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Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in Columbia, came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking. Police were granted a warrant authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep. In the next 28 days, the government used the GPS to track the movements of the vehicle. A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict.
Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in Columbia, came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking. Police were granted a warrant authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep. In the next 28 days, the government used the GPS to track the movements of the vehicle. A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict.
Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in Columbia, came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking. Police were granted a warrant authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep. In the next 28 days, the government used the GPS to track the movements of the vehicle. A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict.
Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in Columbia
came under suspicion of narcotics trafficking. Based on information gathered through various investigative techniques, police were granted a warrant authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep registered to Jones wife (of which Jones was the exclusive driver) The warrant that was issued authorizing the installation of the GPS in the District of Columbia was valid for only 10 days On the 11th day, not in Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed the GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. And in the next 28 days, the Government used the GPS to track the movements of the vehicle and even had to replace the battery while it was parked again in a different parking lot in Maryland. By satellite, the device established the vehicles location within 50 to 100 feet and communicated the location by cell phone to a government computer, relaying more than 2,000 pages of data over a 28-day period. The government ultimately obtained an indictment against Jones which included charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Before trial, Jones filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained thru the GPS device. It was partly granted, the data that was suppressed were those date obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones residence. While the remaining data, were admissible. The District Court denied the motion ruled that a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. (Relying on Katz ruling) A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict. The D.C. Circuit Court reversed the conviction, holding the admission of evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE: Does the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicles movements on public streets constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? YES HELD: (1) GPS attached to vehicle is a search
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, by attaching the device to the Jeep, the officers encroached on a protected area. Stated otherwise, the Government physically trespassed on private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Because the physical trespass was on property expressly protected by the Fourth Amendment. Instead of using the Katz reasonable expectation privacy test, Justice Scalia revitalized and then used a common-law trespassory test. Under this trespassory test, it was irrelevant whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in data about where his car had traveled it was enough that the Governments trespass on Joness effect would have constituted a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
(2) Katz not substitute for trespassory test
In the Katz case, Fourth Amendment protects a persons
reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.
Hence, Katz supplemented rather than substituted the
trespassory test for whether a search has occurred.