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drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.Clearly,
the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under
his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes
is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the
President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around. Only
Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal
structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic
move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since both the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) and the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA)
belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31
(1) of E.O. 292.The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not
only as it affects employees tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the
validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall
within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under
E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly under
the Office of the President. On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions
of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The abolition of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply
transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper.The
abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were
simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the
President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division
the Investigative and Adjudicatory Divisionthrough which ODESLA could take on
the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if
it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.A valid reorganization must not
only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good
faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes
of economy and efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions
within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. In
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its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates
of eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency
in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by
the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGCs
operation in the 2010 annual budget, no separate or added funding of such a
considerable amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to
the IAD-ODESLA.
Administrative Agencies; The Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies
and adjudicate cases.Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to
investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential
appointees in the government and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
Ombudsman; The Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means
exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.Since
the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection of the laws is
a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government;
The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated
differently from each other.The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is embraced under
the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection clause, however, is
not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
Administrative Law; Presidency; Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such
public officials and look into their conduct in office.Presidential appointees come
under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well
settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.
Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President
has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their
conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level
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Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended, enumerates the powers
and functions of the police.The maintenance of peace and order carries both
general and specific functions on the part of the police. Section 24 of RA 6975
(otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990), as amended, enumerates the powers and functions of the police. In addition
to the maintenance of peace and order, the police has the authority to
[i]nvestigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution[,] and are charged with the
enforcement of laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties. Examined side by side, police authority is superior to the punong
barangays authority in a situation where the maintenance of peace and order has
metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal offenders.
Administrative Law; Grave Misconduct; Misconduct is considered grave if
accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard
of established rules, which must all be supported by substantial evidence.
Misconduct is considered grave if accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to
violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all be
supported by substantial evidence. If the misconduct does not involve any of the
additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, the person charged may
only be held liable for simple misconduct. Grave misconduct necessarily includes
the lesser offense of simple misconduct. Sufficient records exist to justify the
imposition of a higher penalty against the petitioner. His open interference in a
legitimate police activity and defiance of the polices authority only show his clear
intent to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot
official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of the law. The photographs,
taken together with the investigation report of the Police Superintendent and the
testimonies of the witnesses, even lead to conclusions beyond interference and
defiance; the petitioner himself could have been involved in corrupt activities,
although we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point. We make this
observation though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys were engaged in
water pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that the petitioner violated the
law by directly interfering with a legitimate police activity where his own son
appeared to be involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)
(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.
[Alijandro vs. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, 695
SCRA 35(2013)]
the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the
appointment of Information Officer V (IO V) created an impression of influence and
cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.In the
present case, respondent Cortes appointment as IO V in the CHR by the
Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.
Commissioner Mallaris abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character
of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still
exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V
created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality
of the Commission En Banc. [Civil Service Commission vs. Cortes, 723 SCRA
609(2014)]
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Same; Same; De Jure Officers; In view of the application of the prohibition under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as
Director or Trustee of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) concurrently with his position of
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered
as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs).In view of the
application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was
not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or
Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects,
legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.
Administrative Law; De Facto Officers; Words and Phrases; A de facto officer is one
who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.A de
facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on
its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned. [Funa vs. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166(2014)]
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stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of
office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or
designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the
holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in
possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Same; Presidency; Holding of Other Office; Evidently, from this move as well as in
the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of
the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition of the President
and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.Evidently, from this move as well as in the
different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government
or elsewhere is concerned.
CARPIO-MORALES,J., Concurring Opinion:
Public Officers; Designation Defined.Designation may be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. In fact, even without a known appointment or election, the
de facto doctrine comes into play if the duties of the office were exercised under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce
people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the
officer he assumed to be.
Same; Effect of assuming a second office which is incompatible with the act.The
other propositionthat a person who assumes a second and incompatible office is
deemed to have resigned from the first officewas applied in Public Interest Center,
Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006) where the Court, by Resolution of March 5, 2007,
clarified that the ruling did not render both appointments void. It held that
[f]ollowing the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma
had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the
second office as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
Same; Rule when acceptance of a second public office does not apply.It has also
been observed that the rule of ipso facto vacancy of a public office by acceptance of
a second public office does not apply where, under applicable constitutional or
statutory provisions, the holder of a public office is rendered ineligible for a
specified time for a second public office; under such circumstances it is the second
office which is considered vacant rather than the first office. I, therefore, vote to
GRANT the petition and further declare that Bautista was a de facto officer during
her brief stint as MARINA OIC Administrator and a de jure DOTC Undersecretary
during her entire tenure as such. [Funa vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 308(2010)]
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