Miller e Saltzman, Beyond The Three Isms', Rethinking IR and The Post-Cold War Order

Original Article
Beyond the three ‘isms’: Rethinking IR and the

post-cold war order
Benjamin Millera,* with Ilai Z. Saltzmanb

a
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel.
E-mail: bmiller@poli.haifa.ac.il
b
Government Department, Claremont McKenna College, 500 E. Ninth St., Claremont, CA 91711, USA.
E-mail: ilai.saltzman@cmc.edu
*Corresponding author.
Abstract The division of IR theory into the ‘holy trinity’ of the three ‘isms’ (realism,
liberalism and constructivism) is the most common classification of theories in the field.
While this division has numerous theoretical benefits, it also has some major short-
comings with regard to the conceptualization of substantive changes in world politics,
especially in the post-Cold War security order. In order to better capture conceptually
these changes and also to be able to provide falsifiable predictions, we offer a novel con-
ceptual classification based on three key factors: (i) the level of analysis used by the
approach; (ii) whether the state continues to be the central actor in the international system
and (iii) whether the post-Cold War international system is more peaceful in relation to
previous eras. Each of the approaches identified in this work – ‘Liberal/Constructivist
Optimists’, ‘Hegemonic Optimists’, ‘New Conflict Pessimists’ and ‘Balance of Power
Pessimists’ – highlights different and sometimes contradictory aspects of these develop-
ments. We probe the empirical applicability of this novel typology on a sequential time
base since the end of the Cold War and find that each of these approaches accounts for the
major patterns of the international security order in a given time period but not in other
periods. We also briefly identify the conditions under which each one perspective is more
valid than the others for accounting for key patterns of international security.
International Politics advance online publication, 18 March 2016; doi:10.1057/ip.2016.3
Keywords: IR theory; realism; liberalism; constructivism; international order; post-Cold

War security
Introduction
This article advances a novel conceptualization of the changes in the post-Cold War
order. The objective is to strengthen the relations between IR theory and international
politics. We will do that by introducing a new classification of four conceptual
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30
www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/
Miller and Saltzman
approaches and applying it to the post-Cold War world. This four-fold classification
draws on the ‘holy trinity’ of the three ‘isms’ in IR theory, but aligns it more carefully
with post-Cold War changes.
The most common typology of International Relations (IR) theory is the conventional
triangle of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, pp. 24–25;
Lake, 2011; Maliniak et al, 2011; Sil and Katzenstein, 2011; and Nau, 2011). While
useful for numerous theoretical purposes, this division does not capture the essence of
some of the key changes in the international order (Bull, 1977; Sørensen, 2011),
especially in international security, which took place since the end of the Cold War as we
elaborate in this article. We argue that this is at least partly due to the mismatch between
the conventional theoretical triangle and some of the key substantive issues and
components of the post-Cold War international security order (namely, war and peace),
in the following ways:
First, despite the numerous theoretical differences between them, liberals
and most constructivists usually share quite a similar substantive position on some
of the key issues involved in the debate on the nature of the post-Cold War
security order and on some of the underlying conceptual elements (Rathbun, 2012,
p. 613). We call this approach the ‘Second-Image/Non-State-Centric Optimists’.
For the purpose of clarity or simplicity – we call them Liberal/Constructivist-
Optimists.
Second, the traditional typology misses a key post-Cold War perspective, which
has distinctive positions on substantive issues pertaining to international security and
more generally on the key concept of anarchy; We call this approach ‘Second-Image/
Non-State-Centric Pessimists’ (or briefly – New Conflict Pessimists – as this approach
underlines the dominance of new type of conflicts in the post-Cold War Era).
Third, the third paradigm – realism – is split down the middle on the peace/
stability nature of the international system between two different realist approaches:
‘Third-Image/State-Centric Optimists’ (or Hegemonic Optimists) versus ‘Third-Image/
State-Centric Pessimists’ (or Balance of Power [BOP] Pessimists).
Lastly, realism and constructivism (though less so liberalism) do not provide
coherent and falsifiable predictions or prescriptions, making it extremely difficult to
confront their expectations with the empirical record.
Thus, we argue that there is a need to better align the common typology of IR
theory to key approaches used to analyze the contemporary international security
order. This can be done by focusing on three key factors consisting of Waltz’s
enduring level of analysis question (Waltz, 1959) and two additional issues that have
generated major debates in the post-Cold War era (Waltz, 1993; Harrison, 2004):
(i) whether the post-Cold War international system is more peaceful than earlier
configurations, especially the bipolar era (Patman, 1999; Lynn-Jones and Miller,
2001); and (ii) whether the state is still the central actor in the international system or
whether non-state actors are replacing it as the key actors (Guehenno, 1995; Hobson,
2000; Seymour, 2004).
2 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30
Beyond the three ‘isms’
This second issue relates to the level of analysis in the following way: a third-
image (structural/systemic) analysis is state-centric and the state is seen as a unitary
actor in contrast to the second-image analysis, which allows for much more influence
of various non-state/domestic actors on the international behavior of the state
(Hobson, 2000: Chapters 2 and 3).
With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing and even contra-
dictory expectations about the likely character of post-Cold War international
security. Among the large number of predictions which were voiced, some were
optimistic while others were quite pessimistic; others foresaw more continuity in
international politics emphasizing the circular nature of world politics.
More specifically, in this post-Cold War marketplace of explanations, four leading
predictions have emerged. The most optimistic with regard to the end of major
conflict was Fukayama’s (1989, 1992) notion of ‘the End of History’, celebrating the
termination of East–West rivalry and the universal victory of liberalism, and
anticipating the end of major geo-political conflicts. In contrast, two scholars with
completely different views suggested more pessimistic predictions. Mearsheimer
(1990a, b) claimed that rather than ‘a brave new world’, the post-Cold War era will
resemble more the conflictual world of ‘Back to the Future’. Just as pessimistic was
Huntington (1993a) who predicted some major international conflicts under the cloak
of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’.1 The fourth perspective, articulated by scholars such
as Krauthammer (1990/91) underlined the emerging distribution of capabilities and
its implications during ‘the Unipolar Moment’.
About two decades or so have passed since these predictions were made. In order
to evaluate their validity, we need, however, to introduce a fresh classification of key
perspectives on international security, which accounts for the historical develop-
ments we witnessed ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in
international security. This novel taxonomy embeds the predictions in a larger
conceptual framework, which integrates approaches to international security with IR
theories. We find the existing theoretical classifications lacking in some fundamental
ways, as we elaborate below, and thus introduce a new set of conceptual approaches
to international security. This new typology contributes to a more accurate and
nuanced evaluation of the character of the post-Cold War international security order.
This article will focus on the following twin objectives: first, introducing a novel
classification of the key approaches to post-Cold War international security.
We incorporate these key predictions, expressed with the end of the Cold War, into
four major approaches for the study of the international security order, while making
explicit the fundamental logic behind each one of them as well as their similarities
and differences. We argue that the division of the three ‘isms’ – realism, liberalism
and constructivism – is not sufficiently helpful for studying post-Cold War
international security; therefore, we will present an alternative quadruple typology.
Second, we do not claim that this new typology substitutes the leading triangle in the
more theoretical/scientific sense of epistemology and ontology. Our claim is rather
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30 3
Miller and Saltzman
much more modest – that this novel typology makes empirical probing of the
character of the post-Cold War security order considerably more effective. We do
that by presenting a brief illustration of the applicability of the four approaches to
different time periods since 1989. This can be only suggestive at this stage as even a
quarter of a century may be too little time to confidently conclude how each approach
will work out. Surely, no devotee of a particular approach would say it always applies
everywhere. Elements and patterns of several or even all of the approaches can be
found in operation at any one time. Still, even a relatively brief empirical application
of the four approaches can be useful for showing the utility of this new classification
and its potential relevance for the post-Cold War security order.
Accordingly, we begin by succinctly outlining some of the limitations of the most
common explanations for the post-Cold War international security order: realism,
liberalism and constructivism. The second section will present a new classification that
differentiates among four novel approaches to the world security order: second-image
(and non-state-centric) Optimists; third-image (and state-centric) Optimists; second-
image (and non-state-centric) Pessimists; and third-image (and state-centric) Pessimists.
The third section will exemplify the utility of the four ideal-type approaches by applying
their logic to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era. The final section will conclude the
theoretical contributions of this article and offer some suggestions for future research.
IR’s Holy Trinity and its Limits
Most of the theoretical literature in IR which deals with the post-Cold War
international security order is still evolving around the traditional differentiation
between the existing triumvirate of IR paradigms: realism, liberalism and constructi-
vism. The dominance of this division also becomes clear in the major overviews of
the IR literature in recent years by, for example, Walt (1998), Jervis (2002), Snyder
(2004), Friedberg (2005) and Betts (2010).
This dominant classification does not capture, however, some of the most
important issues and variations in the post-Cold War international order, especially
with regard to the centrality of the state and the challenges it confronts (from both
‘good’ and ‘bad’ actors) and also with regard to the extent of stability/peace in the
system. In order to address these key issues, we need a new distinction which, while
drawing on enduring IR theory questions (such as the level of analysis), captures
some of the key elements of the post-Cold War security order by introducing the
four-fold typology introduced here. More specifically, this distinction refines the
conventional ‘isms’ typology in the following ways:
(a) What we call the Second-Image Optimists include liberals and most (although
definitely not all) of constructivists as both share very similar views regarding
the nature of the emerging order after the Cold War, thus they can be seen as
affiliated with the same substantive approach to world order despite some major
theoretical differences.2
(b) The Second-Image Pessimists, who are absent from the traditional ‘ism’ triangle,
include not only Huntington’s concept of the ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ but also the
‘failed states’ syndrome (and the related newly emerging asymmetric security
threats of terrorism/warlords/militias/insurgents/guerrillas/drug cartels and so on)
despite the major differences between these two type of challenges.
(c) The Third-Image (who are also state-centric) analysts as we call them here, or
realists as they may also be called, are divided into two clusters: Optimists, who
are hegemonic stability theorists whose approach coincides with ‘The Unipolar
Moment’ proposition and Pessimists who tend to be proponents of balance of
power (BOP) theory who believe in the idea of ‘Back to the Future’.
We start the discussion of the new classification by introducing some of the basic
theoretical differences among the two variants (second and third-image) of both
Optimists and Pessimists (see Tables 1A and 1B) and then we move into a presen-
tation of the four-fold typology based on three key factors: the level of analysis, the
centrality of the state and the effects of the end of the Cold War on international
peace (see Table 2).
Optimists and Pessimists: Conceptual Differences
Table 1A is based on the three components of the Waltzian international structure:

the ordering principle – anarchy; the key units – the states and the lack of functional
differentiation among them; and the distribution of capabilities – the key element
which differentiates among the states (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 5 and 6). Table 1B
presents the three dimensions generating the two-by-two typology of the four
approaches: the level of analysis, the view of the meaning of the end of the Cold
War with regard to war and peace, and the importance and nature of non-state actors.
A major point of division is the conception of anarchy in the post-Cold War
world order. While second-image Optimists argue that international anarchy is being
transformed and a much more cooperative community of states (Katzenstein, 1996;
Adler and Barnett, 1998; Oneal and Russet, 2001), and a global civil society of non-
state actors (Matthews, 1997; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003; Slaughter, 2004; Kaldor
et al, 2012), are replacing the old BOP system, the second-image Pessimists highlight
the detrimental change in the character and locus of anarchy (Job, 1992; Ayoob, 1995;
Holsti, 1996; Patrick, 2011). What is relevant for these Pessimists is not so much the
international anarchy among states, but the anarchy inside states, at least in some of
them; although this has implications for regional and international security much
beyond these weak states. For third-image/state-centric theorists (the Realists),
however, international anarchy endures in the post-Cold War era as it always was the
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Table 1: The schools – key differences
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
1A. The three components of the Waltzian international structure
Anarchy States/Great Powers Material capabilities
second-Image Optimists Transformed Change/decline Less relevant

second-Image Pessimists Inside the state Become Weaker Ineffective
third-Image Optimists and Pessimists Unchanged Key actors Key factor
1B. The Dimensions producing the 2×2 typology of the four approaches
The approach End of the cold war/bipolarity Non-state actors Level of analysis
Second-image Optimists Inspiration for peace ‘good guys’ on the rise Domestic/Second-image/state character
Second-image Pessimists New types of conflicts ‘bad guys’ on the rise Domestic/second image/state character
International Politics
Third-Image Optimists Major Structural effects, producing a Marginal to great powers and state actors International structure/Third image
peaceful& durable unipolar system
Third-image Pessimists Major structural effects, producing a Marginal to great powers and state actors International structure/third image
conflictual & transitory ‘unipolar’
system on the way toward an
imminent return to a BOP system
1–30
Table 2: Predictions – Typology of the major approaches to international security in the post-cold war era
The effects of the end of the cold war/globalization
Level of analysis/is the Benign De-stabilizing

state the central actor?
third image/state-centric 1 2
(the realists) Hegemonic Optimists Balance of Power Pessimists
The benign hegemon/pacifying Inter-State, esp. Great power, conflict
effects ● Abuse of power by a revisionist
● The hegemon as peacemaker hegemon due to lack of balance
● Stabilizing interventions led by of power
the hegemon ● Balancing by rising/revisionist
great powers
second- image/ 4 3
Non-state-centric Liberal/constructivist-Optimists New conflict Pessimists
International Peace&Cooperation Violent non-state actors
● The liberal/cooperative/ ● The failed state
peaceful/status quo state ● Clash of civilizations
● Regional integration ● Terrorism
● International institutions ● Civil wars
● Humanitarian intervention ● Trans-border violence
● INGOs ● Foreign interventions
● Democratic peace ● Asymmetric conflicts
● Economic interdependence ● Democratization and War
● The information Revolution ● Warlords, armed militias
● Social networks ● Transnational Crime
defining attribute of international politics. This means that international institutions

continue to reflect state interests and positional relations, and that the distribution of
capabilities among states persists to be the key determinant of international outcomes.3
The perspective’s conception of anarchy has major implications for their views
of the centrality of the state as the key actor in world politics (Sørensen, 2004).
For both versions of the Realists, the state continues to be the central actor,
particularly the great powers, which determine the key outcomes in international
politics either through hegemony of one of them or BOP among them (Waltz, 1979;
Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2001). In the eyes of second-image Optimists, the
centrality of the state as the key actor in world politics is in relative decline when
compared with non-state actors, operating above the level of the state – in the global
level (Barnett and Duvall, 2004), as well as below it – as part of states’ domestic
affairs and also transnationally. The state is also undergoing a major transformation
of its character from a competitive actor to a cooperative member of international
institutions and regional integration frameworks. From such a vantage point, states’
freedom of choice has become increasingly constrained by rising economic

Miller and Saltzman
interdependence, multilateral arrangements and universal norms such as those related

to human rights (Hurrell, 2007, p. 65). Second-image Pessimists argue that states are
becoming materially and ideationally weaker in relation to a variety of non-state and
trans-border actors, especially violent ones that undermine the traditional role of the
state as the legitimate and ample security-generating sociopolitical entity in inter-
national politics (Kaldor, 2006).
Indeed, while both second-image Optimists and Pessimists share the view that
non-state actors are on the rise in relation to the state, they have completely different
views about the character of rising non-state actors. For the Optimists, these are
‘good guys’ that include international institutions, regional integration and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. For the Pessimists, these are violent groups such as terrorist
networks, armed militias and drug cartels (Shultz and Dew, 2009).
The perspectives also diverge with regard to Waltz’s claim that all states are similar
because they fulfill similar functions. While the third-image scholars (the realists)
basically share this point of view, for the second-image Optimists, there is also a
transformation in the functions some states carry out – from the focus on military
security to a greater emphasis on trade (Rosecrance, 1986) and ‘soft power’ of culture
and diplomacy (Nye, 2004). Thus, in their view there is an increasing differentiation in
the functions the states fulfill. According to the second-image Pessimists, there is also a
growing differentiation between well-functioning states versus malfunctioning states
which lack effective institutions even in the key area of internal (but also external)
security (Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988; Mann, 1993; Ayoob, 1995).
The perspectives have also competing views about the relevance of differences in
material capabilities for determining key patterns and outcomes in the international
order. Because of the rising importance of common liberal norms and ideas, and the
institutions which promote them, second-image Optimists believe that gaps in
material power should matter much less than before. Second-image Pessimists
highlight the growing constraints on the utility of superior resources, especially
vis-à-vis failed states and extremist groups, which resort to asymmetrical warfare.
For both camps of the realists, however, gaps in material capabilities continue to be
the key determining factor in international politics (Waltz, 1979; Wohlforth, 1999;
Mearsheimer, 2001).
The perspectives also differ in their views about the meaning of the end of the Cold
War. For second-image Optimists, the peaceful end serves as an inspiration for the
way intransigent and protracted conflicts will end via both the ‘power of example’ of
the ‘big guys on the block’, as well as the material effects of the end of superpower
support for various antagonists around the world. For second-image Pessimists, the
end of the Cold War opened the floodgates for the rise of new asymmetric conflicts,
such as those involving Al-Qaeda, culminating with 9/11 and its aftermath or the
revival of dormant conflicts, especially in the former Soviet sphere such as in the
Balkans and the Caucuses. For third-image analysts (the realists), the transition from
a bipolar to a unipolar world generated a lot of compelling consequence (even if

third-image Optimists differ from third-image Pessimists in evaluating the nature
of the consequences). The Cold War ended, however, the way all international
conflicts have always ended: the stronger party, possessing superior material
capabilities (the United States), won and got the benefits from its victory, although
a peaceful one, either due to nuclear deterrence or because of the fact that the weaker
party (the USSR), rather than the hegemon, had declined in its material resources
(Wohlforth, 1994–95). But, at any rate, the end of the Cold War does not constitute
an inspiration for a ‘brave new world’ of peace and cooperation or a complete shift to
new types of asymmetric conflicts. Rather, the world continues to function within a
competitive anarchy as has been true over the millennia.
The Four-Fold Classification
Which are the most useful criteria for classifying post-Cold War security approaches?
This article’s novel typology is based on three major factors, two of which are partly
overlapping and thus can be collapsed into a single category, which in turn allows us
to distinguish among four ideal-type approaches (see Table 2): (i) which is the key
level of analysis: domestic or systemic and the partly overlapping question – does the
state continue to be the central actor in world politics? and (ii) whether the post-Cold
War system will be more or less peaceful than the Cold War era? With regard to the
first issue, the realists’ view is that the international systemic level is the most
important factor and that the state, as a unitary actor, continues to be the key actor in
world politics. In contrast, both the second-image Optimists and the second-image
Pessimists argue that the state level is the most important (especially whether the
state is liberal or failed), while the unitary-actor state is in relative decline as the
central actor in relation to non-state actors. According to the Liberal/Constructivist-
Optimists, the liberal/cooperative/status quo state allows for the working and the
major influence of the ‘good’ non-state actors, whereas according to second-image
Pessimists, violent ‘bad’ non-state actors exercise overwhelming influence in failed
states.
There are also two competing positions with regard to the effects of the second
factor. Third-image Optimists view the effects of the end of the Cold War and the rise
of globalization as benign because of the change of the system from bipolarity
to unipolarity in contrast to third-image Pessimists who, for their part, see more
de-stabilizing effects. Second-image Optimists, on the other hand, highlight the
benign effects of globalization and the post-Cold War dominance of various liberal
factors. Second-image Pessimists believe, however, that the highly globalized
post-Cold War era will be characterized by a variety of new detrimental security
threats and new types of emerging conflicts.

Miller and Saltzman
Second-image/non-state-centric/liberal/constructivist-optimists
In this group we can find scholars affiliated with both the liberal and constructivist
schools in IR, working especially on the domestic level of analysis, and sharing a
similar belief in the peaceful and cooperative character of the post-Cold War era.
Though they differ in their theoretical reasoning, liberals and at least most
constructivists believe that the peaceful ending of the Cold War and the demise of
the Soviet Union presented a golden opportunity to spread and embed the same
nonviolent ideas and institutions that brought this era to an end. As Russett (1993,
p. 138) had argued, expressing second-image Optimist logic: ‘the emergence of new
democracies with the end of the Cold War presents an opening for change in the
international system more fundamental than at the end of other big wars… If the
chance for wide democratization can be grasped and consolidated, international
politics might be transformed’.
Liberals, to begin with, see the primarily normative and institutional dimen-
sion of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) as the underlying mechanism for
the spread of peace and security. Whether it is the norms of democratic regimes
that encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts among democracies, or the
procedural feature of democracy that reduces the prospects of armed conflict
among them, the spread of democracies should result in greater stability and
peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russet, 1993; Ray, 1995). As the Soviet Union
collapsed and numerous states reclaimed their independence or autonomy and
commanded a process of political democratization and economic liberalization,
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, the DPT was put into practice with
the expectation of preventing a resurgence of regional instability (Ward and
Gleditsch, 1998).
Another liberal strand focuses on the positive and stabilizing nexus between
economic cooperation and peace and stability, as their motto ‘better trade than
invade’ clearly suggests (Rosecrance, 1986). It highlights the stabilizing effects of
economic interdependence and the premise that the benefits of trade far exceed the
utility of war, making the latter expendable or illogical from a utilitarian perspective.
If wars of the past were fought over control of territory and resources, in modern time
economic development combined with technological progress deem these objectives
to be obsolete. With the further opening of the international system to free trade in the
post-Cold War and the reduction to barriers on foreign direct investment and
monetary transactions to different parts of the international system, the pacifying
effects of economic interdependence should increase dramatically (Oneal and
Russett, 1997).
As for the role of the state, liberals traditionally considered the role of the state
instrumental to international politics. However, they were receptive to various
erosion processes that the states, as a political entity, had experienced throughout
the years. Indeed, as the Cold War had ended, and the rise of globalization,
democratization and international governance captured the eyes and minds of many
liberals, so did the state began to lose its preeminence in parts of liberal political
thought. Consequently, liberals called for a reevaluation of the roles the state may
play in the post-Cold War era. According to Hoffmann (1998), the eroding nature of
the modern nation-state as an international actor results from the outdated distinction
between the domestic and the international and the gradual yet continuous move
toward an intermestic approach (See also Held, 1995; Cha, 2000). Forces from within
and outside wear down the central government’s autonomy and freedom of action,
and under such circumstances, McGrew (1997, p. 10) maintains, ‘the Westphalian
institution of sovereign statehood no longer appears as robust as it may once have
done’.
Liberal Optimists believe that the end of the Cold War and the intensification of
globalization facilitated the strengthening of cooperative sub-state ‘government
networks’ (Slaughter, 2004). Globalization has also made possible the emergence of
various ‘good’ and benign non-state actors at the expense of the state, includ-
ing INGOs, international institutions and Multi-National Corporations that are
expected to reduce the danger of war and further increase the level of international
transparency and cooperation (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Mathews, 1997; Keck and
Sikkink, 1998).
Despite growing controversy among theorists as to the effect of democratization
on the likelihood of war and instability (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Miller, 2007),
liberals suggest that the political transformation actually encourages restraint and
nonviolence. As Ward and Gleditsch (1998, p. 60) maintain, ‘it appears that the
broad and overall effect of democratization is to promote peace’. For that reason,
liberals argue in favor of increasing the number of democracies in the world through
a sustained democratization process. Indeed, the prescriptive recipe of liberal
Optimists was actually quickly adopted and applied by the Clinton Administration
throughout the 1990s. As Clinton and his advisors identified the spread of democracy
and economic interdependence as the solutions to the post-Cold War international
predicament, it was only natural that these elements have become the American
foreign policy catchphrases with ‘enlargement’ as its interwoven slogan (Lake, 1993;
for a critique see Carothers, 1994).
Constructivists, on the other hand, present a more ideational-based descriptive and
prescriptive argument for post-Cold War security and stability. They believe that
world politics is socially constructed. Hence for Constructivists, the possibility to
achieve and maintain peace is, in fact, a function of ideational changes that the end
of the Cold War created or at least encouraged and their codification hereafter
(Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 502). Consequently, the ideas and understandings that
created and preserved the Cold War’s bipolar world order gave way in its aftermath
to ideas of progress and universalism to the extent that the global discourse
had changed and improved inter-state interaction correspondingly (Wendt, 1992;
Finnemore, 2003).
Miller and Saltzman
The conclusion is that instability and international rivalry can be prevailed over
and it is the nature of the social interaction that may transform a ‘zone of
confrontation’ such as the post-Soviet sphere into a celebrated ‘zone of peace’ and
tranquility through a process of normative and political socialization that system-
atically and deliberately transformed the behavioral and ideational foundations of
state identity into a benevolent one (Schimmelfenni, 2000). Through the use of
agents for normative change, such as Western and Western European institutions,
including NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it was possible for the victors of the Cold War to
‘reprogram’ the inter-subjective identity of various former Soviet-ruled countries in
order to reduce the risks of inter-state conflict but also, and perhaps more
importantly, eliminate intra-state conflict (Flynn and Farrell, 1999).
Just as international anarchy or animosity is a social construction that results from
the mutually constitutive nature of international politics, so can the structure and
functions of the state as a social edifice may change over time. In other words, states
are a normative-adaptive entity, to use Finnemore’s (1996, p. 128) terminology, that
can be ‘socialized to accept certain preferences and expectation by the international
society in which they and the people who compose them live’. More critically,
ideational theorists such as the postmodernists argue, for example, that the state has
been non-existent as a genuine material or institutional entity ever since the creation
of the Westphalian state system. From their perspective, all states are the fabrication
of inter-subjective notions of legitimacy that are constantly and increasingly
challenged by globalization and other processes that erode the internal and external
validity of this ideational formation and that were especially intensified in the post-
Cold War era (Shapiro and Alker, 1996).
The way to translate constructivist research into a policy-oriented prescriptive
outline is highly risky. Nevertheless, it would principally consist of the different
ways that norms, identities and interest may be proactively constructed in a certain
fashion in order to encourage peace and stability rather than rivalry and competition
that were cultivated during the Cold War (Walt, 1998, p. 41). For example,
Frederking (2003, p. 376) argued that the world is experiencing a trend supporting
and encouraging increased collective security which is characterized by an ongoing
attempt to legitimize certain practices and disapprove others. ‘Through this inter-
action’, Frederking maintains, ‘linguistically competent agents challenge and/or
perpetuate the rules constituting world politics’.
More specifically, Constructivist-Optimists focus on normative changes in favor of
universal human rights irrespective of ethnicity and nationality, and the emergence of
new ideas on peaceful cooperation and reconciliation starting to dominate interna-
tional politics with the peaceful end of the Cold War (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore,
2003). These ideas were expected to spread more quickly and widely than before,
partly due to the information revolution that, in turn, inhibits the ability of states to
manipulate their citizens. The combined effect of all these changes should make
states more peaceful and status quo-oriented, and discourage violent attempts to
change the current world order, while also leading to a decline in the centrality of the
state as the key actor in world politics. One key manifestation of the spread of
new peaceful ideas and norms is the rise of ‘security communities’, which also
incorporate new regional identities, transcending the nation-state and anticipating the
growing deterritorialization of world politics (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Mansbach,
2002).
Second- image/non-state-centric/new conflict pessimists
Despite the numerous differences among the New Conflict Pessimists, they share
similar answers to the three key questions addressed here. While focusing on the
nature of the state, these scholars believe the state is in decline due to the various
processes of globalization and the lack of unconditional support by the Cold War
superpowers to their clients. Moreover, in the post-Cold War/globalization era, the
state is replaced by violent, ‘bad’ non-state actors, which benefit from states’ decline,
while these actors also contribute to this process by challenging the state and further
weakening it.
The outcome is the spread of ‘failed states’ – lacking the monopoly over the means
of violence within their sovereign territory, while having ineffective, malfunctioning
state institutions (Gros, 1996; Traub, 2011; Patrick, 2011). These conditions
encourage the proliferation of ‘bad’ non-state actors such as extreme ethno-
nationalists, secessionists, terrorists including suicide bombers, religious fundamen-
talists, warlords, armed militias, drug traffickers, transnational criminal syndicates
and various anti-Western ‘civilization’ groups and organizations whose anti-Western
anarchist agenda is either on an economic basis (anti-globalization) or due to cultural
opposition, especially advocates of radical Islam (Rotberg, 2002; Kaldor, 2006;
Lowenheim, 2007; Snyder, 2011; Shah, et al, 2012).
The volume of work associated with the idea that the end of the Cold War
essentially revolutionized the security environment has grown immensely by the
mid-1990s, and especially in face of the different security challenges that emanated
from erosion in traditional great power politics that the Soviet Union and
the United States played since the end of the Second World War. For example,
some observers alleged that the collapse of the Soviet Union could contribute
directly and indirectly to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology
associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Directly since the Soviets
had some restraining influence over their clients’ behavior and proliferation
policies, and indirectly because Soviet nuclear technology that was shared with
three of the former republics – in addition to Russia – became ‘loose nukes’ –
practically unmonitored and unaccounted for (Nye, 1992, p. 85). Moreover, with
the collapse of Yugoslavia, the ethnic fragmentation in the Balkans and the spread
Miller and Saltzman
of civil wars in other regions, various studies began to question the relevance
of existing paradigms and theories of warfare that apparently did not fit the
new trends in interstate and especially intra-state security (Van Creveld, 1991;
Kaldor, 2006).
Among the very first, Huntington (1993a, p. 22) advocated the need to talk
of civilizations as the key fault lines in the emerging security environment:
‘The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future’. The implication was not
only a potential clash between states from different civilizations but also
internal conflicts in states where people from a number of civilizations live.
A key example is the former Yugoslavia where people from three civilizations
(in Huntingtonian terms) lived together until the end of the Cold War, but
following its termination, some major internal conflicts emerged among the
different ethnic groups especially those affiliated with the different civilizations:
Orthodox/Eastern Christians (the Serbs) against Muslim (in Bosnia and Kosovo);
and Orthodox against Western Christians – the Croats (Huntington, 1996, for
example, see p. 208).
Other Pessimists like Kaplan (1994, 1997, 2000), characterized the post-Cold
War international security environment as comprising of various ‘fragile’ states
or political units that suffer from a number of overlapping deficiencies such as
environmental scarcity, food shortage, cultural and racial clash and ethnic conflict
that have a negatively devastating effect on regional peace and stability.
Indeed, Maynes (1993, p. 5) argued that rather than solely focusing on traditional
conceptions of security, ‘animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the
spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces’.
In the eyes of many Pessimists, the problem of security has moved in the aftermath of
the Cold War from the international, inter-state arena to the domestic arena – internal
to the states – of civil wars and trans-border violence. For them, globalization, rather
than pacifying the world, as expected by the Optimists, in reality promotes instability
(Keating, 2001).
Ethnic conflict and various armed militias, separatists, religious fundamentalists,
warlords, terrorists and drug traffickers take refuge in collapsing states – making the
failure of weak states much more likely in the first place. Rice (2005), in her position
as Secretary of State during the Bush administration, argued similarly:
The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they
now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods and information traverse the
globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism
can inflict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states. Absent
responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a
country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc. Weak
and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of
pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of

the world's most dangerous weapons.
Scholars affiliated with this group believe that state-building is the best remedy to
engage the major post-Cold War challenges to stability and peace. From their
perspective, threats to peace emanate from the flawed and failing structure of states,
especially in the Third World but also in other faltering regions such as the post-
Soviet sphere. These underlying deficiencies encourage the growth of extremism,
terrorism, political radicalization and general lawlessness (Helman and Ratner,
1992–1993). Thus, the solution must first involve the proactive creation and
protection of state agencies that will impose governments’ monopoly over the use
of violence. In turn, this will inhibit the growth of politically and militarily parasitical
groups and promote order and stability that can strengthen regional peace (Ayoob,
1995; Krasner, 2004; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Haims et al, 2008).
Beyond the key component of the monopoly over the means of violence, state and
institution-building should include constructing legitimate and professional law and
order institutions, effective and unbiased state bureaucracy, independent court
system, professional military and police force and free media. A key point is that
public institutions should be effective, functioning and professional, so that they
would be able to deliver key services to all the citizens of the state, irrespective of
ethnicity, in the area of law and order, infrastructure (water, electricity, transportation
and so on), social services and public education, thus preventing the hijacking of
these services by radical religious or nationalist organizations (Paris, 2004;
Fukuyama, 2004). As Cohen (1992, p. 32) commented, failed states ‘need our
understanding, assistance and perhaps direct intervention to achieve the kind of
stability that benefits them individually, and the world collectively’.
Third-image/state-centric pessimists (or BOP pessimists)
This group of theorists does not share the view about the decline of the state, while
they share the pessimistic view about the de-stabilizing effects of the end of the Cold
War, particularly the collapse of the bipolar world. Thus, we call them Third-Image/
State-Centric Pessimists or BOP Pessimists.
The BOP school argues that hegemony is not feasible because of the effective
functioning of the balancing mechanism as in the cases of Philip II, Louis XIV,
Napoleon, German Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler (Posen, 1984, pp. 68–69; Rosecrance,
1999, pp. 56–58; Van Evera, 1999, p. 9; Layne, 2006). At the same time,
preservation of the balance among the great powers helps to maintain the peace.4
A major example is the nineteenth century Concert of Europe which both maintained
the balance among the five great European powers and succeeded in keeping the
peace starting from the 1815 Congress of Vienna and at least until the eruption of the
Crimean War in 1854 (Miller, 2002).
Miller and Saltzman
In this view, the inherent balancing tendencies in world politics have two major
implications: first, states will tend to join the weaker coalition (Waltz, 1979, p. 127;
Walt, 1987, pp. 18–19; Layne, 1997, p. 16); second, an imbalance among the major
powers will trigger great efforts by the lesser among them to catch up with the
‘hegemon’ through alliance building and expansion of their own power base. Thus,
the end result of disequilibrium could be more intensive competition and a more
dangerous situation than in a state of parity. In contrast, the achievement of rough
equality would reduce the incentives for a rising power to challenge the status quo.
With the end of the Cold War, scholars who were especially affiliated with Waltz’s
structural realism began to argue that the modification of the international system
from a bipolar to a unipolar constellation will result in renewed inter-state chaos and
instability. They believed that the most stable international arrangement is BOP in
which the great powers constantly check and balance each other, a pattern leading to
moderate and cautious behavior, thus reducing the danger of war or the infringement
on the autonomy of small states. In the absence of a balance, the hegemonic
power will expand and abuse its superior power (Claude, 1962, p. 65; Bull, 1977,
pp. 110–111; and Waltz, 1993, p. 189; 2000, p. 13, 27; 2009, pp. 31–32), while the
other powers will try to counterbalance it (Waltz, 1979: l27; Rosecrance, 1987,
pp. 56–58; Walt, 1987, pp. 18–19; Layne, 2006, p. 16) leading to arms races,
tensions, conflicts and instability (Layne, 1993).
BOP Pessimists echo the fundamental premise of BOP theory that ‘without a
state of equilibrium among them one element will gain ascendancy over the
others, encroach upon their interest and rights, and may ultimately destroy them’
(Morgenthau, 1973, p. 169; Waltz, 2000, p. 28). As the international system appeared
to be moving toward a condition of an imbalanced concentration of power after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the stable bipolar structure of the Cold
War, these scholars feared a renewed struggle for power and influence in Europe and
around the world. Thus, Mearsheimer (1990a) lamented the disappearance of the
simplicity and restraining effects of the relatively stable bipolar world order and
warned that we ‘will we soon miss the Cold War’.
Elsewhere, Mearsheimer (1990b) depicted the future of Europe under renewed multi-
polarity to be rather ominous given that the United States and the Soviet Union were
expected to terminate their military presence in the continent and disengage politically.
Under such conditions, Mearsheimer (1990b, p. 52) predicted that ‘the demise of the Cold
War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe’.
In this regard, what BOP Pessimists fear the most is the emergence of a nationalism-driven,
nuclear capable, revisionist states in either the global or the regional level that would
bluntly offset the already fragile systemic constellation in this period of post-Cold War
reorientation (Van Evera, 1990–1991; Schweller (1994)).
BOP Pessimists see the unipolar constellation as something that can easily threaten
the regional and global peace and stability as the hegemonic power will face no
countervailing coalition to prevent it from pursuing expansionist policies. Under the
control of a hegemonic power, these scholars posit, there can be no assurance for
the security and national interests of the weaker actors because they will always
be at the mercy of the unipole (Layne, 1993). Yet, because of the lack of a
countervailing coalition, the hegemon will expand constantly, leading to an over-
stretch, which eventually might bring about its decline and thus the end of unipolarity
(Kennedy, 1987).
In terms of the state decline variable, BOP Pessimists remain convinced that the state
is still the major political entity in international affairs. They see little if no devaluation
in the role states play and only differentiate between weaker or stronger actors based on
their material capabilities and resources. Scholars holding this position argue that the
state is neither endangered by ethnic fragmentation nor by multi-national corporations
and other globalization-induced supranational economic entities and trends. As Waltz
(1999, p. 696, 697) argued, ‘The twentieth century was the century of the nation-state.
The twenty-first will be too … The range of governmental functions and the extent of
state control over society and economy has seldom been fuller than it is now … The
challenges vary; states endure. They have proved to be hardy survivors’. With regard to
one of the key threats to the state highlighted by second-image Pessimists, BOP
Pessimists see the threat posed by terrorists as a limited one – terrorism is the weapon
of the weak, which cannot pose a major threat to the national security of strong states or
the stability of the system as a whole (Waltz, 2009, pp. 34–35).
From a prescriptive point of view, BOP Pessimists maintain that while the
hegemon cannot and should not relinquish its predominance unilaterally and
abruptly, it should progressively facilitate the creation of a new BOP arrangement
in the global and regional levels. In other words, the hegemon ought to allow and
encourage the peaceful rise of other security-seeking powers that would assume
responsibility of maintaining the equilibrium alongside the hegemon. The hegemon,
in turn, should pursue an ‘offshore balancing’ grand strategy that would prevent the
resurgence of uncontrolled power politics by pledging to intervene whenever and
wherever the BOP in key regions is threatened. In ‘normal times’, the regional order
is based on mutual balancing among the regional powers and the curtailment of
attempts at reaching regional hegemony. According to the ‘offshore balancing’
strategy, the hegemon encourages the mutual balancing among the regional powers
without its direct military involvement in the region. When the regional balance is
threatened as an offensive power seems to emerge, then the hegemon will consider a
direct military intervention in the region – but only if the region is important enough
for the great power from the perspective of the global distribution of capabilities
(Layne, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001; and Walt, 2011). The hegemon may help to
construct a balancing coalition which opposes revisionist attempts at reaching a
regional hegemony. The key members of the coalition are the major regional status
quo states. But at the same time, the hegemon should abstain from over-meddling in
non-acute aspects of international affairs, thus mitigating the negative effects of its
preeminent position (Layne, 1997; See also Art, 1991, 2003).
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Third-image/state-centric optimists (or hegemonic optimists)
While some offensive realists focus on the contribution of hegemony to the national
security of the hegemon itself (Zakaria, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001; Layne, 2006),
others emphasize the beneficial attributes of hegemony for world order (Organski and
Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; Wohlforth, 1999). This is partly related
to hegemonic stability theory (HST), the logic and implications of which for world
peace are contradicted by BOP theory associated with defensive realism. Despite
their common roots in classical and structural realism, the basic premises of HST
directly contradict those of the BOP school. The first assumption of this school is that
order in world politics is usually created and maintained by a single dominant
state (Organski, 1968, p. 354; Modelski, 1978, p. 217; Gilpin, 1981, p. 145). This
assumption rests on the logic of collective goods theory; hegemons are both more
able and willing to provide public goods than other states, which prefer to free ride
rather than share in the costs. Hegemons, for their part, will be more willing to pay
these costs because they benefit greatly from a well-ordered and stable political and
economic system (Olson, 1971).
The second assumption is that continued order depends on the persistence of
hegemony since the emergence of powerful challengers undermines the established
and mutually beneficial international order (Organski, 1968: Chapter 14, esp. 361,
366–367; Modelski, 1978, p. 217).
Contrary to traditional BOP expectations, Organski’s ‘power transition’ model, for
example, suggests that growing equality in the distribution of capabilities among
the great powers will make the international system, in reality, less rather than more
stable and increase the risks of a major war. The classic historical illustration of
the hegemonic stability argument is the nineteenth century ‘Pax Britannica’, which
was supposedly guaranteed by Britain’s predominant economic and maritime power.
Rising German capabilities at the end of that century, so the argument goes, posed a
challenge to the British-led international order; this challenge culminated in WWI
and its destructive aftereffects. After 1945, and especially in the post-Cold War era,
the hegemonic stability school maintains, it has been US preponderance that has
ensured peace and prosperity through Pax Americana, and the emergence of equally
capable powers could undermine this order (Layne and Schwarz, 1993; Sheetz,
1997/98).
Hegemonic Optimists argue that hegemonic systems have the potential of actually
providing security, stability and economic prosperity rather than inducing political or
economic rivalry and strife (Keohane, 1980). As Lake (1984, p. 147) has put it, the
existence of a hegemonic international system ‘may approximate conditions of low
uncertainty, where nations can be reasonably confident that the leader will maintain
stability and a liberal regime’. On the basis of the logic of HST, these writers argue
that a benign hegemonic order is not only possible, but is also very much desirable as
long as the hegemonic power acts responsibly and prudently (Keohane (1984, p. 31).
A benign hegemon, namely a non-coercive one, may create an orderly and stable
international system. This, however, also depends on the duration of the hegemonic
constellation. In addition to material superiority and the willingness to act as the
ultimate provider of collective goods, the hegemonic power furthermore needs to
generate support and approval for its policies and administrative principles
(Ikenberry, 2001, p. 28; Mastanduno, 2002, pp. 264–265).
From such a vantage point, the post-Cold War international system that is
missing both the bipolar distribution of capabilities and the ideological rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union is at present a hegemonic/unipolar
system under US leadership, with a golden opportunity to freely implement what
writers referred to in the past as American providence or exceptionalism (Lipset,
1997; Mead, 2002). This perspective essentially entails a fundamental under-
standing that the international environment is much more receptive to American
policies and ideals as they proved to be better than the alternatives and serve as an
indispensable option for all democracies. The same American model can be
also applicable to other regions and regimes as the cases of Central and Eastern
Europe or the former Soviet Republics suggests. The end of the Cold War has
provided a genuine, and perhaps unprecedented, opportunity to build an inclusive
world order that will be based on American benign hegemony and Washington’s
willingness to extend its influence in a global scale. As former American President
George H.W. Bush and his former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft
recalled:
We were suddenly in a unique situation, without experience, without
precedent, and standing alone at the height of power. It was, it is, an
unparalleled situation in history, one which presents us with the rarest
opportunity to shape the world and the deepest responsibility to do so wisely
for the benefit of not just the United States but all nations. (Bush and Scowcroft
1998, p. 564)
Hegemonic Optimists see no erosion in the role of the state as the major actor in
international politics. Indeed, prominent hegemonic stability theorists such
as Gilpin (2001, p. 17) insist that despite the rise in number and importance of
INGOs and the overall effects of globalization, ‘in the determination of international
affairs… the state remain[s] the principal actor’ (see also Gilpin, 1996). Globalization
is a force that, from their point of view, completes the triumph of the West over
the East as this process encompasses everything that the United States stands for:
human and civil rights, free trade, free movement of people, services and finance. It is the
internationalization, liberalization, universalization, westernization and moderni-
zation, and interdependence of world affairs (Scholte, 2000, pp. 15–16; Agnew, 2005:
Chapter 6).
From a prescriptive vantage point, hegemonic Optimists believe that only the
United States is able to generate a truly stable and peaceful hegemonic world order
Miller and Saltzman
for the benefit of all mankind.5 As Kagan (1998, p. 26) argued:

The truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the US is good for a
vast portion of the world’s population. It is certainly a better international
arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many
others around the world far more than it would cost Americans – and far sooner
(see also Kagan, 2012).
(Huntington, 1993b, p. 83) asserted similarly that
A world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and
disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the
United States continues to have more influence than any other country in
shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the US is central
to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom,
democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.
Thus, American strategists illustrated this line of thinking in the 1992 leaked
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) that called for the preservation of American
global ascendancy and proactive opposition to hegemonic contenders (Tyler,
1992).
But how does this notion of American exceptionalism coincide with other states’
interests and security concerns? According to Ikenberry, there exists a trade-off
between American willingness to behave in compliance with certain broadly defined
rules or norms and US expectation that others will cooperate and concede to its
preeminent global position. The hegemonic order satisfies both the hegemon and the
weaker actors in the system; the hegemon’s interests in retaining a predominant
position are rather self-evident and revolve around the capacity to shape the world
order and enjoy the spoils of providing collective goods. The weaker actors accept
reassurances for their security and long-term prosperity that is based on the
hegemonic economic and political benevolent character (Ikenberry, 1998/1999,
2001).
Propositions: Under which Conditions Does each Perspective Have a

Greater Validity?
To turn the novel typology introduced here into an explanatory framework, we have
to specify the conditions under which one perspective is more valid than the others.
As the focus of this article is on presenting the new typology and illustrate its
usefulness, we can address this issue only briefly in the form of propositions and
briefly suggestive/illustrative applications which have to be more comprehensively
investigated in a future study. As the collapse of bipolarity has made the international
system essentially unipolar (Wohlforth, 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008),
it makes sense to focus on the hegemon (or unipole) and its effectiveness (or lack of)
in providing collective goods, including coping with various challenges and threats.
Thus, the basic proposition is that the conditions for the dominance of each of the
perspectives refer to the distribution of capabilities in the international system
and the extent of the challenges/threats faced by the hegemon (or unipole) in the
following combinations:
1. The conditions under which the Liberal/Constructivist-Optimists’ expectations

are more likely to take place: Under Hegemony of a liberal great power which
confronts relatively low threats
The Logic of the proposition: Under a powerful liberal hegemon, democratiza-
tion and free trade are going to make a major headway and ‘good’/benign
non-state actors (international institutions and INGOs) can prosper, while
advancing and proliferating a great variety of the aspects of the liberal agenda
(ideas, norms and institutions). All of these produce a more peaceful and
cooperative world.
Key Application – 1989–1994 period: The Optimists’ expectations seemed
to be met in the first few years following the end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union. During the first half of the 1990s we witnessed
two major developments: (i) Growing role and influence of ‘nice’ non-state
actors: the EU, the UN, numerous INGOs; and also the rising acceptability of
the idea and the practice of humanitarian intervention in the domestic affairs of
sovereign states; and (ii) A more peaceful and stable international system than
the Cold War because of the termination of the protracted rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union and related proxy conflicts in the Third
World.
2. The conditions under which the Hegemonic Optimists’ expectations are more
likely to take place: Under Hegemony which confronts challenging threats in
unstable regions, but is still able to pacify these regions.
The Logic of the Proposition: The powerful hegemon shows its ability to contribute
to public goods by effectively addressing important challenges to international
peace and stability, while non-state actors fail to deliver these goods.
Key application – 1995–2000: The hegemonic predictions seemed to be met most
forcefully during the second half of the 1990s. After a few years of reluctance to
intervene in the bloodshed in the Balkans, and the failures of the EU and the UN to
end the violence there, the United States successfully pacified this extremely
volatile region. The transition to unipolarity also helped to produce some progress
in the Arab–Israeli peace process and curb Chinese aggressive policies in the
Taiwan Straits.
3. The conditions under which the New Conflict Pessimists’ expectations are more
likely to take place: The Hegemon is confronted by a new type of threats posed by
violent non-state actors and asymmetric warfare in failed states. The unipole has a
Miller and Saltzman
hard time pacifying growing instability in these places.

The Logic of the Proposition: The hegemon is unable to deal effectively and in
affordable costs with these ‘bad’/violent non-state actors (which might also be
affiliated with another ‘civilization’). Thus, this configuration shows the limits to
the capacity of even powerful states to address the new challenges posed by non-
state actors and failed states.
Key application – 2001–2007: The New Conflict Pessimists’ predictions appeared
to be coming to fruition following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
especially considering the growing challenges to the US. Violent non-state
actors, and in this case Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terror cells, seemed to be on
the rise, while international peace and stability were threatened more than in
the 1990s. The hegemon did not seem to be able to pacify the failed states in
which it intervened – Afghanistan and Iraq – and even made the situation there
worse despite the considerable blood and treasure it spent over there.
4. The conditions under which the BOP Pessimists’ expectations are more likely to
take place: Major changes in the distribution of capabilities – a relative decline of
the hegemon who is confronting rising powers.
The Logic of the Proposition: Major changes in the distribution of capabilities are
taking place toward a greater balance in the system – a power transition in which
the hegemon is in relative decline, while new powers are rising and presenting
growing challenges to the dominance of the hegemon (though, none of them
seems to become the hegemon in the foreseeable future).
Key application – 2008–2014: The transition of relative power in the last years of
the first decade of 2000s seems to reinforce the credibility of the BOP perspective
as the world seems to be moving to a relatively greater balance among the great
powers even if the United States is still the dominant power. This is reflected by
the growing capabilities of the rising powers: most notably China but also to a
lesser extent – India and Brazil (see Table 3), while the West has suffered the
consequences of the ‘Great Recession’.
Moreover, there is some return of great power conflict in the last few years,
especially as revisionist powers – China and Russia – pose greater challenges to
the hegemon and its allies. These conflicts include Japan and China in the East
China Sea; United States and China as a result of the growing conflicts between
China and US allies in East Asia, notably Japan and the Philippines; and the
conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine in 2014.
Conclusions
In face of the deficiencies in the existing theoretical literature concerned with the
post-Cold War international security order, we offer a novel typology that
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748
Table 3: The global change in the Balance of Power
Gross domestic Production GDP growth Rate Military budget Military budget
(in current million US$) (%) (in million US$) (as per cent of GDP)
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Brazil 461 951 644 701 2 143 035 −4.3 4.3 7.5 52 182 25 175 38 127 6.3 1.8 1.6
China 356 936 1 198 474 5 930 529 3.8 8.4 10.4 19 820 37 040 136 467 2.5 1.9 2.1
France 1 244 163 1 326 334 2 548 315 2.6 3.6 1.7 70 527 61 783 66 251 3.4 2.5 2.4
India 326 608 474 691 1 710 917 5.5 3.9 10.5 18 807 27 653 49 159 3.2 3.1 2.7
Japan 3 103 698 4 731 198 5 495 379 5.5 2.2 4.6 47 802 60 288 59 003 0.8 1.0 1.0
International Politics
Russian (Soviet Union) 516 814 259 708 1 524 916 −2.9 10 4.5 291 082 32 515 72 918 12.3 3.7 4.3
The United Kingdom 1 019 307 1 475 705 2 256 260 −1.55 4.2 1.7 58 828 48 003 62 946 3.8 2.4 2.6
The United States 5 750 800 9 898 800 14 419 400 1.8 4.1 2.3 527 174 394 155 720 386 5.3 3 4.8
Source: World Bank, SIPRI.

1–30
23
Miller and Saltzman
diverges from the strict traditional division of realist, liberal and constructivism
scholarship. Instead, we advocate a more nuanced understanding of post-Cold War
international security that generates four ideal-type categories that encapsulate the
variation in levels of analysis and in the role and centrality of the state, on the one
hand, and the degree of peacefulness and stability of the post-Cold War order, on the
other hand.
Unlike previous attempts to interpret the post-Cold War order according to the
common ‘isms’, this article chooses to differentiate between the various theoretical
explanations based on their relations to three key factors: (i) whether the state is still
the central actor in international politics relative to non-state actors; (ii) whether the
post-Cold War international system is more peaceful than earlier configurations,
especially the bipolar era; (iii) the level of analysis on which the school is operating:
second-image versus third-image analysis. Each of the approaches identified in
this work – ‘BOP Pessimists’, ‘New Conflicts Pessimists’, ‘Liberal/Constructivist-
Optimists’ and ‘Hegemonic Optimists’, highlight different and sometimes con-
tradictory aspects of these developments. Some (the BOP Pessimists and the
Hegemonic Optimists) argue that the role of the state remains central to world
politics, whereas others (both the liberal/constructivist-Optimists and the New
Conflicts Pessimists) argue that the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of
numerous kinds of non-state actors hinder its conventional functions as the key actor
in international politics.
Some argue that the transformation from a highly discordant bipolar world order to
unipolarity under American hegemony has greatly contributed to the stability of
the international system (the Hegemonic Optimists), while another approach (the
Liberal/Constructivist-Optimists) shares the view of the peacefulness of the post-
Cold War system, but attributes it to the spread of liberal/democratic actors,
institutions, norms and ideas.6 Others (the BOP Pessimists) observe the negative
effects of unipolarity arguing that American hegemony actually encourages the abuse
of power by the hegemon and thus the pursuit of balancing behavior, which in turn
will eventually bring about major conflict between the hegemon and the emerging
power(s). Still others (the New Conflict Pessimists) highlight the de-stabilizing
effects of the Clash of Civilizations, and the spread of violent non-state actors in
failed states.
We suggest two key conditions for the dominance of each one of these
perspectives in the post-Cold War era: the balance of capabilities and the level of
threat in the international system. The combined effect of variations in these
conditions generates four propositions. Each one of these propositions seems to
capture some of the key developments in one sub-period of the post-Cold War era.
This highlights some of the most interesting changes during the post-Cold War era,
especially in the international security field. A rigorous examination of these
propositions and their empirical application calls for a future study.

About the Authors
Benjamin Miller is Professor of International Relations at the School of Political

Sciences, The University of Haifa. His work in international relations focuses on
explaining patterns of international conflict and cooperation and the sources of war
and peace. His current project focuses on explaining changes in US grand strategy
since World War II. Another major project explains variations in war and peace in the
post-Cold War era. Among his publications – When Opponents Cooperate: Great
Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor, MI: The University
of Michigan Press, 2nd edn., 2002); and States, Nations and Great Powers: The
Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press –
Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2007).
Ilai Z. Saltzman earned his PhD in International Relations from the University of
Haifa. He is currently the Schusterman Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at
Claremont McKenna College. He is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power
Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (Lexington Books, 2012).
Notes
1 Another important pessimistic prediction was Kaplan (1994). Even though it differed from Huntington’s
view quite a bit, we highlight some basic similarities inside the framework of the same ‘pessimist’ approach.
2 It is true that constructivism provides a more general paradigm focusing on ideas, norms and identities,
which can also capture illiberal ones, but as a matter of fact most constructivists have advanced ideas and
norms which are close to liberalism (see Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 539–540; for a partial qualification see
Barnett, 1997, pp. 550–551).
3 See Mearsheimer (1994/1995), who was criticized by neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane and Martin,
1995), liberals (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995) and a constructivist (Wendt, 1995).
4 For a critical review of different theoretical approaches to the balance of power, see Little (2007).
On theoretical, regional and policy aspects of the balance of power in the post-Cold War era, see Paul et al.
(2004). For competing theoretical perspectives on the balance of power, see Vasquez and Elman (2003).
5 For different perspectives on post-Cold War US hegemony, see Zartman (2009). For a liberal
perspective, see Ikenberry (2011).
6 For different theoretical perspectives on unipolarity, see Ikenberry et al. (2011).
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Original Article

Beyond the three ‘isms’: Rethinking IR and the

Benjamin Millera,* with Ilai Z. Saltzmanb

Keywords: IR theory; realism; liberalism; constructivism; international order; post-Cold

IR’s Holy Trinity and its Limits

Optimists and Pessimists: Conceptual Differences

Table 1A is based on the three components of the Waltzian international structure:

Miller and Saltzman

1A. The three components of the Waltzian international structure

Anarchy States/Great Powers Material capabilities

second-Image Optimists Transformed Change/decline Less relevant

The effects of the end of the cold war/globalization

Level of analysis/is the Benign De-stabilizing

deﬁning attribute of international politics. This means that international institutions

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30 7

interdependence, multilateral arrangements and universal norms such as those related

a bipolar to a unipolar world generated a lot of compelling consequence (even if

The Four-Fold Classiﬁcation

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30 9

Second- image/non-state-centric/new conﬂict pessimists

pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of

Third-image/state-centric pessimists (or BOP pessimists)

Third-image/state-centric optimists (or hegemonic optimists)

for the beneﬁt of all mankind.5 As Kagan (1998, p. 26) argued:

Propositions: Under which Conditions Does each Perspective Have a

1. The conditions under which the Liberal/Constructivist-Optimists’ expectations

hard time pacifying growing instability in these places.

Table 3: The global change in the Balance of Power

Source: World Bank, SIPRI.

Beyond the three ‘isms’

24 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30

About the Authors

Benjamin Miller is Professor of International Relations at the School of Political

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30 25

26 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30 27

28 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30

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30 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics 1–30

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