Milo vs.

Salanga
By: Krissy Tullo
On Arbitrary Detention, Article 124 of the RPC
G.R. No. L-37007
July 20, 1987
FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent
(accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating
petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of
his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force
of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner
inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the
proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the
information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can
be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion
to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority
to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a
police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may
be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors

would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case
of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or
order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led
the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and

HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 129093
FACTS:On

December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed

agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal
OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of
San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for
said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent
Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for
the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon.
Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as
invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent
judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in
this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance

prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should
not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.

PubCorp:Violavs.AlunanIII
G.R. No. 115844. August 15, 1997
FACTS:
Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of the Art
III, Sec.1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the
Liga ng mga Barangay Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third
vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493
which mentions as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five
members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan
political subdivision, and national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in
the LGC in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or
detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.
RULING:
Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact
requires and not merely authorizes the board of directors to create such other positions as it
may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. To begin with, the creation of these
positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay which
was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the
validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish,
or merge offices in the executive management.
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the
needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the
power to create additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision
levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local chapters. The fact is
that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but
to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays
that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he
was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the
SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because

its

resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the
autonomous

governments

of

Region

XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to

"ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future

with

minimum

intervention

from

central

authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the
This

petitioner's
case

involves

removal
the

as

application

Speaker.
of

most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to

obey

the

clear

mandate

on

local

autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in

Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed
in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could
do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears
is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Case Digest: Navarro, et al. v. Executive

Secretary Ermita
G.R. No. 180050 : May 12, 2010
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL., Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,Respondents.
PERALTA,J.:
FACTS:
Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February
10, 2010 one filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of
public respondents, and the other filed by respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo
Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands.
The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of
Governor Villaroman can be subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of
the OSG, which are as follows:
I.
The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of Section 461 of
the Local Government Code.
II.
The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature.The
acts of the Legislature and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be
respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or
constitutionality.
III.

Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a

reason for upholding the validity and constitutionality of laws involving the
creation of a new local government unit as in the instant case.
As regards the first ground, the movantsreiterate the same arguments in their
respective Comments that aside from the undisputed compliance with the income
requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the Province ofDinagat
Islands,has also complied with the population and land area requirements.
The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by the
Court in its Decision, ruling that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed
to comply with either the territorial or population requirement contained in Section
461 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code of 1991.
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province onDecember 3,2006,
it had an official population of only 106,951based on the2000 Census
ofPopulation conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which population
is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special
census of population inDinagatIslandsin 2003, which yielded a population count
of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local
Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit
(motherProvinceofSurigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new
province.
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted
the2007Census of Population. The NSO certified that as ofAugust 1,
2007,DinagatIslandshad a total population of only120,813,which wasstill below
theminimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.

Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory
requirement of2,000 square kilometers.R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the
Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of802.12 square
kilometers. This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of
Dinagat Islands in her Comment.She and the other respondents instead asserted
that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from
theland area requirementbased on the provision in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph
2 of Article 9which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.The certificate of
compliance issued by the LandsManagement Bureau was also based on the
exemption under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.
However, the Court held thatparagraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRRis null and void,
because the exemption is not found in Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and
the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of
the basic law.
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion ofAssociate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to
comply with the population requirement.However, he contends that the Province
ofDinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirementbecause it
is composed ofa group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only
with the territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-squarekilometer land area criterion inSection 461 of the Local Government Code.
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a)
(i) above is the one being referred to in the exemption from the territorial
requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be
created is composed of islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need
not be contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers.
He asserts that this is because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area are

not two distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An
exemption from one of the two component requirements in paragraph (a) (i)
allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component requirement,
because the non-attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the
other component requirement to effect a qualification.
ISSUE: Whether the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion ofAssociate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded.
POLITICAL LAW: general powers and attributes of local government units
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitledGeneral Powers and Attributes of Local
Government Units) of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 7.Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another levelshall be based
onverifiableindicatorsof viability and projected capacity to provide services,to wit:
(a)Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit
concerned;
(b)Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c)Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands,
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions;andsufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department
of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR).
POLITICAL LAW: requirements for land area
Itmust be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the
generalruleinthecreation of a local government unit, states in paragraph
(c)thereof that the land area must be contiguousandsufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area:(1) the land area must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.A sufficient land
area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided
by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the
creation of a province, specifically states the requirement of
acontiguousterritoryofat leasttwo thousand (2,000) square kilometers.
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a
contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000square
kilometers aredistinctand separate requirements for landarea under paragraph
(a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
POLITICAL LAW: exemption from the requirement of territorial contiguity
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances ofexemption from
the requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:
(b)The territoryneed not be contiguousif it comprises two(2)or more islands,or is
separated byachartered city or cities which do not contribute to the incomeofthe
province.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to
the requirement of territorial contiguity.It clearly states that the requirement of
territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province
comprisingtwo or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which

do not contribute to the income of the province.

Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a
province is composed of two or more islands, or when theterritory of a province is
separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the
land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in
paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account
questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so
as to relax non-compliance therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, but only for application.
Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government
unit is vested with the Legislature, the acts of the Legislature and the Executive
branch in enacting into law R.A. No. 9355 should be respected as petitioners
failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution States:
SEC. 10.No province, city, municipality, orbarangaymay becreated, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, exceptin accordance
with the criteria established in the local government codeand subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that
imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of
the Local Government Code.No law has yet been passed amending Section 461
of the Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases
for the creation of a province.The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria
in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province;
hence, any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local

Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that
R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either thepopulation or territorial
requirements prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No.
9355 unconstitutional.

Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into
either
of
the
following:
(a)
that
R.A.
6734,
or
parts
thereof,
violates
the
Constitution,
and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares
that [t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in
favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces
where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained
shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2)
of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution
and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No.
6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on
the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
the
purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the

votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote
requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the
people when they ratified the Constitution.

Bai Sandra Sema vs

Commission on Elections
558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by
Autonomous Regions (ARMM) Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted
against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this
law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the
1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the
1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later
amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato
City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and
D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution,
upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in
effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless
of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan
province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least
250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative
in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at
least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand,

ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of
legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create
are barangays not cities and provinces.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R.

No. 127820. July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent
to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed
pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when
public interest is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law
because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing
authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring
the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power ofeminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with
the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19
of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or
private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the
land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter
of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but
inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for
the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of
action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate
private property.

Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use
whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to
exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its
authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once
all legal requirements are complied with.

A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot

authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires
an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely
expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not
suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar
subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all
the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

G.R. No. L-26522

February 27, 1969

ANTONIO FAVIS and CORAZON FAVIS doing business under the trade name
"UNION GROCERY & HARDWARE", plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF SABANGAN, BONTOC, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, defendantappellee.
Juan L. Fontanilla for plaintiffs-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal on questions of law, directly elevated to this Court by plaintiffs-appellants
from the adverse decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City.
Plaintiffs-appellants, Antonio Favis and Corazon Favis, doing business under the trade
name of "Union Grocery and Hardware", originally instituted on February 4, 1965, in the
City Court of Baguio City, this action for collection against defendant-appellee, the
Municipality of Sabangan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, for the recovery of the principal
sum of P1,115.00, representing the charge invoice value of G.I. pipes of various sizes
needed by defendant-appellee in its municipal waterworks construction, besides twelve
(12%) per cent interest and twenty-five (25%) per cent attorney's fees and costs. 1
Defendant-appellee, through its mayor, Agustin Velasco, timely filed its Answer to the
Complaint, alleging that according to its records, "the then Municipal Mayor of
Sabangan was never authorized to contract or buy on credit from the plaintiff, various
and different sizes of G.I. pipes needed in the construction of its municipal
waterworks ..., hence, defendant municipality can not in any way, be legally bound for
the acts of the then mayor ...." 2
The City Court of Baguio, after trial, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellants,
as prayed for in their complaint. Defendant-appellee interposed its appeal from said
decision to the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, but did not pay or deposit the
Court of First Instance docket fee nor file an appeal bond, as required by Rule 40,
section 2 of the Rules of Court. Plaintiffs-appellants, therefore, moved the Court a
quo to dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-perfection of the appeal, contending
that only the Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the said requirements for
appeal, under Section 16 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. 3
The Court a quo denied plaintiffs-appellants' dismissal, motion, holding that:
The Municipality of Sabangan being a branch of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, is exempt from the filing of such fees in accordance with
Section 16 of Rule 141, in conjunction with Section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Rec. on App., 14-15)

Plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court a quo,
the case proceeded to trial and the said Court thereafter rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of legal liability on the part of defendant
municipality. 4
Plaintiffs-appellants have filed this "direct appeal" to this Court, expressly pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. 5 The only issue of law raised by them in two
related assignments of error in their brief is "the correct interpretation of Section 16 of
Rule 141 of the new Rules of Court", which provides that
SEC. 16. Government Exempt. The Republic of the Philippines is exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in this rule.
They contend in their brief that "the defendant-appellee, not being the Republic of the
Philippines, is not exempt from filing an Appeal Bond and in the payment of the legal
fees provided for under the said Section 16 of Rule 141 of the new Rules of Court.
Consequently, the decision of the City Court in Civil Case No. 3114 was not vacated
because the appeal was not perfected. (Section 9 of Rule 40.) It follows that the Court
of First Instance of Baguio did not have jurisdiction to try the case on its merit, and
hence, the decision rendered by the said Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 1604
is null and void and has no legal effect." 6
Plaintiffs' appeal must fail for lack of merit:
1. We sustain plaintiffs-appellants in their contention that the exemption clause in Rule
141, Sec. 16 of the new Rules of Court (formerly Rule 130) exempting the Republic of
the Philippines from paying the legal fees provided therein is applicable only to the
Republic of the Philippines; i. e. the National Government, and not to local governments
or subdivisions, as correctly ruled by the late Secretary of Justice Pedro Tuason. 7
Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code specifically defines "National
Government" as referring "to the central government as distinguished from the different
forms of local government and differentiates it from "specially organized provinces",
"regularly organized provinces", "municipalities" and "chartered cities" which constitute
"the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government". That such
exemption from the payment of legal fees is available only to the State, the
Republic per se is evident from the similar construction of long usage to the analogous
provision of Rule 142, Section 1 of the rules of Court that "no costs shall be allowed
against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law". As early as
1920, it has been held by this Court inPalanca vs. The City of Manila and Trinidad, 8 that
while no costs shall be allowed against the Government of the Philippines where it is the
unsuccessful party, the general rule that costs are imposed upon the unsuccessful party
applies to public corporations which sue and can be sued and municipal corporations.
2. The Court a quo, however, did not commit a fatal error of jurisdiction in erroneously
holding that the defendant municipality was exempt from payment of the appellate court
docket fee provided in Rule 40, Section 2, and taking cognizance of its appeal. As far as

the writer's research shows this is the first time that the question of the applicability to
local governments of the exemption from legal fees under Rule 141, Section 16, has
been squarely put in issue in a case before this Court, although this Court has invariably
required local governments to pay such docket fees in cases brought on appeal. The
parties-litigants were properly before the Court a quo, which duly heard them in a
trial de novo and rendered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs-appellants' contention that
non-payment by defendant-appellee of the legal fees and non-posting of the appeal
bond renders null and void the Court a quo's decision when the said Court, in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction had held defendant municipality to be exempt from
such requirements is legally untenable. This Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, in National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. Sec. of Public Works &
Communications, L-20928, March 31, 1966, has already ruled out such a contention,
holding that in appealed cases, failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the appeal, much less affect the Court's jurisdiction, the
dismissal being discretionary in the appellate court, and that this rule is applicable by
analogy to Courts of First Instance in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction conferred
upon them.
In its first assignment of error, the defendant Secretary contends that, admitting
that the NAWASA's complaint in appeal was sent by registered mail on the last of
the 30 days allowed by the Irrigation Act for appealing the administrative decision
to the court of competent jurisdiction, still the complaint may not be deemed to
have been filed on the same day, for the reason that there is no showing that the
filing fees were simultaneously paid.
The appellant's argument, however, fails to take into account that, in appealed
cases, failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal; the dismissal is discretionary in the appellate court. Rule
141, Section 3, speaking of the fees of the clerk of the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, provides that:
If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action
until they are paid and may dismiss the appeal or the action or
proceeding.
The rule quoted is applicable by analogy to the Court of First Instance of Manila
in the instant case, since the Court was exercising appellate jurisdiction
conferred upon it by law to review administrative decisions under the Irrigation
Act. (Emphasis supplied)
3. The Court a quo's appealed decision 9 dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint for
lack of legal liability on the part of defendant municipality remains to be passed upon on
its merits, although appellants did not assail the merits thereof in their brief and appellee
in turn did not file any brief..

It should be noted that plaintiffs-appellants having directly elevated their appeal on

questions of law to this Court, pursuant to Rule 42, Section 2, they are foreclosed from
disputing the Court a quo's findings of fact in its decision, as reproduced hereinafter. 10
On the basis of the facts as found by the Court a quo, we hold its decision on the legal
issues to be in accord with the law and pertinent jurisprudence.
And Sec. 3, Rep. Act 2264 under, Purchasing provides:
Purchasing. Subject to Auditing rules and regulations, provinces, cities and
municipalities are hereby empowered to make purchases, equipment and
supplies that they respectively need either locally or elsewhere without the
necessity of buying the same thru the Bureau of Supply:
Provided, however:

lawphi1.nt

(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) That purchases shall be made by public bidding, and awards shall be made
by the Provincial, City or Municipal Committee on Award, composed of ... the
Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer and a councilor chosen by the
Municipal Council in the case of municipalities and regularly organized municipal
districts.
The record does not show that the foregoing requisites have been complied with.
But the undisputed fact is that the municipality is benefited by the installation of
the G.I. pipes. To this the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-9920, Bartolome E. San
Diego vs. The Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, promulgated
on February 29, 1960, said:
... the doctrine of estoppel can not be applied as against a municipal corporation
to validate a contract which it has no power to make, or which it is authorized to
make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a
prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has accepted the benefits
thereof and the other party has fully performed his part of the agreement, or has
expended large sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently
assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a
municipality in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality
executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on the ground; nor can it
be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away,
controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or governmental powers. (38 Am. Jur.
pp. 202-204)

In connection with public biddings which was not complied with, the same
decision of the Supreme Court stated: "public biddings are held for the best
protection of the public and to give the public the best possible advantages by
means of open competition between the bidders. Thus, contracts requiring public
bidding affect public interest, and to change them without complying with that
requirement would indeed be against public policy."
One more significant point in connection with the acquisition of the assorted
pipes is revealed in Exh. "C", a portion of which is also marked as Exh. "2", for
the municipality. The letter indicates that the payment would come from the
release to be made by former President Garcia which, unfortunately, was frozen.
It also indicates that instructions were given not to install the pipes until all
questions were settled. And since the pipes had already been installed they were
ordered dismantled to be piled and to be returned to the owner if the frozening
(sic) order was not lifted. It is, therefore, clear that the mayor, aside from want of
authority to execute the contract, had not intended to bind the municipality of
Sabangan to pay for the indebtedness for the payment would not come from the
funds of the municipality but from the release of funds by former President
Garcia.
Plaintiff took the risk of delivering the pipes not knowing definitely from whom the
payment would be drawn. He indicated in the invoice that the articles were sold
to Gov. Bado Dangwa for Mayor Bodud of Sabangan. Not able to collect from
Gov. Dangwa or Mayor Bodud he sued the municipality of Sabangan.
Unfortunately, the requisites of municipal contracts in order to bind the
municipality have not been complied with hence the same may not be enforced
against the municipality of Sabangan. (Rec. on App, 24-28)
This Court's ruling in San Diego vs. Municipality of Naujan correctly relied upon by the
trial court in absolving defendant-municipality, has been re-affirmed in
San Buenaventura vs. Municipality of San Jose, Camarines Sur,11 and City of Manila vs.
Tarlac Development Corporation etc., 12 in which latter case, this Court further held that
even a consent decree, in which the officials of a municipality assume obligations not
authorized by law, is null and void. This Court thus held in said latter case that
the fact that, by consent of the municipal officer an agreement or stipulation
made by them has been put in the form of a judgment, in an effort to give it the
force and effect of a judgment, does not cure a lack of power in the officers to
make it, and if such power is lacking, the judgment as well as the stipulation is
void .... (Emphasis reproduced)
In the present case, as pointed out by the Court a quo, the mayor of defendant
municipality, aside from not having claimed any authority to make the purchase of the
materials delivered by plaintiffs-appellants, had clearly indicated that the municipality
would not be bound to pay therefor and that the plaintiffs-appellants would have to look

for payment to the National Government through funds yet to be released by way of
assistance to the municipality.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that
defendant-appellee is required to pay the legal fees due from it to the Court of First
Instance of Baguio by virtue of its appeal from the original decision of the Baguio City
Court in Civil Case No. 3114. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano and Barredo, JJ., concur.

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

Digested
MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311

FACTS:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the
plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was
so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back
part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the
grey matter and brain had suffered material injury.

Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg showed a contraction of
an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the
point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of
the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the
collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up
contracts he recently had.

As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or

employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government
is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature
made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the
GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.

RULING:

No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Governments liability to any cause not previously recognized.
That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to
the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has
by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above
quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers
and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5
of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without
costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally
liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained
by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment
and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to
determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.