Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
B.
Detailed Considerations
I.INTRODUCTION
1. In its 127th meeting the Administrative Council was confronted with the HR-Roadmap
document CA/110/11, in which a financial analysis worked out by Deloitte was presented,
while exploring ideas intending to adopt a global financial scheme for the EPO that would
2.
3.
Also the President of the EPO decided to propose a new career system for the employees
of this Office to the Administrative Council in which promotion is based on merit and
performance. Instead of calling a HIGH-LEVEL NEGOTIATING BODY as an
independent authority dedicated to develop an appropriate career system, the President
assigned that duty to an internal working team led by two Principal Directors and a
Director of Directorate General 1 (DG1), which developed a new career system
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supposed to be in line with the document CA/39/14 presented to the Council earlier in
2014. Unfortunately, the new career system finally presented to the Budgetary and
Finance Committee and to the Administrative Council as document CA/84/14 is replete of
5.
EPO staff.
My request for management review against the upholding of the Councils decision CA/D
10/14 was filed directly with the Administrative Council, because that decision directly
affects adversely all staff members without having to implement that decision individually
at personal level. This is so, because each employee lost his/her former status as A-, B-,
C-category employee as from 1.1.2015 without involvement of an additional
administrative decision. The filed request should have therefore been deemed admissible
recalling inter alia the Defendants own reasoning put forward in document CA/56/14,
under point 15 and the principles laid down in the ILO Administrative Tribunals
Judgment No. 3291 (consideration 8).
ILO has obviously recognised the importance of that fundamental requirement and
pointed it out in J. No. 2972 (considerations 6,8,9,10), i.e. that the EPO as International
Organisation has a duty of care to ensure that any new arrangements do not cause
financial hardship to staff who entered into financial obligations. In J. No. 2941
(consideration 6), the Tribunal assessed specific elements of the career reform carried
out at Eurocontrol and found that the specific provision at issue was carried out
correctly in respect of each of the complainants, who retain not only their right to
continue to receive their previous salary but also their right to an automatic increase in
this salary by advancing to the next step on the basis of acquired seniority.
8.
The new career system of the EPO proposed in document CA/84/14 and adopted by
the Councils decision CA/D 10/14 is in breach with the fundamental principles of
international administrative law discussed above and should therefore be deemed
unlawful and decision CA/D 10/14 rescinded. The reform relating to the new career
system of the EPO not only deprives staff from reaching the scheduled seniority
advancement up to the level of the final step of his or her grade in the current
structure, but even freezes the advancement right to the next seniority step for staff
members who had at least partly - completed the requisite waiting period of 12,
respectively 24 months in their current 1-, or respectively 2-year step entitling them to
advancement to the next higher step by the 31st of December 2014 (emphasis added).
Thus, EPO staff finding themselves in that situation, had already fulfilled at least in part
- the conditions for advancement into the next higher seniority step already under the old
system, i.e. at the end of their last working day of December, but the new relegations do
not foresee - even in proportion - an automatic salary adjustment due to seniority at any
time after 1.1.2015 at which such adjustment was or would be due. The level of
unlawfulness of decision CA/D 10/14 is further manifested through the eternal freezing
of the salary of staff members at former grade A4(2) by converting their last salary into an
ad personam invariant remuneration; these officials are merely entitled to occasional
adjustments due to inflation according to the temporary salary method, cf. Article 56 of
the impugned decision CA/D 10/14. In the case of Eurocotrol, the Administrative
Tribunal of the ILO confirmed the lawfulness of a new career reform under the proviso of
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the fulfilment of certain criteria. Thus, in J. No. 3275 (consideration 8) the Tribunal points
out: The reform has not had the effect of unreasonably restricting the promotion
possibilities of the officials, nor was it intended to do so. In the case of the EPO, the
intention has however been both to prevent the seniority adjustment to the salary of
former grade A4(2) officials and unreasonably restrict their promotion possibilities. Prior
to decision CA/D 10/14, grade A4(2) officials were entitled to automatic advancement
to the next higher seniority step every one to two years; grade A4 officials were on the
average entitled to promotion to grade A4(2) up to the capping of a budgetary limitation
allowing staff at grade A4(2) not exceeding 20% of the number of staff at grade A4 (cf.
ANNEX 3). This is a severe constraint of the system compared to the promotion rates
allowed in the European Union (cf. table of ANNEX 2), but at least had allowed on the
average 50 to 70 promotions to grade A4(2) annually at the EPO, which is an
Organisation embracing about 6800 permanent employees. Instead, the new career
system of the EPO solely foresees to a (limited) number of colleagues (cf. CA/84/14,
point 17) some technical or managerial career path higher than the level of grade A4.
Hence, the new career system of the EPO unreasonably restricts the promotion
prospects of former grade A4 officials and unreasonably abolishes altogether the
prospects of seniority advancement to former grade A4(2) officials.
9.
10. The situation regarding the breach of an acquired right is further aggravated for that
category of undersigned requesters/complainants who have transferred national
pension rights to the Pensions Scheme of the EPO. This is so, because upon such
transfer (which constitutes a final and irrevocable decision) some of the earlier recognised
years have been discounted for actuarial reasons. Thus, for a period of say five years of
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work outside the EPO, an official might have been able to achieve only a two- to threeyear recognition of accrued pension rights at an annual rate of 2% according to the
provisions of Article 10 PENSION REGULATIONS of the EPO. Such a strong discount
results from actuarial considerations anticipating that a new EPO employee would (at
least) reach the highest seniority step in his grade prior to retirement, which is associated
with a predictably higher end salary (apart from salary adjustments due to inflation) than
the officials salary when the national pension rights got transferred. The new career
system abolishes that guarantee of seniority advancement and hence reduces the real
value of the pension rights transferred from a national pensions system to the
pensions system of the EPO.
11. According to ILOAT J. No. 3256 (consideration 14), rules on promotion do confer an
acquired right insofar as they offer staff an expectation of advancement. Article 3 of
the Service Regulations still valid in 2014 grouped category A examiners, lawyers and
administrators in a bracket system comprising grades A1, A2, A3, A4 and A4(2). The
administrative reorganisation of the career system into a single spine career system
according to the impugned decision CA/D 10/14 foresees solely the formal transposition
of former grade A1- to A4-staff into new grades G7 to G13. The highest step of former
grade A4 is transposed to the highest step of new grade G13. No formal possibilities for
further advancement through normal promotion exist, which constitutes a clear breach of
the acquired right of former grade A4 staff members, in particular of those former A4
officials, who fulfilled the formal criteria for consideration of promotion to grade A4(2) at
the end of 2014 (emphasis added). Regarding the situation at Eurocontrol, the Tribunal
set forth in J. No. 3275 (consideration 8) that [I]inasmuch as under the old system there
was an objective prospect of promotion to a higher grade, their assignment to a generic
post in another classification system has not deprived them of that prospect of
advancement. The Tribunal went on with the following explanations: officials who
have reached the highest grade in their career bracket can progress further in their
career only by being appointed following a competition, in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in Article 16a of Rule of Application No. 2 of the Staff Regulations, to
another post in a new bracket, or through a job review justifying the reclassification of
their post in a higher bracket. The new rules on job classification have not therefore
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31.12.2014 fulfilled the merits and seniority criteria for such promotion. That could for
instance concern staff members expecting a promotion from former grade B2 to
grade B3 or from grade A3 to grade A4 and subsequently be entitled to the automatic
seniority adjustment steps of the next higher grade, who should be promoted on the basis
of the services delivered and performance shown by 31.12.2014. The promotion
conditions associated with the new grade into which they are transposed according to
decision CA/D 10/14 annihilates such accumulated rights since under paragraph (2) of
Article 27 of the impugned decision CA/D 10/14, vertical promotion to the next higher
grade may only occur after having reached the last step of the grade into which the official
at issue was transposed as per 1.1.2015. This results to an arbitrary delay of promotion
to the next higher grade and violates the acquired rights of the individual officials
concerned. This is not a trivial matter. For the entitlement to promotion from grade A3 to
grade A4, an examiner or (respectively a lawyer or administrator) had to exhibit a very
high level proficiency and performance over many years for achieving those marks in
his/her staff report that would entitle him/her to such promotion. Moreover, in cases of
conflict still pending before the Internal Appeals Committee or before the Administrative
Tribunal of the ILO, a correction of staff report marks that might be deemed necessary
could have such implications that retroactive promotion should become necessary. Such
potential legal rights are also annihilated by decision CA/D 10/14, since the competent
promotion boards entrusted with the recommendation of promotions is such
circumstances and entitled to review the need for a retroactive promotion, say from grade
A3 to grade A4 before 31.12.2014, have ceased to exist.
14. A further loss of an acquired right is the entitlement to assignment to that step in the next
higher grade following promotion, which would be associated with a higher salary than
prior to promotion. This entitlement has been abolished by the provisions defined in the
last sentence of paragraph (5) of Article 27 of decision CA/D 10/14.
III.
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arise artificially for younger management employees, who are also permanent EPO
officials, and who are transposed to Job Groups 3 and 2 as illustrated in the next
paragraph 18 (this is the effect of Article 54 (3); Article 55 (2) of the currently impugned
decision).
18. Document CA/39/13 (cf. ANNEX 4 reproducing the relevant part of document
CA/39/13) introduces a number of requests for review, which had been filed in 2013 by
several staff members and by elected staff representatives for different grounds but
without success. One of those requests tackled the problems relating to lack of clarity in
the wording of decision CA/D 34/07, which had amended the provisions of Article 49
Service Regulations relating to promotions and appointments. Those requests for review
had been filed in connection with appointments in the General Directorate 4 (Personnel
Department), which had concomitantly been accompanied by promotions falling within
the competence of the same Appointing Authority such that a vertical leap of more than
one category A grade had occurred (e.g. an employees internal appointment from a grade
A3 post to a grade A6 post). Citing ILOAT J. No. 3191, the requesters/complainants asked
the Administrative Council to perform the necessary clarifications in the Service
Regulations so as to respect the Case Law of ILOAT and prohibit that kind of
appointments associated with promotions beyond the next higher grade within the same
category. The two specific examples mentioned in that complaint were
- that of the Principal Director Human Resources (PD43) appointed/promoted from grade
-
A3 to grade A6 and
that of the Director, who had applied for the post HR Customer Interface, and who was
appointed/promoted from grade A3 to grade A5.
The examples of the above mentioned employees are highly relevant to the present
request for review, because the first employee was of grade A6 step 2 and the second
employee of grade A5 Step 3 on 31.12.2014; with reference to Article 40 of decision CA/D
10/14, it is clear that the said first employee (PD43) is transposed to Job Group 2, while
the said second employee to Job Group 3. By referring to the salary tables published in
CA/D 8/14, it is recognised that
- for the first employee (PD43), the basic salary amounted to 11,235.60 EUR in
December 2014 and 13,042.55 EUR in July 2015; and
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for the second employee, the basic salary amounted to 10,283.50 EUR in December
2014 and 10,759.64 EUR in July 2015.
19. The preceding summary of facts and considerations show that the provisions of the
impugned decision CA/D 10/14 are in breach with the principles of equivalence and of
equality. They entail financial benefits to a limited number of young employees in the
medium and senior administration linked with quantum salary jumps from December
2014 to January 2015, which are neither linked with promotion nor with reclassification
of posts. Since the underlying decisions leading to such financial irregularities fall
within the competence of the Budget and Finance Committee (BFC) and of the
Administrative Council (AC), these are the only Bodies that can provide the
necessary remedies.
It is worrisome that one of the above mentioned employees was strongly involved in the
design of the new career system and that the finally proposed scheme in document
CA/84/14 had undergone the control of the harmonisation committees at principal
directorate or Office-wide levels (cf. CA/84/14, point 26).
20.
Since unwarranted financial benefits of the above kind have not been prevented by the
senior administration in the near past, who can guarantee in the future that bonuses
foreseen to be granted (and approved) exclusively by the appointing authority (Article 26
CA/D 10/14) remote from the control of the Administrative Council, may not be
tainted with favouritism and personal advantage in the future (emphasis added)?
21. Analogous questions are raised as to the intent of Article 25 of decision CA/D 10/14
allowing for annual two-step advancement. Where such two-step advancement is
supposed to reward high performing officials for whom a vertical promotion to the next
higher grade is no longer possible (cf. point 13 above), such a measure provides a
reasonable relief. Yet, this situation arises only for officials whose former grade
belonged to a multi-grade bracket and those were officials assigned to former grades C1
to C5, B1 to B5 and A1 to A4 (new Job Groups 6 to 4). The career brackets of officials
assigned to former grades A5 and A6 comprised a single grade in the old system and so
was the situation for grade A4(2) officials until October 2007, i.e. prior to adoption of the
contested decision CA/D 34/07. The provision allowing for annual two-step
advancement in the cases of Job Groups 3 and 2 corresponding to management posts
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and members of the Boards of Appeal is a rather dubious. This is so because respective
unreasonably quick 2-step seniority advancements in those cases would involve the
personal recommendation/decision of either Vice-Presidents and the President, who
according to ILOAT Case Law have been appointed according to political criteria to
those posts, or of the Chairs of the Boards of Appeal, which would be an act raising issues
regarding the independence of the Members of the Boards of Appeal. Furthermore,
from the legal point of view, an accelerated 2-step seniority advancement of employees
who had been assigned to a single-grade bracket (e.g. A5 or A6) prior to decision CA/D
10/14 would be tantamount to accelerated higher deferred pension rights for those
employees, who have not yet paid for a reasonable length of time analogous contributions
to the Reserve Fund for Pensions and Social Security (RFPSS). This in turn would imply
undue financial burden to RFPSS at the cost of lower ranked EPO officials (cf. also
related arguments in ILOAT J. No. 2875), which cannot be deemed lawful (emphasis
added).
22. The transposition foreseen by decision CA/D 10/14 breaches in a very severe form the
principle of equivalence from the point view that staff, who, prior to the reform
belonged to the same hierarchical rank and their basic salaries differed only due to age
seniority, have now been separated by vertical barriers as a consequence of decision
CA/D 10/14 as per 1.1.2015; this cannot be deemed lawful. Directors and Members of the
Boards of Appeal who had been assigned by promotion/selection through competition to
the same single-grade bracket associated with former grade A5 have been transposed
into three new hierarchically different single spine grades G13, G14 and G15. Thus, a
younger former grade A5 director shall have to undergo two promotion procedures in
order to be able to reach the same hierarchical level as an older, former grade A5 director
transposed to new grade G15. This is nothing but age-discrimination deemed unlawful
according to fundament principles of law strictly respected in countries of the European
Union (emphasis added).
IV. BREACH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
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23. As outlined under point 5 above, the true underlying reasons of the reform are reasons of
political economics. At the imitative of some Member States, earlier given guarantees had
been ignored and by the Councils decision CA/D 25/07 a huge financial burden was
transferred overnight to the EPO, which, until that decision, was a financially well-balanced
International Organisation. This has indubitably been acknowledged by the financial
experts of Deloitte as revealed by the following quotation from the minutes of the 127 th
Administrative Council, document (cf. document CA/18/11):
91. The staff representatives said the study had confirmed that the Office's negative equity
was due mainly to shifting the cost of the tax adjustment from the member states to the
Office. They asked the Deloitte representatives what the figure would be if that had not
been done.
92. The Deloitte representatives replied that in that case the Office would indeed have no
negative equity.
24. The EPOs situation being as outlined above, EPO staff has been asked to make sacrifices in
order to improve the EPO equity. The lawfulness of that decision is not subject-matter of
the present request/complaint. However, if EPO staff is asked to make sacrifices, the
principle of proportionality demands that the sacrifices are share by all ranks of EPO
officials as this has been the case in those European countries in which the 2008 financial
crisis forced salary cuts/limitations to civil servants (emphasis added). The impugned
decision CA/D 10/14 pursues a different goal: The maximum attainable salary by highest
performing examiners, lawyers and administrators has been cut by 20% (this is readily
recognised by comparison of the salary tables valid before and after 1.1.2015; cf. CA/D
8/14); on the other hand, the maximum salary attainable by permanent members of the
management and by vice-president has remained unchanged. In addition to that, three
years ago (cf. CA/D 9/11), the Administrative Council had granted an extra 10% benefit to
vice-presidents on top of their normal salary, which decision CA/D 10/14 has not touched.
That kind of amendments may not be deemed proportionate. On top of that, we have
encountered the financial irregularities pointed out under point 18 above.
25. It is further noted, that in questions regarding salary methods, the Tribunal has ruled that
the underlying rules of adjustments in a new salary method should be stable, foreseeable
and clearly understood (J. No. 1821, consideration 7). It would be expected that rules
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relating to the methods of promotions having implications upon salaries meet analogous
standards. Until October 2007, the EPO rules of promotions enshrined in Article 49 Service
Regulations were indeed stable, foreseeable and clearly understood. In October 2007, the
Councils contested decision CA/D 34/07 blurred transparency, which had as a consequence
a number of controversial decisions relating to promotions through appointments. The
impugned decision CA/D 10/14 aggravates the situation further as it leaves a series of
critical questions unanswered, viz. it abolishes an entire grade, i.e. grade A4(2), without
equivalent, speaks of
indication as to the number of new posts to be created in the various sites of employment,
introduces vague provisions linked to undetermined terminology such as within the
budgetary limits ... or the appointing authority may lay down further terms ... and allows
downgrading of posts through reclassification (Articles 4, 25, 56 of CA/D 10/14).
V.
FLAWED CONSULTATION
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27. The impugned decision CA/D 10/14 was made on the basis of the Presidents proposal laid
down in document CA/84/14. That document differed in respect of essential issues (e.g. in
respect of the provisions foreseen in Articles 56 and 60 affecting a whole class of employees
and pensioners) considerably from its precursor version (i.e. GCC/DOC 6/14) discussed on
10 October 2014 in the General Consultative Committee (GCC) on 10 October 2014 as
required by Article 38 Service Regulations.
28. Moreover, the constitution of the GCC, which is the successor body of the General Advisory
Committee (GAC) since the decision CA/D 2/14 has taken effect, may not be deemed
lawful for the same reasons that the Internal Appeals Committee has unanimously concluded
that the constitution of the GAC including Vice-Presidents as members of that Committee
was unlawful (cf. extract of that opinion in ANNEX 5). Furthermore, by the Presidents
decision based on the content of a legally challenged circular, the GCC convened on
10.10.2014 did not embrace all elected staff committee members, who, according to the
election result of 18.6.2014 should be full members of the Central Staff Committee and
hence members of the GCC (cf. Articles 35(1),(3), 36(1) and 38(1) Service Regulations).
29. For the reasons given above, the GCC statutory consultation has not taken place as it
should for the discussion of the merits of the proposed reform as per document CA/84/14,
which, as analysed in the preceding paragraphs, does not comply with fundamental
principles of international administrative law.
C. Procedural irregularities
(i) The analysis provided in the above INSERT and the material
issues addressed under A (ii) above, unambiguously show that the
Complainants Request for Review filed with the Administrative
Council within the statutorily prescribed time limit was justified.
The challenged decision CA/D 10/14 had as direct adverse effect
the termination of counting seniority month after month for the
purpose of automatic seniority advancement to the next higher
horizontal step associated with higher remuneration as from
1.1.2015. Despite that fact having been made clear to the Council
by means of the submissions recited above in the INSERT, the
Council followed the recommendation of the President made in
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