1. [G.R. No. 151866.

September 9, 2004]

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

DECISION
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69537, promulgated on 17 January 2002. The appellate court
reversed the trial courts decision denying respondents claim for damages against
petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the former in the amount
of P100,000.00.
[1]

[2]

Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario

and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October
1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
were already there including the bride, the brides parents and relatives, the make-up
artist and his assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among
those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing
to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items
needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She
proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid
the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon
entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture
that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to
search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the
comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond
rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of
about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to help in the search. The
bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were
searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a
security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed
all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte.
During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner
kept on saying the words Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Valmontes car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte
demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of
petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on
20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that

petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as

attorneys fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any
act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that
everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in which
she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for
the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmontes
complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss
of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a
person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof
was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith
in pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she
suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or that her reputation was
besmirched due to petitioners wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in
finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation and in
disregarding the evidence she presented.
The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly
established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss
of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena Manding, corroborating Valmontes
claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered words to the effect that she was the
only one who went out of the room and that she was the one who took the
jewelry. The appellate court held that Valmontes claim for damages is not predicated
on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but
rather petitioners act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It
categorized petitioners utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon
Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded that petitioners verbal assault upon
Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of
many people without any solid proof except petitioners suspicion. Such unfounded
accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and
embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of
actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate courts conclusion that she publicly
humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. She adds that
even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained of, it was not shown
that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions
reached by the appellate court. The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that
a petition for review must raise only questions of law, and judicial review under Rule
[3]

45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a

showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. This
Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive at the
correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the
inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken.
[4]

[5]

Contrary to the trial courts finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to
prove that petitioners imputations against respondent was made with malice and in
bad faith.
Petitioners testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She
claimed not to have uttered the words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to
have mentioned the latters name to the authorities as the one responsible for the loss
of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.
[6]

Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioners testimony. Quite

credibly, she has narrated in great detail her distressing experience on that fateful
day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she
returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the
words Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong bag?
Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha. Thereafter, her body was searched including
her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once more asked by the
hotel security to go to the ladies room and she was again bodily searched.
[7]

Serea Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondents testimony. She

testified that petitioner confronted respondent in the presence of all the people inside
the suite accusing her of being the only one who went out of the comfort room before
the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was embarrassed because
everybody else in the room thought she was a thief. If only to debunk petitioners
assertion that she did not utter the accusatory remarks in question publicly and with
malice, Mandings testimony on the point deserves to be reproduced.Thus,
[8]

Q After that what did she do?

A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from the
comfort room.
Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?
A She said siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R.
Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?
A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?

A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic)
the paper bag then the jewelry were already gone.
Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?
A Yes.
Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?
A Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko.
Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people
inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?
A Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming
nandodoon, dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.
Q Who was the person you [were] alleging na nakakahiya whose (sic) being accused or being
somebody who stole those item of jewelry?
A Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung
napagbintangan.
Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?
A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?
A Yes, the mother of the bride.
Q And who else did she talk to?
A The father of the bride also.
Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?
A Nawawala yung alahas ko. Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo
munang mabuti.
Q Who was that other person that she talked to?
A Father of the bride.[9]

Significantly, petitioners counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the

witness on this point following her terse and firm declaration that she remembered
petitioners exact defamatory words in answer to the counsels question.
[10]

Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted

petitioners allegation that she did not suspect or mention the name of respondent as
her suspect in the loss of the jewelry.
[11]

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.
[12]

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our
civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience
and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith. To find the existence of an abuse of right, the
following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. When
a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause
unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good
customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when
he acts with negligence or abuse.
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20

and 21 of the Civil Code which read, thus:
Art.20.Everypersonwho,contrarytolaw,willfullyornegligentlycausesdamagetoanother,
shallindemnifythelatterforthesame.
Art.21.Anypersonwhowillfullycauseslossorinjurytoanotherinamannerthatiscontrary
tomoralsorgoodcustomsorpublicpolicyshallcompensatethelatterforthedamage.
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal
provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law,
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such
kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no
right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went
out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein,
and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded
[17]

respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the
malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one
who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which
is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing
jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and
good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice
respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions
of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial court, we sustain the findings
of the trial court and the appellate court that respondents claim for actual damages
has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and must
therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork.
[18]

[19]

Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral

damages may be awarded whenever the defendants wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their
discretion. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendants culpable action. In any case, award of moral
damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.
[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the

appellate court did not err in awarding moral damages. Considering respondents
social standing, and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in
her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly
tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings
with her clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair
and reasonable assessment of respondents damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2. [G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO
REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.

DECISION
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
(Hotel Nikko) and Ruby Lim assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the
human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent
herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya,
alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend of several
years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her
in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
which she replied: of course. Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes
sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was
ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet
table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka
imbitado, bumaba ka na lang). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him
thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked
him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the
party by the policeman. Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos
actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but
not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that
she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. One of her
functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party,
Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. The
guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and
some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. At the party,
Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the
captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. Mr.
Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart. As Dr. Filart was
engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt,
she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that
Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr.
[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered
prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave. When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain
Batung whom she later approached. Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes
knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Still, Mr.
Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to
speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.
However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to
wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him
and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo
ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.
She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to
leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also
gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to
the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded
Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. All the
while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung. Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.
[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
[41]

PlaintiffhadnobusinessbeingatthepartybecausehewasnotaguestofMr.Tsuruoka,the
birthdaycelebrant.Heassumedtheriskofbeingaskedtoleaveforattendingapartytowhich
hewasnotinvitedbythehost.Damagesarepecuniaryconsequenceswhichthelawimposes
forthebreachofsomedutyortheviolationofsomeright.Thus,norecoverycanbehad
againstdefendantsNikkoHotelandRubyLimbecausehehimselfwasatfault(Garcianov.
CourtofAppeals,212SCRA436).HeknewthatitwasnotthepartyofdefendantVioleta
Filartevenifsheallowedhimtojoinherandtookresponsibilityforhisattendanceatthe
party.HisactionagainstdefendantsNikkoHotelandRubyLimmustthereforefail.
[42]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to
leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
Inputtingappellantinaveryembarrassingsituation,tellinghimthatheshouldnotfinishhis
foodandtoleavetheplacewithinthehearingdistanceofotherguestsisanactwhichis
contrarytomorals,goodcustoms...,forwhichappelleesshouldcompensatetheappellant
forthedamagesufferedbythelatterasaconsequencetherefore(Art.21,NewCivilCode).

Theliabilityarisesfromtheactswhichareinthemselveslegalornotprohibited,butcontrary
tomoralsorgoodcustoms.Conversely,evenintheexerciseofaformalright,[one]cannot
withimpunityintentionallycausedamagetoanotherinamannercontrarytomoralsorgood
customs.
[43]

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule
and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them
should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
SaidactsofappelleeLimareuncalledfor.WhatshouldhavebeendonebyappelleeLimwas
toapproachappelleeMrs.FilartandtogethertheyshouldhavetoldappellantReyesinprivate
thatthelattershouldleavethepartyasthecelebrantonlywantedclosefriendsaround.Itis
necessarythatMrs.Filartbetheonetoapproachappellantbecauseitwasshewhoinvited
appellantinthatoccasion.WereitnotforMrs.Filartsinvitation,appellantcouldnothave
sufferedsuchhumiliation.Forthat,appelleeFilartisequallyliable.
...
Theactsof[appellee]Limarecausesofactionwhicharepredicateduponmererudenessor
lackofconsiderationofoneperson,whichcallsnotonlyprotectionofhumandignitybut
respectofsuchdignity.UnderArticle20oftheCivilCode,everypersonwhoviolatesthis
dutybecomesliablefordamages,especiallyifsaidactswereattendedbymaliceorbadfaith.
Badfaithdoesnotsimplyconnotebadjudgmentorsimplenegligence.Itimportsadishonest
purposeorsomemoralobliquityandconsciousdoingofawrong,abreachofaknowndutyto
somemotiveorinterestorillwillthatpartakesofthenatureoffraud(Cojuangco,Jr.v.CA,et
al.,309SCRA603).
[44]

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). On motion for reconsideration, the Court
of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had been
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
[45]

[46]

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the
Court of Appeals seriously erred in
I.

NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OFVOLENTI NON FIT INJURIACONSIDERING

THATBYITSOWNFINDINGS,AMAYBISAYAWASAGATECRASHER
II.

HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITHDR.FILARTFORDAMAGESSINCEBYITSOWNRULING,AMAYBISAYA

COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILARTSINVITATION
III.

DEPARTINGFROMTHEFINDINGSOFFACTOFTHETRIALCOURTASREGARDS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF
AMAYBISAYA
IV.

INCONCLUDINGTHATAMAYBISAYAWASTREATEDUNJUSTLYBECAUSEOF
HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCEWASPRESENTEDINTHISREGARD
V.

INFAILINGTOPASSUPONTHEISSUEONTHEDEFECTSOFTHEAPPELLANTS
BRIEF,THEREBYDEPARTINGFROMTHEACCEPTEDANDUSUALCOURSEOF
JUDICIALPROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in
the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the
party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
[47]

[48]

[49]

[50]

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the
general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
and revising errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however,
obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on
[51]

[52]

the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly
embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place
within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement
that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only,
thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who
was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not just disappear into the
crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by
the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it
did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of
the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a
glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr.
Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes,
upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered
him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that
and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on crossexamination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to
him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
[53]

[54]

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet
table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55]

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him
from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that

ConsideringtheclosenessofdefendantLimtoplaintiffwhentherequestforthelattertoleave
thepartywasmadesuchthattheynearlykissedeachother,therequestwasmeanttobeheard
byhimonlyandtherecouldhavebeennointentiononherparttocauseembarrassmentto
him.Itwasplaintiffsreactiontotherequestthatmusthavemadetheotherguestsawareof
whattranspiredbetweenthem...
Hadplaintiffsimplyleftthepartyasrequested,therewasnoneedforthepolicetotakehim
out.
[56]

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny
Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.
[57]

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
[58]

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article
19 states:
[59]

Art.19.Everypersonmust,intheexerciseofhisrightsandintheperformanceofhisduties,
actwithjustice,giveeveryonehisdue,andobservehonestyandgoodfaith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The
object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21
of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

[64]

Art.21.Anypersonwhowillfullycauseslossorinjurytoanotherinamannerthatiscontrary
tomorals,goodcustomsorpublicpolicyshallcompensatethelatterforthedamage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
[65]

[66]

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.
[67]

[68]

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that
Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each
other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing
to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement
that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel
with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
[69]

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot
put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr.
Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity. Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of
by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did
inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
[70]

[71]

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages especially for the
reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
[72]

Notafewoftherichpeopletreatthepoorwithcontemptbecauseofthelatterslowlystation
inlife.Thishastobelimitedsomewhere.Inademocracy,suchalimitmustbeestablished.
Socialequalityisnotsoughtbythelegalprovisionsunderconsideration,butdueregardfor
decencyandpropriety(CodeCommission,pp.3334).Andbywayofexampleorcorrection
forpublicgoodandtoavertfurthercommissionofsuchacts,exemplarydamagesshouldbe
imposeduponappellees.
[73]

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the
very facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of
the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio
program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO)
chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime
Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. During his
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income and nowhere
did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as
to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without
basis.
[74]

[75]

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which
Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done
within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
3. G.R. No. L-3422

June 13, 1952

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN,

ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant
factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks
full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory
compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with
any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from
the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open,
motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one
could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on
the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely
8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the
factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus
bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a
cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that
the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt
the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It
applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this
Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing

therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured

thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C.J.S.,
p. 455.)
The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness
is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract
the little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
The great majority of American decisions say no.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location.
There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not
been held not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams,
canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65
C.J.S., p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of
Corpus Juris Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its decision was
promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an
attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in
their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are
early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and
if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property,
merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he)
is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs.
Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question
whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And
the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of
contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that
unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual needs no
further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from
liability. No costs.

Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

PABLO, J., disidente:
La recurrente tiene dos estanques de agua, de nueve pies de profundidad, como
anexos indispensables a su fabrica de hielo; estan constuidos dentro de un solar que
esta cercado pero con una puerta de entrada siempre abierta en donde pasan
libremente los coches que distribuyen hielo y las personas que lo compran de la
fabrica; cualquiera puede entrar sin distincion alguna, no hay ningun guardia en la
puerta que impida la entrada de cualquiera persona. A dichos dos entanques tiene
libre acceso el publico.
Es evidente que la recurrente debio haber cercado dichos estanques como medida
ordinaria de precaucion para que los ninos de corta edad no pueden entrar, tanto
mas cuanto que los bordes de esos estanques solo tienen un pie de altura la
superficie del terreno. El cerco puesto en el perimento del solar, con puerta
continuamente abierta, no es suficiente medida para impedir que los ninos puedan
meterse en los entanques. Ese cerco con su puerta abierta es como un velo
transparente con que se cubre una mujer semidesnuda en un teatro, pica la
curiosidad y atrae la atencion del publico.
Los nios son curiosos por naturaleza y los de ocho aos no tienen perfecto
conocimiento de las cosas. Alucinados por la natural atraccion de las aguas, se
meteran en ellas con peligro de sus vidas, a menos que exista algo que les impida.
Voto con la confirmacion de la decision apelada.
4. G.R. No. L-18390 August 6, 1971

PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President; JOHN COTTON and
HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN,
City Engineer of Quezon City, defendants-appellees.
The present case is direct appeal (prior to Republic Act 5440) by the herein plaintiffappellant, Pedro J. Velasco (petitioner in L-14035; respondent in L-13992) * from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in its Civil Case
No. 1355, absolving the defendants from a complaint for the abatement of the substation as a nuisance and for damages to his health and business in the amount of
P487,600.00.
In 1948, appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6
Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. These lots are within an area zoned out as a "first
residence" district by the City Council of Quezon City. Subsequently, the appellant
sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was farthest from the
street-corner, whereon he built his house.
In September, 1953, the appellee company started the construction of the sub-station
in question and finished it the following November, without prior building permit or

authority from the Public Service Commission (Meralco vs. Public Service
Commission, 109 Phil. 603). The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current
suitable for distribution to the company's consumers, numbering not less than 8,500
residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments and about 30 industries
(T.s.n., 19 October 1959, page 1765). The substation has a rated capacity of "2
transformers at 5000 Kva each or a total of 10,000 Kva without fan cooling; or 6250
Kva each or a total of 12,500 Kva with fan cooling" (Exhibit "A-3"). It was constructed
at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's house (T.s.n., 16 July 1956,
page 62; 19 December 1956, page 343; 1 June 1959, page 29). The company built a
stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the
appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire
fence.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation. Whether this
sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case.
Plaintiff-appellant Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable
nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, reading as follows:
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of
property or anything else which:
(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
xxx xxx xxx
because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and
sleep of said appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his property.
Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and asked
that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages
under Article 2202 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
After trial, as already observed, the court below dismissed the claim of the plaintiff,
finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not constitute nuisance;
that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, pyelonephritis,
ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by plaintiff
were not adequate proved. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary
inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not
surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the
inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such

disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, 1 being guilty of causing
nuisance.
While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have been made in the
Philippines, our law of nuisances is of American origin, and a review of authorities
clearly indicates the rule to be that the causing or maintenance of disturbing noise or
sound may constitute an actionable nuisance (V. Ed. Note, 23 ALR, 2d 1289). The
basic principles are laid down in Tortorella vs. Traiser & Co., Inc., 90 ALR 1206:
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, Rogers vs. Elliott, 146
Mass, 349, 15 N.E. 768, 4 Am. St. Rep. 316, Stevens v. Rockport Granite
Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1954,Stodder v.
Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251, 22 A. L. R.
1197, but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort
of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a
particular person in a peculiar position or of specially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. Rogers
v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N. E. 768, 4 Am. St. Rep. 316. In the
conditions of present living noise seems inseparable from the conduct of
many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular
sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of statute noise
becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker
to the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any
definite measure of quantity or quality. They depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case. They may be affected, but are not
controlled, by zoning ordinances. Beane v. H. J. Porter, Inc., 280 Mass.
538, 182 N. E. 823, Marshal v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177 N. E.
504, Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N. E. 787. The
delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or
general business is not a license to emit every noise profitably attending
the conduct of any one of them. Bean v. H. J. Porter, Inc.. 280 Mass. 538,
182 N. E. 823. The test is whether rights of property of health or of
comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a
particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of
noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable
bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who though
creating a noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it. Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 NE
371, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1054.
With particular reference to noise emanating from electrical machinery and
appliances, the court, in Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, 156 S. W.
2d 857, after a review of authorities, ruled as follows:
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial activities which
are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive

to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. It is no defense that skill and care have been exercised
and the most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent
such result. Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S. W. 2d
4; 46 C.J. 683, 705; 20 R. C. L. 438; Annotations, 23 A. L. R. 1407; 90 A.
L. R. 1207. Of course, the creation of trifling annoyance and
inconvenience does not constitute an actionable nuisance, and the
locality and surroundings are of importance. The fact that the cause of
the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the
opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or
excessive and unreasonable. Usually it was shown to be of that
character. The determinating factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be
substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a
question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. 20
R. C. L. 445, 453; Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, supra. There can
be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. It is
true some witnesses in this case say they have been annoyed by the
humming of these transformers, but that fact is not conclusive as to the
nonexistence of the cause of complaint, the test being the effect which is
had upon an ordinary person who is neither sensitive nor immune to the
annoyance concerning which the complaint is made. In the absence of
evidence that the complainant and his family are supersensitive to
distracting noises, it is to be assumed that they are persons of ordinary
and normal sensibilities. Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Company,
160 Minn. 335, 200 N. W. 350, 38 A. L. R. 1502.
xxx xxx xxx
In Wheat Culvert Company vs. Jenkins, supra, we held an injunction was
properly decreed to stop the noise from the operation of a metal culvert
factory at night which interfered with the sleep of the occupants of an
adjacent residence. It is true the clanging, riveting and hammering of
metal plates produces a sound different in character from the steady hum
or buzz of the electric machinery described in this case. In the Jenkins
case the noise was loud, discordant and intermittent. Here it is
interminable and monotonous. Therein lies the physical annoyance and
disturbance. Though the noise be harmonious and slight and trivial in
itself, the constant and monotonous sound of a cricket on the earth, or
the drip of a leaking faucet is irritating, uncomfortable, distracting and
disturbing to the average man and woman. So it is that the intolerable,
steady monotony of this ceaseless sound, loud enough to interfere with
ordinary conversation in the dwelling, produces a result generally
deemed sufficient to constitute the cause of it an actionable nuisance.
Thus, it has been held the continuous and monotonous playing of a
phonograph for advertising purposes on the street even though there

were various records, singing, speaking and instrumental, injuriously

affected plaintiff's employees by a gradual wear on their nervous
systems, and otherwise, is a nuisance authorizing an injunction and
damages. Frank F. Stodder, et al. v. Rosen Talking Machine Company,
241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251, 22 A. L. R. 1197.
The principles thus laid down make it readily apparent that inquiry must be directed at
the character and intensity of the noise generated by the particular substation of the
appellee. As can be anticipated, character and loudness of sound being of subjective
appreciation in ordinary witnesses, not much help can be obtained from the
testimonial evidence. That of plaintiff Velasco is too plainly biased and emotional to
be of much value. His exaggerations are readily apparent in paragraph V of his
amended complaint, signed by him as well as his counsel, wherein the noise
complained of as
fearful hazardous noise and clangor are produced by the said electric
transformer of the MEC's substation, approximating a noise of a
reactivated about-to-explode volcano, perhaps like the nerve wracking
noise of the torture chamber in Germany's Dachau or Buchenwald
(Record on Appeal, page 6).
The estimate of the other witnesses on the point of inquiry are vague and imprecise,
and fail to give a definite idea of the intensity of the sound complained of. Thus:
OSCAR SANTOS, Chief Building Inspector, Department of Engineering, Quezon City
____ "the sound (at the front door of plaintiff Velasco's house) becomes noticeable
only when I tried to concentrate ........" (T.s.n., 16 July 1956, page 50)
SERAFIN VILLARAZA, Building Inspector ____ "..... like a high pitch note." (the trial
court's description as to the imitation of noise made by witness:"........ more of a
hissing sound) (T.s.n., 16 July 1956, pages 59-60)
CONSTANCIO SORIA, City Electrician ____ "........ humming sound" ..... "of a running
car". (T.s.n., 16 July 1956, page 87)
JOSE R. ALVAREZ, Sanitary Engineer, Quezon City Health Department ____ ".....
substation emits a continuous rumbling sound which is audible within the premises
and at about a radius of 70 meters." "I stayed there from 6:00 p.m. to about 1:00
o'clock in the morning" ..... "increases with the approach of twilight." (T.s.n., 5
September 1956, pages 40-44)
NORBERTO S. AMORANTO, Quezon City Mayor ____ (for 30 minutes in the street
at a distance of 12 to 15 meters from sub-station) "I felt no effect on myself." "..... no
[piercing noise]" (T.s.n., 18 September 1956, page 189)
PACIFICO AUSTRIA, architect, appellant's neighbor: "..... like an approaching
airplane ..... around five kilometers away." (T.s.n., 19 November 1956, pages 276277)

ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, radiologist, appellant's neighbor: "..... as if it is a running

motor or a running dynamo, which disturbs the ear and the hearing of a person."
T.s.n., 4 December 1956, page 21)
ANTONIO D. PAGUIA, lawyer ____ "It may be likened to the sound emitted by the
whistle of a boat at a far distance but it is very audible." (T.s.n., 19 December 1956,
page 309)
RENE RODRIGUEZ, sugar planter and sugar broker, appellant's neighbor ____ "It
sounds like a big motor running continuously." (T.s.n., 19 December 1956, page 347)
SIMPLICIO BELISARIO, Army captain, ____ (on a visit to Velasco) "I can compare
the noise to an airplane C-47 being started - the motor." [Did not notice the noise
from the substation when passing by, in a car, Velasco's house] (T.s.n., 7 January
1957, pages 11-12)
MANOLO CONSTANTINO, businessman, appellant's neighbor ____ "It disturbs our
concentration of mind." (T.s.n., 10 January 1957, page 11)
PEDRO PICA, businessman, appellant's neighbor: "..... We can hear it very well [at a
distance of 100 to 150 meters]. (T.s.n., 10 January 1957, page 41)
CIRENEO PUNZALAN, lawyer ____ "..... a continuous droning, ..... like the sound of
an airplane." (T.s.n., 17 January 1957, page 385)
JAIME C. ZAGUIRRE, Chief, Neuro-Psychiatry Section, V. Luna Gen. Hospital ____
"..... comparatively the sound was really loud to bother a man sleeping." (T.s.n., 17
January 1957, page 406)
We are thus constrained to rely on quantitative measurements shown by the record.
Under instructions from the Director of Health, samplings of the sound intensity were
taken by Dr. Jesus Almonte using a sound level meter and other instruments. Within
the compound of the plaintiff-appellant, near the wire fence serving as property line
between him and the appellee, on 27 August 1957 at 11:45 a.m., the sound level
under the sampaloc tree was 46-48 decibels, while behind Velasco's kitchen, the
meter registered 49-50; at the same places on 29 August 1957, at 6:00 a.m., the
readings were 56-59 and 61-62 decibels, respectively; on 7 September 1957, at 9:30
a.m., the sound level under the sampaloc tree was 74-76 decibels; and on 8
September 1957 at 3:35 in the morning, the reading under the same tree was 70
decibels, while near the kitchen it was 79-80 decibels. Several measurements were
also taken inside and outside the house (Exhibit "NN-7, b-f"). The ambient sound of
the locality, or that sound level characteristic of it or that sound predominating minus
the sound of the sub-station is from 28 to 32 decibels. (T.s.n., 26 March 1958, pages
6-7)
Mamerto Buenafe, superintendent of the appellee's electrical laboratory, also took
sound level samplings. On 19 December 1958, between 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock in the
evening, at the substation compound near the wire fence or property line, the
readings were 55 and 54 and still near the fence close to the sampaloc tree, it was 52

decibels; outside but close to the concrete wall, the readings were 42 to 43 decibels;
and near the transformers, it was 76 decibels (Exhibit "13").
Buenafe also took samplings at the North General Hospital on 4 January 1959
between 9:05 to 9:45 in the evening. In the different rooms and wards from the first to
the fourth floors, the readings varied from 45 to 67 decibels.
Technical charts submitted in evidence show the following intensity levels in decibels
of some familiar sounds: average residence: 40; average office: 55; average
automobile, 15 feet: 70; noisiest spot at Niagara Falls: 92 (Exhibit "11- B"); average
dwelling: 35; quiet office: 40; average office: 50; conversation: 60; pneumatic rock
drill: 130 (Exhibit "12"); quiet home average living room: 40; home ventilation fan,
outside sound of good home airconditioner or automobile at 50 feet: 70 (Exhibit "15A").
Thus the impartial and objective evidence points to the sound emitted by the
appellee's substation transformers being of much higher level than the ambient
sound of the locality. The measurements taken by Dr. Almonte, who is not connected
with either party, and is a physician to boot (unlike appellee's electrical
superintendent Buenafe), appear more reliable. The conclusion must be that,
contrary to the finding of the trial court, the noise continuously emitted, day and night,
constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled to relief, by
requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary measures to deaden or
reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a
partition made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is
manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric
Company who are being serviced from the substation.
Appellee company insists that as the plaintiff's own evidence (Exhibit "NN-7[c]") the
intensity of the sound (as measured by Dr. Almonte) inside appellant's house is only
46 to 47 decibels at the consultation room, and 43 to 45 decibels within the treatment
room, the appellant had no ground to complain. This argument is not meritorious,
because the noise at the bedrooms was determined to be around 64-65 decibels, and
the medical evidence is to the effect that the basic root of the appellant's ailments
was his inability to sleep due to the incessant noise with consequent irritation, thus
weakening his constitution and making him easy prey to pathogenic germs that could
not otherwise affect a person of normal health.
In Kentucky and West Virginia Co., Inc. vs. Anderson, 156 SW. 857, the average of
three readings along the plaintiff's fence was only 44 decibels but, because the sound
from the sub-station was interminable and monotonous, the court authorized an
injunction and damages. In the present case, the three readings along the property
line are 52, 54 and 55 decibels. Plaintiff's case is manifestly stronger.
Appellee company argues that the plaintiff should not be heard to complain because
the sound level at the North General Hospital, where silence is observed, is even
higher than at his residence. This comparison lacks basis because it has not been
established that the hospital is located in surroundings similar to the residential zone

where the plaintiff lived or that the sound at the hospital is similarly monotonous and
ceaseless as the sound emitted by the sub-station.
Constancio Soria testified that "The way the transformers are built, the humming
sound cannot be avoided". On this testimony, the company emphasizes that the
substation was constructed for public convenience. Admitting that the sound cannot
be eliminated, there is no proof that it cannot be reduced. That the sub-station is
needed for the Meralco to be able to serve well its customers is no reason, however,
why it should be operated to the detriment and discomfort of others. 2
The fact that the Meralco had received no complaint although it had been operating
hereabouts for the past 50 years with substations similar to the one in controversy is
not a valid argument. The absence of suit neither lessens the company's liability
under the law nor weakens the right of others against it to demand their just due.
As to the damages caused by the noise, appellant Velasco, himself a physician,
claimed that the noise, as a precipitating factor, has caused him anxiety neurosis,
which, in turn, predisposed him to, or is concomitant with, the other ailments which he
was suffering at the time of the trial, namely, pyelonephritis, ureteritis and others; that
these resulted in the loss of his professional income and reduced his life expectancy.
The breakdown of his claims is as follows:
Loss of professional earnings P12,600
Damage to life expectancy 180,000
Moral damages 100,000
Loss due to frustration of sale of house 125,000
Exemplary damages 25,000
Attorneys' fees 45,000
A host of expert witnesses and voluminous medical literature, laboratory findings and
statistics of income were introduced in support of the above claims.
The medical evidence of plaintiff's doctors preponderates over the expert evidence
for defendant-appellee, not merely because of its positive character but also because
the physicians presented by plaintiff had actually treated him, while the defense
experts had not done so. Thus the evidence of the latter was to a large extent
conjectural. That appellant's physical ailments should be due to infectious organisms
does not alter the fact that the loss of sleep, irritation and tension due to excessive
noise weakened his constitution and made him easy prey to the infection.
Regarding the amount of damages claimed by appellant, it is plain that the same are
exaggerated. To begin with, the alleged loss of earnings at the rate of P19,000 per
annum is predicated on the Internal Revenue assessment, Exhibit "QQ-1", wherein
appellant was found to have undeclared income of P8,338.20 in additional to his
declared gross income of P10,975.00 for 1954. There is no competent showing,
however, that the source of such undeclared income was appellant's profession. In
fact, the inference would be to the contrary, for his gross income from the previous
years 1951 to 1953 [Exhibits "QQ-1 (d)" to "QQ-1 (f)"] was only P8,085.00, P5,860.00
and P7,120.00, respectively, an average of P7,000.00 per annum. Moreover, while

his 1947 and 1948 income was larger (P9,995.00 and P11,900.00), it appears that
P5,000 thereof was the appellant's annual salary from the Quezon Memorial
Foundation, which was not really connected with the usual earnings derived from
practice as a physician. Considering, therefore, his actual earnings, the claimed
moral damages of P100,000.00 are utterly disproportionate. The alleged losses for
shortening of appellant's, life expectancy are not only inflated but speculative.
As to the demand for exemplary or punitive damages, there appears no adequate
basis for their award. While the appellee Manila Electric Company was convicted for
erecting the substation in question without permit from the Public Service
Commission, We find reasonable its explanation that its officials and counsel had
originally deemed that such permit was not required as the installation was
authorized by the terms of its franchise (as amended by Republic Act No. 150)
requiring it to spend within 5 years not less than forty million pesos for maintenance
and additions to its electric system, including needed power plants and substations.
Neither the absence of such permit from the Public Service Commission nor the lack
of permit from the Quezon City authorities (a permit that was subsequently granted)
is incompatible with the Company's good faith, until the courts finally ruled that its
interpretation of the franchise was incorrect.
There are, moreover, several factors that mitigate defendant's liability in damages.
The first is that the noise from the substation does not appear to be an exclusive
causative factor of plaintiff-appellant's illnesses. This is proved by the circumstance
that no other person in Velasco's own household nor in his immediate neighborhood
was shown to have become sick despite the noise complained of. There is also
evidence that at the time the plaintiff-appellant appears to have been largely indebted
to various credit institutions, as a result of his unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign,
and this court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that financial worries can affect
unfavorably the debtor's disposition and mentality.
The other factor militating against full recovery by the petitioner Velasco in his
passivity in the face of the damage caused to him by the noise of the substation.
Realizing as a physician that the latter was disturbing or depriving him of sleep and
affecting both his physical and mental well being, he did not take any steps to bring
action to abate the nuisance or remove himself from the affected area as soon as the
deleterious effects became noticeable. To evade them appellant did not even have to
sell his house; he could have leased it and rented other premises for sleeping and
maintaining his office and thus preserve his health as ordinary prudence demanded.
Instead he obstinately stayed until his health became gravely affected, apparently
hoping that he would thereby saddle appellee with large damages.
The law in this jurisdiction is clear. Article 2203 prescribes that "The party suffering
loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or omission in question". This codal rule, which
embodies the previous jurisprudence on the point, 3 clearly obligates the injured party
to undertake measures that will alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the
infliction of the injury, and places upon him the burden of explaining why he could not
do so. This was not done.

Appellant Velasco introduced evidence to the effect that he tried to sell his house to
Jose Valencia, Jr., in September, 1953, and on a 60 day option, for P95,000.00, but
that the prospective buyer backed out on account of his wife objecting to the noise of
the substation. There is no reliable evidence, however, how much were appellant's lot
and house worth, either before the option was given to Valencia or after he refused to
proceed with the sale or even during the intervening period. The existence of a
previous offer for P125,000.00, as claimed by the plaintiff, was not corroborated by
Valencia. What Valencia testified to in his deposition is that when they were
negotiating on the price Velasco mentioned to him about an offer by someone for
P125,000.00. The testimony of Valencia proves that in the dialogue between him and
Velasco, part of the subject of their conversation was about the prior offer, but it does
not corroborate or prove the reality of the offer for P125,000.00. The testimony of
Velasco on this point, standing alone, is not credible enough, what with his penchant
for metaphor and exaggeration, as previously adverted to. It is urged in appellant's
brief, along the lines of his own testimony, that since one (1) transformer was
measured by witness, Jimenez with a noise intensity of 47.2 decibels at a distance of
30.48 meters, the two (2) transformers of the substation should create an intensity of
94.4 decibels at the same distance. If this were true, then the residence of the plaintiff
is more noisy than the noisiest spot at the Niagara Falls, which registers only 92
decibels (Exhibit "15-A").
Since there is no evidence upon which to compute any loss or damage allegedly
incurred by the plaintiff by the frustration of the sale on account of the noise, his claim
therefore was correctly disallowed by the trial court. It may be added that there is no
showing of any further attempts on the part of appellant to dispose of the house, and
this fact suffices to raise doubts as to whether he truly intended to dispose of it. He
had no actual need to do so in order to escape deterioration of his health, as
heretofore noted.
Despite the wide gap between what was claimed and what was proved, the plaintiff is
entitled to damages for the annoyance and adverse effects suffered by him since the
substation started functioning in January, 1954. Considering all the circumstances
disclosed by the record, as well as appellant's failure to minimize the deleterious
influences from the substation, this Court is of the opinion that an award in the
amount of P20,000.00, by way of moderate and moral damages up to the present, is
reasonable. Recovery of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of
P5,000.00
is
also
justified the factual and legal issues were intricate (the transcript of the
stenographic notes is about 5,000 pages, side from an impressive number of
exhibits), and raised for the first time in this jurisdiction. 4
The last issue is whether the City Engineer of Quezon City, Anastacio A. Agan, a codefendant, may be held solidarily liable with Meralco.
Agan was included as a party defendant because he allegedly (1) did not require the
Meralco to secure a building permit for the construction of the substation; (2) even
defended its construction by not insisting on such building permit; and (3) did not
initiate its removal or demolition and the criminal prosecution of the officials of the
Meralco.

The record does not support these allegations. On the first plea, it was not Agan's
duty to require the Meralco to secure a permit before the construction but for Meralco
to apply for it, as per Section 1. Ordinance No. 1530, of Quezon City. The second
allegation is not true, because Agan wrote the Meralco requiring it to submit the plan
and to pay permit fees (T.s.n., 14 January 1960, pages 2081-2082). On the third
allegation, no law or ordinance has been cited specifying that it is the city engineer's
duty to initiate the removal or demolition of, or for the criminal prosecution of, those
persons who are responsible for the nuisance. Republic Act 537, Section 24 (d),
relied upon by the plaintiff, requires an order by, or previous approval of, the mayor
for the city engineer to cause or order the removal of buildings or structures in
violation of law or ordinances, but the mayor could not be expected to take action
because he was of the belief, as he testified, that the sound "did not have any effect
on his body."
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby reversed in part
and affirmed in part. The defendant-appellee Manila Electric Company is hereby
ordered to either transfer its substation at South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman,
Quezon City, or take appropriate measures to reduce its noise at the property line
between the defendant company's compound and that of the plaintiff-appellant to an
average of forty (40) to fifty (50) decibels within 90 days from finality of this decision;
and to pay the said plaintiff-appellant P20,000.00 in damages and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees. In all other respects, the appealed decision is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Castro, JJ., are on leave.
5. G.R. No. L-11014

January 21, 1958

VICTORIANA ESPIRITU, JORGE ROBLES, JOSEFINA DE VERA, FAUSTINO

QINTIVES, LEONOR BRIONES, EVANGELINA PATACSIL, TEOFILO ANCHETA
and BRIGIDA MANGONON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF
POZORRUBIO, PANGASINAN, respondents-appellees.
Teodulfo L. Reyes and Romulo M. Abarcar for appellants.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan of
April 28, 1956, dismissing the petition for prohibition filed by appellants, lifting the
preliminary injunction against the appellees and ordering the removal of appellants'
stalls from the public plaza of appellee municipality, within ten days from notice.
Pending appeal, counsel for the appellees filed a Manifestation on September 16,
1957, copy of which was duly served on appellants, that several months after the oral
argument held before this Tribunal on January 25, 1957, appellants had voluntarily
vacated the public plaza of Pozorrubio by transferring and removing their buildings
and therefrom to private lots fronting the plaza; and that the municipality had already
begun the construction of concrete fences in the premises, formerly occupied by
appellants, without any complaint whatsover from them or their counsel; and that

consequently, the present case has become moot and academic, and asking that the
present appeal be dismissed. By resolution of this Court of October 21, 1957,
appellants were required to comment on this Manifestation and petition for dismissal,
within ten days from notice. Despite notice of his resolution, appellants failed to file
their required comment. For this reason, we could well summarily dismiss this appeal
by resolution. However, for the satisfaction of the parties and for possible guidance of
town officials and residents, we havre deemed it convenient and necessary to decide
the case by formal decision.
The facts are not disputed. In fact, no evidence was submitted at the hearing before
the trial court, the parties having petitioned that the case be decided on the
pleadings. During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio
was destroyed, and after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing
temporary and make-shifts stalls,, even small residences, on a portion of the town
plaza. The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners fees at the rate of
P.25 per square meter a month. In time, the whole municipal market was
rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures on the plaza failed and refused to
transfer to said market place.
The Municipal Council of Pozorrubio received petitions from civic organizations like
the Women's Club and the Puericulture Center, for the removal of the market stalls on
the plaza, which were being used not only as stalls, but also for residence purposes,
said organization desiring to convert said portion of the plaza into a children's park.
The Provincial Board of Pangasinan had also presented to the Council the petition of
another civic organization of Pozorrubio, asking for the removal of the stalls from the
plaza, and the attention of the COuncil was also called to the latter-circular of the
Secretary of the Interior about the existence of these stalls on the public plaza, said
to be illegal.
As a result, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio No. 20, Series of 1951, stating that
the public market had already been rehabilitated, and ordering the occupants and
owners of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings within sixty days from
receipt of the resolution. In answer to this resolution, eight of the market stall building
owners filed a petition for prohibition in the Cour of First Instance of Pangasinan
against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor, and the Chief of Police of
Pozorrubio. Pending hearing, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court found that the fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal
Tresurer, was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied by the
market stalls, as claimed by appellants, but rather the market stall fees charges on all
market vendors in a public market; and that there was absolutely no contract or
agreement between the appellants on one side and the municipality on the other,
about renting of the Plaza to the former. There is reason to believe that the
occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings thereon by
appellants mostly for market, even residence purposes, was merley tolerated by the
municipality, because of the destruction of the public market during thewar, but the
trouble is that appellants, even after the rehabilitationof the old market, refused to
transfer to said market place, perhaps to save the trouble and expense of transferring
their buildings, or possibly to continue enjoying the benefits from the strategic position

of their stalls at the plaza. There is absolutelyno question that the town plaza cannot
be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town Plazas
are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made
available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot
be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. 1While in case of
war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private
individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio,
when the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease,
and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open
to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions.
Appellants must have realized the absolute lack of merit in their stand and the futility
of their appeal because they voluntarily removed their buildings on the plaza. As a
matter f fact, after the filing of the prohibition with the trial court, two out of the eight
petitioners informed the trial court that they were included as petitioners without their
consent, and so asked that they be excluded from the case.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs
against appellants.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
6. [G.R. NO. 130845. November 27, 2000]

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
DECISION
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision dated December 27, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioners petition for review under Rule 65 with
prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist order and/or temporary restraining order, and (2)
the resolution dated August 14, 1997 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
[1]

[2]

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific
Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner
bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one
meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right
of Way. The pertinent portion of the contract dated November 28, 1979, states:

. . . in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their
houses are constructed and to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the
nearest public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third
persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL
and JUSTINA CAPUNOs land and for this purpose, a path or passageway of not less

than two (2) meters wide of said spouses property is necessary for the use
of ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all their needs in
entering their property.
xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the ESPINOLA had been
bought by them from MAXIMO CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses
MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNO hereby agree and permit RODOLFO,
ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and their families to have a permanent
easement of right of way over the aforementioned property of said spouses limited to
not more than two meters wide, throughout the whole length of the southeast side of
said property and as specifically indicated in the attached plan which is made an
integral part of this Contract as Annex A;
This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs,
successors, assigns, without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will
warrant the circumstances.
[3]

Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also
unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991,
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-interest,
Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
[4]

On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of
way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the
Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 31, 1992.
[5]

On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 88, issued an
Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house
pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of
Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was
not a party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition
was denied for lack of merit on August 16, 1995. The motion for reconsideration as well as the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October
19, 1995.
[6]

[7]

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not
annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the
contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced
against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the
reconsideration, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by this court for lack of merit.

No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file their comment, despite
notice.
[8]

Hence, this instant petition.

Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in declaring,

(1) THAT
FOLLOWING
THE
ESSENCE
OF
INHERENCE
AND
INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN EASEMENT, A RIGHT OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN IF
THEY ARE NOT EXPRESSLY STATED OR ANNOTATED ON THE TORRENS
TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER, SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN
EASEMENT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO
BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-91-8703, HE CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR ORDER
RENDERED THEREIN.
[9]

Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right of way
cannot exist when it is not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title. According to him,
even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from the estate to which it actively belongs as
provided in Art. 617 of the Civil Code, the same is extinguished when the servient estate is
registered and the easement was not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the
Land Registration Law. Second, petitioner points out that the trial court erred when it faulted him
for relying solely on the clean title of the property he bought, as it is well-settled that a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond what is recorded in the title. He adds
that it is private respondents who should have made sure their right of way was safeguarded by
having the same annotated on the title with the Register of Deeds. He adds that Section 76 of
P.D. No. 1529 also requires that when a case is commenced involving any right to registered
land under the Land Registration Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on it
will only be effectual between or among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of
such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is recorded.There was no
such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to petitioner. Lastly, since he was not
a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, petitioner argues that he cannot be bound by the writ of
demolition and be forcibly divested of a portion of his land without having his day in court.
[10]

[11]

Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part, adopted the disquisition of the
appellate court as their Comment and asked for the dismissal of the petition and P100,000.00 in
damages. In its decision the appellate court, citing the decision of the lower court, stressed that
unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a right of way can exist even
if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because
servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong.
Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement
but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless
its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before
the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance with Article
617 of the Civil Code.
[12]

[13]

At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily
constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is
one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which
it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said easement
(right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on this Court, hence we
see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one
meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer
and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is wellsettled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in
view of the needs of private respondents estate.
[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because
the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to
enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously
unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate
(of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this
case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he
had not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules
of Court:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or
his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis ours).
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case
and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or
filed in court. In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouses Maximo
and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on
March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the
Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a
party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action in court.
[18]

[19]

[20]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

7. G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco
de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and
representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of
thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of
a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as
natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the
three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing
the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the
defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance
for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other
respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the
decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that
feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for
his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of
the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in
Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-

law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant
was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a
likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber
shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations
resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy
was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of
Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and
placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the
baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday,
February 14, 1931

1:30

p.

m.

Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his
departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he
wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had
developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order
that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to
return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend
Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the
hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where
she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and
the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together
for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and
electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's
ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the
defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should
here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant,
who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre,
quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother
during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of
subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in
holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of
jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights
and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary

case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the
means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child
requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name
used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the
writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael
Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition
contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to
a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end
given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child
which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on
this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the
defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom
the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged
Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last
letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant
urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of
article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in
more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father.
Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting
together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission
made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case
before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the
other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by
Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be
addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing
shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in
holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of
a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the
said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already
stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that
the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be
taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is
undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and
the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued
for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea
entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during
which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child;
and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to
concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child

shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in
subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With
respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was
right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach
of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that
the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an
action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount
of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this
connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance
will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as
circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.
8. G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing
appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December,
1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented
and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December
1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter
conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc.,
where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as

promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling
the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the
complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and
directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of
this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960;Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can

any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman,
Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525
Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started
visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the
defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as
are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very
close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration
of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to
the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a
short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the
defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving
which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the
defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but
instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped
and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the
plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his
promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions
may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On
that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not
here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

9. [G.R. No. 7798. January 14, 1916. ]

ANGELA C. GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAQUIN DEL

ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.
Emiliano T. Tirona for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
1. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE; DAMAGES. Held: Under the facts
stated in the opinion, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in
damages resulting from a breach of his contract of marriage.
DECISION
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Mindoro, on the 10th day of March, 1911. Its purpose was to recover
damages from the defendant, as the result of a breach of promise of
marriage. The complaint sets up three causes of action. For the first cause
of action the plaintiff alleges that upon the 30th day of June, 1910, the
plaintiff and defendant entered into a mutual agreement to join in holy
matrimony; that since that date the defendant has refused, although often
so requested, to carry out said mutual contract, without any legal reason
whatever, as a result of which the plaintiff has suffered damages in the
sum
of
P5,000.
As a second cause of action the plaintiff alleged that by reason of said
promise to marry and after said contract had been mutually entered into,
the defendant had had illicit relations with her, to which illicit relations she
consented; by reason of his promise to marry; that as a result of said illicit
relations, she had become pregnant; and prayed that the court should
award her damages in the sum of P25, to be paid monthly, for the
maintenance and education of the child, together with the sum of P50, as
medical
fees.
For a third cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged that at the time of said
mutual promise to marry, the plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the
public school of the municipality of Calapan, and was receiving as such
teacher, the sum of P30 per month; that by reason of the acts of the
defendant and by reason of his failure to comply with his promise to marry
and by reason of her pregnancy, caused by the defendant as above
described, she was obliged to give up her position as such teacher, and
prayed for damages in the sum of P30, to be paid monthly, or the sum
total
of
P2,000.
To the foregoing complaint the defendant presented a demurrer, which
was overruled by the court, whereupon the defendant presented an
answer, in which he interposed a general and special defense. The general

defense was a general denial. In his special defense he alleged that on

said 30th day of June, 1910, the day on which said contract to marry was
mutually entered into, the plaintiff was 25 years 8 months and 28 days of
age, and prayed that he be absolved from all liability under the complaint.
At the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff waived her right to recover any
damages from the defendant based upon the first and second causes of
action.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Mariano Cui, judge, reached the
conclusion that the defendant had damaged the plaintiff in the sum of
P540, and rendered a judgment for that amount, together with costs.
From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court and made the
following
assignments
of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the lower court committed an error in overruling the demurrer
presented.
"2. That the lower court committed an error in finding that, by reason of
the fact that the defendant had not complied with his promise to marry
the plaintiff, she had been prejudiced in her employment."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Inasmuch as the plaintiff withdrew her first and second causes of action,
the demurrer can now relate only to the third. From a reading of the
complaint, in the third cause of action, we are of the opinion that the facts
contained therein are sufficient, if true, to constitute a cause of action for
damages.
With reference to the second assignment of error, we find upon an
examination of the facts, that the judge of the lower court, the Honorable
Mariano Cui, has so carefully and exactly stated the facts, resulting from a
preponderance
of
the
evidence,
that
we
here
insert
the
same:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is an indisputable fact in this case that the defendant, while still a
bachelor, for he married after the filing of the complaint, made love to the
plaintiff, with whom he succeeded in having amorous relations. His
attentions commenced in March, 1910, which was when defendant began
to frequent the house of plaintiff, who was then over twenty-five years of
age, and they were finally accepted by her about the beginning of June of
said year, from which month amorous relations were maintained between
them. According to plaintiffs statement, she accepted defendants
attentions because he finally promised to marry her. This point is
confirmed by plaintiffs father, Leonardo Cruz Garcia, in his statement that
at the beginning of June as stated above, when he noticed that defendant
was frequenting his house, where plaintiff lived and still lives, he asked

him the reason therefor and defendant replied that he wished to marry
plaintiff. Although defendant in his testimony denies that he made such
promises of marriage, still his own letters, addressed to plaintiff, which are
Exhibits A, B, C, and D, contradict him and at the same time corroborate
plaintiffs testimony, especially the first of said exhibits, which bears the
date of October 6, 1910, wherein defendant made protest of the sincerity
of his promise of marriage, so that plaintiff would not doubt him.
"It is also another indisputable fact that the plaintiff, when she contracted
amorous relations with the defendant, was a temporary Insular teacher in
the public school of the town of Calapan, Mindoro, and as such teacher
received a monthly salary of P30, and that she ceased to be such by
resigning on November 26, 1910. With reference to this resignation,
plaintiff testified that from September, 1910, defendant had been urging
her to resign her position as teacher, telling her that he was unwilling for
her to continue as such; and, moreover, that plaintiff insisted that he
marry her, because she was then ashamed to walk through the streets on
account of her pregnant condition, which was already apparent, and she
had trouble in tightening up her belt to hide that condition; and that finally
plaintiff, confiding in the sincerity of defendants promise of marriage,
acceded to his suggestions and resigned from her employment as teacher.
Defendant tried to deny this, alleging that plaintiff resigned from her
employment as teacher because her pregnant condition at that time
prevented her from continuing in said employment, such being the real
reason for her resignation; but in view of the intimate amorous relations
that existed between them, as evidenced by the letters above mentioned,
one of which, Exhibit B, is dated January 8, 1911, plaintiffs testimony is
more deserving of credence. According to plaintiff, she might have been
able to continue in her employment as a teacher until her superior officers
should dismiss her, despite her pregnant condition, and from that time on
she has been unable to secure other employment, being at the present
time
supported
by
her
father
and
the
little
she
earns.
"The conclusion, therefore, is that the defendant, in not carrying out the
promise of marriage he made to the plaintiff, caused her damages in her
employment as teacher, whereby she received a salary of P30 a month, by
making her resign therefrom, as she did. On account of this action of the
defendant, indemnity for damages can be recovered from him, for through
his fault in failing to carry out his promise of marriage plaintiff lost her
position as teacher. (Article 1902, Civil Code.) In order equitably to adjust
said indemnity, in the opinion of the court, it is necessary to take into
account, not only the monthly salaries defendant receives, and which are
P50 as an employee of the provincial treasury of Mindoro and P15 as clerk
to the parish priest of Calapan, but also a reasonable time within which
plaintiff may get another position as teacher, and for which a year and a
half from the date when she resigned from her employment as teacher are

sufficient; and on this basis plaintiff is sufficiently indemnified by the sum

of P540, equivalent to her salary for a year and a half in her former
employment
as
teacher.
"In view of the foregoing, the court believes it proper to render judgment
in plaintiffs favor and against the defendant to the effect that she recover
from him the sum of P540 in the nature of an indemnity for the damages
caused by the loss of her position as teacher, and also the costs of the
suit."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In our opinion, the lower court committed neither of the errors complained
of by the Appellant. His judgment is therefore hereby affirmed, with costs.
So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
10. G.R. No. L-13505

February 4, 1919

GEO. W. DAYWALT, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
C. C. Cohn and Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Crossfield & O'Brien for appellee.
In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province
of Mindoro, executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W.
Daywalt, a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin, municipality of Bulalacao,
now San Jose, in said province. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as
soon as the title to the land should be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of
Teodorica Endencia. A decree recognizing the right of Teodorica as owner was
entered in said court in August 1906, but the Torrens certificate was not issued until
later. The parties, however, met immediately upon the entering of this decree and
made a new contract with a view to carrying their original agreement into effect. This
new contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance and bears date of
August 16, 1906. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and the area of the land
enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and
a fraction.
The second contract was not immediately carried into effect for the reason that the
Torrens certificate was not yet obtainable and in fact said certificate was not issued
until the period of performance contemplated in the contract had expired. Accordingly,
upon October 3, 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding
the old, by which Teodorica Endencia agreed upon receiving the Torrens title to the
land in question, to deliver the same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila,

to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco, where it was to be

delivered to the plaintiff upon payment of a balance of P3,100.
The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of
the proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was found by official survey
that the area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about
1.248 hectares of 452 hectares as stated in the contract. In view of this development
Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser,
asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had
been misinformed as to its area.
This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance; and Teodorica
Endencia was ordered to convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the
contract of October 3, 1908, which contract was declared to be in full force and effect.
This decree appears to have become finally effective in the early part of the year
1914.1
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation,
with its domicile in the city of Manila. Said corporation was formerly the owner of a
large tract of land, known as the San Jose Estate, on the island of Mindoro, which
was sold to the Government of the Philippine Islands in the year 1909. The same
corporation was at this time also the owner of another estate on the same island
immediately adjacent to the land which Teodorica Endencia had sold to Geo. W.
Daywalt; and for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of
cattle on the farms referred to. Their representative, charged with management of
these farms, was father Isidoro Sanz, himself a members of the order. Father Sanz
had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an
influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the personal
friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little
personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of
business was accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and
other members of his order with whom she came in contact.
Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 by which
Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the later
important developments connected with the history of that contract and the contract
substituted successively for it; and in particular Father Sanz, as well as other
members of the defendant corporation, knew of the existence of the contract of
October 3, 1908, which, as we have already seen finally fixed the rights of the parties
to the property in question. When the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909 in
favor of Teodorica Endencia, she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant
corporation, and it was then taken to Manila where it remained in the custody and
under the control of P. Juan Labarga the procurador and chief official of the defendant
corporation, until the deliver thereof to the plaintiff was made compulsory by reason
of the decree of the Supreme Court in 1914.
When the defendant corporation sold the San Jose Estate, it was necessary to bring
the cattle off of that property; and, in the first half of 1909, some 2,368 head were

removed to the estate of the corporation immediately adjacent to the property which
the plaintiff had purchased from Teodorica Endencia. As Teodorica still retained
possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her
whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were
pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1,
1914.
Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff seeks
to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P24,000, as damages for the
use and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle
thereon during the period stated. The trial court came to the conclusion that the
defendant corporation was liable for damages by reason of the use and occupation of
the premises in the manner stated; and fixed the amount to be recovered at P2,497.
The plaintiff appealed and has assigned error to this part of the judgment of the court
below, insisting that damages should have been awarded in a much larger sum and
at least to the full extent of P24,000, the amount claimed in the complaint.
As the defendant did not appeal, the property of allowing damages for the use and
occupation of the land to the extent o P2,497, the amount awarded, is not now in
question an the only thing here to be considered, in connection with this branch of the
case, is whether the damages allowed under this head should be increased. The trial
court rightly ignored the fact that the defendant corporation had paid Teodorica
Endencia of ruse and occupation of the same land during the period in question at
the rate of P425 per annum, inasmuch as the final decree of this court in the action
for specific performance is conclusive against her right, and as the defendant
corporation had notice of the rights of the plaintiff under this contract of purchase, it
can not be permitted that the corporation should escape liability in this action by
proving payment of rent to a person other than the true owner.
With reference to the rate of which compensation should be estimated the trial court
came to the following conclusion:
As to the rate of the compensation, the plaintiff contends that the defendant
corporation maintained at leas one thousand head of cattle on the land and that
the pasturage was of the value of forty centavos per head monthly, or P4,800
annually, for the whole tract. The court can not accept this view. It is rather
improbable that 1,248 hectares of wild Mindoro land would furnish sufficient
pasturage for one thousand head of cattle during the entire year, and,
considering the locality, the rate of forty centavos per head monthly seems too
high. The evidence shows that after having recovered possession of the land
the plaintiff rented it to the defendant corporation for fifty centavos per hectares
annually, the tenant to pay the taxes on the land, and this appears to be a
reasonable rent. There is no reason to suppose that the land was worth more
for grazing purposes during the period from 1909 to 1913, than it was at the
later period. Upon this basis the plaintiff is entitled to damages in the sum of
p2,497, and is under no obligation to reimburse the defendants for the land
taxes paid by either of them during the period the land was occupied by the
defendant corporation. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Lontok

tract adjoining the land in question and containing over three thousand
hectares appears to have been leased for only P1,000 a year, plus the taxes.
From this it will be seen that the trial court estimated the rental value of the land for
grazing purposes at 50 centavos per hectare per annum, and roughly adopted the
period of four years as the time for which compensation at that rate should be made.
As the court had already found that the defendant was liable for these damages from
June, 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914, or a period of four years and eleven months, there
seems some ground for the contention made in the appellant's first assignment of
error that the court's computation was erroneous, even accepting the rule upon which
the damages were assessed, as it is manifest that at the rate of 50 centavos per
hectare per annum, the damages for four years and eleven months would be P3,090.
Notwithstanding this circumstance, we are of the opinion that the damages assessed
are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during
the whole time it was used. There is evidence in the record strongly tending to show
that the wrongful use of the land by the defendant was not continuous throughout the
year but was confined mostly to the reason when the forage obtainable on the land of
the defendant corporation was not sufficient to maintain its cattle, for which reason it
became necessary to allow them to go over to pasture on the land in question; and it
is not clear that the whole of the land was used for pasturage at any time.
Considerations of this character probably led the trial court to adopt four years as
roughly being the period during which compensation should be allowed. But whether
this was advertently done or not, we see no sufficient reason, in the uncertainty of the
record with reference to the number of the cattle grazed and the period when the land
was used, for substituting our guess for the estimate made by the trial court.
In the second cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff seeks to recover
from the defendant corporation the sum of P500,000, as damages, on the ground that
said corporation, for its own selfish purposes, unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia
to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and
to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the Torrens title, and further, maliciously and
without reasonable cause, maintained her in her defense to the action of specific
performance which was finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court. The cause
of action here stated is based on liability derived from the wrongful interference of the
defendant in the performance of the contract between the plaintiff and Teodorica
Endencia; and the large damages laid in the complaint were, according to the proof
submitted by the plaintiff, incurred as a result of a combination of circumstances of
the following nature: In 1911, it appears, the plaintiff, as the owner of the land which
he had bought from Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract (Exhibit C) with S. B.
Wakefield, of San Francisco, for the sale and disposal of said lands to a sugar
growing and milling enterprise, the successful launching of which depended on the
ability of Daywalt to get possession of the land and the Torrens certificate of title. In
order to accomplish this end, the plaintiff returned to the Philippine Islands,
communicated his arrangement to the defendant,, and made repeated efforts to
secure the registered title for delivery in compliance with said agreement with
Wakefield. Teodorica Endencia seems to have yielded her consent to the
consummation of her contract, but the Torrens title was then in the possession of
Padre Juan Labarga in Manila, who refused to deliver the document. Teodorica also

was in the end contract with the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff was kept out
of possession until the Wakefield project for the establishment of a large sugar
growing and milling enterprise fell through. In the light of what has happened in
recent years in the sugar industry, we feel justified in saying that the project above
referred to, if carried into effect, must inevitably have proved a great success.
The determination of the issue presented in this second cause of action requires a
consideration of two points. The first is whether a person who is not a party to a
contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond
the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining
him in the effort to resist an action for specific performance. The second is whether
the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover under this head are too remote and
speculative to be the subject of recovery.
As preliminary to a consideration of the first of these questions, we deem it well it
dispose of the contention that the members of the defendants corporation, in advising
and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with the contract of sale, were
actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial court found that this contention
was not sustained, observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to
an entire sympathy on the part of the defendant corporation with the efforts of
Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials
may have advised her not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute
actionable interference with such contract. It may be added that when one considers
the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor,
and the doubt in which the issue was involved to the extent that the decision of the
Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court
itself was divided the attitude of the defendant corporation, as exhibited in the
conduct of its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other members of the order of the
Recollect Fathers, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this
feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good
faith that the contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it
should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given
was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to
be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given
possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the
defendants corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree
influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the
paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the
just rights of the plaintiff.
The attorney for the plaintiff maintains that, by interfering in the performance of the
contract in question and obstructing the plaintiff in his efforts to secure the certificate
of tittle to the land, the defendant corporation made itself a co-participant with
Teodorica Endencia in the breach of said contract; and inasmuch as father Juan
Labarga, at the time of said unlawful intervention between the contracting parties,
was fully aware of the existence of the contract (Exhibit C) which the plaintiff had
made with S. B. Wakefield, of San Francisco, it is insisted that the defendant
corporation is liable for the loss consequent upon the failure of the project outlined in
said contract.

In this connection reliance is placed by the plaintiff upon certain American and
English decisions in which it is held that a person who is a stranger to contract may,
by an unjustifiable interference in the performance thereof, render himself liable for
the damages consequent upon non-performance. It is said that the doctrine of these
cases was recognized by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542); and we
have been earnestly pressed to extend the rule there enunciated to the situation here
presente.
Somewhat more than half a century ago the English Court of the Queen's Bench saw
its way clear to permit an action for damages to be maintained against a stranger to a
contract wrongfully interfering in its performance. The leading case on this subject is
Lumley vs. Gye ([1853], 2 El. & Bl., 216). It there appeared that the plaintiff, as
manager of a theatre, had entered into a contract with Miss Johanna Wagner, an
opera singer,, whereby she bound herself for a period to sing in the plaintiff's theatre
and nowhere else. The defendant, knowing of the existence of this contract, and, as
the declaration alleged, "maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff," enticed and
produced Miss Wagner to leave the plaintiff's employment. It was held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages. The right which was here recognized had
its origin in a rule, long familiar to the courts of the common law, to the effect that any
person who entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the
master. The master's interest in the service rendered by his employee is here
considered as a distinct subject of juridical right. It being thus accepted that it is a
legal wrong to break up a relation of personal service, the question now arose
whether it is illegal for one person to interfere with any contract relation subsisting
between others. Prior to the decision of Lumley vs. Gye [supra] it had been supposed
that the liability here under consideration was limited to the cases of the enticement
of menial servants, apprentices, and others to whom the English Statutes of Laborers
were applicable. But in the case cited the majority of the judges concurred in the
opinion that the principle extended to all cases of hiring. This doctrine was followed
by the Court of Appeal in Bowen vs. Hall ([1881], 6 Q. B., Div., 333); and in
Temperton vs. Russell ([1893], Q. B., 715), it was held that the right of action for
maliciously procuring a breach of contract is not confined to contracts for personal
services, but extends to contracts in general. In that case the contract which the
defendant had procured to be breached was a contract for the supply of building
material.
Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of
interference with contract relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrongdoer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract relations, in bad faith sets
about to break it up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by
working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite
is not essential.
Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good illustration was put
in the leading case. If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey to
a remote and unhealthful climate, and a third person, with abona fide purpose of
benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no
action will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the

indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the
intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.
The doctrine embodied in the cases just cited has sometimes been found useful, in
the complicated relations of modern industry, as a means of restraining the activities
of labor unions and industrial societies when improperly engaged in the promotion of
strikes. An illustration of the application of the doctrine in question in a case of this
kind is found in South Wales Miners Federation vs. Glamorgan Coal Co. ([1905]), A.
C., 239). It there appeared that certain miners employed in the plaintiff's collieries,
acting under the order of the executive council of the defendant federation, violated
their contract with the plaintiff by abstaining from work on certain days. The federation
and council acted without any actual malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff, and the
only object of the order in question was that the price of coal might thereby be kept
up, a factor which affected the miner's wage scale. It was held that no sufficient
justification was shown and that the federation was liable.
In the United States, the rule established in England by Lumley vs. Gye [supra] and
subsequent cases is commonly accepted, though in a few of the States the broad
idea that a stranger to a contract can be held liable upon its is rejected, and in these
jurisdictions the doctrine, if accepted at all, is limited to the situation where the
contract is strictly for personal service. (Boyson vs. Thorn, 98 Cal., 578; Chambers &
Marshall vs. Baldwin 91 Ky., 121; Bourliervs. Macauley, 91 Ky., 135; Glencoe Land &
Gravel Co. vs. Hudson Bros. Com. Co., 138 Mo., 439.)
It should be observed in this connection that, according to the English and American
authorities, no question can be made as to the liability to one who interferes with a
contract existing between others by means which, under known legal cannons, can
be denominated an unlawful means. Thus, if performance is prevented by force,
intimidation, coercion, or threats, or by false or defamatory statements, or by
nuisance or riot, the person using such unlawful means is, under all the authorities,
liable for the damage which ensues. And in jurisdictions where the doctrine of
Lumley vs. Gye [supra] is rejected, no liability can arise from a meddlesome and
malicious interference with a contract relation unless some such unlawful means as
those just indicated are used. (See cases last above cited.)
This brings us to the decision made by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep.,
542). It there appeared that one Cuddy, the owner of a cinematographic film, let it
under a rental contract to the plaintiff Gilchrist for a specified period of time. In
violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over the film also
under a rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga. Gilchrist thereupon
restored to the Court of First Instance and produced an injunction restraining the
defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their theater during the period
specified in the contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist. Upon appeal to this court it was in
effect held that the injunction was not improperly granted, although the defendants
did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the plaintiff as the
person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor
of someone. It was also said arguendo, that the defendants would have been liable in
damages under article 1902 of the Civil Code, if the action had been brought by the
plaintiff to recover damages. The force of the opinion is, we think, somewhat

weakened by the criticism contain in the concurring opinion, where it is said that the
question of breach of contract by inducement was not really involved in the case.
Taking the decision upon the point which was rally decided, it is authority for the
proposition that one who buys something which he knows has been sold to some
other person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person
having the prior and better right.
Translated into terms applicable to the case at bar, the decision in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy
(29 Phil. Rep., 542), indicates that the defendant corporation, having notice of the
sale of the land in question to Daywalt, might have been enjoined by the latter from
using the property for grazing its cattle thereon. That the defendant corporation is
also liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from the wrongful use
and occupation of the property has also been already determined. But it will be
observed that in order to sustain this liability it is not necessary to resort to any subtle
exegesis relative to the liability of a stranger to a contract for unlawful interference in
the performance thereof. It is enough that defendant use the property with notice that
the plaintiff had a prior and better right.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission,
characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the
damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability for negligence,
we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another by any
culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when
judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad
enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be
developed in any society. Thus considered, it cannot be said that the doctrine of
Lumleyvs. Gye [supra] and related cases is repugnant to the principles of the civil
law.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the codes and jurisprudence of the civil law
furnish a somewhat uncongenial field in which to propagate the idea that a stranger
to a contract may sued for the breach thereof. Article 1257 of the Civil Code declares
that contracts are binding only between the parties and their privies. In conformity
with this it has been held that a stranger to a contract has no right of action for the
nonfulfillment of the contract except in the case especially contemplated in the
second paragraph of the same article. (Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil.
Rep., 471.) As observed by this court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compaia
Transatlantica, R. G. No. 11318 (38 Phil. Rep., 875), a contract, when effectually
entered into between certain parties, determines not only the character and extent of
the liability of the contracting parties but also the person or entity by whom the
obligation is exigible. The same idea should apparently be applicable with respect to
the person against whom the obligation of the contract may be enforced; for it is
evident that there must be a certain mutuality in the obligation, and if the stranger to a
contract is not permitted to sue to enforce it, he cannot consistently be held liable
upon it.
If the two antagonistic ideas which we have just brought into juxtaposition are
capable of reconciliation, the process must be accomplished by distinguishing clearly
between the right of action arising from the improper interference with the contract by

a stranger thereto, considered as an independent act generate of civil liability, and the
right of action ex contractu against a party to the contract resulting from the breach
thereof. However, we do not propose here to pursue the matter further, inasmuch as,
for reasons presently to be stated, we are of the opinion that neither the doctrine of
Lumley vs. Gye [supra] nor the application made of it by this court in
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), affords any basis for the recovery of the
damages which the plaintiff is supposed to have suffered by reason of his inability to
comply with the terms of the Wakefield contract.
Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may
incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one
proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become more
extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of
those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead
to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia
was the party directly bound by the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the
defendant corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the
breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This leads us to consider at this
point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her
failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.
It should in the first place be noted that the liability of Teodorica Endencia for
damages resulting from the breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject
for adjudication in the action for specific performance which Daywalt instituted against
her in 1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful conclusion in this court,
but without obtaining any special adjudication with reference to damages.
Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a contract is a right
inseparably annexed to every action for the fulfillment of the obligation (art. 1124,
Civil Code); and its is clear that if damages are not sought or recovered in the action
to enforce performance they cannot be recovered in an independent action. As to
Teodorica Endencia, therefore, it should be considered that the right of action to
recover damages for the breach of the contract in question was exhausted in the prior
suit. However, her attorneys have not seen fit to interpose the defense of res
judicata in her behalf; and as the defendant corporation was not a party to that action,
and such defense could not in any event be of any avail to it, we proceed to consider
the question of the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages without refernce to this
point.
The most that can be said with refernce to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that
she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last
an action for specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff was
prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the
property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to dispose of the
property advantageously. Now, what is the measure of damages for the wrongful
detention of real property by the vender after the time has come for him to place the
purchaser in possession?

The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable against a vendor for failure to
deliver land which he has contracted to deliver is the value of the use and occupation
of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld. And of course where the
purchaser has not paid the purchaser money, a deduction may be made in respect to
the interest on the money which constitutes the purchase price. Substantially the
same rule holds with respect to the liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in
possession pursuant to contract of lease. The measure of damages is the value of
the leasehold interest, or use and occupation, less the stipulated rent, where this has
not been paid. The rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of
land is normally to be found in the value of use and occupation is, we believe, one of
the things that may be considered certain in the law (39 cyc., 1630; 24 Cyc., 1052
Sedgewick on Damages, Ninth ed., sec. 185.) almost as wellsettled, indeed, as
the rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of money is to be
found in the interest.
We recognize the possibility that more extensive damages may be recovered where,
at the time of the creation of the contractual obligation, the vendor, or lessor, is aware
of the use to which the purchaser or lessee desires to put the property which is the
subject of the contract, and the contract is made with the eyes of the vendor or lessor
open to the possibility of the damage which may result to the other party from his own
failure to give possession. The case before us is not this character, inasmuch as at
the time when the rights of the parties under the contract were determined, nothing
was known to any to them about the San Francisco capitalist who would be willing to
back the project portrayed in Exhibit C.
The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be determined in the light
of the situation in existence at the time the contract is made; and the damages
ordinarily recoverable are in all events limited to such as might be reasonable are in
all events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts
then known to the contracting parties. Where the purchaser desires to protect
himself, in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give possession,
from the possibility of incurring other damages than such as the incident to the
normal value of the use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the
contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to the paid upon failure of the
vendor to give possession; and not case has been called to our attention where, in
the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the
purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and occupation. On the contrary, the
most fundamental conceptions of the law relative to the assessment of damages are
inconsistent with such idea.
The principles governing this branch of the law were profoundly considered in the
case Hadley vs. Baxendale (9 Exch., 341), decided in the English Court of Exchequer
in 1854; and a few words relative to the principles governing will here be found
instructive. The decision in that case is considered a leading authority in the
jurisprudence of the common law. The plaintiffs in that case were proprietors of a mill
in Gloucester, which was propelled by steam, and which was engaged in grinding and
supplying meal and flour to customers. The shaft of the engine got broken, and it
became necessarily that the broken shaft be sent to an engineer or foundry man at
Greenwich, to serve as a model for casting or manufacturing another that would fit

into the machinery. The broken shaft could be delivered at Greenwich on the second
day after its receipts by the carrier it. It was delivered to the defendants, who were
common carriers engaged in that business between these points, and who had told
plaintiffs it would be delivered at Greenwich on the second day after its delivery to
them, if delivered at a given hour. The carriers were informed that the mill was
stopped, but were not informed of the special purpose for which the broken shaft was
desired to forwarded, They were not told the mill would remain idle until the new shaft
would be returned, or that the new shaft could not be manufactured at Greenwich
until the broken one arrived to serve as a model. There was delay beyond the two
days in delivering the broken shaft at Greenwich, and a corresponding delay in
starting the mill. No explanation of the delay was offered by the carriers. The suit was
brought to recover damages for the lost profits of the mill, cause by the delay in
delivering the broken shaft. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover.
The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to the
conclusion that the damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two
sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense necessary damage; and (2)
special damages.
Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where the are no special
circumstances to distinguish the case specially from other contracts. The
consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort of damage.
In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would
result from such a breach, "according to the usual course of things." In case involving
only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that damage was
contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and
inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as a
necessary legal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a
matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.
Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach
than ordinary damage. It is only found in case where some external condition, apart
from the actual terms to the contract exists or intervenes, as it were, to give a turn to
affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor, without actual notice of
that external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee. Concerning this
sort of damage, Hadley vs.Baxendale (1854) [supra] lays down the definite and just
rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must show that the
particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the
breach was known to the defendant at the time the contract was made.
The statement that special damages may be recovered where the likelihood of such
damages flowing from the breach of the contract is contemplated and foreseen by the
parties needs to be supplemented by a proposition which, though not enunciated in
Hadley vs. Baxendale, is yet clearly to be drawn from subsequent cases. This is that
where the damage which a plaintiff seeks to recover as special damage is so far
speculative as to be in contemplation of law remote, notification of the special
conditions which make that damage possible cannot render the defendant liable
therefor. To bring damages which would ordinarily be treated as remote within the
category of recoverable special damages, it is necessary that the condition should be

made the subject of contract in such sense as to become an express or implied term
of the engagement. Horne vs. Midland R. Co. (L. R., 8 C. P., 131) is a case where the
damage which was sought to be recovered as special damage was really remote,
and some of the judges rightly places the disallowance of the damage on the ground
that to make such damage recoverable, it must so far have been within the
contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of the contract. But
others proceeded on the idea that the notice given to the defendant was not
sufficiently full and definite. The result was the same in either view. The facts in that
case were as follows: The plaintiffs, shoe manufacturers at K, were under contract to
supply by a certain day shoes to a firm in London for the French government. They
delivered the shoes to a carrier in sufficient time for the goods to reach London at the
time stipulated in the contract and informed the railroad agent that the shoes would
be thrown back upon their hands if they did not reach the destination in time. The
defendants negligently failed to forward the good in due season. The sale was
therefore lost, and the market having fallen, the plaintiffs had to sell at a loss.
In the preceding discussion we have considered the plaintiff's right chiefly against
Teodorica Endencia; and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate
that the damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be
recovered from her, first, because the damages laid under the second cause of action
in the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in
question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties
when the contract was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to
be the subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the
plaintiff to recover such damages from the defendant corporation, for, as already
suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation could
in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract.
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
11. [G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005]

YHT

REALTY
CORPORATION,
ERLINDA
LAINEZ
and
ANICIA
PAYAM, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN,respondents.
DECISION

The primary question of interest before this Court is the only legal issue in the
case: It is whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for
safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the
establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of
the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of the Decision[1] dated 19
October 1995 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 16
December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT
Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and Anicia

Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for damages in an action filed by Maurice
McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his American and Australian dollars
deposited in the safety deposit box of Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel,
owned and operated by YHT Realty Corporation.
The factual backdrop of the case follow.
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used
to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met
Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him
in buying gifts for the children and in distributing the same to charitable institutions for
poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to
Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as
manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety
deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlins booking at the Tropicana
where he started staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to
September 1987.[3]
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with
Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety
deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist,
McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety
deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two
keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the
possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to open
his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then
would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening
the safety deposit box with the two keys.[4]
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen
Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in two envelopes, one
envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other
envelope Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
(AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in another envelope; two (2) other envelopes
containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged
side by side inside the safety deposit box.[5]
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin
opened his safety deposit box with his key and with the key of the management and
took therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00),
the envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his
passports and his credit cards.[6] McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he did
not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When
he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the envelope which contained Five Thousand US
Dollars (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Three Thousand US
Dollars (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein.[7] Since he had no idea whether
somebody else had tampered with his safety deposit box, he thought that it was just a
result of bad accounting since he did not spend anything from that envelope.[8]
After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and
left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the envelope with

Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US Dollars

(US$5,000). He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and
stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing,
except for a diamond bracelet.[9]
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4 April 1988, he asked Lainez
if some money and/or jewelry which he had lost were found and returned to her or to
the management. However, Lainez told him that no one in the hotel found such things
and none were turned over to the management. He again registered at Tropicana and
rented a safety deposit box. He placed therein one (1) envelope containing Fifteen
Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), another envelope containing Ten Thousand
Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) and other envelopes containing his traveling
papers/documents. On 16 April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to
open his safety deposit box. He noticed that in the envelope containing Fifteen
Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00)
were missing and in the envelope previously containing Ten Thousand Australian
Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian Dollars
(AUS$4,500.00) were missing.[10]
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and
Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to
him.[11] McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her.
Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety
deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. [12] Lopez also told
McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was
asleep.[13]
McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez
got in touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin.
When the police did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at
Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21
April 1988. The promissory note reads as follows:
IpromisetopayMr.MauriceMcLoughlintheamountofAUS$4,000.00andUS$2,000.00or
itsequivalentinPhilippinecurrencyonorbeforeMay5,1988. [14]
Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did and Lopez
also signed as a witness. Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan,
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the
loss he suffered. However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the
conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled Undertaking For the Use Of
Safety Deposit Box,[15] specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit:
2.ToreleaseandholdfreeandblamelessTROPICANAAPARTMENTHOTELfrom
anyliabilityarisingfromanylossinthecontentsand/oruseofthesaiddepositboxfor
anycausewhatsoever,includingbutnotlimitedtothepresentationorusethereofby
anyotherpersonshouldthekeybelost;
...

4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of TROPICANA

APARTMENTHOTELupongivinguptheuseofthebox.[16]
On 17 May 1988, McLoughlin went back to Australia and he consulted his lawyers
as to the validity of the abovementioned stipulations. They opined that the stipulations
are void for being violative of universal hotel practices and customs. His lawyers
prepared a letter dated 30 May 1988 which was signed by McLoughlin and sent to
President Corazon Aquino.[17] The Office of the President referred the letter to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which forwarded the same to the Western Police District
(WPD).[18]
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin came to the
Philippines and registered again as a hotel guest of Tropicana. McLoughlin went to
Malacaang to follow up on his letter but he was instructed to go to the DOJ. The
DOJ directed him to proceed to the WPD for documentation. But McLoughlin went
back to Australia as he had an urgent business matter to attend to.
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to attend to his business and came
back to the Philippines to follow up on his letter to the President but he failed to
obtain any concrete assistance.[19]
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return to the Philippines on 25
August 1989 to pursue his claims against petitioners, the WPD conducted an
investigation which resulted in the preparation of an affidavit which was forwarded to
the Manila City Fiscals Office. Said affidavit became the basis of preliminary
investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for Australia without receiving the
notice of the hearing on 24 November 1989. Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the
criminal charge for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers wrote letters of
demand to those having responsibility to pay the damage. Then he left again for
Australia.
Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at the Echelon Towers at
Malate, Manila. Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his lawyer which
resulted to the filing of a complaint for damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT
Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of
McLoughlins money which was discovered on 16 April 1988. After filing the complaint,
McLoughlin left again for Australia to attend to an urgent business matter. Tan and
Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only
Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief admitting that they had previously
allowed and assisted Tan to open the safety deposit box, McLoughlin filed
an Amended/Supplemental Complaint[20] dated 10 June 1991 which included another
incident of loss of money and jewelry in the safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin
in the same hotel which took place prior to 16 April 1988. [21] The trial court admitted
the Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the country to
attend to urgent business in Australia, and while staying in the Philippines to attend
the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel bills, airfare and other transportation

expenses, long distance calls to Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses
for food and maintenance, among others.[22]
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,abovepremisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedbythisCourtin
favorofplaintiffandagainstthedefendants,towit:
1. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P342,000.00,
more or less, and the sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency of P99,000.00, or a total of P441,000.00, more or less, with 12%
interest from April 16 1988 until said amount has been paid to plaintiff
(Item 1, Exhibit CC);
2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum
of P3,674,238.00 as actual and consequential damages arising from the
loss of his Australian and American dollars and jewelries complained
against and in prosecuting his claim and rights administratively and
judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Exh. CC);
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum
of P500,000.00 as moral damages (Item X, Exh. CC);
4. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum
of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages (Item XI, Exh. CC);
5. And ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay litigation expenses in
the sum of P200,000.00 (Item XII, Exh. CC);
6. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum
of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and a fee of P3,000.00 for every
appearance; and
7. Plus costs of suit.
SOORDERED.[23]
The trial court found that McLoughlins allegations as to the fact of loss and as to
the amount of money he lost were sufficiently shown by his direct and straightforward
manner of testifying in court and found him to be credible and worthy of belief as it
was established that McLoughlins money, kept in Tropicanas safety deposit box, was
taken by Tan without McLoughlins consent. The taking was effected through the use
of the master key which was in the possession of the management. Payam and
Lainez allowed Tan to use the master key without authority from McLoughlin. The trial
court added that if McLoughlin had not lost his dollars, he would not have gone
through the trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking aid and assistance from
the Office of the President, DOJ, police authorities and the City Fiscals Office in his
desire to recover his losses from the hotel management and Tan.[24]
As regards the loss of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry
worth approximately One Thousand Two Hundred US Dollars (US$1,200.00) which

allegedly occurred during his stay at Tropicana previous to 4 April 1988, no claim was
made by McLoughlin for such losses in his complaint dated 21 November 1990
because he was not sure how they were lost and who the responsible persons were.
But considering the admission of the defendants in their pre-trial brief that on three
previous occasions they allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that it was
logical and reasonable to presume that his personal assets consisting of Seven
Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry were taken by Tan from the safety
deposit box without McLoughlins consent through the cooperation of Payam and
Lainez.[25]
The trial court also found that defendants acted with gross negligence in the
performance and exercise of their duties and obligations as innkeepers and were
therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by McLoughlin.[26]
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the Undertaking For
The Use Of Safety Deposit Box are not valid for being contrary to the express
mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and against public policy. [27] Thus,
there being fraud or wanton conduct on the part of defendants, they should be
responsible for all damages which may be attributed to the non-performance of their
contractual obligations.[28]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as
to the amount of damages awarded. The decretal text of the appellate courts decision
reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but
modifiedasfollows:
Theappellantsaredirectedjointlyandseverallytopaytheplaintiff/appelleethefollowing
amounts:
1)P153,200.00representingthepesoequivalentofUS$2,000.00andAUS$4,500.00;
2)P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sidney [sic] to
Manilaandbackforatotalofeleven(11)trips;
3) Onehalf ofP336,207.05 orP168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana
ApartmentHotel;
4)OnehalfofP152,683.57orP76,341.785representingpaymenttoEchelonTower;
5)OnehalfofP179,863.20orP89,931.60forthetaxixxxtransportationfromthe
residencetoSidney[sic]AirportandfromMIAtothehotelhereinManila,for
theeleven(11)trips;
6)OnehalfofP7,801.94orP3,900.97representingMeralcopowerexpenses;
7) Onehalf ofP356,400.00 orP178,000.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance;

8)P50,000.00formoraldamages;
9)P10,000.00asexemplarydamages;and
10)P200,000representingattorneysfees.
Withcosts.
Unperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation, Lainez and Payam went to this Court in
this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the following issues: (a) whether the
appellate courts conclusion on the alleged prior existence and subsequent loss of the
subject money and jewelry is supported by the evidence on record; (b) whether the
finding of gross negligence on the part of petitioners in the performance of their duties
as innkeepers is supported by the evidence on record; (c) whether the Undertaking
For The Use of Safety Deposit Box admittedly executed by private respondent is null
and void; and (d) whether the damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the
amounts thereof, are proper under the circumstances.[30]
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is worthy of note that the thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of
law and any peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the bounds
of this mode of review.
Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove the fact of
prior existence of the dollars and the jewelry which had been lost while deposited in
the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate
court being the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents thereof. Likewise,
petitioners dispute the finding of gross negligence on their part as not supported by
the evidence on record.
We are not persuaded. We adhere to the findings of the trial court as affirmed by
the appellate court that the fact of loss was established by the credible testimony in
open court by McLoughlin. Such findings are factual and therefore beyond the ambit
of the present petition.
The trial court had the occasion to observe the demeanor of McLoughlin while
testifying which reflected the veracity of the facts testified to by him. On this score, we
give full credence to the appreciation of testimonial evidence by the trial court
especially if what is at issue is the credibility of the witness. The oft-repeated principle
is that where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great
respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court.
[31]
The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[32]
We are also not impressed by petitioners argument that the finding of gross
negligence by the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court is not supported by
evidence. The evidence reveals that two keys are required to open the safety deposit
boxes of Tropicana. One key is assigned to the guest while the other remains in the
possession of the management. If the guest desires to open his safety deposit box,

he must request the management for the other key to open the same. In other words,
the guest alone cannot open the safety deposit box without the assistance of the
management or its employees. With more reason that access to the safety deposit
box should be denied if the one requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box
is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it
is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the
consummation of the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana,
had custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. In fact,
they even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening
McLoughlins safety deposit box.[33] This only proves that Tropicana had prior
knowledge that a person aside from the registered guest had access to the safety
deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and
waited for him to discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to him. Therefore,
Tropicana should be held responsible for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by
reason of the negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident
considering that Payam admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three times in
opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while
the latter was still asleep.[34] In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is
undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the
opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlins money could and should
have been avoided.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its
employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the
time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin
introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of
McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of any
showing that he made the management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly
authorized to have access to the safety deposit box. Mere close companionship and
intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved
in the instant case is the very safety of McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners
exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlins safety deposit box, they should
have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had
been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at the
early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have prompted the management to
investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then, petitioners would have exercised
due diligence required of them. Failure to do so warrants the conclusion that the
management had been remiss in complying with the obligations imposed upon hotelkeepers under the law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the
burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides
that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court
has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was

negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the
negligence of such employer.[35] Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins
money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees in
allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guests consent, both the
assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of
Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.[36]
The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit
Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question
appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the
appellate court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their
common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art.2003.Thehotelkeepercannotfreehimselffromresponsibilitybypostingnoticestothe
effectthatheisnotliableforthearticlesbroughtbytheguest.Anystipulationbetweenthe
hotelkeeperandtheguestwherebytheresponsibilityoftheformerassetforthinArticles
1998to2001[37]issuppressedordiminishedshallbevoid.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public
policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel
business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to
the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and
security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or
diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in
prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
In an early case,[38] the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding Justice (later
Associate Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or
innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be actually
delivered to the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such effects are
within the hotel or inn.[39] With greater reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be
enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests knowledge and
consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003 of
the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from
any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever.[40] Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not
negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is
explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to,
the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the
keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from
any force majeure.[41] It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotelkeeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or
robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the
same as force majeure.[42]
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002 [43] which exempts the
hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or

visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would lead us to reject petitioners
contention. The justification they raise would render nugatory the public interest
sought to be protected by the provision. What if the negligence of the employer or its
employees facilitated the consummation of a crime committed by the registered
guests relatives or visitor? Should the law exculpate the hotel from liability since the
loss was due to the act of the visitor of the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this
provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent negligence or
has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not
responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence
contributes to the loss.[44]
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared
not only by the guest himself but also by the management since two keys are
necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without the assistance of hotel employees,
the loss would not have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent
negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered guest, to open the safety
deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his key. To rule otherwise would result
in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the management
will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of being a family
member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without fear
of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns out to be a
complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade responsibility for any liability
incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the guests relatives and visitors.
Petitioners contend that McLoughlins case was mounted on the theory of
contract, but the trial court and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims of
the latter on the basis of tort.[45] There is nothing anomalous in how the lower courts
decided the controversy for this Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort
liability can exist even if there are already contractual relations. The act that breaks
the contract may also be tort.[46]
As to damages awarded to McLoughlin, we see no reason to modify the amounts
awarded by the appellate court for the same were based on facts and law. It is within
the province of lower courts to settle factual issues such as the proper amount of
damages awarded and such finding is binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently
proven by evidence and not unconscionable or excessive. Thus, the appellate court
correctly awarded McLoughlin Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) and Four
Thousand Five Hundred Australian dollars (AUS$4,500.00) or their peso equivalent at
the time of payment,[47] being the amounts duly proven by evidence.[48] The alleged
loss that took place prior to 16 April 1988 was not considered since the amounts
alleged to have been taken were not sufficiently established by evidence. The
appellate court also correctly awarded the sum of P308,880.80, representing the
peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11)
trips;[49] one-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana;
[50]
one-half of P152,683.57 orP76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;
[51]
one-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expenses from
McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for
the eleven (11) trips;[52] one-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco

power expenses;[53] one-half of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses

for food and maintenance.[54]
The amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable. Although trial courts
are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages, the appellate court
may modify or change the amount awarded when it is palpably and scandalously
excessive. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense
of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendants culpable action.[55]
The awards of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P200,000.00 representing
attorneys fees are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed, jointly
and severally, to pay private respondent the following amounts:
(1)US$2,000.00andAUS$4,500.00ortheirpesoequivalentatthetimeofpayment;
(2)P308,880.80,representingthepesovaluefortheairfaresfromSydneytoManilaand
backforatotalofeleven(11)trips;
(3) Onehalf ofP336,207.05 orP168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana
CopacabanaApartmentHotel;
(4)OnehalfofP152,683.57orP76,341.785representingpaymenttoEchelonTower;
(5)OnehalfofP179,863.20orP89,931.60forthetaxiortransportationexpensefrom
McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in
Manila,fortheeleven(11)trips;
(6)OnehalfofP7,801.94orP3,900.97representingMeralcopowerexpenses;
(7) Onehalf ofP356,400.00 orP178,200.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance;
(8)P50,000.00formoraldamages;
(9)P10,000.00asexemplarydamages;and
(10)P200,000representingattorneysfees.
Withcosts.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

12. [A.M. No. MTJ-98-1162. August 11, 1999]

ANA MAY M. SIMBAJON, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, respondent.
DECISION
In a letter[1] dated September 8, 1997, Judge Rogelio M. Esteban of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (Branch I, Cabanatuan City) was charged by Ana May V. Simbajon with sexual
harassment and grave misconduct.
In the Sworn Complaint dated September 8, 1997, which accompanied her letter,
Simbajon narrated the following:
3.WhenthelocalpositionofbookbinderinBranchIofthesaidCourtbecamevacant,I
appliedforit,butmypapersrequiringthesignatureofJudgeEstebanremainedunactedupon
forsometime;
4.OnJune25,1997,IdecidedtoapproachJudgeRogelioM.Estebanaboutthematter,inside
hisairconditionedchamber,butduringthecourseofourconversation,saidJudgeutteredthe
following:
ANO NAMAN ANG MAGIGING KAPALIT NG PAGPIRMA KO RITO?MULA
NGAYONGIRLFRIENDNAKITA.ARAWARAWPAPASOKKADITOSAOPISINA
KO,ATARAWARAW,ISANGHALIK.
towhichIrepliedthatitcouldnotbepossiblebecauselook[ed]uptohimlikeafathertome;
5.Ashesignedmypapers,hestoodupfromhischair,wenttomybackwhereIwasseated,
andtomyshocksuddenlykissedmyleftcheek;
6.Istoodupshakenandtremblinginfearandimmediatelyleftthesaidchamber,promising
myselfnevertoenterthatchamberagainandnevertotalktosaidJudgeagain;
7.Then,onAugust5,1997ataround9:30oclockinthemorning,CourtInterpreterVirginia
S.MedinatoldmeIwasbeingcalledbyJudgeRogelioM.Estebanregardingourpayroll,and
althoughintraumaovermyexperienceinsaidchamber,Iwasconstrainedtoentersaidroom,
asIhadnochoice,beingamerelowlysubordinate;
8.AsIwasabouttotakeaseatinfrontofJudgeRogelioM.Estebanstable,heinstructedme
tostandbesidehistablenearwherehewasseated;
9.JudgeEstebanaskedmesincewhenIha[d]beenreceiving[a]bookbinderssalary,andI
toldhimquitesometimealready,andafterthat,hetoldme:
MATAGAL NA PALA EH BAKIT HINDI KA PUMAPASOK DITO SA KUWARTO
KO?DIBASABIKOSAIYO,GIRLFRIENDNAKITA?

towhichIfirmlyansweredbackitcouldnotbepossibleforhewasonlylikeafathertome.I
reallyfeltinsultedtobetreatedthatlowbyajudgeatthat,beingamarriedwomanwithtwo
sons;
10.Atthatpoint,JudgeEstebansuddenlystoodupfromhisseat,uttering:
HINDIPUEDEYAN,MAHALKITA.
andthengrabbedme,startedkissingmeallovermyface,embracedme,andtouchedmyright
breast;
11.Ifreedmyselffromhisembrace,leftthesaidchamberhurriedly,andthrewthepayrollon
topofthetableofcoemployeeElizabethQ.Malubay,tearyeyed,tremblinginshockand
fear;
12.Sensingsomethingwasreallywrongwithme,sheaccompaniedmetothecomfortroom
andthereIcriedandrelatedtoherwhathadhappenedinthechamberofJudgeEsteban; [2]
In his Answer filed with this Court on December 2, 1997, respondent judge denied the
allegations in the Complaint in this manner:
4.Thatparagraph4isvehementlyandspecificallydeniedforlackofknowledgesufficientto
determineitstruthorfalsity;thetruthbeingthatwhenMs.AnaMaySimbajonapproached
hereinrespondentandpresentedsomepapers/documentsclippedtooneanother,hescanned
overthesameandwhenhesawthatthesame[were]alreadyapprovedbytheCityMayor,
Hon.ManoletteS.Liwagandthathissignaturethereon[was]amereformality,hereadily
signedthesamewithouthesitation[or]anyquestionsasked;Thatafterheha[d]signedthe
documentAnaMaySimbajonrosefromthechairplacedinfrontofmydeskwhereshewas
seated,walkedtowardstherespondentandbuzzedhimontheforeheadasshesaidThankyou,
sir,mahalkanamin,parakangtataynamin,towhichhesmiledandrepliedsalamat.Thereafter
shetookthesigneddocumentsandcasuallywalkedoutofthechamberofthejudge;
xxxxxxxxx
7.Thatparagraph7isspecificallyandvehementlydeniedforlackofknowledgesufficientto
formabeliefastoitstruthorfalsity[,]thetruthbeingthatrespondentneversentforMs.Ana
MaySimbajonthruCourtInterpreter,VirgieMedina,onAugust5,1997;thatwhenhere
enteredhischamberaftertalkingwithsomepeopleattheMTCClobby,foundthat[the]
payrollvoucheroftheCityHallcasualemployees[was]alreadystackedabovethepilesof
officialpapersonhistable[,]allforsignatureofthePresidingJudge;thathesignedthesaid
payrollvoucherwithoutanyhesitation,asheusuallydoesevenuptothiswriting;
xxxxxxxxx
10.Thathereinrespondentherebyemphaticallymanifeststhephysicalimpossibilityofthe
commissionoftheaccusationconsideringthatthexxxchambersdoortothestaffroomis
alwaysfullyandwidely[open]andalmostalltheemployeesofBranchIarerespectively

seatedontheirassignedplacessuchthatanyunusualconversationorcommotioninsidethe
judge[s]chamberiseasilyandreadilydetected;
11.Thathereinrespondentalwaysact[s]withfatherlyattitudeandbehaviortowardsallthe
employeesoftheMTCCofCabanatuanCity;
12.Thathereinrespondentalwaysconductshimselfpubliclywithamiable,jollyandgood
behaviorand[the]niceattitudeofagoodfatherofthefamily;
13.Thathehasnopersonalenmitywithanybodyandharborsnoillfeelingtowardsanybody;
14.Thatheisnotawareofanyreasonsufficienttoformabeliefwhyheshouldbechargedor
indictedonanygroundeithercivilly,criminallyoradministratively;
15.Thathe isendowedwith publictrust and confidence,hebeing aformerdirectorand
presidentoftheNuevaEcijaJudgesAssociation;formerDeputyGrandKnightoftheKnights
ofColumbusSta.RosaCouncilNo.5463;anactivememberofGen.LlaneraLodgeNo.168
F & AM; an active dual member of Santa Rosa Lodge No. 297, F & AM; incumbent
SecretaryGeneral of the City Judges Association of the Philippines; and a religious and
charitableperson;
16.ThathespecificallyandvehementlyobjectstoallthecontentsoftheAffidavitofMs.
ElizabethQ.Malubaywhichsheexecutedinrelationtotheabovecitedswornstatementof
Ms.AnaMaySimbajon,itbeingentirelypreposterous,hearsayandcontrarytoreasonand
commonsense.[3]
On August 31, 1998, this Court referred the case to Executive Judge Federico Fajardo Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (Branch 30) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Further, the Court placed respondent Judge Esteban under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation until further notice. [4]
In his Report, Judge Fajardo accorded credibility to the complainant and her witnesses and
rejected the testimonies of respondent and his witnesses. The investigating judge reported:
[Respondentjudge]wasnotabletopresentanyproofthatcomplainantisawomancapableof
spinningalie,awomansocallusedandthickskinnedtobeabletobeartheconsequencesofa
taleofsexualharassmentwhichputherownmoralityandreputationatstake,notcountingthe
seriouseffectitwillhaveonherownhusbandandchildren.Respondentfailedtoshowwhat
kindofrelationshipand/oragreementcomplainantandwitnessMalubayhadthattheformer
wouldriskhermarriage,herreputationandherfutureonlytohelpavengethelatterwhowas
notrecommendedtothepositionofUtilityWorkerbyrespondent.Also,complainantfileda
case against respondent before the Ombudsman, the case now being heard at the
Sandiganbayan.Suchdeterminationtoseekjusticeforherselfnegatestheallegationorany
suspicionthathercasewasjustablatantfabrication.
Withoutanyconvincingevidenceonhand,respondentslastlineofdefenseisdenial.The
SupremeCourtheldthatDenial,ifunsubstantiatedbyclearandconvincingevidence,isa
negativeandselfservingevidencewhichdeservesnoweightinlawandcannotbegiven

greaterevidentiaryvalueoverthetestimonyofcrediblewitnesseswhotestifyonaffirmative
matters.
Astothepressurebeingexertedbyrespondentforcomplainanttowithdrawhercaseagainst
himastestifiedtobycomplainantandwitnessesPriscillaSantosandLeaRubiowhichwas
notconvincinglyrebuttedbyrespondent,sufficeittosaythatpressureistheonlyrecourseof
anyrespondentwhoisbereftofanyevidencetodefendhimselfwith.
Based on the foregoing findings, the undersigned Investigator concludes that there is
sufficientevidencetocreateamoralcertaintythatrespondentcommittedtheactscomplained
of.Inalonglineofcasesinvolvingjudges,theSupremeCourthasheldthatactuationslike
those done by respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision he being the Executive
Judge.Hetook advantageofhis positionandpower inordertocarryouthislustfuland
lascivious desires.Instead of he being inloco parentisover his subordinate employees,
respondentwastheonewhopreyedonthemtakingadvantageofhissuperiorposition.
Thus,respondenthasviolatedtheCodeofJudicialConductwhichrequireseveryjudgetobe
theembodimentofcompetence,integrityandindependenceandtoavoidimproprietyandthe
appearanceofimproprietyinallactivitiesastopromotepublicconfidenceintheintegrityand
impartialityofthejudiciary.
AtatimewhentheCourtsaretryingtodisproveitshoodlumsinrobesimage,thisdespicable
actofrespondentturninghisaugustchambersintoabordelloonlyfurthertaintedtheimageof
thejudiciary.Respondentfailedmiserablytoobservetheexactingstandardsofmoralityand
decency mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct.Having proven himself unworthy to
remaininoffice,respondentshouldbeweededoutfromtheservicethesoonestpossibletime
lesthefurther[erode]thefaithofthepeopleinCourts. [5]
In view of the foregoing, Judge Fajardo recommended that Judge Rogelio M. Esteban be
dismissed from the service.[6] The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report to this
Court, agreed with the findings and the recommendation of the investigating judge.
After examining the records of this case, we likewise hold that such findings and
recommendations are supported by evidence and the jurisprudence cited.
By the nature of their work, judges are expected to possess the highest standard of
morality and decency.[7] The Code of Judicial Conduct states:
CANON 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
Rule 2.01Ajudgeshouldsobehaveat alltimesastopromotepublicconfidencein the
integrityandimpartialityofthejudiciary.
This is echoed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides:
3.Avoidanceofappearanceofimpropriety

Ajudgesofficialconductshouldbefreefromtheappearanceofimpropriety,andhispersonal
behavior,notonlyuponthebenchandintheperformanceofjudicialduties,butalsoinhis
everydaylife,shouldbebeyondreproach.
The conduct of the respondent falls short of this standard. According to complainant Ana
May Simbajon, respondent told her that in exchange for his signature on her employment
application, she would become his girlfriend. Thereafter, he went on to kiss her against her
will.
Later, after learning that her application had been approved, he called her to his chambers
and said that she was already his girlfriend. He went on to embrace her, kiss her, and touch her
right breast.Complainant affirmed all these even under withering cross-examination. Her
allegations were corroborated by two witnesses, to whom she confided her humiliating
experience.
One of these witnesses was Elizabeth Q. Malubay, who narrated:
8.That,afterawhile,IsawAnaMayrushingoutoftheroo[m]ofthejudge,thr[o]wour
payrollontopofmytableandthereInoticedthat[shewas]tremblinginfear,tearyeyed,asif
afraidofsomething,sosensingthatsomethinghappenedinsidethatroom,Ibroughtheroutof
ourofficeandproceededtothecomfortroomandthereburstingintears,sherelayedtome
whathadhappened.[8]
Complainants husband, Conrado Simbajon Jr., described his wifes demeanor after the
incident as follows:
3.WhenIarrivedathomeIaskedAnaMaywhathappenedbutsherefusedtotalkandwas
veryquiet.SensingthatmywifehaddifficultyinrevealingtheproblemIpreferredforherto
initiatethediscussionofherproblem;
4.Sometimelater,beforegoingtobed,mywifeembraced[me]tightlyandsuddenlyburst
intotear[s]andshetoldmethathersuperiorJudgeRogelioEstebanmadesexualadvancesin
suchawaythatJudgeRogelioEstebangrabbed,kissed,embracedandtouchedherbreast
rightinsidethechamberofJudgeEsteban[.][9]
The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondents imputation of ill motive on
the part of complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her
family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a
falsehood.[10]
The respondent judge and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
complainant. As the investigating judge correctly observed:
xxxFirst,complainantherselftestifiedthatthedoortothechamberswasclosedasshe
herselfclosedit,asshehadalwaysseenthat[that]roomwasusuallyclosedeversinceshegot
assignedintheoffice,theroombeingairconditioned.Second,nowhereinthecomplaint[or]
in the testimony of complainant and her witness was it mentioned that a commotion or
unusualconversationtookplaceonJune25and/orAugust5,1997loudenoughtobeheard
outside.A perusal of the complaint would show that right after the sexual harassment

committedbyrespondent,complainanthurriedlyleftthechambersinbothinstances.Shedid
notcreateasceneoutsidethechambers.Shekepthersilenceafterthefirstincidentpromising
herselfnevertoenterthechambersagainandinthesecondincident,sheandMalubaywentto
thecomfortroomwhereshecriedandnarratedwhathappenedtoher. [11]
This Court further notes the ostentatious display of power and arrogance on the part of the
respondent. Witness Priscilla Santos declared:
3.[On] several occasions, I ran errands for Ana May Simbajon in the facilitation of her
voucherinorderforhertodrawhersalary;
4.IknowforafactthatsometimeinthethirdweekofJune1998,IwenttoMr.Brionesin
ordertoretrievethevoucherofAnaMaySimbajon,whomsherequestedtointerveneinorder
forJudgeRogelioEstebantosignthevoucher.Mr.Brionesdidnotreleasethevoucherto
me[;]insteadheutteredthefollowingwordstotheeffectthat:[]nahihirapannaako,hindi
namanakokasalinadadamayakoitanongmokayAnaMaykungmagkanoanggustoniya
kung diyes mil o magkano ba talaga.At baka hindi niya nalalaman na malakas si Judge
EstebankayMayorVergarabakamaalissiyasaplantilya..Instead,Mr.Brionesinstructedme
totellAnaMaySimbajontoseehim;
5.There was also an instance sometime in July 1998 when again Ana May Simbajon
requestedmetosubmittotheMunicipalTrialCourtinCitiesherdetailordertotheofficeof
theCityMayorwhichisasupportingdocumentinorderforhertodrawhersalary[,]however,
neithertheofficeoftheclerkofcourtnorJudgeRogelioEstebanreceivedthedetailorder[;]
insteadJudgeRogelioEstebantoldmethathe[could]notaffixhisconformitytothedetail
orderandit[was]AnaMaySimbajonwhomtheyneed[ed].JudgeEstebanevenutteredbakit
kasiayawniyangmagpuntadito;
6.AlsosometimeinAugust1998,IagainwenttotheofficeofJudgeRogelioEstebanupon
request of Ana May Simbajon in order for Judge Esteban to sign the approval of her
voucher[;]again,JudgeRogelioEstebanrefusedtosignthevoucherandcommentedthathe
[would]firstconferwithMayorJayVergarabefore[signing]thesame;
7.Afteraweekorso,IreturnedtotheofficeofJudgeRogelioEstebanagainuponrequestof
Ana May Simbajon in order for said Judge to sign the approval of her
voucher.AccompanyingthevoucherwasadetailorderfromtheofficeoftheCityMayorwith
apersonalnoteaddressedtosaidJudge,anditwasonlyatthatinstancethatJudgeRogelio
EstebansignedthevoucherofAnaMaySimbajonforthemonthofJuly1998[;]infact,after
JudgeEstebansignedthevoucher,hepersonallyfoldedthedocumentsandplaced[them]
insideanenvelopeandsarcasticallycommentedespesyalito.
8.That I am executing this sworn statement to attest to the foregoing in support of the
complaint of Ana May Simbajon against Judge Rogelio Esteban and to prove that some
peopleareinfluencingAnaMaySimbajontodismissthiscomplaintagainstJudgeRogelio
Esteban.[12]
Respondents conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Not only did he fail to live
up to the high moral standards of the judiciary; he even transgressed the ordinary norms of

decency expected of every person. As the Court has often stressed, the conduct of a judge,
whether official or private, must be beyond reproach an above suspicion. A member of the
bench must not only be a good judge; he or she must also be a good person. [13] This is
necessary so as not to erode the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary. [14] In the
final analysis, such faith and confidence is anchored on the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness that judges are expected to possess. [15] As we ruled in Junio v. Rivera Jr.:[16]
Alljudges[o]nalllevelsofthejudicialhierarchy,fromthisCourtdowntotheMunicipalor
Metropolitan Trial Courts, are bound to observe the above exacting standards.There is,
however,aspecialreasonforrequiringcompliancewiththosestandardsfromthosewho,like
respondentJudgeRivera,areMunicipalorMetropolitanjudgesandareaccordinglyfront
linersofthejudicialdepartment.Assuch,aMunicipal(orMetropolitan)Judgeisthemost
visiblelivingrepresentationofthecountryslegalandjudicialsystem.Heisthejudicialofficer
whoonadaytodaybasisdealswiththedisputesarisingamongsimple,ruralpeoplewho
comprisethegreatbulkofourpopulation.Heisthejudicialofficerwhocomesintoclosest
andmostfrequentcontactwithourpeople.Thejudiciaryasawholeanditsabilitytodispense
justiceareinevitablymeasuredintermsofthepublicandprivateactsofjudgesinthegrass
rootslevel,likerespondentJudgePedroC.Rivera,Jr.Itisessential,therefore,ifthejudiciary
istoengageandretaintherespectandconfidenceofournation,thatthisCourtinsistthat
municipaljudgesandallotherjudgesliveuptothehighstandardsdemandedbyourcaselaw
andtheCodeofJudicialConductandbyourpolicy.
Respondents lustful conduct was aggravated by the fact that he was the superior of the
complainant. Instead of acting in loco parentis toward his subordinate employee, he took
advantage of his position and preyed on her.[17]
In Dawa v. De Asa,[18] the respondent judge was dismissed for making sexual advances on
three of his subordinates. Herein respondents conduct does not become less reprehensible for
having been perpetrated on only one employee. Without a doubt, respondent acted beyond the
bounds of decency and morality.[19] He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Rogelio M. Esteban is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part. Relationship to a party.
13. [G.R. No. 123048. August 8, 2000]

YOLANDA FLORALDE, NIDA VELASCO and NORMELITA

ALAMBRA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and PAULINO W. RESMA, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service
Commission dismissing respondent Paulino W. Resma from the service as
Division Chief of Specialist Services Division (SSD) and Officer-In-Charge of
Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), Department of Agriculture.
[1]

[2]

On April 23, 1994, petitioners employees of the ATI charged respondent

Paulino W. Resma with grave misconduct in office (sexual harassment) in three
separate complaints filed directly with the Civil Service Commission.
On August 30, 1994, the Commission gave due course to the complaints and
formally charged respondent with grave misconduct requiring him to submit his
answer with the affidavits of his witnesses, and placed him under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days effective upon notice.
On September 9, 1994, respondent filed his answer to the complaints. He
specifically denied all the accusations against him and asked for the dismissal
of the complaints.
On September 20, 1994, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal
investigation of the case.
At the hearing, petitioners affirmed the contents of their affidavits and gave the
specific dates during which the sexual harassment took place. Petitioners
categorically narrated the various incidents of sexual harassment, and they
were subjected to extensive cross-examination. On the other hand, five
witnesses testified for the respondent including himself. In essence, they
testified that the sexual harassment could not have occurred.
On February 17, 1995, the Commission convinced that the complainants had
proven the guilt of the respondent with substantial evidence, issued a resolution
finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
[3]

On March 6, 1995, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that

the Commission erred because the decision was not supported by evidence.
[4]

On April 18, 1995, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration.

[5]

On June 16, 1995, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
petition for review.
[6]

After due hearing, on September 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision which REVERSED and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission.

Hence, this appeal.

[7]

The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission on the ground that the same were
not supported by substantial evidence.
The sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three (3) rank
and file employees of the Agricultural Training Institute, where respondent
Paulino Resma is OIC. Being rank and file employees, they were all reporting
to their superior, Paulino Resma. Their time records were signed by the latter.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a
woman by reason of sexual desire; it is about power being exercised by a
superior officer over his women subordinates. The power emanates from the
fact that the superior can remove the subordinate from his workplace if the
latter would refuse his amorous advances.
This is the situation at bar. Yolanda Floralde, Nida Velasco and Normelita
Alambra were all rank and file employees reporting to respondent Paulino
Resma, and their Daily Time Records (DTRs) were signed by him.
Respondent Resma alleged that the Civil Service Commission erred in its
resolutions since the petitioners were unable to prove his guilt by the quantum
of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings.
We do not agree. The evidence adduced before the Commission consists of
the positive testimonies of petitioners. On the other hand, respondent claimed
that it was impossible for him to be at the office on the days that the sexual
harassment occurred. In other words, respondent presented an alibi.
Yolanda Floralde testified that it was around four in the afternoon at the
anteroom of the directors office that Paulino Resma approached her and ask
her " Ano yan, pagkatapos ako'y pinalapit sa kanyang kinaroroonan x x x
nanatili akong nakatayo ngunit maya-maya ay bigla na lang siyang tumayo at
dinakma ang puwit ko ng papisilpisil."
[8]

Floralde testified that this was not the only incident that respondent sexually
harassed her. Respondent would oftentimes tell her that "nakakagigil ang batok
mo, " and "masuwerte ka type kita, yung iba may gusto sa akin di ko
type." Respondent would also pinch her at her side close to her bust and when
they met at the corridors respondent would make a motion as though he would
embrace her.
[9]

Nida Velasco on the other hand testified that in 1990 Paulino Resma first made
his sexual advances toward her. According to Velsaco "habang binubuksan ko
po ang pinto ng refrigerator sa Orosa Hall, bigla po niya akong niyakap at
hinawakan niya ang maselang parte ng aking dibdib at bigla po akong
hinalikan sa bibig. Binantaan po niya ako na kapag nagsumbong ako ay hindi
niya irerenew ang aking appointment dahil casual lang po ako." Nida further
testified that respondent would often comment that "mamula-mula na ang iyong

pag-aari at fresh na fresh ka pa" and that she would answer back "lolo ka na
eh, gago ka pa. " At one time she was watching a volleyball game when she
felt someone touch her buttocks, when she looked back it was respondent
Resma, and the latter said "nakakagigil ka "
[10]

[11]

Normelita Alhambra on her part testified that in 1990 at around 7:00 in the
morning that after putting down her bag, respondent Resma suddenly
approached her and embraced her. She was able to escape from his embrace.
In other instances, Normelita testified that " tuwing maglalagay ako ng tubig sa
baso sa loob ng CR biglang sumusulpot si Mr. Resma at dinadakma ang puwit
ko at sinasabing gustong-gusto niya ang malalaking puwit. " Also at one time
Normelita testified that " nakasuot ako ng long sleeve na red at white maong
pants galing ako sa CR ng bigla akong binangga ni Mr. Resma at dinakma ang
aking dibdib.
[12]

[13]

Respondent's defense is that the complaints were instigated by a certain Atty.

Ola, who was his rival for promotion. The defense alleged that the three
complaining petitioners were all convinced by Atty. Ola to file charges against
respondent Resma so that he would be out of contention for promotion.
We are not convinced that all three women would prevaricate at the mere
urging of Atty. Ola. Filing a charge for sexual harassment is not a trivial matter.
It entails having to go public with an incident that one is trying to forget. It
means opening oneself to public ridicule and scrutiny. We, therefore, can not
believe the version of the defense that the charges were all fabricated.
As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service Commission is
supported by substantial evidence, we find that, in fact, preponderant evidence
supported its findings.
"In determining where the preponderance or the superior weight of evidence on
the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of
such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may
legitimately appear at the trial. The Court may also consider the number of
witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest
number." "By preponderance of evidence, is meant that the evidence as a
whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
[14]

[15]

"The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of

greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth."
[16]

Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the

Civil Service Commission. "Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the
findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, as long as such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not

be overwhelming or preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to

weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of
sufficiency of evidence."
[17]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals. In lieu thereof, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dismissing respondent Paulino W.
Resma from office for grave misconduct. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.