Legal Ethics Cases

ELS: Legal Ethics
Cases 1-13
1. FIDELA VDA DE ENRIQUEZ V. ATTY MANUEL G.SAN JOSE
SECOND DIVISION
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE,

Respondent.
Copy of Rae Gammad 1
A.C. No. 3569

Present:
QUISUMBING,J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 23, 2007
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint [1] for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De Enriquez against
respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.
Complainant alleged that on August 28, 1989, she hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the
purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against one Rugerio Alipante, who defaulted in the payment
of monthly rentals on complainants property in Taban, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. According to the
complainant, respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to him of P2,000
attorneys fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from respondent. She demanded the return of the
pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the
documents. As a result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed. Complainant alleged further, that
her daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary. Complainant prayed that Atty. San
Jose be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
In his Comment,[2] respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from
the complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the
filing of an unlawful detainer case had become unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not
file the case even before receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Libmanan-Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He claimed that he informed
complainant that the case could not be filed until a new judge was appointed, but he promised to file
the case before the action prescribed. Respondent claimed further that the attorneys fee wasP3,000
and that he had paid complainants daughter P700 per month.
The Court referred[3] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The investigating officer
found that respondent was indeed remiss in the performance of his professional duties as
counsel. According to Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to
his client was sending a demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days
from receipt of the demand letter. The Commissioner also found respondents explanation for his failure
to file the case unsatisfactory and concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duty as a lawyer for abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. [4]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Commissioner
finding respondent liable for negligence but only imposed the penalty of one-month suspension from
the practice of law.[5]
On December 17, 1997, respondent filed a petition seeking the dismissal of the case against him
and prayed that he be exonerated. He denied being negligent. He claimed that the IBP Board of
Governors misinterpreted the complainants letter, which stated that the complainant and her lessee
ELS: Legal Ethics

Cases 1-13
came to an agreement for the latter to vacate the leased premises.He claimed that he relied on that
letter thereby negating the necessity of further filing a case for unlawful detainer.
In our Resolution, dated December 6, 1999, we resolved to remand the case to the IBP which, in
turn, assigned the case to the IBP-CBD for further investigation.
The Investigating Commissioner in her report, dated August 5, 2004, recommended that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit. Said recommendation was adopted by the IBP, which passed a resolution to
that effect, and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on October 7, 2004.
After a thorough review of the records in this matter, we are in agreement with the IBP that
respondent Atty. San Jose be held liable for negligence; thus, his petition for exoneration should be
denied for utter lack of merit.
The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.[6] A lawyer engaged
to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost
diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert
his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a
practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the
appropriate attention to his legal work.[7]
In Santos v. Lazaro,[8] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic
postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise
due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client
and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. Until the lawyers withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the
interest of the client.[9]
In this case, respondent fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. It is
undisputed that respondent was hired by the complainant on August 28, 1989, and that respondent
sent the notice to vacate to the lessee before the appropriate unlawful detainer case could be
filed. However, after nine months, respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [10] However, respondent in this case
failed to file the appropriate civil case after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by
itself inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent. [11] Moreover, this Court finds reprehensible
respondents failure to heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That
respondent gave no reasonable explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent aggravates his misconduct by blaming the courts. Respondents excuse that the
MCTC having jurisdiction over the case was vacant; that filing of a case would be useless; and that the
best thing to do was to wait for the vacancy to be filled, finds no support in the practice of law. The
vacancy in court did not suspend the courts official existence, much less render it functus oficio.
Respondent also relies in vain on complainants letter dated August 16, 1990, wherein complainant
informed respondent of her decision to withdraw the case. According to the complainant, she resorted
to the letter so she could retrieve the records she previously handed over to the respondent, but he
continued to refuse to return them. It may be noted that the letter was sent to respondent a few days
before the lapse of the one-year prescriptive period. If respondent had earlier filed a case, there would
have been no need for complainant to resort to that letter to get the records in line with her plan to
have the Public Attorneys Office assist in filing the appropriate case. Needless to stress, because of the
respondents failure to file the appropriate case, and his refusal to return the documents, time ran out
and the action for unlawful detainer case was barred by prescription. Damage and prejudice to the
clients cause was undeniable.
Finally, we find the recommended penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law too
light. In previous cases, we have imposed six months suspension for violations of this nature, taking into
consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal
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Cases 1-13
profession. In Reyes v. Vitan,[12] for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his clients
case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to
render accounting of all the sums he received from his client. Considering precedents, in the light of
circumstances in this case, we find no reason to deviate now from the penalty meted previously for
similar infractions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of violation of
Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution. He is ordered to
return to complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution until the full amount shall have been returned.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into respondents personal records as an attorney and as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the
land, the IBP, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
ELS: Legal Ethics
Cases 1-13
2. JULIO B. VERSOZA V. JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRARAS

JULIO B. VERZOSA,
Complainant,
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]
Present:
- versus -
JUDGE MANUEL E.
CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial
Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur,
Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,JJ.
Promulgated:
March 12, 2007
RESOLUTION
Before us is a Verified Complaint [1] dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging
Judge Manuel E. Contreras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with
Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo
E. Candelaria.
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Protected Area Office. On April 14, 2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting
activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an
open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found
and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the
treasure hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose
Credo (Credo) a.k.a. Labaw and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. Moren. The Executive Director of the
DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered the complainant to continue monitoring the said treasure
hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities and on the basis of the
testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against
Rodrigo Candelaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information
relayed by respondent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the
morning of April 18, 2004, which led to the arrest of the principal accused. Respondent did not inhibit
himself from conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the accused,
in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. Complainant was
not among the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended by members of the PNP
on April 18, 2004. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an order
for complainant's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to simple theft was
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge NiloMalanyaon, in an
Order dated September 13, 2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities inOcampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for
which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way of harassing anybody who opposes the
activities.
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Cases 1-13
In his Comment,[2] respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain hiking
at Mt. Isarog with the Tinablanan River as his destination. While at Mt.Isarog, he received an
information that Candelaria, known confidant of the personnel of the DENR and by the CARE Philippines,
was looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company
(PLDT) used as a relay station but already inoperational. The PLDT Tower is already a government
property and declared by the provincial government as a tourist attraction and destination being
strategically located at the towering heights of Mt. Isarog. The activity of looting the steel trusses and
bars of the PLDT Tower had been going on since January 2004. He directed the police
of Ocampo, Camarines Sur to investigate the looting of the steel trusses and bars of
the PLDT Tower. The second time that he went on mountain hiking at Tinablanan River on April
18, 2004, he was again informed that the steel trusses and bars of thePLDT Tower were already being
loaded in a truck bound for the junkshop in Naga City. With the use of a binocular, he was able to
personally confirm the report. He immediately called the PNP Regional Intelligence Group and in a
checkpoint set up by the police, the truck was apprehended with Candelaria and several men
aboard. On April 19, 2004, the OIC-Chief of Police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur filed a criminal complaint
for robbery before the MTC of Ocampo, Camarines Sur docketed as Criminal Case No. 2071 for
preliminary investigation. Upon conclusion of the preliminary investigation and finding probable cause
against the accused for robbery, respondent forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Camarines Sur for appropriate action. However, the provincial prosecutor modified the charge of
robbery to theft, and the corresponding information was filed with the RTC, Branch
32, Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. P-3647, presided by Judge Malanyaon. The latter,
finding no probable cause, dismissed the case against complainant and likewise ordered the arresting
officer to adduce additional evidence against the remaining accused for determination of judicial
probable cause. Having failed to do so, Judge Malanyaon dismissed Criminal Case No. P-3647. Persons
motivated with ill-will against him were just making a failed and porous connection to the alleged
treasure
hunting
activity. If
respondent
was
subsequently
seen
at
Zone
2,
Del
Rosario, Ocampo, Camarines Sur after the apprehension of those involved in the looting at the PLDT
Tower, it was because he was then conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071
having inquisitorial authority to extend his investigation on the area. The complainant's surmise that he
is the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting of the group of Sumalde was based on the alleged
information
relayed
to
complainant
by
Myrna Dacer,
Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria. Complainant imputed bias
against him when he did not inhibit from conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No.
2071 despite prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower. Prior knowledge of the commission of a
crime is not a mandatory ground for a first level court judge to recuse himself from conducting
preliminary investigation. It was just incidental that he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded
with stolen trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. Preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial function of
an MTC judge. The matter of issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary and judicial in nature which
is authorized under the rules. If ever complainant perceived that irregularities attended the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant
despite being represented and assisted by a retained counsel. Under the Rules, the
result/recommendation of the investigating judge during the preliminary investigation is subject to
review or appropriate action by the provincial prosecutor. The finding of probable cause against the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2071 was sustained by the provincial prosecutor of Camarines Sur upon
review, although the recommended charge of robbery was modified to theft. The dismissal by
Judge Malanyaon of the information for theft finding that no probable cause exists should not militate or
be taken against him. He discharged his duties as investigating judge regularly with faithful adherence
to the law and the rules, and he acted in good faith and without malice in his conduct of the preliminary
investigation. The Sangguniang Bayan of Ocampo, CamarinesSur, rendered a committee report stating
that an ocular inspection had been conducted on the alleged site of treasure hunting and they were
able to confirm that it was indeed a fishpond loaded with so many growing fish and not a site of
treasure hunting.
In the Agenda Report,[3] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:
ELS: Legal Ethics

EVALUATION:
Cases 1-13
The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the mastermind of the alleged
treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of
and affidavits executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza and
Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these narrations/affidavits are not based on the
complainant's own personal knowledge but rather on the personal knowledge of the said
persons. The same are, thus, considered hearsay because their probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other tha[n] the
complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For being
hearsay, the same are insufficient and inconclusive to determine the participation of the
respondent Judge in the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. In
this light, the complainant failed to submit substantial evidence to support his imputation
that the respondent Judge is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities
in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be best
resolved through judicial adjudication. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if
there are irregularities in the issuance of warrant against the complainant, the latter has
all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash, an action for habeas
corpus, or a special civil action for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail
of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be
patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done in bad faith and absent a clear showing that
the judge has acted errantly; the issue becomes judicial in character and would not
properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303
SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law, specifically Rule 112,
Section 6, paragraph b, when, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest against the
complainant, he personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers on witness Jose Credo and upon finding probable cause and the
necessity to place the complainant under custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of
justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in conducting the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071, he violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part in a
proceeding where he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary
facts. Respondent Judge admitted having prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling
of the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he was able to visually
confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led to the arrest of
the principal accused in the said case. [The] Judge still conducted the preliminary
investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of respondent judge was
filed by the complainant during the preliminary investigation stage of the case, this does
not mean that respondent can freely act on the same despite the lingering doubt created
in the minds of the parties that he would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. While the first
paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds for disqualification and gives
the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second paragraph leaves the matter
of inhibition to the sound discretion of the judge (People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
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It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition but provides a broad
policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges for just and valid reasons other than
those enumerated in the first paragraph (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case for just and valid reasons (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807) other than those
mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test in determining the validity of the
court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is deprived of fair and impartial trial
(Associacion de Agricultures deTalisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA
294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court are our recommendations that:
1.
2.
The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;

Judge
Manuel
E.
Contreras,
Municipal
Trial
Court
of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished for violation of Canon 3, Section
5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent manifested their
willingness to submit the case for decision/ resolution based on the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being
merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.[4]
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other
than those mentioned in the first paragraph.[5]
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,[6] citing Perez v. Suller,[7] we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under
Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 [S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which
he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to
preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice. [8]
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True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the
law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere
appearance of partiality is proscribed.[9]
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at
the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and he was instrumental in the apprehension of the
robbers. Respondent should have been aware of the impropriety of conducting the preliminary
investigation considering that Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge from
taking part in proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Respondent
ignored said rule, warranting disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Respondent's averment that prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground
for the first level court judge to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation, holds no
water. As a judge, respondent must keep himself abreast with the law. He should have known that it is
well entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time, that personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies him from taking part in such
proceeding as the same would necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no
moment that the finding of probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is
ofparamount importance is the perceived bias and impartiality by the complainant against respondent
in his conduct of the preliminary investigation due to respondent's prior knowledge of the looting at the
PLDT Tower, respondent being instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers.
Although respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation, it did
not render as void the act of respondent in issuing a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of
the then existing Section 6(b), Rule 112 [10] of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without
waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after
an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing Rule, when, prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant, respondent personally conducted preliminary
examination in the form of searching questions and answers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing
the warrant of arrest was to place the respondents under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.[11] Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody is left to the judges sound
judgment.[12]
Moreover, the OCA correctly sustained respondents claim that if ever complainant perceived that
irregularities attended the issuance of warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial
remedies,[13] such as filing a motion to quash warrant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari,
but none was availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,[14] we held that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability -civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
[15]
To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [16] An
inquiry into the administrative liability of a judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies
have been exhausted and decided with finality. [17] For until there is a final declaration by the appellate
court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude
whether respondent is administratively liable.[18] The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial.[19] Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do
an injustice.[20] Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge x x x can find refuge.[21]
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Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities
in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, we find the allegation to be devoid of merit.
In Espaol v. Mupas,[22] we held that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies
mainly on second-hand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is
reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. [23] The Court cannot give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden. As
aptly observed by the OCA, complainant has no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by
respondent as he relied only on the information relayed to him by the relatives of the
accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore,
we
find
that
the
affidavits
of
Myrna Dacer,
Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria relate to the incident
surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the accused in the robbery case. The police blotter which
is not even a certified true copy is an alleged threat made by respondent against Mary
AnnCandelaria. Nowhere in the said documents do we find that respondent was being tagged as the
mastermind of the treasure hunting. Taken all together, these documents have noprima
facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,[24] we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always
be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal,
such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation
of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced.
[25]
If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent. [26]
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in
not recusing himself from conducting preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of
violation of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and isREPRIMANDED with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
3. PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION V. ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON JR.
FIRST DIVISION
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
Complainants, Present:
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
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R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment and suspension[2] against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by
Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paraaque.[3]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[4] The case was dismissed for improper venue.[5]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. [6] The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. [7] Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the
order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.
[8]
The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. [9]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274[10] where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009. [11] It was dismissed on the grounds
of res judicata and prescription.[12]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a
lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. [13] He denied that he was forum shopping as
his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, [14] disclosed the two previous cases involving the
same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. [15] Respondent further claims he could not
refuse his clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the
transaction.[16]
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [17]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in
repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter. [18] It opined that respondent
should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. [19] Under Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. [20] The
CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however,
modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.[22]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality.
When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [23] As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. [24] Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers
should not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same.[25]
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect
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of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent
appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to
the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract.
As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his
1999[26] arguments and assertions in the 2004 [27]complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and
tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon
12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice.
Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple
actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves
to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth
and honor.[29]
[28]
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that
CBDs recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate
to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006, [30] the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary
case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
4. FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA V. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298
Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened
complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
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Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005,
complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice
from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the
conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her
alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent
notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to
work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his clients claim for separation pay.
The letter also contained the following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1.
Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the

government.
2.
Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3.
Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4.
Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). [1]
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant
filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)
[3]
claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important part in
imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed out
that the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the
issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages
and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of
Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions[4] and for violation of the Notarial Law.[5]
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear.[6] Both
parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found
that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94
requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. [8] On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the
case.[9] Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four
hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the false, malicious,
defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a
groundless and false suit.[11]
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after
serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his
right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and
without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006
Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
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Cases 1-13
Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed his position paper
on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page
of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt
attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the
same date. [14]
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his
failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No.
28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of
Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court
of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 tobecome Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [15] Said rule states that a violation
thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. [16]
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his
failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed
his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand
of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the
reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainants subsequent compliance
with the requirement, and the merit of complainants complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be
attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other
proceedings or action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise
the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing
multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, [19] which tends to degrade the
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administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of
the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. [20] Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks
to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before
the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other
party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of
two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue. [21]
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against
forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e.,
the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment
complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. [22] Thus, if the
complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of
another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have
previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory
pleading, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[23]
At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed
defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification
against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents
Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies the grant of the
present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even
spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. [24] In particular, Rule
19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should
not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of
his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyers client.[25]
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his
letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as
settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple
charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate
due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also
amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or
opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making
an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of
money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence.
Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises
to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. [26]
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a
very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondents disbarment from
the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution. [28] While the respondent in Boyboy was
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Cases 1-13
exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he
admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an
act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a
lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses
punishable by the State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice
and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondents threat
to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give
in to his clients demands. It was not respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the
law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep silent
about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is
usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients
claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple
demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his clients claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure
leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under
which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The
privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and
extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment
is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his
overzealousness to protect his clients interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is
hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
15
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Cases 1-13
5. MA. LUISA HADJULA V. ATY ROCELES F. MADIANDA

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula
against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT[1] bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of
Article 209[2] of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both
worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she
was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime
in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the
course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets
and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be
informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was
malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had
already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later
part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainants account,
precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a
cellular phone in exchange for the complainants promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT[3] with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant)with violation of Section 3(a)
of Republic Act No. 3019,[4] falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being
based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same
disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latters act of disclosing
personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondents legal
advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her
answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, [5] respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive
documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of
the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph
4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had
any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained
any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL
SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some
confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of
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Cases 1-13
Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to
CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS
referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the
same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph
8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP
and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she
also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover where she has a child .
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime
in 1998, are all part of public records .
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get
even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since
she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC
ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL
ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out
with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the
respondent is protected under the attorney-client privilege communication. Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she [revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended that
respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and , finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal
consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes
upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of
the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end
of the day, not inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the
fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation.Nor will it make any difference
that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said
in Burbe v. Magulta,[6] -
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A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the formers business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer
with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is
established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the formers
fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. [7]
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of
a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information
revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used
as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.Without meaning to
condone the error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the
end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without
perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule
on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished
to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She
is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.
SO ORDERED.
6. JOSELLANO GUEVARRA V. ATTY JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
EN BANC
18
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JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,
versus
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,
Respondent.
Cases 1-13
A.C. No. 7136
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which
read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation,
he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off
all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love
You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
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By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because
theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will
love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18,
2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the abovequoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as
they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001,
on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala.A photocopy of the report is attached as
Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting
their adulterous relationship supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as
the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
20
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Cases 1-13
15. Respondents adulterous

conduct
with
the
complainants
wife and
his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible
was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding,
vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.
[6]
(Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint
regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity
thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
that Respondents
relationship
with
Irene
was not
under
scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with
[his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne
is aware ofRespondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution
of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with
respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarmentpursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to
the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth [13] bearing Irenes signature and naming
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respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS [14] dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office.
During
the
investigation
before
the
IBP-CBD,
complainants
Complaint-Affidavit
and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. [16]Respondents counsel did
not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent
sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
in
unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
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While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the
news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent
through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that
there is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife,
Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the
child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted
that complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was
the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father
of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining
that it was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
[27]
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired
information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate [29] shows that they were affixed by one and
the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
denied being the father of the child.
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Cases 1-13
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene
was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.[34]
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances.Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.
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Cases 1-13
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. [35] The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extramarital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is
not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. [37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent
did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as
well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
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Cases 1-13
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the
IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation [41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants
petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed
against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was
pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion
of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. [43] As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing
the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when
complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to
her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In
fact,
he
(Eala)
himself
was
married
to
another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which
was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.
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Cases 1-13
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided
to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For
one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What
finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of
the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is
most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and
thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery
were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case [47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation
of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of thePhilippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
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7. RE: ABSENCE WHITHOUT OFFICIAL LEAVE (AWOL) OF ATTY MARILYN B. JOYAS

FIRST DIVISION
RE: ABSENCE WITHOUT A.M. No. 06-5-286-RTC
OFFICIAL LEAVE (AWOL) OF
ATTY. MARILYN B. JOYAS,
Clerk of Court V, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Present:
Branch 16.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 2, 2007
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative matter concerns Atty. Marilyn B. Joyas, clerk of court V in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 16.
Atty. Joyas daily time record (DTR)/bundy card for November 2004 showed that she was on unauthorized
leave from the 15th to the 30th of that month. She failed to submit her DTR/bundy card for December
2004. Neither did she file an application for leave.
On April 1, 2005, the Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) sent a telegram to
Atty. Joyas requiring her to submit her DTRs/bundy cards and/or leave applications. [1] She did not
comply.
On May 23, 2005, the OCA Leave Division, thru Judge Carmelita S. Manahan, presiding judge of Branch
16 of RTC Manila, caused the service of a letter [2] to Atty. Joyas requiring her to explain her unauthorized
absences in writing. It was received by her husband, Atty. Edwin Joyas, on July 4, 2005.
In a letter dated July 11, 2005, [3] Atty. Joyas informed the OCA that she already notified Judge Manahan
of her application for retirement effective at the close of office hours of November 15, 2004.
Upon verification, however, the Employees Welfare and Benefits Division informed the OCA that
Atty. Joyas failed to complete the requirements in support of her application for retirement. [4] Thus, the
OCA recommended that Atty. Joyas be dropped from the rolls and her position declared vacant. [5]
The OCAs recommendation is approved.
Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as amended by Circular
No. 14, s. 1999, provides:
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) calendar
days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He
shall, however, be informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files, of his separation
from the service, not later than five (5) days from its effectivity. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
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Thus, under civil service rules, Atty. Joyas should be separated from the service or dropped from
the rolls on account of her continued unauthorized absence since November 15, 2004.
A court employee who goes on absence without leave (AWOL) for a prolonged period of time
disrupts the normal function of the organization. [6] His or her conduct is prejudicial to the best interest of
public service.[7] It contravenes a public servants duty to serve the public with utmost degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[8] It also manifests disrespect for his or her superiors and
colleagues, in particular, and for the service and the public at large, in general. [9]
By going on AWOL, Atty. Joyas grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of her office. She
failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in government
service.[10]
The conduct and behavior of all court personnel are circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[11]
The prejudice caused by a court employees prolonged unauthorized absence is both great and
grave. It impedes the dispensation of justice which is the essential function of the courts. One who
delays justice, denies justice.[12]
The non-feasance of Atty. Joyas was aggravated by the fact that she is a member of the bar. Her
conduct runs counter to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
A lawyer is an officer of the court. It is his duty to promote the objectives of courts the speedy, efficient,
impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments.
[13]
He should not only help achieve these ends but should also avoid any unethical or improper practice
that will impede, obstruct or prevent their realization as he is charged with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient dispensation of justice. [14] This Atty. Joyas failed to do when she went on
prolonged unauthorized leave and effectively abandoned her office.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[15] this administrative case against Atty. Joyas as a court personnel
shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against her as a member of the bar.
Accordingly, Atty. Marilyn B. Joyas, clerk of court V in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16 is
hereby DROPPED from the rolls and her position declared VACANT.
Atty. Joyas is further hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000 for her unprofessional conduct as a
member of the bar.
Let copies of this resolution be served on Atty. Joyas at her address appearing on her 201 files pursuant
to Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as amended, as well as on
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
8. JUAN DE LA CRUZ V. JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETA AS
FIRST DIVISION
JUAN DE LA CRUZ A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043
(CONCERNED CITIZEN OF
LEGAZPI CITY),
Complainant, Present:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
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JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS,

Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 9,
September 5, 2007
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by Juan de la Cruz, a concerned
citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint [1] read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge
Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side
comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa
batas. Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap
ng publiko. Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para
malutas ang problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
In his comment,[2] respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and claimed
that he had not insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in his first few months in office, he experienced
the following exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting on further examining a
witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor proceeding with the
presentation of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing for an
absent counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing in corroboration with the latter; lawyers
appearing without observing the proper dress code; a lawyer offering the testimony of his witness to
collaborate the testimony of another witness; a lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but
turning out to be unprepared with his documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a
case for unjust vexation committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the records showed
that the victim was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area where the accused touched her
private part and mashed her breasts; a case being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only
despite the fact that the girl was raped while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never
encountered these mistakes in all his years of law practice in Manila. Thus, he was shocked because he
thought that these things happened only in anecdotes.
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Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers appearing in his sala
hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In such instances, he called the attention of
counsels because, to his mind, they were making a moro-moro[3] out of the proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were
made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his presence,
not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have been offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Daas, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi
City, conducted a discreet investigation. [4] He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of
respondent judge. He requested them to submit their respective written comments on the decorum of
respondent judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.
Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive
remarks. He should also limit himself to asking clarificatory questions. [5]
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful. However,
in open court he is arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in making embarrassing or
insulting remarks when presiding over cases. Most of the time, he was the one
conducting direct and cross-examination of witnesses. He used to scold, harass and
embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and PAO [6] lawyers for just a slight
mistake in procedure.[7]
3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao
In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and
subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent judge, not once but for several occasions.
This traumatized him and made him avoid reading the transcript of stenographic notes
of the said hearing until now. In one occasion, respondent judge proceeded to cut short
the proceedings. When he manifested that he would cross-examine the defendant,
respondent judge stood from his seat and in a sarcastic manner looked backward
manifesting that he was not interested or not listening to the cross-examination. Thus,
he was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-examination. Most of the time,
respondent judge would unduly intervene in the presentation of evidence and asked
more questions than counsel. Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were
subjected to his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He
showed inflexibility to minor mistakes.[8]
4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent judge
instructed him to ask questions which respondent judge thought to be material. When he
was through with his direct examination, respondent judge asked him in open court how
long he had been in private practice. He replied that he had been practicing for only a
period of one and a half (1) years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed
direct questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed.[9]
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to
discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During the meeting,
the prosecutors raised their concern about the behavior of respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor
Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Daas with a copy of the minutes of the meeting. [10] The relevant
portions of the minutes[11] were:
II.
DISCUSSION
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The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the
meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about
the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that the
Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.
Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the
Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
[present] to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge.
Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden
burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of
their clients even in the presence of other people.
Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and
is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said
that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her attention and
would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and Resolution of the
case and even the Chief who approved the same.
III.
Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing
[where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were]
much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch 9 will not be
good for the health of any prosecutor.
RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not temperamental.
is
It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC

Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court assignment.
It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the
Department of Justice a prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his sala.
[12]
Judge Daas also received a letter [13] from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City
prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not want to
comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit team from this
Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to see and feel the tension[-]charged
atmosphere in the sala once the trial started.[14]
To his report, Judge Daas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the
letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public prosecutors in
Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio. [15] He concluded that the charges against respondent judge
were true. However, he refrained from recommending any definite action against him and left the
matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). [16]
In its report,[17] the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Daas and made the following
recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial
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decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions. [18]
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere advice.
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary: [19]
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in
demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law,
he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. [20] In this
connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court. [21] A
judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his
sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the peoples faith in the judiciary. He also
violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges
shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.[22](emphasis supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, [23] litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. [24] Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. [25] He
must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just
man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. [26]
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. [27] A judge
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He
descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide
remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.
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Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the
eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint
of arrogance in his comment when he professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes [28] or even
negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of collaborate and corroborate). He also displayed a
condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they were inferior to
lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. [29] A sense of
shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of them.
[30]
They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and derision.
Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and public
prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks.
Consequently, he impaired the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions
than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he contravened
Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: [31]
RULE 3.06 While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear
up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it
should be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of
the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
14. Interference in conduct of trial

While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition
and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he
should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of
the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel,
litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his
mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or a premature judgment.
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the testimony of
the witness or thereafter.[32] Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant
evidence are not improper.[33] But the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions and the
power should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it as much
as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. [34] A judge must always
maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a magistrate, not an advocate. [35]
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In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a magistrate. It is
classified as a light charge [36] for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be
imposed.[37]
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[38] this administrative case against respondent judge shall also
be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics
constitutes a breach of Canons 1 [39] and 11[40] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a
judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law
and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial
officers.
Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 8 [41] and Rule 8.01[42] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala. Instead of
establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge alienated them and
effectively disregarded their significant role in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and 11 and
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he isFINED in the amount of P7,500.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
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9. MANUEL L. LEE V. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO

FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281
Complainant,
Present:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,

February 12, 2008
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing
a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.
Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate [2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. [3] Furthermore, the signature of the testator was
not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation [4] (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s].
[1]
[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and
merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September
19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s] files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained
false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in
question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee,
Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per
affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx. [9]
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Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the
criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the
archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there
because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he
(complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in
the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions
of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 [11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his
function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. [15] A will may either be
notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object
of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. [16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. [17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void. [18] This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.[19] The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
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signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. [21] The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe
the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They
are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. [23] A notary public, especially a
lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every
contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence
certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by
the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each
[cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.[25]
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act [26] which
stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such
transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate
showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity
of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By
having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with
the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his
failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the
notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was
therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
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Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
witnesses, if any, to the signature;
date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
fees collected by him for his services as notary;
give each entry a consecutive number; and
if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
instrument.[27]
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended
that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he
presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification[28] stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of
the original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of
respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will
because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;
[31]
its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents.[34] Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of
the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. [35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a
notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates. [36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [37] and Canon 1[38] and
Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
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The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the
law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every
citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a
servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate. [42] Being a
lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned. [43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [44] A breach of these conditions
justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer
upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct. [45] These sanctions
meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. [46] We have held in a number of
cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution [47] and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired. [48] The
rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as
well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission [50] and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of
the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as
a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment
as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
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10.VIVIAN VILLANUEVA V. ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES

EN BANC
VIVIAN VILLANUEVA,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 7657
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 12, 2008
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint Vivian Villanueva (complainant) filed against Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales
(respondent) for failure to render legal services and failure to return the money, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT), and other documents he received from complainant.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring the
title over a piece of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to transfer
the title to her name because the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the redemption period
and the sheriff had already issued a sheriffs definite deed of sale in complainants favor. Complainant
gave respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the propertys TCT, and other pertinent documents. [1]
After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid
complainant. Whenever complainant went to respondents office at BPI Building, Escario St.,Cebu City,
respondents secretary would tell her that respondent could not be disturbed because he was either
sleeping or doing something important.[2]
In a letter dated 2 July 2003,[3] complainant told respondent that she had lost her trust and confidence in
him and asked him to return the P8,000, TCT, and other documents.Respondent refused to return the
money, TCT, and other documents. After some time and after complainants daughter confronted him,
respondent finally returned the money.However, until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and
other documents.[4] Thus, complainant filed a complaint[5] dated 10 September 2003 against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
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In an Order[6] dated 7 October 2003, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent did not submit an answer. [7] In an
Order[8] dated 21 April 2004, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, and set the mandatory conference on 2 June
2004. Respondent did not submit an answer or attend the mandatory conference. The Commission on
Bar Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution.[9]
The IBPs Report and Recommendations
In a Report[10] dated 27 October 2006, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar
R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found respondent guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he
failed to perform any legal service to his client, (2) he did not inform his client about the status of the
case, (3) he returned the P8,000 acceptance fee without any explanation, and (4) he was
indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
In a Resolution[11] dated 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the
Report dated 27 October 2006 with modification. The IBP Board suspended respondent from the
practice of law for six months and ordered him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the other
documents.
As provided in Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [12] the IBP Board forwarded the instant
case to the Court for final action.
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification. Respondent violated
Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent Refused to Account for
and Return His Clients Money
Canon 16 states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come into his
possession. Rule 16.01 of the Code states that a lawyer shall account for all money received from the
client. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver the funds of his client when due or upon
demand.
In Meneses v. Macalino,[13] the Court held that if [a] lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. In the instant case, respondent
demanded P10,000 and received P8,000 as acceptance fee. Since he did not render any legal service,
he should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.[14] He did not.
After receiving the money, respondent began to avoid complainant. He asked his secretary to lie to
complainant and shoo her off. When complainant demanded for the return of the money after three
years of not hearing from respondent, respondent opted to ignore the demand. Respondent only
returned the money after complainants daughter confronted him. If complainants daughter had not
persisted, respondent would not have returned the money. Respondent did not offer any explanation as
to why he waited for three years to lapse before returning the money. In Macarilay v. Seria,[15] the Court
held that [t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Respondents failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity [16] and moral soundness,[17] and
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. [18] It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the
money to his own use and constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.[19]
Respondent Refuses to Return
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His Clients TCT and Other Documents
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver
the property of his client when due or upon demand.
The TCT and other documents are the properties of complainant. Since respondent did not render any
legal service to complainant, he should have returned complainants properties to her. However, he
refuses without any explanation to return them. Respondent has kept the TCT and other documents in
his possession since 2000. He refuses to return them despite receiving a written demand and being
confronted by complainants daughter. In Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,[20] the Court held that failure to
return the documents to the client is reprehensible: this Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to
heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable
explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client. Canon 18 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Clearly, respondent did not serve complainant with fidelity, competence, or diligence. He totally
neglected complainants cause. An attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant
was established when respondent accepted the acceptance fee. Since then, he should have exercised
due diligence in furthering his clients cause and given it his full attention. [21] Respondent did not
render any service.
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is bound by the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Atty. Dioneda,[22] the Court held that the act of receiving
money as acceptance fee for legal services and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18.
Respondent Did Not Keep His Client Informed
of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
Respondent avoided complainant for three years and kept her in the dark. He did not give
her any information about the status of her case or respond to her request for information. After giving
the money, complainant never heard from respondent again. Complainant went to respondents
office several times to request for information. Every time, respondent avoided complainant and gave
her the run-around. In her affidavit, complainant stated that:
I often visited him in his office to make a [follow up] of the progress of the transfer
x x x only [to be] told by his secretary that he [was] sleeping and not to be disturbed or
[was] doing something important;
x x x For three agonizing years, I x x x never received a feedback from Atty.
Gonzales so much so that I was forced [to write him] a letter which up to present
remain[s] unanswered[.][23](Emphasis ours)
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Respondent unjustifiably denied complainant of her right to be fully informed of the status of her case,
and disregarded his duties as a lawyer.[24]
Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP
Respondents repeated failure to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the 2 June
2004 mandatory conference aggravate his misconduct. These demonstrate his high degree of
irresponsibility[25] and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. [26] His attitude stains the nobility of
the legal profession.[27]
On the Appropriate Penalty
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.[28] The Court finds the recommended penalty inadequate. In Rollon,[29] the
Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any legal service
after receiving money and for failing to return the money and documents he received. In that case, the
Court held that:
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P8,000 as x x x partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in
relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups
from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause,
in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated
demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been
entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. [30]
In Small,[31] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any
legal service after receiving money, failing to inform his client of the status of the case, and failing to
promptly account for and return the money he received.
The Court notes that respondent does not have to return any amount to complainant. Complainant gave
respondent only P8,000, not P10,000, and respondent has returned the total amount he received. As
stated in complainants affidavit:
For the legal service[s] sought, Atty. Gonzales asked an acceptance fee of P10,000 to
which I gave him P8,000 together with the pertinent [mortgage] documents needed by
him for the transfer including the Transfer Certificate of Title;
xxxx
[D]ue to the persistence of my daughter, Lurina Villanueva, Atty. Gonzales returned
the acceptance fee of P8,000 on August 5, 2003 but never returned the documents
mentioned in my letter.[32] (Emphasis ours)
Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because an attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. Those who violate the Code must be disciplined. [33] Respondent failed to live up
to these standards.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons 16,
17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective
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upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him to RETURNthe TCT and all other documents to complainant
within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar
offense, including the failure to return the TCT and all other documents as required herein, shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
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11.WILFREDO M. CATU V. ATTY VICENTE G. RELLOSA

FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA and
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
CORONA, J.:
February 19, 2008

RESOLUTION
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu [2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The
latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them
in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties
reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
[6]
claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them
by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer
with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
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Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while
in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)
(2) of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,
[11]
we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA
6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
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provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do
not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the
private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces;
the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members
of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On
the
other
hand,
members
of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members
of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. [14] Since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside
session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any
other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]
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Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department,
as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT
PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR
AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of
the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head
of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires
legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. [18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]
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A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct
for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
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12.HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY FALAME NAMELY MELBA FALEME, LEO FALAME AND JERRY
FALAME V. ATTY EDGAR J. BAGUIO
SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876
FALAME, namely: MELBA
FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present:
JERRY FALAME,
Complainants, CARPIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,
March 7, 2008
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame (complainants)
against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late
Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible
entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy,
represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and
Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to
file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a
special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame,
appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July
1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the
first civil case.[4]
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the
defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and
counsel for his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed
a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A.
Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and
persons acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the
deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a
consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property.
Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages
with preliminary injunction and restraining order. [6] Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as
counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants,
respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the
spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.[7]
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Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the
complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph
(d), Section 20[8] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[9] complainants asserted further.
Lastly,
complainants
alleged
that
the
second
civil
case
is
a
baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for
complainants
uncle
against the heirs of respondentsdeceased
client.
Specifically,
they averred that respondent filed the case for
the sole purpose
of
retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the
possession of the subject property from complainants
who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section
20[10] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[11]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[12] respondent controverted complainants allegations. He
emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on
Lydios behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorneys fees. He also stated that he
signed the jurat in Raleighs affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to
the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray the
confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latters counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained
that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorneyclient relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first
place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful
statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any means
inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case. [13]
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction.
Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his
acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not
between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and
Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further averred
that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as
plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and
Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by
Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydios death.[14]
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP
had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.
[15]
In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.[18]
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus:[19]
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated by
the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind
the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is
no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under
Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No.
5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential
information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez,
426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.
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In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of
complainants position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be
countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which
the respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the
complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales,
id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is a suit against the
complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective
aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The
complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of
Lydio Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated
in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the
second amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action
against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or
confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation
of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his
and Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d),
Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath when he allegedly betrayed
the trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the
land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one
time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full
ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of
both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568
is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint against the
respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4)
years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper. [21] They likewise assert that the IBP
erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on
16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case
53
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was filed on 23 October 2000. [22] In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated
Reply),[23]complainants invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[24] to support their contention
that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe. [25]
In his Comment,[26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their accusations
as he enjoys the presumption of innocence. [27] Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper and in the
instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.[28]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As
early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor
does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a
crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the
disbarment proceeding x x x (5 AM. JUR. 434)[30]
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[31] where the Court
held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of
no legal effect for being ultra vires.[32]
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the
Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint
are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put
forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact,
respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his
comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss,
he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential
element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent
submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and
heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process
is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their arguments.[33]
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [34] The test is whether, on behalf of one client,
it is the lawyers duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when
the possibility of such situation will develop. [35] The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used.[36] In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. [37]
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Cases 1-13
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer
may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is
materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule
is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. [38] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [39]
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should not
be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
previous relation.[40]
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His
highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.
[41]
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by
any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. [42]
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in
the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established
despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David[43] tells us that it is
immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for. [44]
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely
owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property,
respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position
that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the
property, committing acts which debase respondents rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the
completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to
advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his
employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.[46] And while complainants have never been
respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which
respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleighs supposed coownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having
previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently
studied and anticipated the potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.
[47]
Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from the point of view that
there are possible conflicts; and further, to think in terms of impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. [48]Considering, however, that this is respondents
first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession.[49]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and
meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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13.ATTY MELVIN D.C. MANE V. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE,
Complainant,
- versus -
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119

[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI
No. 07-2709-RTJ]
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN,CARPIO MORALES,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCHTINGA,
36,CALAMBA CITY,
VELASCO, JR., and
Respondent.
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 30, 2008
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006 [1] which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) chargedJudge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003C, Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a
saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are
created equal, not alllawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
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Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were duly recorded in a tape recorder by
stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to
furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the
present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.
In his Comments[3] dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement
dated May 31, 2006[4] of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit,[5] paragraph 3[6] of which was malicious and a direct assault to the integrity and
dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge as it succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated
27 September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case. He thus could not simply sit
idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity.
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the unedited
tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 3 [7]of the motion which, to him,
implied that the trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in editing the transcript of
records to favor a party litigant against the interest of [complainants] client.
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by
separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days [8] why he should not be cited for
contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,[9] stating that it was a
mere result of his impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,[10] the OCA came up with the following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative
complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and
personnel. Thus, the complainants withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the
continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made
by the respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct
unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondents comment and the
documents at hand, we find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during
the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of the
incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the respondent
judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained
actuations.
xxxx
. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties
should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. Respondent judges insulting
statements which tend to question complainants capability and credibility
stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law
school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in
intemperate language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character,
through an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case.
Although respondent judges use in intemperate language may be attributable to human
frailty, the noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of
the court.Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and language.
xxxx
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Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and
civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of
respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected
but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an
essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If
a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he
who sows the wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make
insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and
debating. . .
xxxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by
complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that
there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting
remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. It betrays the judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or
debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. [12]
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent
complied on February 26, 2008,[14] manifesting in the affirmative.
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others
appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate
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language during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of
the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt
counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he
be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold
counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the
adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business
before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do
so in an insulting manner.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the
February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and
boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as
well as unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it
states that if there is already a decision by the Supreme Court, when
that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise noncompliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction,and I
quote the decision. Thats why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court Sir,
because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants and I
state, The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a
seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled
to buy. Sir, thats very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not
assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state,
the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic
assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the
decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
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Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which
you should have researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court
decision sir? Please answer it.
ATTY. MANE:
No your Honor.
COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the
Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am
grossly ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman
ako ganon. I am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from
the instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a client is secret.
Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform with the
decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my twenty (20)
years of practice Ive never been haled by a judge to any question of
integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or
decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical
behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit
errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court,
this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and
honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have
now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
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Cases 1-13
No counsel because the imputations are there, thats why I want you to see. Show him
my assets and liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir,
I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined the bench. And it was very clear to
everyone, I would do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I have
spent my fifteen (15) years and thats how much I have worked in fifteen (15) years
excluding my wifes assets which is more than what I have may be triple of what I
have. May be even four fold of what I have. And look at my assets. May be even
your bank can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets. That is the
reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show you
even the Income Tax Return of my wife and you will be surprised that my salary is
not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief Executive Officer of a
Multi-National Publishing Company. Thats why I have the guts to take this job
because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty.
Mane, please you are still young. Other judges you would already be haled to the
IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the threeday notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of
Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again that any pleadings that do not
conform with the three-day notice rule is considered as useless scrap of paper and
therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I
was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my
record and you will see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already
thrown out so many motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will
give you an exception because of this, then I would be looked upon with
suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and you will see how many
motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. It is not
only your case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud
graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I
supposed you were taught in thought that the three-day notice rule is
almost sacrosanct in order to give the other party time to appear and
plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other commentators state
that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule makes the pleading
and motion a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper,
sir, what would be my ground to grant exception to your motion? Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir dont confuse the Court. Despite of being away
for twenty years from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your
motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir please read your
rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be
the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po
ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga
anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever
heard of anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask
around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a
duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in
a judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know
whether a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3)
whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and
please ask around before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a
public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the
only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or
favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang,
not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang
ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong
mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng
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Cases 1-13
corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong tanggapin
sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman
lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado
ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po
malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi
po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the respect, not
to me but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court
then you have no business appearing before the Court because you dont believe
in the Court system. Thats why one of my classmates never appeared before Court
because he doesnt believe in that system. He would rather stay in their
airconditioned room because they say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I
salute, I give compliment because in their own ways they know the futility and
they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane
hindi mo ako kilala, Ive never disrespect the courts and I can look into your
eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang
makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang
handa po akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can quote me, you
can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only
treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because
it is the first time, but the second time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong
kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng
pangalawa. Thats adding insult to the injury po. Hindi ko po sanagagawin ito pero
ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case against me
for graft and corruption, for incompetence.
xxxx
COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing
any wrong doing to me I will apologize to you.
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity
is unchallenged.
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner
hammered out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes
you. Please read what your younger companero has written to this Honorable
Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to the Court in his
honest opinion. Remember he said honest.That implication is your honest opinion
of an implication sir.
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word
you said honest opinion.
Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of
pride. But if you are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
There will be some . . .
COURT:
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What sir?
Cases 1-13
ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.
COURT:
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to
the Court because of respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you
say that is your honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years
of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more I who
sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the
Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an
officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the
fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent
felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant
to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the
above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal
and personal discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court.[17]
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by
any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch
36, Calamba City,
is
found GUILTY of
conduct
unbecoming
of
a
judge
and
is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
63

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ELS: Legal Ethics

ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE,

Copy of Rae Gammad 1

A.C. No. 3569

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Copy of Rae Gammad 4

2. JULIO B. VERSOZA V. JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRARAS

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Copy of Rae Gammad 6

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Copy of Rae Gammad 7

The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;

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Copy of Rae Gammad 9

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

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Copy of Rae Gammad 10

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Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the

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Copy of Rae Gammad 13

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Copy of Rae Gammad 16

5. MA. LUISA HADJULA V. ATY ROCELES F. MADIANDA

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ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

Copy of Rae Gammad 19

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Copy of Rae Gammad 21

15. Respondents adulterous

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and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

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Copy of Rae Gammad 28

7. RE: ABSENCE WHITHOUT OFFICIAL LEAVE (AWOL) OF ATTY MARILYN B. JOYAS

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Copy of Rae Gammad 30

JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS,

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It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC

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Copy of Rae Gammad 34

14. Interference in conduct of trial

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Copy of Rae Gammad 36