5. People v.

Calumpang 454 SCRA 719

Facts: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts of murder,
committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The trial court
dismissed the defense of alibi interposed by the defendants because it was weak and
then convicted the defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno Gomez who allegedly
eye witnessed the killing of the two victims. The defendants appealed, contending that
the testimony of Magno is unreliable and inconsistent, and that the trial court erred in
dismissing their defense of alibi.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of
the accused.
Ruling: Yes. Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were
corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was
impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an
accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the
burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand
or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond
reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants
presumed innocence stands. The Supreme Court found that the testimony of the lone
witness Magno is full of inconsistencies. While Magno claimed to have witnessed the
gruesome killings, the records show that serious discrepancies attended Magnos
testimony in court and his sworn statement executed during the preliminary
examination. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances stand. Magnos testimony failed to satisfy such rule, hence, the
presumed innocence of the accused must be upheld.
6. Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa G.R. No. 152807
Facts: The heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with
damages against respondents Alberto Comorposa, et al. The MTC ruled in favor of the
heirs, but the RTC reversed such decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC judgment, ruling that respondents had the better right to possess the subject
land; and it disregarded the affidavits of the petitioners witnesses for being selfserving. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court, contending that the Rules on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of

affidavits and that the failure of respondents to file their position papers and counteraffidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by the Court
of Appeals.
Ruling: No. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to
be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits
are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party
to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners
still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones
asserting an affirmative relief.
7. People v. Negosa G.R. No. 142856-57
Facts: Roberto Negosa was charged with two counts of rape, committed against
Gretchen Castao. As to the second count of rape, Gretchen testified on direct
examination that the penis of the appellant was able to penetrate her vagina. However,
on cross examination, she testified that she and the appellant were wearing short
pants and underwear, hence, it was physically impossible for his penis to penetrate
her vagina. The RTC convicted Negosa for statutory rape and for acts of lasciviousness
in lieu of the second count for rape. Negosa appealed, contending that the trial court
should have not believed the inconsistent testimony of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the inconsistent testimony of the victim is sufficient to acquit
the accused.
Ruling: No. The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony on the second count of
rape that the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side
of his short pants and the side of the victims loose short pants and convicted the
appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens
credibility and the probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the
appellant. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly
believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part
of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not
an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more
flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly

disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus,

where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or
where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to
pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor
mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the
witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in
the case.
8. People v. Matito G.R. No. 144405
Facts: Ferdinand Matito was charged with murder, committed against Mariano
Raymundo, Jr. The prosecution presented the following during the trial: (1) testimony
of the widow that her husband, prior to his death, declared that it was appellant who
had gunned him down; (2) the presence of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the
right hand of appellant; (3) the bitter quarrel that ensued between Matito and the
victim after the latter had cut off the formers water supply; (4) the denial by Matito of
the request of his neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along the
premises of his house; and (5) hours before the victim was killed, the threatening
remarks of appellant to the formers daughter. The Regional Trial Court convicted
Matito.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to convict the
accused.
Ruling: Yes. Circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and
forcefulness, may be the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by
bare denials or hackneyed alibis. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence
that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws
from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct
testimony would result in setting a felon free." It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former
may surpass the latter in weight and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain
showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On the strength of the
circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a quo did
not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The combination of the
circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to
appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.