[G.R. No. 140946.

September 13, 2004]

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MAXICORP, INC.,respondent.
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals
Decision[2] dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order[3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila (RTC), denying respondent
Maxicorp, Inc.s (Maxicorp) motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC
issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against
Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree
No. 49 (Section 29 of PD 49)[4] and for unfair competition under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[5]
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Dominador
Samiano, Jr. (NBI Agent Samiano) filed several applications for search
warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD
49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of
the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search
Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996,
against Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a
search of Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated
in the search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the
warrants are in the form of general warrants. The RTC denied Maxicorps
motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining
NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz (Sacriz), and computer technician
Felixberto Pante (Pante). The three testified on what they discovered during
their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented
certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to
perform the witnessed activities using petitioners products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals seeking to set aside the RTCs order. On 23 December 1998, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order denying Maxicorps motion to quash
the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold
the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales
receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE
PETITION;
3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH
WARRANTS;
4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE GENERAL WARRANTS.
The Ruling of the Court The petition has merit
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of
law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners presented are
questions of fact, which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45
petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented
in this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts
are not in dispute.

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
questions of law.[6] Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not
review them on appeal,[7] subject to exceptions as when the findings of the
appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court.[8]
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled.
A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law
is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple,
determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the
facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. [9]The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. [10] If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual.[11] Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno[12] is illustrative on this
point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not
the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether
or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in
relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be
strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by
one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to
their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the
body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said
proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this
situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into
questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of
the petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable
cause only the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of
whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question
of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it
does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the
resolution of this issue would require this Court to inquire into the probative
value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of
law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.[13]
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising
arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary
evidence presented during the search warrant proceedings. In short,
petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is
exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits
by requiring the petition to raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier
of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence.
[14]
When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of
exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely
meritorious circumstances.[15]
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings
of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC.[16] Since
petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is
proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this
petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the
Solicitor General as representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp
states the general rule but the exception governs this case.[17]We ruled

in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [18] that the

petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its
case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error
committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation
where a complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case
would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to circumstances
beyond
its
control.
The
circumstances
in Columbia
Pictures
Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the
application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC
based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent
Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the
overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence
of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in
reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination
that the RTC conducted was defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the
RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as
proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a
certain Joel Diaz. Second, the fact that petitioners other witness, John
Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs findings.
Probable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and
the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.[19] Thus, probable
cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.[20]
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally
examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. [21] The applicant
must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. Reliable information is
insufficient.[22] Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in
writing the complainant and his witnesses.[23]
The Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the
fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination
failed to prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from
Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove
the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place
searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under
Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To
support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent
Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that
petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of
counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and
Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of
infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies
of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that
he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises.
He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within
Maxicorps premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was
certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its
customers without giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license
agreements and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several
instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners software into computers it had
assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners software
within Maxicorps premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or
sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence
of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe

that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the

prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases,
installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial
on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, [24] not the
exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of
evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. [25]Probable
cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.
[26]
Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings
simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the
only proof that the sale of petitioners software occurred. During the search
warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge
the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit
Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners software.[27] Sacriz, who was present
when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI
Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit.[28] Pante, the computer
technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners software on
the same computer unit.[29] There was a comparison between petitioners
genuine software and Maxicorps software pre-installed in the computer unit
that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.[30] Even if we disregard the sales receipt
issued in the name of Joel Diaz, which petitioners explained was the alias NBI
Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals ruling on Sacrizs testimony.
The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from
Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright
infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling
counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying,
assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the
counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners witnesses on
such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court
only require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for
the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC
complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the
judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question
the applicant and his witnesses.[31] For this reason, the findings of the judge
deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason.[32] Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination
proceedings reveal any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As
one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his
witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely.
The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were
required to present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and
the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit
the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search
warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. [33]
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a search warrant shall issue in connection with one specific
offense. The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is issued. [34] Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must
state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended
for use in the commission of a specific offense.

Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in
scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized.
After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTCs Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioners store can be
seized on the ground that it is used or intended to be used in the illegal or
unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents software and
their manuals.[35]
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph
(e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that
similarly worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase used or
intended to be used, were previously held void by this Court. [36] The disputed
text of the search warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft
software bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION contained in CDROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft
instruction manuals and/or literature bearing the Microsoft
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals,
purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents
used in the recording of the reproduction and/or assembly,
distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with
fake or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights
and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing units
including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor
screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other
equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in
the illegal and unauthorized copying or reproduction of
Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain,
display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft
trademarks and copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access
all computer hard drives, data bases and other information
storage devices containing unauthorized Microsoft software.
[37]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow.[38] The description of the property to be
seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the
description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its
character is a matter of concern.[39] Measured against this standard we find
that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not
only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically identified by
stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to
those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying
of petitioners software. This language meets the test of specificity.[40]
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those
cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular
circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase used or intended to
be used. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the
seizure of television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape
cleaners x x x were found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed
distributor of video tapes.[41] The mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in
the defendants store does not mean that the machines were used to produce
the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a

licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge
Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized the
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of the defendant.
[42]
And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized,
aggravated by the fact that such appliances are generally connected with the
legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes.[43]
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in
particularity. Paragraph (c) states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the
copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for
personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may
have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph
(c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether
legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used
in copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially
defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with
respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective
warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. [44] A
search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant.[45] The exclusionary rule found in Section
3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all
items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution
dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search
Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or
f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78631 June 29, 1993
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORP., PARAMOUNT
PICTURES CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., UNITED
ARTISTS CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY, and WARNER BROS., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ALFREDO C. FLORES, FGT VIDEO NETWORK, INC.,
MANUEL MENDOZA, ALFREDO C. ONGYANCO, ERIC APOLONIO, SUSAN
YANG and EDUARDO A. YOTOKO, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioners.
Santos & Associates and San Jose, Enrique, Lucas, Santos & Borje Law
Offices for respondents.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the order dated May
29, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region (Branch
167, Pasig) directing the immediate release and return of television sets, video
cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment,
and other paraphernalia or pieces of machinery which had been seized by
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation by virtue of a search
warrant.
Petitioners herein are all foreign corporations organized and existing under the
laws of the United States of America and represented in the Philippines by
their attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Benitez-Cruz of the Motion Picture Association
of America, Inc. (MPAA for brevity). Private respondent FGT Video Network,
Inc. is a merger of Fox, Galactic, and Technica Video. It is registered with and
licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board as a distributor under License
No. 1333 VMM. Technica Video, Inc. which is part of the merger, is registered

with and licensed as a reproducer by the said board under License No. 967
VMM (p. 11, Rollo).
In a letter dated April 20, 1987, the MPAA, through counsel Rico V. Domingo,
lodged a complaint before then Director Antonio Carpio of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) against certain video establishments for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property), as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1988, in connection with its anti-piracy campaign.
Specifically complaining of the "unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or
disposition of copyrighted film", the MPAA sought the NBI's "urgent assistance
in the conduct of search and seizure operations in Metro Manila and
elsewhere". (p. 29, Rollo.)
On the basis of said letter, NBI and private agents conducted discreet
surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them private
respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT). Thus, on April 20, 1987, Danilo
Manalang, a.k.a. Ronaldo Lim, allegedly an NBI agent, went to the office of
FGT to have the copyrighted motion pictures "Cleopatra" owned by Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. and "The Ten Commandments" owned by Paramount
Pictures, Inc. reproduced or retaped in video format. For the reproduction
services, FGT issued Order Slip No. 3482 dated April 20, 1987 and Delivery
Slip No. 118667 dated April 22, 1987, for which services Danilo Manalang paid
P45.00. On May 5, 1987, Manalang also had MGM's copyrighted film "Walk
Like a Man" reproduced or retaped by FGT for P15.00 (p. 5, Rollo).
Consequently, on May 14, 1987, NBI Agent III Lauro C. Reyes, with Manalang
and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz as witnesses, applied for a search warrant with the
Regional Trial Court in Pasig. Introduced as evidence in support of the
application were the following: the letter dated April 20, 1987 of the MPAA
through Rico V. Domingo (Exh. A) FGT's Order Slip No. 3842 (Exh. B); FGT's
Delivery Slip No. 118667 (Exh. B-1); video cassettes containing the film "The
Ten Commandments" (Exhs. B-1-A, B-1-B); video cassette containing the film
"Cleopatra" (Exh. B-1-C); video cassette containing the film "Walk Like a Man"
(Exh. B-1-D); FGT's Order Slip No. 3923 dated May 5, 1987 (Exh. B-2); FGT's
Delivery Slip No. 123321 dated May 6, 1987 (Exh. B-3); list of copyrighted
MPAA member company titles (Exh. C); sketch of location of FGT's office or
premises (Exh. D); affidavit of Rebecca Benitez-Cruz (Exh. E); special power
of attorney designating Ms. Benitez-Cruz as petitioners' attorney-in- fact (Exh.
F to F-8); and affidavit of Danilo Manalang (Exh. G).
Upon the offer of these pieces of evidence, Judge Alfredo C. Flores of the
aforesaid court, issued Search Warrant No. 45 which reads:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under
oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo
Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to
believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No.
1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property)
has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C.
Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible
and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner
Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and
list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in
the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or
retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or
mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the
reproduction/repating business of the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the
unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation
or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described, which should be seized and brought to the
Undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00
A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned immediately
upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 14th day of May 1987, at Pasig, Metro Manila. (pp. 30-31, Rollo;
Emphasis supplied.)

At or about high noon of the same day, agents from the NBI, led by Lauro C.
Reyes and Mamerto Espartero, with the assistance of the personnel of the
Videogram Regulatory Board headed by Elmer San Pascual, duly served
Search Warrant No. 45 on the operators or representatives of FGT. In the
course of the search of the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized

various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures or films owned and
exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers,
production orders, and posters. Inventories of these seized articles were then
prepared and copies thereof were furnished Jess Ayson, production manager
of FGT. On May 18, 1987, the NBI agents filed a return of the search warrant
with a motion to retain custody of the seized items (p. 32, Rollo).
Meanwhile, FGT filed an urgent motion for the immediate release of equipment
and accessories "not covered" by the search warrant, without prejudice to the
filing of a motion to quash the said search warrant (p. 101, Rollo). It argued
that as a licensed video reproducer, FGT had the right to maintain possession
of the seized reproduction equipment and paraphernalia which are not
contraband or illegal per se, but are rather "exclusively used and intended to
be used for reproduction" and not in the "sale, lease, distribution or possession
for purposes of sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of
pirated video tapes". (p. 102, Rollo.)
Petitioners opposed the motion, asserting that the seized articles were all
lawfully taken. They explained that since FGT was a videogram distributor and
not a reproducer, "it may be logically concluded that such 634 VCRs,
accessories, etc." were "used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of, at the very least, the 310 videocassette tapes
containing the copyrighted films/motion pictures." They asserted that Search
Warrant No. 45 was issued upon the proper determination of probable cause
and that, therefore, it is not for FGT "to second-guess the wisdom" of the
court's directive to seize the questioned VCRs and accessories "as an inquiry
thereon would involve evidentiary matters which are better ventilated in the
criminal prosecution proper". (pp. 107-116, Rollo.)
Finding that FGT was a "registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain
instances and under special instructions and conditions . . . reproducer of
videograms" and that, therefore, its right to possess and use the seized
equipment had been "placed in serious doubt", the lower court resolved the
doubt "against the Government and in favor of a lawful business enterprise."
Applying the constitutional precept of presumption of innocence and
considering that the seized articles are not contraband, respondent court ruled
that to allow the Government "to keep possession of the equipment(s) and
machines where there is no actual criminal charge" would amount to a
"confiscation in violation of the due process clause of the constitution,
notwithstanding the filing by the Director of the NBI of a letter to the
Department of Justice recommending that the defendants be charged with
violation of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49, as amended by P.D. No. 1988." (pp.
131-132, Rollo.)
Thus, in its order on May 29, 1987, the lower court granted FGT's motion and
ordered the immediate release and return of the "television sets, video
cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment
and other machines or paraphernalias, as reflected in the "Receipt for
Properties Seized" attached to the records of the case beginning from page 84
to page 130, to the defendants, excluding video cassette tapes reflected in the
"Receipts for Properties Seized", beginning from page 132 to page 146 of the
records." Respondent court also ordered the inventory of all articles returned
with individual descriptions "to evidence their existence" copies of which
inventory should be furnished the NBI and the court (p. 132, Rollo).
Hence, the present recourse.
As prayed for by petitioners, on June 17, 1987, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from implementing the lower court's
order of May 29, 1987 upon a bond in the amount of P750,000.00 which
petitioners accordingly posted on June 19, 1987, (pp. 138-141, Rollo.)
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate release and return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant.
Petitioners insist that the search warrant was issued upon due determination
of probable cause. They argue that FGT's act of illegally reproducing
copyrighted films had been clearly established by evidence on record and that
FGT's principal ground in praying for the immediate release of the seize
articles is a matter of defense which should be ventilated at the trial of the
case on the merits.

Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 45 is tainted with illegality as no particular or specific acts or
omissions constituting the offense charged had been alleged in the application
for its issuance.
The right to security against unreasonable searches and seizures is
guaranteed under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the
requisites in the issuance of search warrants:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements. He must determine the existence of
probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions (Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. XXXIII (203 SCRA 140 (1991]). The search warrant must contain
a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be
seized must be described with particularity (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191
SCRA 429 [1990]).
Withal, measured by the aforegoing constitutional and legal provisions as well
as the existing jurisprudence on the matter, we find that Search Warrant No.
45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. More so because the Court has previously
decided a case dealing with virtually the same search warrant.
In 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655 [1988]),
wherein therein petitioner is also one of the petitioners herein, we upheld the
legality of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under
circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar.
A striking similarity between the case at bar and 20th Century Fox is the fact
that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the
articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant
issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:
(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to
be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the
above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the
premises above-described. (at p. 664.)
On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, we held in said
case:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are
articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate
business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles
and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate
business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without
specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating
an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result
in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. (at p. 665.)
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too allembracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its
business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is
constitutionally objectionable (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]).
In consequence, respondent court was merely correcting its own erroneous
conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45 when it ordered the return of the
seized television sets and other paraphernalia specified in the motion filed by
FGT. This can be gleaned from its statement that ". . . the machines and
equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal

reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be

said with moral certainty that the machines or equipment(s) were used in
violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network,
Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has
the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction
equipment (s) and paraphernalia (s)." (pp. 131-132, Rollo.)
Far from being despotic or arbitrary, respondent judge must be commended
for rectifying his error when he found that his initial conclusions were
inaccurate and erroneous, colliding as they did with the constitutional rights of
private respondent.
Much has been said in the media about piracy of films and videotapes and that
violators of the law must be brought to the courts but, as the Court said
in Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614 [1991]), "[z]eal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution
itself abhors." (at p. 622.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, the assailed order of May 29, 1987
AFFIRMED, and the temporary restraining order issued on June 18, 1987,
vacated and lifted. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 153254. September 30, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDEN DEL
CASTILLO, appellant.
Eden del Castillo appeals from the decision dated June 27, 2001[1] of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU54778, finding her guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and imposing
on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
She was indicted under an Information dated August 2, 2000 which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of July 2000, at about 10:30 A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then
and there have in her possession and control or use the following:
ABC-

Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline

substance weighing 294.86 grams;
B- Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline
substance weighing 12.33 grams;
C- Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline
substance weighing 4.75 grams locally known as shabu, containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon her arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.[3] Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon,
PO3 Alfredo Petallar, P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas and PO2 Brazilio Borinaga. Their
testimonies proved the following facts:
On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Isaias Dicdican of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, authorizing the search and
seizure of shabu and its paraphernalias in the house of appellant located in M.
Borgonia Street, Hayco, Mabolo, Cebu City.[4] At about 10:30 in the morning of
July 31, 2000, a team composed of Police Chief/Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II,
Bauzon, Petallar and Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon, Jr. and PO1 Jeric
Cuyos Toring, went to the subject house to implement the search warrant.
[5]
The police officers accompanied by three barangay tanods,
namely: Wilfredo Wasawas, Mansueto Toong and Leonico Sagosa, entered
the house, saw appellant and served the warrant on her.[6] At that time,
appellant was with her grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the registered
owner of the house, and Servando del Castillo, appellants brother, in the living
room. The police officers pressed them by telling them not to move and they
were asked to just sit down while the search was on-going. [7]
The raiding team divided themselves into two searching groups. The first
group composed of Bauzon, Toring and one barangay tanodsearched the

upper portion of the house and found three large plastic packs of white
crystalline substance.[8] The second group, composed of Baclayon and
Borinaga, searched the ground floor and found eight medium heat-sealed
plastic packs of white crystalline substance and fifty-three heat-sealed plastic
packets of white crystalline substance; two disposable lighters, one pair of
scissors, one tooter, one puller and an improvised hacksaw.[9] Servando
voluntarily surrendered five small packs of white crystalline substance.
[10]
Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights, specifically,
the right to counsel to which she replied that she has a lawyer who will
represent her.[11] Petallar then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and
appellant was made to sign the same.[12] PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar
explained that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 although the raid
was conducted on July 31 because their office had earlier prepared the blank
form.[13] A copy of the inventory was given to a tanod[14] and thereafter
appellant and Servando were brought to the police station while the items
seized were brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination.[15]
P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas, chemist of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office,
who conducted the laboratory test on these substances confirmed that the
specimens submitted for testing were positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.[16]
The defense presented the following witnesses: Elena R. Garcia, Jaime Garcia
and appellant herself who testified to establish the following facts:
The house subject of the search on July 31, 2000 was owned by Elena,
appellants grandmother, and her late husband, Jose Garcia, as evidenced by
a copy of Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of Jose Garcia;[17] that
only Brent Lepiten, Elenas grandson, was living in the house while appellant
was living with her parents in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, a
distance of about five kilometers from Elenas place.[18] On July 31, 2000,
Elena, who was in the upper portion of the house with her son, Jaime, who
happened to sleep in her house the night before because he had a drinking
spree with some friends, went downstairs because of the thudding sound from
their door.[19]Appellant, who was in the house to visit her grandmother, was
having breakfast when the door was opened. Several men entered the house
and instructed them to sit down. Two of these men carrying an envelope went
upstairs and woke up Jaime Garcia.[20] Jaime then went downstairs and these
two men without the envelope followed two minutes later.[21] Appellant and the
other occupants were told to wait for the arrival of thetanods. Then, the same
two men who earlier went upstairs went up again with a tanod and when they
came down, they had with them an envelope, the contents of which were
spread on the table and were listed down.[22] Appellant was then asked to sign
a paper where a listing of the contents of the envelope was made but she
requested to contact her lawyer which was denied.[23] She was forced to sign
otherwise she would be handcuffed.[24] The list of the inventory was neither
read to her nor did they leave a copy for her or to any of the occupants.
[25]
Appellant declared that the search warrant was served on her but she never
read it nor was it read to her.[26]
On June 27, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed decision[27] finding
appellant guilty as charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Eden del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The seized or confiscated items are declared
forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be disposed of in the
manner allowed by law.[28]
In convicting appellant, the trial court ratiocinated:
After a careful analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record, the Court is of the well considered view and so holds that the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the accused had indeed, with
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, in her possession and
control or use on or about July 31, 2000 at about 10:30 A.M. the following:
A - Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 294.86 grams;
B - Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 12.33 grams;

C - Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance
weighing 4.75 grams
locally known as shabu, containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription. The
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), by virtue of a Search
Warrant issued against Eden Garcia del Castillo by Judge Isaias Dicdican and
implemented on July 31, 2000 resulted in the acquisition of said items. The
items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and the result
is positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, or locally
known as shabu. No less than the accused signed the Receipt for Confiscated
Articles signifying that the Raiding Team of the Philippine National Police had
actually seized and confiscated certain items or articles from the herein
accused. The prosecution then was able to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7,
8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities: 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylampetamine
hydrochloride;
Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignment of errors:[30]
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS

JUDGMENT A CLEAR AND DISTINCT FINDINGS OF FACTS
(WHICH) PROVED THAT ACCUSED DID NOT OWN THE HOUSE
WHICH WAS SEARCHED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS
JUDGMENT THAT THE ARTICLES SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF A
SEARCH WARRANT WERE NOT TURNED OVER TO THE
ISSUING COURT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RAIDING TEAM FAILED TO ISSUE A DETAILED RECEIPT OF
SEIZED ARTICLES AND TO GIVE A COPY THEREOF TO THE
LAWFUL OCCUPANT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT BY THE
RAIDING TEAM ORDERING ACCUSED TO SIGN THE
INVENTORY AFTER THE ARREST WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IS VIOLATIVE OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAID
WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRIVACY OF ELENA R. GARCIA, AS
OWNER OF THE HOUSE BEING SEARCHED, AND NOT THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED EDEN DEL CASTILLO.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and

Motion in lieu of appellees brief praying that the decision under consideration
be reversed and set aside and that the appellant be acquitted.
We agree with the OSG. The appeal is meritorious.
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.

The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs

are the following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug;
(b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and,
(c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
In People vs. Tira,[31] we explained the concept of possession of
regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent
to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes
not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where
the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a
showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such
fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove
that the accused had knowledge of the existence of the presence of the drug
in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drug.
Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in
the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same
may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the house or
place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises
in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Prosecution witnesses failed to establish that the house where
the shabu and other shabu paraphernalias were found belongs to
appellant.On the other hand, defense evidence clearly showed that the subject
house belongs to appellants grandmother, Elena Garcia, who testified in direct
examination as follows:
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q You stated in your personal circumstances that you are a resident of
Mabolo, Cebu City. Do you own a house?
A Yes, I owned a house.
Q With whom are you living therewith?
A My grandson.
Q What is the name of your grandson living with you at that house?
A Brent Lepiten.
Q You stated that you owned a house in Mabolo, Cebu City which was the subject of the
search. Do you have any evidence to show that you owned that house?
A Yes, I have.
Q Showing to you this machine copy which is Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name
of Jose Garcia. Is this the tax declaration evidencing your ownership and
possession of your house?
A Yes, that is the one.
Q How are you related to Jose Garcia?
A My husband.
Q Where is he now?
A He is already dead.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
We request Your Honor that the machine copy of the tax declaration be marked as our
Exhibit 1.
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q The house which you mentioned belongs to you, how many storeys are there?
A Two storeys.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q You mean the ground floor and the upper portion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where do you usually take your rest in the evening?
A In the upper portion.
Q Do you know accused Eden del Castillo?
A Yes, she is one of my grandchildren.
Q Where is she living?
A San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City.
Q Is accused Eden del Castillo still single?
A She is still single.
Q With whom is she living with before the arrest?
A Together with her auntie Edna Aballe.
Q How about her parents?
A Sometime(s) when they traveled at Badian only Eden is in the house together with her
auntie but they stayed in their house.
Q On July 31, 2000 in that evening who was sleeping at the upper portion of your
house?
A Myself and my grandson.
Q You are mentioning of Jaime, who is this Jaime?

FISCAL LABORTE:
The witness was only asked who slept at the upper portion and she answered myself
and my grandson.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q You mentioned one Jaime Garcia, why was he there?
A This Jaime was able to sleep in the house at that time considering that his wife was
abroad.
...
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q That Jaime Garcia you said where did he take his rest that night?
A At our house.
Q In what portion thereof?
A At the upper portion. [32]

The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish by competent

evidence that appellant is the owner or at least shared the ownership of the
house where the shabu was found. PO3 Petallar testified that based on their
own casing operation, appellant frequented the subject house to eat meals;
[33]
that they were not sure that the house was owned by appellant but only
believed that she had belongings therein since she frequented the same.
[34]
PO2 Borinaga testified it was a public knowledge that appellant was living in
the subject house since she was a child. [35] Thus, there is no competent
evidence that appellant had control and dominion over the place where
the shabu was found. The claim of appellant that she has her residence in San
Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City and that she was only a visitor in the
house that belongs to her grandmother at the time of the search was not
rebutted by convincing evidence.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued,
however, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants
control or possession.[36]
The prosecution likewise failed to prove appellants possession of
the shabu at the time of her arrest. It bears stressing that at the time the
raiding team conducted the search, appellant and the other occupants were
asked to stay in the living room. PO3 Petallar did not find any drugs on
appellants body nor was there anything unusual or suspicious noted in her
person.[37]
Notably, the policemen testified that they found the shabu in the upper
portion of the house, however, it was not shown at all in whose room it was
found. In fact, the defense evidence showed that at the time the two policemen
went upstairs, Jaime Garcia, appellants uncle, was asleep and was awakened
by the policemen who asked him to go down. This was corroborated by PO2
Borinaga who testified on cross-examination that while he was downstairs,
there was a person upstairs who came down. [38] Moreover, it was appellants
grandmother and the latters grandson, Brent, who were staying in the upper
portion of the house. Also, the shabu found at the ground floor of the house
does not conclusively establish that it belongs to appellant since it was not
found together with the other things of appellant. To reiterate, she was not the
only person who had access to the entire house. In fact, it was also shown by
the prosecution that a certain Servando, appellants brother, voluntarily
surrendered five small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. We find
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
prove
convincingly
that
the
seizedshabu belonged to appellant.
Moreover, the manner in which the search was conducted on the subject
house failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly
Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two
witnesses No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the
lawful occupants and it is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality may be called
upon to witness the search. While appellant and the other occupants of the
house were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually
witness the search of the premises. They were in the words of the policemen
pressed, i.e., they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were seated
while the simultaneous search was on-going in the upper and lower portions of
the house.[39] They should be the ones that should have accompanied the

policemen while the search was being done and not substituted by
the barangay tanods in their stead. We held in People vs. Go:[40]
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted
that the search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of
the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of
either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his
son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a
procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from
actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the
spirit and the letter of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was
planted is strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted by
the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala together
with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito
na. Apparently, the search of the accused-appellants house was conducted in
violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically
provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised
Penal Code.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of
Investigation, et al., a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can
roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only
witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search
conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the
house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the
search at the second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and
explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the
search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126
provides that the search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the absence of either of
the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the
search of appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son
Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without
discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the
law.
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is
essentially no different from that in People v. Del Rosario where this Court
observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister
was actually seized or confiscated at the residence of the accused-appellant.
In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and
much delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of the
accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they
immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched
the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the
search, the witnesses were called in only after the policeman had already
entered accused-appellants residence (PP. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991),
and therefore, the policemen had more ample time to plant the
shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Section
14[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that
in order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all
and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs.
Tanchoco, 76 Phil 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653[1964];
People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516[1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out
the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.

We also find that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures
on search and seizures provided under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality,
leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court. The officer
must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful
occupant. In this case, however, PO3 Petallar admitted that the inventory
receipt was given to the barangay tanod[41] despite the presence of the
appellant and her grandmother which is a violation of the rule.
Likewise, the police officers failed to deliver the seized items to the court
which issued the search warrant. It was commanded in the search warrant that
the seized articles be brought to the court which issued it to be dealt with as
the law directs. Under the rule, the seized property must be delivered by the
officer to the judge who issued the warrant. It must be accompanied with a true
inventory thereof duly verified. The police officers all testified that the
confiscated shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. Faced with the same circumstance, we held in People vs.
Gesmundo:[42]
On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court, the trial court
held that it takes judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo City
police force of retaining possession of confiscated specimens suspected of
being marijuana by immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI
accredited physician for preliminary examination and/or laboratory examination
before filing a case with the city prosecutors office. The mere tolerance by the
trial court of such a practice does not make it right. Clearly, such practice
violates the mandatory requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose
for which they were enacted. Speculations as to the probability of tampering
with the evidence cannot then be avoided.
The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al vs. Mariano Almeda , et al.
(70 Phil 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of
the allegedly confiscated specimens. While in said decision, this court
recognized the fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of the
Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the Justice of the Peace of
Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was for the reason that the custody of
said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention having
been approved by the latter. Thus, approval by the court which issued the
search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the
police officers; and only then will their custody be considered custody of the
court. Absent such approval, the police officers have no authority to retain
possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to another
agency, like the NBI.[43]
Moreover, the inventory receipt was not certified under oath by any of
the members of the raiding team as required by the rule but was signed only
by appellant and her brother.
The trial court erred in relying on the receipt of confiscated articles to
establish that the raiding team had actually seized the listed items therein.
First, it is highly irregular that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000
when the actual raid was conducted on July 31, 2000. We find the explanation
unacceptable given that the receipt was already prepared earlier than the
search. Such discrepancy affects the integrity of the inventory receipt. Second,
appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. It was
established that at the time she signed the receipt, she was already under
custodial investigation. The testimony of PO3 Petallar is revealing:
Q When you saw the articles seized you were of the impression that they were illegal?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because of that impression you held Eden del Castillo in custody of the law?

A Yes, sir.
Q You handcuffed Eden del Castillo immediately?
A No, we do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo.
Q Although you do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo, the accused but virtually
she was already held in custody of the law?
A We effected the arrest.
Q So you begun listing down the articles which is supposedly seized?
A Upon the delivery of the seized articles from the searching parties I began listing.
Q You listed the articles in that prepared form, correct?
A Yes, sir. [44]
Q In your joint affidavit, you stated in paragraph 7 That we informed her Constitutional
Right provided under the 1987 Phil. Constitution?
A Yes, sir.
Q You informed her of her right under the Constitution because you wanted her to claim
ownership of the seized articles?
A We just informed her about her constitutional right.
Q So that after informing her of her constitutional right she signed this receipt or
inventory of seized articles, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So you asked her by interrogation or question whether or not you will concur to the
entries listed in this inventory?
A Yes, sir.
Q You also asked her that the search was conducted in a very orderly manner?
A Yes, sir.
Q You also asked her that nothing was destroyed or lost inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q That you also asked her that the members of the raiding team did not in any manner
subjected (sic) them to unreasonable treatment?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that they were not exposed to embarrassment?
A Yes, sir.
Q Since you shoot (sic) several questions and informing her of the constitution(al)
right(s) under the 1987 Constitution did you tell her that you have the right to be
assisted by counsel?
A I told her that.
...
COURT:
Q After you had told the accused that she is entitled to have counsel now what did the
accused say, if any?
A She told me that she would get a lawyer.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q In effect, did she get a lawyer?
A Not immediately.
...
Q Thereafter was she able to get a lawyer?
A When we arrived at the camp her sister told us that she had already hired a lawyer.
Q In effect, did that lawyer appear in the camp?
A I never saw.
Q So accused would (sic) sign (sic) that instrument without the assistance of counsel?
A Yes, sir.[45]

While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read her constitutional
right, it was not clearly shown that she was informed of her right not to sign the
receipt and that it can be used as an evidence against her. If appellant was
indeed informed of her constitutional right, it is unusual for her to sign the
receipt acknowledging ownership of the seized items without the assistance of
counsel considering that she wanted to get a lawyer. In People vs. Go,[46] we
found the inventory receipt signed by appellant inadmissible for being violative
of her custodial right to remain silent, thus:
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to
appellant for his signature without any showing that appellant was informed of
his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was
he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced with
similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo stated:
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accusedappellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission
embodied in a document entitled PAGPAPATUNAY previously prepared by the
police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having
been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that the
accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document;
neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact
that the document may be used as evidence against her.
In People vs. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing
suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their
possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent,
viz:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right
to be silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used

against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement unless it is

made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this
effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic
bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt
and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried
marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these
alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the
commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to
sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who
confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is
a violation of the constitutional right of the appellant to remain silent whereby
he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of
his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is
inadmissible in evidence.
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for
being violative of appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an
indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted
the search of appellants residence.
Assuming arguendo that appellant did waive her right to counsel, such
waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. To insure that a waiver is
voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution [47] requires that for the right to
counsel to be waived, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the
counsel of the accused.[48] There is no such written waiver in this case, much
less was any waiver made in the presence of the counsel since there was no
counsel at the time appellant signed the receipt. Clearly, appellant affixed her
signature in the inventory receipt without the assistance of counsel which is a
violation of her right under the Constitution.
In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus in People
vs. Del Norte,[49] we said:
We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to protect
appellant where the evidence presented shows insufficient factual nexus of her
participation in the commission of the offense charged. In People vs. Laxa, we
held:
The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But
it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional
rights. It is precisely when the governments purposes are beneficent that we
should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis
warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without understanding.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
appellant Eden del Castillo. She is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged
against her and her immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered
unless she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to forthwith
implement this decision and to inform this Court, within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
The shabu and other shabu paraphernalias seized during the search are
forfeited in favor of the State. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING
alias "DICK," accused-appellant.
CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by the
trial court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in
transit 999.43 grams of shabu;[1] and, having in his custody, possession and
control 5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. [2]He was meted two (2)
death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of Sec.

16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (TheDangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as

amended).[3] He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first
case, and P12,000,000.00 in the second. [4] He is now before us on automatic
review.
The antecedent facts: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements
of the Special Operation Unit, Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected
drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a transparent plastic
bag containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of
NARCOM agents. When questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with
the government agents and revealed the name of accused Che Chun Ting as
the source of the drugs. Misspped
On 27 June 1996 the Narcotics Command deployed a team of agents for the
entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major
Marcelo Garbo, a certain Captain Campos,[5] P/Insp. Raymond Santiago,
SPO3 Renato Campanilla, and a civilian interpreter. The members of the
NARCOM team were in two (2) vehicles: a Nissan Sentra Super Saloon driven
by Mabel with P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla as passengers; and the
other vehicle, with Major Garbo, Captain Campos and the civilian interpreter
on board. At around 7 oclock in the morning they proceeded to the Roxas
Seafront Garden in Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place
under surveillance. Later, they moved to the McDonalds parking lot where the
civilian interpreter transferred to the Nissan car. Mabel then called Che Chun
Ting through her cellular phone and spoke to him in Chinese. According to the
interpreter, who translated to the NARCOM agents the conversation between
Mabel and Che Chun Ting, Mabel ordered one (1) kilo of shabu.
At around 10:30 oclock in the morning of the same day, Mabel received a call
from the accused that he was ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately
relayed the message to the NARCOM agents. After receiving the go-signal
from Major Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago, SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded
to the Roxas Seafront Garden. The other vehicle followed but trailed behind
within reasonable distance to serve as a blocking force.
Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel honked twice and went to
Unit 122. The two (2) NARCOM agents, who waited inside the car parked two
(2) meters away, saw the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand
Mabel a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. The
NARCOM agents immediately alighted and arrested the surprised man who
was positively identified by Mabel as Che Chun Ting. Then the agents radioed
their superiors in the other car and coordinated with the security guard on duty
at the Roxas Seafront Garden to make a search of Unit 122. During the search
SPO3 Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second floor. The bag
was examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his
girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz. The accused together with the evidence was then
brought to Camp Crame where Forensic Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Julita T. de
Villa after conducting laboratory tests found the white crystalline substance to
be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[6] Spped
The defense has a different version. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her
brother Noli Ortiz to meet Mabel Cheung Mei Po in front of the Allied Bank at
the EDSA Extension to help the latter find a lawyer and at the same time get
the laser disc she lent to Mabel. Noli testified that when he got inside the car of
Mabel a policeman sitting at the back of the car suddenly hit him on the head.
The car then proceeded to McDonalds at Roxas Boulevard near the Roxas
Seafront Garden where he was moved to another car, a green Nissan Sentra,
with Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and a certain Palma (perceived to be the
civilian interpreter) on board. Mabel stayed behind at McDonalds until she was
brought back to Camp Crame.
Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas
Seafront Garden where they parked the car five (5) to seven (7) meters away
from Unit 122. Noli rang the doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened the door,
two (2) NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the
premises. Noli denied having seen any black bag seized by SPO3 Campanilla;
instead, what he saw was his sister's video camera being carted away by the
NARCOM agents. He further testified that when his sister was made to sign a
certification on the conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened and
crying. He claimed that accused Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the
second floor of the unit.
The defense presented documents showing that the owner of Unit 122 was
Nimfa Ortiz and not accused Che Chun Ting who lived at 1001 Domingo
Poblete St., BF Homes, Paranaque.[7] This information, according to the

defense, was vital for purposes of ascertaining the legality of the search on
Unit 122 as well as the seizure therein of a black bag containing several plastic
bags of shabu. Finally, the defense assailed the lower court for relying on the
testimony of Mabel who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial.[8]
Accused Che Chun Ting now contends that the trial court erred: (a) in
convicting him on the basis of the shabu seized inside Unit 122, which was
constitutionally inadmissible as evidence since it was seized without a search
warrant; (b) in failing to recognize that the testimony of Mabel Cheung Mei Po,
who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial, has discredited the
prosecution case and cast doubt on the testimonies of P/Insp. Santiago and
SPO3 Campanilla; and, (c) in assuming that the entire white crystalline
substance seized is positive formethylamphetamine hydrochloride. Jospped
We resolve. The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure
can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
Thus The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.[9]
It further mandates that any evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[10]
The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For
instance, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense,
without a search warrant.[11] The search may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his
immediate control.[12]
The issue is whether this case falls within the exception.
The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to
Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM
operatives. Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his
residence but that of his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely
a sojourner therein. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of the
house constituted a permissible area within his reach or immediate control,
[13]
to justify a warrantless search therein. Sppedjo
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless
search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by
the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search
is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that
may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to
the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with
the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at
the place where the suspect was arrested,[14] or the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person
arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. [15] The exception
therefore should not be strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its
purposes, as what the Solicitor General would want us to do.
We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some
5,578.68 grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal
for being violative of ones basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are
regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit of a
poisonous tree." However, objects and properties the possession of which is
prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the
illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives
which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and
must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the 5,578.68 grams of shabu in

evidence does not totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in Unit 122
was preceded by a valid arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante
delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM operatives on the
basis of the information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the
accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3
Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of white crystalline substance to
Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag
of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in evidence, being the fruit of
the crime. Miso
The second assigned error hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As we have
consistently stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, appellate
courts give weight, and at times even finality, to the findings of the trial judge
who is in a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses, as he can
observe firsthand their demeanor and deportment while testifying. Appellate
courts have none of the judges advantageous position; they rely merely on the
cold records of the case and on the judges discretion.
As mentioned earlier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness in the
course of the trial. The defense capitalized on such fact and hammered the
prosecution on this point, arguing that Mabels testimony during her crossexamination virtually belied the prosecutions factual theory of the case and
cast doubt on the testimony of the NARCOM agents.
But we are not persuaded. Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness
understandably because of her adverse interest in the case. She was
separately charged for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, [16] although she
was subsequently acquitted by the trial court on reasonable doubt. [17] It is
therefore to be expected that she would be extremely cautious in giving her
testimony as it might incriminate her. At any rate, the testimony of the police
informant in an illegal drug case is not essential for the conviction of the
accused since that testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative.
[18]
Hence, even if we concede that Mabel Cheung Mei Pos testimony was
discredited on account of the dismissal of the criminal case against her, the
prosecution could still rely on the testimonies of the arresting officers and
secure a conviction on the basis thereof.
Further, the attempt of the accused to downgrade the testimonies of the
NARCOM agents is bereft of substantial basis since it has not been shown
that they had an improper motive for testifying as they did. It would not be
amiss to point out that NARCOM agents are not just ordinary witnesses but
are law enforcers. As compared to the baseless disclaimers of the witnesses
for the defense, the narration of the incident of the police officers is far more
worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to
have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[19]
From the evidence at hand, we find no reason to denigrate their
declarations.
Indeed, there is no doubt from the records that the accused was caught
in flagrante delicto, i.e., in the act of delivering shabu. The evidence for the
prosecution is both substantial and convincing. At its core is the testimony of
P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla who categorically pointed to the
accused as the person who handed to Mabel a plastic bag of white crystalline
substance which, upon forensic examination, was found positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As can be gleaned from the
assailed decision of the trial court, the narration of events by the police officers
is positive, credible and entirely in accord with human experience. It bears all
the earmarks of truth that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to give
credence to it. They testified in a clear, precise and straightforward manner,
and even the rigid cross-examination by the defense could not dent the
essence of their testimonies. Nexold
As regards the third assigned error, the accused questions the accuracy of the
laboratory tests conducted by the forensic chemist on the seized articles. He
contends that the PNP Crime Laboratory should have subjected the entire
999.43 grams and 5,578.66 grams of white crystalline substance taken from
him, to laboratory examination and not merely representative samples thereof
in milligrams.
The argument is untenable. Primarily, there is no law or rule of evidence
requiring the forensic chemist to test the entire quantity of seized drugs to
determine whether the whole lot is really prohibited or regulated drugs as
suspected. On the contrary, it has always been the standard procedure in the
PNP Crime Laboratory to test only samples of the drugs submitted for

laboratory examination. A sample taken from a package may be logically

presumed to be representative of the whole contents of the package. [20]
Moreover, we held in one case that chemical analysis is not an indispensable
prerequisite to establish whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a
prohibited drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without
any knowledge of chemistry to such an extent that the testimony of a witness
on the point may be entitled to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not
required, and the degree of familiarity of a witness with such drugs only affects
the weight and not the competency of his testimony.[21] Manikx
At any rate, it was up to the defense to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the findings of the forensic chemist were erroneous. In the absence of
such evidence, the positive results of the tests conducted by the chemist
should be accepted as conclusive. After all, she has in her favor the
presumption that she regularly performed her official duty, which was to carry
out those tests in accordance with the accepted standard procedure.[22]
All told, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 96-8932.
Accordingly, he must suffer for his serious crime of poisoning the health and
future of this nation. However, we refrain from imposing the capital
punishment. As amended by RA 7659, Sec. 20, Art. IV of The Dangerous
Drugs Act now provides in part that the penalty in Sec. 15, Art. III, shall be
applied
if
the
dangerous
drug
involved
is,
in
the
case
of shabu or methylampethamine hydrochloride 200 grams or more and the
delivery or distribution of regulated drugs without proper authority is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
toP10,000,000.00. Thus the law prescribes two (2) indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. Pursuant to Art. 63 of The Revised
Penal Code, since there were neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending accused's violation of the law, the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
The legislature never intended that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved exceeds those stated in Sec. 20, the maximum penalty of death shall
automatically be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision
from which such a conclusion may be drawn. On the contrary, this Court has
already concluded in People v. Gatward[23] that RA 7659 did not amend Art. 63
of The Revised Penal Code, and the rules therein were observed although the
cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in
Sec. 20.[24] Maniksx
With respect to Crim. Case No. 96-8933, since the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, which
rendered the evidence against him inadmissible, he is acquitted of the offense
charged.
Finally, we take this opportunity to remonstrate the law enforcement agencies
regarding respect for the constitutional rights of persons suspected of
committing crimes. As the phalanx of our united efforts to stem the surging tide
of drug-trafficking in this country, the police force is not only expected to be
well-trained and well-equipped in the detection and apprehension of drug
pushers, but more importantly, it must also be aware that arrests, searches
and seizures should at all times and in all instances be done within the context
of the Constitution. While we encourage an active and vigorous law
enforcement, we nevertheless defer to and uphold the sacredness of
constitutional rights. In the instant case, while the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by this Court on the accused may be sufficient to put him
away for good, it is nonetheless lamentable that he will walk away unpunished
in the other case of possession of more than 5,000 grams of illegal narcotics
on account of a blunder which could have easily been avoided had the
NARCOM officers faithfully adhered to the requirements of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932
convicting accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15, Art.
III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended) is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the penalty imposed by the trial
court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The accused is ordered to pay a fine in
the increased amount of P2,000,000.00, and the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt the evidence against him being inadmissible.
The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case Nos.
96-8932 and 96-8933 are FORFEITED in favor of the government to be turned

over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board and the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. Manikanx

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C.
TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City
Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS
and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to
through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year),
AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon
Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT,
however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on
the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the
CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at
No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence
of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of
the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high
ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84
for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing
was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A.
Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of
S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records,
documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic
Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be
used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following
may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was
arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in
all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on
August 10th, 4 the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang,

owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was
made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and
documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods,
but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO
and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the
CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners
for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents)
against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P.
Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY
FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to
retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that
are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City
Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment
on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising
the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the
Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and
ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal
trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items
belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings
under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on
January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to
be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware
of the Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set
aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his
Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized
Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners'
Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized representatives from
introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because
it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity
the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not
been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General,
contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in
this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the
disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be
seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist
Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the
National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of
possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support
money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an allembracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It
is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications
to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations
known as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and
April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge
were described as 'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs,
printing paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description
hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles
might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if
not worse than, the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos,
et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being
too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge
allowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the
language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness
presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno
and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many suspicious persons
with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front, Organization of the
Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public and support money from foreign and local sources. 9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the

applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to
rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the
1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching
questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to
be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the
same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature
and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon
which a warrant may issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the
illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this
original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their
Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the

admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during
the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984
claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash,
petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two
different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It
should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one
Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or
Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right
to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be
returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12,
Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A
person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter
case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes
the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be
considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is
a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made
within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the
search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and
articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by
respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set
aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible
introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before
Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila AguilarRoque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to
her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing petitioner Rodolfo
Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and control twelve
(12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops,
marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo
Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other
police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea
bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there
was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found
ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited
drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his
order of release on July 29, 1991. 4

Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory

Section, testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding
the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive
for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in
his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He
alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when
they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for
investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife
Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere afterthought" and
found the version of the prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting
petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court
finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of
violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of
Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179,
and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine
of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus
costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall
be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were
inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his
conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly
identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no
compelling reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment
of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine
the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were
more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show
that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other
than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him
such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of
such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other
members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting
or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the
desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer
whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of
proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . . ,
must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
appellant that she had been framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any
consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the
time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that
he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it
was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-

up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a
common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence
was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the
alleged informant in court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his
acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to
produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even
the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed
been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who
apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and
identified him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case
against appellants. There is no compelling reason for us to overturn
the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the
lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward spontaneous
and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible and
positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to
prove that petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the
finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be
ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in
flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the
area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence,
however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches
and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house
after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house,
the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search
was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's
house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed
with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made
incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search
and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or
that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or
of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his
house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the
inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.

The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the
doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search
made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the penalty
imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No.
7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall
now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People
v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is less
than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is
not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the
quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed
under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and
ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS

GR NO 175783 SEPTEMBER 3, 2007
For Review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled,People of the Philippines
v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas, affirming the Decision[2] dated 14 October 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case
No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,[3] as amended.
The Information filed against appellant alleged:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON

y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A.
6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of
Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control seven
(7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92
grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95
grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white
crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory
examination conducted gave positive result to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu a
regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[4]

Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not

guilty. The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of
PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the morning of 7 March
1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a
confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC
411[6] would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville
Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief of Police
Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a
surveillance.When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said
Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a
stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the
opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police
Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked
on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant
allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent
document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order
appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from
the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the
contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu.Appellant was
thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated
that when they frisked appellant, they discovered 2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5
medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial
number C-9890 with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.[7]
The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon
City for examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over to the
crime laboratory yielded the following:
FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens
A-1
through
A-7
contains
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x. [8]

Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that

led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of
Curacha, a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road,
Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999,
he reported for work at six oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified
men walked up to him. One of these men asked him regarding the ownership
of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside
so he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were
inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu
Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After
revealing this information to the unidentified men, the latter purportedly
pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The
men allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened
to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he
was then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding
his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly
forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of
the shabu and the gun recovered from said vehicle. He learned later on that
he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession
of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct
examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one
charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the
Gemini car.

The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to
support a guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[9]
On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by
appellant, the records of the case having been forwarded to this Court by the
RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their
respective briefs.[10]
In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary
pleading in which he questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility
of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at the time of his
warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within Marville Subdivision. He had
not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime
which could have justified his apprehension. He goes on to argue that even if
he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his failure to
raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the
unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant
claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police
for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his
identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said
warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence.[11]
On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of
Appeals conformably with our decision in People v. Mateo, which modified the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from
the RTCs to this Court of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.[12]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a
quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is
hereby AFFIRMED.[13]
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony
to be clear and unequivocal[14] and should therefore prevail over appellants
defense of denial.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants
contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed
with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions
arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [16] It also took note of
appellants failure to give any credible reason why the police singled him out
considering that they were strangers to one another prior to the date of the
incident.[17]
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone
assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16,
ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]
Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence
was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade school graduate, could
not have concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest. [19] He also
maintains that he was an easy target of police operatives, since he was a new
employee in the videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who
frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution
failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for conviction and
that the trial court should not have applied the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties on the part of the police officers. [20]
Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate
the factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes that the court a quos
evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs
and was utterly lacking in substantial discussion, in contravention of this
Courts edict that the decisions must distinctly and clearly express their factual
and legal bases.[21]
On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant filed a
Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all
relevant matters for his defense were already discussed in his previous
pleadings.[22] The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it
would no longer file a supplemental brief.[23]

The appeal must fail.

In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the
testimony of PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue about a
witnesss credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts
will generally not disturb factual findings of the trial court since the latter has
the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying.[24] Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of
pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest
degree of respect on appeal. [25] Our careful review of the records of this case
reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3
Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno recounted their encounter with appellant as
follows:
PROS. LUNA:
Thank you, your honor.
Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the
month of March 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know him?
A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please
point him out?
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when
confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7,
1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: What were you doing then at that time?
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
Q: Who were your companions at that time?
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident
at that time?
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.
Q: About what?
A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville
Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to
deliver an undetermined amount of shabu?
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the
telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC
411 who will deliver at said place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle
and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Where is this located?
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.
Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate
number PFC 411, sir.
Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify
it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B2. What relation has this to the one you mentioned?
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q: What happened after flagging down the car?
A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police
officers, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of
the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
COURT:
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document
for his gun.

Q: What do you mean he was asked? Who was asked?

A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did
you do as police officer?
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it
contained shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the
evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the shabu?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir.
[26]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3
Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellants culpability. His
testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7
March 1999 from the moment their office received a confidential tip from their
informer up to the time they accosted appellant deserved to be given
significance as it came from the mouth of a law enforcement officer who
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police
officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their
official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary
or that they were moved by ill-will.[27]
Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the
positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. It is well-settled
that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare
denials of an accused.[28] A defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and selfserving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters.[29] Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be supported by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[30]
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the
admissibility of the physical evidence presented against him.No less than our
Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in
Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against
warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[31]

In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[32] this Court had the occasion to

elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles
from the requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object
of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to
moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the
aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to
indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright
harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search
of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the
police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates
that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the
warrantless search of a vehicle.[33]

important significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost
so that he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that
the decision needs to be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal.[39]
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court
substantially complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The decision
contained a summary of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution
and by the defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to why it found
appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it
sufficiently informed appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It
readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense of bare
denial in favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant
Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[34] the term probable cause was explained to

mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of the case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to
the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[35]
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the
warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential
informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, theAntipolo City police sent a team to Marville
Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer
turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place
where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw
a gun tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to
support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the
polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the
drivers seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for
the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into
evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the
evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a
warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the
police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence. [36]
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the
Constitutional requirement that (n)o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.[37] Again, we disagree.
Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is
a vital component of due process and fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more

[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from
six (6) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and
sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were

filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information
alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited
drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,
whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S.
Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar
of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando
Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The
prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of
accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and
Badua saw that theshabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accusedappellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody
opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heatsealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint [9] having a
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them
to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had
seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence.[13] The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams
and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand,
the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850
grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His
testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as
they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and
on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire,
brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an
opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a
piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant
[4]

fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no
chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of
the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets
and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry,
and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and,
after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the
NARCOM onEDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained. [18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his
testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their
food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6)
months ofarresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of
marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition
according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to
turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to
law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First,

the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was
invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the
search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT
NO. 160
For: Violation of RA
6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V.
AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L.
ESPAOL
Ju
dge

Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds:

(1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that
the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that
the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu

and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of
the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant
contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no
evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the
same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the
intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the
proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug
paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to
the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff
(shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw
that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of
shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief
PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded
positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP
CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was
taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia,
but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,

in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene

books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not
follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the
seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be
condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of
the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if
otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a
warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the
danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in
character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that
wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an
abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on
probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis
thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a
search for other items not supported by the evidence. [26] Accordingly, we hold
that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accusedappellants house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though
the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two
different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court
said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
connection with Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that There is probable
cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628
Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control
and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of
the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of
the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation
of R.A. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and
it authorized the search and seizure of dried marijuana leaves and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic).
This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more
than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that
since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than
one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been
three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the
second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession
of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]

Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For

Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of
the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference
to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several
offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is
penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are
so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of
firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to
cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the
place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City, the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search
Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents which identified the
premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which
stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11
at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which
described the premises as a house without a number located at Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the
premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants
house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could
not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same
neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at
the end of appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by
Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it was really appellant who
was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant
that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their
operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a search warrant
authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant
Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top
floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the
description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting
the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante
of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accusedappellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no
doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accusedappellants residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge
under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The
search
warrant
authorized
the
seizure
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However,
seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented in evidence. [35] For this doctrine to apply,
there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence;
and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. [36] The
question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police
found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search
warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any
basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been
explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for
possession of shabu.However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to
the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.
[38]
The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested
from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory
evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of
the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellants person or in
an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the
cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in
which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents
because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents.We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the
appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond,
they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this
case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the
bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM
agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the
plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the
possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in
newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there
mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for
failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold
that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accusedappellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was
employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.

Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose
and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof
of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is
unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement
of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in
order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially
accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching
party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances
justified the searching partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on
the apprehension thatthe execution of their mission would be frustrated unless
they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited
drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as
well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its
disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133265. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE MING KHA
alias ALFONSO GO and KIM QUE YU alias ALFONSO QUE, accusedappellants.
On May 16, 1997, around 5:00 in the afternoon, members of the Central Police
District, Batasan Station No. 6 intercepted a van carrying nine (9) sacks of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu near Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City. The police arrested the driver of the van, Que Ming Kha alias
Alfonso Go (Go), and his companion, Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que (Que).
Go and Que were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with
violation of Sec. 15, Article III in relation to Sec. 2(e), (f), (m), Article I of R.A.
6425 as amended by P.D. 1683, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, in an information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring together, confederating with other persons whose true
names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly transport or distribute 253.8609
kilograms of white crystalline substance known as "SHABU" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Go and Que were found guilty of the charge and were given the death
sentence. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Que Ming
Kha (a.k.a. Alfonso Go or Que Beng Kha) and Kim Que Yu (a.k.a. Alfonso
Que) GUILTY as principals beyond reasonable doubt of transporting in large
scale 253.8609 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a.k.a. shabu, in
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, (R.A. 6425), and they are
hereby sentenced to DEATH.
In case their sentences on appeal are commuted, it is advised that they be
ordered deported after service of sentence as they are both in the Philippines
illegally.
Inasmuch as the bulk of the shabu involved in this case has already been
destroyed at the San Lazaro Crematorioum in Manila on July 21, 1997 in the
presence of the Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona, the Director of the
Dangerous Drugs Board, Manuel Supnet, the Vice-Mayor of Quezon City
Herbert Bautista, prosecutor Luis Maceren, defense counsel Godwin Valdez, a
representative of the NBI, the PNP Chemists and other officials, the remaining
shabu retained for purposes of evidence and other related paraphernalia of
contraband are ordered confiscated in favor of the Government and destroyed
pursuant to law upon finality of this decision.
The Khia Pride (sic) van, color blue with Plate No. UPN 595 is ordered
forfeited in favor of the State. For this purpose, the Philippine National Police
officer in custody of said van is hereby ordered to transfer and surrender said

vehicle to the Clerk of Court Mercedes Gatmaitan of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City to be used for official purposes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Bureau of
Immigration.[2]
The case is now before us on automatic review.
From the prosecution evidence, it appears that on May 16, 1997, Chief
Inspector Gilbert Dela Fuente, Head of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, Station 6, Central Police District, received a phone call from an
informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was
being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. Dela Fuente immediately dispatched the
three teams to monitor the van.Team 3, composed of team leader Police
Inspector Raul Espejon and team members PO3 Justo Curameng, SPO1
Joselito Velasquez and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, positioned themselves at Don
Antonio Avenue, Barangay Holy Spirit. Around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon,
the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going
toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching
Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit a sevenyear old boy. The van sped away, leaving its young victim behind. A concerned
motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. Espejon, in the
meantime, reported to Dela Fuente that they have spotted the blue Kia
van. They followed the van after it sped away and intercepted it at
Commonwealth Avenue corner Zuzuarregui Street. The members of the team
alighted from their vehicle and approached the van. They introduced
themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of the van. The
police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's
seat. Espejon informed Go that he just committed the crime of reckless
imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police peered through the
window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of
the van. The sacks have Chinese markings and had a logo which looked like
the head of a pig. One of the sacks was open and they noticed that it
contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The
police also asked for the identification of Go's companion. The latter handed
his driver's license which revealed his name as Kim Que Yu. The police
handcuffed Go and Que, confiscated their driver's license and their cellular
phones found at the front seat of the van, and brought them to Police Station
No. 6 for investigation. PO3 Curameng drove the van to the police station.
They passed by the Kabayan Center to check on the condition of the boy who
was hit by the van. Upon reaching Police Station No. 6, the monitoring team
turned over the suspects and the seized articles to the desk officer. Dela
Fuente informed Superintendent Hercules Cataluna, Chief of the Central
Police District, about the incident. The police inspected the contents of the van
in the presence of Superintendent Cataluna and several officials of Barangay
Holy Spirit. They counted nine sacks, eight of which were sealed and one
open, revealing several plastic bags which contained white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu.[3] The arresting officers thereafter forwarded
the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of
the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of
the white crystalline substance.[4]Upon examination, the substance was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[5]
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the
back of the van.
Go stated that two months prior to his apprehension, he came to Manila
from Cebu and was employed as driver by a certain Ah Chai. On May 16,
1997, Ah Chai instructed him to meet with him at Ever Gotesco in
Commonwealth Avenue. Go took a taxicab from Ah Chai's residence in Pasig
to their meeting place. After waiting for some time, Go saw Ah Chai arrive,
driving the blue Kia van. Go took over the wheel but relied on Ah Chai for the
direction. Suddenly, a boy crossed the street, prompting Go to swerve to the
left. But the van still hit the boy. Ah Chai lost no time in picking up the boy to
bring him to the hospital. He hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver to bring
them to the nearest hospital. Before he left, Ah Chai instructed Go to watch
over the van and assured him that he would return shortly.Curious onlookers,
meanwhile, gathered around the scene of the accident. Then, a car pulled over
and a man in civilian clothes approached him. The man introduced himself as
a police officer. He asked Go several questions, but since he was having
difficulty with the language, he remained silent. The man slapped him several

times because of his refusal to answer. While he was being interrogated by the
police officer, he saw a taxicab stop in front of them and his friend from China,
Alfonso Que, alighted from the cab. Que asked him what happened and
offered to help him. Go related to him in Chinese the events that transpired
before he arrived. Que talked with the police officer in Go's behalf. Que told Go
that the police officer invited them to the police station for interview. Go agreed
after being assured that nothing bad would happen to them. Go rode with the
police officer while Que drove the van to the police station. When they reached
the police station, Go was made to stay in a small room and his hands were
handcuffed. Que, meanwhile, continued to talk with the police officers
outside. Later, Que entered the room. His hands were also handcuffed. He
was fuming mad. Que asked him about the contents of the van. But Go denied
any knowledge about the cargo. After they were interrogated by the police
officers, they were brought to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District where they were detained. Go denied any involvement in the
commission of the offense. He also said that he did not own any of the cellular
phones confiscated inside the van.[6]
Que, on the other hand, testified that he runs his own business together
with his cousin, Lorenzo Que. They buy and sell corn, soya beans and other
hog feeds.On May 16, 1997, after taking an early lunch, he went to see his
cousin at 12th Avenue, Caloocan City. From Caloocan, he took a jeepney to
Novaliches to see a certain Mr. Chua of Liberty Farm to offer him some of their
products. But since Mr. Chua was not at his office at the time, Que proceeded
to Uniwide in Novaliches.From there, he took a taxicab going to Fairview. He
wanted to visit his friend, Henry Co, and offer him a business proposal. He
instructed the taxi driver to take a short cut at Sauyo Road. Que, however, did
not reach his destination. While they were traversing Don Antonio Avenue,
Que saw his friend from China, Alfonso Go who seemed to be in trouble. He
noticed a small crowd gathered around him and a man was talking to him. He
got off the taxicab and approached Go. He asked him what happened. Go told
Que that the van he was driving had sideswiped a boy and his employer
brought the boy to the hospital, but the latter has not returned.Go told him that
the name of his employer was Ah Chai. The policeman invited them to go to
the police station. The police officer requested Que to drive the van because
he wanted Go to ride with him in the car. Upon reaching the police station, he
handed the key to a police officer. The policeman told him to stay in the office
while Go was locked inside a small cell. They were told to wait for a while until
Go's employer comes back from the hospital. After waiting for quite some time,
a police personnel came in and reported that they found sacks of shabu inside
the van. The police handcuffed Que. He protested. He denied any knowledge
about the contents of the van. But he was nonetheless placed inside the cell
with Go.[7] The police later brought Que and Go to the Batasan Police
Detachment. Que testified that he did not see Espejon at the scene of the
accident. He only saw him at the Batasan Police Detachment when he
interrogated Go. He belied the testimony of the police officers who testified
before the court. Que stated that from Batasan Police Station No. 6, they were
transferred to Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District
where they were detained.[8]
To corroborate Que's testimony, the defense also presented other
witnesses who were allegedly at the scene of the accident at the time of the
apprehension of Go and Que.
Pedro Loreto, a tricycle driver, testified that on May 16, 1997, around
5:00 oclock in the afternoon, he took a passenger to Don Antonio Avenue in
Quezon City. When they got to Don Antonio, he saw a crowd gathered in front
of Andok's Litson Manok. After his passenger got off the tricycle, he tried to
see what the commotion was all about. He saw a blue Kia van parked in front
of his tricycle. Then he saw a Chinese man carrying a young boy. The Chinese
and the boy boarded his tricycle and the former instructed him to bring them to
the hospital. He brought them to Malvar Hospital along Commonwealth
Avenue. The Chinese paid himP100.00 and then alighted from the tricycle
together with the boy. Loreto went back to ply his route. When asked to identify
the person who brought the boy to the hospital, he said that the man was not
in the courtroom. He, however, identified Alfonso Go as the driver of the van.[9]
Fermin Dagumang testified that on May 16, 1997, around 5:00 oclock in
the afternoon, he took a tricycle to Commonwealth Avenue. When he alighted
in front of Andok's Litson Manok at Don Antonio, he saw a blue van parked
nearby. The driver of the van was short and stocky and Chinese-looking. Then
he noticed a crowd gathered in front of the store. He went closer and he saw a

child lying on the road. A tall skinny person who looked Chinese took him into
his arms. The man, at that time, was looking for a vehicle to bring the child to
the hospital. Dagumang then left the scene. Dagumang said that the man who
carried the boy was not in the courtroom.[10]
Elmar Cawiling, the seven-year old boy who was hit by the van, also
took the witness stand. He stated that on May 16, 1997, after the van hit him, a
small, Chinese-looking man immediately picked him up and brought him to the
hospital. When asked if it was Alfonso Go who brought him to the hospital, he
replied in the negative.[11]
Go raised the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
1. The lower court [sic] was so full of bias and prejudice against
appellant that he was incapable of rendering a fair, just and
correct judgment in the case.
2. The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
the policemen who testified for the prosecution that they were
tailing the Kia Pregio van when it hit the 7-year old ambulant
vendor, Elmar Cawiling; that after hitting the boy, the van sped
away; that the policemen chased the van until they overtook it
at the corner of Zuzuarregui Avenue; and that when they
overtook the van they found appellant Que Ming Kha and his
co-accused Kim Que Yu inside the van.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the shabu was the
product of illegal search and seizure, hence not admissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
4. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Que Ming Kha
distributed or transported shabu within the meaning of Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.[12]
Que, on the other hand, cited the following errors:
1. Appellant was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased
court.
2. Testimony of the prosecution witnesses is plainly self-serving,
concocted and full of discrepancies.
3. Discovery of the drugs was accidental and not the result of
monitoring or surveillance by the police.
4. Testimony of actual eyewitnesses was disregarded while that of
police officers who were latecomers to the scene was
credited.
5. Eleven reasons given by the trial court as grounds for its
decision are products of bias and prejudice.
6. Owner of shabu is Ah Chai, a person entirely different from
appellant Alfonso Que.
7. Fact of warrantless search sustains defense apart from violating
constitutional rights of Que.
8. Presumption of innocence must prevail because an honest
analysis of the evidence clearly shows innocence or, at the
very least, reasonable doubts.[13]
We reverse the decision of the trial court in so far as it found accusedappellant Que guilty of the charge.
In People v. Pagaura[14] we made the cautionary warning that the court
must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to
suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses x x x. In our criminal
justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt. x x x In the case at bar, no less than the Solicitor General himself
entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his acquittal. When
the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Ques guilt, the Court should listen
and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
We fully agree with the Solicitor General that persistent doubt exists on
the full veracity of the prosecutions theory as regards his (Ques) participation
in the crime.[15] Eye contact with the evidence of the prosecution against Que
will establish that it is incredible as it goes against the grain of our natural
experience and expectation. Right from the start, the prosecution story cannot
but raise the quizzical eyebrow. According to the story, five (5) days before the
apprehension of the accused, the policemen had already gathered detailed

data about the Kia Pregio van that would be used in moving a big quantity of
shabu in Quezon City. They knew exactly its model, plate number, color, etc.
Despite the wide time lead, the prosecution does not explain its failure to flush
out the true owner of the van who could well be the drug lord in the case at
bar. Certainly, it was not too difficult to discover his identity from the vans
registration papers with the LTO and thereafter monitor the vehicles
movement. Instead, the policemen meandered around the city, hoping they
would encounter the van by chance. We cannot be made to believe that our
policemen catch drug syndicates by using the calculus of chance.
Equally unexplainable in the prosecution story is the reaction of the
policemen when they spotted the van transporting the shabu which they have
been hunting for five (5) days. They knew it was carrying shabu of big
quantity. They ought to suspect that its passengers pose a clear danger to
their lives. Yet, nothing in the records shows that PO1 Raul Espejon and PO3
Jesus Curameng called for reinforcement when they first saw the van. They
just serenely tailed the van until it bumped an ice cream-on-sticks
vendor. Again, such an act of throwing caution to the wind strains the seams of
credibility of the policemen-witnesses.
More astonishing is the hit and run story peddled by the prosecution.
Don Antonio Avenue, the place where the van swiped Elmar Cawiling, a 7-year
old ambulant vendor, is just a few yards away from the main Commonwealth
road. The street intersects a main road and is a bustling place especially at
5:00 p.m. or after office hours. On both sides of the street can be found
commercial establishments like banks, pharmacies and eating places while the
giant Ever Gotesco mall stands across Commonwealth Avenue. To compound
the traffic jam in the area, numerous tricycles that ply the nearby subdivisions
parks operate in the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Don Antonio
Avenue. Given the usual traffic mess in the area, it is inconceivable that the
van could speed away after swiping the vendor Cawiling. Indeed, there is no
credible evidence that there were no vehicles in front of the van that could
have impeded its movement. The defense version that the van stopped after
hitting Cawiling and that it did not move as people surrounded it is more
worthy of credence as it accords with the traffic situation in the venue of the
accident.
Similarly, the prosecution story on how the accused were arrested and
the van brought to the police station defies reason. To repeat, the policemen
declared that they have been on the alert for the van carrying shabu for about
five days. When by chance they spotted the van, they followed it until it sped
away after sideswiping Cawiling. They gave the van a hot pursuit and overtook
it after a one kilometer chase. Again, the expectation is that confronted with a
dangerous drug syndicate, the apprehending officers, with ready guns, would
order the driver and passenger of the van to go down with upraised hands,
search them for weapons, handcuff them and then inspect the van for the
suspected shabu. The evidence, however, does not show that policemen
Espejon and Curameng followed this standard police procedure for their own
safety.
To be sure, it is critical to ascertain whether the van sped away or
whether it remained stationary after hitting the vendor Cawiling. The pieces of
evidence on this issue are hopelessly at odds. The testimonies of policemen
Espejon and Curameng tend to establish that the van with Go and Que inside
sped away and they intercepted it after a kilometer long chase. In contrast,
Que declared that he was just passing by Don Antonio Avenue on board a taxi
when he saw his friend Go in the middle of the street after the accident. He
alighted to find out Gos problem. At that time, the van was already parked by
the streetside. As Go was unfamiliar with Tagalog, Que interpreted to him the
questions of the policeman. Later, Go and the van were brought to the police
station for investigation. He agreed to accompany Go who had communication
problems. In the station, the van was found to be carrying shabu. He was
arrested together with Go. Only disinterested witnessescould clear the fog
of evidence on this important factual issue. None of the disinterested
witnesses, namely, Cawiling, the boy vendor, Loreto, the tricycle driver
who brought Cawiling to the hospital, and Dagumang, the passenger of
Loreto, corroborated the prosecution story that the van carrying Go and
Que sped away after sideswiping Cawiling. Consequently, the trial court
erroneously calibrated the evidence against Que and in favor of the
prosecution.
We fully concur with the following analysis of the defense evidence
made by the Solicitor General, viz:

Elmar Cawiling, the ambulant vendor sideswiped by the van, testified that it
was not accused-appellant Kim Que Yu who picked him up but another
Chinese looking man. Pedro Loreto, driver of the tricycle who brought Elmar
Cawiling to the hospital, corroborated the testimony of the latter. Pedro Loreto
further testified that there were no police officers at the scene when the
accident happened, until the time he brought the boy to the hospital
along with a Chinese looking man. He also identified appellant Que Ming
Kha as the other person inside the van who was seated at the drivers seat.
Loreto was later asked if the other Chinese man, who brought the boy to the
hospital, was in the courtroom to which he politely said no. The defense claims
that appellant Kim Que Yu arrived at the scene only after the tricycle carrying
the boy to the hospital had left.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x the records will show that the defense testimonies sufficiently establish
that the other man in the van, aside from the driver, is not Kim Que Yu alias
Alfonso Que, but a certain Ah Chai whom the driver, Appellant Que Ming Kha,
identified as Chiang Lai On. Further, verification from the records of Malvar
Medical Foundation, to where the boy, Elmar Cawiling was brought, reveals
that it was Chiang Lai On who brought the boy there as shown by his drivers
license No. 96-215658. Thus, Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que could not have
been the owner of the illegal contraband as there were only two Chinese
looking men seen inside the van when the accident happened. Appellee
cannot see its way clear to concur with the conviction of Kim Que Yu which
might result in the forfeiture of his life, when persistent doubt exists on the full
veracity of the prosecutions theory as regards his participation in the
crime. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the
shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with
Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. Not one witness saw him
get off the van when the accident happened. Not one credible eyewitness
testified that Kim Que Yu was seen at the vicinity of the bumping of the
child at the time of the accident until shortly before the police arrived.
On the contrary, the undisputed civilian eyewitnesses confirmed Kim Que
Yus story that he just chanced upon the accident and that he got off the
taxicab where he was riding when he saw his fellow Fookienese in some kind
of trouble with a crowd of curious onlookers milling around the accident
scene. The testimony of disinterested eyewitnesses shows that when Que
arrived, the injured child had already been brought to the hospital. Que did not
see him. The police who arrived even later than Que did not see the accident
victim. Much less did they see the accident itself. As will be shown later, the
testimonies of the policemen who were the only prosecution witnesses
on the accident are shot through and through with discrepancies and
obvious fabrication.
The eyewitnesses who corroborated the testimony of Que were Elmar
Cawiling, the boy victim of the accident; Pedro Loreto, the tricycle driver who
drove Cawiling to the hospital; and Fermin Dagumang, the passenger of the
tricycle who got off to give way to the accident victim.
It is beyond dispute that they were at the scene of the accident. There is no
reason to doubt the truth of their testimony, especially when it bears the
hallmarks of being spontaneous, straightforward, categorical and remains
consistent.[16]
The judgment of the trial court convicting Que despite the paucity of the
prosecution evidence can only be attributed to the racial bias of the trial judge
against Chinese. The trial judge unblushingly revealed this racial prejudice in
his decision itself when he wrote:[17]
The Chinese in this country ever since the Spanish regime are known to buy
people. By default and other reasons, they are lording it over our land
economically despite Dr. Jose P. Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and others. They are
known to be cheapskates or kuripot, but, not when they want to attain certain
things. Since the large contraband involved here belongs clearly to a criminal
syndicate, such syndicate of Chinese ruffians would have spared no amount to
pollute our justice system as indeed the illegal entry and stay of Alfonso Go
and Alfonso Que have shown, together with their contemptuous disregard of
our penal laws on falsification and use of aliases and our tax laws by their nonpayment of any tax since 1987.

Even the Solicitor General denounced the relentless prejudice of the trial
judge, viz:[18]
The judge from the very start attempted to conduct trial even if there was no
preliminary investigation (May 23, 1997 hearing). In his own words an
exculpatory existence has to be proved in court (May 27, 1997 hearing). Only
after being reminded of the requirements of due process did he postpone
arraignment so that the preliminary investigation could be conducted.
During arraignment, the judge ignored the unfamiliarity of appellant Que Ming
Kha with English or Tagalog.
Contrary to the familiarity with Tagalog and Visayan, respectively, to enable the
understanding of the highly technical terms in an arraignment (July 15, 1997
hearing).
Up to the end of trial, this prejudice against one he wrongly believed was an
undocumented alien namely Kim Que Yu colored the courts judgment.
The manner and attitude of the judge in the aforesaid proceedings bespeaks
of his partiality. His prejudgment or hasty conclusions does (sic) not speak well
relative to the utmost circumspection he should exercise in the discharge of his
duties to preclude suspicion on his impartiality (Jarquete vs. Boncuaras, 60
SCRA 217; Yanuario vs. Paraguay, 71 SCRA 11).
The unfortunate bias of the judge against the Chinese is expressed in the
decision. The judge presumed an accused as guilty because he is
Chinese. The accused is prejudged guilty because of his nationality and his
status as an illegal overstaying alien.
More need not be said.
Every accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving his guilt and it is
required that his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has
ruled time and again that it is only when the mind is satisfied that the crime has
been committed by the person on trial that the judgment should be for
conviction.[19] If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.[20] The all too clear reason for the age-old ruling is the
failure of the prosecution to discharge its duty to overcome the presumption of
innocence. Such is the case at bar with respect to Que. His conviction cannot
be rooted on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty accorded
to the police officers who made the apprehension. This presumption cannot be
used against Que when the Solicitor General himself concedes that their
testimonies are obvious fabrications. Appellant Que cannot rot in jail on a
sentence of reclusion perpetua on the basis of these obvious fabrications.
We now come to the appeal of accused-appellant Go. It has been
established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time
of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated
drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the
existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The
crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of
criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal
liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal
drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession
and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[21]
Go further argued that the search made on the van was illegal and
therefore the shabu discovered from that search is inadmissible as
evidence. We do not agree.
The Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant
and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. [22] The search

made in the case at bar falls under the fourth exception. We held in People
vs. Doria:[23]
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand
and its discovery inadvertent.
The facts show that while the van was traversing Don Antonio Avenue in
Quezon City, it accidentally hit a seven-year old ambulant vendor. The van
stopped and the owner got off to bring the boy to the hospital. A police officer
who witnessed the accident approached the van to apprehend the driver for
reckless imprudence. As he stood near the van, he saw through the lightly
tinted window of the van several sacks placed at the back of the van. One of
the sacks was open, revealing several plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance which the police suspected to be shabu. Clearly, the prohibited

substance was within the plain view of the police officer who was in a position
to be near the van at the time. The substance is therefore not a product of an
illegal search and not inadmissible as evidence.
We now discuss the penalty that should be imposed on the guilty
appellant. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,00.00) for the
offense. The law thus prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in such case, when
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty
shall be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in
this case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on Go.
[24]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds accused-appellant Que Ming Kha

alias Alfonso Go GUILTY as charged. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que
is ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to order
his immediate release and to report to this Court his compliance with this order
within five (5) days from notice hereof. The remaining shabu retained for
purposes of evidence and other related paraphernalia are ordered confiscated
in favor of the government and destroyed in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.