Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Economic Modelling
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecmod
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University, VIC 3000, Australia
Department of Economics, Monash University, VIC 3800, Australia
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Accepted 26 February 2012
JEL classication:
E52
E58
E63
Keywords:
India
Ination targeting
CPI
Taylor's rule
Monetary policy
a b s t r a c t
This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of
monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments
(IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and
CPI ination targeting, strict and exible ination targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests
that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in exible domestic ination targeting and
CPI ination targeting respectively. However, exible domestic ination targeting seems a better alternative
from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where nancial markets are still not sufciently
integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.
2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Ination targeting has emerged as a powerful and effective monetary policy regime since the early 1990s. It has been adopted by a
number of industrial countries starting with New Zealand in 1990,
Canada in February 1991, Israel in December 1991, the United Kingdom in 1992, Sweden and Finland in 1993 and Australia and Spain
in 1994. Many of the empirical studies show that an ination targeting regime has been successful in signicantly reducing ination in
these countries. Bernanke et al. (1999), for example, found that ination remained lower after ination targeting than would have been
the case if forecasted by using Vector Auto-Regressions (VARs) estimated with the data from the period before ination targeting
started. Ination targeting also helped to maintain price stability
once it was achieved. Inspired by the success of ination targeting
in industrialized economies, many Emerging Market Economies
(EMEs) also adopted an ination-targeting approach to monetary
policy, including Chile in 1991, Brazil in 1999, Czech Republic in
1997, Poland in 1998 and Hungary in 2001.
Ination targeting is currently practiced by a group of advanced
economies and several medium to small sized EMEs. The applicability
of this regime to a large, growing, developing economy like India is
still a researchable area. There has been growing interest in analyzing
the applicability and suitability of ination targeting as a monetary policy regime for India, primarily because the current multiple indicator
monetary policy approach2 of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) seems
to have lost its relevance and does not appear to work effectively.3
Many studies in the literature have attempted to analyze India's preparedness for ination targeting. Indeed. several studies have examined
nancial sector reforms as the essential pre-condition for adoption of
ination targeting, and analyzed the preparedness of India for ination
targeting from that perspective (see, Jha, 2008; Kannan, 1999). Following Kannan's (1999) suggestion that implementation of ination targeting in India should wait until nancial sector reforms have been
completed, Singh (2006) argued that the rst phase of nancial sector
reforms is complete and macroeconomic performance in terms of
level of ination and interest rates is satisfactory and stable suggesting
that conditions are favorable in India for the adoption of ination targeting. Singh advocated addressing a few issues, namely, use of both scal
and monetary instruments to control ination, publication of fulledged ination reports, and establishing an ination committee to
bring transparency in its operation before an actual ination targeting
framework could be adopted in India. Khatkhate (2006) asserted that
ination targeting might be a good policy framework for India as the
RBI always has to be on alert to maintain its credibility and authority
2
Post global nancial crisis, nancial stability has become one of the major concerns
of central banks across the world. However, if implemented in a exible manner, ination targeting is perfectly compatible with a nancial stability objective (Walsh, 2009).
3
Refer to D'souza (2003), Shah (2007), Mishra and Mishra (2009), Mishra and Mishra
(2010).
1054
Such as changes in food output, marketed surplus, lax scal policy etc.
The most suitable implies the framework which is capable of bringing in overall
macro stabilization and not just ination stabilization.
6
For a closed economy version of the model, refer to Ball (1997).
5
Here, t denotes domestic or Wholesale Price Index (WPI) ination. We assume that there is some inertia in ination and it is not
completely forward-looking. The degree of forward-lookingness depends on the values of the parameter b1. Thus, ination depends
on its lag, its expected value in period t + 1, output gap (Yt), lag of
(log change in) real exchange rate (qt) (or lag of depreciation rate)
and zero mean i.i.d. ination shock (etp). Ett + 1 as the expected ination rate in period t + 1 is observed from period t. 10 The variable
output gap yt is dened as:
yt
d
p
yt yt :
Here, ytd is (log) aggregate demand and ytp is potential output 11.
The variable qt 1 is the (log) lag real exchange rate. The real exchange rate in the economy is dened by following the Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) condition:
qt et pt pt :
qt qt1jt t1jt it t :
t 1t t :
t pt pt1
ptf pt et
and
1055
et Et et1 it it t
where it and it* are domestic and foreign nominal interest rates respectively, and te is a combined shock in foreign interest rate and
other disturbances in the foreign exchange market, including shocks
to foreign exchange risk premium. 12
The aggregate demand (dened in terms of output-gap) in the
economy in period t is given by the following equation:
y
t 1t t qt qt1 t qt qt1 :
Thus, the model consists of aggregate supply Eq. (1), aggregate demand Eq. (5), real interest rate parity Eq. (7), and the CPI Eq. (9).
3.1. The Loss function
The optimal monetary policy rules can be derived from central
bank's explicit loss function. We assume the following loss function
of RBI:
5
2
c2
Lt t t y yt i it i it it1 :
The aggregate demand curve is backward looking. It depends on
its own past lag, real interest rate (rt), depreciation rate and demand
shocks. The term ty is a zero mean i.i.d. aggregate demand shock.
9
This Phillips curve is similar to the Phillips curve emerging from a Calvo type staggered price setting framework from the inter-temporal maximization of a representative agent that demands domestic and foreign goods, and also to Fuhrer and Moore
Phillips curve in that ination depends on both lagged ination and future expected ination. Further, the motivation for this empirical version of Phillips curve comes from
the results of Mishra and Mishra (2010). They found that the (change in) exchange
rate affects ination with a lag. External factors like oil prices and foreign interest rates
were also signicant in explaining ination. We assumed that effects of all these external factors would be transmitted to domestic ination via a change in exchange rate.
10
For estimation, the expected ination is taken as a forecast obtained from tting
AR(1) model in WPI ination series.
11
Potential output is obtained with HodrickPrescott lter method. It is thus a longterm trend component in (log) of Index of Industrial Production (IIP) series, which is
the measure of output (aggregate demand) in our model.
12
This assumption is motivated by Batini and Haldane's (1999) model and the response of exchange rate to monetary policy shock as discovered by Mishra and Mishra
(2010) where we see some prolonged appreciation of exchange rate to a positive interest rate shock.
10
Here, all the weights are non-negative; thus, the loss function is
the weighted sum of the respective unconditional variances and dened in the following way:
c
c
ELt Var t Var t y Varyt i Varit
i Var it it1 :
11
Here, , c , y, i and i are policy parameters that relate to domestic ination, CPI ination, output, interest rate and interest rate
smoothing. The strict domestic ination targeting corresponds to
positive and all other weights are equal to zero. Flexible domestic
ination targeting refers to positive weights to other policy parameters also. CPI ination targeting will have c positive rather than .
Thus, the decision problem of the central bank is to choose the instrument it conditional upon the information available in period t so as
to minimize Eq. (10).
1056
h
i
j
2
c c2
2
2
2
t t y yt i it i it :
12
j0
Here, is the discount factor (fullling 0 b b 1 representing central bank's rate of time preference).
4. Data and empirical estimations
The aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations are estimated with an Instrumental Variable-Generalized Method of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator. 13 We use monthly data for the period
January 1996 to March 2007. The data is sourced mainly from the
IFS (IMF) and the RBI (www.rbi.org.in). All the variables other than
interest rates are transformed as annual changes in log values. Thus,
all the variables denote year-on-year changes in the original series
which take care of seasonality issues in the monthly sample. All the
variables are for the 199394 base period. All the variables entering
into the estimation are stationary. 14 As there are expectation variables in the equations, we estimated the equations by replacing
these expected values with their corresponding realized values and
thereby introducing expectation errors into the equations' composite
disturbances.
4.1. Variable description
Domestic ination and CPI ination are measured as year-to-year
changes in Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and Consumer Price Index
for Industrial Workers (CPI-IW). Output gap is measured as the difference between (log of) Index of Industrial Production (IIP) and
its long term trend, proxied by (log of) HodrickPrescott trend. Real
exchange rate is measured by real effective exchange rate (REER)
trade weighted. The call money rate (CMR) is taken as the short-run
nominal interest rate.
4.2. Estimation of aggregate supply equation
The specication of aggregate supply equation is kept as close as
possible to the theoretical specication as described in Section 3.
The annual WPI ination (WPI) is the dependent variable. The lag
of ination (WPIt1 ) and lag of (log) change in real effective exchange rate (REERt1 ) are the included instruments. The endogenous regressors are output gap ( Y) and expected ination (E
[WPI]). They are instrumented with a number of variables and their
lags (excluded instruments) 15 in the regression.
The estimation results of aggregate supply equation suggest that
both lagged ination rate and expected ination are highly signicant
(at 1% level). The ination in India shows substantial inertia along
with the degree of forward-lookingness. This conrms our assumption in the theoretical section that hybrid Phillips curve could better
explain ination dynamics in India. The lag of (log) change in real
13
The GMM estimator applied here is the two-step efcient generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator. The efcient GMM estimator minimizes the GMM criterion function J = N * g * W * g, where N is the sample size, g is the orthogonality or moment conditions (specifying that all the exogenous variables or instruments in the
equation are uncorrelated with the error term) and W is the weighting matrix (inverse
of an estimate of the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions). These moments'
conditions are tested using Hansen J statistic.
14
The unit root tests of stationarity are reported in Appendix Table A.1.
15
List of excluded instruments in aggregate supply equation is given in
Appendix Table A.2. We also estimated alternative specications of IV regressions
using a subset of 12, 8, 6 instruments respectively. The results of these alternative specications were very close (sign, signicance and magnitude) to the results reported in
Table 1, suggesting that the model is robust to alternative specications of choice of
instruments.
Coefcient
Standard
error
P-value
Y
WPIt1
E(WPI)
REERt1
Constant
Number of observations
Centered R-square
Uncentered R-square
Root MSE
F (4,128)
Underidentication test (KleibergenPaap
rk LM statistic)
Hansen J statistic
0.0109
0.5931
0.4226
0.057
0.0005
133
0.7387
0.7939
.0039
498.80
36.39
0.0078
0.0498
0.0570
0.0072
0.0011
0.168
0.00
0.00
0.019
0.638
0.00
0.00
11.072
0.1976
33.854
76.349
0.0508
0.0013
123.027
0.6550
Note: WPI : WPI ination; Y: Output gap; REER: (change in) real effective exchange
rate; E(WPI) : expected WPI ination. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signicance
levels respectively.
instruments. Variable real interest rate (RIR) is the endogenous regressor, which has been instrumented with a number of exogenous
variables (excluded instruments). 16
The estimation results of the aggregate demand equation suggest
that lag of output gap is signicant at 1% level and the depreciation
rate is signicant at 5% level. The real interest rate coefcient is signicant only at 10% level. The coefcient on real interest rate is a very
small negative number indicating the low interest elasticity of the aggregate demand in the Indian economy. Model selection statistics
such as F-statistic, Root Mean Square Error and R-square are signicant
and support the tight t for the model. The tests of validity of instruments, that is, Hansen J test and KleibergenPaap LM test, suggest that
instruments are valid instruments; thus excluded instruments are correctly excluded from estimation equation and the equation is identied.
The PaganHall test suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity.
5. Simulations
5.1. Results on optimal policies
We simulated the model 17 using the estimates of aggregate demand and supply from Tables 1 and 2 (taking the values of b1 = 0.
5931, b2 = 0. 0109, b3 = 0.057 for aggregate supply and a1 =
0.2437, a2 = 0.0032, a3 = 0.1536 for aggregate demand), an estimate for (), the share of imported goods () in CPI 18 and the variance of various shock parameters in our model, demand shocks
(y2), supply shocks (p2) and exchange rate shocks (q2)). Also we
assumed that the model is subjected to historical shocks, thus the variance of demand shocks (y2) and supply shocks (p2) is assumed to be
1 and the variance of exchange rate shocks (q2) is to be 0.5).
1057
Table 2
IV-GMM estimates of the aggregate demand equation.
Dependent variable: Y
Variable
Coefcient
Standard
error
P-value
Y t1
RIR
REERt1
Constant
Number of observations
Centered R-square
Uncentered R-square
Root MSE
F (3,122)
Underidentication test (KleibergenPaap
rk LM statistic)
Hansen J statistic
0.2437
0.0032
0.1536
0.0446
0.0818
0.0018
0.0653
0.0123
0.00
0.087
0.019
0.00
125
0.4210
0.4210
.03015
12.24
54.363
0.00
0.00
9.433
0.8538
78.945
137.814
0.000
0.000
253.931***
0.000
Note: Y: output gap; REER: (change in) real effective exchange rate; RIR: real interest
rate. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signicance levels respectively.
The unconditional standard deviation results highlight the unsuitability of simple Taylor type monetary policy rules over optimal
monetary policy rules. Closed economy simple monetary policy
rules with only weight on output and ination result in huge volatility
in exchange rate and interest rate. The performance of simple Taylor
rule CPI ination is worse than the simple Taylor rule domestic ination. The open economy Taylor rule with weight on exchange rate
generates lesser volatility in exchange rate than its closed economy
counterpart. However, the performance of open economy Taylor
rule is worse in stabilizing ination and output in comparison to
closed economy Taylor rules and exchange rate and interest rate in
comparison to optimal monetary policy rules (Table 4).
The results also indicate that there exists a trade-off between ination variability and variability of other macro variables (output, exchange rate and interest rate) in strict ination targeting cases. When
we move from strict (both domestic and CPI) targeting cases to exible targeting cases, the variability of ination rises and the variability
of other macro economic variables reduces. In CPI targeting cases the
Table 3
Targeting cases and Taylor rules.
Optimal MPR
Strict domestic-ination targeting
Flexible domestic ination targeting
Strict CPI targeting
Flexible CPI targeting
= 1
= 1
= 0
= 0
Simple MPR
Taylor rule, domestic ination
Taylor rule, CPI ination
Taylor rule, open economy
it = 1.5t + 0.5yt
it = 1.5tc + 0.5yt
it = 0.5yt + 1.5t 0.4qt + 0.2qt 1
c = 0
c = 0
c = 1
c = 1
y = 0
y = .5
y = 0
y = .5
i = 0
i = 0
i = 0
i = 0
i=.01
i :01
i=.01
i :01
1058
Table 4
Unconditional standard deviations.
Targeting cases
yt
tc
qt
it
2.075
0.946
4.536
5.466
4.487
5.472
0.0039
0.0026
0.0039
0.0026
0.906
0.734
1.308
1.824
3.973
3.972
4.785
2.221
2.949
2.787
3.534
4.908
1.832
1.886
2.779
0.942
0.754
7.818
8.712
4.825
0.905
0.754
4.458
8.848
5.142
0.5
0
0.1
0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d. dd shock on
dom.inflation
0.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d. dd shock on CPI inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d. dd shock on interest
rate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on dom. inflation
0
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on CPI inflation
0
0.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on interest rate
0.0005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.5
0.0005
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on y
0.5
0.05
0
0.01
0.005
0.05
0.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on exchange rate
0.0005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Fig. 1. Impulse response: domestic ination targeting (cases: strict and exible).
0.01
1059
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on y
0.005
0
0.5
-0.005
-0.01
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.05
0.5
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on dom. inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effect of 1 s.d. dd shock on CPI
inflation
0.1
0.05
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on CPI inflation
0.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.1
0.005
0.05
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.01
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on interest rate
0.1
Effect of 1 s.d.
shock on exchange rate
0.05
0.005
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Fig. 2. Impulse responses: CPI ination targeting (cases: strict and exible).
22
We found that patterns of impulse response functions to demand and ination
shocks are quite alike in strict and exible domestic ination targeting cases and in
strict and exible CPI ination targeting cases. However, these response functions do
differ in magnitude of volatility from strict to exible targeting cases. For example, demand and cost push shocks generate greater volatility in output and exchange rate and
lesser in ination in strict targeting cases when compared to exible ones. Given the
similar pattern of impulse response function in strict and exible cases, while discussing the results, we presented the results of strict domestic ination targeting together
with exible domestic ination targeting and strict CPI ination targeting together
with exible CPI ination targeting.
1060
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-1
-1
-2
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2
1
1
0
-1
-1
-2
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2
1
0
-1
-2
1
0
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-2
-1
-4
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Fig. 3. Impulse responses: simple Taylor rule domestic ination.
1061
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
rate
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
4
2
0
-2
-4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2
1
0
-1
-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
targeting monetary policy rule. There is a bigger (as compared to domestic ination targeting rules) rise in nominal interest rate and
hence real interest rate, as well as a larger (compared to domestic ination targeting rules) appreciation in real exchange rate. As a result,
output gap starts contracting and ination starts falling in the subsequent periods. The economy returns to its steady state after about 56
periods.
Similarly one standard deviation ination shock in CPI targeting
cases causes a similar reaction in domestic and CPI ination as
under domestic ination targeting cases, and they increase by half a
percentage point in period 1. Output gap again does not respond to
this shock in period 1. There is a very strong monetary policy reaction
to this and a large increase in nominal interest rate and hence real
1062
increases. Additionally, there is an increase in nominal (hence real interest rate) and an appreciation in real exchange rate. Due to this,
output gap contracts and ination falls. Ination turns negative after
around 78 periods and consequently there is a fall in interest rate
and hence exchange rate depreciates. This leads to the expansion of
output gap which rises for a few periods before returning to its steady
state. Ination also returns to its steady state after around 12 periods.
The supply shocks generate erratic response from all the major variables and the economy takes longer to stabilize.
CPI Taylor type monetary policy rules cause very high variability in
exchange rate. However, they result in very moderate volatility of
output gap and thus are quite successful in curbing the volatility of
the output gap. Under CPI Taylor rules (similar to domestic ination
Taylor rule), the economy takes more time to stabilize after a shock.
In our model framework, CPI Taylor rule results in huge volatility of
real exchange rate in line with Svensson (2000) observation that,
This might illustrate the danger of responding to a current
forward-looking variable, and provides support for the warning in
Woodford 23 (p.23).
6. Conclusions
Our small macro model of the Indian economy was built on the
results from the VAR model proposed by Mishra and Mishra
(2010) and based on literature on small open economy models. In
our model the exchange rate has a prominent role to play in both
the determination of the aggregate demand and supply equation of
the economy. Our model specication is different from other models
of open economies in that we assumed both the aggregate supply
and demand equation to be affected by the lag of (change in) exchange rate rather than its contemporaneous value. 24 Estimation results of aggregate supply justify the assumption of hybrid Phillips
curve for India and suggest that backward dynamics (lag of ination) are slightly more important than forward dynamics (expected
ination in the next period) to explain ination outcomes in India.
This further indicates the presence of rigidities 25 in price setting
behavior in the Indian economy resulting in short-run trade-off
between ination and output. We found that the supply curve in
India was atter compared to a mature small open economy and
that there was an excess capacity in the economy. We also found
that the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand is low.
Within this framework, the properties of strict vs. exible domestic and CPI ination targeting were examined and compared with the
Taylor rules (domestic and CPI Inations). The analysis highlights the
unsuitability of simple Taylor type monetary rules in stabilizing the
economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better.
There appears to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization
and real exchange rate stabilization under domestic and CPI ination
targeting respectively. Flexible domestic ination targeting seems a
23
Woodford analyzed the budding issue in monetary policy literature that a desirable
monetary policy would be able to contain ination before much had developed. This
could be conducted by monetary indicators that are supposed to be good predictors
of future ination rather than by concentrating on variables (such as money supply)
that are thought to be probable causes of ination. In his analysis, Woodford suggested
that there were important advantages in nding indicators of the causes of ination
rather than of inationary expectations. For more details, refer to Woodford (1994).
24
The assumption is motivated from the results of Mishra and Mishra (2010) and
further veried by the estimations in this study where lag of exchange rate turned
out to be statistically signicant in both aggregate demand and supply equations.
25
The main sources of real rigidity in the Indian context relate to goods market and
labor market imperfections. Both goods and labor markets are characterized by dualistic consumers and labors respectively, where one type of consumers and labors are at
above subsistence level while others are at subsistence level (for more details refer to
Goyal, 2011).
WPI
REER
RIR
CPI
2 CPI
Y
OIL
USIIP
2 USIIP
USCPI
M3
ffrate
f f rate
lrate5
lrate5
lrate10
lrate10
spread1
spread5
ADF test
PhillipsPerron test
3.020 (0.033)
3.99 (0.011)
5.495 (0.00)
1.992 (0.29)
7.513 (0.00)
8.679 (0.00)
3.016 (0.033)
2.160 (0.22)
10.33 (0.00)
2.689 (0.075)
2.622 (0.089)
0.689 (0.84)
5.874 (0.00)
1.815 (0.37)
10.791 (0.00)
1.705 (0.43)
11.009 (0.00)
3.656 (0.0048)
3.670 (0.0046)
2.958
3.614
5.290
2.477
7.304
8.799
2.538
1.749
10.525
2.72
2.616
1.088
5.985
1.836
10.779
1.710
11.009
3.118
3.517
(0.039)
(0.0055)
(0.00)
(0.12)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.10)
(0.41)
(0.00)
(0.071)
(0.089)
(0.72)
(0.00)
(0.36)
(0.00)
(0.43)
(0.00)
(0.0252)
(0.0076)
Notes:
1. ***, **,* indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signicance levels respectively.
2. Figures in parenthesis indicate Mackinnon p-value.
3. The number of lagged difference terms included in testing for each series has
been decided on the basis of no autocorrelation in the error terms for the ADF tests.
For PP tests lags have been selected on the basis of NeweyWest criterion.
Meaning
Y t1
T t2
RIR
REER
OIL
OILt1
OILt2
OILt4
2 CPI
2 CPI t1
USCPI
USCPIt1
2 USIIP
f f rate
f f ratet1
f f ratet2
Meaning
Y t2
Y t4
spread1
spread5
lrate5
lrate5t1
lrate10
lrate10t2
RIRt 1
RIRt 2
M3
M3t2
REER
REERt2
WPI
WPIt1
f f ratet1
f f ratet2
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