[G.R. No. 106632.

October 9, 1997]

DORIS TERESA HO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by

the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) and the
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

[G.R. No. 106678. October 9, 1997]

ROLANDO S. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman)
and the SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, without personally determining
probable cause by independently examining sufficient evidence submitted by the parties
during the preliminary investigation?
The Case
This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Sandiganbayans
August 25, 1992 Resolution which answered the said query in the affirmative.
The Facts
Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor and investigator, Atty.
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against
Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678,
respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoo. The
complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a
public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government
if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public

officer profited or will profit thereby. After due notice, all respondents therein filed their
respective counter-affidavits with supporting documents. On January 8, 1992, Graft
Investigation Officer Titus P. Labrador (hereafter, GIO Labrador) submitted his
resolution with the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an
information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be filed against
respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the Sandiganbayan.
It is likewise recommending that the case against the other respondents be DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence.
However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer
Leonardo P. Tamayo (hereafter, SPO Tamayo) recommended that both Rolando Narciso
and Doris Teresa Ho be charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The
resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the memorandum of SPO Tamayo, was
approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on May 5, 1992. Thus, herein
petitioners were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an information filed
on May 18, 1992. Attached to the information were the resolution of GIO Labrador and
the memorandum of SPO Tamayo. The said information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses ROLANDO NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO, President of National
Marine Corporation, of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as
follows:
That on or about April 4, 1989, and for sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused ROLANDO NARCISO, a public officer, being then the Vice-President of
the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation
organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and DORIS TERESA HO, a private
individual and then the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private
corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally,
with evident bad faith and through manifest partiality, cause undue injury to the National
Steel Corporation (NSC), by entering without legal justification into a negotiated contract
of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate
ofP129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they
have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping
Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts
of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding held on June
30, 1988, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation, in the
total sum of One Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two Pesos and Seventy
Five Centavos (P1,116,052.75), Philippine Currency, to the pecuniary damage and
prejudice of the NSC in the aforestated sum. The said offense was committed by
Rolando S. Narciso in the performance of his official functions as Vice-President of the
National Steel Corporation.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned
warrant of arrest against Petitioners Ho and Narciso.Petitioner Ho initially questioned
the issuance thereof in an Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for
Reconsideration which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso. They alleged that the
Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their
arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the
Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. Respondent
Sandiganbayan denied said motion in the challenged Resolution. It ratiocinated in this
wise:
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in
the information in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown
by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of responsible
investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration
sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows
that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by
both parties during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire
record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence
submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an
exercise in futility.
Thus, these petitions.
The Issue
Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:
May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the
basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary
investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainants
affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at
the preliminary investigation?
In his separate petition, Rolando S. Narciso adopts the foregoing and raises no
other distinct issue.
Petitioners Ho and Narciso similarly contend that a judge, in personally determining
the existence of probable cause, must have before himsufficient evidence submitted by
the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support
his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not
be merely described in a prosecutors resolution. Citing People vs. Inting, petitioners
insist that the judge must have before him the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of

stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents which are material in
assisting the judge to make his determination.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
Section 2 [, Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. (Underscoring supplied.)
In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate,
particularly the power and the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court
elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. [Underscoring supplied]
We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine
probable cause personally. The word personally does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions
intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under the previous Charters.
While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting elaborated on what determination of
probable cause entails, differentiating the judges object or goal from that of the
prosecutors.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not
have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the transcripts
of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to
make hisdetermination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper -- whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial -- is the function of the
Prosecutor.
And clarifying the statement in People vs. Delgado -- that the trial court may rely on
the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may
rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest -- this Court underscored in Lim
Sr. vs. Felix that [r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutors certification
presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been
submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the
records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. We added, The warrant issues
not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which
sustain it. Summing up, the Court said:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the
same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should
be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of
these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes depends
on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judges examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case
require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutors certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for [the] complainant and [the]
witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing questions when the circumstances
of the case so require. [Underscoring supplied]
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs.
Diokno where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a
warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It
is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable
cause. In Webb vs. De Leon, we stressed that the judge merely determines the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so; he need not
conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutors initial
determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
In the recent case of Roberts Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Courts application of the
dictum laid down in Soliven -- affirmed and fortified inInting, Lim Sr.,
Allado and Webb -- should lay to rest the issue raised in the instant petitions. In Roberts
Jr., this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., set aside the order of the
respondent judge directing inter alia the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
accused, reasoning that said judge did not personally determine the existence of
probable cause, since he had only the information, amended information, and Joint
Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutors finding of probable cause.
In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer
and the three-page memorandum of the prosecution officer, when it issued the warrant
of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two documents/reports even had dissimilar
recommendations -- the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso, the second including
Petitioner Ho. This alone should have prompted the public respondent to verify, in the
records and other documents submitted by the parties during the preliminary
investigation, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the Ombudsmans action
charging both petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-Graft law. But in its initial
justification of the issuance of the warrant, the Sandiganbayan simply said:
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
xxx xxx xxx
But in this particular case we believe there is a prima facie case based on our
examination of the resolution because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not
approve a resolution just like that, without evidence to back it up.
In attempting to further justify its challenged action, the public respondent explained
in its assailed Resolution:
In the instant case, there are attached to the information, two (2)
Memorandum/Resolution (sic) emanating from the Offices of the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor (Pp. 4-6, 7-19, respectively, Record) which clearly and indubitably
established, firstly, the conduct of a due and proper preliminary investigation,secondly,

the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority; and thirdly, the
determination and ascertainment of probable cause based on the documentary
evidence submitted by the complainant (Anti-Graft League of the Philippines), foremost
among which is the Contract of Affreightment entered into between National Steel
Corporation (NSC), and National Marine Corporation (NMC) and the COA-NSC audit
report, together with the counter-affidavits of accused Rolando Narciso and NMC
officials, among whom is accused-movant. Outlined in detail in the aforesaid Resolution
of Titus P. Labrador, Graft Investigation Officer II, which was reviewed by Attys. Romeo
I. Tan and Arturo Mojica, Director, Community Coordination Bureau and Assistant
Ombudsman, PACPO, [respectively,] are the facts leading to the questioned transaction
between NSC and NMC, together with an evaluation of the propriety and legality of the
bidding process involved therein and which revealed that there were supposed noncompliance with proper bidding procedures. GIO Labradors findings and
recommendations, extensively set out in his thirteen-page resolution, is complemented
by the three-page Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer II Leonardo P. Tamayo,
both of which meticulously delved into the merits and demerits of the evidence
presented by the complainant and accused-respondents and which resulted in their
respective recommendation which led the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez to approve
the recommendations of Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer and Special
Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto for the filing of the information in the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in
the information in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown
by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of responsible
investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration
sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows
that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by
both parties during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire
record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence
submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an
exercise in futility.
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be
upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once
more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is
for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on
one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their
distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the
report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support
his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold
him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue
an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most
basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge
and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information
and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial
finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend
to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as
the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts
of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the
very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys
the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.
True, in Webb vs. De Leon, we found that the painstaking recital and analysis of the
parties evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there [was]
probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. This statement may have
been wrongly construed by the public respondent to mean that the narration or
description of portions of the evidence in the prosecutors report may serve as sufficient
basis to make its own independent judgment. What it should bear in mind, however, is
that, aside from the 26-page report of the DOJ panel, the sworn statements of three
witnesses and counter-affidavits of the petitioners in Webb were also submitted to the
trial court, and the latter is presumed to have reviewed these documents as well, prior to
its issuance of the warrants of arrest.
In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the
resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing
prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the
Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting
evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines) or the People from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable
cause exists. Clearly and ineluctably, Respondent Courts findings of the conduct of a

due and proper preliminary investigation and the approval by proper officials clothed
with statutory authority are not equivalent to the independent and personal responsibility
required by the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At least some of the
documentary evidence mentioned (Contract of Affreightment between National Steel
Corporation and National Marine Corporation, the COA-NSC audit report, and counteraffidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC officials), upon which the investigating officials of
the Ombudsman reportedly ascertained the existence of probable cause, should have
been physically present before the public respondent for its examination, to enable it to
determine on its own whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding of
probable cause. But it stubbornly stood pat on its position that it had essentially
complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook
contravenes the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Court palpably
committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of
arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendation, and without
determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such
bare findings and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET
ASIDE. The warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992
in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is
hereby declaredNULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.