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Conversations about Sermo


To become the inventor of satire, Lucilius made much use of his external circumstances:
spectacles of political and forensic competition, social posturing of the wealthy, powerful, and
ambitious, and Romes developing literary and scholarly culture.1 To become the inventor of one
of the genres signature elements, the defense of satire now known as the apologia, Lucilius also
drew on the poetic world he was creating. The topos of the apologia is not traditionally
highlighted in discussions of Lucilius accomplishments, but it merits consideration as an
element of the new genre. This chapter will examine the apologia as an integrated part of the
Satires, attempting to trace how the poet contextualized it in his first publication: the five books
that came to be numbered 26 through 30. I will argue that Lucilius took care to make both satire
and satires defense appear as natural phenomena, so to speak, in the world that the Satires
depicted. Although the relevant group of fragments has been examined numerous times,2 I hope
that this study, by treating the apologia as something more than a commentary on the text, will
do its part to capture the novelty of Lucilius work for its original audience (Muecke 2013,
286).
In one of the poems of Book 30, Lucilius staged a conversation with a critic or critics of
his satiric verses (called sermones at 1085-6W [1015-16M]). The conversation attaches certain
ethical and/or legal problems to satire. In one fragment, a speaker appears to address the poet
with a complaint that he has been a target of satire: now, Gaius, since with your rebuking you
injure us in turn (nunc, Gai, quoniam incilans nos laedis vicissim, 1075W [1035M]). In others,
there are accusations of slander, malice, and verbal violence; for example, and slandering in
1 See, e.g., Gruen 1992, 272-317; Manuwald 2001; Goldberg 2005, 144-77; Ha 2007; and
Muecke 2013.
2 Marx 1904-5, 2.325-32, Krenkel 1970 2.582-90 (with some differences from Marxs text), and
Griffith 1970, 67-70; Cichorius 1908, 181-208; and Christes 1971, 144-95.

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many chats you tear [somebody/me/us?] up (et maledicendo in multis sermonibus differs,
1086W [1016M]). There is also what looks like a retort to this, perhaps beginning a
rationalization of satire: dont believe that I have the power to slander you (nolito tibi me male
dicere posse putare, 1069M [1030 W]). These fragments and the others that represent the
remains of Lucilius apologia (1061-92W, roughly equivalent to 1008-38M) show striking
thematic and formal correspondences with the later satirists programmatic dialogues (Marx
1904-5, 2.220-1; Griffith 1970; Braund 1996, 117-19). Book 30 may have been a favorite of
imperial-era readers, as it is the source of nearly 10 percent of the surviving lines of Lucilius. At
any rate, the book represents a major turning point for the formal development of the Roman
satiric genre, as it was the first one written entirely in the meter that would become standard for
Lucilius and his successors.3 But before this was known, Lucilius had to define what he had
begun.

Apologia and plot


Lucilius dialogue about satire would have differed from the later examples it inspired in
one obvious way: there was no prior Lucilius to cite as precedent. But another striking
difference, visible even in the fragments, is its position in the text. Virtually all of the later
apologiae are placed at the beginning of a book of poems. Horace is the partial exception: in his
first book the fourth poem contains arguments with a critic of his practice, as if the poet has been
interrupted in his ongoing business, and the tenth discusses style and audience. But his extended
dialogue with the jurist Trebatius (Hor. Sat. 2.1) evidently inspired his successors to use the
inaugural moment as the place to anticipate and discuss public reaction to their books. Like the
3 Because of its exclusive use of the hexameter, it is not surprisingthat [Book 30] should have
been thus prominently placed by its author at the end of his first essay in the genre (Griffith
1970, 65).

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Horatian example, Persius spirited exchanges with a critic (Pers. Sat. 1) and the confrontation of
Juvenal by a worried interlocutor (Juv. Sat. 1) raise ideas about satire and its reception that the
reader is presumably meant to ponder while taking in the rest of the collection. Lucilius evidently
had a more complex plan. He did include in Book 26 a programmatic discussion that expressed
his choices in audience and literary subject matter (starting with 632-5W [592 and 595-6M]); this
may have been a dialogue like his later apologia, with one or more speakers trying to persuade
Lucilius to try his hand at a lofty genre (Marx 1904-5, 2.592). But the poet placed a more
sustained discussion of his work near the end of the five-book series.
One reason for this placement may have been that only at this point did it make sense to
stage an apologia that explicitly investigated the practice and effects of satire: the genre first
needed to be given form. In the chronology of the unrolling book (Zetzel 1980) or in this case
pentad, the apologia follows a variety of poems on everyday themes: food, philosophy, business,
politics, law, domestic struggles, sex, and literature.4 Somewhere in the plot of this series,
Lucilius causes offense to certain individuals, who then appear in Book 30 to confront the poet
with the consequences of his practice. It is a Lucilian sermo (defined as conversation, chat5)
that works to define previous Lucilian sermones in not just a less charitable but also a narrower
way (as abusive, harmful satire). Because the apologia seems to consider what has come before,
the book that contains it has been called an Epilogue to the collection (Christes 1971, 141-95;
Ha 2007, 204). But this discussion is of course no paratext. Lucilius embedded it in mid-book;
Marx identifies it as the second poem of five, Warmington as the fourth. Like every satiric
apologia that follows its model, it is a part of the text that aims to manipulate the audience as it
processes that text (Bogel 2001, 11; Keane 2006, 5-6).
4 In Marxs conservative restructuring, these amount to about a dozen poems.
5 On the effects of unmarked, ordinary speech in some Lucilian verses, achieved by the poets
manipulation of diction and structure, see Chahoud, Verbal Mosaics.

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The discussion in a satiric apologia has a crucial basic function: regardless of the external
reality, it creates the fiction that satire is being talked about out there even before the reader
has finished the text. The same fiction is seen later in Horace (Sat. 1.4).6 Both poets knew that it
would matter more to their reception than any specific defense of satire they mounted, more even
than any specific agenda or theme they associated with the genre in the process. Moreover, the
apologia represents satire as having a different kind of impact than other genres with which
authors aim to gain renown and profit (laudemac fructum ferat, 713W [620M]) or capture
hearts (capere animum, 721W [589M]). Lucilius work has caused a more personal and
troublesome controversy. With this fiction, an account of his short-term reception, the satirist has
an occasion to prescribe the terms of his long-term reception.7 Such manipulation in the guise of
plain speech and paratext is a device of earlier comic drama: Aristophanes and his competitors
did it with the parabasis, Terence with the prologue (Keane 2007, 36-40).
Indeed, Terences six prologues constitute a perfect example of an authors successful
assertion that his work matters. For example, in his very first play the prologus announces that
Terence is devoting his efforts to writing prologues, not in order to relate the plot, but to
respond to the abuse of an ill-willed old poet (nam in prologis scribundis operam abutitur/ non
qui argumentum narret, sed qui malivoli/ veteris poetae maledictis respondeat, An. 5-7). This
becomes a refrain in the other five plays. With their defensive posture, the prologues do a great
deal to direct the audience to apply certain criteria in their judgment of Terences work. These
include the playwrights choice and synthesis of models, the integrity of his writing process, and
6 This strategy may also have been used by Varro in his Menippean Satires, going by Sat. Men.
fragment 359 Astbury: he started to scold, saying, the things you know and spread around in
public, and that artless art youre publishing... (iurgare incipit dicens: quae scis atque in
vulgum vulgas artemque expromis inertem). A more face-value reading of the fragment is found
in Wiseman 2009, 147, where it is taken as evidence that the Menippeans were originally
produced as stage performances over a number of years.
7 Cf. Keane 2002, 38-40, and Breed, Lucilius Books on Lucilius programming in Book 26.

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his ability to please large and fickle audiences; the viewer or reader who was not already
thinking along these lines is likely to begin doing so. The prologues also assert that Terence has
both zealous critics (particularly the ill-willed old poet Luscius Lanuvinus) and influential
friends. Terence crafts these monologues in such a convincingly authentic way that his claims of
a hostile reception were long taken at face value. Yet there is every reason to read them as
programmatic posturing aimed at strategically shaping reception (Parker 1996).
Terences patrons and friends later associated with Lucilius, and although the dramatist
wrote for a different venue than the satirist and claimed to desire a wider and positive reception
(populo ut placerent [fabulae], An. 3; cf. Ha 2007, 96), his plays clearly inspired some of
Lucilius themes and language.8 Whether the satirists intention was merely to imitate the lively
and down-to-earth dramatic genre or to convert its stock material to an overt moral-critical
agenda,9 he paid homage to Terences work in his choice to fill the Satires with dramatized
sermo and with comic material on erotic, domestic, and legal themes. It would be no surprise if
he was inspired by the playwrights programmatic strategies as well. But a prologue would not
work in his first publication. Placed after most of the satire proper, the account of reception in
the apologia bears a veneer of authenticity, and proclaims that the authors work already matters
enough to upset people.

Integration between apologia and plot is also achieved by Lucilius choice of a dialogue
structure for the former; this too should be recognized as his special creation, honored by
imitation in the later poets. An apologia might take any number of rhetorical forms, and Lucilius
8 See, e.g., Muecke 2013; Goldberg 1986, 220 calls the satirists Terences spiritual heirs. As
shown in Pezzini, Early Lucilius, while Lucilius language exhibits many Plautine features,
there is also evidence of a Terentian tendency to standardize morphology and grammar.
9 For the latter argument, see Auhagen 2001.

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does seem to have found simpler and monologic ways to thrust himself into his poems qua
author, such as in the readership fragment of Book 26 and the sphragis-like passage at 7912W=688-9M. The latter fragment represents Lucilius as an author in control, and the reference to
fictis versibus evokes a textual product. But the fragments of dialogue in Book 30 seem to
distribute statements and questions between Lucilius and another speaker or speakers, suggesting
a dynamic of attack and defense. For instance, in the first fragment quoted in this chapter, the
adverb vicissim may be attached to laedis or to the retort that followed, but either way it points to
a general responsive dynamic between Lucilius and his readership.10 A similar effect is created
with these lines: nevertheless I will try to write back briefly in a few words (summatim tamen
experiar rescribere paucis, 1063W [1027M]) and hear also this thing I have to say, for it relates
to this matter (hoc etiam accipe quod dico, nam pertinent ad rem, 1068W [1032M]). This
spirited exchange is something very different from a proem in which a poet talks with a guiding
god (cf. Ennius Annales and Callimachus Aetia) or attacks absent critics (Callimachus against
the Telchines). Its speakers also give the impression of being more symmetrically poised than
those in the later satiric apologiae. Trebatius in Horace Satire 2.1 is being consulted for legal
advice; the later satirists interlocutors are anonymous. The Lucilian fragments show characters
who occupy the same social world and meet on equal terms. When a speaker we can probably
identify as Lucilius opponent challenges why do you care where I muck and roll about? (quid
tu istuc curas, ubi ego oblinar atque voluter? 1082W [1019M]), his striking choice of terms even
makes it look as though he might be throwing the poets words back at him. It has also been
proposed that Lucilius used the dialogue to allow a counter-attack on his own behavior, thereby
showing how satires victims can be inspired to create their own satire (Griffith 1970, 67-70).

10 Ferriss-Hill in press. Marx believes vicissim introduces the retort represented in 1066W [1036M].

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Lucilius successors, too, will show how the practice of satire can involve a bit of role-switching;
a notable example is Davus the slaves lecture to his master Horace (Sat. 2.7).
The special impact of Lucilius choice of rhetorical form can be appreciated even
without more evidence on the identity, perspective, or number of the poets interlocutors.11
Christes (1971, 191) finds that the fragments from Book 30 preserve the linguistic color and
variety that characterize the remnants of Lucilius other work. In short, the apologia looks like
the rest of Lucilius satire, which seems to have been dominated by conversations in gatherings
of various sizes. In this way, Lucilian satire is true to the name it acquired, chat (sermo) far
more so than the work of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. I refer not to that fiction of monologic
sermo, the impression the satirist figure often gives that he is chatting with us (Schlegel 2005,
16-17) but to the very strong evidence that many of Lucilius poems consisted of staged
exchanges, reflecting the Varronian etymology of sermo as related to joining (from sero; Ling.
6.64.3-5). The fragments have served as rich evidence for the ways in which speech patterns
could be replicated in hexameter poetry (Chahoud 2011, 370-71 and Verbal Mosaics; cf.
Petersmann 1999).
This kind of sermo is one of the predominant actions, if not the predominant action, in
Satires Books 26-30. Lucilius image in later satire sells him a bit short on this count; he is
memorialized as a practitioner of invective (cf. Grillo, Invective, virtus, and amicitia), though
the evidence suggests ancient readers saw more in him (Svarlien 1994; Goldberg, Lucilius and
the poetae seniores). It does take a slight adjustment of the usual approach to the fragments to
appreciate the point. It has been the custom for scholars to envision and draw boundaries around
the original Satires in thematic terms; that is, to imagine the individual poems as treating
11 On the references to literary success in surrounding fragments and the possibility that Lucilius
is talking to one or two fellow writers, comic and/or tragic, see Cichorius 1908, 181-208 and
Christes 1971, 144-68 and 191.

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particular areas of experience and endeavor (friendship, business, love, literature, and so on) that
are suggested by clusters of fragments.12 It is easy to see what inspires the critical metaphor in
Goldbergs remark (2005, 176-7) that Lucilius immerse[d] poetry directly in the cultural life of
its time. With the diverse and mundane subjects evoked in the fragments, the Satires can indeed
look very much like a kind of textual imprint or run-off of a social life zestfully lived and
flavored with plenty of mischief, mockery, and criticism. The anecdotes in Horace and Porphyrio
that show Lucilius enjoying his real-life friendships (the pot of humble greens; the napkin chase)
contribute to this image as well.13 Yet the poets creation must have amounted to more than a
thematic sampler, and the individual poems must have differed from one another in other ways
besides their themes. Speakers everywhere make reference to what I am saying to you or
vice versa, request answers, announce stories, ostentatiously give counsel, and so on. Learned
and partisan discussions of literature and language are easily traceable, but so are lively
storytelling, debate, argument, advice, abuse, and collaborative examination of various topics.
Direct commands to tell or narrate are just one explicit sign to be found sprinkled
throughout.14 Other examples, discussed below, hint that some conversations involved rough
confrontation or mockery. Perhaps the silver lining in the fragmentation of Lucilius corpus is the

12 This framework is exemplified in Warmington 1967 (featuring thematic poem titles such as
On certain teachings of the Cynics and Stoics and On the intercourse of men; see also
Christes 1971 and Ha 2007. On the more conservative end in this regard, Christes designates
theme-groups in Books 26 and 30 without positing poem-breaks (Christes 1971), while
Warmington somewhat more ambitiously makes attempts at casual titles or themes for many
poems (e.g., Friendship, Loves Madness).
13 See Grtner 2001 for the argument that friendships in the Satires are of the real-life kind,
not defined by philosophical values; for Grtner, Lucilius friendship with Scipio looms large in
the early Satires. Cf. Breed, Lucilius Books, on the poets use of his friends wit.
14 E.g., 819W [757M] (interpella), 833W [758M] (da), 892W [890M] (perge), 922W [869M ]
(doce), 1118W [987M] dicas. Such examples do not obviously fall into the categories of legal or
political speech or displays of philhellenic pretension, all of which Lucilius adeptly reproduces
(Gruen 1992, 286, 299, and 307).

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fact that we have been left with so many of these small rhetorical trees, even if we cannot see
the forest of their larger context.
In these exchanges of words, there is plenty of room for conflict and drama, both overt
and subtle; for debate and argument crackling with wit, rhetorical force, and even emotion. To be
sure, the chats that made up Lucilian satire may have been friendly more often than not. And the
mysterious fragment referring to ludo ac sermonibus nostris (1039W [1039M]), which is
ostensibly unconnected to the poet (pace Marx 1904-5 2.332), associates chat with play. But
play is not immune to little dramas of social or intellectual competition.15 Although the most
arrogant and pompous kinds of posturing by the traditional cultivated oligarchy may have lost
its former power by the late second century (Gruen 1992, 272), Lucilius was still acquainted with
plenty of men who were invested in their status, wealth, or intellectual image. In his recollections
or imaginings of their conversations, we can be sure that he represented a full range of social
dynamics and moods.

Constructing sermo and its problems


If the complainant(s) in Book 30 is talking about this collection of Lucilius poems as his
sermones, there is a paradox to be acknowledged: the term advertises multi-participant chats,
but the complaint imagines these as a monolithic work coming from a single (and ill-intentioned)
source (sermonibus differs). This act of interpretation could also carry an accusation in itself, if
the author had previously called his work by this disarming title; its use in the fragment would
15 So too, Horace will deploy play terminology in ways that associate it with conflict and
seriousness, even as he ostensibly uses it to defend his work. Even as he announces his shift from
ludic chat to moralizing at Sat. 1.1.27, he gives no indication of changing his tone, and has of
course just linked the two in his program (ridentem dicere verum, 24). Although he selfeffacingly claims inludo chartis (4.139) and haec ego ludo (10.37), he has by now established
that this practice offends people. When he pictures Lucilius and friends nugari and ludere
(2.1.73), he is still defining the men by their status in public life.

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then be an ironic quotation, coming from someone who saw through the ruse. In fact, Lucilius
has to this point been making it possible to take another view of his role in the Satires: he is one
of many participants in this speech world, showing up at least periodically as a discussant or
subject of discussion (814W [774M], 929-30W [821-2M]).
The poets participation in the apologia is an extension of this. While the readership
manifesto and other genre-related fragments in Book 26 set Lucilius up as a writer of texts, and
the literary discussions that follow sustain that image, this part of Book 30 has a different
function: it puts Lucilius on display as a speaker of words. More specifically, it portrays him as a
participant in speech contexts akin to the storytelling, advice, and debate sessions that pack the
previous books. The apologia itself is one such context, and it makes reference to others in the
past. Lucilius personal connection with his interlocutor(s) is indicated by references to intimate
knowledge relayed to the public: and slandering in many chats you tear [somebody] up (et
maledicendo in multis sermonibus differs, 1086W [1016M]); cf. you get pleasure from sharing
those things about me around in your chats (gaudes cum de me ista foris sermonibus differs,
1085W [1015M]). And the use of Lucilius praenomen in the nunc, Gai line has been taken as
evidence that in the original poem, the debate was carried on at a personal level, with the parties
specified by name (Griffith 1970, 66-67). Even if the participants were not close friends to
begin with, the victim turns satire into a personal matter. Again, none of the later satirists will
stage such intimate conversations about satire. On the other hand, here too the prologues of
Terence create a kind of precedent. For all its very public setting and cagey refusal to name
names, Terences programmatic discourse is intimate, sympathetically delivered by a member of
the company and alluding meaningfully to the authors rivals (see above) and friends (e.g.,
amicum ingenio fretum, Haut. 24; homines nobiles/ hunc adiutare, Ad. 15-16).

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The potentially intimate setting does not soften the criticism of Lucilius work, but
creates a striking frame for it. The poets critic(s) may be truly unhappy or joking; either way, the
accusations are vivid and energetically delivered. They play at representing satire as
metaphorical violence, a staple of later satiric programmatic discourse (Keane 2006, 45-6). The
Gaius fragment conjures the metaphor with laedis; Horace will put the same word in the
mouth of a critic at Sat. 1.4.78. In 1086W [1016M], differs performs a similar function; this is
highlighted by Nonius as an example of metaphorical use of differre to mean cut or tear apart
(Nonius 284.17). One quotation is an invitation to scrub me all over, pluck me clean, and burn
me up, why dont you (quin totum purges, devellas me atque deuras, 1088W [1037M]). If these
are Lucilius words to his critics (so Marx 1904-5, 2.332), they make a clever counteraccusation
and demonstration that verbal violence can self-perpetuate through exchange. Metaphorical
savagery inches toward its literal counterpart in another fragment possibly addressed to Gaius,
where the addressee is represented as a kind of self-appointed censor: this too with your dire
deeds and stern sayings (idque tuis factis saevis et tristibus dictis, 1084W [1014M]). The
chiastic construction suggests an equivalence between the two parallel elements: does the second
phrase gloss the first? In this case too, Horace gives us reason to believe this was a reference to
Lucilius work (Trebatius refers to his tristiversu at Sat. 2.1.21). If this is the same speaker who
accuses Lucilius of taking pleasure in slander in the gaudes fragment, he is conveying and
perhaps condemning a central paradox of comic genres, their incongruous combination of moral
criticism and scurrility (Rosen 2007).

Many fragments from earlier in the collection refer to analogous battles being played out
in the arena of Roman aristocratic friendship, which like politics was never free of conflict,

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divergence of views, or competition. Friends help friends as a rule, but amicitia is hardly as
simple as that. Horace may be acknowledging this fact when he balances the charming vignette
of Lucilius relaxing with his friends (Sat. 2.1.71-4) with the claim that the poet turned to his
books alone to record secrets, as if [confiding in] trusted comrades (velut fidis...sodalibus, 30).
In Lucilius early poems, friendship is just as likely to be characterized by bumps and
confrontations as by shared pleasures. One cluster of lines from Book 26, remnants of an
advising session that may have been concerned with literary endeavor, contains several iterations
of the idea that friends can have different tastes and opinions: and what is very dear to your
heart strongly displeases me (et quod tibi magno opera cordi est, mihi vehementer displicet,
701W [629M]); so I avoid that which I perceive you particularly long to attain (ut ego
effugiam quod te in primis cupere apisci intellego, 702W [628M]); with all your powers you
strive, but I on the other hand strive to be very different (summis nitere opibus, at ego contra ut
dissimilis siem, 703W [630M]). If these represent the words of one character reiterating his point,
the repetition could have caused tension or discomfort. Alternatively, if they represent an
exchange between two characters, it would seem that each is trying to assert the validity of his
own position, mimicking in order to defy. The repeated expression of opposition in a friendly
context in the first book of the collection would have helped establish an expectation of
contentious sermones played out between friends, even in scenes that also show harmony,
camaraderie, and bonding over shared interests.
Other fragments that sound like pieces of or prefaces to advice hint at small dramas, even
power struggles, between friends. Notwithstanding the quip of Terences Sosia (flattery wins
friends, the truth wins hatred, obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit; An. 68), many ancient
authorities saw frank speech as a duty and prerogative of true friendship at least of friendship

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between men of Lucilius social standing and culture.16 The point of the ethical principle is to
clear the way for speech that aims to help but is capable of offending; cf. Persius scrap[ing]
tender ears with biting truth, Sat. 1.107-8. When friends formally advise friends, they may
explicitly lay claim to the right to frank speech. This may be happening in the declaration I have
to speak out (mihi necesse est eloqui) in Lucilius 696-7W [957-8M]. If this and the nearby
fragments quoted above do represent a literary advice dialogue, the statement seems to predict
the addressees poor public reception; this is one explanation for its air of defensiveness. Another
fragment reads similarly: and furthermore a friends job is to give advice well; it is a Tuscan
priests to deliver a good prophecy (porro amici est bene praecipere, Tusci bene praedicere,
694W [611M]). In still another, someone asserts it is not my way to lie to a friend and
associate (homini amico et familiari non est mentiri meum, 695W [953M]). This would make a
perfect preface to a harsh home truth or revelation to someone who valued his role as homo
amicus et familiaris.17
Frank advice need not be brusque; it can be clothed in smooth and complimentary
language. A metaphor of beneficial irrigation ornaments this gentle address: if you are willing
for your heart to be watered with these words through your ears (haec tu si voles per auris
pectus inrigarier, 690W [610M]). In the same spirit are a group of fragments from Book 27 with
singular forms that suggest a one-on-one chat and a relationship of trust: But if youd be willing
to take up and look at this for a little while (quod si paulisper captare atque observare haec
volueris, 769W [696M]); I ask you to investigate this matter with me and train your mind on my

16 See Cic. Amic. 91-2, Sen. Ep. 3, Plut. How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend, and Habinek
1990, which considers Lucilius 694W=611M at 174-5.
17 Grtner (2001, 92) thinks that this speaker is probably Lucilius, as the sentiment befits a
straight-talking satirist who also represents himself as a friend.

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words (rem cognoscas simul, et dictis animum attendas postulo, 770W [693M])18; and if, as I
especially hope, you return this favor to me (et si, maxime quod spero, mutuum hoc mecum
facis, 771W [692M]). Judging from some nearby references to the variability of human fortune
(777W [701M], 779W [699M], 784-785W [697 and 702M]), we may be looking at the remains
of a particular genre of compassionate but pushy address: a consolatio, a type of address that
Juvenal would also find ripe for satiric exploitation. The imperial satirist subjects his suffering
addressee to mocking abuse, though it should be pointed out that even a straight consolatio can
read like a dogmatists harsh exploitation of a vulnerable friend.19 Although a pleasing symmetry
of service and interests is evoked in the above series, a nearby fragment contains this less
friendly command: so then at last let your order admit to the crimes it has committed (proferat/
ergo iamiam vester ordo scelera quae in se admiserit, 772-3W [690M]). If this is the same
speaker who gently appeals to his companions critical skills and sense of duty, we may be right
to doubt that he is speaking as his addressees social peer (thanks to vester ordo; cf. Raschke
1987, 311-12), but he is still exploiting a personal relationship to expose misdeeds.20 Behind this
consolation there is confrontation and revelation, also ingredients of the sermones that end up
causing offense. In this light, it appears possible that any number of the commands to da, dic,
perge, and the like came from exchanges on similarly touchy subjects.

18 Cf. the similar captatio benevolentiae at 910-11W [851-2M]: moreover, that youll be willing to direct and
apply your mind to what I say, praeterea ut nostris animos adtendere dictis/ atque adhibere velis).

19 On the parodic consolatio in Juvenals thirteenth Satire see Pryor 1962 and Braund 1997. On
philosophical consolations see, e.g., Wilson 1997. Wilcox 2005 uncovers the competitive and
evaluative tones of consolation discourse in the republican political realm.
20 Another case of intimate confrontation might be represented in this line: believe that I am
your admirer, friend, and lover (favitorem tibi me, amicum, amatorem putes, 874W [902M]).
Was there a but after these words?

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As it is represented in Book 30, Lucilius work exists on a continuum with scenarios like
these, rather than representing a kind of outlier, antisocial sermo. Here too the satirist may have
taken a page from Terences prologues. Although the prologues pretend to be paratexts and invite
reading in a series as a sketch of the playwrights career, they also subtly represent the author as
entangled in the conflict-ridden fictional world he has created. As Gowers 2004 shows, the
prologues introduce issues pertinent to the plots of their respective plays misunderstanding,
criticism, alliances, maturation and decline, even confusion of identity. This creates, with each
play, parallels between the ordeals of the protagonists and the challenges Terence advertises as
the dramatic artists lot.21 And in various ways, Terence alternately makes himself out to
resemble specific characters: the mistrusted and resentful young Clitopho of The Self-Tormenter,
the energetic parasite of Phormio, the maligned Sostrata of The Mother-in-Law, and so on. The
pre-emptive bad-mouthingscreens a confident programme for inventive new treatments
within an old tradition, and each prologue functions to emphasize the continued precariousness
of this dramatists literary career (Gowers 2004, 163).22 In the big picture, the interlocking
structure of prologues and plays adds up to a running narrative. That may not look logically like
a young playwrights career, and some of the problems it advertises are fictional, but it
significantly encourages the audience to think about author and plays alike in particular ways.
As the plots and characters change, the author figure keeps returning in the form of the
prologus, a constant presence against a backdrop of confusion, strife, deception, and negotiation.
The two worlds of fabula and reception reinforce one anothers importance with this thematic
interplay; here is a strategy for making the authors work and struggles seem more consequential.
21 Aristophanes parabases can be read as intertextual in a similar way; see Hubbard 1991.
22 Where there is no direct correlation between playwright and character, other kinds of
connections are detectable, such as the shared vulnerability of the play The Woman of Andros and
its title character (Gowers 2004, 154-5).

16
Which came first, the signature themes of Terences career, or those he wove into his inherited
generic material? The answer may be unrecoverable, but the effect of the parallelism on
Terences image is significant: through the voice of his actor-spokesman, the brilliant young
writer begins to look like a sharer in the struggles that define his characters world.
For Lucilius, building a reception narrative from subject matter obviously meant jumping
a much narrower divide than Terence had to. The Gaius of Book 30, although he seems to
become the center of attention there, has much in common with the characters that populate the
whole first collection. This should make the sermones on which the apologia focuses appear less
marked as a special case of transgressive or disruptive speech. We might put it this way:
having no literary tradition to call on for his articulation of Roman satires principles and
problems, no prior cases of a satirist, at least, being punished or criticized for his work, Lucilius
wrote his own, intra-textual history of satiric speech.

Practicing for the apologia


Book 30 establishes that part of satires business is to talk about satire. But just as the
apologia is far from the first conversation in the collection, it is also far from its first
conversation about speech or specifically problematic speech. Here too, it helps to
defamiliarize the fragments: thematic context can be elusive at best, but it is often possible to
see, at least to some degree, what is happening rhetorically. Throughout Books 26-30, the
potential for the spoken word to cause conflict and discomfort is in the spotlight, even as it can
also be seen to bring about understanding, amusement, and social order. The medium for these
dissections of speech is, of course, sermo; the friends, associates, and foes who gather in the
Satires like to talk about speech. We could call many of these conversations meta-sermo.

17
In many fragments, it is possible to detect themes that come up in Lucilius apologia.
These examples do as much to reveal the formation of the category of satiric speech as do
fragments that are more obviously programmatic. Indeed, in the first four books of this
collection, it is difficult to find what looks like explicit commentary on satire on the order of the
Book 30 fragments with their references to sermones. Two possible exceptions are worth looking
at, though for different reasons than one might expect. This juicy fragment from Book 26
concerns betrayal of a sort also highlighted in Book 30: but suppose you say the thing that was
entrusted to you in private, you shouldnt have muttered anything about it, nor brought forth
sacred secrets to public view (at enim dicis clandestino tibi quod commissum foret,/ neu
muttires quidquam neu mysteria ecferres foras, 672-3W [651-2M]). Here, somewhere in the
background, a relationship has been fractured by speech, and specifically by the revelation of
secrets. This foreshadows the reference to taking information foris and the use of Lucilius
praenomen in the Book 30 fragments. It is also hard to miss the echo of an idea that comes up in
Horaces first programmatic dialogue: the satirist there portrays the betrayal of commissa as a
major transgression against a friend, aiming to deflect suspicion from his own writings.23
Considering these links, Marx (1904-5, 2.238) and Ha (2007, 93) believe the quote inside the
fragment represents a victims response to a satire by Lucilius. Christes too (1971, 104-5) thinks
we are listening in on a conversation between Lucilius and an adversarius, and that Lucilius is in
the midst of declaring his right to practice free speech in his satire. As it is positioned some ways
into the first book in the series, this could be a model for Horaces mid-book dispute with a
nameless critic that contributes so cleverly to the chronology of the unrolling book in Satires 1.

23 Hor. Sat. 1.4.84-5. Cf. again the portrayal of Lucilius as entrusting arcana to his books, not
other people (Hor. Sat. 2.1.30-1).

18
These lines from Book 29 have also been taken as referring to the satirists work: he
swears he hasnt written it and wont write it; return to fellowship (deierat se non scripsisse et
post non scripturum; redi/ in consortionem, 890-1W [818-19M]). In Marxs view (1904-5,
2.286), the speaker is discussing Lucilius, writer of offensive words, with an estranged friend of
the poets. As in the previous case, however, we have no obviously similarly themed fragments
nearby to help reconstruct the context. It is possible that Marx and others are simply tempted to
read Lucilian satire into this piece of a conversation about other inflammatory writing. The
utterance could belong in plenty of other possible contexts, and the same is true of the mysteria
fragment.
That is not to say that these fragments do not illuminate, if read without the
preconception that they concern our poet. Both patently come from dialogues. One quotes (or
anticipates?) the speech of his interlocutor (dicis); the other quotes (indirectly) another
character who seems to be absent (deierat) and who was himself talking about a piece of writing
that may or may not ever have been produced. The mysteria fragment is particularly enigmatic,
and becomes still more interesting once we scratch the surface. What has happened? The speaker
may be doing one of any number of things: responding to an accusation leveled at himself, with
contrition or with scornful mimicry;24 alternatively, he could be pre-empting such an accusation,
using dicis loosely with future sense. It is also not impossible that he is offering his interlocutor
some friendly coaching for a future confrontation of a third party. Or he could be seeking to win
an argument, to assert his rights, to establish himself as an authority, or to mock anothers views
or language. (Then too, he may be in the middle of more or less re-committing a prior crime by
speaking about his interlocutors mysteria!) In any of these cases, the betrayed partys big speech
24 For the interpretation of mysteria as a mocking quote of the accuser, who was aiming for
solemnity, see Mariotti 1954: 375; Christes 1971, 104; and Baier 2001, 41-2.

19
to the betrayer is the primary object of attention. We can be grateful to Nonius for excerpting not
just the quote, but also its introduction; this carries not just a strong indication of conflict, but
also suggestions of jockeying for authority and the right to mimic and mock. If the discussion in
the poem had nothing explicit to do with Lucilian satire, it most certainly grappled with some of
the issues that became attached to the genre. And elsewhere in the remains of Books 26-30, there
is other evidence that the spotlight shed on Gaius is not unprecedented.

Meta-sermo evidently took various forms and pursued various agendas. These are
scarcely recoverable now, but the complete chats, in their variety of meters, must have been
interesting to read as poetic compositions, not just as social commentary. The fragments afford us
only a glimpse of what must have been a colorful poetic world driven by many different kinds of
relationships, friendly and other. Critical or offensive speech would have been one of the most
important ingredients that dynamically generated the plots of poems. Such speech could have
an active role (creating or resolving conflict, casting judgment, hurting feelings) but it could also
be the object of scrutiny be reported, discussed, dissected, contested, approved, or mocked.
Glimpses of such talk can be seen in these examples: you, too, insult poor me (insulta miserum
tu quoque in me, 865W [914M]); Why not? Even you would then be calling me uneducated and
ignorant (quidni? et tu idem inlitteratum me atque idiotam diceres, 674W [649M]); the man
they see gets called sloppy and feminine, they call crazy (insanum vocant quem maltam ac
feminam dici vident, 744W [732M]). These are all moments of defiance, judgment, and even
meta-judgment. We have no grounds to read them as explicit commentary on the poets work (cf.
Gruen 1992, 311). But they do have a potentially programmatic analogue in the apologia, in this
dubious representation of others moral judgment: to you theyre all lovely, theyre all

20
valiant, while Im a rogue fine (omnes formonsi, fortes tibi, ego inprobus, esto, 1077W
[1026M]). Here it is tempting to picture Gaius exasperatedly attacking his critics for their
illogical moral standards, throwing their perversely chosen labels back at them.
Elsewhere it is indicated that some speech carries risks for the speaker: Be sparing with
that talk; save yourself, while you can keep your back and hide safe (orationem facere conpendi
potes;/ salve, dum salvo in tergo et tergino licet, 796-7W [771-2M]).25 Of course, transgressive
or potentially upsetting speech may meet with resilience instead of complaint: We easily handle
being mocked; we know its a capital offense to get angry (facile deridemur; scimus capital
esse irascier, 664W [658M]). This last example strikes Warmington (1971, 213) as likely to have
come from the satirists mouth. Although there is no evidence for this, the modern editor is
attracted to the unruffled attitude it expresses about mockery, and perhaps to a legal joke: it
should be illegal to take legal action against a derisor.
In fact, the world of the Roman courts was well known to Lucilius, who is on record as
initiating a prosecution of his own (for defamation, iniuria, of all things; Rhet. Her. 2.19). He
may also have run into legal trouble for letting his cattle graze on public lands (Cic. de Orat.
2.28426). The satirists speaking characters find themselves engaging in legal disputes as well.
One chooses to respond to some offense with a kind of formal and consequential speech, a
prosecution: for which reason Im resolved to do the opposite and prosecute and indict the man
(quapropter certum est facere contra ac persequi / et nomen deferre hominis, 863-4W [9201M]). There are other fragments referring to the speech of the courts, including 804W [783M]:
25 Restraint can also be required when it comes to literature: and be content to restrict yourself
in the meantime to these verses (et te his versibus interea contentus teneto, 1015W [1086-7M]).
The conventional reading of this fragment identifies the you as the recipient of verses
(Warmington 1971, 329; Marx 1904-5, 346), but we could entertain the possibility that it is the
poet, being told to curb his ambition. All three later satirists will certainly weave the idea of their
self-restraint (or lack thereof) into their programmatic poems.
26 That is, if the reading Lucilius, rather than Lucullus, is correct.

21
to threaten openly that he will present an accusation on a capital charge (minitari aperte
capitis dicturum diem). Whether these pronouncements were met with support or ridicule in the
sermo being staged is impossible to know, but they are clearly being put on display. This is
certainly true of the comparatively lengthy fragment on Lupus court preserved by Probus (80511W [784-90M]), which is thought to be connected to the comic-style home break-in narrative in
Book 28. There, the poet or the speaking character makes the judges formal speech into a show
in its own right, imagining a future verdict that deprives the offender of first elements and
primary matter.fire and water and possibly even air and earth. Lucilius mockery of Lupus
in the later Satires is well known, but this passage may have concentrated on mocking the
doomed defendant and underscoring the authority of his judges verbal pronouncements.27 Legal
pronouncements are a species of public exposure; this is not satires realm alone.28
In the full apologia of Book 30, one argument Gaius could have made is that hurtful
speech should arouse no more suspicion or resentment than speech that aims to flatter. There is
evidence in the early Satires of a cynical interest in the latter type. Manipulative, wheedling
words are represented almost as a form of assault: let him give the man what he wants and calm
him down, spoil him completely, and pluck away all his vigor (concedat homini id quod velit,
deleniat, /corrumpat prorsum ac nervos omnes eligat, 860-1W [918-19M]). Even in this short
fragment, the metaphors build up, conjuring speech with an invasive, violating power.29
Elsewhere, there is a warning about the dangers of flattery: the more fawning this woman is, the
more fiercely she bites (quanto blandior haec, tanto vehementius mordet, 1073W [1025M]);
27 In the view of Goldberg (2005, 160), the Greek terms for the elements may indicate that the
defendant had philosophical pretensions no help to him now.
28 Cf. the possible consolator-cum-muckraker speaking at 772-3W [690M]. Character slurs and
calumnies seem common in Roman intellectual society (Gruen 1992, 296).
29 904-5W [882-3M] may describe a similar scene of flattery, though not according to Marx
1904-5, 298.

22
note also the trouble[maker?], fawning and tricky (mite malum, blande atque dolosum) at
1003W [1097M]. Similar in sense, perhaps, is this description: thus his mind was caught in nets,
manacles, foot-fetters (sic laqueis manicis pedicis mens inretita est, 1107W [990M]). Even
poetic speech can enthrall its audience, not always for the good: cf. the dolt enchanted by shrill
singing (acri/inductum cantu stolidum, 1127W [1005M]).
These lost discussions represented a world of constant social performance and exchange,
in which no one can speak up or speak out without that speech attracting attention to itself. They
thus built up a context for the readers processing of the speech of Gaius, which was incubated
in the same world. Like subjects, like satirist. This is not to say that Lucilius meant to justify
literary sermo by melting into this sermo-filled background or by explicitly appealing to it as a
precedent, only that he created an overwhelming impression of precedent that could not have
been lost on his readers. It does not even matter if Gaius was represented as winning the
argument in Book 30 (nor can we know whether the confrontations in earlier poems had clear
winners and losers). With its many disguises and names, its exploitation of intimacy and conflict,
its potentially troubling mixture of pain and pleasure, and its fascination with itself and its own
powers, literary satire is at home in this world. So is the critical speech about satire that arises in
Book 30.

A satiric epilogue?
Lucilius composed twenty-five more books of satire after this collection, but what
happened in the plot of Book 30 after the apologia? Whether or not he represented himself as
triumphing in the argument, Lucilius followed this interlude up with one or more poems. In other
words, he represented the criticism and defense of his sermones not as the final word, but as a

23
prelude to and even generator of more sermo, on the spot. While the original content of this
aftermath or dnouement is as difficult to decipher as the rest of the Satires, there is some
evidence that Lucilius here took the opportunity to stage his own clever response to criticism,
adding another chapter to his history of satire in real time.
In Warmingtons arrangement, the fifth and final poem of Book 30 contains an animal
fable, based on the fragments that evoke the tale of the sick lion and the cautious fox (1111-20W
[980-9M]). This may have been a surprise move from readers perspective: for what it is worth,
no other fragments in Books 26-30 suggest that Lucilius had employed the fable genre before
this point, and fables certainly had a more popular than a literary pedigree at this time.30 But
animal fables would appear throughout Horaces poetry, starting with his Satires, and the genre
had broadly satiric associations in antiquity, possibly including an appearance in Ennius
Satires.31
If this was indeed Lucilius first use of a fable, and if Warmington is correct to place it
after the apologia, we might entertain the possibility of a connection. The animal fable, by
avoiding nominatim attack and offering a seemingly external exemplum, can be a trenchant form
of satire clothed in a charming guise. In Horaces second book of Satires it is represented
superficially as a kind of genial, organic, and conflict-free satire in the spirit of Lucilius and
friends (2.6.79-117, in a setting that recalls the vignette of Lucilius at 2.1.71-4). The Horatian
case is part of the satirists poetic response to the cautions issued by Trebatius in 2.1. In this
30 On Lucilius innovative adaptation of a popular genre for presentation to his small, learned,
and like-minded audience, see Cozzoli 1995, 195. The only other possible fable in Lucilius is
represented by 586-7W [561-2M] in Book 19; Cozzoli 1995, 194-5, after Marx 1904-5 2.209, is
inclined to interpret these lines as the moral of the fable of the industrious ant.
31 See Cavarzere 2001 and Marchiesi 2005. For a catalogue of Roman authors use of fables, see
Holzberg 2002: 32-3. Horace refers to the sick lion fable, with political meaning, at Epist. 1.1.7375. Ennius fable of the crested lark (fragments 21-58 Vahlen) most likely appeared in the
Satires. Cf. Chahoud, Verbal Mosaics, for the observation that 1119-20W [988-9M] is
appropriately crafted to mimic ordinary speech.

24
move underground, the coded satire he produces, with its hissings of compliance, speaks
volumes about the conditions that prompted its creation (Freudenburg 2001, 108-24).
Perhaps Lucilius, after his own apologia, played the cautious, chastened author by
trotting out his animal fable in lieu of a story about real people. If so, the sick lion fable was an
interesting choice. In the version related in Babrius (103), the sick lion pretends to be weaker
than he really is, and lures prey into his lair by using a subdued voice (5) and friendly words (1316). The fox, of course, detects his ruse: the tracks of other beasts all lead into the cave, but none
lead out (19). But before that happens, the lions ambiguous condition would seem to make an
apt symbol of the ostensibly chastened satirist who is now using tempered/weakened voice or
even subtle style (deducta tunc voce leo, Lucilius 1116-17W [985-6M]). Any profession of
lessons learned in the apologia itself could be a trap; the satirist can find other tricks, and his
career is only beginning.32

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