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[G.R. No. 138509.

July 31, 2000]


IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.
BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit,
an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a
civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend
the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
[1]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent
should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
[2]

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a


civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
[3]

fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense
must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter
action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to


the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of
the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is
that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.
[8]

[9]

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of


nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to
prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on
the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
[10]

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for


themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for
lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this case is limited to
the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds." Hence, parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be
submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how
obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of
the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family
[11]

[12]

[13]

Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as
ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence
of a marriage.
[14]

[15]

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be


successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should
he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of
the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it
as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper
in the criminal case.
[16]

[17]

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter
that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be
stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two
marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by
petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above,
this cannot be done.
[18]

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said
to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot
be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.
[19]

[20]

[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29,


1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139676

March 31, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying

the marriage of respondents Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A. Melgar 2 (Eulogio)
pursuant to Article 363 of the Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City.
Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On
August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. 4 According to Norma, the
manifestations of Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since
December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service on Eulogio on
October 21, 1996 by the sheriff.5 Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within
the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the
case to determine whether or not there exists collusion between the contending parties. 6 On
December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the effect
that no collusion existed between the contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the
reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.8
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Normas counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence
before the Clerk of Court.9 Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has been a
habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he (a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he
goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home, (c) he usually lays
a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable reason; his liquor drinking habit
has brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when she would refuse to give him money
for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and threaten her; he has not been employed
since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to look for a job; she has been the one supporting
the family, providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out of her salary as a
government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male
officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her up; her brothers saw
this, came to her rescue and then told Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has
not visited or communicated with his family such that reconciliation is very unlikely.10 The Public
Prosecutor thereafter conducted a brief cross-examination of Norma.11
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of
Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being impressed with merit. As
such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L.
Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.

The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel the Marriage Contract of the
parties bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the required
fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City Prosecution Office, Dagupan
City, the Solicitor General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant has been incorrigible in
his vices such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many times
caused them to be scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that he
could also help his wife in supporting his family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy.
These are clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his
wife such as showing respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also became indifferent to
the needs of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing to make the sacrifice in
looking for a job so as to support them. Without any communication to his family since 1985,
certaining [sic] reconciliation and love would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this
case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his responsibilities as a
good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving father to his children x x x. 13
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA,
contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article
36 of the Family Code.14
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC. 15 The CA,
quoting extensively Normas testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is proper not simply because of
defendants habitual alcoholism but likewise because of other causes amounting to psychological
incapacity as a result of which defendant has failed to perform his obligations under Articles 68-72,
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of annulment is not based merely on
defendants habitual alcoholism but also because of his inability to cope with his other essential
marital obligations foremost of which is his obligation to live together with his wife, observe mutual
love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they actually lived together as
husband and wide and even thereafter, defendant has miserably failed to perform his obligations for
which reason the plaintiff should not be made to suffer any longer. The contention of the Republic
that plaintiff never showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband is stretching
the obligations of the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying that plaintiff
deserves to be punished for all the inabilities of defendant to perform his concomitant duties as a

husband and a father all of which inabilities in the first place are in no way attributable to the herein
plaintiff.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN
THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.18
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the essential marital
obligations as equivalent to or evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code; that such inability must be due to causes that are psychological in nature; that no psychiatrist
or psychologist testified during the trial that a psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's
inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other disagreeable
behavior; and that the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness, and incurability of
Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts and circumstances of
Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness
and indolence are more than enough proof of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations, which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Normas comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the
arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Normas evidence fell short of the
requirements of the law since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove that
Eulogios inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable
behavior are manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.21 Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation
is not the concern alone of the family members.22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, 23 the rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If the defendant in
an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there
is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the
OSG to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.25(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level.
Other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation26 that no collusion existed between the contending
parties and the brief cross-examination27 which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading,
motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have
been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.28 Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely insufficient to sustain a
finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.31 It should refer to "no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."32 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina34 the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its

dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the

same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x.35(Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.37
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they
were married, Eulogio was already suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him
of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact,
Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogios disagreeable behavior started
only after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job. 38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the Family Code. It was
not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity
of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.
lawphil.net

The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogios immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family. These circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article
5544 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,45 it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.46
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere
fabrication, evidence other than Normas lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity,47 an expert witness would have strengthened Normas claim of Eulogios
alleged psychological incapacity. Normas omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can

be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 48
The Court commiserates with Normas marital predicament, but as a court, even as the highest one,
it can only apply the letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law
and jurisprudence are ranged against Normas stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them
accordingly, if it must be true to its mission under the rule of law. The Courts first and foremost duty
is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D, dated January 20, 1997,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-9601061-D is DISMISSED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels
of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his
wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico
and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving
sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City,
Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner,"

claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the
marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all
the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the
estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."
[1]

Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, formulating that"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy
arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.

"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at
No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is
the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a
legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."
[2]

On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.


Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of
the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister,
herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other
half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate,
and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as
such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of
kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the
estate."
[3]

On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for


reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner
asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court."
[4]

It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage
between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would
be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code,
not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of
the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where
it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
[5]

Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83


of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to

articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in


any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage
is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from
the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three
exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present(not
the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in
good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of
a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not
find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
[6]

[7]

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as


long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that
the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article
83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage. Calrky
[8]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been
absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Article 41 , in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. Mesm
[9]

[10]

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first


husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for

more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to
them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to
the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to
the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other
hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation
by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed.
The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children,
along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional
rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
[11]

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV


No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of
the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise
entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is
hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains
solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Seguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for private respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
37925 denying petitioners appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her
complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on
June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the
marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and
resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights,
petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her
to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a oneyear suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a
womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three
women in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife;
that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the
family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling
private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and
friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets
and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other
financial institutions, without private respondents consent; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent

prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from


further dissipation.
[1]

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative


defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married
couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two
children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that
due to the extreme animosities between them, he temporarily left the conjugal
home for a cooling-off period in 1984; that it is private respondent who had
been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that
petitioners work as owner and operator of a radio and television station
exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and
the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial
reverses in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife,
to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country
clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal
home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private
respondent presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a
Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and
petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F.
Racela IV, private respondents counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted
documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husbands
relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal
possession of drugs; and copies of a prior church annulment decree. The
parties marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal in 1986.
[2]

[3]

During presentation of private respondents evidence, petitioner, on April


18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondents petition for appointment
as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.

After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the
reception of petitioners evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel
was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.
[4]

[5]

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private


respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present
evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
private respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L.
Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void oh initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of
the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of
Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the
defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other
effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
[6]

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990.
No appeal was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties. Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990
[7]

[8]

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel,
filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990
decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.

[9]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court
denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court.
[10]

Hence this petition.


The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is
warranted under the circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other
proceedings thereof. - When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken, against a party in a court of first instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional
Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing
that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If
the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
[11]

[12]

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private


respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to
appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the
decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due
process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to

appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived
his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the
evidence for private respondent.Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings
on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reasons. In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a
certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command,
Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was
admitted for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center
at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police. The records, however, show that
the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this
confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was
out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory
as no appeal was taken therefrom.
[13]

[14]

[15]

The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse


judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not
excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid
and regular on its face.
[16]

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the
trial court of petitioners confinement and medical treatment as the reason for
his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any
reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners counsel, the
order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due
process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied
his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively
participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition,
cross-examined private respondents witnesses and even submitted his

opposition to private respondents motion for dissolution of the conjugal


partnership of gains.
[17]

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only


in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and
he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this
petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive
the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
[18]

[19]

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites
the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or
legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state
because the law looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of
annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed to appear
at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance.
[20]

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:


Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxxxxxxxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
[21]

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught


with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution
is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles
48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default
by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private
respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds
barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any

of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses,
particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and
hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he
could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he and
private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy
family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal
dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and television
corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for
malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts, according to
petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage is final and binding on us. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that
the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous.
[26]

[27]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

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