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ENBANC

GOVERNMENT OF HONG
G.R.No.153675
KONG
SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine
Present:
DepartmentofJustice,Petitioner,
PUNO,C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARESSANTIAGO,

SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIOMORALES,
versus
CALLEJO,SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICONAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO,JR.,and

NACHURA,JJ.

HON.
FELIXBERTO
T. Promulgated:
OLALIA, JR. and JUAN
ANTONIOMUOZ,
April19,2007
Respondents.

xx

DECISION

SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:

ForourresolutionistheinstantPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65ofthe1997Rulesof
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.)
issued in Civil Case No. 9995773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001
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allowing JuanAntonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail and (2) the Order dated
April10,2002denyingthemotiontovacatethesaidOrderofDecember20,2001filedby
the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the
PhilippineDepartmentofJustice(DOJ),petitioner.ThepetitionallegesthatbothOrders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potentialextraditee.

Thefactsare:

OnJanuary30,1995,theRepublicofthePhilippinesandthethenBritishCrownColony
ofHongKongsignedanAgreementfortheSurrenderofAccusedandConvictedPersons.
IttookeffectonJune20,1997.

OnJuly1,1997,HongKongrevertedbacktothePeoplesRepublicofChinaandbecame
theHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion.

PrivaterespondentMuozwaschargedbeforetheHongKongCourtwiththree(3)counts
oftheoffenseofacceptinganadvantageasagent,inviolationofSection9(1)(a)ofthe
PreventionofBriberyOrdinance,Cap.201ofHongKong.Healsofacesseven(7)counts
oftheoffenseofconspiracytodefraud,penalizedbythecommonlawofHongKong.On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted,hefacesajailtermofseven(7)tofourteen(14)yearsforeachcharge.

OnSeptember13,1999,theDOJreceivedfromtheHongKongDepartmentofJusticea
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
requesttotheNationalBureauofInvestigation(NBI)which,inturn,filedwiththeRTC
ofManila,Branch19anapplicationfortheprovisionalarrestofprivaterespondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order ofArrest against
privaterespondent.Thatsameday,theNBIagentsarrestedanddetainedhim.

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On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court ofAppeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunctionand/orwritofhabeascorpusquestioningthevalidityoftheOrderofArrest.

OnNovember9,1999,theCourtofAppealsrendereditsDecisiondeclaringtheOrderof
Arrestvoid.

OnNovember12,1999,theDOJfiledwiththisCourtapetitionforreviewoncertiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be
reversed.

OnDecember18,2000,thisCourtrenderedaDecisiongrantingthepetitionoftheDOJ
andsustainingthevalidityoftheOrderofArrestagainstprivaterespondent.TheDecision
becamefinalandexecutoryonApril10,2001.

Meanwhile,asearlyasNovember22,1999,petitionerHongKongSpecialAdministrative
RegionfiledwiththeRTCofManilaapetitionfortheextraditionofprivaterespondent,
docketedasCivilCaseNo.9995733,raffledofftoBranch10,presidedbyJudgeRicardo
Bernardo,Jr.Forhispart,privaterespondentfiled,inthesamecase,apetitionforbail
whichwasopposedbypetitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petitionforbail,holdingthatthereisnoPhilippinelawgrantingbailinextraditioncases
andthatprivaterespondentisahighflightrisk.

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil
CaseNo.9995733.ItwasthenraffledofftoBranch8presidedbyrespondentjudge.

OnOctober30,2001,privaterespondentfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheOrder
denyinghisapplicationforbail.ThiswasgrantedbyrespondentjudgeinanOrderdated
December20,2001allowingprivaterespondenttopostbail,thus:

Inconclusion,thisCourtwillnotcontributetoaccusedsfurthererosionofcivilliberties.
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Thepetitionforbailisgrantedsubjecttothefollowingconditions:

1.BailissetatPhp750,000.00incashwiththeconditionthataccusedherebyundertakes
thathewillappearandanswertheissuesraisedintheseproceedingsandwillatall
timesholdhimselfamenabletoordersandprocessesofthisCourt,willfurtherappear
forjudgment.Ifaccusedfailsinthisundertaking,thecashbondwillbeforfeitedin
favorofthegovernment

2.AccusedmustsurrenderhisvalidpassporttothisCourt

3.TheDepartmentofJusticeisgivenimmediatenoticeanddiscretionoffilingitsown
motionforholddepartureorderbeforethisCourteveninextraditionproceedingand

4. Accusedisrequiredtoreporttothegovernmentprosecutorshandlingthiscaseorif
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week and if they
furtherdesire,manifestbeforethisCourttorequirethatalltheassetsofaccused,real
andpersonal,befiledwiththisCourtsoonest,withtheconditionthatiftheaccused
fleesfromhisundertaking,saidassetsbeforfeitedinfavorofthegovernmentandthat
thecorrespondinglien/annotationbenotedthereinaccordingly.

SOORDERED.

OnDecember21,2001,petitionerfiledanurgentmotiontovacatetheaboveOrder,butit
wasdeniedbyrespondentjudgeinhisOrderdatedApril10,2002.

Hence,theinstantpetition.Petitionerallegedthatthetrialcourtcommittedgraveabuseof
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditeehasarighttobail,therightbeinglimitedsolelytocriminalproceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee and that
extraditionisaharshprocessresultinginaprolongeddeprivationofonesliberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be
impaired,thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficientsureties,orbereleasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Theright
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
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suspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.

Jurisprudenceonextraditionisbutinitsinfancyinthisjurisdiction.Nonetheless,thisis
not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospectiveextraditeemaybegrantedbail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
[1]
Judge,RTCofManila,Branch42,andMarkB.Jimenez,a.k.a.MarioBatacanCrespo,
this Court, speaking through thenAssociate JusticeArtemio V. Panganiban, later Chief
Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings.Itisavailableonlyincriminalproceedings,thus:

xxx. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
whenapersonhasbeenarrestedanddetainedforviolationofPhilippinecriminallaws.It
does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgmentsofconvictionoracquittal.

Moreover,theconstitutionalrighttobailflowsfromthepresumptionofinnocence
infavorofeveryaccusedwhoshouldnotbesubjectedtothelossoffreedomasthereafter
hewouldbeentitledtoacquittal,unlesshisguiltbeprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt(De
laCamarav.Enage,41SCRA1,6,September17,1971,perFernando, J.,laterCJ).It
followsthattheconstitutionalprovisiononbailwillnotapplytoacaselikeextradition,
wherethepresumptionofinnocenceisnotatissue.

TheprovisionintheConstitutionstatingthattherighttobailshallnotbeimpairedeven
whentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspendeddoesnotdetractfromthe
rulethattheconstitutionalrighttobailisavailableonlyincriminalproceedings.Itmust
be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion (Sec. 18,Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminalproceedingsfortheaforementionedoffenses.Itcannotbetakentomeanthatthe
rightisavailableeveninextraditionproceedingsthatarenotcriminalinnature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growingimportanceoftheindividualpersoninpublicinternationallawwho,inthe20th
century,hasgraduallyattainedglobalrecognition(2)thehighervaluenowbeinggivento
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human rights in the international sphere (3) the corresponding duty of countries to
observetheseuniversalhumanrightsinfulfillingtheirtreatyobligationsand(4)theduty
of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand,andthelawonextradition,ontheother.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is
nowtakingroot.Thevulnerabledoctrinethatthesubjectsofinternationallawarelimited
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For
one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacleofindividualdefendantsforactscharacterizedasviolationsofthelawsofwar,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individualpersonisnowavalidsubjectofinternationallaw.

Onamorepositivenote,alsoafterWorldWarII,bothinternationalorganizations
andstatesgaverecognitionandimportancetohumanrights.Thus,onDecember10,1948,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
[2]
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,

[3]
the

principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the
UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
RightswhichthePhilippinessignedandratified.Fundamentalamongtherightsenshrined
thereinaretherightsofeverypersontolife,liberty,anddueprocess.

ThePhilippines,alongwiththeothermembersofthefamilyofnations,committed
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toupholdthefundamentalhumanrightsaswellasvaluetheworthanddignityofevery
person.ThiscommitmentisenshrinedinSectionII,ArticleIIofourConstitutionwhich
provides:TheStatevaluesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespect
for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detainedorarrestedcanparticipateintheproceedingsbeforeacourt,toenableittodecide
withoutdelayonthelegalityofthedetentionandordertheirreleaseifjustified.In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
underdetentionsuchremedieswhichsafeguardtheirfundamentalrighttoliberty. These
remediesincludetherighttobeadmittedtobail.WhilethisCourtinPurgananlimitedthe
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
righttolifeandliberty,areexaminationofthisCourtsrulinginPurgananisinorder.

First,wenotethattheexerciseoftheStatespowertodepriveanindividualofhis
libertyisnotnecessarilylimitedtocriminalproceedings.Respondentsinadministrative
[4]
proceedings,suchasdeportationandquarantine, havelikewisebeendetained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudentialhistory.Philippinejurisprudencehasnotlimitedtheexerciseoftherightto
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involvedincriminalproceedings.Infact,bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
personsindetentionduringthependencyofadministrativeproceedings,takinginto
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
upholdhumanrights.

[5]
The 1909 case of US v. GoSioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportationforfailuretosecurethenecessarycertificateofregistrationwasgrantedbail
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime,
theCourtopinedthatTorefusehimbailistotreathimasapersonwhohascommittedthe
mostseriouscrimeknowntolawandthatwhiledeportationisnotacriminalproceeding,
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some of the machinery used is the machinery of criminal law. Thus, the provisions
relatingtobailwasappliedtodeportationproceedings.

[6]
[7]
InMejoffv.DirectorofPrisons andChirskoffv.CommissionofImmigration,
thisCourtruledthatforeignnationalsagainstwhomnoformalcriminalchargeshavebeen
filedmaybereleasedonbailpendingthefinalityofanorderofdeportation.Aspreviously
stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustainingthedetaineesrighttobail.

Ifbailcanbegrantedindeportationcases,weseenojustificationwhyitshouldnot
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
DeclarationofHumanRightsappliestodeportationcases,thereisnoreasonwhyit
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
wheretheinnocenceorguiltofthepersondetainedisnotinissue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
mustbeviewedinthelightofthevarioustreatyobligationsofthePhilippinesconcerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumptionliesinfavorofhumanliberty.Thus,thePhilippinesshouldseetoitthatthe
righttolibertyofeveryindividualisnotimpaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law)definesextraditionastheremovalofanaccusedfromthePhilippineswiththeobject
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
himortheexecutionofapenaltyimposedonhimunderthepenalorcriminallawofthe
requestingstateorgovernment.

Extraditionhasthusbeencharacterizedastherightofaforeignpower,createdby
treaty,todemandthesurrenderofoneaccusedorconvictedofacrimewithinitsterritorial
jurisdiction,andthecorrelativedutyoftheotherstatetosurrenderhimtothedemanding
[8]
[9]
state. Itisnotacriminalproceeding. Evenifthepotentialextraditeeisacriminal,an
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extraditionproceedingisnotbyitsnaturecriminal,foritisnotpunishmentforacrime,
[10]
even though such punishment may follow extradition.
It is sui generis, tracing its
[11]
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.
It is not a trial to
determinetheguiltorinnocenceofthepotentialextraditee.

[12]
Norisitafullblown

[13]
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.
Its object is to
preventtheescapeofapersonaccusedorconvictedofacrimeandtosecurehisreturnto
[14]
thestatefromwhichhefled,forthepurposeoftrialorpunishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following:(a)itentailsadeprivationoflibertyonthepartofthepotentialextraditeeand
(b)themeansemployedtoattainthepurposeofextraditionisalsothemachineryof
criminallaw. This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law)whichmandatestheimmediatearrestandtemporarydetentionoftheaccusedif
such will best serve the interest of justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state in case of urgency to ask for the provisional arrest of the accused,
pendingreceiptoftherequestforextraditionandthatreleasefromprovisionalarrest
shall not prejudice rearrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
receivedsubsequently.

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all

earmarksofacriminalprocess.Apotentialextraditeemaybesubjectedtoarrest,toa
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
followingtheproceedings.Temporarydetentionmaybeanecessarystepintheprocess
ofextradition,butthelengthoftimeofthedetentionshouldbereasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admissiontobail.Inotherwords,hehadbeendetainedforovertwo(2)yearswithout
having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolongeddeprivationoflibertywhichpromptedtheextraditioncourttogranthimbail.
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While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however,thereisnoprovisionprohibitinghimorherfromfilingamotionforbail,aright
todueprocessundertheConstitution.

Theapplicablestandardofdueprocess,however,shouldnotbethesameasthatin
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumptionofinnocenceoftheaccused.AsPurganancorrectlypointsout,itisfromthis
majorpremisethattheancillarypresumptioninfavorofadmittingtobailarises.Bearing
in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee.Thisisbasedontheassumptionthatsuchextraditeeisafugitivefromjustice.
[15]
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showingthatheorsheisnotaflightriskandshouldbegrantedbail.

The timehonored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
SpecialAdministrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorilymet.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in

granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospectiveextraditeefromfleeingourjurisdiction.InhisSeparateOpinioninPurganan,
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thenAssociateJustice,nowChiefJusticeReynatoS. Puno,proposedthatanewstandard
which he termed clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide
withalltheordersandprocessesoftheextraditioncourt.

Inthiscase,thereisnoshowingthatprivaterespondentpresentedevidencetoshow
thatheisnotaflightrisk.Consequently,thiscaseshouldberemandedtothetrialcourtto
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of clear and
convincingevidence.

WHEREFORE,weDISMISSthepetition.ThiscaseisREMANDEDtothetrial
courttodeterminewhetherprivaterespondentisentitledtobailonthebasisofclearand
convincingevidence.Ifnot,thetrialcourtshouldorderthecancellationofhisbailbond
and his immediate detention and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SOORDERED.

ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
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AssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice

ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

CANCIOC.GARCIA
AssociateJustice

AssociateJustice

CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJustice

DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,ArticleVIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

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[1]
G.R.No.148571,September24,2002,389SCRA623,664.
[2]
90Phil.70(1951).
[3]
Sec.2,Art.IIstatesThePhilippinesrenounceswarasaninstrumentofnationalpolicy, adoptsthegenerallyaccepted
principlesofinternationallawaspartofthelawofthelandandadherestothepolicyofpeace,equality,justice,
freedom,cooperation,andamitywithallnations.

[4]
In cases involving quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, bail is not available. See State v.
Hutchinson,18So.2d.723,246Ala.48Varholyv.Sweat,15So.2d.267,153Fla.571,Bakerv.Strautz,54NE2d.
441,386lll.360.

[5]
12Phil.490(1909).
[6]
Supra,footnote2.
[7]
90Phil.256(1951).
[8]
Factorv.Laubenheimer,290US276,78L.Ed.315,54S.Ct.101Terlindonv.Ames,184US270,46L.Ed.534,22S.Ct.
484FongYueTingv.US,149US698,37L.Ed.905,13S.Ct.1016Fitzpatrickv.Williams, 46 F2d. 40 US v.
Godwin,97F.Supp.252,affd.191F2d.932Dominguezv.State,234SW701,90Tex.Crim.92.

[9]
SecretaryofJusticev.Lantion,G.R.No.139465,October17,2000,343SCRA377.

[10]
USexrelOppenheimv.Hecht,16F2d.955,certden.273US969,71L.Ed.883,47S.Ct.572.

[11]
Statev.Chase,107So.541,91Fla.413Statev.Quigg,108So.409,91Fla.197.

[12]
Bensonv.McMahon,127US457,32L.Ed.234,8S.Ct.1240Jimenezv.Aristequieta,311F2d.547,stayden.314F2d.
649.

[13]
Spatolav.US,741F.Supp.362,Affd.925F2d.615.

[14]
ReHenderson,145NW574,27ND155StateexrelTresoderv.Remann,4P2d.866,165Wash.92.
[15]
Beaulieuv.Hartigan,554F.2d1.

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