Hearing Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2016

Calendar No.: 8
Case Name: DeCrescenzo v. Church of Scientology International, et al.
Case No.: BC411018
Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
Moving Party: Defendants Church of Scientology International and Religious Technology Center
Responding Party: Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo aka Laura A. Dieckman
Tentative Ruling: Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Summary adjudication is granted as to the
3rd COA and is otherwise denied.

Background and Procedural History

On 4/2/09, Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo aka Laura A. Dieckman filed this action against Defendant
Church of Scientology International (Scientology) arising out of her experience and employment with
Scientology. After Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on 5/19/09, Scientology removed this action
to federal court. On 11/5/09, the District Court remanded this action to state court.
On 2/2/10, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint which added Religious Technology Center as a
defendant and asserted causes of action for (1) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under
the California Constitution; (2) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under common law; (3)
deprivation of liberty in violation of her rights under the California Constitution; (4) false imprisonment;
(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) wage and hour violations; and (7) unfair business
practices.
On 3/18/10 and 4/30/10, the Court sustained Defendants demurrers to the SAC without leave to
amend based on the statute of limitations. Judgment was entered on 6/9/10. Plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and ordered that the demurrers be overruled, concluding that
Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support an equitable estoppel (DeCrescenzo v. Church of
Scientology Intl, 2011 WL 2508142 *5-6 ). Remittitur issued on 10/5/11. On 1/13/12, the Court
bifurcated trial as to the issue of equitable estoppel. On 10/23/13, the Court denied Defendants Motion
for Summary Judgment. On 9/17/14, this action was assigned to this Court. A Trial (with a court-trial
phase concerning equitable estoppel to be convened first) Setting Conference is set for 4/27/16. The
parties have stipulated to extending the time within which this case must be brought to trial (see Order
filed 10/23/15). Defendants now move for summary judgment/adjudication.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff objects to portions of the declarations of Warren McShane (Nos. 1-12), Allan Cartwright (Nos.
13-20), Benjamin J. Hubbard (Nos. 21-36), and Jesse DeCrescenzo (Nos. 37-45). Objection No. 36 is
sustained; the remainder of the objections are overruled. The Court notes that Plaintiffs objections to
the declaration of Benjamin J. Hubbard essentially attempt to dispute the weight of his testimony (see
Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1318-19), and Plaintiffs remaining objections
otherwise largely dispute the factual basis of Defendants arguments.

Defendants object to the declaration of Robert V. Levine. The objections are overruled. In Headley v.
Church of Scientology Intl (9th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d. 1173, 1181 n.1, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the District Court had discretion to strike Levines declaration therein which was based on a review of
deposition transcripts. This does not establish that Levines present declaration based on a review of
Plaintiffs declaration (Levine Decl. 7) is necessarily not based on matters of a type that may
reasonably be relied upon by Levine (Evid. Code 801(b)), in light of the Courts broad discretion in
ruling on foundational matters (see generally Maatuk v. Guttman (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197).
To the extent Defendants argue that Levines theories are not generally accepted (see U.S. v. Fishman
(N.D. Cal. 1990) 743 F.Supp. 713, 719-20), the Court notes that Levine submits that he has published
peer-reviewed research concerning his theories (Levine Decl. 4-5). Whether the conclusions reached
in Fishman hold true today to one extent or another has not been established. Finally, Defendants argue
that consideration of Levines declaration would impermissibly question the religion of Scientology.
However, Levines declaration at its core is offered to present an opinion as to the effect on Plaintiff
based on her long relationship with Scientology. It is not offered to support some kind of
pronouncement that all Scientology practices are wrongful, and has not been construed as such.
Plaintiff objects to the reply declaration of Nicholas F. Daum as new evidence that was not included with
the motion. However, the Court notes that this evidence was incorporated in the parties revised papers
to which Plaintiff responded. Therefore, the Court perceives no prejudice in considering this evidence.
See Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1183.
Ministerial Exception and the First Amendment
The ministerial exception is grounded in the First Amendment and generally precludes the application of
the employment discrimination laws to claims concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.
(2012) 132 S.Ct. 694, 705-6. Based on this exception, the courts have declined to right alleged wrongs
related to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy. Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 1168, 1175. The courts have refused to adopt a rigid formula for a definition of minister.
Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288, 1291-92;
Hosana-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, the Supreme Court noted the deep religious convictions of
the Amish which relate to their daily living (id. at 216-17), and concluded that the First Amendment
prohibited the application of a states compulsory education requirement because of parents
fundamental interests in guiding the religious future and education of their children (id. at 232-34).
Similarly, a churchs disciplinary conduct such as shunning is protected under the First Amendment. Paul
v. Watchtower Bible and Tact Society of New York, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987) 819 F.2d 875, 883; see also
Headley, 687 F.3d at 1180 (distinguishing between improper threats or coercion, from permissible
warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences).
However, Plaintiff correctly notes that merely because Scientology is an undisputed religion does not
make the Defendants immune for all purposes from all tort liability even for acts that are in some
measure religiously motivated. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1114, 1119-20
(addressing deceptive recruitment practices); see also Higgins, 210 Cal.App.3d at 1176 (stating in dicta

that torts such as battery, false imprisonment, or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon a churchs
ministers or members with civil impunity).
Additionally, Plaintiff correctly notes that to the extent Defendants attempt to classify all individuals as
ministers, this could be determined by a fact-finder to be subterfuge (Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria
(7th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (stating in dicta that designating a janitor as a minister would be
treated by the courts as subterfuge) (abrogated on other grounds in Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 709
n.4)). This is particularly relevant as it relates to Plaintiffs early years with Scientology as a minor.
Notably, the ministerial exception arguably does not apply to minors. See Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292
(declining to address the extent of the ministerial exception to minors); see generally Brock v. Wendells
Woodwork, Inc. (4th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 196, 198-99 (concluding that the religious beliefs of a church
cannot immunize employers from child labor laws).
Forced Abortion
Plaintiffs 1st and 2nd COAs for forced abortion in violation of her privacy rights are based on
Defendants allegedly forcing her to have an abortion by threatening her with losing her job, housing,
and husband, and owing a freeloader debt. SAC 8, 24. Defendants argue that they merely exercised
their First Amendment right to attempt to persuade Plaintiff to have an abortion and that Plaintiffs
claims impermissibly question the validity of Plaintiffs belief in making her decision (see Katz v. Superior
Court (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 952, 986-87). But this is disputed, with Plaintiff submitting evidence that she
and Jesse had agreed to keep the baby but that Defendants (later joined by Jesse) then pressured her
into changing her mind by telling her that she would be made subject to the freeloader bill and would
have to leave without Jesse. Oppn Sep. Statement [OSS] 45-51. This raises triable issues of fact as
to whether Defendants violated her privacy rights concerning abortion (see generally People v. Garziano
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 243) by interfering with her marriage relationship (see Carrieri v. Bush
(Wash. 1966) 419 P.2d 132, 543-44; Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church (Pa. 1975) 341 A.2d 105, 33435). See also Hill v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (autonomy privacy).
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs 1st COA based on the Constitutional right of privacy does not
support damages, relying on the standards stated in Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2002) 29
Cal.4th 300, 317. However, Defendants have provided no substantial analysis as to the language or
history of the Constitutional right of privacy, or whether adequate remedies exist for violations thereof.
Cf. Weimber v. County of Kern (E.D. Cal. 2006) 2006 WL 3834237 *8 (concluding that the Constitutional
right of privacy does not suggest a damages action, and that a damages remedy may be available under
Civil Code 52.1). Defendants reply argues that Civil Code 52.1 is unavailable to Plaintiff which
suggests that, as applicable to Plaintiff, a damages claim for violation of the Constitutional right of
privacy might be proper here under the circumstances.
Liberty and False Imprisonment
Plaintiffs 3rd and 4th COAs are based on her being confined to the Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF).
SAC 40-45, 54-56. Defendants submit that Plaintiff voluntarily chose to go to the RPF for religious
reasons, but this is disputed with Plaintiff submitting that she stated numerous times that she wished to
leave Scientology but Plaintiff was placed under watch (which included someone sleeping with her in
her bed and someone outside her door) so that she would be physically prevented from leaving until she

could be worn down and thereby coerced into staying. OSS 68-81.
Defendants also argue that the 3rd COA based on the Constitutional right of liberty only applies to state
action (see generally Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013,
1027), and does not provide for damages. The Court is inclined to agree, insofar as there is an
alternative remedy for false imprisonment. Summary adjudication is granted as to the 3rd COA only.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs 5th COA is based on Plaintiff undergoing sec checks (SAC 67-68) and the harsh conditions
she allegedly endured when she was at the RPF (id. 69-70). Defendants submit that the sec checks
are an integral part of Scientologys program but this is disputed. OSS 12-13. And as discussed above,
there are triable issues of fact as to Plaintiffs claims concerning her time at the RPF.
Wage and Hour
Plaintiffs 6th COA is based on alleged false representations to induce Plaintiff to join Defendants (SAC
82-86), and is brought based on Labor Code 970 and 1194. Defendants argue that the ministerial
exception applies. But, as discussed above, it has not been established that the ministerial exception
wholly bars the 6th COA, particularly as it relates to Plaintiffs relationship to Scientology while she was
a minor. Plaintiffs wage and hour claims based on Labor Code 970 and 1194 survive, at least with
respect to the period of time when Plaintiff was a minor. In all events, these are not proper subjects of a
summary adjudication.