In discussing how his CRS meets the desiderata required from any

semantic theory applicable in psychology, Block notes that conceptual

role, as he construes them, determines the nature of referential role,
not of reference (p. 644). Now whatdoes the latter distinction amount
to? Apparently, he intends to flesh out this dichotomy by appealing to
Putnams twin earth thought experiment. Block claims, I take it, that
reference means the thing picked out in a certain possible world,
whereas referential factor would have a broader significance, i.e. it
would stand for the thing picked out across possible worlds: a word
with the conceptual role of water could map onto one substance here,
another on Twin Earth, and another on Triplet Earth. What is the head
conceptual

role-

determines

the

nature

of

reference

without

determining reference itself. (p. 644). Block seems to be implying

here, in Putnams smile,

that the reference of the term water on

Earth as compared to the reference of water on Twin Earth. For

Putman, water has different extensions in both cases because it
picks out two distinct types of liquids that are equal in macroscopic
features and yet different in chemical composition. But if water has
the same conceptual role both on earth and on Twin Earth, then
shouldnt it be a primary function of conceptual role precisely to
distinguish between things that are apparently similar and yet are
ultimately different in a deeper sense? Let me illustrate what I have in
mind with an example: reasonably, the conceptual role of water is

distinct from that of vodka, and yet they share many macroscopic
characteristics. However,

it would seem that by applying the

distinction between referential factor and reference,

one could

claim that water and vodka have different reference but the same
referential role again, both refer to liquids whose visible properties are
identical. My point is that, as I construe conceptual role, that is, as
inferences both warranting the application of a concept and licensing
what follow from such an application, the conceptual role of water
determines

not

only

referential

factor,

but

reference:

the

conceptual role of our concept of water is such that, upon encountering

on another planet a liquid that looks like water, I would NOT be entitled
to call it water unless I had at least some evidence that its chemical
composition is the same as that of the thing I normally pick out with
water. In other words, I cant seem to agree with Blocks claim that
a word with the conceptual role of our water could map onto one
substance here, another on Twin Earth, and another on Triplet Earth.
(p. 644)
Then Block discusses what, in my view, is the greatest merit of CRS:
unlike the various truth-conditional theories available, CRS does
succeed in explaining a crucial aspect of meaning often neglected by
representationalist semantic theories, i.e. linguistic understanding.
According to CRS, a , a speaker understands a new concept not when
she hypothesizes definitions for that concept in terms already known,

as Kripke would claim, but rather when she understands its cognitive
and communicative function (p. 646-647). Put differently, CRS brings
out what a responsible concept user in fact does in properly deploying
a concept, or language expression generally, i.e. understanding the
expressions inferential roles (pp. 645-648)