Hazard: Any operation that could possibly cause

a catastrophic release of toxic, flammable or

explosive chemicals or any action that could
result in injury to personnel.
Operability: Any operation inside the design
envelope that would cause a shutdown that
could possibly lead to a violation of
environmental, health or safety regulations or
negatively impact profitability.

What is HAZOP?

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) methodology is a

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) technique used for

studying the hazards of a system, and its operability

problems, by exploring the effects of any deviations from

design conditions.

HAZOP is one of the best and most rigorous techniques

for identification of hazard and operability problems in a

chemical plant.

Who carries out hazop?

HAZOP is carried out by a team. The usual team is as
follows:

Hazard study leader

Commissioning manager

Plant manager

Project engineer

Process engineer

Control/Electrical engineer

Research Chemist (if new chemistry is involved)

When to perform HAZOP?

The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out as early

in the design phase as possible. On the other hand; to carry
out a HAZOP we need a rather complete design. As a
compromise, the HAZOP is usually carried out as a final
check when the detailed design has been completed.

A HAZOP study may also be conducted on an existing facility

to identify modifications that should be implemented to
reduce risk and operability problems.

PREREQUISITES FOR HAZOP

As a basis for the HAZOP study the following information
should be available:
Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
Plant Layout diagrams
Material safety data sheets (MSDS)
Provisional operating instructions
Heat and material balances
Equipment data sheets
Start-up and emergency shut-down procedures

Phases of hazop
Pre-meeting phase
Collection of data about facility viz. PFDs, P&IDs,
Plant layout, Chemical hazard data
Identification of team members

Meeting phase
Division of plant in sections or nodes
Deviations, causes, consequences & protective
systems are identified

Post-meeting phase
Discussions are recorded
Actions are followed-up & report is issued

HAZOP procedure
1.

Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage)

3.

Choose a study node (vessel, line, operating instruction).

Describe the design intent of the study node.

4.

Choose a process parameter.

2.

6.

Apply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest

possible deviations.
Determine possible causes & find protective systems.

7.

Evaluate the consequences of the deviation (if any).

8.

Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)

9.

Record all information.

5.

10.

Repeat procedure until all guide words, all applicable process

parameters & all study nodes have been considered.

Guide Words Used for the HAZOP

GUIDE
WORDS

MEANING

COMMENTS

NO, NOT, NONE

The complete
negation , ex. No
flow

No part of the design intention is achieved,

but of the intention nothing else happens.

MORE,
HIGHER,
GREATER

Quantitative
increase, ex. High
temp.

Applies to quantities such as flow rate and

temperature and to activities such as heating
and reaction.

LESS, LOWER

Quantitative
decrease, ex. Low
temp.

Applies to quantities such as flow rate and

temperature and to activities such as eating
and reaction.

AS WELL AS

Qualitative
increase

All the design and operating intentions are

achieved along with some additional activity,
such as contamination of process streams.

PART OF

Qualitative
decrease

Only some of the design intentions are

achieved, some are not.

GUIDE
WORDS

MEANING

COMMENTS

REVERSE

The logical
opposite of

Most applicable to activities such as flow or

chemical reaction. Also applicable to
substances, for example, poison instead of
antidote.

OTHER THAN

Complete
substitution

No part of the original intention is achieved

the original intention is replaced by
something else.

SOONER THAN

Too early or in the

wrong order

Applies to process steps or actions.

LATER THAN

Too late or in the

wrong order

Applies to process steps or actions.

WHERE ELSE

In additional
locations

Applies to process locations, or locations in

operating procedures.

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

1. Structured and systematic

approach
2. Helpful when confronting
hazards that are difficult to
quantify:
Hazards rooted in human
performance
and
behaviours
Hazards that are difficult to
detect, analyse, isolate,
count, predict, etc.
3.
Built-in
brainstorming
methodology
4. Multidisciplinary study
5. Comprehensive methodology
6. More simple and intuitive

1. No means to assess hazards

involving interactions between
different parts of a system or
process.
2. Highly time consuming
3. Team members often divert
into endless discussions of
details.
4.
No means
to assess
effectiveness of existing or
proposed safeguards.
5. The success of a HAZOP study
depends greatly on the ability &
experience of the study leader
and the knowledge, experience
and interaction between team
members.

Hazop case study: example

Materials A and B are continuously transferred by pump

from their respective supply tanks to combine and form a

product C in the reactor.
Suppose that A always has to be in excess of B in the reactor
to avoid an explosion hazard. The part of the system selected
for examination is the line from the supply tank holding A to

the reactor, including pump A. The intent for this part is to

continuously transfer material A from the tank to the reactor
at a rate greater than the transfer rate of material B.

HAZOP Worksheet
GUIDE
WORD

ELEMENT

DEVIATION

POSSIBLE
CAUSES

CONSEQUENCES

ACTIONS
REQUIRED

NO

Material A

No flow

Supply Tank No flow of A into Installation of a

A
reactor
low-level alarm on
is empty
tank A & low-level
Explosion
trip to stop pump
B

MORE

Material A

More flow

Filling
of Tank will overflow Installation
of
tank
into bounded area
high-level alarm
when
insufficient
capacity
exists

LESS

Material A

Less flow

Low level in Inadequate

net Low-level alarm on
tank
positive suction head tank A
Possible vortexing &
leading
to
an
explosion
Inadequate flow

TYPICAL HAZOP WORKSHEET