Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda Unite in Yemen | Foreign Policy

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www.foreignpolicyjournal.com /2015/09/23/saudi-arabia-and-al-qaeda-unite-in-yemen/
In viewing Yemen as an important battleground in the grander struggle against Irans expanding regional influence,
Saudi Arabia has united with a variety of Yemeni Sunni factions in an effort to crush the Houthi insurgency. This has
entailed the kingdom cooperating with Sunni Islamist groups that Saudi Arabiaalong with other Arab and Western
governmentshave designated as terrorist organizations. However, as the U.S. continues to wage its War on
Terror in Yemen, Riyadhs strategy is complicating the kingdoms already chilly relationship with Washington.
Saudi Arabias alignment with terrorist groups in Yemen was highlighted in June when the Saudi-backed exiled
Yemeni government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi sent Abdel-Wahab Humayqani to Geneva as one of its delegates
in the failed UN-sponsored roundtable talks. In December 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
Humayqani a Specifically Designated Global Terrorist, having allegedly served as a recruiter and financier for alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and having orchestrated a car bombing in March 2012 that targeted a
Yemeni Republican Guard base, killing seven.
Despite the international communitys condemnation of Saudi Arabias bombing of civilian areas in Yemen, recent
victories on the part of Riyadh-sponsored forces in Aden and elsewhere seem to have inspired greater confidence in
the kingdom that the Sunni Arab coalition can crush the Houthi insurgency through a prolonged military campaign.
Yet, Saudi Arabias embrace of such extremists raises questions about whether the kingdom will attempt to achieve
victory over the Houthisviewed in Riyadh as a proxy of Iranat any price, and serves to reemphasize concerns
that many in the West have had about the company Riyadh chooses to keep.

Historical Context
After thousands of Yemeni nationals who had joined ranks with Osama bin Laden in the Soviet-Afghan War returned
to Yemen in 1980s, the Saudi-backed Yemeni regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh sponsored such militants in the fight
against South Yemens Marxist regime, and later in a campaign to defeat southern secessionists. During the 1990s,
Yemen became a central location for militant Salafist groups such as AQAPs predecessors, including Islamic Jihad
in Yemen, Army Aden Abyan and al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY).
By the early 2000s, AQY had weakened as a result of a declining membership, but Saudi Arabias crackdown on its
own local al-Qaeda branch prompted many Saudi members to flee to Yemen. By 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni
branches had merged into AQAP. In addition to targeting the central state of Yemen, Houthi insurgents, and Western
nationals/interests in Yemen, AQAP has also made clear its intention to topple the ruling Saudi family, accusing it of
maintaining an unholy alliance with the U.S.
In August 2009, then-Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayif (currently the kingdoms Crown
Prince) met with members of the public as part of a Ramadan celebration, including Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-Asiri,
a militant from AQAP who claimed to have renounced terrorism and had asked to repent before the Prince. Al-Asiris
real intentions were made clear after he entered a room with Mohammed bin Nayif and detonated an improvised
explosive device carried inside him. The explosion killed Asiri but failed to assassinate the prince, leaving him with
only minor injuries. It is indeed remarkable that Saudi Arabia appears to be teaming up with the group that only six
years ago carried out that failed assassination attempt on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayif.
The de facto partnership between Riyadh and AQAP is made further evident by the fact that the Saudi-led military
coalition has entirely avoided bombing AQAP targets, despite its aggressive bombing of other territories under
Houthi control. While doubtful that AQAP has abandoned its objective of overthrowing the Saudi monarchy, Riyadh
likely perceives its tacit alliance with AQAP as a short-term venture and is focused on the immediate task at hand.

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Perhaps under the pretext of countering Wilayat al-Yemen (Yemens Daeshalso known as the Islamic State
division), Riyadh perceives strategic value in working with its rival, AQAP. Although Wilayat al-Yemen and AQAP
have thus far not waged any large-scale armed campaigns again each other, their competition for recruits and the
mantle of Yemens dominant Sunni Islamist militia lead some analysts to expect their conflicting interests to
eventually pit the two groups against each other. Concerned that the Houthi takeover of swathes of Yemeni territory
is aiding Wilayat al-Yemens ability to lure greater Sunni support through its highly sectarian and ultra-violent
agenda, countering the groups ability to gain further traction likely contributes to Riyadhs evolving relationship with
AQAP.

Implications for the West

The Obama Administration has identified AQAP as the worlds most dangerous al-Qaeda branch, and the gravest
terrorist threat to U.S. national security. In 2000, al-Qaeda orchestrated the attack against the USS Cole, and two
years later the group waged a suicide bombing that targeted the French oil tanker M/V Limburg. Both attacks were
carried out by individuals who would come to hold prominent roles in AQAP.
Throughout 2008 and 2009, AQY/AQAP attacked Western embassies, in addition to Belgian and Korean tourists in
Yemen. On Christmas Day in 2009, an AQAP affiliate unsuccessfully attempted to bomb a Detroit-bound jet, and ten
months later the group made another attempt to strike the U.S. homeland by bombing two Chicago-bound cargo
planes (the plot was intercepted by Saudi intelligence officials). Additionally, while AQAPs role in the January 2015
Charlie Hedbo massacre in Paris remains a source of debate in intelligence circles, the organization claimed
responsibility.
In June of this year, Washington officials voiced concern about Humayqanis role in the Geneva talks, underscoring
the U.S. and Saudi Arabias conflicting strategies toward the Yemeni crisis. Although Washington has provided
logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis, the U.S. militarys direct
involvement in Yemen since Riyadh waged Operation Decisive Storm in March has been exclusively striking AQAP
targets with Washingtons controversial drone program.
Despite Saudi Arabias official lukewarm endorsement of the Iranian nuclear deal, Riyadh is gravely concerned
about the geopolitical implications of a gradual improvement in the Wests relationship with Iran. Unsettled by the
idea that Tehran will more forcefully assert its influence in the Arab world by providing more support to Iranianbacked paramilitary groups with newly available funds derived from sanctions relief, Saudi Arabia is flexing its
muscles in Yemen. Viewing the Houthi insurgents as an Iranian proxy committed to establishing a client state for the
Islamic Republic on Saudi Arabias southern border, officials in Riyadh clearly perceive a graver threat from the
Houthis than from Sunni Islamist militias such as AQAP.
From Washingtons perspective, the Riyadh-led campaign in Yemen is contributing to chaotic unrest in Yemen that
provides fertile ground for the local al-Qaeda branch and creates a magnet for other extremist groups. Having
seized control of the Riyan airport and Mukalla (an oil rich city with a major sea port and a population of 300,000) in
April, AQAP has emerged as an increasingly influential actor amidst the bloody turmoil and humanitarian crises that
have spiraled out of control since the Saudi-led coalition began bombing Yemen in March. By positioning itself as a
disciplined Sunni force capable of effectively countering the Houthi insurgents, AQAP has unquestionably
established itself as a de facto partner of the U.S.-backed Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, despite being the primary
impetus for Washingtons ongoing drone campaign there.
Ties between elements of Saudi Arabias ruling monarchy and global jihadist terror groups are not new. Following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, questions regarding the costs and benefits of maintaining a strong alliance with Riyadh
resulted in spirited debate in the U.S. By having deep economic relations with Western nations and being the
worlds top crude oil exporter, Riyadh has long used its powerful influence in the Middle Easts geopolitical order and
international energy markets to foster ties with groups like AQAP with minimal objection from the kingdoms

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Western allies.
In the case of Yemen, analysts contend that the Obama Administrations support for Riyadhs war against the
Houthis has occurred within the context of Washingtons efforts to secure Saudi support for the Iranian nuclear
agreement, despite U.S. reservations over the kingdoms policies. Paris has been a strong backer of Riyadhs
campaign in Yemen, largely due to Frances interest in becoming the kingdoms leading arms dealer. Over time,
however, Riyadhs de facto alliance with AQAP should raise further questions in the U.S. and France about whether
the kingdom is a genuine partner in the global War on Terror or is a direct sponsor of groups affiliated with those
who perpetrated the 9/11 and Charlie Hebdo attacks.
In Syria, where Saudi Arabias support for hardline jihadist militias is fueling tension in Riyadhs relations with
Western governments, the means and objectives of the kingdom are increasingly at odds with those of American
and European officials. As the U.S. explores diplomatic opportunities with the Houthis in Yemen, and as EU officials
begin eyeing Iran as a potential partner in regional security crises, there is a widening gulf between Western and
Saudi perceptions about security considerations in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabias Blowback in Yemen?

Beyond implications for Saudi relations with the West, the kingdom is playing a risky high stakes game of poker by
incorporating a short-term alliance with AQAP into a larger strategy of countering Irans alleged hegemonic aims in
the Middle East. If history can serve as any guide, groups such as AQAP are unlikely to maintain any loyalty to state
or other non-state sponsors that serve as allies of convenience. Riyadh has in the past sponsored jihadist
movements in foreign countriesmost notably Afghanistan and Pakistanthat later turned their guns on the
kingdom. As the conflict in Yemen is extremely fluid, and complicated by the vast array of armed groups with a broad
range of objectives and ideologies, the nations future political landscape is entirely unpredictable. Riyadh is taking a
big risk by cooperating with armed groups on its borders that have previously exposed their hostility toward the
kingdom and its Arab/Western allies.
Last month U.S. officials and local Yemeni sources reported that AQAP militants were closing in on Aden. According
to unconfirmed media reports, al-Qaedas flag flew over an administrative building with the group patrolling some of
the citys neighborhoods. If the al-Qaeda franchise were to seize control of Yemens second largest city, such a
dangerous development would certainly create new security dilemmas for locals already enduring a grave
humanitarian crisis. It could also pose a serious threat to international traders if jihadist terrorist groups were to
usurp control of both the Yemeni and African sides of the narrow Bab-el-Mandabone of the worlds busiest
shipping lanes, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.
Saudi Arabia finds its own security further imperiled by Daesh-affiliated cells that have carried out attacks against
police officers, Shiite mosques, and Western expatriates in recent months, and with the caliphate leadership
vowing to topple the ruling Al Saud family. Therefore, Riyadh may very well regret having pursued a short-term
foreign policy that is creating conditions in Yemen in which AQAP gains the most from the nations chaotic and
ungovernable environment. Saudi Arabia would benefit from having the same long-term orientation toward Sunni
extremism as it does toward the global oil landscape.
AQAP, Iran, Saudi Arabia, US Foreign Policy, Yemen
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