve in the
national army. However, other elder Kunamas told the author that this
is not our war. They felt betrayed by the Tigrinya-rulers, and saw the

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1053

new conict with Ethiopia as a conict between Tigrinya-groups, rather
than between the countries Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Such sentiments are also reected in the fact that the pressure on
Kunama land by the central authorities has led to organized resistance
towards these infringements, and a Kunama resistance movement has
been established. The Kunama resistance towards central authorities,
whether Eritrean or Ethiopian, will possibly also affect their conceptualization of the national border dividing their homeland. Thus, to
counter the border-subduing tendencies by minority groups in the frontier areas, it might be argued that the Eritrian, as well as the Ethiopian
authorities have to employ stronger measures to politically, culturally
and socially internalize the geographical borders among the frontier
populations. Some are of the opinion that such a perspective should be
included in an analysis of the current war between the two countries.
Demarcating and sustaining Eritrean national identity
Many kinds of socially constructed identities refer somehow to space and
territory, be it individuals belonging to the family farm, the ethnic groups
identication with a homeland, or the nations claim to a specic territory of the state. But land is not only a territory considered as an exclusive domain of an individual or group, it is also subject to cultural and
social organization and becomes part of individuals or groups symbolic
representation of the world. Human societies, Mach writes, have physical and conceptual relations between themselves and their land (1993,
p. 172); relationships which are in a continuous process of creation, maintenance and negotiation. In certain historical periods the forging of such
links between people and their land as part of a nationalist expression, is
much more pertinent and demanded than in other periods. A recently
liberated territory is in strong need of producing primordialistic national
symbols and myths to legitimate self-rule and independence from the
former colonial state. In the mature and well-established nation-states of
Europe, however, we rather see the emergence of national symbols
which reects multiculturalism in order to accommodate the growing
number of immigrants and their descendants into the conceptual space
of nationhood.
Nationalist liberation movements, such as the EPLF, on the other
hand, are in a radically different position to that in contemporary Europe
or other well-established nation-states. EPLF have to justify their
belonging and occupancy of the Eritrean territory through social organization and specically designed procedures. Symbols and rituals of
national consciousness and territorial belonging must be created which
emphasize the idea that the land called Eritrea is the only proper place
for the community to live, even though it took decades of liberation war
to achieve such a goal. Moreover, a war of liberation and a war to defend

1054

Kjetil Tronvoll

territorial sovereignty will forge even stronger ties between the people
waging the war and their territory. In this way, the idea of the land as an
independent homeland will play a vital role in shaping a cultural identity
attached to the territory over which the war was, or is, fought. National
identity is made up of a set of ideas and notions manifested, created, and
sustained through symbols, myths, rituals and action. The idea of a given
national territory, a motherland, becomes transformed into a symbolic
image through violence and war by means of personal sacrices, which
then forms part of and determines peoples images and sentiments concerning their land. Thus the given territory is also culturally established
and mythologized (cf. Mach 1993).
When a nationalist group has dened its rights to a specic land and
cemented this relation through political, social and cultural means it
does not only involve the right of that specic group to inhabit a particular territory; it also implies that other groups of people are not
allowed to have those prerogatives. This and the important fact that the
concept of a groups own land entails that there are other neighbouring
groups who also have lands and territorial claims, but notably not theirs
draws attention to the processes of boundary mechanisms in order to
distinguish between ones own land and that of others. A distinction not
only in territorial rights but also in the realm of identity negotiation.
The EPLF has never been an ethno-nationalist movement, as
labelled by the Derg regime and misclassified by some international
scholars (as, for instance, A. Smith 1991, p. 124). Eritrea has never
been an ethnic category, as the Tigrean or Oromo resistance movements denote. The Eritrean liberation movement refers to the liberation of the territory of Eritrea and the people inhabiting that land, be
they Tigrinya, Afar, Saho, Tigre, Beni Amer or Kunama. Nationalism,
as an expression of a process of identity creation, is simultaneously a
process of border creation, negotiation and maintenance. If the particular Eritrean nation is to be defined, it must be bound and delimited to a previously established space and given a relevant historical
past, since it encompasses a multi-ethnic and diversified population.
The historical past into which the idea of the new Eritrean nation-state
is inserted, both in terms of time and space does not need to be
lengthy and elaborate, and the EPLF has defined the breach with the
greater-Ethiopia identity sphere with the advent of the Italian colonialism, and has thus established their own relevant past (cf. Hobsbawm
1992). The long experience of violence and history of war has therefore
contributed to the development of a fierce Eritrean territorial nationalism;37 a nationalism which seemingly has not yet accommodated the
shift from being an occupied country and a society at war, to an independent state at peace. This shift implies a radically different conceptualization of the raison dtre of Eritrean nationalism, which is also
acknowledged by Isaias Afwerki who pinpoints this challenge at the

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1055

celebration of the 33rd Anniversary of the start of the liberation war,
one year after gaining independence:
The 30 years of struggle were testimony to our steadfast tenacity. But
the last three years have seen our resolution weaken. Perhaps it is
because human behaviour differs in times of peace and war. Perhaps
it is because expectations change in war and peace. Perhaps it is difcult to adjust to new conditions. Whatever the reason, on September
1st, a date which marks the start of a long journey, we should understand that though war is difcult, the challenges of peace and consolidating it are equally hard. It is simple to dismantle and destroy. It is
not easy to rebuild and consolidate. Peace calls for no less endurance,
dedication and patience than war. We have to be as resolute in time of
peace as we were in time of war.38
President Isaias tries to convey to the Eritrean people that even though
the war is over, they still have to be united and strong to face the challenges ahead for the nascent Eritrean nation-state. It seems that Isaias
Afwerki is well aware that national identity is a doubled-edged relationship, an identity which is dened both from within and without. From
within, the Eritrean territory unites per denition all Eritrean citizens,
and forms the fundament upon which their national identity is established. But, a territory alone is not enough: an identity is always constituted in interaction with others. Triandafyllidou writes that the history
of each nation is marked by the presence of signicant others that have
inuenced the development of its identity by means of their threatening presence (1998, p. 600). By defeating the Derg army in 1991 and
establishing friendly relations with the new EPRDF regime in Ethiopia,
Eritrea simultaneously lost its signicant other in terms of what they
had previously built their own national identity on: we the Eritreans
of all ethnic groups are the ones who ght the others the Ethiopians.
This left a void for contrasting the territorial Eritrean identity: who were
to replace their old military adversary in order to demarcate the Eritrean
ethnic groups from their ethnic and religious cousins in Ethiopia and
Sudan? In this context, it is important to acknowledge that diversity in
itself cannot generate identity, and in order to achieve this, to transform
diversity into difference, there must be opposition, a signicant other is
needed (cf. Conversi 1995).
How this opposition should be manifested varies according to how
strong the centrifugal forces are which operate within a state. In the
majority of cases, the signicant other is presented as a cultural and
political other only, and not as a military adversary too. However, we
know that the Eritrean government is facing political, ethnic, religious
and military opposition from various Eritrean groups based in neighbouring countries. To counter their strong centrifugal potential, the

1056

Kjetil Tronvoll

Eritrean government seems to deem it necessary to create signicant

others by means of violence. State violence through the mobilization and
use of the national army whose recruits are drawn from all ethnic groups
in the country, is thus viewed as a practical and accepted means by the
power-holders to forge and sustain a national unity.
The construction of an Eritrean formal nationalism surely involves a
broad range of policies and development strategies. The Eritrean
government employs a combination of multiple, or redundant, dimensions and levels of communication to counter centrifugal forces in the
heterogeneous Eritrean society, in order to create and sustain a strong
sense of national unity. Their new policies of regionalization, national
service, and land tenure; and various celebrations of national heroes and
holidays are only a few examples of such strategies. It is within such a
perspective that we might also nd the explanation behind the border
conicts waged by the Eritrean government conicts they consider
necessary for the demarcation of religious (Sudan), ethnic (Ethiopia,
Sudan), political (Ethiopia, Sudan), and territorial (Ethiopia, Yemen)
borders and boundaries, in order to both defend what they perceive as
competing claims to parts of Eritrean territory, and to re-establish signicant others that the formal Eritrean identity may be contrasted
against. In other words, the Eritrean borders and boundaries are still in
the process of being made, and where and what they will eventually
contain and embrace remains to be seen.
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to Tekeste Negash and Siegfried Pausewang for
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Notes
1.
The Eritrean border clashes with Yemen and Djibouti in 1995 and 1996 respectively,
will not be included in this analysis. The dispute with Yemen did not involve people as
subjects or citizens, as the Sudan and Ethiopia conicts reect, but concerned territorial
claims over the Greater Hanish archipelago only. The ownership of the islands was decided
by an international court in London in October 1998, which granted the main islands to
Yemen. Concurrently with Eritreas engagement in the Yemen conict, reports of Eritrean
border clashes with Djibouti in mid-April 1996 appeared. It was claimed by the Djiboutian
authorities that Eritrean artillery had shelled a border post and troops had crossed the
border and penetrated seven kilometres into Djibouti territory. Noteworthy, however, is
the fact that the Eritrean government denied all charges that their troops had made any
incursions into Djibouti territory. The border skirmishes ceased as swiftly as they had ared
up, and talks between representativesof the two governmentsmanaged to settle the dispute
peacefully.
2.
Eriksen contrasts this formal nationalism with informal nationalism, that is, as
identied in collective events, such as ritual celebrations and international sports competitions, taking place in civil society (1993, p. 1). This contrasting aspect to a formal Eritrean
nationalism will not be addressed here.

Demarcating the Eritrean nation-state 1057

3.
The citations of Isaias Afwerki are taken from the various ofcial statements and
interviews he has given on these topics. Most of the statements have been published in
Eritrea Prole, an English version newspaper published by the Ministry of Information, the
Government of Eritrea. Other citations stem from ofcial statements published by the
Government of Eritrea. Thus, the source of all citations is the Eritrean Government, in
order not to reproduce misquotations or misinformation disseminated by Eritrean adversaries or opposition groups.
4.
The terms border and boundary are used interchangeably by different scholars.
However, many tend to distinguish between borders as territorial demarcations and
boundariesas identity (ethnic, national or other) demarcations, a distinction also favoured
by this author.
5.
With the possible exception of the US-Mexican border which Alvarez describes as
the border icon within this eld of study (1995, p. 451).
6.
The crossing of borders as a topic for anthropological research, was already highlighted in 1909 by the renowned scholar Arnold van Gennep in his seminal work Les rites
de passage (English version published in 1960), where he writes:
The passage from one country to another, from one province to another within each
country, and, still earlier, even from one manorial domain to another was accompanied
by various formalities. These were largely political, legal, and economic, but some were
of a magico-religious nature.
He continues to elaborate on the symbolic meanings of border crossings (1960, pp. 1625).
7.
The expression Mereb Melash is often translated as The Land beyond Mereb which
is a translation reecting a view from the south (where most authors/academics have been
positioned, that is, in Addis Ababa), in other words from the Abyssinian point of view.
This is an inaccurate translation, since the name was given to the land by the people living
there, thus it should really be translated from a perspective north of the river, namely The
Land up to Mereb. In this way a distinction between their own territory and the others
territory beyond the river is created. To avoid using a translation where one is positioning
oneself in a geographical, and, consequently, an ethno-political position, one can translate
the expression as The Land of Mereb. (The author is grateful to Tekeste Negash for
pointing out this semantic clarication.)
8.
A decree was passed in 1937 which distinguished the Eritreans from other subjects
of the new colony; Eritreans were to be addressed as such and were given special prerogatives to certain categories of jobs and professions, whereas the Ethiopians were termed
natives and were in certain elds discriminated vis--vis the Eritreans (Negash 1997, p.
1618).
9.
This point was also stressed by the old TPLF leader Sebath Nega in order to explain
the Eritrean aggression in the current border conict, in an interview with the author, 19
November 1998, Addis Ababa.
10.
See, for instance, Lussier 1997 for an illuminating account of Kunama resistance
towards EPLF hegemony.
11.
For an in-depth analysis of the Eritrean referendum process, and how it was
perceived by the rural inhabitants, see Tronvoll 1996.
12.
From a speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 27
October 1988. Printed version appeared in Adulis, November 1988, pp. 34 (emphasis
added).
13.
Taken from Eritrea Prole, 27 September 1995.
14.
On the occasion of this same Congress, the Front decided to change its name to
Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice [PFDJ], signifying that military liberation had
been achieved, and that the country was under civilian administration.
15.
Printed in Eritrea Prole, 10 December 1994, p. 1.
16.
Cf. Eritrea Prole, 30 September 1995, p. 2.

1058

Kjetil Tronvoll

17.
From the address made at the US Institute of Peace delivered under the theme
Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan on 17 September 1997. Written version
appeared in Eritrea Prole, 4 October 1997, p. 3.
18.
Cross-border operations were also used by the international community during the
war to bring in relief aid and support the EPLF liberated areas.
19.
A statement of the Eritrean Ministry Foreign Affairs explains: The core cause for
the deterioration of the relationship is the NIF Governments actively working to disrupt
the peace which the Eritrean people are enjoying, by pursuing a policy that would destabilize the security of the country, issued on 6 December 1994 (printed in Eritrea Prole,
10 December 1998).
20.
Cf. Financial Times, 18 January 1996.
21.
From an interview with Voice of America. Written version appeared in Eritrea
Prole, 30 May 1998.
22.
This article was written in July 1998 and revised in early January 1999, hence the
Eritrean-Ethiopian border conict was still unsettled. The information presented in the
article must therefore be interpreted against this background.
23.
From an interview at EriTV, 8 July 1998.
24.
From an interview with BBC News, 1 June 1998.
25.
See forthcoming book Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrea/Ethiopia War,
by Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, for an elaborate analysis of these multiple aspects
of the conict.
26.
Cf. Eritrea Prole, 20 June 1998 (emphasis added).
27.
From interview on Voice of America, 9 June 1998.
28.
The three groups were Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union (ARDU), Afar
Ummatah Demokrasiyyoh Focca (AUDF) and Afar Revolutionary Forces (ARF).
29.
From an interview which appeared in Africa Events, May 1993.
30.
Cf. Ethiopian Constitution article 46.2: States shall be delimited on the basis of the
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned (Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995) .
31.
Yemane Gebreb, head of Political Department within PFDJ/EPLF voiced this
concern in an interview with the author in Asmara, 26 February 1997.
32.
Cf. Statement of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea on the
Dispute with Ethiopia, 14 May 1998.
33.
According to ARDUFs statement of June 1998.
34.
Cf. ARDUFs statement, June 1998.
35.
The Eritrean number is an estimate since no population census has been broken
down to show ethnic representation in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, however, the 1994 population
census states that the Tigray had 3,136,267 inhabitants of whom 94.8 per cent were Tigrawis
(Tigrinya-speakers) (Central Statistics Authority 1995).
36.
Cf. Ghidey Zeratsion, one of the initial seven founders of TPLF, interviewed 3 June
1998 in Oslo.
37.
Territorial nationalism is understood as an ideology which embodies a concept of
the nation as a civic and territorial unit. In a pre-independence phase, movements supporting such an ideology will seek to eject foreign rulers and substitute a new state-nation for
the old colonial territory (Smith 1991, p. 82).
38.
From the Presidents Message to the Eritrean People on the 33rd Anniversary of
Armed Struggle, Eritrea Prole, 3 September 1994, p. 3.

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KJETIL TRONVOLL is Research Fellow/Horn of Africa Programme

Director at the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, University of
Oslo.
ADDRESS: University of Oslo, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights,
Universitetsgaten 2224, N-0162 Oslo, Norway.