Hsg28 - Safety Advice For Bulk Chlorine Installations

Crown copyright material is produced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and Queen's Printer for Scotland.
U:
Safety advice
for bulk chlorine installations

HSG28(rev)
HSE BOOKS
Crown copyright 1999

Applications for reproduction shouldhe madein
writing to: Copyright Unit, Her Majesty 's
Stationery Office. St Clenienis House,
2-16 Colegate, Norwich NR3 JBQ
First published1987
Second edition 1999
ISBN 0717616452
rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may
be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means
All
(electronic, mechanical, photocopying. recording
or otherwise) without the prior written permission
ofthe copyright owner.
This guidance is issued by the Health and Safety

Executive (HSE). Following the guidance is not
compulsory and you are free to takeother action.
But ifyou do follow the guidance you will
normally be doing enough to comply with the law.
HSE Inspectors seek to secure compliancewiththe
law and may referto this guidance as illustrating
good practice.
Safetyadvice for bulkchlorineinstallations
Foreword vii
Introduction
Managementofhealth and safety and risk assessment

Risk assessment 5
Design and location ofinstallations 7

Potential incidents 7
Siting ofinstallations 8
Unloading area 10
Design cincl locatin /0
Delii'crie.c ofliquidc'hlori ie hi' road tankeror ISO tank container
interlocks 3
Delii'eric',', ofliquidchlorine hi' rail tanker /4
/2
Connections between thetankerand the fixedlinesto the storage installation

Ti'pes (?t c'0n1icC'tiofl 15
Flexiblec'ouplingv (seoiirigid loading arms) 15
14
Flexiblehoses /6
Articulated arms /6
Pipework for liquid chlorine 17
Permanentpipeworkat the iozloaclingpoint /7
Designcriteria for pipework transferring liquidchlorineto storage tanks' or
from storagetopoint of use 7
Protectionofpipeu'or/c 19
Marking 20
Protection ofliquidchlorine pipework againstoverpressure 20
Proi'ision ofrelief si'stems' 20
Valves 22
T'pe.v of ia/ic 22
Vertical globe vali'es 23
Conicalplug vali'e,r (PTFE-s'leeved) 23
Ball i'alve.s 24
Remote/i controlled vcili'es' 24
Storage vessels 24
Design criteria 26
Connecting pipc'work cmii ,necmn,s' for isolation of storage tc,nk.s' 27
Liquid chlorineinlet 25
Liquid chlorineoutlc'i 25
Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations
III
tent ciiicl comprc'sseddirgas hues
30
Relic! svsteni 30
andchlorinedetectorsystems30
Chlorine detectorsand alarms 32
Protection ofstorage vessels against ovcrpressure 33
Reliefsystem 33
B,,rstint' discs 34
Arrcoigcmentsfoi' ic//cf systems 34
Expansion vessels 37
Pressurealcirnis 37
Arrangements for unloading ofliquidchlorine from road tankers to storage 38
lJnloaclmg usingdcv conipressecic/jr Oc/ct' nitrogen 38
Suppli ofcirt'pcidcliog gas to ti/c system 39
lJn/oad/iog usingchlorinegas pm ssure 39
Useofrecompressed chlorinevapour 39
Chlorine \'aporisers40
Instro,neotation
T'pes 40
Regulcilion of throughput 41
Methods ofheating 41
Generalinstallation 42
HaarcIs 42
Routineand emergency isolcition 45
Pressure control vc,hi'e 46
Corrosion 46
Chlorine absorptionsystem 47
tent collectwn system 47
1bsorptionequipoient 48
Jnstrionentcution 48
Disposalofeffluentfroumu ti/c chlorine absorptionplant 49
Operating and maintenanceprocedures, trainingand PPE 51
Operating instructions5 1
Maintenance, inspection and installation 52
Generalouainteoance
rec/uirements52
Mc,intencunceofconnections 52
Insjcc'tion coid conioussioniog ofchlorine tank installations 53
inspection procea'ioe 54
Testing 55
Modification ofthechlorinesystem and clearance procedures 55
Unloading ofliquidchlorinefromroadtankers to storage 56
Use of ISO (demountable) tank containers 57
Transferofchlorine to the consuming units 58
Trcmnsfcrofgcmseouschlorine 58
Trcmnsfer of liquidchlorine using vapourpressure 59
Transfer ofhcjiocl chlorine hrpadding with dry conipressech gas 59
Transferofh/c/u/cl chlorine using asepclrate pionping tcmnk 59
Precceutions 59
iv
Training 61
Competence (10(1(Ilk/it 62
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 62
Seleciin' sintallc respiratort'protectiveequipment(RPE) 63
Emergencyarrangements 67
Emergency equipment 68
Control of leakages 68
Releases insideliuildins 69
Appendices 71
I Toxicologicalproperties and first aid 71
2 Characteristics ofchlorine 73
3 Relevantlegislationand HSE guidance 79
4 Useful
contacts and standards 91
5 Outside installations and inside installations 95

6 Procedures for discharging road tankers of chlorine 99
7 Types of vaporiser 103
8 Emergency plans 107
References 111
List ofacronyms and abbresiations
119
I
::ulIulllutuIIi!::
7'
he aim ofthis gLildance note is to help those responsible for ihe safe ue ol chlorinehum
bulk containers to meet their oliligatlons under health and salely law.
itli
This guidance. like the document that preceded it. was prepared
the help of the chlorine
producers, users, trade unions, the WaterServices Association (WSA), and the Chemical
Industries Association (CIA).
We are grateful to those whocontributedfor their assistanceand cooperation in preparing this
advice, and to Shaw Valvesand to Descote Ltd for permission to usethe photographs linked to
paragraph 74, to Weston Point Studios for permission to use the photographs linkedto
paragraph 216 and to Zeneca plc for pernhission to takethe remainingphotographs.
The guidelines maybe appliedto any bulk chlorineinstallationbut they are not intended to be
a detailed design code. Sonic existinginstallations maynot at present meetall the
recommendations and, in sonic cases, not all the recommendations may be appropriate. It is
for the occupier, usually in consultation with the chlorine supplierand/orspecialistadvisers, to
judge the need for further risk control measures,following an assessment ofthe actual risks. If
improvements are shown to be needed, a responsible decisionis required from the operating
company on the nature and timing of changes sothat they can be made safely.
Where reference to British. European and otherstandards is made in this document equivalent
standardsare equally acceptable alternatives.
You mayneed helpbeyondthat given in this guidance.
If
you do, trade and employer

associations, such as the Chemical Industries Association and Euro Chlor, or your chlorine
suppliercan offera range ofadvice and support. These and othersources of informationare
given in Appendix 4.
Vii
This publicationgies guidance on the sal handlingorhtlll\ liquid chlorineat

chlorineby road or rail tanker,or by I
tank container.
The guidance is aimedprimarily at managersofthese installations, but it is also
relevant for plant supervisors, design and maintenance engineers, and safty
professionals. Application of the guidance ill help to ensure that the risksto
people onsite and offsite are niimisedso far asis reasonably practicable.
I
()
Sites which recei C liquid
The risks arise because chloriiie is a highlytoxiC (see Appendix I ) and

reactie substance (see Appendix2). It forms flammable and explosixe niixtures
ithsonic organicandinorganicsubstances.Whenreleasedfroni coiltainmentit

gas cloud that is hea\ icr thanair and hich maintains contact withthe
ground as it disperses, possihl endangering people in its path.
l'orms a
Despite theserioustoxic and reacti'e ha,ards, and the potential to harm

people oftsite,the chlorme industry has established a ver' good safty record. This
has been achieved through the (Ie elopment and practice of eliective procedures for
handling chlorine sa Fely. This gL!idance, likethe document it replaces. is issued to
help maintain and enhance that record. Guidance on thesafi handling ofchlorine
supplied m drums and Iinders is given else here.
3
The guidanceis based on the conibmed experience of'the Ibur 1 K

manuftcturersof'chlorine, their customers, trade Unions and associations and HSF.
It co ers the safity and health requirements at all stages. from the receipt of'the
liqLiid chlorine to the point of use, including the location, design. testing. operation
and maintenance of'equipment. Procedures for dealing ith eniei'gencies are also
4
outlined.
Safety advice forbulk chlorine installations
Employers havea legal responsibility under Sections 2 and 3 ofthe Health and Safety
at Work etc Act 1974 (HSW Act)2 to ensure, so )aras is reasonably practicable. the health
and safety oftheir employees and others who may be affected by their activities. Other
people. such as designers, installers and suppliers, also havesimilardutiesunderthe HSW
Act with respect to products. Since 1 974various regulations have been maderequiring
specific controls for particular hazards leg pressure systems), oractivities(eg manual
handling). A list ofthese and other current health and safety legislation, codes ofpractice
and guidance is published annually.3 This list also covers amendments to the regulations.
References in this docunient are to the base regulations. Appendix 3 gives au overview of
the main legislation and regulations relating tothe safe handling ofchlorine.
5
You must obtain planning permission for new installations in the usualway from the
6
Local Planning Authority, who will,when appropriate, referto HSEfor advice. If you store,
or plan to store. morethan 10 tonnesol chlorine. your site will be subject to a numberof
specific regulations.
7
The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations l982
require you to notify your activity to HSE ifmore than 10 tonnesofchlorine is liable to be
must alsonotify subsequent changesto your activity. New installations over 10
kept.
tonnes chlorine capacity, or proposals to increase the notified capacityto morethan three
times the original capacity, must be notified threemonths in advance. Theform ofthe
notification is in the Regulations.
ou
The Control of Industrial MajorAccident Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH )5 also

apply to sites storing or processing chlorine. These regulations apply at two levels. The
lower level requirements apply to sites which store 10 or more tonnes. They also apply at
sites where chlorine is involved in a process in any quantity. unless the process operation is
incapable ofproducing a major accident hazard. You needto comply withtwo general
requirements:
8
(a)
to demonstrate to HSE, at any time, that major accidenthazardshave been

identified and adequately controlled; and
(h)
to reportany majoraccidents to 1-ISE.
Safety advice forbulk chlorineinstallations
For sites which store 75 or more tonnes,or which process chlorine and haveinventories of
25 ormore tonnes, unless the process operation is incapable of producing a major accident
hazard, niore stringent regulations apply. These require the preparation of a safety report.
the preparation of oilsite and offsite emergency plans and the provision of information to
members ofthe public likely tobe affected by a major accident. CIMAH will be replaced
in February 1999 by the Control of MajorAccident Hazard Regulations (COMAH) which
implement the requirenients oftile Seveso II Directive6 on the control ofmajoraccident
hazards tile thresilold for the lowertier requirements is 10 tonnes, and 25 tonnes for the
top tier.
9
The Planning(hazardous Substances) Regulations I992 apply to sites with 10 or
more tonnesofchlorine. lJnderthese regulations tile consent'of the local Hazardous
Substances Authority (I-ISA) is needed for the presence ofclllorine in sucil quantities. The
HSA must consult HSE on the associated risk levels. To quantify the off-site risks HSE
mayrequest technical intornlation about the installation.8
10 In addition, any process wilicil involves the manufacture or useofclllorine or any
process wilicil is likely to result in the release ofclllorinc into tile air or water, is a
prescribed process undertile Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and
Substances) Regulations l99i. Otiler processes arealso prescribed in tile Regulations.
Undertile Environmental Protection Act 1990 no person shall carry on a prescribed
except underan autllorisatioil granted by the enforcingautllontyand in accordance
witil the conditions in the authorisation. Applications for the authorisation ofa prescribed
process in England and Wales must be made to the Environment Agency ([A) and in
Scotland to tile Seottisll Environnlental Protection Agency (SEPA). In addition in Scotland
wilere tile Alkali and Works Regulation Act 1906,11 as anlended by tile Health and Safety
(Emissions into Atmosphere) Regulations 1983,12 is still in force, suell processes are listed
as Scheduled works and must be registered amuiaiiy witll SEPA.
iocc
II If you fill containers from your bulk installation and transport themoffsite.you will
needto comply with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods(Classification. Packaging and
Labelling) and Use ofTransportable Pressure Receptacles Regulations 1996,13 aild the
Carriage of Dangerous Goods By Road Regulations 199614 (in the case of transportatioll
by road). The relevant legislation is outhned in an NSF booklet.15 Note: The (legal) ternl
for gas cylinders is now transportahlepressure receptacles'.
12 Although you must comply with health and safety legislation, regulatorycontrol
cannot compensate for deficiencies inthe way that safetyis nlanaged. Effective health and
safety managenlent is mainlyabout management (at all levels)taking a proacti\e approach
to minimise the chance of incidents occurringratilertllan putting tilings right after they
havegonewrong . Guidance on effective healtil and safety management is given
eisewllere' 7 which advocates and elaborates Oil tile following general principles of
good nlailagelllentpractice:
(a)
set your policy and demonstrate commitment to it;
(b)
organise and train your staff to ensure effective communications, cooperation, and
their competence to control risks;
Safetyadvice for bulk chlorineinstallations
(c)
plan what you need to do, set perfomianccstandards, and establish systems
and procedures for controlling risks;
(d)
measure your performance to assess whetherthe risks are being adequately

controlled;
(e)
conductsafetyaudits to ensure that yoursystemsare working as intended;

review your findings and take any corrective action.
A risk assessment isessentialto this proactive approach to safetymanagement and

is a statutory requirement ofthe Management ofHealth and Safety at Work
(MHSW) Regulations 1992.18 Guidance on these Regulations and risk assessment
is contained in an Approved Code ofPractice.19
RISKASSESSMENT
The M1-ISW Regulations require you to conducta full risk assessment to
identify all the hazards and assess the associated risks. Therisk assessment needsto
include all sources ofhazards, including thoseassociated with transportaroundthe
site, accessto plant and security. The needfor risk assessment is also a requirement
ofother regulations (eg The Control ofSubstances Hazardous to Health Reulations
1994 (COSHH)20 and the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997.2!
13
14
In outline, a risk assessment for your chlorine operations requires you to:
(a)
look for the hazards ic potential sources ofchlorine releases;
(b)
decidehow serious each ofthese loss-of-containment events could be,

ie who could be hannedand how seriously;
(c)
decidethe likelyfrequency ofeach ofthese hazardous events;
(d)
evaluatethe associated risksand consider whetherthe precautionsto prevent

releasesofchlorine and to mitigate theireffectsare adequate, or ifmore
shouldbe done (this guidance and the sources ofadvice listedin Appendix 4
is relevant here; particularly the publications ofEuro Chlor;22
(e)
recordyour significant findings; this is a statutory requirement ifyou

have five or more employees; and
(f)
updateyour risk assessment at least every threeyears.and before making

significantmodifications. Check that your operational experience accords with
any significant assumptions you madeto carry out your risk assessment.
Safetyaudits, as well as day-to-day management arrangements. should
address the need to check assumptions.
Safety advice for bulkchlorineinstallations
15
Each site will have its own special featuresand you need to takethese into account when
conducting your risk assessment. A properrisk assessment will helpyou to:
(a)
decidewhetherthe risks are being controlled so far as is reasonably practicable; and, if

not,to:
(b)
establish adequate controls and safeworkingprocedures based on the advice in this note.
16 Your risk assessment will needto consider the mainpotential causes ofreleasesof
chlorine. For bulk chlorine installations these are (see paragraph 20):
(a)
plant damage causedby external sources (vehicles, hoists,flying debris from nearby
accidents, fires etc);
(b)
incorrect operation; and
(c)
inadequate inspection and maintenance.
17 The people conducting your risk assessment must have relevant experience and
knowledge. Ifnecessary, you niust18 seek assistance from experienced and knowledgeable
people. Your chlorine supplier will be able to identify competent people able to conductthe
risk assessment on your belialiland supplyinformation to help youcarry out your risk
assessment and to manage safety.
18
The remaining sectionsofthis booklet provideguidance on the arrangements for
prevention and mitigation ofchlorine leaks and spillages through good design,operation
(including emergency procedures) and maintenance. The guidanceappliesonly to installations
storing liquid chlorine underpressure in bulktanks or tank containers. You should therefore
pay particularattention to the requirements ofthe Pressure System and Transportable Gas
Container Regulations 1989 (PSTGC).23 Precautions for the storage ofliquid chlorine in
refrigerated tanksat low pressure are outside the scopeofthis guidance. Additional sources of
advice and information are listed in Appendix 4.
Safety advice for bulk chlorineinstallations
19
Bulk chlorine installations operate under pressure. Consequently, the design,
installationand operation (includingperiodicexaminationand maintenance) of
these pressuresystemswill need to meetthe requirements of PSTGC.23 Pipework,
equipmentand protective devices for liquid chlorine are part ofthe system. The
regulations do not apply to systems operating at or below pressures of 0.5 bar
gauge, except for steam systems. Guidance on PSTGC is contained in an Approved
CodeofPractice24 and the publication A guide to the Pressure Systems and
Transportable Gas Containers Regulations I 989;25 see Appendix3 for brief
details.
POTENTIALINCIDENTS
20 When designing or modifying your installation,you should include provisions
to prevent the following potentialincidents whichcould result in a release of
chlorine:
(a)
Damage to chlorine linesfrom external sources eg by hoists or vehicles

while
it
is
toor
from
the
the
road
tanker
unloadingpoint.
including
moving
When the tanker is positioned for unloadingyou need to provideadequate
clearance for the valve dome when it is open. You also need to make
allowancefor movement ofthe delivery vehicleduring thc transferoperation,
eg the normal upwardmovementofthe tankeron its suspension can cause
damage thereis inadequate flexibility in the connection, or movement
caused by inadequate brakingor wheel chockingor careless operation by the
driver.
if
(b)
Damage to the liquid chlorinedelivery vehicle,storage tank or connecting

pipeworkcausedby impact from other vehicles.
(c)
Joint and gasket failures due to failure to tighten joints, over-tightening of

joints, incorrectly fitted or the use ofunsuitablejoint rings, or the use of
hydrocarbon based lubricants which mayburn whenattacked by chlorine(see
Appendix2).
Safety advice for bulk chlorine installations
(d)
ElTors in operating procedures, including over-filling ofthe storage tank and
(e)
Plant and equipment failure due to inadequate maintenance. eg 'passing' valves, or leaks
causedby corrosion or erosion, or use ofplant and equipment beyond the recommended
overloading ofthe vent scrubber, failure to closevalveswhenremovingcontainers, or

breaking into the system for maintenance.
Iife.
(f
Damage caused by fire or explosion.
SITING OF INSTALLATIONS
The guidance in this section relates to general features which affectthe location of the
installation. More specific factors arc reviewed in the detailedsections dealingwith offloading (see paragraphs 134-147) and eniergency procedures (seeparagraphs 247-263). When
deciding the location of your installation an important consideration is the potential risksto
people and the environment. Theserisks decrease as the separation distance increases. The
site of such separation distances will depend upon a nuniberoffactors, including:
21
(a)
the numberand size ofstorage tanks:
(b)
whetherthe storage is indoors oroutside
(c)
the operational conditions and the type of process:
(d)
the frequency ofchlorine deliveries;
(e)
the design ofthe installation, eg length and diameter ofliquid and vapour lines; and
(f)
the size,distribution, and type (eg sensitive groups) ofthe surrounding population.
You should carefullyconsider these factors whendesigning and deciding the location of
installation
and when conducting your risk assessment (seeparagraphs 13-17). You
your
should involve your chlorine supplierat an earlystage. Consideration should be given to
maximising the distance between the site boundary and the chlorine installation. It should be
emphasised that your risk assessment and individual circumstances (see paragraph 21) will
determine the separation distances. The same considerations alsoapplywhen making
significant changes to an existinginstallation within a site.
22
When choosing the location for your chlorine area,you needto consider the location of
other onsitebuildings in relation tothe prevailing wind direction. It is recommended that the
chlorine area should be located downwind ofbuildings thatare regularly occupied. Ventilation
intakes to occupied rooms should be at least25 m from the chlorine installation, and
preferably at a high level.
23
24 You alsoneed to take account ofthe prevailing wind direction whendecidingthe

locations ofemergency assembly points. Two assembly points are recommended; these should
be located so that at least one will be available regardless ofthewind direction when a release
occurs. For complex sites, indoor assembly points are recommended; open air assemblypoints
may be suitable for simple sites.
For a new installation, full account will have tobe takenofany requirements
attached to the planning permission granted by the Planning Authority. In addition
the local Planning Authority needsto ensure that theoverall planwill avoid
problems arising in thefuture from developments leading to a high density of
population near the installation, or from the introduction of other potential hazards
in an adiacent area (see Appendix 3: Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations
1992). For sites which maypresent such hazards HSF. may recommend that the
highest standards are applied, before consent can be granted by the HSA. In some
casesthe consideration of'off-siterisk levels by HSE may requirc control measures
in addition to those recommended in this guidance.
25
For existinginstallations, control of neighbouring population densities is not

possible in the shortterm. However, proposed developments nearbywhich would
increase the number of peopleare controllable and would he permitted by the local
Planning Authority only after detailed consideration. Suchconsideration will
include the advice received from HSEon the risks from chlorine releasesto those
who mayoccupy or use the proposed development.
26
27 The location ofa new chlorine installation within a site shouldbe decided
following a risk assessment. In making your decisionyou should takeinto account
possible damage from flooding or subsidence, and the possible damage to the
installation if neighbouring plant or factories suffer a catastrophe by fireor
explosion. Installations shouldbe sited at a sufficient distance (25 iii minimum)
from public roads or main railway lines to reduce the riskof damage to the
installation ifthere is an accident. Protective haiTiersshouldbe installed where
necessary.
In all cases, suitable fences, together with adequatesecurity supervision,
should he provided to minimise the possibility of unauthorised access.
28
29 Hazards arismg from aircraft maynormally he regarded as minimal with

probabilities below the level ofsignificance required for any special consideration.
Flowever.attention may be necessary in exceptional circumstances, eg ifthe
installation is at the end ofan airport runway or close to a busy airfield. In such
circumstances liaisonwith the airfield operatoron suitable risk reduction measures
is essential.
30 The installation is preferably located in the open air:but undersome
circumstances an indoor installation maybe appropriate. In decidingthis, it is
important that a risk assessment is made, taking into accountthe factors listed in
Appendix 5. Youneed to consider the following possible risk reduction measures at
an earlystage:
(a)
the scopefor reducing the chlorine inventory, eg rescheduling of deIiveries
(b)
interlocking arrangements (see alsoparagraphs 35, 39-41) for the automatic

isolation ofleaks and to prevent the delivery vehicle moving during transfer
operations:
(c)
minimising the length and diameter ofpipework carrying liquid chlorine and ensuring
overpressure protection;
(d)
mechanically ventilating chlorine buildings and discharge through a fume scrubbing

system; the associated air inlet ductsshouldbe at a low level;
(e)
improving the leak-tightness ofany chlorine building against major leaks; and
(f')
restricting transfersofchlorine to daylight hours or normal working hours (8.00am to

5.0() pm) as the weatherconditions are likely to be more favourable for the dilution of
chlorine concentrations ifthere is a release.
UNLOADiNGAREA
Design and location
Youshouldaim to minimise the possibility ofchlorine escape during the transferof

liquid chlorine from the delivery vehicles to the storage tank. Detailed attention to the siting,
design and layout ofthe unloadingequipment and operating procedureis essential.
31
32 The unloading area should be on reasonably level ground with adequate surrounding
space providing goodaccess from different directions. The location should minimise the risk
ofimpact damage from vehicles, mobileequipment or fallingobjects from lifting equipment.
33 The unloading point shouldbe reasonably close tothe storage installation. To avoid
impact damage a protective barrierbetween the tankerbay and the storage installation is
recommended. The unloading point shouldalso be sitedat a safedistance from drains, rivers,
drainage collection points and any plantor equipment which might give rise to fire or
explosion.
34 Satisfactory accessshouldbe provided tothe permanent pipework for dischargeofthe
chlorine tankers and to ensure that connections tothe tankers can be madesafely. Wherethis
involves working from a place abovegroundlevel,a permanentstructure should be provided.
This should be designed so that, in case ofemergency, escape is possible with minimum risk.
You canachievethis by installing a substantial and non-flammable (eg steel) structure and
ensuringthat platforms are free ofobstructions and have non-slip surfaces, adequate toeboards and guard-rails. Alternative escapeways shouldbe providedwith stairways ofstandard
slope. Vertical ladders or steep stairways should be avoided. If vertical ladders are
unavoidable, ensure that safety hoops, etc. do not impede access for peoplewearingbreathing
apparatus. The design ofmoveable platforms givingaccesstothe top ofthe tankers needsto
minimise the possibility ofaccidents due to collision with thetankers. Interlock systemsmay
be used for this purpose, see paragraphs 39-41.
10 Safety advice for bulkchlorineinstallations
A welldesigned unloading area
35
You needto provide for the safe isolation ofany leaks that may arise,
particularly from pipework carrying liquid chlorine, It is recommended that
remotely or automatically controlled valves should be installed on thetransfer line
to the storage tanks. When automatic isolation is employed, operated by chlorine
sensors in the unloading area, the detector systemneeds to closeboththe storage
tank isolation valveand that on the tanker. The possibility ofliquid chlorine being
trapped between closed valvesand the needfor pressure relief (seeparagraphs 6167) needs to be considered,
36
It is also goodpracticeto provide:
(a)
protection against theweatheron fixed gantriesat unloading points, eg by

windbreaks or overhead canopies;
(b)
storage space for connectors used for transferoperations so that they can be
kept dry and protected from dirtand moisture gettingin, and possible impact
damage;
(c)
storage space for emergency equipment (eg filter respirators, breathing

apparatus, protective clothing and spareequipment) in a safe location so that
theequipmentis readily available in an emergency;
(d)
adequatelighting and emergency lighting covering the unloading area, and all
escape routes;
(e)
sufficient manuallyoperatedalarmstationsto enable warning to be given in

the eventofa chlorine escape. Furtherdetails on emergency procedures are
given in paragraphs 247-263.
11
Deliveriesofliquid chlorine by road tankeror ISO tank container

The Carriage ofDangerous Goods(CDG)by Road Regulations 199614 and the CDG
(DriverTraining) Regulations 199626apply. For safetyreasons all UK road tankers are fitted
with air-operated shut-offvalves for the paddingair (see paragraphs 134-141) and the
chlorine delivery connections. Itis also strongly recommended that the following meansof
minimising potential risksare adoptedwhereverpossible:
37
(a)
Provision of a separate and protected unloading areafor the sole use of chlorine tankers
(eg by erecting sideprotection ofthe motorway-type crash barrier).
(b)
Restriction by suitable means of the speedoftraffic on adjacent roads.
(c)
Unauthorised access ofvehicles and personnel tothe unloading area shoLild be

prevented, egby placing warning barriers, notices, moveable barriersor road cones, or
closing gates when the chlorine tankers are in position.
(d)
Provision ofan interlock (see paragraphs 39-41)systemto preventcoupling of liquid

chlorine lines to the tankers and openingofthe dischargevalveuntil the tanker is
immobilised. In addition, the air-operated tankervalves should be interlocked withthe
chlorinedetectionand shut-downsystem, orbe remotelyoperable from the emergencystop
points.
(e)
A systemofwork wherebyone person (the driverfor road deliveries) is present

throughout the unloading (seeparagraphs 214-215, and Appendix 6), and a second is
present during connection and disconnection. The second person shouldbe nearbyand
available throughout unloading to providehelp on request.
(f)
Routing ofchlorine pipework in thearea to minimise the risk ofdamage from impact
by thetanker,other vehicles or mobileequipment.
12 Safety advice for bulk chlorine installations
38
Where a separate unloading area cannot be provided, and the unloading point
is on a factory through road, such roads should be physically closed (seeparagraph

37c) to other traffic duringthe transferofliquid chlorine. Yourrisk assessment will
determine whetheradditional measures are needed.
Interlocks
39
Interlocks should be used to prevent seriousincidents. For example, interlocks
can be used to ensure that the vehicle brakes are fully applied befoi-e the unloading
pipe is finally connected Ll and the tanker valve opened or, a barrieron the
unloading platform can be interlocked to the loading connector, so preventing
inadvertent movement ofa tanker still connected up. Alternatively the pressurein
the unloading pipecan activate a flashing sign to remind the driverthat the tankeris
--- still connected (the latter system may be appropriate at
a producerplantor a consumer plant with a large
throughput).
The manoeuvring necessary to locate a road

tankerprecisely in relation to a solid pipeconnector
may make it more difficult to devise an interlock to the
highest standard ofsecurity. In such cases, an illterlock
to prevent access ofother tankers is strongly
recommended, and specialattention musthe paid to the
40
The airsupplyto the iruek's

h,ukesIllS to be dth oune(tc'd
he/ire 1/u'tnstume,,( 00
(,uehs/ 100/X'IY11I the IaO/u'i
pa(kIu0' Wt00(1(h/allot'
discharge ;'a1re) i(iit hi-
system ofwork which effectively prevents accidental

movement ofthe tanker, and to drivertraining.
Alternatively movement detectors ofthe light beam
and reflector typecan be Ll5ed and interlocked to close
the isolation valvesand soundtheaudiblealarm.
Interlocks may he used to prevent somereleases

due to operator error.For example to ensure that liquid
chlorine is not transfi'rred to the ventabsorber, in
addition to a procedure (step 9 of Appendix 6)
41
Safety advice for bulkchlorineinstallations 13
requiring the closure ofthe manual vent valve on the liquid chlorine delivery line before
starting thetanker discharge procedure, the vent valve shouldbe interlocked with the delivery
point or thetanker off-loading valve.
Deliveriesofliquidchlorine by rail tanker

42 The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail Regulations 199627apply. it is strongly
recommended that you adopt the following nieans ofminimising potential risks. Your risk
assessment will determine whetheradditional measuresare needed.
(a)
Closethe sidings to other traffic duringtransferofchlorine from tankers to storage. by

locking the points. Alternatively, friction buffers or a de-railermay be used.
(h)
Control by suitable means the volume and speedofadjacent traffic.
(c)
Close warning barriersand/orplace warning notices when the chlorine tankers are in
position.
(d)
Provide an interlock (see paragraphs 39-41) systemto prevent coupling or uncoupling of

the liquid chlorine lines, unless barriers or warning notices are in position. it is
recommended thatthe interlock system extendsto ensure that appropriate points on the
rail sidings arc locked and wheelstops raised before transfer of liquid chlorine can start.
(e)
Establish a system of work whereby one person is responsible for the whole operation of
unloading, and a second is within call during connection and disconnection. The second
person should be in the area and available throughout unloading.
Route chlorine pipelines in the area to minimisethe risk
ofdamagefrom collision by thetanker, other vehicles or
mobileequipment.
Owingto the very limited use of rail transport. the rest ofthis
guidance focuses on chlorine delivery by road tanker. When rail
transportis used, the sanie generalprinciples forthe safe
handling of bulk deliveries ofchlorine apply.
CONNECTIONSBETWEENTHE TANKERAND
THEFIXED LINES TO THESTORAGE
INSTALLATION(see also paragraphs 134 -147)
Flexiblecouplings to thetanker
forhquul chiorineondpadding
the.swo'elJolt?! (toil
iur.\otiee
the Jti1ngloaded pipeirork

uvpeo ton forthepwklingcar
li,
((lid liquid (JiloflOc
To transferliquid chlorine to storage, it is necessary to

couplethe liquid chlorine outlet line on the tankerto the inlet line
to storage. It is alsonecessary to increase thetanker pressure by
about I .7. bar abovethat in the
storage tank by connecting a
.
supplyof dry compressed air, nitrogen or chlorine vapourto the
tanker. The associated pipework (seeparagraphs 53-79)should
be as simple as possible to minimise the risk ofpotential loss-of43
containment accidents.
44 Connections For the transferofliquid chlorine require very careful

consideration, as theyare a potential source oflossofcontainmentleading to a
releaseofchlorine to the environment. Failure ofthe unloading connections can
result From inadequate design, poor weather protection, incorrect materials of'
construction, inadequate pipework support, improper use, or inadequate inspection
and maintenance. Therefrire. you need to ensure that the design standards are
adequate. that testing and inspection procedures are regularly carriedout andthat
the equipment is satisfactorilymaintained.
Types of connection
45
Three types of'connection are available:
(a)
Flexible couplings (sometimes called semirigid loading arnis)have:
(if
a solid connection pipe with swivel joints to flicilitate connectionto the

tanker and
(ii)
a degree offlexibility built into the supports and hangerto allow

movement when coupledup, ie a crankedfree length ofpipe or a coiled
pipe.
(b)
Flexible hoses.
(e)
Articulated arms.
Flexible couplings are normally used,but flexible hoses or articulated arms may be
used by agreement with, or recommendation of. the chlorine supplier.
Flexiblecouplings (semi-rigid loadingarnis)

46 Flexible couplings arc normally constructed from steel pipe. However,
Hastelloy C (not B) pipe is recommended up to the firstisolation valve. This offers
greater life in situationswhere the pipe is repeatedly exposed to very small amounts
of atmospheric moisture by the connection/disconnection process. Flexibility is
provided by a crankedfree length ofpipe(less usually by a coil) to allow for
vertical movement of thetanker during discharge. Screwed connections are used for
the connections to the road tanker screwed connections to BS2128 are commonly
used at eitherend of the flexible coupling. 'Swivel' joints in the paddinggas line
and the liquid chlorine line facilitate connection to the tanker. These joints are
tightened oncethe connections are made. Flanged connections are used fi)r
connecting to rail tankers.
Piping local to the tankerberth should not hefixed forthe first 5-7 m but it
needsto be supported. Thesystemofsupport used should ensure that the pipework
is keptabovethe headroom required by the tankerwhen it is being put in position.
The support should alsoallowthe pipework sufficient vertical movement to
accommodate that in the delivery vehicle's suspension system during the unloading
operation typically about 150 mm. A minimum internal pipediameterof 25 mm is
47
recommended.
Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations 15
48 The desitzn criteria for flexible couplingsconstructedfrom pipeworkare similarto those

for fixed pipework (see paragraphs 5660). Where the connections arc screwed connections,
the gasket should he a trapped joint ring, which is renewed at every connection (see also
paragraph 215).
Flexible hoses
The designofflexible Iioses2' should he agreed with your chlorine supplier. They
require more frequent testing than flexible couplings and their life is shorter,but position rig
of tankers is easier. FlexibleMonel braided hose connections are normally constructed up to
50 mm (2 in) size for the liquid chlorine discharge, and 25 mm (1 in) size for the compressed
gas connection to the tanker.
49
50 The operating instructions coveringunloadingshould ensure that visual inspection and

leak testing of theflexible hoses iscarried out before commenciilgtransferof liquid chlorine
(see also pL1i'agi'ipl1 2 I5).
Articulatedarms
Articulated arms, with swivelledjoints (knuckles). are Lisually used on high volume
installations. They should be designed to meetthe requirements specified in the Euro C'hlor
publication (lEST 75/44 and certilied as nleetmg this or an equivalent standard. They
shouldbe operated and niaintained as advised by the manulicturer. Arms shouldbe visually
inspected for dellcts and tested tor gas tightnessevery time they are Lised. Suspect arms
shouldbe immediately withdrawn from service fOr maintenance.
51
52
Where the seals at knuckle joints are purgedby a flovv of dry (dew point less than
40C) air or nitrogen. this gas should he continuously sampled by a chlorine detectorsystem
with an alarm. An isolation valve suitable for use with articulated arms should be attached to
the dischargeend of thearm to prczei1t air entering the arm after operation. It should:
(a)
ensure a gas tight seal when the arm is not in use to prevent moisture getting in an end
cap shouldalso be used and
(b)
permit the venting down of'the arm and depressurisation of'any connection adapter. The
arm should he ventedafter each operatioil and purged with a suitable dry gas.
Whenan arm is oLit of service the purge gas shoLild be maintained under a small pressure (eg
0.5 bar gauge).
You need to keep a register showing each operation and the quailtity (eg tonnes) of chlorine
trans rred
16
PIPEWORKFOR LiQUID CHLORINE

In designing your pipework you shouldtake stepsto guardagainstthe
following caises offailure:
53
(a)
impact:
(ii)
heatino.
(c)
severe internal
(d)
overpressure(see paragraphs 6167); and
(c)
erosion due to relatively high liquid velocities and inadequate inspection and
maintenance procedures. Liquid velocities less than 2 m's are recommended.
cc fire (resulting in a reaction between (lie steel and chlorine):

or external corrosion;
54 Routing ofpipcvork fir liquid chlorine should normally heabove ground and
should he sLich as to maximise protection from mechanical damage,corrosion and
fire. A minimum internal diameter of 25 mm (I in) is recommended to ensure
adequate mechanical strength.
Permanentpipework at the unloadingpoint

55
The permanent pipework at the unloading point usually consists ofthe
lollowing lines:
(a)
pipework fi)r pressurisiigthe tanker with dry air, nitrogen or chlorine (see
alsoparagraph 1 34I47);
(h)
pipework for the transferofliquid chlorine to storage; and
(c)
instrument air lines. eg to operate the remotelycontrol lcd valves

pipework
on the tanker.
br
The source ofcompressed 'padding' air needs to be independent from that

supplying other services. Detailed design reqLnrementsfor the pipework and fittings
aredescribedin paragraphs 5679. The system for offloading ofliquid chlorine is
described in paragraphs 134-147.
Design criteriaforpipeworktransferringliquid chlorine to storage tanks or
from storage topointofuse
Your pipework will be part ofa pressure system and subject to (lie
requirements of the PSTGC RegLilations.232 It therefore needs tobe properly
designed. fabricated, inspected and tested in accordance with a recognised Code, eg
ANSI/ASME B3 1.332, and shouldhe sufficiently robust for all friresecable
conditions of work.
56
Safety advice forbulk chlorine installations 17
(a)
Design pressure. Should not be less than 12 bar gauge (174 psig).corresponding to a
design temperature of+45 O( Any part ofthe system which may operateat a higher
temperature shouldbe designed to withstand the corresponding vapourpressure (see
Appendix 2. Figure A2.l).
(b)
Design temperature. Should be lessthan the minimum at which the pipe is intended to
operate. or the temperature to which it will be cooled Lf liquid chlorine boils offat
atmospheric pressure (35C). Thenormal designrangeis 35C to +45C. In certain
uncommon situations lowertemperatures are possible due to chlorine cooling below its
boilingpoint,eg when purging systems with dry gas locations where liquid chlorine
has collected maycool to temperatures as low -50C due to evaporative cooling. Your
chlorine supplier should be able to provide advice on the needto design for such low
tei1peratures.
(c)
Materials of construction. Care is needed in selecting suitable materials (see

Appendix 2). Seamless carbonsteel tubing is recommended thr pipework. All
components ofpipes,valvesand fittings shouldbe resistant tothe action ofchlorine
between the extremes ofoperating temperatures and pressures.. Original material
certificates shouldbe kept throughout the plant's life.
(d)
Corrosion allowance. 1 mm.
(e)
Radius of curvature ofany formed bends. Three pipe diameters minimum (weldelbows
must be used where tighterbends are necessary). Elbows, tees and reducing pieces
should be forged or hot-formed without reduction in wall thickness.
(f)
Bolting. Should be designed to the requirements ofBS 4S82.
(g)
Flanges. The numberofflanges shouldbe limited as far as possible and thoseused

or
shouldbe to the requirements of a recognised design codeeg BS
ASME/ANSI Bl65.36 Steel used for fabrication of flanges or welded connections to the
pipe must be compatible with that ofthe pipe itself.
(h)
Gaskets. Theuse ofincoiTectmaterials for gasketscan be dangerous; if in doubtyou

shouldseek the advice ofyour chlorine supplier. Rubber gaskets should never be used
for liquidchlorine service. All packings. gaskets and diaphragms shouldbe resistant to
the action of chlorine between theextremesofoperating temperatures and pressures.
Proven materials such as spiral wound Monel, Kel-F or Aramid fibreare suitable.
Compressed asbestosfibre(CAF) gaskets to BS I
grade A or 0, preferably
graphite-treated on each face to facilitate dismantling, are suitable forjoints that are
expectedto remain in service for several years without being disturbed. Any used
asbestoscomponents shouldbe collected and disposed ofsafely. Where joints are made
and remaderelatively frequently CAF is not recommended for environmental reasons.
Alternative jointing material such as ararnid fibre shouldbe used.
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) to BS 656438 grade CA I/I may be suitable provided
thejoint is ofan encapsulated type (eg a spigotted joint) to preventthe PTFE 'creeping'.
Some users havefound lead tobe suitable on smalldiameterpipework (less than
25 mm). Where a varietyofgasketmaterials arc used joints should be tabbed for easy
identification.
l560
832,
18 Safety advice forbulk chlorine installations
(i)
Manufacturers' instructions needto be strictlyadheredto. Avoid overtightening fittings asthis can result in leaks due to the subsequent failure of
the fixing nuts or packing.
(j)
Lubrication. Normally in assembling pipe flanges, boltsand gaskets, no

lubricants are required. Where lubrication is needed, onlyfully inert oils and
greases recommended for chlorine duty shouldbe used. On no account must
hydrocarbon-based lubricants be used as they react with chlorine and may
ignite. The heat generated may be sufficient to cause a chlorine-iron fire (see
Appendix 2) which\vould result in a pipework failure and a release of
chlorine.
57
The following controls should be applied during construction:
(a)
Stress relief All fabricated items and butt welds should be stress-relieved
before final inspection and testing.
(b)
Inspection and pressuretesting. All weld spatter, scale and other foreign
matter should be removed. All butt welds should be fully radiographed or
ultrasonically examined. All pipework should be pressure-tested in accordance
with the design code. Where hydrostatic tests are made it is essential thatthe
complete piping system is thoroughly cleanedand dried to a dew point less
than -40Cbefore introducing chlorine. All traces of oil,greaseand solvents
mustbe removed (eg with steam or aqueous detergents or both) for the
reasons stated under 'Lubrication' in paragraph 56. Ifa hydrostatic test is
madeafter installation it will be necessary to change all gaskets to ensure
dryness. Appropriate leak tests will then be required to cheekthe newlymade
joints.
(e)
Modifications. Any extension, modification or repairs to pipework should be

carriedout to a standard at least equivalent to the original design and
construction codeincluding stress relief,inspection and testing.
Protection ofpipework
58
You should install pipework conveying chlorine so that it is:
(a)
protected from impact by vehicles by distance or with barriers;
(b)
protected from falling objects eg no overhead hoists.Canopyroofsfor weather

protection should be constructed oflightweight materials;
(e)
separated from pipework carrying corrosive or flammable materials or other

sources ofheat,eg steani - the separation will depend on the natureofthe
other material and anestimateofthe hazard;
(d)
adequately supported;
(e)
accessible for maintenance and inspection;

(f) preferably unlagged; and

(g)
regularly inspected under any lagging to detect corrosion due to failure ofweathersealing.
Marking
59 The chlorine areaneedstobe clearlyidentified, marked3941 - see also the Dangerous
Substances Regulations in Appendix 3 - and secured against unauthorised entry. It is
recommended that chlorine pipework should be clearly labelledand paintedyellow in
accordance with BS 171042
to 08E5l-BS4800). The Health and Safety (Safety Signs
and Signals) Regulations
require clear labelling whenever risks to employees cannot
be avoidedor adequately reduced by other mcans advice is given in the associated
guidance.45
(e
l996
It is good practiceto markvalves which are required to operate in an emergency. They

shouldbe marked with a clear indication oftheir function and thedirectionin which they open
and close. These markings needto be consistent with the markings on any flow diagrams or
operational nistructions. Valve keys for operating the emergency valvesshouldbe located
near to the valve.
60
PROTECTIONOF LIQUID CHLORINEPiPEWORKAGAiNST

OVERPRESSURE
Trapping of liquid chlorine between closed valves, followed by a rise in temperature.
increases the risk ofoverpressure. Even a small temperature rise cancausea very high
hydraulic pressure, becauseofthe high coefficient ofexpansion ofliquid chlorine (see
Appendix 2).
61
62 Therisk of liquid chlorine being trapped between closed valves is increased by the
following factors:
(a)
Isolation valves that are controlled by differentoperators. This may be a special risk
where there are long linesor complex pipework between units.
(b)
The simultaneous closure of automatically operated valves that have been installed for
plant isolation. This risk shouldbe assessed. In somecircumstances it may be preferable
to employ at least one manuallyinitiated remotely controlled valve.
You shoulddesign your system and operating procedures to minimise the risks of
overpressurisation. Whenappropriate, pressure reliefdevices should be fitted.
63
Provisionofreliefsystems
64 Reliefsystenis complicate pipework and introduce other potential hazards, and should in
general be avoided. However, ifthe capacity ofyour system is such thatrelease ofthe
chlorine present could lead to a serious incident, automatic means of releasing excessive
pressure in the pipework needs tobe provided. It follows that the configuration ofthe
pipework, positioning ofvalves, and valve-closing methods (see paragraph 62) haveto be
studied to see whether the hazardcan occur.
20
Pressure reliefsystemsshould be designedto meet your operating conditions.

It is recommended that the needfor, and thedesign of, relief systems is fully
65
discussedwith your chlorine supplier.
66 A common method ofpressurerelieffor protection ofliquid chlorine lines is

viaa bursting disc installed in a vertical tee on thepipework, discharging to a
suitable collecting system (see Figure 1) The relief volume ofthe pressure vessel
shouldbe at least 20% ofthe line volume. Anyexpansion vessel should be
registered as a pressure vessel for examination and recordingpurposes.23
Figure 1 Pressure relief system for chlorine pipelines

Note: Valve A should be secured open and valve 13 closed.
Locking mechanisms should be defeatable if the valve
position needs to be changed under emergency conditions.
Pressure alarm gauge
V Locked open valve
Lockedshutvalve
Vent line toprocess

ortoabsorption plant
Pressure vessel
Bursting disc assembly
Chlorine pipeline
67
The pressure vessel should be fitted with a suitable alarmwhichoperatesas a
result oftherise in pressure in the vessel, ifthe bursting disc leaks or ruptures. The
vesseland line can then be vented to process, orto the chlorine absorption system
via a normally locked-closed valve. The heated bottle' system originally used on
older installations is now obsolete and not recommended.
21
VALVES
It is strongly recommended that Euro Chlorapproved valves are used on new
installations. Care isessentialin the choiceofvalves (eg see the publications on valves in
reference 22) as theyhave tobe resistantto chlorine and able to copewith the stresses to
whichthey may be subjected. The valve bodyshouldpreferablybe madeofforged steel:
cast ironis not acceptable. Ifthe valvedesign is such that liquid chlorine could be trapped
within the body when the valve is closed, provision should be madeto avoid excess
pressurewhichmay developwith temperature rise. Inothersituationsthe evaporation of
liquid chlorine may cause operating temperatures to fall below 350( (see paragraph
56(b)): the valves shouldbe selected so as not to fail ifthis occurs. Problems whichare
specific to coldor to liquid chlorine limit the application ofcertain designs of valve.
68
69 The selection ofthe appropriate type ofvalve for each application should be
reviewed with your chlorine supplierwho will be able to suggest manufacturers ofvalves
whose equipment has given satisfactory service with liquid chlorine.This will reduce the
possibility ofunsatisfactory valves being used \vhich will require replacement after a short
period and could he a potential source of hazard.
70 Valves which are 'permanently'open (eg to prevent inadvertent isolationofpressure
alarms), or 'permanently'closed(eg emergency vent lines) shouldbe securedin these
positions. The locking mechanisms should be capable ofbeing broken in the event of an
emergency, eg the lead or plastic seal type.
It is emphasised that, during maintenance operations, reliance on valves ofwhatever

for
type isolation is insufficient. The design ofthe system shouldbe suchthat complete
isolationofthe section concerned is possible. Suitable methods for achieving this include
the installation of spool pieces in the lines which can be removed and substituted by
blanks,or the insertion ofslip plates.46
71
Types of valve
72 Valvesofthe following types have beendeveloped for use with liquid chlorine or dry
chlorine gas under pressure:
(a)
vertical globe valves;
(b)
conical plug valves;
(c)
ball valves.
73 Valveshave tobe degreased using steam or detergents and thencompletely dried

before use. All traces ofany solvent usedshouldbe removed as it could react with
chlorine (seeparagraph 57(b)). It is recommended thatafterthis treatment the valves
should be stored in individual gas-tight plastic bags ready for installation when required.
22
Verticalglobe valves
74 This typeofvalveis preferred to other types and is used for isolation of liquid
chlorine stocktanksor for large flows ofchlorine gas. The billet-globe valve is
recommended for installation on the liquid chlorine outlet line from chlorine storage
tanks(see paragraph 96). The gas seal aroundthe valve spindle in globe valvesmay
be formed by a packedgland (preferably usingringsor chevrons of PTFE) or by a
bellows seal. The bellows shouldbe backedup by a secondary gland seal. Globe
valves may, with advantage, be fittedwith a back seating arrangement which
isolates the gland from line pressure when the valve is fullyopen.
Glandpackedglobevalve
(('pica! si:e.s(0,01101)/c I5nim
In250mm)
Be/lows sealed globevalve with

pneu,na/lcactualor. Hydraulic
and electricalactuatorsare also
available
Conicalplug valves (PTFE-sleeved)

Conicalplug valves, PTFE-sleeved, are satisfactory for isolation of liquid
chlorine lines, particularly when quick isolation maybe required, but the primary
valveon the storage tank is preferably a globe valve. Rapidisolation can cause
pressure surges and you needto consider these whendesigning your installation
(seealso paragraph 79).
75
76 Conical plug valves for use with liquid chlorine require provision for the
avoidance ofproblemsarising from liquid chlorine trapped in the bore when the
valve is closed. If this makes the valves uni-directional, they needto be marked
with an indication ofthe required directionof liquid flow to ensurecorrect
installation. Gas-tightness is providedby a PTFE sleeve inserted into the bodyof
thevalveand by a supplementary seal along the length ofthe spindle between the
valve bodyand head. Careshouldbe takento avoid the application ofside thrustto
thespindles ofplug valves.
Ball valves
77 This typeofvalvecan be used for isolation in liquid chlorine linesand should
incorporate the following:
(a)
spherical turning limited to a quarter-turn:
(b)
straight-through flanging:
(c)
PTFE seals.
78 Ball valves shouldbe avoidedwhenoperating conditions involve large and frequent

temperature changes. If used with liquid chlorine, you shouldmakeprovision for avoiding
problems arising from liquid chlorine trappedinthe borewhenthe valve is closed. Liquid
trapped in the ball shouldbe released downstream via a small hole in the ball. Ifthis makes
the valve uni-directional it needsto be marked with an indication ofthe required direction of
liquid flow to ensure correctinstallation. (Ball valves may not seal whenthe sealing pressure
and the system pressure are in opposite directions). The reniarks about pressure surges in
paragraphs 75 and 79 also apply.
Remotely controlled valves
79 The rate ofclosure ofany actuatedvalveshouldnot be so rapid that it causes undue
pressure surgesin the system. The standard rate of closure shouldbe satisfactory for pipework
up to 50 mm diameter. Longruns of larger diameter pipework may require lowerrates of
closure to prevent liquid hammer. You should seek advice from your valve supplier.
STORAGEVESSELS(seealso paragraphs 190-229)

80
To minimise the dangerofover-filling your storage vessel, its capacity needs to be
significantly greaterthan that ofthe largest delivery vehicle. The chosencapacitywill depend
on therate ofconsumption and the frequency ofdeliveries. Installation ofbulk storage
facilities shouldbe considered only ifthe annual consumption ofchlorine is sufficient to
justify bulk supplies ratherthanpurchaseof liquid chlorine in drums or ISO containers (see
paragraphs 216-221). An installation consisting ofsmallertankswhichwould require split
loads is not recommended. New sites should involve HSE at an early stage.
81
In considering the number of individual storage tanksfor a required total storage
capacity, take the following pointsinto account:
(a)
The minimum workingcapacityofthe tankshouldbe adequate to safelyaccommodate

the working stockresidue and the maximum foreseen unit delivery.
(b)
Ifcontinuity ofsupplyis essential, at least two tankswill be requiredto allow time for
necessary inspections and to facilitate maintenance. Thisalso providesgreater flexibility
ofoperation.
(c)
24
Increasing the numberofstorage tanks leads toan increase inthe ancillary plant and
equipment witha corresponding increase in complexity of operation.
82 The distance between adjacentstorage tanksshouldbe adequateto provide

good access tothe tanksunderall circumstances. This includes those in which
bulky protective equipment(suchas self-contained breathing apparatus) is being
used.
83 All chlorine storage tanks should be

installed in a bund which is impervious to
liquid chlorine. The bund shouldbe capableof
taking the contents ofthe largest storage tank
with adequatefreeboard and a sump. Ifthere is
a sub-division to givea separate section under
each tank, each section shouldhave a sloping
floor leading to a sump, whichmay servemore
than one tank. Sumps shouldnot be connected
to the drain. Provision shouldbe included for
removal of rain water over the bund wall, not
viathe drain or through valvesin thebund.
84 Leaksofliquid chlorine are potentially
much more dangerous than leaks ofgaseous
several) attheedge ofthebund.
chlorine. Your systemtherefore needsto be
designedso that sources ofleakageofliquidare
reducedto a minimum, eg by avoiding joints which are continuously exposed to
liquid chlorine such as bottom outlets, see paragraph 88.
Chlorine storagevesselandbund.
Note theemergencystopbutton(oneof
85 The severityofa leak is reducedby loweringthe pressurewithinthe system

and therefore it is important that facilities for transferring gaseouschlorine to a
consuming processor to a waste-chlorine absorptionplantare available. You should
also consider in your risk assessment the need for arrangements to transferliquid
chlorine from a leaking tank to anothertank whichcan be isolated.
86 Layout ofthe chlorine areashouldbe plannedto provide all facilities

necessary for good housekeeping and emergency response. Chlorine storage tanks
shouldtherefore be erectedaboveground level.Installation in deeppits is not
recommended becauseit increases the difficulties oftreatment and dispersal ofa
chlorine escapeand ofaccess for maintenance or repair. Ample storage space is
needed for maintenance and safetyequipment, which has to be readilyaccessible in
an emergency.
Thermal insulation ofthe storage tanks is not normally required. However, if
your vessel is relatively close to a firehazardand lagging is required, the material
should be fire-resistant, chemically inert to liquid or gaseouschlorine and resistant
to atmospheric moisture getting in. Periodic inspection beneath the lagging is
essential whenchecking for corrosion.
87
25
Designcriteria
88
Design criteriafor new liquid chlorine storage and expansion vessels are outlined below.
(a)
Design pressure. 12 bar gauge (174 psig) minimum.
(b)
Design temperature. When liquid chlorine evaporates at atmospheric pressureits

temperature fallsto -35Cand therefore the minimum design temperature should not be
any higher, but lowertemperatures are possible ifevaporative cooling of liquid chlorine
occurs, see paragraph 56(b). Thenormaldesign range is -35C to +45C.
(c)
Filling ratio. Filling ratios fortransportable liquid chlorine containers are detailed in
BS 535547 for various size ranges ofmobilecontainers and for differenttemperatures.
Although there is no equivalent standard for fixed tanks, for simplicity a figure of
1 .25 kg ofliquid chlorine/litre capacity is normally used to fix the maximum level to
which thetank may be filledand the settingchosenfor the high level alarm. This
ensures that the volume of liquid chlorine does not exceed95% ofthetotal volume of
the vessel, even for a maximum temperature of 50C.
(d)
Design code. New vessels shouldbe designedand manufactured

Category I (or an equivalent standard).
(e)
Corrosion allowance. Minimum 1 mm.
(f)
Supports and load cells. The vessel supports should be designed in accordance with the
design code to permit thermal expansion or contraction overthe design temperature
range. Special consideration may be necessary (checkwith your supplier) where load
cellsare used for determining the contents ofthe tank.eg certain types of weighing
device require secondary supports.
(g)
Branches. Dimensions shouldbe limited to the minimum required, particularlyfor the

liquid lines. All branchesshould be mounted, wherepossible, on the manholecover or
covers. Manhole accessshouldbe providedon top ofthe vessel. The opening should
preferably be 600 mm diameter, but in no case should it be lessthan 460 mm diameter.
Bottom outlets should not be providedexcept where required for chlorine transferby
pumping. Any bottom outlet should have an internal valve, preferably remotelyoperable, plus a back-up isolating valve (seeparagraph 97).
(h)
Bolting. Should meet the requirements ofBS 4882.
(i)
Gaskets. Use ofincorrect materials for gaskets can be dangerous, see paragraph 56(h)
for suitable materials.
(j)
Documentation. Regulation 5 ofPSTGC2325
to BS 550048
requiresdesigners, manufacturers and
suppliers ofpressure systems to provide sufficient written information concerning the
design, construction, examination, operation and maintenance to enable the regulations

to he complied with. You must retain this information togetherwith any Certificate of
Compliance (eg BS 5500' or similardocumentation ifother standards are being used).
26
(k)
Marking. The vessel must bemarkedwiththe details specified in Schedule 4

ofthe PSTGC Regulations. All valvesand pipework associated with chlorine
storage tanks should be labelledand colour coded(see alsoparagraphs59 and 60).
89 Paragraph 88 applies to new systems designed and constructed in accordance

with a current standard. Wherean existingtank has beenprovidedin accordance
with a different standard, the systemsshouldbe assessed according to the
requirements of thoseoriginal standards. In particular, ifthe vessel'ssafe working
pressureis less than 12 bar gauge(174 psig),then the air system pressure, relief
devices etc all have to he altered to suit, and the delivery system has tobe arranged
so as to be capable ofworkingwithin the storage tank conditions. It is
recommended that such tanks are replaced withtanks meeting the requirements of
paragraph 88. The timingofthe replacement shouldbe agreedwith your chlorine
supplierand the competent person who examines your vessels.
Connectingpipeworkandmeansforisolation ofstorage tanks

90
The main connections tothe storage tanks are:
(a)
liquid chlorine inlet
(b)
liquid chlorine outlet;
(c)
vent linesand compressed dry gas lines;
(d)
reliefsystem;
(e)
instrumentation and pressure gauges.
You need to keep the

numberofconnections to a
minimum to reducethe
91
Connections atthetop ofthechlorine storagetank. .ate

thepressuresreliefsystem with interlocked valves
potential sources ofleakage.

The arrangements ofvalves
and pipework shouldbe made
as simple as possible to
mm imise errors in operation.
Pipework isolation valves should
be fitted directly to the branches
on the manlidor the tank itself.
The system should be designed
and operated so that, ifthejoints
between the valvesand
the storage tanksfail, gaseous
chlorine only will be released
(seeparagraphs 94-96).
(seeparagraphs120 to 127)
27
92 Whenevertwo valvesare installed in series for isolation, it is recommended that the

system ofoperation is plannedso that each valve is used exclusively for a defined period
during normal operation. This ensures that both valvesare kept in operable condition at all
times.
93 An application ofthe principles in this sectionis shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.
Notall installations will beto this pattern, and variations (some ofwhich are described in the
text) maybe appropriate.
Liquidchlorine inlet
94 The liquid chlorine inlet should not normally extendfurther into the tank than the
maximum liquid level. Some older installations use a dip-pipe on the inlet line. To avoid
liquid chlorine flowing back ifthe fillingline fails, holesare drilled in the top ofthe dip-pipe
so that liquid will not siphon back. A full dip-pipe maybe provided as an inlet to a vessel used
for both importation and exportation. Suchvesselsneedto be fittedwith the additional
controls appropriate to a liquid chlorine outlet. Youshould discuss the controls neededwith
your proposed chlorine supplierat an early stage.
95 The isolation valve on the chlorine inlet line, directlybolted to the flangeon the storage
tank,should preferably be a billetor high integrity globe valve. A back-upvalveshouldbe
provided, which maybe remotelyoperated. Ifa manualback-upvalve is used, the isolation
valveat the delivery point end of the pipework should be remotely operablefrom the
emergency stop points.
Liquid chlorine outlet

96 The removal ofliquid chlorine from the storage tank is by meansofa dip-pipe. You
therefore needto makearrangements to prevent chlorine releasescaused by the joint between
the isolation valve and storage tank failing. This ismost satisfactorily achievedon new plant
by use of a billet-type globe valve, bolted to the flanged branch on thestorage tank, with the
dip-pipescrewed into the bottom of the valve.
97
You needto back up the main isolation valvewith anadditionalvalveto enable isolation
ifone valve fails to seat effectively. Depending on thelocal pipingarrangement, provision of
one or more remotelycontrolled valvesis recommended for emergency control. A remotely

operated valvewhichis designed to give positive isolation and which is suitably positioned
mayalso serveasone ofthetwo isolation valvesrequired.
In addition, it is strongly recommended that you incorporate a restricting orifice in the

line tothe consuming plant.The objectofthis is to reducethe size ofa releasefrom a major
failure to as low as reasonably practicable, ie appreciably lessthan the full-bore flow through
the pipe.The size and location ofthe orifice needscareful consideration. The orifice should
not be so small asto lead to problems, such as proneness ofthe orifice to blocking, etc. In
somecases it may be practicable to limitthe flow in the line tothe maximum requiredby the
process. The orifice shouldnot be located within the dip-pipe becauseofthe problem of
removing the liquid chlorine fromthe tankin theeventofa blockage oftheorifice.In some
98
28
poets(rriu9o)
need
pools Ipara
37d
lobe inkedinto the

automaticgas detect on
and shut down system
(parall3etseq) and Or
Whtblth
vesse poras 128 133
Eopanniee
Valve A or B shOu
Ire rereotely operab e
Iron emergency slop
0..
hi b'< read tuoker ira
stop
LPata
Dry air ordry N

sapply Systeer at
000trettedpte080re
t34 t4t)
Storage vessel
be rvmvtely operab e
from emergeevystop
P0 nts (Peru 97)
01ev) these valves shov
0--
Liqu dcl to vvrsvirerg plan

(peru 98)
seapara
96
il rage vesse
bilage pipe
(pares 07 and tb8(
000 paId PA
J!
v<
- Vent absorber
(para t7t t89)
It there is any risk vi iqu

rem the vent being sucked
huk this ne should nvlvde
a preventive device
(107 174)
The parirwthiothe dotted Inc are repeated00 every
i:ri
Restrictingoritice
plants, the flow restriction can be replaced by the remotely operable shut-offvalves(see
paragraph Ill) controlled by a suitable flow or pressuresensor. Excessflow valvesmay be
advisable for linesnormally taking a flow ofchlorine much lessthan the flow which could
passthrough in fault conditions. They arenot suitable for lines in which the normal flow rate
is high, and for which other means of fault detection and flow isolation shouldbe used.
Vent and compressed drygas lines

99 Vent linesand compressed dry gas lines can be connected to the storage tank either
through separate inlets or through a combined single inlet. In eithercase, the valvedirectly
connected tothe storage tank shouldbe backed up by a second valve.
The prevention ofsuck-back of aqueous liquor into the vent line requires similar
precautions to those described for vaporisers (see paragraph 161). The prevention ofbackdiffusion ofmoisture is describedin paragraphs 1 78-181. The inlet tothe scrubbing system
should include a lute pipe(barometric leg) to prevent liquid from the scrubbing system
entering the chlorine system.
100
The procedure for transferring liquid chlorine to the storage tanksshouldprovide for the
vent valve to be opened slightly at the end of discharge for about a minute(see Appendix 6,
paragraph 17) to confirm that thetank has not been significantly over-filled. ie abovethe
extra-high level alarm(see paragraph 104). Overfilling is indicated by frosting on the vent
line, in which casepressurerelief maybe necessary (seeparagraphs 102-132).
101
Reliefsystem
102 The special requirements for the isolationvalveson the pressure relief system on the
storage tanksarecoveredin paragraphs 123-133.
Instrumentation and chlorine detector systems

103 Control instrumentation on storage tanksand elsewhere in the installation should,
whereverpossible, be designedto fail safe. Electrical and electronic equipment. unless

specially protected against corrosion. should not be placedin areas where itcould be affected
by gas leaks.
104 Storage tank contents. The quantity ofliquid chlorine in each storage tank is preferably
determined by installing the tankon loadcells or on a weighbridge. Load cells should be
recalibrated whenever the vessel is inspected and pressure-tested with water. Accuracy checks
caii alsobe madeagainst the weight ofchlorine supplied whenever a delivery is made,
provided the plant is off-line. Itis recommended that load cells are recalibrated at intervals not
exceeding three years. The weight of liquid chlorine in each tank shouldbe indicated locally
and maybe repeated in the plant control room. The contents-measuring devices needto
operate a highcontents alarm in the control room (and on complexplants,possiblyan extrahigh contents alarm) for safety reasons. The extra-high level alarmneeds to be run
independently ofthe systemgivingthe high-contents alarm, for reliability reasons.When
fitted, it is recommended that the extra-high level alarm is used to automatically closethe tank
inletvalveand thetanker oLitlet valve, see paragraph 105.
105 Asan alternative to the measurement ofthe quantityof liquid chlorine by

weight, measurement by liquid level in the tanksis alsoacceptable. However,
selection of suitable equipment is difficult and you shoulddiscuss ii with your
chlorine supplier. Such devices are preferred as themeansoftriggering the extra
high level alarm.
106 To limitthe liquid volume in the storage tank to that permitted by the filling
ratio (seeparacraph88(c)). an ullage pipecan be screwed into the bottom ofthe
valve on the vent line. The length ofthis ullage pipeneedsto he consistent withthe
filling ratioso that, if liquid chlorine rises abovethe correctlevel, it will flow
through the ullage pipewhenthe vent valveis opened at the end of a delivery (see
Appendix 6) or in response to an alarm. The ullage pipe shouldbe checked when
the routine Inspection ofthe storage installation is made. A low temperature or other
alarm(see paragraph 107) shouldbe fittedon the vent line from the storage tanks to
warn if liquid chlorine is entering the ullagepipe on the vent line.
107 On a simpleinstallation, with good staffing and attendance at the tanks, an
ullage pipe (see paragraph 106) may serveasthe extrahigh level alarm. You need
to he awarethat this method requires the vent line to be left open, which is not
necessarily thecase for alternative methods, see Appendix 6. Ifa high contents
alarm is ignored during filling ofthe tank, the liquid reaches the bottom of the
ullage pipeand evaporates in the ventlineabovethevent control valve, producing
frostiig ofthe pipe. An ullage pipe therefore presents the risk ofliquid chlorine
being passed to the scrubber unless the line contains a knockout device fitted with
a high level alarm. A knockout pot in thevent line with level alarmsis also
recommended for other reasons (see paragraph 157). The minimum protection fitted
should be a restriction orifice plate (seeparagraph 98) and a low temperature alarm.
108 Ullage pipes arenot recommended for contents indication on new
installations: instead an extrahigh level alarm on thetank should be installed, see
also paragraph 105.
109 A low contents alarm ma be usefLil for operational reasons and may have
safety implications if, eg therecould be process upsets on thilure ofchlorine supply
or passage ofpadding air (seeparagraph 226) into a downstream vessel.
110 Storage tank pressure. The pressLirein the chlorine storage tanksis usLially
measured by gaugesspecially developed for use with liquid chlorine these have
silver or tantalum diaphragms. Before use, the gauges needto he completely
degreased (eg with steam and/ora detergent), dried and all traces of solvent
removed, and be pressuretested using only clean, dry. oil-treecompressed air. The
pressuregauges may be tOtedwith switches to give analarm ifthe pressure
exceeds, or tOlls below, a pre-set value. Alternatively, pressure switches maybe
used to give an independent signal for the high and low pressure alarms.
Ill Where reference is made to flow or pressure sensors 'operating' valves(see

paragraph 98) there isa choice whetherthe operation is automatic or via manual
intervention (seeparagraph 62(h)). At the extremes, operation should be automatic
in an unstaffed plant, and maybe indirectin a well-instrumented plant with a continuously

staffed control room.
112 Equipment associated with the automatic pressurerelief systemis describedin
paragraphs 120 and 128-133.
Chlorine detectorsand alarms

113 The air in a buildinghousingchlorine storage tanksshouldbe continuously monitored
using proprietary chlorine detector systemsto givewarning of chlorine leakage. Detectorsare
strongly recommended in buildings which are not continuously staffed to provide early
warning of leaks, allowing promptremedial action. For outdoor installations, the value of
detector systems needs to be assessed by considering factors such as the size ofthe
installation, the staffing levels and the response timesachievable. On detecting a leak, the
detector should:
(a)
raise an audible alarm in a continuously staffed area or control centre;
(b)
activate audible alarms in the affected area;
(c)
operate the automatic isolation valves; and
(d)
control the mechanical ventilation, if fitted.
114 Audible alarms need to havea distincttone. In addition, warning lights ofthe amber
flashing ortraffic light type maybe fittedoutside each chlorine building. Whereappropriate,
eg at large, remote or sensitive sites, alarmsshouldbe connected to a telemetry systemto
providewarning at a staffed control point. The control point shouldbe able to isolate the
chlorine supply, preferably via a remotelyoperable valvefitted to the outletofthe tank.
II 5 Chlorinedetectorsmay be placedin storage and plant areas. The manufacturer or

supplier ofthe system should advise on the best location for the sensors; typically sensors are
mountedbetween 0.3 iii and 0.5 m abovegroundlevel,and at the outletfromfume scrubbers.
For indoor installations, sensors mayneedto be located inor near the entrance to ducts
carrying chlorine pipework,and the air intakes to extractorfans.Where forced ventilation
systems havebeeninstalled,the detector should be located at theoutlet ofthe system; where
this is not reasonably practicable the detector should be placednear the storage and use areas.
116 Detection systems shouldprovide a continuous monitoring function whenchlorine is in
storage or in use. Chlorine gas sensors should be tested regularlyin accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions to denionstrate that the detector and its associated circuits are
functioning correctly. A record ofsuch tests is recommended. The detection system should
operate thealarm circuits in the event ofpower loss, sensor failure,or low condition ofthe
standby batteries.All alarm relayoperations shouldbe protectedby a battery back-up facility.
The detector system should activate the low level alarmat a chlorine concentration of
1-5 ppm. Lower settingsare liable to activate the systemat every tank-fillingoperation, unless
I 17
32
a duration requirement is alsoimposed. For example,some companies set the low
level alarmat 0.5 ppm, but require the sensorto register this concentration for at
least30 seconds, to avoid spurious trips ofthe alarmsystemduringfilling
operations. For indoor installations, the lowalarmlevelshouldactivate the
ventilation fan, open the intake louvers, and activate local audio alarms and any
remotetelemetry alarm.
118 Multi-stage detectorsystems are sometimes used to give an indication ofthe

severityofthe malfunction to personnel outside a chlorine room. It is suggested that
the high level alarm operates at aboutthreetimes thelevel ofthe first-stage alarm,
ic 3-15 ppm, depending on the durationthat the sensorneedsto register this level.
However, some companies set the high level alarm at 2 ppm with a 30 second
duration requirement.
On activation ofa high level alarmthe ventilation system should be shut off, the
auto-shutdown systemactivated (where fitted ) and the high level alarmsounded.
Thetone ofthe alarm at lowand high levelsshouldbe differentand operators
trained to recognise the difference and how to respondin eachcase. Local alarms
may be supplemented by telemetry links to control rooms, where appropriate. The
response to alarmsis coveredin paragraphs 247-263. Some sensors can be damaged
by high chlorine concentrations; detector systems should therefore be checked after
any high level alarm.
PROTECTIONOF STORAGEVESSELSAGAINST
OVERPRESSURE
Highpressure on the liquid chlorine storage tank is indicated by a high
pressure alarm (paragraph 110). Overpressure in the liquid chlorine storage tanks
can result from over-filling or excessive paddingpressure. Over-filling with liquid
chlorine is indicated by alarmson the weigh systemused to determine the liquid
chlorine content ofthe storage tanks (paragraphs 104-109). Overpressure on the
compressed air or nitrogen supplyto the storage tank is prevented by the installation
ofa reliefvalveon thesupply source of the compressed gas. The supply source
should be wellupstream ofthe tank and separated from it by isolationvalves
119
(paragraph 139).
Reliefsystem
120 The storage tanksneedtobe protectedagainstoverpressure by a suitable
automatic pressurerelief system which is set to operate at a pressurebelow the
design value. The preferred pressurerelief systemconsistsoftwo bursting discs
placed back to back. A bursting disc followed by a relief valve may alsobe used,
but is always subject to the risk of corrosion ofthe reliefvalve. Protection ofthe
relief valve from corrosion mustbe carefully considered ifthe bursting discrelief
valvesystem isused. The use of reliefvalvesaloneis not recommended because of
the corrosion or blockage whichcould occur ifa reliefvalve were left continuously
exposed to chlorine. Whichever system is used, you should provide a pressure
alarm/indicator between the two discs or between the disc and reliefvalve(see
paragraph 133). Inthe latter arrangement it is good practiceto remove and overhaul
the relieF valvewhenever the bursting disc is replaced.
121 The dischargeline from the pressurerelief system normally entersa closed expansion
vessel (except in a few specialised arrangements). Anypressure iii the expansion vessel or
between components in the relief system reducesthe protection given to the storage vessel
(seeparagraphs 85, 128-133). Special relief arrangements are usually requiredwhenthere is a
significant risk of overpressure from continuous pressure sources such as radiant heat oi by
pumping chlorine. Underthese circumstances relief into a closed expansion vessel may be
inadequate. Reliefarrangements based on relief valves into an 'open' system (cg a vent
scrubber) may be preferable to bursting discs,as the valves reseat once the source of
overpressure hasbeen removed. This arrangement is normallyonly found on larger
installationsyou shouldconsult your chlorine supplier.
Burstingdiscs
122 Bursting discs (which are designed to fail at or below the design pressure of storage
tanks) are commonly made ofnickel, although tantalum, silver or other compatible materials
may be used. Uncoated graphite is not recommended. Discs should coniply with BS 291 549
(or equivalent standard) and should he carefully selected for the operating temperature range,
as the rupture pressure is temperature-dependent.
ArrangementsJbr reliefsystems
123 On simple installations, such asthose with a single storage vessel and associated
expansion vessel, a single bursting discsystem without any isolating valves, installed directly
on the storage vessel, may be acceptable. In practice, however, it is more convenient to install
a valvedsystemto allow replacement ofdiscs undera controlled system ofwork, without
needingto completely empty and purge the system. Wheretwo or more storage vesselsshare
an expansion vessel, the relief arrangements should allow prompt replacement ofdiscs and
venting 012111 excess pressureout ol the expansion vessel.
124 The preferred arrangements are shown in Figures 3 and 4 and shouldbe used on all new
installations. The kolatingvalvesmay be mechanically mterlocked (recommended for new
installations) so that one pair of discs is alwaysoperative, or the isolatingvalves may be
individually locked. To he cffi,ctive the bursting discs needtobeol the sLmple domed
unsupported type with the concave sidefacing in the directions shown in Figures 3. 4. and 5.
The identifying tags should be lefi attached to each disc so that they can be identified as
having been installed correctly. Existing older installations usingthe arrangement shown iii
Figure 5 should replace it with a prefi.rred arrangement (Figure 3 or 4) when major
modifications lire in hand.
125 The valves which remain open must permit the operational devices to discharge at the
required rate toan expansion vessel. Pipework before the isolating valves should beas short
and simple as possible to minimise the risk ofchlorine leakage fromjoints and pipework the
isolation using valves before the bursting discs should preferably be fitted directly on flanged
connections on thenianlid of the storage tanks.
34
Figure 3 Pressure relief system

(preferred arrangement). Double
stream with interlocked valves
Toexparsior vessel
Pressure alarmgauge
Pressure aart gauge
xx
Borstieg
::
ds S
Bursting dscs
TestCurrentOfl forpros Crc gaugeroroboes)
Figure 4 Pressure relief system.

Double stream with locked-open
valves
Pressure alarmgauge
Toexpansion vesse
fl
Ptessuealarmgauoe
Looked vane
at eastoneline
needstobe
B i uring discs
_i__(
onkedoper
____
Bursi
i pdsos
Loused ualves
Testnornedonslvi nressure gauge trotsrotor)
Safety advice forbulk chlorineinstallations
35
Figure 5 Pressure relief system

Single stream ith lockedopen
Toexpansion vessel
\ alves
Lockedopen valve
Barsting discs
Looked open colon
126 Your procedures for dealingwith a failure ofa bursting disc shouldbe clearly
defined. Base themon the principlethat at no timeshouldpressuresbeyondthe design
range beallowedto develop(see alsoparagraph 127).
127 At any installation where a 'locked'-open isolating valveprecedes a bursting disc, a
safe system ofwork should be defined to preventunacceptable pressures from any source
occurring in the vessel while the isolatingvalveis closed. The procedures needto cover the
safe removal ofthe vessel from normal service, stabilising the pressure, changing the
bursting disc, venting the expansion tank and returning the vessel to normal use. Such safe
systemswill vary with plantdesign hut should:
(a)
be in a written form, unambiguous and readilyavailable
(b)
include a permit-to-work system:
(c)
be included in plant personnel training programmes;
(d)
be properly supervised with responsibilities clearly allocated;
(e)
be regularly updated and periodically subjected to HAZOP 50 review, particularly

whenplant design, operating procedures or management systemsare modified; and
(f)
be rigidly adheredto.
36
Expansion vessels
128
The design requirements for the construction of
the expansion vessel aresimilarto thosefor the storage
tanks;the capacity of the expansion vessel shouldbe at
least 10% ofthe largeststorage vessel.
The expansion vessel should be capable of

vented
being
manually toan absorption system;the
ventvalve is normally lockedclosed. Controlled
venting shouldbe through a suitable flow restriction
device, eg an orifice plate to prevent overload ofthe
absorption system.
129
The expansion vessel should be providedwith a

pressure-sensing device which gives an alarm if
pressurebuildsup in the vessel. Thealarm system
needs to be capableofbeing tested regularly to ensure
that it is operable(see paragraph 133).
130
131 Arrange the compressed air or nitrogenconnection to the expansion vessel to

avoid the possibility ofinadvertently pressurising the vessel. This may be achieved
by physical disconnection, isolating blanking plates. or by double block valves
supported by a safesystemofwork. Ifan expansion vessel serves more than one
storage vessel, makearrangements for prompt response to a pressure alarm signal
from it.
132 While the risk ofthe expansion vessel itselfbeing over-pressurised with
chlorine is minimal because ofthe precautions described in paragraphs 128-131,
you shouldestablish procedural or mechanical meansto ensure thatthis cannot
occur.
Pressurealarms
133 There should be a high-pressure alarm on every storage vessel, and an
additional pressure indicator/alarm at each important safetylocation on the relief
arrangement. Thismeansthat one additional pressure alarm may suffice on each
storage vesselthat has its ownexpansion vessel, and that alarmmay be eitherin the
reliefline (ifthere is a single bursting disc) or on the expansion vessel. When one
expansion vessel serves several storage vessels, thereshouldbean additional
pressure alarm withineach reliefassemblyand also one on the expansion vessel.
Test alarms regularly (at least monthly) by gas injection or moving contacts.
37
ARRANGEMENTSFOR UNLOADINGOFLIQUID CHLORINEFROM

ROAD TANKERSTO STORAGE
UnloadingUsingDry Compressed Airor DryNitrogen
134 The recommended system for
transferring liquid chlorine from
chlorine tankers to storage vessels, by
'padding' with dry air or dry nitrogen,
is outlined in Figure 2 and in Appendix
6 which providesa soundbasisfor
developing local procedures. Detailed
requirements, whichsupplement
information given in previous sections,
are reviewed in paragraphs 135-147.
You needto agreeyour arrangements
with yoursupplierand design them to
minimise the risk ofoverpressure.
1 35 A separate and independent dry
compressed air or nitrogen system
shouldbe used for chlorine duty, to
minimise the possibility of'backdiffusion of chlorine which could lead to dangerous conditions in other airconsuming
units, particularly instrumentation. Compressed nitrogen may be produced in a liquid
nitrogen evaporation unit.
1 36
Ifyou use compressed air, your supply needs tobe oil-free and havea dew point
below -40C. Normally, air should be compressed to around 10 bar gaugeusinga truly oilfree compressor(1.5 m3/min free air capacity); ifan oil-lubricated compressor is Lised it
must be fitted with an oil filter which must be regularly maintained.
137 The compressed air is cooledto

remove part ofthe moisture content and
finally dried, usinga regenerative-type
drying system, to a dew point below 40C. Thedew point shouldpreferably
be monitored continuously using a
monitorprovided with an alarmthat
giveswarning ifthe dew point exceeds
a preset figure. It is important to
recharge or regenerate drying agents
according to the equipment and
chlorine suppliers'advice.
Hvgronwteralarm. At thisinstallationthc' compressed

airdewpointisless (ha,, - 6(1k
38
138 A guardtower, filled with

anhydrous calcium chloride or other
suitable material. may be installed after
the regenerative system as a further
For small installations a
drieralone using anhydrous calcium chloride or other drying agent maybe

adequate, provided that proper cheeks on the condition ofthe drying agentare
made,
Supplyofdrypaddinggas to the system

139 The compressed dry air or dry nitrogen shouldbe stored in a pressure receiver.
This shouldhe fitted with a relief valve set to operateat the chlorine storage plant's
safeworkingpressure or 10 bar gauge,whichever is lower. From the receiverthe
gas should passthrough a non-retuni valve, or a pressure-actuated shut-offvalve,
followed by a reducing valve to give a supply at the pressure required for unloading
thetankers. This supplywillalso be suitable for other purposes on the chlorine
plant,such as drying out or purging ofpipelines and vessels providedprecautions
aretakento prevent baekflow ofchlorine into theair system. Pressure gauges
shouldbe installed upstream and downstream ofthe pressure reducingvalveso that
cheekscan be made that the padding gas pressure is greaterthan the chlorine
pressure. It is important to providesafeguards 23-25 to ensure that excessive gas
pressures cannotbe applied to the chlorine system. This may be particularly
important ifthe padding gas is supplied from high pressure cylinders.
140 The liquid chlorine discharge line on the chlorine tankershouldbe connected
to thepermanent pipework at the unloading point (seeparagraphs 43-55). The
pipework connecting the unloading point to the liquid chlorine storage vessels
shouldbe reasonably short(see alsoparagraphs (53-60). Ifit is necessary to usea
long liquid chlorine line to storage, you must consider the needto protectthis line
against overpressure (see paragraphs 61-67).
141 A pressure gauge, a vent line to the absorber and a connection for dry
compressed gas shouldbe installed close to theend ofthe permanent pipework at
the unloading point, with the necessary isolation valves, as detailed in Figure 2.
Unloadingusingchlorine gas pressure

142 Liquid chlorine may be transferred from the chlorine tankersto the storage
vessels by padding with dry chlorine gas. The gas is normally taken from one ofthe
stock tanksbut this should preferably not be the one into which the tankeris being
unloaded. The supply of dry chlorine gas at the required pressure niaybe obtained
by re-compressing chlorine vapourfrom a storage tank or by vaporisation ofliquid
chlorine. A source ofdry, compressed, oil-freeair or nitrogen is still required. for
drying out and purging the system.
Use ofre-compressedchlorine vapour

143 Selection ofthe appropriate compressorfor re-compression ofchlorine vapour
requires careful consideration to ensure that the equipment can operate satisfactorily
on an interniittent basis. Diaphragm compressorsor dry carbon ringreciprocating
compressors are suitable for this duty provided that maintenance is carriedout on a
regular basis.
144 Diaphragm compressors shoulduse stainless steel double diaphragms withinert fluid
between them.Dry carbonring compressors shouldpreferablybe purged with dry air after
use, to avoid problems resulting from residualchlorine in the compressorleakingfrom
shaft glands. During operation ofthe compressor, the shaft glands should be pressurised
with dry, compressed, inert gas.
145 Ifcooling ofthe compressor body is required, this shouldpreferably be accomplished
by air cooling.Ifjacketcooling is necessary, this shouldbe achievedby circulation
through an external heat exchangerwith provision to detectleakage ofchlorine into the
heat exchange fluid. Direct water coolingshould be avoided.
146 The compressor needstobe fittedwith a bypassso that the chlorine can be recycled
until its temperature is raised sufficiently to prevent liquefaction in the delivery lines. The
temperature ofthe chlorine shouldbe monitored using an indicatorwhich is fitted with an
alarm, set to soundifit exceeds90C.
147 A pressure reliefsystemon the compressordelivery line should also be providedto
prevent the delivery pressure exceeding a pre-setfigure (see paragraph 139).
CHLORiNE VAPORISERS
148 Vaporisers (also known as evaporators) convert liquid chlorine into gas. A major use
ofchlorine vaporisersisin water treatment, to control weed and algae in coolingwater and
to sterilise drinking water. Theseunitsare frequently supplied as part ofa package with
other dosing or analytical equipment. Vaporisers are always required with a fixed or
demountable bulk tank, to obtain a regular. steadysupplyofgas to process. The drawing of
gas from the vapourspace ofa bulk tank is unsatisfactory and unsafe.There is the risk of
process liquids passing back into the tank, irregularity ofsupplyand the possible
accumulation ofless volatile,dangerous impurities, such as explosive nitrogen trichloride
in the tank.51 The safe handling ofchlorine containing nitrogen trichloride is discussed
elsewhere.52
Types
149 There are fourmain typesofvaporiser(see also Appendix 7):
(a)
Vertical tube bundle. Theseresembleordinary heat exchangers, usuallywith the

chlorine in the tubes. Alternative formats includethe common vaporiserused in
water treatment (a cylinder with a dip-pipeliquid chlorine inlet immersed in the
heating bath) or a shell and tubeheat exchangerwith the chlorine on the shell side. A
bayonetvaporiser is very similar.
(b)
Coil. The chlorine is evaporated in a coil ofsteel tubingrunning insidea wet steam
bath or a waterbath heated by steam or electricity.
(c)
Concentric tube. The heat exchange surface is a tube, typicallyfourinchesin

diameter, surrounded by a heating jacket.
40
Safetyadvice forbulkchlorineinstallations
(d)
Kettle. Kettleevaporators are used on large

capacity systems. They containa heatersystem
(usually a tube bundleofhot wateror heated
fluid- not steam)passing through a vessel
containing liquid chlorine. Kettle evaporators
do not superheat the chlorine vapour, other
systemsdo.
Regulation ofthroughput
Coilinbath vaponerheated
bylowpressuresteam
Selfregulatingvaporisers
150
In sonictypes ofvaporiserthe liquid chlorine is
fed in at the bottomand gas is drawn offvia a control
valveat the top. Whendemandis high, the liquidchlorine level rises in the
container, and a greaterheat exchange surface areais presented to the liquid. When
demandis low, the greatervapourpressure at the temperature ofthe heating
medium drives the liquid chlorine out ofthe vaporiserback into the storage vessel
and the evaporation rate falls. This system is usually applicable to vaporisers witha
relatively small chlorine capacity. ie vertical tubebundles,coil typesand concentric
tubetypes. Bayonet vaporisers can be used for high vaporisation rates. On water
treatment plantsa self-regulating vaporiser, with an electrically heated water bath is
usually used.
Constantlevel vaporisers
151 Othertypes ofvaporisers, usually found only in large-capacity plants, sacrifice
certain advantages ofthe self-regulating types to achievemuch larger vaporisation
rates. These vaporisers requireseparate instrumentation and control arrangements to
provide a constant level ofliquid chlorine in the kettle or shell with high and low
level alarms. In such types(wherethere can be parts ofthe liquid chlorine pool
which arenot well-mixed), there is a greatertendency to concentrate the less
volatile impurities than in a self-regulating vaporiser. A separate purge and
vaporisercircuitmay be required to deal periodically with the residues. The design
and operation ofthese larger-capacity vaporisers is a specialised topic, and requires
consultation between the user, the designer,and the chlorine supplieras the risk of
52 You
nitrogentrichloride enrichmentand subsequent explosion is increased.
should involve your supplier when assessing this risk.
5l
Methods ofheating
152 The methods ofheatingthe vaporiser shouldminimiseboth the risk of
corrosion and vaporiserfailure. These include: heatingwithhot water; heating with
low pressure steam and usingclosedcircuitheatingwith heattransfer fluids other
than water. Directelectrical heating should not be used because ofthe risk oflocal
overheating and chlorine/iron fires (see paragraph 158 and Appendix 2).
Safety advice for bulk chlorine installations 41
(a)
Heatingwith hot water. This isthe most frequently used method; the normal working
temperature (60-70C)is well belowthat at which any significant reaction ofcarbon
steel occurs with dry chlorine.
(b)
I leating withsteam. The steam should be saturated and its pressure shouldbe limited to
lessthan I bar gaugeto avoid overheating, particularly ifthe vaporiseris madeofmild
steel.Any small leaks ofchlorine tothe watersideofhot water or steam types lead to
veryrapid corrosion ofthe steel by moist chlorine (see pararaph 169). Steam systems
must meet the requirements ofthe PSTGC Regulations.232 The greaterflexibility of
steam heating is useful on plants using chlorine gas at high or at very variable rates.
(c)
I leat transferfluids (otherthan water). Electrical or steam heat can be applied to a heat
transferfluidwhich is relatively unreaetive towards chlorine. The available fluids

(eg hexachlorobutadiene) are themselves hazardous, so that the hazardsofusingwater as
heattransfermedium are in practiceaccepted,with suitable safeguards.
General installation
153 The vaporiser should be installed in the storage area orin an adjacentspace
as close as
possible tothe chlorine storage tanks in orderto keeppipelines carrying liquid chlorine short.
Long pipe runswill require pressure relief(see paragraphs 61-67). Changeover of liquid
chlorine supplyfromone storage tankto another canaffect operating conditions in the
vaporisersystem and any such difficulties will be reduced ifthe spacing is not too great.
eg lessthan 5 metres. Nevertheless, the space between the vaporiser and thestorage system
should be such as to allow adequate access for emergency action in the eventofan incident at
the vaporiser.
Hazards
154 The quantity of chlorine in a chlorine vaporisersystem is relatively small compared with
that normally contained in the main chlorine storage tanks. Nevertheless, the systeni design
should be such that failure ofequipmentcan bedetectedand rectified quickly and that any
consequent releaseofchlorine to the environment is niinimised.
155 Potential hazards associated with chlorine vaporisers include:
(a)
Pinhole leaks leading to rapid corrosion and increased loss ofchlorine.
(b)
Rapid corrosion, ifany moisture is allowed into the chlorine system.
(e)
Possible concentration of inipurities in the chlorine as it is evaporated, such as explosive

nitrogen triehloride. Thisneedsto be discussedwith your chlorine supplier.
(dl
Reverse flow of reaction fluids, caused by a fall in pressure in the vaporiser, or by

excess pressure in the process,or by solution ofchlorine gas in the fluid. The presence
ofthe fluid (water, solvent or reagent) in the vaporiser can cause corrosion or local
violentreaction leadingto rapid overpressure and possible rupture ofthe vaporiser.
42
(e)
Carry-over ofliquid chlorine as bulkfluidor droplets into the gas line or into
the process itself. Thiscan (depending on the materials ofconstruction and on
the process) cause daniage or hazard.
(f)
Excessive gas pressure to the systemdue to overheating a vaporiser. since the

vapourpressure of chlorine rises very steeply with temperature
(see Appendix 2. Figure A2. I).
(g)
Excessive hydraulic forces, ifthe system is closed up and full of liquid due to
the expansion of liquid chlorine when heated.
Thesebasichazardsare considered in more detail in paragraphs 156-161, but

grouped according tothe type ofhazard.
Floodingand liquidcarrvo'er
156 Flooding (filling) ofthe chlorine vaporiser with liquid chlorine mayresult
from operation ofthe equipment above its capacity, inadequate heating, or fouling
ofthe heal transfersurfaces. The temperature oftheheatingmedium is usually
controlled thermostatically. Ifthe temperature ofthe heatingmedium falls too low
in a self-regulating evaporator, it is possible for the outgoinggas tobe inadequately
superheated, or for flooding to occur. Flooding results in carry-over ofliquid
chlorine into the vapour lines, and a potential hazard (depending on the process and
plant materials). The same mayhappen ifthe level ofwater in a water bath falls. In
theextreme, if chlorine is drawn offbut no heat is supplied tothevaporiser, itis
possible thr ice to form on the heat exchangersurfaces and damage theni severely.
You should consider installing a gas flow rate indicator. This may be ofvalueto the
operator routine purposes. and will also indicate excessive withdrawal rates.
br
157 You should consider fitting a knockout pot (or spray catcher) to prevent
chlorine droplets and sprayfrom passing into gas pipework when liquid chlorine
might damage the material ofthe pipes, or cause the process to become unstable. In
all caseswherethe possibility ofliquid passing to process is unacceptable, itis
strongly recommended thata low temperature alarm be fittednear the knockout pot
and arranged to cut off the liquid chlorine supplyto the vaporiseror (in selfregulating typesonly)the gaseouschlorine outlet maybe closed, driving the liquid
chlorine back into the storage vessel(s). Adequate instrumentation and alarms
shouldalwaysbe provided to give immediate warning ofthis condition. Highand
low bathtemperature and level alarnis with shut-down facilities are recommended.
Acceleratedcorrosionand reaction (high temperature)

158 To avoid rapid corrosion of thewaterside ofheat exchange surfaces made
from galvanised steel, operating temperatures shouldnot exceed 70C. Ifoperation
at highertemperatures is required. vaporisers madeofnickel or nickel alloys (such
as Monel 400 or Inconel) should be used. In such cases, the downstream chlorine
gas pipework may alsoneed upgrading to ensure adequate resistance to corrosion at elevated
temperatures.
159 lfthe heating medium is steam, the temperature can bemonitoredby low pressure and
highpressurealarmson the steam inlet. The pressure of steam should normally be limitedto I
bar gauge (120C equivalent) and the steam has tobe saturated, not superheated.
Highpressure
160 Precautions must 23 be in place to protectthe systemagainstover-pressurisation,
eg a
pressure reliefdevice. Pressure reliefdevices and high pressure alarms, wherefitted, should
be properly designedand installed, maintained in an effective workingorder,and tested
regularly. They mustbe periodically examined by a competent person.53 A typical working
temperature for a vaporiseris 70C. The vapourpressure ofchlorine at 70C exceeds 21 bar,
(see Figure A2.1, Appendix 2). It follows that you need to take the following steps to:
(a)
Ensure thatthe vaporiser is not isolated when full ofliquid chlorine. Strict observance of
written procedures for shut-down is vital.
(b)
Avoid accidentally isolating the vaporiseron both sides. Care needsto betakento
ensure that the closing arrangements for the emergency valves take this into account (see
paragraphs 162-165).
(c)
Design the vaporiser shell and pipesto withstand the workingpressureand duty.
(d)
Implement operational controlswhich minimise the risk ofthe workingpressure being

exceeded.
If your chlorine vaporiser is not supplied with a pressure relief device you will needto adopt
procedures. or fit suitable pressure relief, to ensure that the conditions in (a) to (d) are met.
Reverse flow
161 You should eliminate the possibility ofsuck-back intothe vaporisers by suitable design.
For example, water chlorinating package systenisusually incorporate a set ofvalvesin the
control systemto prevent suck-back or push-back. The arrangements vary, and careneedsto
be taken to ensure that the system provided does give protection intheeventof, eg, a leak at
theejectornon-return valve. You should alsoconsiderfitting a low pressure gas alarm to the
outletgas line. This gives warning ofloss ofsupplyto the process. and may indicate a needto
start purging the systcm, usingdry air or other suitable dry gas (dewpoint lessthan -40C)to
prevent suck-back. Whatever method is used,the systemneedsto be regularly inspected and
maintained, and adequate records kept.
44
Routine and emergency isolation

_____
ii
77
162
The vaporiserhas to be capable ofbeing
isolated for maintenance, orin an emergency, such as a
failure ofthe vaporiseritselfthrough leakage or a failure
ofthegas line downstream. In addition to a manual valve
on the liquidinletand on the gas outlet. reniotelyor
automatically operable valves are strongly recommended
on both inlet and outlet. A pressure-reducing or flow
control valve will almostalwaysbe fittedon the outlet
and it is sometimes possible for this valve to be the
remotely operable shut-offvalve.
163
Yourrisk assessment shouldconsiderthe need
for additional protection in theeventthat automatic
valves fail to operate (or remotelyoperable valves are
________________________ not activated)inan emergency. For example a flow
restrictionin the liquid inlet (typically on the exit from
Emergency shutdown push
buttonat the vaporiser.Also the storage tank(s)), will limitthe releasewhichcould
shown in oneofsix chlorine
occur in theevent ofa majorplant failure.
detectors atthisinstallation
which canalso automatically
164
The hazards oftotally isolating the vaporiserare
shutdown thechlorine
considerable and will be most severe when the
installation (seeparagraphs
evaporator is full (eg ifthe valvesclose together in a
_____________________ condition ofmajor gas line failure). Ifthere is a gas
space abovethe liquid chlorine when the vaporiseris
isolated and heated, the internal pressure will reachthat ofchlorine at the heating
medium temperature. The vaporiser, linesand valvesneed to be designed to
withstand such pressure or incorporate arrangements to relieve to a safe place. The
control ofautomatic valvesneedsto be arranged so thatthe valves do not close
together whenan alarm is raised(see alsoparagraph 160). One approach is to
arrange for the gas control valve to closeon alarms related to improper working of
the system (eg low gas pressure, downstream process alarms, low temperature) and
the liquid control valveat the storage tank to closeon chlorine release(eg detectors
local to the vaporiser and storage,or manual alarms). Ifthe plantis continually
staffed, manual intervention maybe a suitable alternative to providingwholly
automatic operation ofshut-down. However, procedures needtobe established to
ensure that this does not introduce significant delays into the responsetoan alarm.
An alternative approach isto use a pressure control globe valve for remoteisolation
oftheoutlet line so that excessive pressures will lift it slightly off its seat,
preventing excessive overpressures. Reliefpressuresand valvedirectionneed
careful consideration and shouldbe discussed with the valvesupplier.
165 Isolation ofthe vaporiscris still possible, but interlocks betweenthe inlet and
outletvalvesto prevent total isolation are rarely fitted. This is becauseit is
occasionally necessary to close both valvesduring cleaning and overhaul. A safe
system ofwork for maintenance and operation is thus a vital part ofthe safety
23
arrangements, and is a requirement underthe PSTGC Regulations.
Pressure control valve

All vaporiserdesigns incorporate an elementofsuperheating ofthe vapour, either in the
vaporiser itselfor as a separate unit. This is necessary to prevent chlorine reliquefying in the
control valves, where it could cause problemsofirregularpressure in operation. These
problems are avoided by reducing the gaspressureat the exit from the vaporiscr. A suitable
pressurc-reducing control system is recommended.
166
Corrosion
167 CoiTosion of the vaporisertubesorcoils could lead to a loss-of-containment accident.
The consequence ofa minorchlorine leak from the chlorine sideofa vaporiserheating bath
could be very serious since the mixture ofchlorine and moisturewill lead to rapid corrosion of
the evaporator surfaces and a substantial releaseofchlorine.
168 You must arrange for a competent person to periodically examine your vaporiser and
other pressure systems in accordance with your written scheme ofexamination.4 A
must certify thatthe written scheme for examination is sUitable for the
competent person
of
purpose preventing reasonably foreseeable danger to people from the unintentional release
of stored energyfrom the system. The written scheme ofexamination should describe the
natureand frequency ofthe examination. This should bebased on risk assessment and give
due consideration to the duty and the condition of the vaporiserwhen it was last inspected.
The competent person will advise on suitable examination and test regimes, and when the
vaporiser shouldhe replaced. Examination intervals betweenone and five years are typical.
Coil-in-bath evaporators are commonly given a rigorous inspection every two years, and the
coils are discarded ifseriously pitted. Some manufacturers advisethat the coils should be
renewed every two years. Following examination the equipmentshouldbe thoroughly dried to
a dew point lessthan 40C before recommissioning. Moisture left in the system can lead to
very rapid corrosion. The procedure shouldbe coveredby a writtenoperating procedure.
169 Corrosion of the heat exchanger surfaces is not directly monitored. Instead the
evaporator vessel or tubes are frequently protected against water corrosion by cathodic
protection. Typically the anodes should be checked visually every threeto six months. The
frequency should be established by experience ofthe rate at which theanodesare consumed
and replaced. Ifthe anodesare found whollyconsumed at inspection, a thorough examination
ofthe vaporiser should be undertaken. The waterbathor condensate outlet should be
monitored for chlorine leaks by redox or conductivity measurements. This earlywarning of
minorleaks is helpful in all cases,and is very strongly recommended ifcathodic protection is
not provided or not maintained.
170 Accumulation ofsolid deposits reducesthe effectiveness ofa vaporiserand can also
enhance corrosion. The vaporiserneedstobe cleanedand dried to a dew point lessthan -40C
regularly. Closeattention tothe cleaning procedure will minimise corrosion but typically, the
chlorine evaporator cylinder in a hot water bath (see Appendix 7, type Ic system) should be
renewed after five years. The old one maybe submitted to a competent inspection body for
certification for furtheruse if required.
CHLORINEABSORPTIONSYSTEM
171 You should give detailed consideration to ensure that in all chlorineusing
operations chlorinecan. in an emergency, be ventcd to an absorber without
emission to the environment.
172 Control ofchlorine emissions from prescribed processes(see paragraph 10)
must be the subject of consultations with the Environment Agency in England and
Wales and SEPA in Scotland.
1 73
In some installations, the nature of the eonsunimg process is such that
absorption ofthe chlorineis possible without a special absorption unit. I lowever, in
such circumstances operators need to ensure that duringillaintenance periods
adequateabsorption capacity is alwayskept available to accommodate any chlorine
emissions. A separate absorption plant may not he essential in, tor example cooling
watertreatment plants and bleach liquor productionplants.
174 For most bulk storage installations.

however, a separatechlorineabsorptionplant
is required and it should always he maintained
in a state of readiness. The quantityofreagents
available in the absorption system needs to he
adequate to deal with any foreseeable
emergency. The inlet to the scrubbing system
should include a lute pipe (barometric leg) to
prevent liquid fl'om the scrubbingsystem
-IJ
I toenpt'(buronuu'ou l(t!) (ltU/ In!

mt ubsnrptioii\t'S!tJII
enteringthe chlorine system.
175 The responsibilityfor the installationof

an adequate chlorineabsorption system rests
with the consumer, but von should obtainthe
cliIon ne supplicr's advice on the proposed
installation.
176 Considercarefully the provisionofadequate instrumentation with alarms and

the disposal of effluent from the chlorineabsorption plant.
177 Adequate standby equipment shouldbe providedto cover breakdowns and
routineoverhauls. Essential circulatingpuml1, fans and instrumentation should be
among those items which are connected both to the mains and to the factory
emergency powersLipply there is one. When the absorption fiteility is required to
be continuouslyavailable (eg vents from reactors) it is essential to provide
emergency powerand stand-by circulatingpimpsor an emergency gravityfed
if
supply ofabsorbing solution.
Vent collection system

178 The pipelines for the collection ofthe ventgasescontainingdry chlorinemay
he made ofmild steel but backdiffusionof moistLire from the absorption system.
which may occurif' ventings are intermittent,has to he prevented.
47
179 Vent systemsfromrelief systems, whichare likelyto operateonly infrequently, maybe

protectedfrom back-diffusion ofmoisture by theuse ofprotective membranes. In somecases
it mayhelp to providea controlled dry gas purgethrough the vent lines.
180 lfthere is any risk ofmoisture contamination, the pipework has to be made of
rubber-lined or plastic-lined carbon steel,or plastic resistantto wet chlorine (eg PVC, Hetron
orAtlac 382), orglass.
181 lfthere is any possibility ofliquid chlorine carry-over, liquidgas separators shouldbe
installed on the linesto avoid excesspressure or overloadingofthe absorption system; these
separators arefittedwith a temperature alarmto indicate the presenceofliquid chlorine in the
separator. Furthenirnre, ifit is possible for liquid chlorine carry-over to take place, plastic
pipework shouldnot be used. Pipework shouldbe sized to take account ofthe maximum
possible flows under themost unfavourable conditions.
Absorptionequipment
1 82 Varioustypes of absorbers are usedfor the treatment ofventgases; suitable absorbers
may be basedon the useofpackedtowers, vent injectorsor sparge absorbers. It can be an
advantage ifthe system selected givesa suction on the plant.
183 Caustic soda liquor is the most convenient reagent for absorption ofchlorine in waste
gases. The concentration ofcausticsoda should not exceed21% NaOH becauseofthe risk of
salt deposit causingblockages in the absorption plant. It is recommended that theflow of
chlorine is controlled or restricted by an orifice plate toan acceptable maximum, so that the
temperature risc in theabsorberdoesnot reduceits effectiveness.
184 Alternatively, for installations where there is no bulk storage for caustic soda liquorand
wherelime orsodaash is available on the site, a lime slurry or a soda ash solution may be
used.
Instrumentation
1 85 It is essential that faults aredetectedquickly. Adequateinstrumentation with alarms
shouldbe providedon the ventabsorption plantto ensurethere is a warning if equipment fails.
Significant faults are:
(a)
Lossofcirculation.
(b)
Chemical depletionofthe absorbing solution. Depletion of the solution canbe

monitored by theuse ofredox or conductivity measurement.
186 Consider providing a pressure indicator fittedwithan alarmto showifthere is excessive

venting or a blockage in the absorption system.
187 A monitorto detectchlorine shouldbe

installed on the outletfromthe absorber. On
detecting chlorine the following actions are
needed:
(a)
raisethe alarm.
(b) isolate the flow ofchlorine

and
to process;
(c) increase the flow of liquor to thevent

scrubber.
Theflow from the ventline to the scrubber

should be maintained. Isolating the flow to the
scrubber may put peopleat risk.
Disposalofeffluentfrom the chlorineabsorption plant
188 The disposal of the liquorfrom the chlorine absorption plant requires careful
consideration, as the presence ofhypochlorite maycreateproblems. Ifthe waste
liquoris discharged withouttreatment, the possibility of interaction with other
effluents should be investigated (eg a mixturewithacideffluentcanlead to
evolution ofchlorine inthe effluent mains, and with ammoniacal effluentcan lead
to formation ofnitrogen trichloride).
Undersome circumstances it maybe necessary to treat the effluent to reduce

hypochlorite contentto an acceptable level before discharging to a sewer.Your
chlorine supplier and your local Environmental Health Officer should be consulted
on an environmentally acceptable meansofdisposal. For highlycontaminated
effluent you shouldconsult the Environment Agency or in Scotland, the Scottish
1 89
Environmental Protection Agency.

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
One ofthe main risksofchlorine escapetothecnironmentis from incorrect
operation ofthe plant.Operating procedures and the selection and training of
process operators are therefore extremely important considerations for the efficient
and safeoperation ofchlorine installations. Your operating procedures needto
coer each process operation and meet legal requirements eg see references 18. 23,
and 55-60 and the standards recommended in industry guides (seeAppendix 4 and
reference 22).
190
191
Written instructions are required for:
plantmaintenance (see paragraphs 193-198);

plantcommissioning inspection and testing (seeparagraphs 199-209);
(c) plant modification and shut-down (see paragraphs 210-213);
(d) all process work and procedures ino1ved in the unloading ofliquid
chlorine tankers (seeparagraphs 214,215);
(e) operation ofthe storage installation and utilisation ofthe chlorine
(see paragraphs 214-229); and
(f) emergency action to deal with chlorine spillages and gas escapes
(seeparagraphs 247-263).
(a)
(h)
Thesemay take differentforms depending uponthe complexity ofthe installation,

eg from simple guide cardsfor straightforward operations to complete manuals for
complex operations and installations.
You should make the site manageror other designated person responsible for
authorising any amendments to the procedures or schedules. Youneedto ensure
that copies of the instructions include a flowsheet and indicate the valvesto be
closed in an emergency. Instructions needto be available inthe workingarea for
operators, and in the control roomor control centre for operators and supervisors.
Supervisors shouldcheck regularly that operations are carriedout precisely
according to the written instructions.
192
MAINTENANCE,INSPECTIONANDINSTALLATION
General maintenance requirements
193 Satisfactory maintenance ofplant, equipment and instrumentation is essential to
minimise risks. Themain Regulations that you needto comply withare: COSHH
Regulations20, MHSW Regulations 18, and PSTGC Regulations (regulation 12). 23-25 The
CIMAH Regulations (to be replaced in February 1999 by the COMAH Regulations - see
Appendix 3), will also apply, depending on the size ofthe installation and the operating
conditions.
194 Youwill needto preparemaintenance schedules definingthe required frequency for
servicing, testingand inspection. These schedules shouldbe strictlyadheredto.
Appropriate recordsofthe results must be kept as required by the PSTGC Regulations
1989 and COSHFI Regulations. The needfora writtenscheme of examination (WSE) is
a separate requirement (ie regulations 8 and 9) ofthe PSTGC Regulations. Other aspects of
maintenance are indicated in paragraphs 19, 44, 51, 56-58, 71, 81, 86-89,98, 127, 136,
143, 160-162, 165, 169, 173, 174, 225, 232, 233, 237, and 255.
195 You needto ensure thatdetailedwritteninstructions covering all routinemaintenance
operations are available. These should be formally approvedand issued by the responsible
maintenance engineer. Supervisors should check regularly that work is carried out
according to these procedures. Pay particular attention to corrosion (see alsoparagraphs
167-170 ), especially where lagging is used; and to chlorine detectorsystems to keep such
monitoring equipment in effective operation.
196 Close liaison is necessary betweenthe maintenance engineerand the process

manager, to ensure that maintenance work is started only afterthe equipment concerned
has beenadequately prepared by processpersonnel and is free from chlorine.
197 Adequate training is required for all maintenance personnel. This should include
basic information on the propertiesofchlorine, safetyprecautions and emergency
procedures (see alsoparagraphs 231-234).
Maintenanceofconnections
198 The inspection and replacement procedures for hosesand connections mustbe
documented in accordance with thewrittenscheme ofexamination. Records ofthe
inspections and replacements shouldbe kept. You needto:
52
(a)
Carryout engineering inspections

operations.
(b)
Renewconnections at regularintervals, or as required as a consequence ofthe

engineering inspection. Flexible hoses shouldbe renewed on eithera fixed time
schedule or numberoftransfers as advisedby the hose supplier.
(c)
Hydraulically pressure test replacement flexible connections and dry them with dry
air to a dew point lessthan -40C beforeuse.
ofhosesat least once a year, or per every 1000
Inspectionandcommissioningofchlorine tank installations

199 It is your responsibility to organise and control inspections, testing and the
commissioning ofyour storage tank. Your chlorine supplier, as a matterofpolicy,
will give advice ifrequestedto do so and visit the plant before it is commissioned.
They deliverchlorine only ifthey consider your installation to be satisfactory. Your
equipmentinstaller also has responsibilities underSection 6 ofthe Health and
Safety at Worketc Act. Youand your installerhaveresponsibilities underthe
PSTGC Regulations; in particularthewrittenscheme ofexamination (WSE)must
be in placebefore the pressure system goes into service.
200 You should determine the scopeofthe scheme for the examination ofthe
pressure system, with expertadvice being obtainedifrequired. The WSE must
specify all inspection and testingtechniques employed as requiredby Regulation 8
of PSTGC Regulations. The WSE reportmust contain specific details ofany
deterioration found in the vessel or vessel ancillaries (seeRegulations 9 of PSTGC
Regulations). It shouldstate which parts ofthe systemhave been examined, the
condition ofthose parts and the results of the examination.
Initial inspection and testing should be carried out in accordance with the
design code(seeparagraph88). Thefirst thorough in-service examination ofa
vessel specified for liquid chlorine duty shouldbe madeby a conipetent inspecting
authority 24 within five yearsofcommissioning and preferably within two or three
years. Thereafter the frequency offurtherthorough examinations shouldbe
determined by the inspecting authority and noted in the examination reportas
required by Regulation 9 ofthe PSTGC Regulations. The WSEcan only be
modified after an examination is complete. The examination interval should not
normally exceed five years.
201
202 A competent person to carry out such examination shouldhave the

knowledge, experience and resources to search for, detect and assess particular
defects associated with systems containing chlorine. Resources should include
accessto appropriate non-destructive testing and laboratory facilities, togetherwith
professional technical ability to relate inspection findings to appraisal ofvessel
integrity, safe working parameters and future use. The competent personmust
assessthe vessel for continued use with chlorine with respect to:
(a)
maximum and minimum safeworkingpressures:
(b)
maxinium and minimum safeworkingtemperatures; and
(c)
safeworking loadsat supports and foundations.
Suchinformation shouldbe noted on the examination report, together withthe

latestdate forthe next examination.
203
For laggedtanks,you need to remove sufficient lagging to enable the

ofthe tankto be assessed.
condition ofthe external surface
204 Routine hydrostatic testing is not normally recommended, It is, however,

recommended ifany modifications aremade to the storage vessels. Such modifications
require a further examination by the competent person.
Inspectionprocedure
Preparationthr internal inspection
Before opening the storage vessel for inspection (see also paragraph 168), the vessel
needstobe emptied ofliquid chlorine and purged to remove all traces ofchlorine.
Procedures for this should be covered by preciseoperating instructions 46 and normally
205
include:
of all pipework connections to the vessel by removal ofspoolsor by

off
(a)
breaking
blanking
(b)
removingthe manlid and filling the vessel with water to which soda ashhas been
addedto neutralise acidicmaterial which forms whenwater is addedto ferric
chloride - the contentsofthe vessel shouldbe stirred thoroughly throughout the
process;
(c)
siphoning offthe water and checking the atmosphere inthe vessel for chlorine and
oxygencontent;
(d) controlling internal inspection ofthe vessel in accordance with the conditions set out
in the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997
and the Code ofPractice 60 (see Appendix 3).
Re-assembly a/terinspection
206 Procedures for this include:

(a) drainingoffall water;
(b)
thoroughly drying the vessel by dry air or nitrogen and removing and replacing joints
on all connections tothe vessel;
(c)
re-fittingthe manlid;
(d)
pressurisation ofthe vesselwith dry air and measurement ofthe dew point of theair
released;
(e)
successive pressurisation with dry air and release until the dew point ofthe air
leaving the vessel is less than -40C.
207 It is goodpracticeto overhaul all valveson the vessel at the time ofinspection.
Following overhaul they needtobe driedout and stored in individual plastic bags pending
reinstallation. Ancillary equipmentshouldalso be overhauled at each inspection. Bursting
discs should always be renewed.
54
Testing (See currentversionofHSE GuidanceNote GS4 Safety in Pressure

Testing,)61
208 Following completion

requiredlevel, you needto:
ofre-assembly oftheequipmentand drying out to the
(a)
leaktestwith dry compressed air or nitrogen at around 8 bar gauge for several
(b)
introduce a small quantity ofchlorine to the storage vessel and pressurise with
compressed air or nitrogen to around 8 bar gauge;
(c)
test all joints for leakage by releasing ammonia vapourfrom an ammonia

bottleand observing the absenceofthe formation ofwhite fumes of
ammonium chloride (this is a very sensitive and well-established method).
hours; then
If thereis flO sign ofleakage, you should leavethetank underpressure for about a
further 12 hours and then repeat the leakage test.
209 All associated pipelines, which needto have beendriedout to a dew point less
than -40C, are thengas-testedfor leakage. Anyleakingjoints needto bemade gastight before introducing liquid chlorine into the system.
MODIFICATIONOF THE CHLORINE SYSTEM AND

CLEARANCEPROCEDURES
210 You shouldonly modify the chlorine system after conducting a risk
assessment (and possibly HAZOP).50 This ensures that approval is given by
responsible staff covering the operating and engineering sections involved, and that
appropriate procedures are put in place to deal with any required alterations.
Proposed major modifications should preferably be discussed with your chlorine
supplier.
The Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers Regulations 1989 23
require (Regulation 4) you to make arrangements for propercontrol ofrepairs and
modifications to pressure systems. Anymodifications orrepairswhich could affect
the integrity ofthe systemhave tobe defined and overseenby a competent person.
211
Formal clearance procedures needto be established as part ofa permit-towork system 46 for:
212
(a)
ensuringthat the plant is in a satisfactory condition for maintenance and

internal examination, appropriately isolated and free from chlorine;
(b)
covering all work inthe chlorine areawhichrequiresthe use of cranes, mobile

equipment, welding sets or other plantwhich could lead to accidental damage
tothechlorine system. This safeguard is necessary even ifthe work does not
directly involve the chlorine-containing linesor equipment;
55
(c)
formally accepting thatthe plant issafeforoperation after theworkhas been completed.
213 The storage installation must be emptiedofliquid chlorine during inspection and
maintenance ofthe expansion vessel unless provision has been made for alternative means
ofreleaseofpressure.
UNLOADiNGOFLIQUID CHLORINEFROMROAD TANKERSTO

STORAGE
214 Transfer ofliquidchlorine from tankers to liquid chlorine storage may be achieved
either by use ofdry compressed air or dry nitrogen or by use ofchlorine gas pressure. The
methods employing dry compressed air or nitrogenare simpler and theuse ofchlorine gas
pressureis normally encountered only in special circumstances. The gas supplypressure
needs to be about 1 .7bar above the pressure in the storage vessel (ie the saturated vapour
pressureofchlorine at ambient temperature) to effectthe transferofliquidchlorine from
thetransportvehicle to storage.
215 You should base your operating procedures for unloading on the outlinegiven in
Appendix 6. The procedures should specify requirements for inspection and testingof
couplings beforeuse (see paragraph 198). Some operational details are summarised in
points(a)-ffl:
(a)
Visual inspection, beforeuse, with particularattention to threads. (NB hydrocarbon

oils or greasesmustnot be usedon threaded or other connections - see Appendix 2,
and paragraph561j).)
(b)
Use ofnew gaskets(see paragraph 56(h)) each time connections are made to the
tanker.Compressed asbestosfibre(CAF) gaskets are not recommended for
environmental reasons.If CAF is used the discardedgaskets shouldbe collected
and disposed ofsafely, bearingin mindthat they contain asbestos.
(c) Provingofthe tightness ofall connections before

introducingliquid chlorine. A gaseouschlorine
test is recommended (seeparagraph 208c)aftera
dry air/nitrogen test.
(d) Capping pipes afteruse and protecting pipes to
reducethe possibility ofaccidental damage to
threads or ingressofmoisture, and provide an
additional safeguard againstan accidental
releaseofchlorine due toan error in valve
operation.
Testingfor leakswithammonia bottle

(seealsopam208c). Thedriver tests
thejointsnearthetanker dome
56
(e) Consider continuous purging with dry air or

nitrogen (dewpoint less than-40C).
(f)
It is important to vent padding gas' totheabsorption system (see paragraphs

171-184) afterthetransfer operation is complete, to restore tile pressurein the
tankto about the vapourpressureofchlorine at tile temperature ofthe tank
contents. Ifthis is not done, the tank mayover-pressurise as it warms up. and
cause the relief system to operate.
USE OFISO(DEMOUNTABLE)TANK CONTAINERS
(h/urineISOfunk containeron route
ISOtankcontainer:derail 0/tile
conhiectionpoint
216 An ISOtank container is a pressurevessel mounted in a substantial steel

frame. They are used predominantly for rail and sea transport and where containers
needtobe stacked. They vary in capacity. and in thecase of chlorine the largest
vessels can holdabout 14 tonnes. ISO containers are usually sized to meet customer
requirements and invariably eachtank is designated to a specific customer. Ifyour
planned consumption ofchlorine is not enough to justify investment in a bulktank
and too greatfortransportable containers I to be used,an ISO container may be
appropriate. Ifthe containerchangeover periodexceedsfourweeks you should
discuss the use ofone tonne drums with your proposed supplier.
217 Thedriveris responsible for ensuring that the ISO container traileris correctly
berthed, the motiveunit is uncoupled, and that the landing legson thecornersofthe
trailerare in place.
218 The design ofthe ISO berth should be similarto the requirements for an offloading bay for road tankers (see paragraphs 31-41) eg the ground must be level and
the area well-lit, awayfromtrafficetc. The ground surface needstobe resilient
enough to preventthe local loads from the landing legs damaging the surface or
allowing sinking. Considerspill containment (eg use kerbing, serni-bunding or
collection sumps) inthe eventofany incident. Although the frame provides
substantial impactresistance, to prevent damage to thetank and its fittings you
should providecrashprotection similarto that required for fixed tanks. Similarly,
you should providecrash protection for yourplant against inadvertent movement
during the berthing operation.
57
219 Youwill needto provide suitable flexible hose connections to connect the tank to
your process. Theseshouldbe ofsufficient length and unobstructed routing so that a leg
collapse would not stress the hose or connecting joint.
220 Youwill also needto drawup procedures for connecting and disconnecting the tank
to your process. Theseprocedures and the associated interlocks are effectively thesame as
for roadtanker unloading operations (see paragraphs 35, 39-41, 214, 215 and Appendix 6).
They needto be carried out with the motive unit uncoupled and always with the driver
present as it is thedriverwho is responsible for making/breaking and testing the integrity
ofthejoint. Barriers should be lowered whentheISO is berthed and thebarrier linked
mechanically or by softwaresequence tothe flexiblehose connection as drive away
protection. Asthe ISO tankeris not fittedwith a reliefvalve(a regulatory requirement 14)
measures must betaken to prevent overpressure from radiantheat sources such as stored
flammables, or from inert gas supplied to raisethe pressure in thetanker transferring
chlorine to the process.
You will need to agree precautions with yoursupplier to ensure there is no potential
forreverse flow from your plant into the ISOtank (seeparagraphs 224-229) and
221
implement them.
TRANSFEROF CHLORiNE TO THE CONSUMINGUNITS

222 Transfer
achieved by:
of liquid chlorine fromthe storage tanksto the consuming units maybe
(a)
using the vapourpressureofthe liquid chlorine alone;
(b)
padding the chlorine storage tank with dry compressed gas;
(c)
transfering the liquid chlorine to a separate tank from which it is pumped using a
pump specially designedfor use with liquid chlorine.
Methods (a) and (b) are normally themost satisfactory for customer installations.
Underexceptional circumstances and by agreement with your chlorine supplier,

liquid chlorine from the tankers maybe transferred directlyto your process or to a chlorine
vaporiser. This is a specialand unusual arrangement; the adequacy ofthe control systems
and procedures shouldbe verified by a risk assessment. Ifyou see a regular need for this
arrangement you should consider the use of ISO tank containers (see paragraphs 216-221 ).
223
Transfer ofgaseous chlorine

224 With the exception ofventing, you shouldavoidthe discharge ofgaseouschlorine
from tankers or storage vesselsdirectlyto a process. Such a procedurecancause a potential
hazard51 by concentrating thetrace amounts ofthe unstable substance, nitrogen
trichloride, normally present in the chlorine - see alsoAppendix 2, paragraphs 15, 20. In
addition, a risk ofsuck-back ofmoisture or other materials into the vessel ortanker exists
(seealso paragraphs 100,161).
58
Transfer ofliquidchlorine using vapourpressure

225 For many applications, the vapourpressureofthe liquid chlorine in the
storage tank is adequate to transferthe liquid chlorine to the consuming unit,
although theremay be problems in cold weatherwith outdoor installations, as the
vapour pressure will fall as the liquid chlorine cools. Ifthe demandrate is likely to
cause problems in cold weatherone ofthe methods below (paragraphs 226, 227)
should be used. Whenthe liquid hasbeen removed fromthe tank, it may alsobe
acceptablefor part ofthe remaining gas to be used on process. However, a
minimum positive pressure should alwaysbe maintained in the storage vessels; this
should be definedfor each system. You should be aware thatthis method increases
therisk of nitrogen trichloride accumulation in the tankand you should implement
additional monitoring. 52
Transfer ofliquidchlorine bypadding with dry compressed gas

226 Transfer by padding the storage tankswith dry compressed gas is
straightforward; the action and precautions whichwill be requiredarc similarto
thosedetailedin paragraphs 134-141.
Transfer ofliquidchlorine usinga separate pumpingtank
227 Completely enclosed 'canned' pumpshavebeen developed fortransferof
liquid chlorine: these are used when the chlorine is requiredat higher pressure,
typicallyabove 7 bar gauge, or when the use ofdry inert compressed gas is not
acceptable. The liquid chlorine is first transferred from storage to a separate
pumpingtankwhichusually consistsofa pressurevessel with a bottom connection.
The liquid chlorine is withdrawn from thebottomofthe pumpingtank to the
suction ofthe pump. A remotelyoperated valve is preferably installed insidethe
tank or between the pumping tank and the pump for isolationin emergency. The
design ofthis system shouldensure thatthe nett-positive-suction head(NPSH) is
adequate to meet the minimum requirements for the pump used. Ifyou see a need
for this arrangement you should seek advice from your chlorine supplierat an early
stage.
Precautions
228 You shouldmakearrangements to rapidly stop theflow ofliquid chlorine
from the storage vessel in theeventoffailure at the chlorine consumingplant(see
paragraphs 35, 79, 95-97). Longliquid chlorine pipelines to consuming units may
need tobe protected against overpressure (see paragraphs 61-67).
229 You needto design the installation to prevent, or minimise the risk of suckback of aqueous solutions or process liquids from an absorption system. This
requiresdetailedconsideration at the design stage and might involve the installation
ofa non-siphoning barometric leg or a reverse flow/pressure-measuring device.
Safety advice for bulk chlorineinstallations 59
Generalguidelinesfortraining
People have legal duties to comply with the safetyprocedures associatedwith
theirwork. However, it is never sufficient simply topresume that staffwill know
andunderstandwhat to do. Positiveinstruction and training is needed. Health
andsafetytraining shouldtakeplace during working hours andshould bepart of
thejob.
Trainingis vital in helpingto preventincidentsandto minimise the consequences
iftheydo happen. Thinkabout who should be trained, in what, andto what level
ofcompetence.
Trainingwill helpemployees understandthe healthandsafetyaspects oftheir
work. Initial trainingfor new staffshouldbefollowedup with newor
refreshertraining as required.
Training must includeanyone whoworks on the site. Operators, managers, staff
andoccasionalvisitors, such as maintenance contractors,may allneed some

training.
Trainingcan take manyforms,rangingfrom on-the-job training linked to

information notices, written instructions etc, toformaltraining courses. The type
oftrainingshould be appropriatetotheactivities and dutiesofthose to be
trained and thehazards at the site.
Involve andconsultstaff Where there is a recognisedtrade unionsafety
representative, theywillneed tobe consulted. They will know many ofthe
hazards occurringin everyday situations. Caterfor unusualoccurrences.
Information, instruction and training must be understoodby those to whom theyare
given. Ifpoorperformanceshows that training is not working, the training will
needto be reviewed andimproved. Do not assumethat previousexperience or
formal qualcations will mean that new employees do notneed training. (You are
advisedto keepa training recordfor each staffmember, so that it is clear what
training they havereceivedand, therefore, which duties theycan be expected to
perform.)
230 It is essential that the personnel selected are ofadequatephysical fitness and
they shouldpass a medical examination beforeengagement. Operators needto be
capable ofeffective communication and be reliable understress conditions.
Previousexperience in the chemical or similarindustry is very desirable.
TRAINING
23 I
Youneedto ensure that site personnel are properly trained and practised in
each procedure. You should developand implement a training programmewhich
includesboth 'off-the-job' and 'on-the-job'aspects. You shouldregularly assess the
programme fir its effectiveness.
232 Off-the-job training needs to include basic information on the following:
(a)
statutory requirements, ACOPsand guidance;
(b)
Physical, chemical, and toxic properties
(c)
safetyprecautions;
(d)
personal protective equipment;
(e)
processoperations and systemconfigurations;
(f)
safesystemsofwork including 'permits-to-work';
(g)
containertypes, methods ofhandling and security;
(h)
operational procedures;
(i)
maintenance procedures;
(j)
defectrectification;
(k)
automatic control systems;
(1)
leakage detection systems;
ofchlorine;
(m) emergency procedures, including leakagecontainment; and

(n)
chlorine suppliers'support facilities.
Maintenance engineers needtobe providedwith more detailed training on these

topics, together with training on system integrity testing, pressurereduction,and
safetydevices.
On-the-job training needsto be carriedout underthe guidance ofan
experienced operator/maintenance engineer who is familiarwith the process,with
233
an emphasis on safety precautionsand methods ofdealingwith emergencies. Give particular

attention to the following aspects:
(a)
the hazards and characteristics ofchlorine;
(b)
safe methods ofplantoperation, including connection to and disconnection from supply

systems, and regular monitoring and verification ofthe adequacy ofthe systems
adopted;
(c)
niethods of maintenance and inspection, in particular the application ofrelevant

standards and codes (seealso paragraphs 193-198).
(d)
46
special operations; eg, plant shut-down and start-up, methods ofisolation and
of
for
maintenance
and
preparation equipment
periodic
inspection;
(e)
the location and operation of emergency shut-offvalves, ventilation equipment, alarms,
(f)
the procedures to be followed ifa release occurs, these should include isolation and
containment ofthe releaseand emergency plans; the procedures will needto be sitespecific and cover different scalesofrelease(see alsoparagraphs 247-263);
(g)
leak detectors dc:
training in the use ofall personal protectiveequipment (PPE)supplied

(seeparagraph 237). Maintenance staff should also cover defect rectification.
Competency and audit

234 Competence in the abovetopicsneeds to be assessed through post-training assessments
using documented procedures. Itis recommended that training and safety procedures are
auditedannually by management or an auditteamwithrelevantexperience as part ofyour
company's auditprogramme. Internal auditsniay be supplemented by external audits from
chlorine suppliers underthe CIA's initiativefor responsible careand product stewardship. or
by other competent peopleat intervals of approximately three years.
PERSONALPROTECTIVEEQUIPMENT(PPE)
235 Chlorine is a highly toxicsubstance: acute exposure can be fatal (see Appendix I). You
thereforeneedto establish safe working practices and controlmeasures (including PPE) and
ensure that theyare understood by operatives. Safe procedures are vital where it is necessary
to enteran enclosed storage space or a room where a chlorine leak has occurred. Work in such
Guidance on how to
confined spaces is subject to The Confined Spaces Regulations 1997.
60
comply with the Regulations is given in an Approved CodeofPractice. The precautions
identified must be implemented and suitable traininggiven to operators.
236 A common soLirce of exposure to chlorine is in operations involving the making and
breaking ofchlorine pipework connections, particularly to containers. Stepsshouldbe takento
preventor, wherethat is not reasonably practicable, i-educe personal exposure to

chlorine 20 by means otherthan personal protective equipment. When PPE,
including respiratory protective equipment, needstobe worn, equipment
manufactured after 30 June 1995 should carry the 'CE' mark, to indicatethatthe
equipmenthas beendesignedand tested to meetthe basic requirements ofCouncil
Directive 89/686/EEC.
237 Respiratory protective equipment (RPE) that has beenapprovedby the HSE or
is claimed by the manufacturer to conform to a standard approved by HSE, and
whichwas manufactured before 1 July 1995, can continue to be used at work,
providedthat it is still suitable and maintained in good condition. All personnel who
arerequired to use RPE (eg, respirators, breathingapparatus, or escape breathing
apparatus) must receive adequate instruction and training in its safeand correctuse.
The RPE mustbe thoroughly examined and tested in accordance with the
manufacturer'srecommendations (typically at least onceevery month) and records
kept.20
Selectingsuitable respiratoryprotectiveequipment(RPE)
238 Where PPE including respiratory protectiveequipment (RPE) needsto be
worn, you must ensure that it is properly selected and that it provides adequate
64
66
protection. 63. When selectingRPE you shouldconsult relevantguidance 65,
20
and base your selection on the results of a risk assessment. The selected RPE
must:
(a)
provide adequate protection for yourparticularcircumstances (eg for specific

tasksor for emergency escape); and
(b)
be compatible with other demands ofthejob and the working environment.
The selected RPE should make theoverall risk ofinjurywhile wearing RPE as
low as reasonably practicable.
239 When selectingRPE for a particularapplication, a two-stage selection
procedure is therefore recommended:
(a)
Based on theresultsofyour exposure risk assessment:

(i)
decide whethera respiratoror BA, or eithermay be used;then
(ii)
determine the minimum protection required from the RPE. This is done
using the equationbelow. In deciding the maximum allowable
concentration insidethe facepiece you will needto take account of
recognised exposure limits (see Appendix 1) or takeaccountofyour inhouse limits.
Minimum ProtectionRequired
Workplace concentrationoutside thefacepiece ottheRPE

Maximum allowableconcentration insidethe faccpiece ofthe RPE
For emergency escape purposes where the exposure will be lessthan 15 minutes, the maximum
allowable concentration in the above expression is the Short-Term Exposure Lmit (STEL) (see
Appendix 1). Now compare the Minimum Protection Required value with the Assigned
ProtectionFactors (APF) indicated in HSG5366and identify a selection ofequpment. (APFs
shown in HS(G)53 havebeenpublished by the British Standards institution ).6 These APF
figures are a guide, not a hardand fast rule. Indeed, it should be recognised that protection levels
belowthe APF are possible whenRPE is unsuitable for thetaskand is not suited to the wearer
and the environment. Where advice given in HSG53 is properly takeninto account, it is possible
to achieve protection at or above the published APF values. Youmay use higherAPFs ifyou
have good quality information (eg satisfactory face-fit results forthosewearing RPE) to
demonstrate that theyapply in your workplace conditions and to the selected RPE. Youcanuse
the AFF for the equipment selected to estimate concentration insidethe facepiece.
Concentration inside the facepiece
= Workplace concentration outsidethe facepiece

APF
Note: NominalProtectionFactors (NPF)values have been used in thepast, for iclentij5'ing aselection
ofequipment. This procedureis no longer validbecauseworkplace studies haveshown that mani'
wearersmar notachievethelevel ofprotectionindicatedby NPFs.
(b) The next stage isto take accountofthe factors detailedin paragraphs36-47 of
HSGS3 to help narrow down the choice. Alwaysinvolve the wearers inthe selectionprocess,
and wherepossible provide them with a choice ofsuitable RPE. This will helpto ensure that it
is suited to them individually, and increase the chances that it will be acceptedand worn
correctly.
Where there is doubtaboutthe choice, you needto confirm with the manufacturer or supplier
that thechosen equipment is suitable for the task and the conditions in which it istobe used.
They have dutiesunderthe Healthand Safetyat WorkAct etc 1974 to provideinformation on
thelimitations and capabilities oftheir RPE.
240 At somechlorine installations it is common practice for personnel to carry halfmask
respirators fitted with suitable filters (eg: type and class:
B 1; colour: grey) for protection againstchlorine. The
purposeofthis type ofrespiratoris to providean

immediate protection inthe eventofan incident
involving low concentrations ofchlorine gas so that the
wearercan escape into freshair. This type ofhalfmask
respiratorhas an APF = 10, ie the maximum allowable
workplace concentration = 10 x STEL = 10 ppm.
241 A full facemaskwith cartridgeor canisterhas an

APF of40. Theuse ofthis type ofrespiratorwould
typically be inor very near the open air duringthe
connecting up or disconnecting ofcontainers or breaking
into previouslypurgedchlorine systems. The operating
procedures specific tothe site should state whether the
respiratorhas tobe wornfor each operation, or be 'at the ready' to be put on in case
ofneed. A respirator(eg a maskfittedwith a filter or canister) is not suitable for use
in atmospheres which are immediately dangerous to life or health. In other words,
respiratorsare not suitable for operations where there is a potential for a significant
releaseofchlorine gas. In these circumstances a suitable breathing apparatus (BA)
shouldbe worn.
242 Filters havea shelf-life specified by the manufacturers beyond which they
shouldnot be used. Oncefilter-canister seals have beenbroken, filterlife will
depend on usage, contaminent concentrations, breathing rateetc. Your risk
assessment, combined with information from the filter manufacturer, will determine
the useful life ofrespiratorfilters; yourdecisionsneedto be communicated to the
wearers. Once unsealed, filters should not be stored for re-use, but they may be used
over a numberofconsecutive days, providedthey havenot been exposed to
concentrations of chlorine similartoor abovethose they are providedfor.
A negative pressuredemandBA withfull face maskhas an APF of40. For

major leaks a positivepressure demand BA with full face mask(ie a self-contained
BA)wouldbe appropriate, providedthe minimum protection requiredwas
consistent with the APF (2000), see paragraph 253.A self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA) shouldalwaysbe worn (possibly with a gas-tight chemical
protective suit) when entering an enclosed space or chlorine roomwherea
significant leak hasbeen detected or suspected. This isbecausethe chlorine detector
maybe some distance away from the source of the leak or pocketsof 'trapped' gas
which are not dispersed by the ventilation system. The concentration in such areas
maybe much higherthanthosedetectedby the alarm system.
243
244
In certain circumstances, compressed airline breathing apparatus (CABA) may
be suitable. However, theserestrictthemovement ofthepersonnel and thetrailing

hose canadd to therisk in areaswith obstructions. In such situations a selfcontained breathing apparatus maybe appropriate.
245 Forindoorinstallations with multi-stage alarms, the forced ventilation system

willhavebeen switchedoffon activation ofthe higherlevel alarm. People entering
the area to identify and eliminate the source ofthe leak should wear suitableBA,
see paragraphs 252-255). No personshouldworkalonein these circumstances. Any
back-up staff in attendance for emergency action should wear suitable BA 'at the
ready'.
246 Emergency escape BA is not intended for use duringnormal work and
therefore it is not recommended by HSE for anything other than emergency escape
use.
Note: Further guidance will be available when the COMAII Regulations come
into force in February 1999.
247 You needto inform the appropriate Fire Authority and Police Force of the
presence ofchlorine at your site. You shouldalso involve them and your chlorine
supplier at an early stage whendeveloping and updating your emergency plan and
procedures. Your emergency arrangements shouldbe basedon a risk assessment
and include procedures on how gas releases maybe dealtwith safelyby site
69, 70 Your
personnel and on whetherto call for assistance from beyondthe
risk assessment shoLild also address fire safety ofthe process or installation and
possible impacts from neighbouring sites. General fire precautions should
comply
with the requirements of the FirePrecautions (Workplace) Regulations l997.
site.'
Your emergency planshouldcoverthe foreseeable range ofchlorine releases

for your site: a summary of sonicofthe important elements ofa plan is given in
Appendix 8. A copy ofthe plan should be made available to all personnel involved
in its implementation. It is recommended that the plan includes thenamesor
positions ofthe personswho will sound the off-site alarm. This may be someone
on-site, or it may undersomecircumstances be the responsibility ofthe first Fire
Officer on the site in the event of an emergency. The plan shouldalso include firstaid (see Appendix I ) and evacuation arrangements both oil-site and, ifappropriate,
off-site (see Appendix 8).
248
249 Each installation needs to have means ofwarning all workers that a gas escape
has occurred. A wind direction indicator, mounted in a highly visible location,
needs to be provided to help personnel decide the bestdirection in whichto escape.
The appropriate actionto hetaken following a gas escape warning shouldbe
defined in written mstructions, and appropriate training given.
25() For a minorgas escape, you mayonly need to plan simple actions. In other
circumstances however, a further system ofspecialwarnings maybe required,
which initiatesthe emergency plan and, ifnecessary, the off-site emergency plan.
The first call for assistance shouldbetothe eniergency servicesfor incident control
and rescue, and then to Chlor-Aid, through your supplier who will offer advice on
how to deal withthe release. UnderChlorAid the chlorine producers and suppliers (see
Appendix 4) collaborate in dealingwith chlorine emergencies at bulk installations 71
throughout the UK.The arrangements are outlined in a booklet publishedby the CIA
underthe chemical industry'sResponsible Care initiative.
Arrange regularpractices ofthe emergency plan. Someoftheseshouldinvolve the
emergency services, whowill advise on a suitable frequency.
251
EMERGENCYEQUIPMENT
252 Yourrisk assessment should considerthe extent, type, and location ofthe emergency
equipment, including theneed for chemical protection suits whichprovidetotal
encapsulation. These can be compressed airline supplied full suits or full protective suits
worn over self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
SCBA with fullfacemask confoniiingto BSEN 137 (SCBA) 72 or airline BA
confonmng to BSEN 139 has an APF of2000 (butsee paragraphs238-246). Selfcontained equipment will supply air for up to about 40 minutess (seethe manufacturer's
details). Thesesets are providedwith a warning systemto alert thewearerto leavethe
contaminated areawhenthe air cylinders are becoming empty. Compressed airline breathing
apparatus providesthe same protection withouta time limit, but doesrestrict freedom of
movement in search and rescue operation.
253
254 As withother RPE,emergency escape breathing apparatusshouldbe CE-markedand

incorporateface protection(eg in theform ofa hood orfull face mask). SuitableHSE-approved
escapeequipmentmayalso be used ifit was manufacturedbefore 1 July 1995. Such equipment is
for escapeonly and not for use during routine work.
255 Emergency and rescueequipmentshouldbe
available and readily accessible in all chlorine plant

areas, and its location suitablymarked. Such equipment
needs tobe regularly inspected and maintained. An
inventory ofthe equipmentshould be kept and attached
to the plantoperational and emergency procedures.
CONTROLOF LEAKAGES
256 Local alarmstationsto provide earlywarning of
chlorine escapesare an essential link in the emergency
procedure. The use ofchlorine detectors and alarms is
coveredin paragraphs 113-118. Localalarm stations
(push-button type preferred) should be located at
strategic pointsnear chlorine storage installations;
generally two alarm stations on convenient escape
routesfrom the chlorine unloading terminal! storage tank areaare sufficient. The local alarm
stationsmay actuate the worksemergency alarm directlyor indirectly by raising an alarmin
theemergency control centre and the main control room. Preferably in largeworks the local
68
alarm station should actuate a distinct local chlorine alarm to warn people offfrom
theaffected area.
257 The alarmstationsmay also actuate the remotelyoperated shut-offvalveson

thechlorine storage tankswherethis is consistent with thesafe operation oftheuser
plant.
258 Materials and equipment including sand and plastic sheetsto contain spills of
liquidchlorine shouldbe readilyavailable. Covering a stabilised spill with plastic
sheetsis often the best action. Application of foam would cause renewed evolution
ofvapourbecauseofthe heat supplied. The needfor foamand water spraysshould
be discussed withthe chlorine supplierand local fire authority, sincethe useof
foamand water may, in certaincircumstances, aggravate the problem. The fire
authoritymaycarry stocks ofsuitable foam, but the decision to use it shouldbe
takenin conjunction with the senior technical manageron site.
259 Watershouldneverbe added to a spillage of liquid chlorine or sprayed ontoa
leakingtank. However, water hoses or fog sprays directed at a chlorine gas cloud
can helpdilute it as a result ofthe air entrainment generated by the jets ofwater.
Releasesinside buildings
Ifthe spill is indoors and contained by the useofsand or a bund it will rapidly
coveritself with a coatingofslushychlorine hydrate and a cold vapour layer. Such
a stabilised spill shouldbe coveredwith a plastic sheet(seeparagraphs 258 and
259). Fora severe leak,possiblyarising from a failure ofpipework, the chlorine
buildingwill providesome delay to the release of the gas to the open air, provided
vents and apertures areclosedor sealed. Thiswill give moretime forthe technical
staffand management to identify and deal withthe source ofthe release. In
dispersing the contained release from a chlorine roomit is stillessentialto consider
the off-site consequences and it maybe necessary to sound the off-site alarm(when
fitted)to alert people to go indoors and remainthere. It is for the emergency
services to consider clearingpeoplefrom the area immediately downwind of the
installation after such a release.
260
A significantreduction inthe releaseofchlorine from a buildingis only

obtainedifthe leak is quickly controlled and the rate ofair change in the chlorine
roomis low. The ventilation systemshould, therefore, be switched off(unless a
scrubbing systemis installed to remove chlorine from the exhaustgas) and all
apertures needto be closed or sealed.
261
262 Consider usingan additional sensorcapable of measuring concentrations up to

500 ppm and giving a visual display outside the chlorine room and inthe works
control room. Sucha display is useful for assessing the significance ofthe leak and
whether it can be isolated safely. Once concentrations exceed 1000 ppm (this is
about the threshold concentration for thecloud tobe visible),personnel dealingwith the
release should take additional precautions and shouldwithdraw to a safe area as soon as they
are aware that they are breathing contaminated air.
Aftera leak or substantial releasehas beendealtwith it will be necessary to ventilate the

chlorine rooni thoroughly. Operators should not remove any RPE until they haveremoved
clothing (whichmay be contaminated with chlorine) and are in a safe environment.
263
70
D1
TOXICITY
Chlorinehas a perceptible odour that can he detected by most people at a

concentrationof 0.3 ppm (v/v) and by some at concentrationsas low as 0.02
ppm. The Occupational Exposure Standard (OES)74 for exposureto chlorine is
0.5 ppm: this is a time-weighted average concentrationover a period of' 8 hours.
The Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL)74 is I ppm: a time-weighted average
over 15 minutes.
I
It producesclear sensory irritation at concentrations of 05-1 ppm and
aboe.7 Irritationof the mucousmembranesof the eye and nose, and especially
of the throat and lungs, is caused by exposureto chlorine at levels ofaround 1-15
ppm. In general. irritation becomes intolerable at concentrations ofabout

4 ppm.76 Concentrationsof 50 ppm or more aredangerouseven for exposures of
about 5-10 mins; they may cause inflammation of the lungs with accumulation of
fluid. Occasionally the development of respiratory symptomsmay be delayed for
up to two days after exposure. However, there is no convincing evidence of
serious long-term sequelae following recovery from a single exposure to
chlorine.75
Exposure to 1000 ppm may be fatal after a few breaths.77 Death results
from lung damage. It can either occur rapidly (from within hours to a couple of
days post-exposure). due to oedemaand congestion, or it can be somewhat more
delayed (several days) due to secondary pneumonia.
3
4 The harm from exposure to chlorine is proportional to the 'toxic load'

defined as the product of the square ofthe concentration and exposure time. For
risk assessment work, HSE uses a 'dangerous toxic load' 78 (DTL) of:
DTL 108 000 ppm2min hich is potentially fatal to the most vulnerable
members of the population. Thus exposures to 104 ppm for 10 minutesor 73
ppm for 20 minutesetc are potentiall) fatal; the chance of fatality depends on
many factors.78
FIRSTAID
5
When liquid chlorine comes into contact with the skin or mucousmembranesii can
produce seriousburns which need to be treated by a medically competent person. People
who have inhaled chlorine gas should be moved as quickly as possible into 'fresh air', laid in
a resifLil position with thehead and chest raised, and kept warm. It is essential that
qualified medical attention is obtained quickly, as serious symptoms may develop up to 48
hours later. Anyonewho has been affected by chlorine gas should be examined locally by a
medically competent person or sent to hospitalby ambulance.
First-aidattendantsshould be aware ofthe dangers arising from gassing by chlorine.

The following basic rules shouldbe observed:
6
(a) if chlorine has affected the eyes. they shouldbe irrigated with plenty of clean
(preferably rap) water:
(b) contaminated clothingshould be removed
washed with plenty ofwater
(c)
in a well-ventilated area and affected skin
mouth-to-mouthresuscitation should not be given ifthe patient is breathing,

becausethere is a risk ofthe attendant being harmed. However, oxygen may be
administered or resuscitation equipmentused by suitablyqualified personnel.
More comprehensive guidanceis given elsewhere.79
72 Safety advice for bulk chlorineinstallations
i
Chlorine is a grecnish-yel1ogas at ambient temperatureand pressure.
supplied commercial1 as a liquid under pressure.
It is
Commercial liquid chlorine conforms to BS 3947:l976. This Standard

specifics a minimum limit for the chlorine contentand maximum levels for water
content and residue on eaporation details ofthe methodsof analysis for gaseous
impurities (carbon dioxide, oxygen and nitrogen), water content, nitrogen
trichloride. and residue on evaporation are also given.
3
Traces of dissolved gaseous impurities in chlorine arenot normallysignificant
for most applications moisture contenthoweveris extremely important because
of the corrosive nature of wet chlorine.
Trace residues which are left on evaporation,usually chlorinated organic

productsor ferric chloride, may lead to blockage of pipelines, valves or
instruments. Nitrogen trichloride can be potentially dangerous5 L52 if the
vaporisationprocess leads to its concentrationin residues, but this is generally not
considered to be a problem in drum and cylinder installations.
4
Physicalproperties
Atomic weight
35.46
Molecular weight
70.91
Density liquid
1561 kg/m3 at -35C
1468 kg/rn3 at 0C
1410 kg/rn3 at 20C
gas
3.173 kg/rn3 at 0C and

at 20C relative to air)
I bar absolute(relative density 2.490
Safetyadvice for bulkchlorineinstallations 73
Boiling point at 1.0133 bar absolute

Meltingpoint
Critical temperature
Critical pressure
Vapour pressure at 20C
Viscosity: liquid at 20C
-34.05C
-101.6C
144C
77.1 barsabsolute
6.7 bars absolute

0.35 cp
I volume of liquid chlorine = 463 volumes of chlorine gas at 0C and I bar absolute
1
kg of liquid chlorine
0.3 19 m3 ofchlorinegas at 0C and
I bar absolute
The variationof the vapour pressure of liquid chlorine with temperature is given in Figure
A2.l.
Thermalproperties'
Specific heat (liquid chlorine between 1C and 27C) 0.236 kcal/kg!C
Specific heat (gas at constant pressure at 6.9 bars absolute or less and between 1C and
27C) 0.11 3 kcal/kg/C
Ratio of specific heat at constant pressure to specific heatat constant volume 1.355
Latentheat of fusion
21.6 kcal/kg
Latent heal of vaporisation at 0C
63.2 kcal/kg
Coefficient of cubicexpansion (liquid chlorine
at 20C)
0.002! per C
This coefficient is sufficiently largeto result in excessive pressure should liquid chlorine be
trapped in pipework between two closed valves with no gas space.
Heat of reaction of chlorine gas with sodium hydroxide liquor 348 kcal/kgof chlorine.
6 While the above data give a general summaryof the physical and thermal propertiesof
chlorine, more detailedinformation is needed fiir use in plant design calculations.
Figure1 Variation ofchlorine vapour pressure with temperature

20
.0
19
18
U)
U)
17
16
K!)
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
(1
60
50
40
30
20
10
20
30
40
50
60
Temperature C
Solubilitp?t chlorine in waler

7 Chlorine dissolves slightly in water to give a solution which has oxidising,
bleaching and germicidal properties. The solubility ofchlorinein water increases
with the partial pressure ofthe chlorine. The table belowgives the solubility of
chlorinein waler at differenttemperatures for a total pressure of I bar absolute:
Temperalure C
gramsofchlorineper litreoJwater
10
15
9.97
8.5
20
7.29
25
6.41
For a total pressureof I bar absolute, thepartial pressure ofchlorine reduces as

the water temperature(and hence the partial pressure of waler vapour) increases.
8 On cooling below 9.6C, crystals ofchlorinehydrate (C12.8H20)are deposited. For

this reason, wet chlorine in process must always be kept above this temperatureto avoid
the blockages which would otherwise occur as a result ofthe formation of solid chlorine
hydrate.
9
A solution of chlorine in water forms hydrochloric acid and hypochlorousacid:

Cl7 + H,0
HCI + HOCI
chemicalproperties
Dry chlorine at ambient temperaturesreacts directly with many of the elements
producing chlorides both of non-metals (eg sulphuror phosphorus)and of metals (eg
iron in a finely divided form, aluminium or titanium).Dry chlorine at ambient
temperaturedoes not attack steel, copper or nickel, but these metals are attacked at
highertemperatures. Steel combineswith dry chlorine above 200C and, since the
reaction is exothermic, the rate ofreaction may increase rapidly. Reactionwith nickel
does not take place until the temperatureexceeds 500C.
10
II Traces of moisture in chlorine lead to rapid corrosion of steel, copper and nickel.
12 Titaniumis resistantto wet chlorine between 15C and 100C but reacts violently
with dry chlorine and shouldnot be used: but see paragraph 18.
Chlorine dissolves in cool aqueous solutionsof alkalis to produce solutionsof

hypochiorites; in hot or boiling aqueousalkalis,chloratescan be produced.
13
Chlorine reacts vigorously with many organiccompoundsincluding mineral oils and

greases, producing chlorinated products. The mechanism is either directaddition to
unsaturatedbonds or substitutionof hydrogen. In the latter case, hydrogen chloride is
formed as a by-product.
14
Mixtures ofchlorine and hydrogen are explosive over a large range of

concentrations; the explosion may be initiated by a spark, by photochemical action or by
a catalyst. Undercertain conditions chlorine reacts withammonia to produce nitrogen
trichloride, which is spontaneously explosive. This is not a risk when testing for leaks
with a bottle ofammonia.
15
Selection ofmaterials oJ construction

16 The choice ofappropriate materials of construction for chlorine systems is
considered in detail elsewhere.81Your options should be selected only after a
detailed survey of all possible variations in operatingconditions,and your
preferred option decided in consultationwith your chlorine supplier.
17 A system constructedofsteel, which is appropriate for dry chlorine, must
itselfbe dried adequately beforecommissioning. This may be done by purging
with dry air or inert gas until the exit purge has a dew point below -40C.
However, the upper operatingtemperaturemust be limited.
The useof titaniummetal for wet chlorine is satisfactory,81 providedthat the

moisture level is always kept high and that controlis exercised over the upper and
18
loweroperatingtemperaturelimit. Maintenanceand inspection proceduresmust

include awareness ofthe possibility of crevice corrosion.However, where titanium
is used in plantscontainingwet chlorine (gas or liquid)consideration should be
given to the possibility ofa fault condition giving rise to contact between titanium
and dry chlorine gas or liquid. If such a fault could possibly arise it may be best
to consider alternativeconstructionmaterials.
19 Materials which are resistant to attack by both wet or dry gaseouschlorine at
ambient temperaturesinclude glass, stoneware, porcelain, tantalum, ebonite and
certain plastics. The use ofplastic materials with liquidchlorine is unsatisfactory.
LEARNINGFROMINCiDENTS
20
An interesting selection of incidents, which illustrate some ofthe above
hazards (including a nitrogen trichloride explosion, a titaniumlchlorine fireand

external corrosion)and the means for controlling them, is reviewed in
GEST/API 82
__
Si
'0
[I
L.J flfl
I
The basis of health and safety law in the UK is the Health and Safety at
Work etc Act 1974. This sets oUt general duties which employers have towards
employees and members of the public, and thosethat employees have to
themselves and each other. These duties are qualified in the Act by the principle
of so far as is reasonably practicable' ie the extent ofthemeasurestaken to
avoid or reduce a particularrisk to health and safety needs to he balancedagainst
the time, trouble, cost, and physical difficulty involved. This balancing process83
is often referred to as making risks as low as is reasonably practicable'(ALARP).
2 In essence, what health and safety legislation requires is what good

management and common sense would lead employers to do anyway: that is to
look at what the risks are and take sensible measuresto make them ALARP.
This broad requirement is made explicit in the Management of Healthand Safety
at Work Regulations l99219 (referred to asthe Management Regulations).
Like the Act, these RegLilationsapply to every work activity. Other regulations
are more specific, eg the Manual HandlingOperationsRegulations (MHO)57 or
the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (COSHH).2t
3
A full list3 of current legislation, ApprovedCodes of Practice and some
guidanceis published annually. The list contains legislation, which, although in
existence, is spent or has lapsed. A price list84 ofall available USE publications is
published annually by HSE Books. Contact details areon the inside ofthe back
cover.
A number of regulations (eg COSI-IH, MHO, PPE,64 Management

Regulations etc) specifically require you to undertake a risk assessment. A
leaflet85 is available describing how these assessments are linked together and
what the requirements at-c: however, it does not deal with highly specialised risks
such as major hazards.
4
Under the basic legal requirements you must:
(a)
have a written, up-to-datehealth and safety policy if you employ five or more
people;
(b) carry out a risk assessment (and if you employfive or more people, record the main
findings and yourarrangementsfor health and safety);
(C)
notifyoccupationof premises to yourlocal inspector if you are a commercial or

industrial business;
a current certificate as requiredby the Employers' Liability (Compulsory

Insurance)Act 1969 if you employ anyone;
(d) display
(e) display the Healthand Safety

(f)
Law poster for employees or giveout the leaflet;86
notify certain types of injuries, occupationaldiseases and events (see paragraph 23);
and
(g) consult employees and any appointed union safety representatives87 on certain
issues, such as any changes which might affect health and safetyand any
information,instruction and training which has to be provided.
6 The ALARP principle and the need for risk assessment enables the Health and Safety
Commission, where appropriate,to make Regulations in a goal-setting form: ie setting out
what must be achieved, but not how it must be done. Sometimes it is necessary to prescribe
in detail what must be done and set absolute standards.
Some activities or substances are so inherently hazardous that they requireadditional

arrangements. For example, chlorine installations which store 10 tonnes or moreneed to
meet the general requirements ofthe CIMAH Regulations (see paragraph9).
7
THENOTIFICATIONOFINSTALLATIONS HANDLiNGHAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES (NIHHS)REGULATiONS 1982'
These Regulations implement a notification scheme for installations with inventories
greater or equal to specified quantities(10 tonnes for chlorine). Notification is to the Health
and Safety Executive via your Local Area Office (see Appendix 4). Under NIHHS the
8
following requirements apply:
80
(a) beforechlorine is used or stored at a site, at least three months noticemust

be given to HSE and certain details specified;
(b) the notificationmust be updatedwhenever there is a change in activity on

site or there is an increase or reduction in the operationalquantity of chlorine
on site; and
(c) the amount of chlorine on site must not be increased to three or more times
the quantity originally notified,unless a newnotificationis made. (Any
increases in inventorylevels must ofcoursecomplywith other legislation, in
particularsection 3 ofthe HSW Act, ie that the risks to people off-site
are ALARP).
THE CONTROL OFINDUSTRIALMAJORACCiDENTHAZARDS

(CIMAH,)REGULATIONS 1984
9 These Regulationsimplement the requirements of the European Directive
(82/501/EEC) on the major hazards ofcertain industrial activities commonly
referred to as the 'Seveso' Directive. They apply to the storage and processing of
hazardous substances. The Regulations have been amendeda number of times.3
These include the 1988 amendment(revision of threshold quantities for certain
substances) and the 1990 modification ofthe controls on storage following a
serious warehouse fire. Two levels of activity arc defined. The lowerlevel
requirements require companies to take the precautionsthat are necessary to
prevent a major accidentand to limit the consequences, and generally to
demonstratesafe operation (regulation 4), and to report any major accident
(regulation 5). Installations in which chlorine is involved in a process under
Schedule 4 are subject to these general requirements regardless ofthe quantity
present, unless the operation is incapable of producing a major accident hazard.
Larger(ie top-tier) installations which store 75 or more tonnes, or installations
with 25 tonnes or more which carry out process activities under Schedule 4,
additionally require the preparation of safety reports. emergency plans and the
provision of informationto the public (regulations 7-13). Guidanceon the
CIMAH Regulations is available.69'88These Regulationswill be withdrawnwhen
the proposed Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)Regulationsare
implemented in February 1999.
81
THE COMAH REGULATIONS

These Regulations will implement the requirements of The Control of Major Accident
Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances Directive (96/82/EC) which was adopted by the
EU on 9 December 1996. The Directive is referred to as the 'Seveso II' Directive. The
Regulations follow the Directive closely and mirror the Seveso l/CIMAH regime, in having
two levels of duties:
10
(a) general duties on all operators subject to the Regulations: to notify the competent
authoritiesof their activities, to takeall measures necessary for the prevention and
mitigationof major accidents, to prepare a major accident prcvention policy, and
report major accidents
(b) top-tier duties on operatorsof sites where the quantitiesofdangeroussubstances
exceed the higher thresholds. These operatorsmust, in additionto the duties in the
above paragraph,submit safety reports,prepare and test emergency plans and provide
information to the public.
In thecase of chlorine the thresholdquantities are 10 tonnes for the generalduties and
25 tonnes forthe top-tier duties. Application depends solely on the presence or anticipated
presence of the thresholdquantitiesof dangeroussubstances, including dangerous
substances which might be generated in the course ofan accident due to loss of control of
an industrial chemical process, with no differentiation between storage and processing. The
general duty for operatorsto take 'all measures necessary for the prevention and mitigation
of major accidents' is similar to theCIMAH Regulations which require manufacturersto
'take adequate steps to prevent ... major accidents... and limit their consequences ...'. In
judging how this duty should be complied with in practice. the competentauthoritieswill
base their view on whetherrisks have been reduced to ALARP. The main new
requirements are:
All operators within the scope of the Directive must produce a major-accident
prevention policy (MAPP) and ensure that it is properly implemented to guaranteea
high level of protection for humansand the environmentby appropriate means,
structures, and management systems.
Land-useplanningis brought within the scopeof the Directive.
82
Safety reports (top-tier sites only) have to be made availableto the public, but
companies can request that certain information,including commercial and
personal confidential information,is withheld.
The competentauthorities, HSE and tile EnvironmentalAgency (EA) in

England and Wales, and HSE and the Scottish Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) in Scotland, must prohibit operations where the measures
taken by operators to prevent and mitigate major accidents are seriously
deficient.
The Seveso II requirements place much more emphasison the management of

safety and tile role ofthe safetyreport than in the original Seveso Directive
(implemented by the CIMAH Regulations). Paragraphs 11-23summarise the
main requirements of other legislation that is relevant to the control of risks
posed by installations handling chlorine.
THEPLANNING(HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES) ACT1990AND
PLANNING(HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES) REGULATIONS 1992
'
II Tile Act and Regulations introduce planningcontrols which are designed to

ensure that hazardous substances can be kept or used in significant amounts only
after the responsible authoritieshave had the opportunityto assess the degreeof
risk to peoplein tile surroundingarea and are satisfied that the risks are tolerable.
In essence the Act and Regulationsrequire sites to apply for hazardous
substances consent for inventory levels at or above specific amountsknown as
the controlled quantity - 10 tonnes in the case of chlorine. Neighbouringsites
within 500 m. and controlled by the same person. must be taken into account
when deciding the maximum inventory. New sites must obtain hazardous
substances consent at an early stage in tile life cycle.
In England and Wales the controls are enforced by the Hazardous
Substances Authority(HSA), usually the District or London Borough Council for
the land in question, C tile Local PlanningAuthority(LPA). In Scotlandthe
equivalent regulations are The Town and Country Planning(Hazardous
Substances) (Scotland) Regulations 1993. They arc enforced by the Scottish
Office. Environment Department(SOED). HSE is a statutory eonsultee under the
Act and advises HSAsand SOED on the nature and severity of the residualrisk.
The Act recognises that safety must be an overriding control. The controls apply.
regardless of whetherplanning permission is required under other legislation.
12
13 Guidanceon applying for hazardous substances consent in England and

Wales is given in Ha:ardousSubstances Consent: Guidance Industry (produced
by the Department of the Environment and the Welsh Office. 92 PLAN000I).
SOED has issued circular 16/1993 Hazardous Substances Consent: Guidancefor
Industry.
Jr
83
THE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES (NOTIFICATiON ANDMARKING OF

SITES) REGULATIONS 199039,40
Wheremore than 25 tonnes ofdangeroussubstances are present on a site (including
chlorine) notification must be made to the fire authority and appropriate signs placed at
site access points. The enforcing authorityis the fire authority except in specified
circumstances when it is HSE. The Regulations requireall signs to conform to BS537841
and to be kept cleanand free froni obstructions.
14
THEMANAGEMENT OFHEALTHAND SAFETYATWORK

REGULATIONS 1992 18
15 These Regulations implement CouncilDirectives 89/391/EEC (OJ No L183.
29.6.89, p1) and 91/383/EEC (OJ No L206, 29.7.91, p19) on the introductionof
measures to encourageimprovements in safety and health of workers at work. Under
the Regulationsyou must:
(a) assess the risks to thehealth and safety ofyouremployees and non-employees
arising in, or from, youractivities and review the assessment when there is
significant change. Recordsof significant findings of the assessment must be kept
where there are five or more employees;
(b) plan, organise, control, monitor and review the preventative and protective measures
taken as a result ofthe assessment:
(c) appoint any competent person(s) needed to help you comply with legal obligations.
for example, when havingpressure systems examined:
(d) set out what should be done in case of serious and imminentdanger at your
premises, such asthe spillage ofan appreciableamount of chlorine:
(e) tell employees about the risks and precautionsinvolved in their work; and
(f)
provide health surveillance where necessary.
THE LIFTING PLANTANDEQUIPMENT(RECORDSOF TESTAND

EXAMINATIONS ETC) REGULATIONS 199289,
16
You must:
(a) have certificates of test and examination (normally providedby manufacturersand

suppliers) specifying safe working loadsbefore first using chains, ropes and lifting
tackle;
84
(b) have chains, ropes. lifting tackle, hoists and lifts thoroughlyexamined every
six months by a competent person (often employed by an insurance
company)and obtain and keep the report;
(c) ensure tests and thorough examinations ofcranes are carried out before
they are first used and obtain a certificate of test and examinationspecifying
safe working loads. Periodic thorough examinations at least every 12 months
are also required, for which a report should be obtainedand kept.
HSE guidanceis available.90
Vote: These Regulations 'ill he revokedand i'eplacedin December 1998hi' the Litiing Operations
(01(1 lifting Equipment LOLER) Regulatiom (SI 1998/2307i. Guidance sill he publishedin an
4pprored (ode of Practiceon Safe Ue of Lifting Equipinesit. TheProvLdon and Ue of Work
Lqu,pmentRegulations1098 (see paragraph19) also app/c to ff11 ng equipment.
THEMANUAL HANDLINGOPERATIONS REGULATIONS 1992

These Regulations implement the substantiveprovisions ofCouncil Directive
90/269/EEC (OJ No LI56. 21.6.90, p9) on the health and safety requirements for
the manual handling of loadswhere there is a risk ofback injury to workers.
Employers must:
17
(a) avoid the need for hazardous manual lifting and handling
practicable;
if reasonably
(b) assess the risk of injury from any hazardous manual lifting and handling
which cannot be avoided;and
(c)
reducethe risk of injulyaccordingly.
Employees must:
(a) follow safe systems of work laid down by their employers;
(b) use mechanical aids providedby their employers properly; and

(c)
remember to use the trainingprovidedon lifting.
85
THE CONTROL OF SUBSTANCES HAZARDOUS TOHEALTH

REGULATIONS 1994 20
18 These regulations re-enact, with minor modifications, the COSHH Regulations 1988
(SI 1988/1657). They impose requirements on employers using substances hazardousto
health to protect employees and other peoplewho may be exposed to such substances.
They also impose certain duties on employees concerning their own protection from
exposure.
Employers must:
(a) assess risks to health;

(b) preventexposure;
(c)
where prevention is not reasonably practicable, control exposure by, for example,
isolatingor enclosing the process or, if this is not reasonably practicable, local
exhaust ventilation;
(d) maintaincontrolmeasuresin efficient working order and ensurethat a thorough

test and examination ofengineering controls are carried out at suitable intervals.
Records ofsuch maintenance must be kept for at least five years;
or controlis insufficient on its own, provide personal protective

and
maintain
equipment
it;
(e) where prevention
(1)
inform,instructand train employees; and
(g) carry outair monitoringand health surveillance where necessary.

THEPROVISIONAND USE OF WORKEQUIPMENTREGULATIONS
(PUWER) 1992 55,56
These Regulations impose health and safety requirements with respect to the provision
and use of work equipment(machinery, appliances, tools etc). They impose requirements
upon employers, including the need to:
19
(a) provide work equipmentthat is suitable for the purposefor which it is used or
supplied;
86
(b) take steps to ensurethat the equipmentis not used under conditionsfor
which it is not suitable;
maintainwork
(c)
equipmentin an efficient workingorder and good repair and
that any maintenance log is kept up to date:
(d) provide peoplewho use work equipmentwith:
(i) clear health and safety information and, where appropriate,written
instructions; and
(ii) adequatetraining, including the risks involved and the precautionsto be

taken. (This also applies to supervisors and managersof such people.)
(e)
protect people from dangerousparts of machineryby suitable protection

devices;
(f) providesuitable and sufficient lighting at any place wherea person uses work
equipment;
(g) ensure that work equipmentis marked in a clear and visible manner with
appropriatehealth and safety information and warnings and
(hj ensure that any warning device is unambiguous and easily perceived and
understood.
\'ote: These Regulations icill he revokedand reenactedin December 1998. The newPLIWER
Regulations (SI 1998/2306) include neii provisionsbr mobilework equipment.
THECONFINEDSPACES
REGULATIONS 199759,60
20 These Regulations apply when it is necessary for workersto carry out work
in a confined space including a chamber, tank, flue or a similar space, which, by
virtue of its enclosed nature, gives rise to a 'foreseeable specified risk'. In the case
of chlorine installations the most likely foreseeable specified risk is 'the loss of
consciousness or asphyxiation ofany person at work arisingfrom gas, fume
vapour or the lack of oxygen'. The Regulationsprohibitthe entry into a confined
space for the purposeof carryingout work where it is reasonably practicable to
carry outthe work by other means. In other situations(for example, the isolation
of a leak in a chlorine room) they impose requirements on employers including
theneed to:
(a) establish safe systems of work for entry to, or carrying out work in, or
leaving a confined space that rendersthe activities safe and withoutrisks to
health:
87
(b) establish suitable and sufficient arrangements for the rescue of people in the
confined space in the event of an emergency
(c)
ensurecompliance, so far as is reasonably practicable. with the provisions of the

Regulations in respect of any work carried out by employees, or other people - in
which case the mattersneed to be within the employer's control.
THEPRESSURESYSTEMANDTRANSPORTABLE GASCONTAINERS
REGULATIONS 198923,24,25
These Regulations impose requirements for pressure systems containinga gas or
liquefied gas at a pressuregreater than 0.5 bar above atmosphericpressure. They impose
requirements on designers. suppliers of pressure systems and on employers of people
who modify or repair such systems. Tile intentionofthe Regulations is to prevent the
risk of serious injury from stored energy as a result ofthe failure of a pressure system or
part of it. A measure ofthe stored energy is given by multiplying the system pressure
(bar gauge) and volume (litres). A pressure system is:
21
(a)
a system comprising one or more pressurevessels ofrigid construction, any

associated pipework and protectivedevices (systems with a stored energyof 250 bar
litre or less are exempt from some requirements, eg the written scheme of
examination):
(b)
the pipework with its protective devices to which a transportablegas containeris. or

is intendedto be, connected; or
(c)
a pipeline and its protectivedevices.
The transportablegas containeris not part ofthe system. Employers must ensure that:
(a) all plant and systems are designed. constructedand installed to prevent danger;
(b) systems are properly maintained:

(c) modifications
or repairs do not cause danger;
(d) there is a written scheme for examination54 ofcertain pressure vessels, such as
chlonne vaporisers, fittings and pipework, drawn up by a competent person;
88
Safetyadvice for bulkchlorineinstallations
(e) examinations as set out in the writtenscheme are carried out by a competent
person; and
(f) records are kept.
Note: The transportable go container ( TGC') part ofthese Regulations 'as i'c'rokedin /996 and
inc'o;porated into The Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Classification, Packaging and L/'Iling) and Crc
of Transportable Pressure Receptacles Regulations /996. These PSTGCRegulations i/I be replacedin
jVorenilier199') hi ThePrescoreEquipmentRegulationsand The PressureSi'stems Sii/iii' Regulations.
THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTATWORKREGULATIONS

1992 63,64
22 These Regulations impose health and safety requirements when providing

PPE and using it to protectpeople in the workplace. Employers must:
(a) provide suitable PPE free ofcharge to protect employees against risks which
have not been controlled by other means;
(b)
(c)
take all reasonablesteps to ensureit is properly used;

before providing PPE, assess risks to health and safety which have not been
avoidedby other meansand define the characteristics requiredby PPE to
make the risks ALARP:then select suitable PPE by matchingthose
characteristics with those ofPPE available:
(d) maintain the PPE provided in cleanand efficient working order and provide
suitable storage for it when not in use; and
(e) give information,instructionand training.
Employees must:
(a) use PPE provided; and

(b) report any loss or obviousdefect to the employer.
89
THEREPORTINGOFINJURIES,DISEASESANDDANGEROUS
OCCURRENCESREGULATIONS (RIDDOR)1995 91,92,93
23
These apply to all employers and self-employed people and cover everyone at work.
The main points are that you must:
(a) notifyyour inspector immediately, normally by telephone, if anybodydies, receives

a major injury or is seriously affected by, for example. an electric shock or
poisoning:
(b) notify yourinspector immediately if there is a dangerousoccurrence, eg a fire or
explosion, which stops work for more than 24 hours;
(c)
confirmtelephone notifications in writing within ten days on F2508;
(d) report within seven days (on form F2508) injuries which keep an employee offwork
or unable to do theirnormaljob for more than three days;
(e) report certain diseases suffered by workers on form F2508A; and
(f) keepdetails of reported incidents.
ENFORCINGTHE LAW
24 Health and safety laws relatingto your firm will usually be enforced by a health and
safety inspector from USE. In somecases, eg a public swimming pool, health and safety
law is enforced by the local authority.
25 Inspectors may visit workplaces without notice but you are entitled to see their
identification before they come in. Theymay want to investigate an accident or complaint,
or inspect safety, health and welfare at your premises. They have the right to talk to
employees and safety representatives, take photographsand samples, and even in certain
cases to impounddangerousequipment. They are entitled to co-operationand answers to
questions.
26 Inspectorswill be aware of the main risksin handling chlorine and will giveyou help
and advice on how to comply with the law. Ifthere is a problem, they may issue a formal
notice requiring improvements or, where serious danger exists, one which prohibits the use
of a process or equipment. Inspectors have powers to prosecutea firm (or an individual) for
breaking health and safety law.
90
CHLORINEPRODUCERSAND SUPPLIERS
Hays Process ChemicalsSandbach, Cheshire CWI I 3PZ
ImperialChemicalIndustries plc, ChiorChemicalsP0 Box 13, The Heath,
Runcorn, CheshireWA7 4QF
RhodiaLtd Staveley, Chesterfield S43 2PB
The Associated Octel Co Ltd P0 Box 17, Ellesmere Port, Wirral,
CheshireL65 4HF
BOC Ltd Special Gases 24 Deer Park Road, London SWI9 31JF
(Note: BOC supplies only cylinders.)
Air Products(GB) Ltd Speciality Gases Department,Weston Road,

Crewe CWI 1 DF
(Note: Air Products supplies only drums and cylinders.)
OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS
ChemicalIndustriesAssociation (CIA)Kings Buildings, Smith Square,

London SWIP 3JJ Tel: 0171 834 3399
The CIA runs a chlorine committeedealing with technical and liaison issues.
Water ServicesAssociation ofEnglandand Wales 1 Queen Anne's Gate. London
SWIH 9BTTeI: 0171 957 4567: Fax: 0171 9574666
HSE
You can find details of your local HSE office in your local telephone directory or the
currentedition of HSE35 The Healthand Safbtv Executive. Working withemployers,
available from HSE Books.
You can find details of USE Booksand HSE's enquiry service on the inside back cover
of this booklet.
ChlorineInstituteInc. 2001 L Street,NW, WashingtonDC 20036 USA
EuroChior Avenue E Van Nieuwenhuyse 4, Box 2. B-I 160 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32267672 II; Fax: +322 676 7241
Euro Chior publishes a wide range of relevant reports.22 The new series (AP) of
pamphletson learning fiwin accidents is essential reading(eg see reference 82).
UK suppliers ofEuroChior approvedglobe valves
Descote Ltd 19 Sandy Lane, Weston Point, Runcorn, Cheshire WA7 4EX
Tel: 01928 565666; Fax: 01928 565646
Shaw,Son & Greenhalgh Ltd AlbertStreet, Lockwood, Huddersfield HDI 3QG

Tel: 01484 532425; Fax: 01484 512426
BritishStandardsInstitute
BSI Salesand CustomerServices, 389 Chiswick High Road, London W4 4AL

Tel: 0181 996 7000: Fax: 0181 996 7001
British Standardsare available from the above address.

Standards relevantto chlorine
Specification fbrpipe threads/brtubesandfittingswherepressure-tightjoints are nade
on thethreads (metric dimensions) BS 21:1985
Specification/hrliquidchlorineBS 3947:1976 (1997)

Specification forfillingratios and developedpressures/br liquefiable andpermanent
gases BS 5355:1976
Specification/orunfiredfhsion welded pressure vessels BS 5500:1997

Specification/hrflatproducts madeofsteels forpressurepurposes BS EN 10028:
Parts 1,2,3:1993and4:1995
Specficationfhr toleranceson dimensions, shape and mass/br hotrolled steel
plates 3mm thickor above BS EN 10029:1991
Circularflangesfbrpipes, valves and fittings. Part 3: Section 3.1 Specification jbr
steelflanges. Part3 Section 3.3 Specificationfhr copperalloyand composite
flangesBS 1560: Part 3: 1989
fbr boltingforflanges andpressurecontaining purposesBS 4882: 1990

Specification
Specification for compressed asbestosfibrejointing BS 1832:1991(1997)
Specification for burstingdiscs and burstingdiscdevices BS 2915: 1990
Transportable gas containers. Part 1 Specificationforseamlesssteelgas containers
above 0.5 litrewater capacityBS 5045: Part 11982; Part2 Specificationforsteel
containersof0.5 L up to 450 L water capacitywith welded seams BS 5045: Part2
1989
Specficationfbrfillingratios anddevelopedpressuresfor liquefiable and

permanentgasesBS 5355: 1976
Safe/v signs andcolours. Part1 Specificationfbr colourand design BS 5378: Part
1980 (1995); Part3 Specificationforadditionalsigns to thosegiven in BS 5378:
Part] BS 5378: Part 3 1982 (1995)
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PFTE) materialsandproducts. Specificationfor

fbbricated unfilledpolytetrafluoroethylene productsBS 6564: Part2 1991 (1996)
Specificationfor identification ofpipelinesandservicesBS 1710: 1984 (1991)
Schedule ofpaintcoloursfor buildingpurposesBS 4800: 1989 (1994)
Guide to implementing an effective respiratoryprotectivedevice programme
BS4275: 1997
Specification/orrespiratoryprotectivedevices: selficontainedopen-circuit compressed air

breathingapparatus BS EN 137: 1993
Respiratory protectivedevices: compressed airline breathingapparatusJbr use with afiill
Jbce mask, hal/mask, or mouthpiece assembly. Requirements, testing, marking
BS EN 139: 1995
Steels /brpressure purposes.Part3 Specification/brcorrosion andheat-resistingsteels:
plates, sheet andstrip BS 1501: Part 3 1990
Specification/br steelsJbr firedand unfiredpressurevessels: sections
BS 1502: 1982 (1990)
94
andbars
Ui3]c
I
Bulk chlorine installations should preferably he located in the open air.
Sometimes it may be appropriate to locate the installationin a building.
The building may enclose the entire installation or part of it. eg the manlids,
valves, associated pipework,gauges and other equipment, leavingthe tank itself
2
outside.
3
The advantages, disadvantages and consequent requirements for outside or
inside installations are listed in paragraphs 4-8.
OUTSiDE INSTALL4TIONS
4
The advantages of outside installationsare that:
(a) leakagesare not confined, so the source of leakage is more safely accessible
from upwind:
(b)
it is easier to identify the point of leakage and take immediate local corrective
action:
(c) access
for installationand for major maintenance is simpler;and
(d) building costs are lower.

5
The disadvantages of outside installationsare that:
(a) leakages may be detected at an early stage only from downwind positions;
(b) small leakages, particularly thosearising from corrosion,can develop
unnoticed;
95
(c) maintenance and repair work may have to be carried out in adverseweather
conditions;
(d) there is no containmentto reducethe rate of release to the atmosphere;

(e) surface corrosionis more likely; any leak may rapidly escalate; and
(f)
there is less security.
It follows that outdoor installations require:
(a) strict vigilance and protection against corrosion;

(b) protectionagainstpossible mechanical damage and unauthorisedaccess;
(c)
an appropriate emergency system, possibly including proceduresfor theuse of water

sprays for gas clouds (see also main text paragraphs247-263);
(d) weatherprotection for maintenance in critical areas; this could be eithera

permanentcanopyor temporary sheeting; and
(e)
continuousstaffingon the site ifa chlorine release could presentserious

consequences on or off site.
INSiDE INSTALLATIONS
7
Theadvantagesof inside installations are that:
(a) valves and other equipmentare protectedfrom rain and snow, and provided
the buildingis kept dry, there will be less risk of corrosion;
(b) backgroundheatingis possible, to help providedry surroundings and

increased chlorine vapourpressure for processes where inert gas/airpadding
is not acceptable;
(c) controlled ventilation is possible, limiting the external effects if the leak is
fairly small;
(d) there is greater likelihood of a monitoringdevice detecting a leak; this is a

particularadvantage on an unattended plant; and
96
(e)
theinstallation is protected from accidental mechanical damage,explosion or

fire in adjacentplant or interference by unauthorisedpersons.
The disadvantages of inside installations are that:
(a) following a medium or major leak, emergency access may have to be made
to a closed room with a high chlorine concentration;
(b)
thepoint of leakagemay be difficult to identify, owing to lack of dispersion,

and mist formation;
(c)
ifthe building is heated, there will be greatergroundevaporationand flash

from a liquid leak; and
(d) access for maintenanceis likely to be more difficult.

9
It follows that indoor installations require:
(a)
adequate forced ventilation systems, including start-up from operating points

outside as well as inside the building; and
(b) careful consideration of plant layout and provision

and escape respiratory equipment.
ofadequate escape routes
JL
iVote: This typicalprocedure assunies 1/ia! the storage tanks and avvociateditems of
equipment hine sate Forking pressure of at least 12 bar gauge. If this is not the case,
then steps isilIneed to he taken (eg adjust theair sssteni pressure, and relief va/ic
settings) to el/sure that the saf' working limitsfor the storage vessels and delivery
vvvtein are not exceeded. It is important that more detailed andsitespe(i/ic procedures
are developed and agreed hj' the customer, Ijaulier and chlorinesupplier.
Action by
Actionneeded
Joint
The procedures need to be designed to minimise potential

leaks by ensuring that all newly made joints are tested by gas
pressure with, at most, only a small amount of liquid. During
these test operations a gas mask must be worn. Similarly, a
suitable gas mask (see paragraphs 235-246) must be worn
during the disconnecting operation when thereis a possibilityof
the escape of a small quantity of residual vapour. During the
rest of the operations it should be kept readily available.
Customer
Will operate all valves on the bulk storage installation,

including the filling pipe.
Driver
Driver
On arrival at the works, will weigh off on the site

weighbridgeand proceed to the discharge berth.
Will position the tanker at the discharge berth
and employ
the drive-away protection. A variety of techniques may be used,
eg interlocks to the tanker brakes, wheel chocks, and the
removal of the vehicle ignition key to a controlled location.
These are in addition (see paragraph 7 below) to any drive-away
protection barriers and any interlocks to shut down the
discharge should movement of the vehicle or should chlorine be
detected (see main text, paragraphs 39-41).
Driver
Presents the delivery notes to a responsible official.
In signing these notes the customer accepts the responsibility that there is
sufficient space available in the storage tank to receive the full load from
the road tank and that the installation is fit and ready for the discharge
to proceed.
Will tell the plant operator the weight of chlorine in the tanker so
that the operatorcan determine where the final reading will be on the
weighing machine dial or load cell indicator.
Driver
Customer
Will ensure that any warning notices are displayed and barriers are
erected, and will operate any safety interlocks associated with the road
vehicle berth.
Customer
Where there are two or more tanks the customer will determine which
tank is to receive and check that the storage tank cannotbe overfilled.
The pressure on the tank before starting the discharge should not
normally be greater than 5.9 bar gauge but in very hot weather it may be
8
higher.
Customer
The customer will ensure he,ftredischarge that the vent valve on the
stock tank filling pipe is closed. When fitted, the barrier mechanical
interlock key is used to activate the control panel sequence for the
discharging operation and release the off-loading arm.
Driver
10 Establish the vehicle movement detection interlock and activate
interlocks to the chlorine detection system before operating valves on the

tanker and installation. Wearing a gas mask, remove both caps from the
road tank valves and the customer's filling arms and test for leaks. Using
new PTFE. aramid fibre or other suitable material for joint rings
(preferably not CAF, see paragraph 56), connect both air supply and
liquid discharge arms to the appropriate valves on the tanker.
Joint
Wearing a gas mask, apply pressure to the discharge connection,

preferably by brieflyopening the valve to the stock tank. An alternative
but less desirable method is to open the tanker discharge valve
monientarilv. The driver (wearing a gas mask) tests the joints on the
discharge pipe using ammonia water. satisfactory, the driver can
remove his gas mask and then request the plant operatorto open the
valve on the stock filling line afterthe drop arm. The liquid valve on the
11
100 Safety advice for bulk chlorineinstallations
tanker can he s/ow/v openedto fill the delivery line: tile pi-essure
observed will be the pressure on the road tanker. Alternatively.
and oilly wllen the driver is satisfied with the integrity of the
connections, the instrumeilt air connections are made which will
allow tile discharge valves to be operated. This may also
activate a brake interlock wilich is integral with the custonler's
shutdown systenl.
Joint
12 Start the air compressor and when tile line pressure is .3

bar gauge open it to the road tanker. When tile road tanker
pressure (as indicated on tile filling pipe to the stock tank) is
bar gauge above that of the stock tank request the plant
operator to open tile valve to tile appropriate stock tank arid
commence discharge of tile road tanker.
1.7
Joint
13 Observe tile discilarge of the road tanker is proceeding

satisfactorilyby reference to the weighing machine dial or load
cell indicator.
Joint
Observe the stock tank pressure as the discharge is

proceeding. Should this rises to 6.2 bar gauge the driver requests
the customer to crack open tile vent valve on the tank to reduce
14
tile pressure.
joint
15 Indication that the road tanker has been completely

discharged is:
(a) fluctuation of pressure gauge on the liquid chlorine delivery

line;
(b) equalisation of tanker and line pressure readings.

Joint
16
The plant operatorcloses the storage tank inlet valve and
the padding air supply valve. Vent excess pressure from the
tanker via the vent valve to the scrubber. The driver then closes
the padding air inlet to the tankerand tIle liquid chlorine outlet
from the tailker, and disconnectstile operating air leads to them
so the tanker valves cannot be reopened. The connecting pipe
for padding air can now be vented and disconnected and the
tanker padding air connection capped. The operatorcracks
open the vent valve on tile liquid chlorine delivery line to the
stock tank filling pipe. When the pressure gauge on the liquid
chlorine delivery line shows zero (and any hoar froston the vent valve
has begun to disappear) the operatorcloses the valve on the chlorine
delivery line at the tanker dischargepoint. Close the delivery line vent
valve.
Customer
17 Crack open the vent valve on the stock tank for about one minute in
order to check that the level of liquid chlorine in the tank is below the
bottom of the vent dip pipe (no frosting should appear). This operation
also vents non-condensable gases. Check that the pressure in the tank is
reasonable for the temperature of the chlorine. The storage is now
isolated from the discharge line to the scrubber and the delivery line is
purged by pressurising and depressurising(open vent valve and close it
when pressure gauge shows zero) with dry air for a minimum of live
cycles. The operatorcan now shut down the air compressor if it is not
needed for other operations.
Driver
18 Wearing a gas mask, disconnect the liquid discharge pipe from the
tanker, replace the sealingplug to prevent the entry of moist air, and
swivel back to the staging. Tell the plant operator that the vent can be
closed. The short connecting pipes from the liquid and air valves can be
disconnected, both valves capped and the tanker dome securely fastened.
The RPE can now be removed.
Customer
Underno circumstancesallow any section of the pipeline to be left

u;ivented wit/i liquid chlorine trapped between closed valves.
Driver
19
20 Before leaving the storage plant ask the designated responsibleperson
to sign the advice note and consignment note after the words all
operations connected with the discharge of the road tank have been
completed satisfactorily'. Handone copy to the responsibleperson.
On leaving the works weigh again on the site weighbridge.
102 Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations
Chlorine vaporisers may be divided into four basic types:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Vertical tube bundle.

Coiled tube immersed in a heating bath.
Concentric tube.
Kettle-type evaporator.
VERTICAL TUBEBUNDLE(TYPE 1)
la Shell and tube
lb Steam bayonet
Chlorine qas
Chlorine gas
S!eam
Liquid
chlorine]
Steam
----
I iqidctoeire
103
Advantagesof this type of system are:
Ic Hot water bath
(a)
small overall size for relatively large

heat transfer surfaces;
(h)
easy maintenance; and
(c)
for the mode of operation in which the

chlorine is in tubes, the liquid chlorine
is automatically displaced by overpressure when the vapour supply to
theconsumingplant is shut off.
Chlorine gas
Liquid chlorine
Waterbath
Disadvantages ofthis type of system are:

(a)
Electric heater
for the mode of operation in which the

chlorine is in the tubes, there is a risk
of instability at high throughput owing
to variation ofliquid levels and a
possibility of corrosion in the region of
the liquid surface; and

(b)
forthe mode of operation in which the

chlorine is in the shell, it is difficult to
dry out the shell.
COILED TUBEIMMERSEDIN A HEATING BATH (TYPE2)

Advantages of this type of vaporiserare:
2 Coil in bath
(a)
-
operate;
Hotwateroutlet
Hotwaterbath
L>(J
Chlorine gas
it is simpleto maintain and
(b)
the long coil generally ensures

adequate superheating;
(c)
there are no problemswith

differential thermal expansion;
(d)
plug flow operation avoids

concentrationof high boiling
Coil
Liquid chlorine
Sted
- -
impurities;
(e) drying out of equipmentbefore use is relatively easy: and

(f) liquid chlorine is automatically displaced when the vapour supply to the
consuming plant is shut off.
Disadvantagesof this type of vaporiserarc:
(a) low throughput;
(b) external corrosion of the iLibe can easily occur, especially near the liquid
surface;
(c) irregular internal erosionof the coil may occur: and
(d) internal inspection and cleaning of the coil is difficult.
CONCENTRICTUBEUNITS(TYPE3)
3 Concentric lube unit
Chlonne gas
Advantages of this type of system are:
(a)
simple construction with

minimum weldingrequirements;
(h)
easy maintenance and operation;
(c)
easy provision of adequate
Steam
corrosion allowance;
Condensate
Liquid chlorine
(d)
automatic displacement ofliquid

chlorine when the vapour supply
to theconsumingplant is shut
off; and
(e)
plug-flow operation abovea

certain minimum flow avoids
concentrationof high boiling
impurities.
Safetyadvice forbulkchlorineinstallations 105
Disadvantages of this type of system are:
potential instability of operation at high and low throughput;
(a)
(b) limitation
of unit capacity owing to relatively small heattransfer surface area; and
greater difficulty in obtainingadequate superheating ofthe chlorine.
(c)
KETTLE-TYPE EVAPORATOR (TYPE 4)
4 Kettle-type evaporator
Liquid chlorine
Chlorinegas
Control to inlet
Level
measuring
device
-T
Heating medium in
[J
////
LiquidCl2
medium out
Advantages of this type of system are:
(a) it can be designed for large throughput;

(b) allowance for thermal expansion
(c)
caneasily be made; and
operation is stable, providedthat either the level of chlorine in the kettle or the
pressureof chlorine fed to the vaporiser. is controlled.
Disadvantages of this type of system are:
(a) since the vessel contains a relatively largeamount ofliquidchlorine,leakage or

excess pressure in the vessel pose a greaterpotential hazard;
(b)
a reliefsystemwith a large capacity is required, unless thevaporiseris designed for

high pressure:
(c) operation can result in concentrationof nitrogen trichloride; the purging process
required to i-educethis hazard may be difficult to carry out on consumerpremises:
(d) drying ofthe equipmenton the chlorine side is difficult; and

(e) dismantling of the tubes is difficult and requiresa large space.
106
(Note: A tullerdivcussion at einergencr plansappears in HSEc 11SG2569 and re,ferences

and 71. Additional guidance iii! be issued Iv support the COMA H Regulaiion,r.
/7, 70
I
The works shouldhave an on-site emergency plan for dealing with a major
chlorine release. The plan should include instructions for the emergency team and
for non-essential personnel, and for liaison with the emergency services. The
emergency plan should be based on paragraphs247-263. Your plan will depend on
the results ofyourrisk assessment and the need to comply with health and safety
legislation, eg section 3 of the HSWAct.2The following paragraphs contain some
elementsof a plan.
The plan may include detailedinstructions for:
(a) raising the alarm;
(h) investigating and assessing the source and extent of the chlorine release;
(c) alerting all personnel on-site or in neighbouring premises and the emergency
services;setting up emergency control centres, assessment by key personnel of
the incident and consequentemergency measures on and off-site;
(d) methodsfor controlling
thechlorine release;
(e)
search systems for casualties, and accountingfor personnel on-site;
(1)
methodsfor assessing the directional spread and concentration ofthe gas

cloud;
(g) criteria for determining whether to evacuatenon-essential personnel or to

advise them to stay inside buildings with doors, windows and ventilation
shut;
(Ii) methods for assessing whether corresponding actionsare advisable for people
off-site and, in particular,liaison with the managerat any adjacent underground
workings where chlorine could enter the ventilation system: advice to emergency
services on the direction,spread and concentration ofthe gas cloud; and
(i)
first aid to on-site casualties, and arrangements for evacuation where advisable and
practicable; advice to ambulance service on routes to use.
Since each installation will have its own special features, a detailed plan relating to the
particLilarplant will be required. Local management should be responsible for preparation
of the plan which shouldhe developed iii co-operation with the local authority, the police,
fire, hospitaland ambulanceservices, andthe chlorine supplier. Specific duties are laid on
some of these people by the Control of Industrial Major AccidentHazards Regulations
1984. These will he superseded by the requirements of the COMAH Regulationsin 1999.
3
EMERGENCYCONTROL CENTRES
4 Basic requirements for a satisfactory system to deal with
serious escape ofchlorine are outlined as follows:
an emergency resulting from a
(a) two control centres should be providedso that, in the event of a gas escape,
operationscan be controlled from the centre which is least affected under
prevailing atmospheric conditions:
(b) each centre should be providedwith a separate external telephoneline, as well as
withconnectionsto the factory's external and internal telephone system;
(c)
adequateemergency equipment(self-contained breathingapparatus, supplies of

suitable foam as agreed with the emergency services, protective clothing, etc) should
he available (see section on emergency equipment):
(d) emergency first-aid fitcilities, including equipmentfor administering oxygen, need to

he provided;
(e)
a large-scale map (1:25 000 or 1:10000) ofthe surroundingarea should be available

to help determine which parts of the factory and the local neighbourhoodare likely
to be affected;
(f)
wind directionindicators have to be visible from, or indicated in, eachcontrol

centre; and
(g) equipmentand information are needed to assess the likely extent of the gas
cloud for various sizes of release and variousweatherconditions.
The emergency plan should specify in advance the individuals and deputies
responsible for the action necessary to deal with the emergency.
5
SITEEMERGENCYTEAM
6
There shouldhe a trained emergency team with the following key personnel:
(a) Site incidentcontrol/er- the senior person on-site responsible for the direction
of on-site operations
(b) Sitemain control/er- normally the works manager or deputy with overall
responsibility for the operation ofthe emergency plan, maintaining close
liaison with the police and lire services, and for advising them on the risk
and
(c)
Otherkeypersonnel - including:
(i)
the team responsible for the control ofthe chlorine release
(ii)
the team responsible for the search for casualties, for first aid and for the
control of evacuation.
7
The police will be responsible for dealing with members of the public who
might be affected by the chlorine escape they will need to be advised ofthe size
and expected duration of the release together with the areas which could be
affected, to allow the police and the site main controller to agree whether the
pLiblic should remain indoors or be evacuated.
EMERGENCYASSEMBLY AREAS
8
Emergency assembly areas should be designated for use in a chlorine

emergency by personnel not involved in the emergency team.The assembly areas
allow for counting of personnel and for controlled evacuation ifthe need should
arise. Preferably, the assembly area should he at the periphery of the works site
with good exit for evacuation. A building with upper storeys at a location upwind
of the chlorine release may offer sufficient protectionwhile the release is brought
under control. Evacuation of personnel to the assembly areas should be directed
by a seniormemberof the emergency team who will takewind directionintoaccount.

There will be occasions when evacuating off-site is not the best action, for example, when
the release is sudden and oflimited duration.
CASUALTIES
9
First-aid treatment for casualties is discussed in Appendix
1.
Safe haiidlingof ciiloriiie f/on! (1/71/115(1/id ci'linders HSG4O I ISE Books 1999
ISBN 0 7176 16460
Health and Sak'tvat Worketc Act /974
List ofcurrenthealth and sa/tv legislation 1996 HSE Books 1997

1SBN07176 13119
The NotifIcatwn ofInstallationsHandlingHazardousSubstances Regulations

1982 SI 1982/1357 HMSO
The Controlof industrialMajorAccident HazardsRegulations1984

SI 1984/1902 HMSO
CouncilDirective96/82/ECControlofmajor-accidenthazards involving
dangeroussubstancesOfficial Jofthe EC No LI0/40 CEC January 1997
The Planning(HazardousSubstances Regulations 1992 SI 1992/0656

HMSO
Risk criteria/orland-useplanning inthe vicinity ofmajor industrial hazards

HSEBooks 1989 ISBN 0 II 885491 7
Environmental Protection (PrescribedProcessesand Substances) Regulations

199/ SI 1991/0472 HMSO
10
Environmental Protection Act 1990
11
Alkali and WorksRegulation Act 1906
12
Health andSafety (Emissions into the AtmosphereRegulations 1983

SI 1983/0943 HMSO
13
The Carriage ofDangerous Goods (Classification, Packagingand Labelling) and Use of

Transportable Pressure Receptacles Regulations 1996 SI 1996/2092 HMSO
14
The Carriage ofDangerousGoods by Road Regulations 1996 SI 1996/2095 HMSO
15
Areyou involved in the carriage ofdangerousgoods by road or rail? 1NDG234

HSE free leaflet 1996
16
Success/uI health andsafi'tymanagement HSG65 1-ISE Books 1997

ISBNO7I76 12767
17
Formula fir healthand safety: guidance small to medium-sizedfirms in the chemical

manu/iicturing industry HSGI66 HSE Books 1996 ISBN 0 717609960
18
The Management ofHealthand Saftv at WorkRegulations 1992 SI 1992 /2051 HMSO
19
Management ofhealth andsafetyat work. Approved Codeof Practice. Management of

Healthand SatCtv at WorkRegulations 1992 L21 HSE BooksI992ISBN 071760412 8
20
The Control ofSubstances Hazardousto HealthRegulations 1994SI 1994 /3246 HMSO
21
The Fire Precautions(Workplace,)Regulations 1997 SI 1997 /1840 TSO
22
Publications: Literatureand technicaldocumentation Euro Chlor 1997*
23
br
ThePresscire Systems and Transportable GasContainersRegulations 989 SI 1989/
2169 HMSO
24
SatCiv ofpressure systems. Pressuresystems and Transportable Gas Container.s

Regulations /989. Approved codeofpractice COP37 HSEBooks 1990
ISBN 0 11 885514 X
25
A guide to thePressure Systems and Transportable
Gas Containers Regulations 1989
HSR3OHSE Books 1990 ISBN 0717604896
112
26
The Carriage o/ DangerousGoods by road (Driver Training.)Regulations 1996

SI 1996/2094 HMSO
27
The Carriage ofDangerous Goods hi; Rail Regulations /996 SI 1996/2089 HMSO
28
SpecifIcation/erpipc'threads/or tubesand fittings where pressuretightjoints are made

on thethreads (nietric dimensions) BS 21: 1985
29
GEST 75/45 Flexible Monelhosesfor thetransfer ofgaseousor liquid

chlorine 5th Ed May 1996 Euro Chlor*
30
GEST 75/43 Flexible steelcoils for the transferofgaseousor liquid chlorine

7th Ed May 1996 Euro Chlor.
31
GEST 75/44 Articulated armsfor the transferofgaseousor liquid chlorine

9th Ed May 1996 Euro Chlor*
32
Processpiping B31.3 American
33
Chemical plantandpetroleumrefinerypiping Supplement to B31 .3 American
Society ofMechanical Engineers 1996

34
for boltingfor flanges andpressure containingpurposes
Specification
BS4882: 1990
forpipes, valves andfittings. Part3 Steel, castironand

copper alloy flanges BS 1560: Part 3 Sections 1-3: 1989
35
Circularflanges
36
Pipeflanges andflangedfittings B16-5 NPS 1-2 through NPS24 American

37
38
for compressed asbestosfibrejointing BS 1832: 1991 (1997)
Specification
Polytetrafluoroethylene
(PFTE) materialsandproducts Part 2 SpecUlcation
forfabricated unfilled polytetrafluoroethylene productsBS6564: Part2

1991 (1996)
39
The DangerousSubstances (Notification and MarkingofSites) Regulations

1990 SI 1990/0304 HMSO
40 Notification and marking ofsites. The DangerousSubstances (Notification and

MarkingofSites) Regulations 1990. Guidanceon RegulationsHSR29
HSEBooks 1990 ISBN 0 11 885435 6
41
Safety signs and colours. Part Specificationfor colour anddesign BS 5378:

Part 1: 1980/(1995);Part3. SpecJicationfor additional signs to thosegiven in
BS5378 Part] BS 5378: Part3 1982 (1995)
for identification ofpipelinesand services BS 1710: 1984 (1991)
42
Specfication
43
Schedule ofpaintcoloursforbuildingpurposes BS4800: 1989 (1994)
44
The Healthand Sa/tv (Sq/en' Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 SI
1996/0341
HMSO
45
Saf'tv signs and signals. The Healthand Sak'tv(Safe/v Signs and Signals) Regulations
1996. Guidanceon Regulations L64 HSE Books 1997 ISBN 0 717608700
46
HSC Oil Industry Advisory Committee

HSEBooks 1997 ISBN 071760871 9
47
The
saf isolation ofplant and equipment
fr
SpecifIcation fillingratios anddeveloped pressuresfor liquefiable andpermanent

gases BS 5355: 1976
48
Specification fi.r unfired fusion weldedpressure vessels BS 5500: 1997
49
Specification flr burstingdiscsand burstingdisc devices BS 2915: 1990
50
Kletz TA Hazop and Hazan: Identifying and assessingprocess industry hazards3rd ed

IChemE 1992 ISBN 0 85295 285 6
51
GEST 76/55 Maximum levels ofnitrogen trichloride in liquid chlorine 1990 Euro Chlor*
52
Safe handling ofchlorine containingnitrogen trichiorideChlorine Institute Pamphlet I52**
53
introducingcompetent persons. Pressure Systems and TransportableGas Containers

Regulations 1989 1ND529 HSEfree leaflet 1990
54
Writtenschemes of examination. Pressure Systems and Transportable Gas Containers

Regulations 1989 INDGI78HSEfree leaflet 1994
55
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 SI 1992/2932 HMSO
56
Work equipment. Provisionand Use of WorkEquipment Regulations
1992 Guidance on
Regulations L22 HSE Books 1992 ISBN 0 717604144

57
The Manual HandlingOperationsRegulations 1992 SI 1992/2793 HMSO
58
Manualhandling. ManualHandlingOperationsRegulations 1992. Guidance

on Regulations L23 HSE Books 1992 ISBN 071760411 X
59
The Confined Spaces Regulations 1997 SI 1997/1713 TSO
114 Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations
60
SafL work in confined spaces. Confined SpacesRegulations 1997. Approved
CodeofPractice and GuidanceLI 01 HSE Books 1997 ISBN 0 7176 1405 0

USEBooks 1992 ISBN 071760811
61
SafL'ty in pressure testingGS4(rev)
62
Permit-to-work systems INDG98(rev3) HSEfreeleaflet 1998
63
The Personal Protective Equipment at WorkRegulations 1992 SI 1992/2966

HMSO
64
Personalprotectiveequipment at work: PersonalProtectiveEquipment at

WorkRegulations 1992. Guidanceon regulations L25 HSE Books 1992
ISBN 0717604152
65
GEST 92/171 Personal protective equipment for use with chlorine 1995
Euro Chlor*
66
The selection, use and maintenance ofrespiratoryprotectiveequipment:

practical guide I-15G53 1998 HSE Books ISBN0 7176 1537 5
67
Guide to implementing an effective respiratoryprotectivedevice programme
BS4275: 1997
jr emergency 1NDG246HSEfree leaflet 1997
68
Prepared
69
ControlofIndustrialMajorHazardsRegulations1984 (CJMAH): Further

guidanceon emergency plans HSG25 1985 HSEBooksISBN0 11 883831 8
70
Robinson BWand UK Chlorine Producers Generalguidanceon emergency

planning within the CJMAJ-1 Regulations fbr chlorine installations l986
71
Inter-company collaborationforchlorineemergencies CIA 1992

ISBN0 900 6231
72
Specification for respiratoryprotectivedevices: selficontained open-circuit

compressed air breathingapparatus BS EN 137:1993
73
Respiratoryprotectivedevices. Compressed airline breathingapparatusfbr

use with afidlflice mask, halfmaskor mouthpiece assembly. Requirements,
testing, markingBS EN 139: 1995
74
Occupational exposurelimits EH4O/98 HSE Books (updated annually)

ISBN 07176 14743
75
WHO International Programme on Chemical SafetyEnvironmental Health

Criteria21 Chlorineandhydrogen chloride World Health Organisation, Geneva, 1982
76
Summary criteriafor occupational exposurelimits EH64 HSE Books (updated annually)
ISBN07176 15766
77
Lewis RJ Sax's dangerouspropertiesofindustrialmaterials(9th ed) Van Nostrand

Rheinhold 1996 ISBN 0 4420 2025 2
78
TurnerRM and Fairhurst S Toxicologyofsubstancesin relation to major hazards:

ChlorineHSEBooks 1990 ISBN 0 11 885528 X
79
GEST 89/145 Guidelines for medical management ofchlorine exposure (3rd ed) 1995
Euro Chlor*
80
Speci/ication for liquid chlorine BS 3947: 1976(1997)
81
GEST 79/82 Choice ofmaterials

EuroChlor 1995*
82
GEST/AP1 Learning from accidents 1996. Euro Chlor*
83
The setting ofsafetystandards:A reportby the interdepartmental group and external

advisors1996HM Treasurytt
84
Price listHSEBooks(publishedannually)
85
A guide to risk assessment requirements: Commonprovisionsin health andsafetylaw

INDG218 HSEfree leaflet 1996
86
Health andSafety Law. Whatyou shouldknow (poster) HSE Books IBSN0 7176 1380
87
The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 SI 1996/1513
ofconstruction for use in contactwith chlorine (7th ed)
ISO
88
A guide to the ControlofIndustrialMajorAccident HazardsRegulations 1984

HSR21 (rev) HSE Books 1990 ISBN0 11 8855794
89
The Lifting Plant andEquipment (Records of Test and Examination etc)

Regulations 1992 SI 1992 /0195 HMSO
90
A guide to the LiftingPlant andEquipment (Records ofTestand

Exwninution et) Regulations 1992 L20HSEBooks 1992 ISBN 071760488 8
91
The Reporting ofinjuries,DiseasesandDangerousOccurrencesRegulations

1995 SI 1995/3163 FIMSO
92 A guide to the ReportingofInjuries, DiseasesandDangerous Occurrences

Regulations 1995 L73 HSEBooks 1996 ISBN 0 7176 1012 8
93
Everyone'sguide to RIDDOR HSE3 I HSEfree leaflet 1996
The futureavailability and accuracyofthe references listedin this publication

cannotbe guaranteed. CurrentRegulations, guidanceand ACOPs, and current HSE
publications are listed in the latestversionofreferences 3 and 84 respectively.
*
Availablefrom Euro Chlor, see addressin Appendix 4.

Available from CIA, see address in Appendix 4.
Available from CIAor chlorine producers, see addresses in Appendix 4.
Available from The Public Enquiry Unit, HM Treasury, Parliament Street,
London SWIP3AG Tel: 0171 2704558
Fordetails on howto obtain HSE pricedand free publications, see insideback

cover.
ACOP
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HAZOP
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HSA
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I-ISR
HSW
ISO
LOLER
ApprovedCode of Practice
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
American National Standards Institute
Assigned ProtectionFactor
American Society of Mechanical Engineering
Breathing Apparatus
British Standard
Compressed Airline Breathing Apparatus
Compressed Asbestos Fibre
Commission of the EuropeanCommunities
Chemical Industries Association
Control of IndustrialMajor Accident Hazards (Regulations)

Control of Major Accident Hazards (Regulations)
Control of Substances Hazardousto Health (Regulations)
Dangerous Toxic Lnad
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Her Majestys StationeryOffice
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Healthand Safety Regulations(Booklet)
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Official Journal (of the European Communities)
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Pressure Systems and TransportableGas Containers (Regulations)
Polytetrafluoroethylene
Provisionand Use of Work EquipmentRegulations

Reporting of injuries,Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence (Regulations)
RespiratoryProtective Equipment
SelfContained Breathing Apparatus
Scottish EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
UK
Statutory Instrument
Scottish Office, EnvironmentDepartment
Short-TermExposure Limit
TransportableGas Container
The StationeryOffice
United Kingdom
UPYC
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Unplasticised Polyvinyl Chloride

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This booklet gives guidance on

the safe handling of chlorine at sites
which receive bulk deliveries of chlorine
by road or rail tanker.
It is aimed at the managers of these

installations, but it is also relevant for
plant supervisors, design and maintenance
engineers and safety professionals.
14.00
ISBN 0717616452
9 780717 616459
HSG28(rev)
08c.

Hsg28 - Safety Advice For Bulk Chlorine Installations

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Crown copyright material is produced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and Queen's Printer for Scotland.

for bulk chlorine installations

Crown copyright 1999

(electronic, mechanical, photocopying. recording

or otherwise) without the prior written permission

ofthe copyright owner.

This guidance is issued by the Health and Safety

Safetyadvice for bulkchlorineinstallations

Managementofhealth and safety and risk assessment

Design and location ofinstallations 7

Connections between thetankerand the fixedlinesto the storage installation

Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations

tent ciiicl comprc'sseddirgas hues

Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations

contacts and standards 91

5 Outside installations and inside installations 95

List ofacronyms and abbresiations

Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations

You mayneed helpbeyondthat given in this guidance.

you do, trade and employer

Safety advice forbulkchlorineinstallations

This publicationgies guidance on the sal handlingorhtlll\ liquid chlorineat

Sites which recei C liquid

The risks arise because chloriiie is a highlytoxiC (see Appendix I ) and

ithsonic organicandinorganicsubstances.Whenreleasedfroni coiltainmentit

Despite theserioustoxic and reacti'e ha,ards, and the potential to harm

The guidanceis based on the conibmed experience of'the Ibur 1 K

Safety advice forbulk chlorine installations

The Control of Industrial MajorAccident Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH )5 also

to demonstrate to HSE, at any time, that major accidenthazardshave been

to reportany majoraccidents to 1-ISE.

Safety advice forbulk chlorineinstallations

set your policy and demonstrate commitment to it;

Safetyadvice for bulk chlorineinstallations

measure your performance to assess whetherthe risks are being adequately

conductsafetyaudits to ensure that yoursystemsare working as intended;

A risk assessment isessentialto this proactive approach to safetymanagement and

look for the hazards ic potential sources ofchlorine releases;

decidehow serious each ofthese loss-of-containment events could be,

decidethe likelyfrequency ofeach ofthese hazardous events;

evaluatethe associated risksand consider whetherthe precautionsto prevent

recordyour significant findings; this is a statutory requirement ifyou

updateyour risk assessment at least every threeyears.and before making

Safety advice for bulkchlorineinstallations

decidewhetherthe risks are being controlled so far as is reasonably practicable; and, if

incorrect operation; and

inadequate inspection and maintenance.

Safety advice for bulk chlorineinstallations

Damage to chlorine linesfrom external sources eg by hoists or vehicles

Damage to the liquid chlorinedelivery vehicle,storage tank or connecting

Joint and gasket failures due to failure to tighten joints, over-tightening of

Safety advice for bulk chlorine installations

ElTors in operating procedures, including over-filling ofthe storage tank and

overloading ofthe vent scrubber, failure to closevalveswhenremovingcontainers, or

Damage caused by fire or explosion.

the numberand size ofstorage tanks:

whetherthe storage is indoors oroutside

the operational conditions and the type of process:

the frequency ofchlorine deliveries;

24 You alsoneed to take account ofthe prevailing wind direction whendecidingthe

Safety advice for bulk chlorine installations

For existinginstallations, control of neighbouring population densities is not

29 Hazards arismg from aircraft maynormally he regarded as minimal with