BACHE v.

RUIZ
GR L-32409
February 27, 1971
FACTS:
Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against petitioners for violation of Section 46 (a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Authorized respondent,
revenue examiner Rodolfo de Leon, to make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the
letter. The next day, De Leon and his witness, respondent
Logronio went to the CFI with the papers for the application
of the issuance of search warrant to the petitioner.
At the time, respondent Judge was hearing a certain case so
by means of a note, he instructed deputy clerk of court to
take depositions of respondent De Leon and Logronio. After
the session of case was adjourned, the depositions had
already been taken. Stenographer read to the respondent
judge the stenographic notes and thereadter asked
respondent Logronio to take oath. Respondent judge signed
Respondent De Leons application for search warrant and
Logronios deposition. Search warrant was signed then
issued.
3 days later, BIR agents served the search warrant on
petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation. Petitioners
lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. Agents proceeded with their search and yielded 6
boxes of documents.
Petitioners filed a petition praying that search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled respondent judge dismissed
the petition. Meanwhile, BIR made tax assessments on
petitioner corporation based partly, if not entirely, on the
documents seized. Total amount of assessed tax:
2,594,729.97.
ISSUE: WON the search warrants are null and void due to the
failure of respondent judge to personally examine the
complaint and his witness.
RULING:
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and

his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the

existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to
Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the
issuance of warrants except upon probable cause.
Determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls
for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of
any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was
conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio).
While the complainants application for search warrant and
witness printed deposition were subscribed and sworn to
before respondent judge, he did not ask either of the two any
question, the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against
herein petitioners.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings was
limited to listening to the stenographers reading of her
notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant
and his witness. This cannot be considered as a personal
examination.
The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge
did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to
propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial
mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not
there was probable cause.

PEOPLE
GR 147607
January

V
22,

MAMARIL

and the examination must be reduced in writing in the form

of searching questions and answers.

2004

Facts:
SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search
warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family
residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation,
the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected
marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the
confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property
seized and certified that the house was properly searched,
which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials
who witnessed the search.
The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized
specimens positive for the presence of marijuana. Moreover,
the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed
that it was positive for the same.
Appellant denied that he was residing at his parents house,
and that he was at his parents house when the search was
conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said
that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time
during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on
the certification that the house was properly search was his.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant
Ruling:
Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has
been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required
that:
The judge must examine the complaint and his
witnesses personally, the examination must be under oath,

The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the
warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers
before issuance of the search warrant.
When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the
available records kept in their office, he was only able to
present before the court the application for search warrant
and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of the
proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the
sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses
showing that the judge examined them in the form of
searching questions and answers in writing was presented.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not
sufficient.
Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge
may be able to properly determine the existence and nonexistence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing
and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the
appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid
warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an
illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant.

OGAYON v. PEOPLE
GR 188794
September 2, 2015
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against Ogayon for [1] illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia and [2] illegal possession of
drugs. During arraignment, accused pleased not guilty on
both charges. According to the prosecution, Police chief
Ferrera with other members of Albay provincial Police office
went to Ogayons house to enforce a search warrant for
seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and
concealed in the accuseds house. Upon reaching the house,
police team noticed several persons inside a nipa hut located
nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held,
police team restrained 2 of the 5 persons and immediately
proceeded to Ogayons house. They saw in the comfort room
2 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets suspected to be
shabu, 4 disposable lighters, 1 knife, used aluminum foil, 1
roll of aluminum foil and dorco blade. Police team thereafter
arrested Ogayon and the 2 other persons who had been
earlier restrained and brought them to Camp Simeon.
Ogayon was held guilty of the 2 charges relying on the
presumption of regularity, RTC rejected ogayons frame-up
defense. Ogayon appealed to the CA assailing the validity of
search warrant. He avers that it was improperly issued, as
the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript
showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination of
the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
ISSUE:
WON
Ogayons
Constitutional
right
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.

against

RULING:
Yes. Ogayons appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his
claim that the search warrant was defective because there
was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in
which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the
required searching questions and answers in order to
determine the existence of probable cause.

Failure to attach to the records the depositions of the

complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the
judges examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not
by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right.
Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however
salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional
requirements.
What the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct
anexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, after which he
determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant
Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his
witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of
the affidavits. The purpose of the Rules in requiring
depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate
as to the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does
not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be
attached to the records of an application for a search
warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as
long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented.
Compliance with the examination requirement is shown by
the depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however,
a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the
records that the requisite examination was made and
probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the
records, particular facts and circumstances that were
considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent
evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrant.
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, there
was nothing in the records of this case indicating that the
issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the
applicant and his witnesses. The records, therefore, bear no
evidence from which we can infer that the requisite

examination was made, and from which the factual basis for
probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. The
nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from
considering Ogayon's belated objections thereto.

PEOPLE V CHOI
GR 152950
August 3, 2006
Facts:
Mario Nieto, an intelligence operative of the Department of
Finance, applied for a search warrant against Choi for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code. (fake Marlboro red
cigarettes and cardboard cases) After examination of the
applicant and the witnesses, the judge issued the search
warrant. Search was conducted the same day.
Choi questioned the validity of the search warrant before the
RTC and the CA, arguing that probable cause was not
sufficiently established because the examination conducted
was not probing and exhaustive. Moreover, the warrant did
not particularly describe the place to be searched.
CA ruled that the judge committed GADLEJ in relying upon
the conclusion of the witness that the cigarettes he received
from Choi were fake, without requiring the presentation of
the alleged fake cigarettes and genuine ones for comparison.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search
warrant
Ruling:
No. A search warrant can be issued upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it
is required that: the judge must examine the complaint and
his witnesses personally, the examination must be under
oath, and the examination must be reduced in writing in the
form of searching questions and answers.

Although there is no hard and fast rule governing how a

judge should conduct his examination, it is necessary that
the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory, or pro forma. The
judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. Probable cause is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after full-blown trial.
The questions of the judge during the examination in this
case were sufficiently probing, and not at all superficial and
perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent with each other,
and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and
other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to
establish probable cause that the alleged offense has been
committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and
findings of the judge, the findings of the judge deserve great
weight, and may only be overturned when there is clear
disregard of the facts before him and dictates of reason,
which is not present in this case.

PEOPLE V. ESTRADA
GR 124461
September 25, 1998

safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give

meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy
of his home and personalties.

FACTS:
Atty. Lorna Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD), filed with the RTC an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against Aiden Lanuza for violation of The
Consumer Act of the Philippines. The application, however,
ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the
premises of another person at a different address.

The best evidence procurable under the circumstances to

prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to
sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have
easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD
to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No
justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could
not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a
license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish
probable cause for a search warrant.

A search warrant was issued and a raid was conducted by the

policemen. Private respondent filed a motion to quash the
search warrant. Respondent Judge quashed the search
warrant and revoked all the articles seized and declared
them inadmissible to evidence.
ISSUE: WON the quashal of the search warrant was valid.
RULING:
To establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to
justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must
show "facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched."
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause
must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is
necessary especially in cases where the issue is the
existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged
for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as
in the present case and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be
secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural

The place sought to be searched had not been described with

sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant,
considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence
is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized
were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person. Respondent judge correct. The applicant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.

PEOPLE V UMANITO
GR 172607
October 26, 2007
Facts:
AAA, then below 18 years of age, was accosted by Umanito.
He dragged her into the Home Economics Building of
Daramuangan Elementary School and undressed her while
holding a knife against her. He set her down on a bench, put
down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and
threatened to kill her if she reported the incident.
Six months later, AAA s mother noticed the prominence on
her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother
the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police
station.
5 years later, Umanito was caught. He pleaded not guilty. RTC
rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to
suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito s appeal was transferred
to the CA for intermediate review, and CA affirmed. Umanito
seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of
the case and AAA s questionable credibility as grounds,
given that there were several inconsistencies in her
assertions. (nature of their relationship, who took off her
clothes, when he met appellant, where the kissing happened)
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully met
the level of proof needed to find the appellant guilty of the
crime of rape
Ruling:
No. Given the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, the
fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape
may provide the definitive key to the absolution of Umanito.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAAs child. If it
can be conclusively determined that Umanito did not sire the

child, this may cast a shadow of reasonable doubt and allow

his acquittal on this basis.
AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA
testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence
(AM No. 06-11-5-SC), which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few
days before promulgation of this case).
DNA print/identification technology is now recognized as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence
is available. The groundwork for acknowledging the strong
weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v.
CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA analysis as evidence and
traced the development of its admissibility in our
jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in case proof of
filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA
testing could be resorted to.
The determination of whether or not Umanito is the father
(through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since
SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that
the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility
of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC
should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this
case. RTC shall determine the institution to undertake the
testing, and the parties are free to manifest their comments
on the choice. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be
incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to
offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence,
which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7
(Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence) and 8
(Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined
to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.

To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the

parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA
testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.

PEOPLE V. UMANITO
GR 172607
April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The alleged 1989 rape
of the private complainant, had resulted in her pregnancy
and the birth of a child. In view of that fact, as well as the
defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed
uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of the child.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of the child.
The DNA analysis showed that there is a Complete Match in
all of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and
the child; That based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the
biological father of the child. The defense admitted that if the
value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there
shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
ISSUE: WON Umanito is the father of the child.
RULING:
Yes. Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA
Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion,
and that as testified to by the victim, Umanito had fathered
the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after
the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
The disputable presumption that was established as a result
of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by
other evidence considering that the accused did not object to

the admission of the results of the DNA testing nor presented

evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to
have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and the indemnification of the private complainant in the
sum of P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that
no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties
imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny Umanitos
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

Maryland v King
569 US
June 3, 2013

FACTS:
After his 2009 arrest on first- and second-degree assault
charges, respondent King was processed through a Wicomico
County, Maryland, facility, where booking personnel used a
cheek swab to take a DNA sample pursuant to the Maryland
DNA Collection Act. The swab was matched to an unsolved
2003 rape, and King was charged with that crime. He moved
to suppress the DNA match, arguing that the Act violated the
Fourth Amendment, but the Circuit Court Judge found the law
constitutional. King was convicted of rape. The Maryland
Court of Appeals set aside the conviction, finding
unconstitutional the portions of the Act authorizing DNA
collection from felony arrestees.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid search

RULING: When officers make an arrest supported by probable

cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to
the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a
cheek swab of the arrestees DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Using a buccal swab inside a persons cheek to obtain a DNA
sample is a search under the Fourth Amendment. And the
fact that the intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to
determining whether the search is reasonable, the ultimate

measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search.

Because the need for a warrant is greatly diminished here,
where the arrestee was already in valid police custody for a
serious offense supported by probable cause, the search is
analyzed by reference to reasonableness, not individualized
suspicion, and reasonableness is determined by weighing
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests against
the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individuals
privacy, In this balance of reasonableness, great weight is
given to both the significant government interest at stake in
the identification of arrestees and DNA identifications
unmatched potential to serve that interest.
The Act serves a well-established, legitimate government
interest: the need of law enforcement officers in a safe and
accurate way to process and identify persons and
possessions taken into custody. Probable cause provides legal
justification for arresting a suspect, and for a brief period of
detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest,
and the validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful
arrest is settled.
By comparison to the substantial government interest and
the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion
of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is minimal.
Reasonableness must be considered in the context of an
individuals
legitimate
privacy
expectations,
which
necessarily diminish when he is taken into police custody.
The
reasonableness
inquiry
considers
two
other
circumstances in which particularized suspicion is not
categorically required: diminished expectations of privacy
and a minimal intrusion. An invasive surgery may raise
privacy concerns weighty enough for the search to require a
warrant, notwithstanding the arrestees diminished privacy
expectations, but a buccal swab, which involves a brief and
minimal intrusion with virtually no risk, trauma, or pain, does
not increase the indignity already attendant to normal
incidents of arrest.

VALEROSO V. CA
GR 164815
September 3, 2009
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the
petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily
searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was
found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later
confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to
the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was
arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the
boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on
him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the
raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the
room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming
that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of
a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a
revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the
necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of
appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm
and ammunition has merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are
as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be
searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that
the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect
the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest
will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can
be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person
or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the

statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist

arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the
gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found
could not be in his immediate control. Incidental searches
without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize
any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the
arrest under the plain view doctrine. However, the firearm
was not found accidentally but was actually searched and
therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a
violation of Velorosos right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to
court and cannot be used against him.

PEOPLE V. ARUTA
GR 120915
April 3, 1998
FACTS:
Law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would
be leaving for Baguio City and would be back in the afternoon
of the same day, carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana .In the evening of the same day, Aruta alighted
from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag and as she
was about to cross the street, Benjie pointed her out to
NARCOM officers.NARCOM officers approached Aruta and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.
When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling
bag, she gave the same to him. When they opened the same,
they found dried marijuana leaves and Aruta was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure, which constitutes a
violation of constitutional rights
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless search
RULING: No. The SC held that there are situations wherein
warrantless searches are valid. However, the SC held that
even so, the essential requisite of probable cause must still
be satisfied.
In this case, Aruta cannot be said to have committed, is
committing or will commit a crime. Aruta was merely
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents
to suspect and conclude that she a crime was being
committed. It was only when Benjie pointed to Aruta and
identified her to the agents that she was singled out as the
suspect. There was no probable cause.
Consequently, the arrest being illegal, it logically follows that
the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not

incidental to a lawful arrest. The SC further held that

pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the evidence is
inadmissible.

People v. Racho

that there was no valid warrantless search because there was

no adequate probable cause.

G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

FACTS:
The accused was about to board a tricycle. He was
approached and invited to police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. As he pulled out his hands from his pocket, a
white envelope containing shabu slipped.

ISSUE: WON there was valid warrantless arrest

RULING: According to the SC, the accused can no longer

question the validity of the arrest but can raise the
inadmissibility the shabu. It noted that the accused never
objected to the irregularity of the arrest before his
arraignment and raised the issue for the first time before the
SC. Considering the lapse of time coupled with his active
participation in the trial of the case, accused was deemed to
have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court and waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over his person.

As regards the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence,

the court ascertained whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The SC concluded

Here, the SC considered the shabu inadmissible in evidence

for being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Without the
confiscated shabu, the conviction of the accused cannot be
sustained and thus he was acquitted despite the waiver of
his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a
plea and his active participation in the trial of the case.

CHIMMEL V. CALIFORNIA
395 US 752
June 23, 1969
Facts: Three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana,
California, home of the Chimel with a warrant authorizing his
arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on
the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if
they might come inside. She ushered them into the house,
where they waited 10 or 15 minutes until Chimel returned
home from work. When Chimel entered the house, one of the
officers handed him the arrest warrant and asked for
permission to "look around." Chimel objected, but was
advised that "on the basis of the lawful arrest," the officers
would nonetheless conduct a search. No search warrant had
been issued. Accompanied by Chimel's wife, the officers then
looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the
attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In some rooms the
search was relatively cursory. In the master bedroom and
sewing room, however, the officers directed Chimel's wife to
open drawers and "to physically move contents of the
drawers from side to side so that they might view any items
that would have come from the burglary." After completing
the search, they seized numerous items - primarily coins, but
also several medals, tokens, and a few other objects. The
entire search took between 45 minutes and an hour. At
Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary,
the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence
against him, over his objection that they had been
unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted, and the
judgments of conviction were affirmed by both the California
Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Both
courts accepted Chimel's contention that the arrest warrant
was invalid because the supporting affidavit was set out in
conclusory terms, but held that since the arresting officers
had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since in any
event they had sufficient information to constitute probable
cause for Chimel's arrest, that arrest had been lawful. From
this conclusion the appellate courts went on to hold that the
search of Chimel's home had been justified, despite the
absence of a search warrant, on the ground that it had been
incident to a valid arrest.

Issue: Whether the search incident to arrest extends to the

whole of the house where the accused was arrested.
Ruling: When a man is legally arrested for an offense,
whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is
unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the
offense may be seized and held as evidence in the
prosecution. A similar analysis underlies the search incident
to arrest principle, and marks its proper extent. When an
arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well
be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it
is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all
the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized
exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a
search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes"
mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less. Herein,
the search went far beyond Chimel's person and the area
from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been sed as evidence against
him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence
of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area. The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable"
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Chimel's
conviction cannot stand.

NOLASCO V. PANO
GR L-69803
October 8, 1985
Facts:
Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion
before Special Military Commission, and also one of the
accused of Subversion. She was then still at large. Lt. Col.
Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant
from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month of "round
the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA."
Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for being
a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were
arrested by CSG. The record does not disclose that a warrant
of arrest had previously been issued against Nolasco. At
12:00 noon on the same day, elements of the CSG searched
the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The
searching party seized 428 documents and written materials,
and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes,
making 431 items in all. Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino
were subsequently charged for Subversion/Rebellion and/or
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion.
Issue: Whether the description of the things to be seized in
the search warrant is too general to render the warrant void.
Ruling:
The Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an
all-embracing
description
which
includes
everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the

searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized

thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description
were considered null and void for being too general.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant
and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid
search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered
returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches may be made
without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is
declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested.
It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be
search without a search warrant. Considering that AguilarRoque has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime
against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not
been served for a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that
the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her
arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her respect, the
search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need
a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order. Such being the case, the
personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for possible
introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to ask Special
Military Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant
documents and articles.

NOLASCO V. PANO
GR L69803
January 30, 1987
Facts:
The case at bar is for the motion for partial
reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of the
SCs decision that the questioned search warrant by
petitioners is null and void, that respondents are enjoined
from introducing evidence using such search warrant, but
such personalities obtained would still be retained,
without
prejudice
to
petitioner
Aguilar-Roque.
Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and
that it should be considered in the context of the crime
of rebellion, where the warrant was based. Petitioners on
the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-Roque,
contend that a lawful search would be justified only by
a lawful arrest.
And since there was illegal arrest of
Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that the
personalities seized during the illegal search should be
returned to the petitioner. The respondents, in defense,
concede that the search warrants were null and void but the
arrests were not.
Issue: WON the articles seized were illegally obtained.
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional mandate expressly adopting
the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to
be
the
only
practical
means
of
enforcing
the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and
police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the
plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the
power of the courts to change or modify. All the articles thus
seized
fag
under
the
exclusionary rule totally and
unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three
petitioners.

Malacat vs. CA
GR 123595
December 12, 1997
Facts:
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in
response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier,
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police
Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men,
posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop and frisk,
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object
is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the
seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a
lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of
PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua,
as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of
appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the
exception of stop and frisk
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure
of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant
and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to

obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as

it was not certain that a crime had been committed,
however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to
require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC
emphasized that Yu and his companions were confronted
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the
officers had to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions
were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group
suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the
arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an
officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is
not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow
the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the
grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and
since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the
police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury
Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales,

Clerk of Court, MeTC of Manila
AM P-08-2519
November 19, 2008
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an
unsigned, undated letter of complaint regarding Atty. Miguel
Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). The letter
alleged that Atty. Morales was consuming his work hours
filing and attending to personal cases, and was using office
supplies, equipment and utilities.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz
conducted a spot investigation and gained access to Morales
personal computer. Pleadings to two of Atty. Morales
personal cases were found among the computer files. The
computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.
Morales filed a motion for the release of his computer. The
Court granted his motion but ordered that the files be
retrieved first. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to
then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz for alleged conspiracy
and culpable violation of the Consti. Morales asserted that
the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and
seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles
seized should therefore be considered inadmissible.
ISSUE: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal
computer admissible in the administrative case against him?
RULING: No. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines
the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. Any violation of
this right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless
search. DCA Dela Cruz claims that they were able to obtain

the pleadings with Atty. Morales consent. However, the Court

finds his assertion insufficient to make the present case fall
under the exception. Consent to a search must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. It must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that: (1) the
right exists, (2) that the persons involved had the knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of the right,
and (3) that the person had actual intention to relinquish the
right.
In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual
intention to relinquish his right. He may have agreed to
opening his computer and printing the files during the spot
investigation, but he immediately filed an administrative
case against the DCA and his team, specifically invoking his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Pollo v Constantino-David
GR 181881
October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking
place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then
formed a team and issued a memo directing the team to
back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from
the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over
to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing
files copied from the computer assigned to and being used
by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents,
were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the ShowCause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit
within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against
him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing expedition
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his
computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713. He assailed the
formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the
formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC
denied the omnibus motion.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition

to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground
that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was
further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to avail the right to
privacy over his computer and electronic files as a
government employee.
RULING:
No. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal
files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that
his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the
contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office
of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office
like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he
even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a
trivial request.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of
the computer resources using both automated or by human
means. An Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer
Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provided for such. This implied
therefore, that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to

Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV

where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with
pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government
employer of an employees office is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.

RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
573 US
June 25, 2014
Facts:
David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San
Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened
fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters
then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August
22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car;
he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because
Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required
that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police
are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that
the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to
protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover
hidden contraband. During the search, police located two
guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the
firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was
arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and
photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang
indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether
Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the
shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate
charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied
vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm.
Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding
his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell
phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert
testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the
rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting
could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all
three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1,
affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell
phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches- Yes

RULING:
The Court held that the warrantless search exception
following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting
officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at
issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be
used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police
officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting
a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and
placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court
characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with
massive amounts of private information, which distinguished
them from the traditional items that can be seized from an
arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that
information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud
computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person."
Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches
of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the
government's interests are so compelling that a search would
be reasonable.

TERRY V. OHIO
392 US 1
June 10, 1968
Facts:
The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and
down the same street. The men would periodically peer into
a store window and then talk some more. The men also
spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the
street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other
men were casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the
nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick
search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the
Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue: WON a search for weapons without probable cause for
arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
RULING: The Supreme Court of the United States held that it
is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick
seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that
the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical
beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited
from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be
armed.
The facts of the case are important to understand the
Supreme Courts willingness to allow the search. The
suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if
the officers suspicions were correct then he would be in a
dangerous position to approach the men for questioning
without searching them. The officer also did not detain the
men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without
probable cause.
J. Douglas dissented, reasoning that the majoritys holding
would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and
seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.

ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE
GR 182010
August 25, 2010
FACTS:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two police
officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were
transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the
officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white
substance in it. When asked, she fled but was eventually
caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the
officers planted evidence against her.
The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to
search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.
RULING:
The SC denied the appeal.
Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by
the petitioner when she did not quash it before arraignment.
The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the
appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white
substance from a distance, the plain view doctrine was
imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition
and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People
v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.

PEOPLE V VINECARIO
GR 141137
January 20, 2004
FACTS:
About 15 police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas,
Davao City pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban when a
motorcycle with three men on board (Vinecario, Roble, and
Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were
ordered to return to the checkpoint, an officer asked what
their backpack contains, and appellants answered that it was
only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb,
and when appellant opened the bag, they found marijuana.
The three were then brought to the police station and later to
Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police
officials without the assistance of counsel, following which
they were made to sign some documents which they were
not allowed to read.
RTC found them guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act

ISSUE: WON the search upon the appellants and the seizure
of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana is lawful- YES

RULING: Although the general rule is that motorists and their

vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints
may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may
be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense.

In light of Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the

checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by
police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when
interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they
passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when
asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the
checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army,
apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that
the contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.

PEOPLE V BAGISTA
GR 86218
September 18, 1992
FACTS:
NARCOM received information from regular informants that a
certain woman, 23 y/o, naturally curly hair, and with a height
of 53 would be transporting marijuana. Agents proceeded to
establish a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles (private
and public) to check if they were carrying marijuana on
board. They stopped a tranco bus. Sgt. Parajas boarded the
bus and told the passengers that they were going to search
their baggage.
They then noticed a girl with curly hair, and when he checked
her bag, found 3 bundles of marijuana. According to the
woman, she only carried cabbages. The bag with marijuana
was found in the carrier of the bus, and when no one
admitted ownership, she was asked to go with the agent as
she fit the description
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search was valid- YES
RULING: search of moving vehicles without warrant is
justified on the ground that the mobility of vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. However,
this does not give the agents unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of vehicles in the absence of probable
cause. The officers conducting the search must have had
reasonable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the evidence in the vehicle to be searched. In this case,
probable cause was present considering the tip given by the
informant. There was no objection as to the admissibility of
evidence in the trial court, this is tantamount to a waiver
DISSENTING: no probable cause- information alone not
sufficient, there must be suspicious circumstances. If there
really was information sufficient to constitute probable cause,
why did they have to search all the bags?

PEOPLE V. MARIACOS
GR 188611
June 16, 2010
FACTS:
San Gabriel La Union police conducted a checkpoint to
intercepta suspected transportation o marijuana. When
checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the
officers proceeded to Barangay Balbayang to conduct
surveillance operation. According to one secret agent,
marijuana had been loaded in a jeepney in a bag with an
o.k marking. Officer boarded the jeepney, found the bag,
peeked inside and saw marijuana, he asked the agent who
owns it, no one knew. He waited for the passengers to alight
and saw 2 women got the bag. He arrested the women and
they are the appellant in this case. RTC found them guilty.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search was valid.
HELD:
The essential requisites of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. Warrantless search is valid it would be
impractical if he were to obtain a search warrant since the
vehicle that carried the contraband was about to leave. He
had to make a quick decision and act fast. Officer has
probable cause because of the information of the agent and
he saw the inside of the bag.

PEOPLE V BALINGAN
GR 105834
February 13, 1995

ISSUE: WON the search conducted in the Dangwa bus,

subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an informants
tip, is valid- YES

FACTS:
Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police
Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male
informant. He passed the information that Balingan was
going to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on
the information, a surveillance team was formed to monitor
Balingan's movements. They reported seeing Balingan move
out from her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab.
Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray
luggage with orange or yellow belts. She also reported the
make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan
boarded. Others thus proceeded to the Philippine Rabbit
Terminal, while others proceeded to the Police Checkpoint at
Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy. Lt.
Obrera was informed that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus
bound for Manila. Lt. Obrera went up the bus described by
Pat. Bueno, and he saw Balingan on the third or fourth seat
behind the driver's seat. In the luggage carrier above her
head was the gray luggage earlier described by Cpl. Garcia.
He then left the bus.

RULING: A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified

on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Unquestionably, the warrantless search herein is not bereft of
a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence
Division received an information that Balingan was going to
transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance
operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had
been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division, boarded
a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious-looking
gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped,
her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those
circumstances, the warrantless search of Balingan's bag was
not illegal.

Pat. Kimay, who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint, was

instructed to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong tailed the bus at about 15
to 20 meters behind. Pat. Kimay stopped the bus at the
Kennon Road Checkpoint. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary
check-up. Pat. Ong identified himself as a policeman to
Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage, she
did not respond and just looked outside the window. He
opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it.
Thereupon, Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter
resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held
tightly onto the window pane. RTC convicted Balingan for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

PEOPLE v. MUSA
GR 96177
January 27, 1993
FACTS:
Civilian informer gave information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling juts in Zamboanga. A surveillance and out
[cut/pit] buy was conducted on Musa. The informant guided
the agents to Musas house and gave the description of
Musa. They were able to buy a newspaper wrapped juts.
The next day, a buy bust was planned. Ani [agent] was to
raise his hand once he successfully buys juts from Musa.
When he met Musa at the latters house, he was given 2
newspaper wrapped juts. He opened and inspected it, and
raised his right hand as signal.
Belarga [other agent] frisked Musa in the living room but did
not find the marked money [Musa gave it to his wife who
slipped away. In the kitchen, they found a cellophane plastic
bag. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a
response. When they opened it, they found dried juts. Musa
was then arrested.
ISSUE: WON seizure of plastic bag and juts is unreasonable
and inadmissible in evidence. YES.
RULING:
The plastic bag was not in plain view. Musa was arrested in
the living room but they moved to the kitchen in search of
other evidence where plastic bag was found. Marijuana is
inside the plastic bag not immediately apparent from the
plain view of the object.

PEOPLE V VALDEZ
GR 129296
September 25, 2000
FACTS:
Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the
place of the accused where they found marijuana plants
being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the
house of the accused. They uprooted the plants and arrested
the accused. They asked the accused who owned the plants
and the accused admitted that they belonged to him. The
prosecution offered the plants and the admission of the
accused as evidence. The accused claimed that the
warrantless search was illegal while the police officers
claimed that the plants were found in plain view.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless search- NO
RULING: The marijuana plants were not in plain view. For
the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be
present: (a) there was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they were; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) plain view justified seizure of the evidence
without further search. In this case, the police officers
located the plants before they arrested the accused without a
warrant. Also, they were dispatched precisely to look for the
marijuana plants. The discovery was not inadvertent. The
confession is also inadmissible. In trying to elicit information
from the accused, the police was investigating him as a
suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial
investigation and had a right to counsel.

PEOPLE V. SALANGUIT
GR 133254-55
April 19, 2001
FACTS:
Sgt. Aguilar applied for a search warrant against the
residence of Salanguit in QC. He presented a police who was
a poser-buyer of shabu. Warrant was granted. Police
implemented the warrant, knocked but no one responded,
they heard panicky people, so they broke the door. There
they found marijuana and shabu. Salanguit argued that he
did not have a chance to see the warrant because his glasses
fell. Money, jewelry, gun was forcibly taken.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure was valid.
RULING:
YES as to the shabu, but as to the marijuana, it was not plain
view. There was probable cause. Based on the transcript,
Judge was asking questions to verify drugs. Warrant provided
for drugs and drug paraphernalia, but the questions judge
asked were merely for drugs. Warrant was therefore valid
only with respect to drugs, void as to paraphernalia. The
offense was specific, as it said it was for violation of the DDA.
The place was particular. As to the marijuana however, it was
not in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
within plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position those that are in plain view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. There must be prior
justification, inadvertent discovery, and immediately
apparent illegality
There was no prior justification as police failed to prove that
marijuana was found before the shabu, because once the
valid portion of the warrant was executed, plain view can no
longer apply. There was also no inadvertent discovery as
marijuana was wrapped in newsprint; no presumption of
regularity on constitutional rights violation. Marijuana is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.

CANDELARIA V. RTC
GR 173861
July 14, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners were arrested through a buy-bust operation in the
evening of June 22, 2001. They had the intention to sell 5
cases of fundador brandy, violation of Sec. 155 to 170 of the
Intellectual Property Code. Petitioners filed motion to
suppress evidence because of violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the
time of the seizure of the products, they were neither
committing nor attempting to commit a crime. RTC said we
deny motion because objection to an arrest must be made
before an accused enters his plea or arraignment.

ISSUE:
WON RTC erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners raised the issue by way of certiorari under
rule 65. They failed to prove that RTC denied the motion
whimsically. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to fix an
act of a court which shows grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Records showed that RTC
thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted by the
parties.