A.C.

1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1),
petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to
reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the
relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity
of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself
of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was
disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly
pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23,
1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without
prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the
disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution
penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors,
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency
and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary
of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to
pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to

Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors
to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid
resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous
case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter
of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine
Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in
the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the
decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent
for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August
19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not

unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the

consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical
concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal
knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this
Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the
impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more
than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court
where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked
the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence
apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at
times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be
ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made
certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of
this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal
profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he
war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power
to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting
to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle.11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no
irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is
likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a
sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there
was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of
October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy
Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO
PABLO,
JR.,
Members,
1971
Bar
Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment;
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon.
Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for
disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar
Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to
the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971
Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971,
1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and
67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling
fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades

were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?

Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into
these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records
of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects
Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office
code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a
grade
of 67.55%,
68.65%,
72.75%,
68.2%,
56.45%
and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In
his sworn statement dated April 12,
1972,
said
Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each
of
the
five
(5)
examiners
in
his
individual
sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant VictorioLanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the reevaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing

average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on
March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 6063, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required
by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent
Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of
examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in
the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and
Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that
another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent
re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery
of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject
of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50%
This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty
dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon
request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias

Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon

University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino
F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp.
45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations,
did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to
do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and
was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were
required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and
Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent
residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who
offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the
affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same
became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as
their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they reevaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law,
affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I
was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy
in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that
candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject
and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he

brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for reevaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me
for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that
the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with
original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with
4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations
in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxxxxxxxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination
booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I
received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about

October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevoand myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination
booklets of bar candidates I have always followed
him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with
respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to
take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering
his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission
of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at
that time, I was isolating myself from all members of
the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the
Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a
bar examiner;
xxxxxxxxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me
in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his
affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence
to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks
(bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of
the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar
confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if
it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said

examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the

highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or reexaminee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as
long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified
or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was
revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had
not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said
examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I reexamined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook
and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed
the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1
to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxxxxxxxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political
and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name
of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon

receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his

name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the
Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision
and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed.
The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so
appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in
the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to
verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious.
Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of
the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular
visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:
xxxxxxxxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the
same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to
review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to
see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did
not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the
grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained

by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%.
After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final
grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and,
as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee
pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed
the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we
still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or
his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit
dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxxxxxxxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the
correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he
would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that
is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points,
initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and
revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee

concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to
now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated
April 14, 1972, that:
xxxxxxxxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used
the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested
me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the
grade that I had previously given. He explained that the
examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr.
Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo
particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and
submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as
Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the
said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of
the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made
deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in

other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the
total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxxxxxxxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxxxxxxxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in
increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted
in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo.
Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first
time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature
of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxxxxxxxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of
doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it
was only in that particular subject that the said
examine failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to

be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be

mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an
answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9%
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxxxxxxxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be
willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase
his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the
changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxxxxxxxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby
state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar
Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith
and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one
of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that
where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made
the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this
time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 4041, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:
xxxxxxxxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in
the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I
was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of
the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier
to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after
the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or reevaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the
same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances
that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited reevaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake
or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither
did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that
he remembers having brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed
to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in
said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to
the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la
Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act
would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxxxxxxxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification
of, his answer, stating:
xxxxxxxxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only
in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that
the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they
so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the

notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the
early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the
office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that
the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that comes into
my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At
that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street
towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the southeastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached is identified and marked
as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh.
4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so significant to
me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on
the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first
took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up
to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is
identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-aLanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-aLanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo

and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-aLanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born
out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as
a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke
out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined
at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in
many casualties. From then on, I regarded November
27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having
been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and
(c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since
then we begot children the youngest of whom was
born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While
thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was
still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing
and language and the apparent soundness of the
answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on
the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and
later on took them back to the respective examiners
for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have
reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the
attention of the committee during the meeting and which the

Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines,

namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% (47%)
in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50% after reevaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-aLanuevo). This notebook in Political and International
Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the
sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter,
under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized
the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in
his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very
little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation,
unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since

the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the
fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April
12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent
Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In
his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a
Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among
others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidantVictorioLanuevo and never met him before except
once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxxxxxxxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court
not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation
clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is
richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant VictorioLanuevo's
actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein

respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation

of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who
are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it
must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact
that BarConfidantLanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's
having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar
themselves and the result of their work that year, as also
unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.
xxxxxxxxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would
make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between
them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied
and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the
performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.
xxxxxxxxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent
Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been

submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is

simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of
December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate
obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook
for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought
back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the
particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing
average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's
word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian,
2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in
seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang
still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75%
for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondentexaminer Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has
reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done

well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo
likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the
notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also
particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English.
Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that
the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant,
had the authority to make such request and further believing that such
request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in
the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade
in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made
by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by
him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol.
V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could
not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in
the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out
a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that
particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed
in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law;
and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be

increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations.
After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the
Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter reevaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation,
the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%.
Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general
average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in
four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet
in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then
helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International
Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in
his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points
to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the
words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he
did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the
general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner
Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee
is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular reevaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing
the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that
he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was
long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the

same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61,
rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general
average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's
notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase
of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar
Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate
said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8,
1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent
Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed
all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made
during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all
closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his
willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration
or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71;
Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information
that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the
others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the
said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillolikewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after
he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number
1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to
the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200

notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent

Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this
was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondentLanuevo had with him on
that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent
Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as
office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 &
2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON
E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own
initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in
the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade
74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of
the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had
no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that
respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on
the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos.
1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to

the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he

acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited reevaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray
the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice
to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not reevaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide
them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a
basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo
and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondentsexaminers (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive crossexamination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases
show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent
Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as
well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the
answers ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the
increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average

was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be

honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was
referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to

74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and

prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage
of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with
the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who
Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile
Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare
a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the
Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done
by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which
alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as
well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang
without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of
the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for reevaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees
with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of
Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the
original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted
on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent

Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman
of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and
increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who
were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the
re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela
Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number
given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as
to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It
only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind
for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the
first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR REEVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back
the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases
were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them

back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the

case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
delaCruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p.
28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and
record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented
by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in
his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release
of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that
the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room
of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X,
Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there
was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to
him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp.
34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile
Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the
initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner
code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by
the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-aLanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4,
rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner

Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of
any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8,
1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject
the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63,
Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade
of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other
failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation
of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "

Criminal Law 78% 78% = "

Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political
Taxation 72%

Law

70%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the
answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to
the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile
Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation

and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was
considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered
in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant,
thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining
public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be
disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed
that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5)
major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the
legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman
and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8)
bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison
officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every

act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the

admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance
with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the
final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose
position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his
functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are
defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority
from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or reevaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or
a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings
or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection,
among others, with the character requirement of candidates for
admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a
member
of
the
Bar
must
be
...
of
good
moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules,
every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement
in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the
Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the
supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending
becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar

examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965

require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude
filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases
of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application
form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in
1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to
reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's
moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending
case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that
form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not
been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other
officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of
any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against
him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued
to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of
the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969
and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969
and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when
he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By
falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar

examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law
is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners
and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or
the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of
the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the
judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and
his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any
criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of
some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name
of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted
by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite

attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore

unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution
of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August,
1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal
case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted
every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It
would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to
hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on
the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off
the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478;
(b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c)
fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re:
Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the reevaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidantLanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any
consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good
faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of
admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under
the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman
of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter
to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have
required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete
grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent
Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that
the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and
so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really
deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo
in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would
appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a

passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one
causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and
4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And
respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to
have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can reevaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75,
this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I
asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used
to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me
and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to
go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not
mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I
raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp.
44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable reevaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave
were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent
influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the reevaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your
own accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my
report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he

brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for reevaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and
in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.);
and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. VictorioLanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of
the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was
only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he
did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given
the
passing
grade
of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law,
if
I
recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent

Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation
adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation
effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless,
WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed
with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the
proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost
case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support
thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal
to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as
Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said
examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and
integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge
against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before
the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or
an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the

motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination

Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to
see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking
his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to
Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after
the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations
and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired
from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374
square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The
deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only
on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the
said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No.
90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00,

which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of

the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the
remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in
the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol.
VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It
appears,
however,
that
his
alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under
Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his
1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the
amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction
therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII,
pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00)
is not reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo
himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during
the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise
was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own,
is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten

or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing

circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date
of instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription).
On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and
was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No.
30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage
in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the
house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in
his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding
the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW
car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of
the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the abovementioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties

came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing

the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar
examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact,
after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement
on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly
filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of
retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show
cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results
of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and
sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case
value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which
he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or

money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented
or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights
educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school
days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine
Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the
affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the
position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record,
p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951,
which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all
the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and
even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87,
rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of
the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to
the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school

year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon

E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the
Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He
does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board
every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent
Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not
remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon
E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the
91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the
guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's
father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other
guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in
Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board.
He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija

Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal
Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942
and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army,
stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th
Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT
VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS
HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
A.C. No. 244

March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

TELESFORO
A.
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

FOR

DISBARMENT OF
DIAO,

BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred

to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and

later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed
by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically
admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high
school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed
the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent
of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been

permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take
it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA,
JR., Respondent.
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an
attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons
of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between
counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE
CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. Whether directed at the person of complainant
or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo"
was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing
the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow
lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language,
respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach
because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and
warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.

Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to

observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the
offense will be dealt with more severely.
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of
judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time,
one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel
for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say
"bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter
looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in
the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with
his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the
same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo",
referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant
and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of
making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by
respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present
complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of
this representation called up this representation at his house and crying
over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the
defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he
harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l
would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The
Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering

evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court.
By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to
the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which
all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that
respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from
engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in
the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals;
Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation
was triggered by complainants own manifest hostility and provocative
remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when
respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is
directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.
68635,
entitled
"EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE,
vs.
HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
Before us are 1) Atty. WenceslaoLaureta's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987,
finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him
indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion
for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without
hearing violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason
thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to
him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had
circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the

Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his

having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the
banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but
that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did
nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law
practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he
would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the
Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself
would have written stories about the case in a manner that sells
newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would
have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;"
that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was
cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse
publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan;
that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized
in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a
scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after
all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case
last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance
to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time
personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to
help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called by a
reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the
Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by
Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its
finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan
and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional services
having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before
this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the
Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan
do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre
caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on
the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to
the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent to deal with
the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he
has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two
highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to
errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders;
that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have
prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious
charges of Eva MaravillaIlustre who was no longer his client when these
alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder
on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a

duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally,
that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the
filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as
her main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due
process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly
treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of
evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as
practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given every
opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some
sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the
Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation by
its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter,
which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course
which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in
making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that
reason that she addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres
Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that
"if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member
of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the
resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that
instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent
movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful
investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her grievance
to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had
committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not
impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438
[1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type"
proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29,
1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of
the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His
Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed,
contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre
was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts
and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices
concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the
contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19)
pages, double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain

matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by
Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having
circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body,
and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court
believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled
against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray
not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of
respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness
to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton
disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res
ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The
necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See
People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA
712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard,
and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in
his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services
were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this
Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the
individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the
Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution
dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for
the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it
was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and,
after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of
this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam
Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her
address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been
informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the
residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the
two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p.
670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution
delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March
27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for

Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that

Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987,
the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the
lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been
allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to
the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on
Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up
between the corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process
servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam
Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the
one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges
before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the
complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer
were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the
caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of
elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He
gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again
surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
"understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the
serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his
being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because
after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union
case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming
of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying
reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits
in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the
Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his
Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus
incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive
notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam
Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code
has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to
which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other

department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them

'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and
uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and
circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity"
generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned
before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was
calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the
case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides,
he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an
occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is
because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately
sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of
collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the
integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly
administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration
that would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that
he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
an attorney and officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has
turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have
refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of
losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions
and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation"
was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be
they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact
that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on
May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division voted
unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in
any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without
any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been
drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty.
Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into
the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was
Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986

denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself
from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the
challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of
Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our
process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her
personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12,
1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server
Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo,
Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to
serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of
ms.EvaMaravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17
Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is
no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in
the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve
copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house
in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix
Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an
elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but
vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does
not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she
always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla
because the latter always gives the address of her house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in
the same place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla
which was returned unserved because she is not known in the
place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for
Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo
St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she
was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her
contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no
further standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty.

Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him
from the practice of law, and of Eva MaravillaIlustre for the lifting of the
penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva
MaravillaIlustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten
(10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon
failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED.
[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO
PEFIANCO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive
language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District
Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He
alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring
with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in
San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the
woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that
Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in
another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was
sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client,
saying, Nga-a
gina-areglomoina,
ipapresoangimongakliyente
para
mahibal-an naanangsala. (Why do you settle that case? Have your client
imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst
and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty.
Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the woman
who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled
because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the
same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty.
Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked
him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the
matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started

shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with

respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put
a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in
the Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when
he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsilingsi Atty.
Alcantarangapagwa-on
nakunoakodyasa
PAO,
buyonngaklasekatawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of
the PAO, what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent
pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people
in the office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he
confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to
leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent
resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to
complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert
Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent
Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of
the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack
complainant and even shouted at him, Gagoka! (Youre stupid!)
Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow and
complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert
Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that
the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense.He said that he
resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon
Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round
in the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning
the womans case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted
at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two
security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take
respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainants claims, however,
respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and
shout at him, Gagoka! (Youre stupid!)

Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had

filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal
complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by
the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the
complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his
actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to
be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco
who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several
disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation that respondent
Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even
attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [1] admonishes
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward
each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all
times.[2]
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no
right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand
an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of
her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent
should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the
right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused
in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was
being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated
those who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil
and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office because

they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had
been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal
rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent
had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An
injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to
be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and
DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.

SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks
to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying
his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to
issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on
October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private
respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for
damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of
the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference
on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default
and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A

decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private

respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by
petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the
decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano
Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the
lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa
his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly
award of moral damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses. 2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate
of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L.
Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision became final on
June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by
respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the
lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida
Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately
protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or
levied upon without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said
Petition is ". .a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for
defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied
upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of
Appeals ... " 6

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting

upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three
motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a
dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack
of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at
the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the
pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not
amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in
the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the
judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona
fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply
protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he
was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was
at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on
the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6,
1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without
justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance
further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years
to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado &
Associates" of 209 SampaguitaBldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby
ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why
Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V
of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48

January 31, 1958

THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction
and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended

informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt

of court with which said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco,
Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H.
HubillaOreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J.
Briones, Alawadin T. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas
and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said amended
informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one Of these
cases.
. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and
was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after
haing been duly informed and notified that certain portions of
Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and
that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who
failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission
to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the
Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptously disobey and
resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the
Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the
petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and
manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines
and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the
Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then
and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath
as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that
effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court.
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent
part of which reads:
Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior
court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may
be filed with such superior court . . . (Emphasis our.).
and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that .
It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the contempt
rest exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is
authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly,
disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for
contempt by a court of another state or by a federal court.
the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed
by appellees herein "was committed not against" said court "but against

the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of
First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the
appellees herein.
This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provisions of the Rules of
court is permissive in nature. It is merely declaratory of the inherent
power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It
does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the
guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this
Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the
jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said
authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, under Article
VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," and does not extend to the
determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines.
In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains
that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that
such power is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the
aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only
"unless otherwise provided by stattute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute,
providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines.
Moreover, the amended informantions specifically allege that the
defendants herein did "perform acts constituting improper conduct and
manifestations that the tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and
impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the
Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it
differently the acts charged werecommitted, according to said amended
informations, in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of "all other
courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify
the same.
Again , section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court provide that a person guilty of any of the acts of contempt defined,
respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64,
"may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more
than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of
1948 (Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original
jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be
imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the
same are within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme

Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of
contempt against the same.
It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent
jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice
to acknowledge the preferencial right of the court against which the act of
contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party. However,
insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court
passed and promulgated a resolution of the following tenor:
The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following
tenor:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.
Pedro B. Ayuda.
Alawadin I. Bandon.
Roque J. Briones.
Abraham C. Calaguas.
Balbino P. Fajardo.
Claro C. Gofredo.
Estela R. Gordo.
Generoso H. Hubilla.
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.
Angelo T. Lopez.
Eustacio de Luna.
Jaime P. Marco.
Santos L. Parina.
Florencio P. Sugarol, and
Maria Velez y Estrellas.
Attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

MANIFESTATION
COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the abovenamed attorneys and to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully
makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as
Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A.
Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R-

201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of the provisions

of Republic Act No. 972;
There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of
the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L',
'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'.
Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Godofredo, and Florencio P.
Sugarol of the group took the bar examination in August, 1954. They
also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20,
1955.
This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice
law in all the Courts of the Philippines.
Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as
president of the 1946-1952 BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION,
2034 Azcarraga, Manila.
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and
Sugarol, have not passed the examinations, it was resolved:
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation
and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;
B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority,
he is given 10 days from notice thereof, within which to explain why
he should not be dealt with for contempt of the Court;
C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has
illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of
this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except
Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show
cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice
of law;
D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to
the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of
Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the
Department of Justice;

E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken

later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)
It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to
exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt
committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the
corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the
cases at the bar.
The next question for determination is whetehr the acts charged in the
amended informations constitute contempt of court. After quoting the
allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the defendant
in each one of the instant cases.
. . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously
disobey and resist in an insolent snd defiant manner the said
Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and
everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting improper
conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. . .
the lower court had the following to say:
From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command,
order or notification from the judicial court or any non-judicial
person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for
contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused.
Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court of March 18, 1954 dircting the accused not to take
their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person
as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer without
having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme
Court for the admission to the practice by law. It is necessary before
his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar
examinations and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice as
attorney. Our statutes punishas criminal contempt one 'assuming to
be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without
authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath of
lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not
tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken one step
further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out
themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants,
appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings
therewith, would be considered that they are really engaged in the
practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts
as enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and

Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any command,
order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court.
What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers
before a notary public who was not authorized by law to take their
oath as lawyers, as the latter can only swear as such before the
Supreme Court or any member thereof.
Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion
and so holds that no criminal contempt has been committed by the
herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest
Tribunal of this land.
The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is,
however, incomplete. It did not include the allegation to the effect that
the defendant in each one of the cases ar bar took his "oath as a lawyer
before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the
resolutionabove quoted,
well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was
not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after
having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of
Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and
that all the petition of the candidates including the accused who
failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive for admission to
the bar were refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . .
In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar
examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission to the Bar under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court
denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to
the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by
those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution
denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied,
necessarily, a denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or
injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding,
appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this
Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the
courtr of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied,
in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which
declares in part:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for
contempt:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,

judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge.
and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is
identical.
This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque (8
Phil., 146), which involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a
Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and
Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general
practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote
himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law.
Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as charged, although
upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former
order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of in the
Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that
the aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and
purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that "consequently the
conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order
made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he was
found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended
informations, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did,
in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and
settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they
should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct
the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of
justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they
performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice,"
in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
. . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which
offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its
authority constitute contempt of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.).
The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could
not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the
practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of
circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . .
and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which
contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of
the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of office as attorneyat-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would
"practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had for all

intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law

(U.S. vs. Ney and Mosque, supra).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the
records of these cases be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official organization of all
Philippine lawyers whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. The IBP came into being when the Supreme Court created
on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration which was tasked
not only to ascertain the advisability of integration of the Bar, but even
more, to serve as a common vehicle of the Court and the Bar in
fashioning a blueprint for integration and putting the same into actual
operation. Republic Act No. 6397, which became effective September 17,
1971, confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Then on January 9, 1973,
the Supreme Court, by a percuriam resolution, pursuant to its
constitutional mandate, ordained the integration of the Bar in accordance
with its Rule 139-A, effective January 16, 1973. Within the next
succeeding months, the IBP was organized. On February 17, 1973, local
chapters all over the country were finally formed and elections for
chapter officers were held. Then on March 17, 1973, the first batch of
representatives to the IBP House of Delegates composed of 104 delegates
representing the IBP Chapters nationwide convened in Manila and elected
its first set of IBP Governors.
It is an official organization - and by official we mean that it is
established by the State. Republic Act No. 6397 confirmed the power of
the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar. Presidential Decree. No. 181 was promulgated on May 4,
1973 constituting the IBP into a body corporate and providing
government assistance thereto for the accomplishment of its purposes.
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rule 139-A
(Inserted by Republic Act No. 6397 which took effect on January 16, 1973)
Section 1. Organization. - There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of

all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 2. Purposes. - The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall
be to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Sec. 3. Regions. - The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of
the Integrated Bar, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet,
Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La
Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva
Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales; chanroblesvirtua law
library
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;
(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavity
Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and
Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Al bay, Camarines Norte,
Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern
Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor;
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte,
Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, CaMiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur,
Davao Oriental, Nlisamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur;
and
(i) Western M;ndanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga,
and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur Misamis
Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga
del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors
shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, determine the Region to
which the said province shall belong.
Sec. 4. Chapters. - A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in
every province. Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be
considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political
subdivisions or areas:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay Citys Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and
(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof,
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more
than one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by
uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved
by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on
matters and problems of common concern.
Sec. 5. House of Delegates. - The Integrated Bar shall have a House of
Delegates of not more than one hundred twenty members who shall be
apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least
one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of
Delegates. chanroblesvirtua law library
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening
of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the day
immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding

annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two

terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of
Governors at any time during the month of April of each year for the
election of Governors, the reading and discussion of reports including the
annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other
business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of
such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty
Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board
of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A
majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether
annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. - The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a
Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of
Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one
Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of
nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not
more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and
the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of
themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become
members
of
the
Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from
the date of their election and until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified. No person may be a governor for more than two
terms
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date
and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special
meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the
Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt ByLaws and promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility for all
members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be
amended
by
the
Supreme
Court motuproprio or
upon
the
recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the Integrated Bar as
well as the provisions of this Rule.

Sec. 7. Officers. - The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an

Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the Governors
immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or
from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five
Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex
officioVice President for the Region which he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term
of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall
have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically
become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency
shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order of
rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be
President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than
one term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other
officers and employees as may be required by the Board of Governors, to
be appointed tray the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold
office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said
officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 8. Vacancies. - In the event the President is absent or unable to act,
his duties shall be performed by the Executive vice President; and in the
event of the death, resignation or removal of the President, the Executive
Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the
term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation,
removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice
President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold
office until the next succeeding election or during the period of
disability.chanroblesvirtua law library
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors,
and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as
provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for
a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Sec. 11. Voluntary termination of membership; reinstatement. - A
member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that
effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately
bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall
cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from
the Roll of Attorneys. Re-instatement may be made by the Court in
accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of
Governors and approved by the Court.
Sec. 12. Grievance procedures. - The Board of Governors shall provide in
the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and
maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar,
but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the
removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without
the final approval of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 13. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar shall be strictly nonpolitical, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly
prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, Officer or employee of the
Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files
his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Sec. 14. Positions honorary. - Except as may be specifically authorized or
allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national
or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation,
allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any
service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense
incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Sec. 15. Fiscal matters. - The Board of Governors shall administer the
funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to make
appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books
of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall
see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated
Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Sec. 16. Journal. - The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a
quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be
distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 17. Voluntary Bar Associations. - All voluntary Bar associations now
existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-exist with the
Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.
Sec. 18. Amendments. - This Rule may be amended by the Supreme
Courtmotuproprio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors
or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 19. Organizational period. - The Commission on Bar Integration shall
organize the local Chapters and toward this end shall secure the
assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the
Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on
Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause
proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting to be served
upon all the lawyers concerned at their addresses appearing in the
records of the commission. The lawyers present at the meeting called to
organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including
the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and
five Directors. chanroblesvirtua law library
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion
the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the
number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least
one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its
Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his
alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one
Delegate, in which case, the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect
additional as well as alternate Delegates. The House of Delegates shall
convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 1 7,1973 for the
purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall
immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the

Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their

respective positions. chanroblesvirtua law library
Sec. 20. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.