THIRD DIVISION

REYNALDO R. PILARES, SR.,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 165685

Present:

-versus

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 14, 2007

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DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,[1] petitioner Reynaldo R. Pilares, Sr. prays for the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 28 March 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 20275, [2] affirming
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
77, Malolos,Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1023-M-94, dated 13 November 1996,
[3]
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical
Injuries under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 March 1994, petitioner and his son, Reynaldo Pilares, Jr. (Reynaldo Jr.) were
charged in an Information[4] for Frustrated Homicide allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of January 1994, in the municipality of Meycauyan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill one

Pedro Bantigue, Jr. y Tanjutco, conspiring, confederating together and mutually

helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault and stab with the said knives they were then provided the said
Pedro Bantigue, Jr. y Tanjutco, hitting the latter on the face, thereby inflicting upon
him serious physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of more
than 30 days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time, which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said
Pedro Bantigue, Jr. y Tanjutco, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Pedro Bantigue, Jr. y Tanjutcowhich
prevented his death.

When arraigned on 15 August 1994, petitioner and Reynaldo Jr. pleaded Not Guilty
to the charge therein. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented its case through the testimonies of its witnesses, namely:
Pedro T. Bantigue Jr. (private complainant), Ernesto Mangunay (Mangunay) and Dr.
Francisco C. Rodriguez (Dr. Rodriguez).
Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
Private complainant works as a movie stuntman and a driver of an international
firm. He is a resident of Brgy. Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan. He testified that on 16
January 1994, at about 12:00 in the morning, he was brought home by his brotherin-law, Mangunay, using the latters car. After dropping him at his house at
around 1:00 in the morning, Mangunays car broke down due to engine overheat. He
advised Mangunay to wait for the engine to cool down before starting it
again. Thereafter, he and Mangunaydecided to park the car at a nearby
chapel. Bored of waiting, they went to a nearby store to buy two bottles of beer. The
store is owned by the petitioner. While handing over the two bottles of beer, the
petitioner told the private complainant that drinking liquor within and near
the formers store is not allowed. Private complainant replied that they will drink at
the back of Mangunays car. At this juncture, private complainant handed to
petitioner a twenty-peso bill and stated that the balance will serve as a
deposit. Upon noticing that the petitioner was not satisfied, private complainant
gave him a one hundred-peso bill and uttered O, ano pa? Irked, petitioner answered
back O, ano? Thereafter, private complainant and Mangunay proceeded to the
latters car and drank at the back portion thereof. [5]
After consuming the said bottles of beer, private complainant and Mangunay bought
two more bottles from the petitioner but this time no bickering ensued between the
private complainant and the petitioner. Still unsatisfied, they went back to the
petitioners store for the third time and bought two more bottles of beer. Again, no
argument between the private complainant and petitioner took place. When private
complainant and Mangunay returned the last empty bottles of beer to petitioner,
the latter asked the private complainant O, ano pa? In response thereto, the private

complainant demanded for his change and exclaimed O, ano pa? to which the
petitioner retorted O, ano pa?Suddenly, the petitioner took his one-foot bladed
weapon and stormed out of his store. The private complainant told Mangunay to
stay put. When the petitioner was about to approach the private complainant,
Reynaldo Jr., armed with a kitchen knife, emerged and followed the petitioner. The
private complainant ran away but the petitioner and Reynaldo Jr. chased him. After
running one hundred meters, the private complainant stumbled and fell on the
ground. While private complainant was lying with his back on the ground, Reynaldo
Jr. approached him. When Reynaldo Jr. was about to stab the private complainant,
the latter tried to avoid the same by swerving his head to the right
side/direction. The private complainant was hit by the kitchen knife on the right side
of his face, particularly, on the right cheekbone. Afterwards, the petitioner appeared
and closed in on the private complainant. The private complainant was still lying
with his back on the ground when the petitioner tried to stab him. The private
complainant parried the same with his left foot and rolled over his body until he
reached the side of a fence. Later, the private complainant heard someone
shouting Tama na yan! Tigilan na yan!Thereupon, the petitioner and Reynaldo Jr. left
him.[6]
After regaining his strength, private complainant proceeded to his house and upon
arriving thereat, Mangunay brought him to the Malhacan Hospital. Subsequently,
the private complainant was transferred to
the Manila Central University Hospital (MCU Hospital) where he was treated for
three days. Private complainant claimed that he spentP9,000.00 for the professional
fee of the attending physician and that before the incident, his daily income as
stuntman in foreign films was five hundred pesos and above. [7]
Mangunay is the private complainants brother-in-law. He is an employee of Procter
and Gamble Phils. and a resident of Sto. Nino, Meycauyan, Bulacan. He narrated
that on 16 January 1994, at about 12:00 in the morning, he brought home private
complainant in Brgy. Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, using his own car. When he
was about to return to his house at around 1:00 in the morning, the car broke down
due to engine overheat. The private complainant advised him to wait for the engine
to cool down before starting it again. Thereafter, they parked the car in a nearby
chapel. At this stage, the private complainant invited him for some bottles of
beer. They went into a nearby store owned by the petitioner which is about six to
seven meters away from the car. While buying two bottles of beer, the petitioner
informed the private complainant that drinking of liquor within and near the store is
prohibited. The private complainant replied that they will drink inside the
car. Subsequently, he and private complainant returned to the car and drank the
bottles of beer. After consuming the two bottles of beer, the private complainant
returned to the store and bought two more bottles. [8]
Craving for more, the private complainant returned to the store for the third time
and bought two more bottles. Thinking that the engine of the car had already cooled
down and was now in good condition, they proceeded to the store and returned the
bottles. When they were about to leave the store, the petitioner spoke O, ano? in a
confrontational manner. Private complainant answered back
angrily E, ano rin? Reynaldo Jr. was situated at the back of the petitioner and was

observing the exchange of words. Suddenly, the petitioner, armed with a knife, went
out of his house to confront the private complainant. Private complainant
told Mangunay to stay put. Later, Reynaldo Jr., also armed with a knife, followed the
petitioner. Mangunay opined that the private complainant did not notice that
petitioner and Reynaldo Jr. were armed with knives. Afterwards, the private
complainant ran towards the other side of the store prompting the petitioner and
Reynaldo Jr. to chase him. Mangunay tried to seek assistance from other people in
the neighborhood but to no avail. Hence, he went inside the car and waited for the
private complainant.[9]
Dr. Rodriguez is a physician-surgeon assigned to the Department of
Surgery, MCU Hospital. He testified that sometime on 16 or 17 January 1994, he
treated the private complainant who was referred to him from the emergency
section of the said hospital. The private complainant sustained multiple deep
lacerations on his face particularly situated: a) from the cheekbone down to the
lower lip measuring fifteen centimeters in length; b) on the lower right lip measuring
one centimeter in length and c) near the left side of the upper lip measuring two
centimeters in length. He also had an abrasion on his forehead.[10]
According to Dr. Rodriguez, these injuries could have been caused by a dull-edged
instrument like a dull knife or any blunt instrument. [11] He described the said injuries
as serious physical injuries which, if not treated properly, may result in the private
complainant having a squint, yung tumatabingi ang mukha,
or palaging kumikindat since the facial nerve is near the area and there is a slight
injury there. He explained that the lacerations were so deep that you can almost
see the cheekbone of the private complainant. [12]
He also pointed out that the injuries suffered by the private complainant could not
have been caused by a kitchen knife, otherwise, the resulting wound would be an
incised wound which is clean cut in character. He stated that the wound could not
have been caused by the private complainants head or face hitting a metal object
or a rough pavement because if such was the case, there would have been more
abrasion than laceration on his face. He opined that the private complainant was
facing his attacker/s when the latter struck him with an upward thrust. [13]
On the other hand, the defense relied on the testimonies of the petitioner and
Reynaldo Jr. to refute the afore-stated charges. The following are their substantial
narrations:
Petitioner is a resident of Brgy. Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, where he and his
family own a two-storey house, the ground floor of which serves as a mini-store. He
knows the private complainant because they are neighbors. Although the aunts of
private complainants wife are involved in some court cases against the petitioner
and his family, the petitioner and private complainant had no personal quarrels or
disagreements prior to the incident in question. [14]

Petitioner testified that on 15 January 1994, at about 10:00 in the evening, he was
tending his store when private complainant and Mangunay came over to the
store. The private complainant told
petitioner Rene, bigyan mo ako ng dalawang boteng beer. Petitioner did not
immediately accede and instead replied bote. The private complainant took some
money from his pocket, handed it over to the petitioner and voiced
out O, ano pa? Yan isang daan yan. Sensing that the private complainant was hotheaded, the petitioner instead asked his wife to hand over the bottles of beer to the
private complainant. The petitioner tried to give the change to the private
complainant but the latter refused to accept it. [15]
At about 11:00 in the evening, the petitioner was resting when the private
complainant and Mangunay returned to the store. The private complainant asked
the petitioners wife who was then tending the store Nasaan si Rene? Petitioners wife
answered Namamahinga na iyong Mister ko dahil medyo pagod na maghapon. Priva
te complainant demanded Sabihin mo sa kanya na siya ang gusto kong magbili. The
petitioners wife ignored such request and proceeded to serve the beer to the
private complainant. The latter, however, refused to accept the beer and insisted
that the petitioner should be the one to serve the beer. Private complainant also
remarked Nagtatago yan, duwag yan eh. Later, the petitioner came out and served
the beer to the private complainant.[16]
At about 1:00 in the morning, the private complainant and Mangunay returned
again to the store to buy four more bottles of beer. When the petitioner was about
to hand over the bottles of beer to the private complainant, the latter called him a
coward and dared him to get out for a fight. Insulted, the petitioner went out of his
store and chased the private complainant. Unable to catch up with the private
complainant, the petitioner returned to the store. While the petitioner was on his
way back to the store, the private complainant followed the former and threw
stones at him. The petitioner pursued the private complainant for the second time
but he failed to catch him. Petitioner returned to the store but the private
complainant followed him again and hurled stones at him. For the third time, the
petitioner chased the private complainant. Tired of running, the petitioner walked
briskly trailing the private complainant. Upon reaching Floro street, the private
complainant stumbled and fell to the ground. [17]
Thereafter, the petitioner approached the private complainant. He noticed that the
right face of the private complainant had a scratch and a reddish line across the
right cheek, and, something was foaming or bumubula-bula at the back of his
ear. When the private complainant tried to stand up, the petitioner kicked him three
times but none of those kicks landed on the private complainant. Petitioner
admitted that he punched the private complainant on the left jaw but the same was
not that strong or solid. Thus, the petitioner was surprised when the private
complainant fell to the ground after the punch. [18]
Petitioner denied that he was armed with a knife during the chase and confrontation
with the private complainant. According to him, he was then merely carrying a
plastic material wrapped in a newspaper around one foot and a half [in size] with a

chisel-like edge which he used in picking ice and killing rats. [19] He admitted that he
was holding such object in his right hand when he, using the same hand, punched
the private complainant on his left jaw.[20] He, however, denied that such object had
touched, hit or slashed the face of the private complainant since he was holding it
vertically and thus cannot in any way inflict injury on the private complainant.
[21]
Petitioner alleged that his son, Reynaldo Jr., had no participation whatsoever in
the verbal tussle in the store and in the subsequent chase and confrontation
between him and the private complainant; that Reynaldo Jr. was sleeping at the
upper part of the house during the said events; and that he was already on his way
home after the confrontation with the private complainant when he met Reynaldo Jr.
[22]

Reynaldo Jr. works as a Field Representative of Universal Sales Corporation. He

testified that petitioner is his father. He narrated that he was sleeping at the upper
part of their house while his parents and elder sister were downstairs when the
incident occurred; that at about 1:00 in the morning, his elder
sister, Perlita Pilar Pilares, woke him up and told him to follow the petitioner as the
latter and the private complainant were quarreling; that he immediately went out of
the house to follow the petitioner; that when he was about one post away from their
house, he met the petitioner and asked the latter on what had transpired; that the
petitioner told him Lets go home and nothing of importance had happened; that
when they were already home, the petitioner explained that the private
complainant was challenging him to a fight as early as 10:00 in the evening; that
late in the morning, the petitioner pointed to him the place of the incident; and that
he did not see bloodstains in the area where the private complainant allegedly
tripped and fell.[23]
On 13 November 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty only
of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries under Article 263, paragraph 3, of the
Revised Penal Code. It, however, acquitted Reynaldo Jr. of any crime. It did not give
merit to the testimony of the private complainant that the latters lacerated wounds
in the face were inflicted by Reynaldo Jr. who was then allegedly carrying a kitchen
knife. Instead, it sustained the narration of the incident by the petitioner as it was
compatible with the findings and testimony of Dr. Rodriguez that the deep lacerated
wounds sustained by private complainant were caused by a dull-edged or blunt
instrument and not by a kitchen knife. Petitioner admitted that he was carrying a
plastic material with a chisel-like edge when he chased the private complainant. He
also admitted that he was holding such object in his right hand when he, using the
same hand, punched the private complainant on the left jaw. Thus, the RTC
concluded that it is highly probable that when petitioner punched the private
complainant, the object, which has a dull-edge, had also slashed the private
complainants face upward from the latters lower lip up to his right cheekbone.
It opined that the private complainant had implicated Reynaldo Jr. in the incident
because if he succeeded in having Reynaldo Jr. convicted, it would bring more harm
and damage to the Pilares family. It took note of the fact that the petitioner was
already 66 years old while Reynaldo Jr. was employed in a prestigious firm and was
presumed to have a bright future. It also ruled that there was no convincing
evidence showing that the petitioner had intended to kill the private complainant

and that there was conspiracy between the petitioner and Reynaldo Jr. to kill the
private complainant. The fallo of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Reynaldo Pilares, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF ARRESTO MAYOR TO FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION
CORRECIONAL and to pay Pedro Bantigue, Jr. the sum of NINE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P9,133.50) in
reimbursement of actual medical expenses incurred.
The guilt of accused Reynaldo Pilares, Jr. not having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, said accused is acquitted of the offense charged. The Municipal Treasurer
of Meycauayan,Bulacan, is ordered to release to the said accused the cash bond
which he posted for his provisional liberty under O.R. No. 459823 dated April 11,
1994.

Petitioner appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of Appeals. On 28 March

2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the
RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner is liable for the crime of serious physical
injuries under paragraph 4 and not under paragraph 3 of Article 263, as held by the
RTC, since the allegations in the information clearly pertain to paragraph
4. The decretal portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo dated November 13, 1996, finding
accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical
Injuries is hereby AFFIRMED in all respect except with the modification reducing the
sentence imposed as aforestated.

Petitioner filed the present petition on the following grounds:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
ADHERING TO SEC. 2 RULE 133 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT OR DECLARING
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE HONOROBALE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS UNFOUNDED AND THERE EXIST SPECIAL OR
COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURTS RULING.
III.

APPELLANTS CASE DESERVES A THOROUGH RECONSIDERATION AND REEVALUATION TO AVERT GRAVE INJUSTICE TO AN OLD AND SICKLY MAN (75 YEARS OF
AGE) WHO IS INNOCENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

Since the first and the second issues are interrelated, we will discuss and resolve
them jointly.
Petitioner argues that there is no evidence showing that he inflicted injuries to the
face of the private complainant. In fact, according to him, the private complainant
had identified Reynaldo Jr. as the person who inflicted wounds on his right cheek
and not the petitioner. Moreover, the private complainant testified that the
petitioner tried to stab him in the face but he evaded it. In addition, the prosecution
witness Mangunay did not actually see the person who inflicted wounds on private
complainants face.
Petitioner also stressed the fact that he was then 66 years old and suffering from
certain ailment at the time of the incident. He was not as strong and robust as the
private complainant who was younger and stronger than him, considering the fact
that the private complainant was also a movie stuntman. As such, he could not
have inflicted serious harm on the private complainant. Petitioner also maintained
that since he was holding the plastic material with a chisel-like edge in his right
hand vertically at the time he punched the private complainant in the face, the
same could not have slashed the latters face. He theorized that the private
complainant had sustained deep lacerations on his face when the latter fell and hit
a rough pavement during the incident.
We reject these contentions.
It is well-settled both in law and jurisprudence that the guilt of an accused must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt before he can be convicted of the crime charged.
[24]
Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a
criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element
essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the offender. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the judge
can rest at ease concerning its verdict. [25]
Article 263, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, states that the crime of serious
physical injuries is committed when a person has wounded, beaten or assaulted
another and that the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than 30 days, viz:
Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
xxxx

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correcional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have cause the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days. x x x.

Based on this provision, the elements of the crime of serious physical injuries under
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code may be deduced as follows:
1.
That the offender has wounded, beaten, or assaulted another; and
2.
That the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity
for labor of the injured person for more than 30 days.
Further, there must be no intent to kill on the part of the offender in inflicting the
injury.
From the testimonies of all the witnesses, the following have been established: (1)
Identity of the malefactor petitioner; and (2) the existence and infliction of the
injuries on the face of the private complainant. Controverted are: co-participation of
Reynaldo Jr.; presence of intent to kill; and cause of the commission of the crime
(whether there was justification in the infliction of the injuries).
Petitioner admitted that he was carrying a plastic material with a chisel-like edge
when he chased the private complainant. [26] Petitioner also acknowledged that he
was holding such object in his right hand when he, using the same hand, punched
the private complainant in the face. [27] Moreover, the RTC found that when the
petitioner punched the private complainant in the face, it was highly probable that
the object, which had a dull-edge, also slashed the private complainants face
upward from the latters lower lip up to his right cheekbone. [28] The private
complainant himself and Mangunay alleged that the petitioner was carrying a
bladed weapon at the time of the chase. [29]
Dr. Rodriguez also declared that the injuries sustained by the private complainant
were caused by a dull-edged or blunt instrument similar to what the petitioner was
carrying at the time of the chase and assault. [30] Dr. Rodriguez explained that the
wounds could not have been caused by a kitchen knife which was the weapon
allegedly used by Reynaldo Jr. in slashing the face of the private complainant
because, if such was the case, the wound would have been an incised wound,
cleanly cut.[31] He added that the injuries could not have been due to the fact that
the private complainants face hit a rough pavement or a metal object when the
latter fell to the ground during the incident since, if this was so, then the private
complainant would have sustained more abrasions than lacerations. [32] The medical
certificate[33] of the private complainant as signed and testified to by Dr. Rodriguez
shows that the former had sustained multiple lacerations on the face and only one
abrasion on the forehead.[34]

In inflicting the wound on the private complainant on the right cheek, it is apparent,
however, that the petitioner had no intent to kill the private complainant. He could
have easily killed the private complainant during the incident as the latter was
already intoxicated and lying on the ground. Instead, upon inflicting injuries on the
face of the private complainant, the petitioner walked away from the private
complainant and proceeded home. The nature and location of the wounds further
belie any intent to kill. The medical certificate signed and issued by Dr. Rodriguez to
the private complainant states that the facial injuries suffered by the latter would be
healed after 30 days or more.[35]
As to the participation of Reynaldo Jr., we quote with approval the findings of the
RTC, to wit:
Reynaldo Pilares, Jr. testified that he met his father while the latter was already on
his way home after his fight with Bantigue. The testimony of said accused appears
to be more credible as it was given in a straightforward manner coupled with his
demeanor on the witness stand which excuded an aura of a truthful testimony. This
Court is more inclined to believe that Bantigueis insisting on implicating
accused Pilares, Jr. because if he succeeds in having him convicted, he will be able
to do more harm and damage to the Pilares family. Accused Reynaldo Pilares, Sr. is a
66 year-old man, accused Reynaldo Pilares, Jr. who is presently working as Field
Representative of Universal Sales Corporation is presumed to have a bright future.
It is a settled rule that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to sustain a conviction (People vs. Taruc, G.R.
No. 74655, January 20, 1988, cited in People vs. Torre, 184 SCRA 525; People
vs. Parayno, 24 SCRA 3 cited in People vs Libag, 184 SCRA 707). The fact that the
defense interposed by Reynaldo Pilares, Jr. is weak is inconsequential, as the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense (People vs. Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148).[36]

Finally, it appears that petitioner was not justified in inflicting wounds on the face of
the private complainant. During the confrontation, private complainant was
unarmed, intoxicated and lying on the ground. Furthermore, there was no
convincing evidence to show that the private complainant repeatedly threw stones
at the petitioner during the chase.
Before concluding, we again lean to our jurisprudential moorings that the factual
finding of the trial court, its calibration of the evidence of the parties and its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded respect and are generally
conclusive.[37] This is even more true if the findings and conclusions of the trial court
are affirmed by the appellate court. [38] In the case at bar, both the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that petitioner is guilty of the crime of serious physical
injuries. We find no compelling or exceptional reasons to deviate from their findings

since they are supported by the evidence on records and by prevailing

jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 March 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12141

January 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL LASALA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Senen C. Pearanda for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Miguel Lasala was accused of the crime of serious slander by deed with less serious
physical injuries and damages committed, according to the amended information
dated December 10, 1956, as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of September 1956, in the municipality and province
of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused with the deliberate intent to expose to public ridicule, cast dishonor and
public contempt on one Wenceslao Andanar incumbent municipal mayor of Sapao,
Surigao, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in a public place use
personal violence by attacking, assaulting and using fistic blows on said Wenceslao
Andanar thereby exposing the latter to public ridicule, contempt and dishonor and
inflicting injuries in the different parts of his body which required 14 days medical
treatment and incapacitated him from the performance of his customary labors for
12 days, thereby exposing the said Wenceslao Andanar to public contempt,
dishonor and special humiliation, purposely committed in the cockpit where there
were many people present.
That on the same date, place and on the same occasion, the herein accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault the said
Wenceslao Andanar with fistic blows, causing bruises and contusions in the different
parts of his body which required 14 days medical treatment and incapacitated him
from the performance of his customary labors for 12 days.
That by reason of all these acts alleged and described in the preceding paragraphs
the offended party suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation, physical and mental torture and social humiliation causing him great
damage and prejudice in the total sum of P30,000 as actual exemplary, and moral
damages.
Before his arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
act he has committed, if any, is not the complex crime of serious slander by deed
defined in Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code and of less serious physical injuries
but the single offense defined in paragraph 2 of Article 265 for the reason that said
act has happened in the same place, on the same occasion, and had been impelled
by the same intent. So he prayed that the information be quashed or amended by
eliminating the charge of serious slander by deed. Notwithstanding the opposition
interposed thereto by the prosecution, the trial court sustained the motion granting
the fiscal 5 days within which to amend the information charging therein the proper
offense in line with its suggestion. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the prosecution instituted the present appeal.
The grounds on which the lower court predicated its order requiring the prosecution
to amend the information by setting forth therein only the single offense of less
serious physical injuries as prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, are as follows: .1wph1.t

The accused in this case filed a motion to quash the information, dated February 8,
1957, on the ground that two crimes have been charged in the information which
constitute, according to the accused, only one single crime, and that the offense
allegedly committed by said accused is the one defined and penalized under the
second paragraph of Article 265, of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution
objected to said motion contending that the crime committed is a complex crime of
slander by deed with less serious physical injuries defined and penalized under Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court, after considering the matter and hearing the arguments both sides,
holds and declares that this is the crime specifically defined and penalized under
the second paragraph of Art. 265 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court is of the
opinion that the crime committed is less serious physical injuries with the manifest
intent to insult and offend the complaining witness and the same acts cannot
constitute the complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries
because such complex crime only exists in cases where the Code has no specific
provision penalizing the same with definite specific penalty." .
Article 265, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code provides:.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest
intent to insult or offend the injured person, or under circumstances adding
ignominy to the offense, in addition to the penalty ofarresto mayor, a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
An analysis of the provisions of the article above-quoted reveals that whenever an
act has been committed which inflicts upon a person less serious physical injuries
with the manifest intent to insult or offend him or under circumstances adding to
the offense, the offender should be prosecuted under that article and, if convicted,
should be sentenced to the penalty therein prescribed. This specific provision should
be considered as an exception to the rule contained in Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code relative to complex crimes. Of course, we cannot deny that Article 359
considers as slander by deed any act "which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or
contempt upon another person", and if said act results in the infliction of physical
injuries it may also be covered by any of the articles compromised in Chapter Two,
Title Eight, of the Revised Penal Code, relative to physical injuries, but if such
eventuality happens the act cannot come under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which considers as complex a single act that constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies for the simple reason that in this particular case that act is
specifically covered by paragraph 2 of Article 265 already abovementioned. In this
respect, we agree with the following comment of the lower court: "The Court is of
the opinion that the crime committed is less serious physical injuries with the
manifest intent to insult and offend the complaining witness and the same acts
cannot constitute the complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical
injuries, because such complex crime only exists in cases where the Code has no
specific provision penalizing the same with specific penalty." .
The acts alleged in the information as constituting the crime of slander by deed with
the infliction of physical injuries on the body of the offended party fit well into
Article 265, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, for it is there alleged that the
assault upon said offended party was committed in the cockpit where at the time
there were many people present. In other words, it may be said that the act was
committed with the manifest intent to insult or offend the offended party, or under
circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, it appearing that said offended party

was then the incumbent municipal mayor of the place. The lower court, therefore,
was justified in ordering the amendment of the information..
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

G.R. No. 192150

October 1, 2014
FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision2 dated October 23,
2009 and the resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR No. 31532.
The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 126, finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries. The RTC decision in
tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) judgment.
The Antecedent Facts
At around three oclock to four oclock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the
petitioner and his daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and
water pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted the
petitioner about his (the petitioners) alleged intrusion into Godofredos property. A
verbal altercation ensued between them.
In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard
object. The petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredos face, breaking
the latters eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy. 5 The
petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.
Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the
course his efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo. 6 The neighbors intervened not
long after and pacified the parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered
a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek,
while Jerviesustained a wound in his right palm.
On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner
before the barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the
recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their
Kasunduang Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan,
however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the
promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the
parties.10 Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an
Action.
The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical
Injuries under two (2) Informations11 that read:
Criminal Case No. 209934
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a
bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which
required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7) days or
incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for
the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 209935
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a
bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries
which required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7)
days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual
work for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light
Threats12 for allegedly uttering threatening words against the private complainant,
Godofredo.
When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr.
y Dolping (Rodolfo) and Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the
details of the crime); Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa Palugod (Godofredos
attending physician). The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner,
Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in selfdefense. He narrated that on the date of the incident while he was putting a
monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his right hand,
causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie), Godofredos son, went out of their house
and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone
and threw it at Godofredo.
The MTCs and the RTCs Rulings
In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical
injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed the light threats charged, as this offense is
deemed absorbed in the crime of slight physical injuries. Further, it absolved Erlinda
for the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that she uttered threatening
words against Godofredo.
The MTC rejected the petitioners claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing
and satisfactory supporting evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to
prove that there had been unlawful aggression by Godofredo; he did not even
present the medical certificate of his injury as evidence. The dispositive partof its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted
a penalty ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each count as there is neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.
SO ORDERED.
In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed
the MTCs decision.
The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC
has no jurisdiction over the case in view of the prosecutions failure to offer the

Certification to File an Action in evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in not
sustaining his claim of self-defense.
The CAs Ruling
The CA rejected the petitioners arguments and affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA
held that even if there had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, the Certification to File an Action could still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the records of the case.
Noting that the Certification to File an Action was identified by the complainants and
is attached to the records of the case, the CA ruled that an exception to Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence could be recognized.
The CA also dismissed the petitioners plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that selfdefense is essentially a factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the
absence of any showing that both the MTC and the RTC overlooked weighty and
substantial facts or circumstances that could alter their conclusion, the appellate
court saw no reason to disturb their factual ruling.
On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration;
hence, the present petition.
The Issues
On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions:
(1) the jurisdiction of the MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged
inadmissibility ofthe Certification to File Action; and (2) the lower courts finding of
guilt, its appreciation of the evidence and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
We find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioners
conviction for two counts of slight physical injuries.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding
the existence of the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This
existing settlement between the parties rendered the Certification to File an Action
without factual and legal basis, and is hence null and void. The petitioner also
contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
criminal cases in view of the noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification toFile
an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with conciliation procedures under
Presidential Decree No. 1508.
We see no merit in these contentions.
The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification
to File an Action Where NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File
an Action
Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.
The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation
prior to the institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact
admitted that a meeting before the Lupontranspired between them, resulting in a
Kasunduan.
Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied
their agreement was never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the
building inspector failed to make his promised recommendation to settle the

dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an
Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.
The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case
was conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no
recommendation, no resolution of the conflict likewise took place.
Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly
in the performance of official duty. 13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this
presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was
regular and pursuant to law.14 Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the
Certification to File an Action.
Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captains
issuance of the Certification toFile and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC.
As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals: 15
Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and
private respondents as defendants therein. Similarly, in Garces v. Court of
Appeals,16 we stated that:
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure
required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with
which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over
the person of the defendant.
Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioners case; the claimed
irregularity in conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification
to File an Action, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity
merely affected the parties cause of action. 17
The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid Certification to File an
Action, the lower courts still erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the
prosecution did not formally offer it as required by the Rules on Evidence. He
emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato, 18 the Court held that a formal offer is
necessary because judges are required to base their findings solely upon evidence
offered by the parties. In the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not
admissible pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, and cannot be
considered by the court.
We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.
The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot
consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. 19 Formal offer means that
the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits
into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse
party objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this
evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has
relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be
admitted.

The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves,
et al. v. The Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al., 23 to cite a few, enumerated the
requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely:
first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer
rule are present.1wphi1 As the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo
identified the Certification to File an Action during his crossexamination, to wit: 24
Q: And Im referring to you thisCertification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as
181-01, is this the one you are referring to?
A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.
Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular
certification referring to the case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie
Lopez versus Mr. Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for
the defense. [TSN, Godofredo Lopez, page 119; emphasis ours.]
Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as
Exhibit "1" and attached to the records of the case. 25 Significantly, the petitioner
never objected to Godofredos testimony, particularly with the identification and
marking of the Certification. In these lights, the Court sees no reason why the
Certification should not be admitted.
The Claim of Self-Defense
On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions
of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great
weight and respect and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.26
In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked
facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not
disturb their factual findings.27
We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the
crime of slight physical injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA
correctly rejected the petitioners claim of selfdefense because he did not
substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.
Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that
would have been criminal in character had it not been for the presence of
circumstances whose legal consequences negate the commission of a crime. 28 The
plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused must be duly proven. The
most basic rule is that no self-defense can be recognized until unlawful aggression
is established.29
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove
that he satisfied the elements required by law; 30 he who alleges must prove. By
admitting the commission of the act charged and pleading avoidance based on the
law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts that
the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged. 31

In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that
he acted in self-defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful
aggression that Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on his right hand.
As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed
self-defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting
evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he
everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was
attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by
the prosecution eyewitnesses Rodolfo and Dina who both testified that it was the
petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.
The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal
certificates showing that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area
of his head and an abrasion on his left cheek. These medico legal findings are
consistent with Godofredo' s claim that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical
injuries.
In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of slight physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of selfdefense fails for lack of supporting evidence; he failed to present any evidence of
unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a measure to
defend himself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision
dated October 23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: