Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
DE GRACIA
National Service Corporation (NASECO) vs. NLRC
G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988
FACTS: Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the NASECO, a
domestic corporation which provides security guards to PNB and its
agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard
through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then Personnel
Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records.
Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of
Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO,
stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum,
regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of
Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not comply
with Lloren's instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks
in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo] was called
by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo]
showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting
and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her coemployees."
Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General
Manager of NASECO, to explain her side in connection with the
administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the
same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days.
Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, Credo filed a complaint, with
the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forced leave,
without due process.
Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, NASECO's Committee on
Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past acts of
The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credos employment (or
the decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made
effective 1 December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on
terminating her services when she was informed on 1 December 1983
of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO
thought of affording her after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro
forma or an exercise in futility.
Besides, Credos mere non-compliance with Lorens memorandum
regarding the entry procedures in the companys Statement of Billings
Adjustment did not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal.
ISSUE 2: WON the alleged infractions committed by Credo were
not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have been
condoned by petitioners.
HELD 2: Yes. Of course, in justifying Credos termination of
employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal
Credos previous and repeated acts of insubordination, discourtesy and
sarcasm towards her superior officers, alleged to have been committed
from 1980 to July 1983. If such acts of misconduct were indeed
committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been condoned by
NASECO. For instance, sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly
reacted in a scandalous manner and raised her voice in a discussion
with NASECOs Acting head of the Personnel Administration, no
disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her. Nor was she
even reprimanded when she allegedly talked in a shouting or yelling
manner with the Acting Manager of NASECOs Building Maintenance
and Services Department in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted at
NASECOs Corporate Auditor in front of his subordinates displaying
arrogance and unruly behavior in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted
at NASECOs Internal Control Consultant in 1981. But then, in sharp
contrast to NASECOs penchant for ignoring the aforesaid acts of
misconduct, when Credo committed frequent tardiness in August and
September 1983, she was reprimanded.
2. MARTIN
Facts:
Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious
corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private
respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his
services were terminated. Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. He
started as a literature evangelist in 1963 then got promoted several
times. He became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West
Visayan Mission of the SDA in 1968 and Pastor in the West Visayan
Mission in 1972.Finally in 1989, he was promoted as District Pastor of
the Negros Mission of the SDA.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria
received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the
Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros
Mission. In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made
accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr.
Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since
he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Thereafter, petitioner
went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and
asked for a convention to settle the dispute between petitioner and
3. MIRANDA
4. BARTOLOME
Agabon vs NLRC
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is
engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and
construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and
Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2,
1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent
to pay the monetary claims.
5. TALAY
COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION
VS
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISION
SEPTEMBER 7, 2001
FACTS:
Supreme Court presenting its main argument that their termination was
a valid and authorized cause on the ground of abandonment of work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are illegally dismissed.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that private respondents are illegally
dismissed. In termination cases, the burden of proving that the
dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests
on the employer. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to show by
substantial evidence that the termination of the employees was validly
made and upon failure to discharge that duty would mean that the
dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. On the other hand,
abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, after notice to
return is not enough to amount such abandonment. For a valid finding
of abandonment two factors must be present: the failure to report for
work without valid or justifiable reason and clear intention to severe
employer employee relationship. Private respondents were asked to
relinquish their assigned buses and from that date forward they were
not given bus assignments. Thus under the circumstances private
respondents absences are supported with valid reason and that they
never intended to severe their employer employee relationship. Private
respondents are illegally dismissed.
6. AGORILLA
7. BACALZO
STA CATALINA COLLEGE VS NLRC
FACTS:
HilariaTercero was hired as a teacher in Sta Catalina College in
1955. She was granted a 1 year leave of absence without pay in 1970
for her to take care of her ill mother. She, however, failed to report back
to work after the expiration of her leave. She instead was employed as
a teacher at the San Pedro Parochial School during school year 19801981 and at the Liceo de San Pedro, Bian,Laguna during school year
1981-1982.
In 1982 she reapplied and was accepted to teach at Sta
Catalina College and on 1997 was awarded a Plaque of Appreciation
for 30 years of service. Upon her reaching the compulsory retirement
age of 65, the school computed her benefits on the basis of the 15
years of service from 1982 to 1997. The school claims that Tercero
abandoned her employment when she did not report back to work at
the expiration of her 1 year leave of absence in 1971. Tercero, however,
insisted the computation be based on her 30 years of service. For
failing to reach an agreement, Tercero filed a complaint against the
school. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the school but was reversed
by the NLRC.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. The CA held that petitioners failed to
prove that Hilaria had abandoned her position in 1970, as petitioner
school even gave her a Plaque of Appreciation for thirty years of
service "precisely because of her thirty year continuous service," and
that petitioner school never sent notice to her dismissing her, hence,
the employer-employee relationship was not severed and, therefore,
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her services for petitioner school during the period from 1955-1970
should be credited in the computation of her retirement benefits.
ISSUE: WON Tercero abandoned her work.
HELD:
YES.For a valid finding of abandonment, two factors must be
present: (1) the failure to report for work, or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor,
being manifested by some overt acts.
It is not disputed that the approved one year leave of absence
without pay of Hilaria expired in 1971, without her, it bears repeating,
requesting for extension thereof or notifying petitioner school if and
when she would resume teaching. Nor is it disputed that she was
rehired only in 1982 after filing anew an application, without her
proffering any explanation for her more than a decade of
absence.Under the circumstances, abandonment of work at petitioner
school in 1971 is indubitably manifest. Abandonment of work being a
just cause for terminating the services of Hilaria, petitioner school was
under no obligation to serve a written notice to her.
As Hilaria was considered a new employee when she rejoined
petitioner school upon re-applying in 1982, her retirement benefits
should thus be computed only on the basis of her years of service from
1982 to 1997.
8. OLORES
PAZ MARTIN JO AND CESAR JO V. NLRC AND PETER MAJILA
PREPARED BY EMMANUEL M. OLORES
FACTS:
1. 1970. Peter Majila was a barber in Dinas Barbershop
2. Dina Tan, the owner of Dinas Barbershop sold the Barbershop
to Paz Martin JO and Cesar JO
3. Paz JO and Cesar JO, being the new owner of Dinas
Barbershop, absorbed all the employees of Dinas Barbershop.
This includes Peter Mejila.
4. Winfield Barbershop is the new name of Dinas Barbershop.
Winfield is now owned by Paz Jo and Cesar JO
5. Peter Majila was paid on a commission basis. 2/3 to the Barber,
1/3 to the owner.
6. 1977. Peter was designated as caretaker of the shop because
he became unfit. As caretaker, he was paid a fixed monthly
honorarium
7. Peter Mejila was also asked to do other tasks i.e. to report to the
owner the malfunctioning aircondition, to call laundry woman to
wash dirty linen, to recommend applicants for interview and
hiring, attend to other needs of the shop.
8. 1986. Winfield Barbershop closed. Reason: Building was
demolished.
9. Later, a new barbershop opened. It is named as Cesars Palace
Barbershop.
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10. 1992. Peter Mejila had an altercation with his co-barber named
Jorge Tinoy.
11. Peter Mejila filed before the NLRC for mediation.
12. The Labor Arbiterfound out that the dispute was not between
Paz Jo and Peter Mejila but between Peter and his coemployee.Further, Peter Mejila demanded a separation pay.
13. 1993. Peter Mejila turned over the duplicate keys to the cashier
and took away his belongings.
14. Peter Mejilabagan working at a newly opened barbershop
named Goldilocks Barbershop.
15. Peter Mejila filed before the NLRC an illegal dismissal case
against Paz Jo and Cesar Jo.
16. The complaint prayed for payment of separation pay and other
monetary benefits, attorneys fees and other damages.
DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC
17. Labor Arbiters Decision. (a) There is an employer-employee
relationship. (b) Peter Mejila left the job voluntarily because of
his misunderstanding with his co-employee.
18. NLRCs Decision. (a) There is an employer-employee
relationship. (b) Peter Mejila was illegally dismissed. NLRC
ordered the payment of the following:
1. Backwages
2. 13th Month Pay Peter was not only paid on a commission
basis but he also workedas caretaker or paid on a fixed
monthly honorarium
3. Separation Pay those paid on a commission basis are also
entitled to separation pay
4. Attorneys fees.
19. [CAs Decision. WALA probably because this case was decided
on 1994, when the 1997 Revised Rules of Court was not yet in
effect. Probably.
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9. RIVERA
A Prime Security Services Inc. vs National Labor Relation
Commission
G.R. No. 93476 March 19, 1993
Facts:
Certain Florentino Lising, the herein private respondent, was an
employee of the herein petitioner security agency (APPSI).
Regional Relay Facilities, a U.S. Mission Facility was one of its client
and located at Angles City where the private respondent was assigned
as shift supervisor.
During its service, sometime on Sept. 1988 Assistant Region Security
of the U.S Embassy wrote a letter in favor of the agency requesting for
the relief from service of the private respondent on the ground that he
was caught sleeping while on duty for at least (4)four times.
After conducting an investigation, the agency terminated the service
and assignment of the respondent on that client. After learning the
same, the respondent no longer reported for work but instead he was
declared on AWOL.
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The employer wrote him that if he will not go back for work, he will be
dismissed.
Instead of complying with such order, the respondent filed an action for
illegal dismissal and prayed for a separation pay and full back wages.
Because of his continued absence, he was dismissed.s
Issues: 1. Is the respondent Illegally dismissed ?
2. Is he entitled for separation pay?
Held:
1. The respondent was not illegally dismissed. His dismissal is for valid
cause. Based on the facts, what is terminated is his assignment only in
the U.S Facility and not his employment with the APPSI and it is without
prejudice for reassignment to another or other client.
It is his own act, his continued absence without official leave, that
causes his termination.
Under such circumstances, the employer is justified in terminating his
employment due to his own abandonment.
2, He is not entitled for separation pay. Under the labor code, employee
is entitled only for separation pay if his dismissal or termination is due
to retrenchment, closure of the business or disease.
10. ROXAS
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11. ALOTA
Wenphil Corporation vs NLRC
Facts:
Roberto Mallare was hired by petitioner on January 18, 1984 as
a crew member at its Cubao Branch. He thereafter became the
assistant head of the Backroom department of the same branch. At
about 2:30 P.M. on May 20, 1985 private respondent had an altercation
with a co-employee, Job Barrameda, as a result of which he and
Barrameda were suspended on the following morning and in the
afternoon of the same day a memorandum was issued by the
Operations Manager advising private respondent of his dismissal from
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Issue:
Whether or not, Mallare was illegally dismissed and his right to due
process was infringed when he was suspended and immediately
terminated without investigation as to the event?
Ruling:
It is a matter of fact that when the private respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner he was afforded the right to an
investigation by the labor arbiter. He presented his position paper as did
the petitioner. If no hearing was had, it was the fault of private
respondent as his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearings.
The labor arbiter concluded that the dismissal of private respondent
was for just cause. He was found guilty of grave misconduct and
insubordination. Under the circumstances the dismissal of the private
respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to
return to his former employer.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account
for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation
before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed.
The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and
after due process. 5 Petitioner committed an infraction of the second
requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a
12. SALVADOR
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION
vs.
PACOT, PAROHINOG, BISNAR, DOMINGO, LESCANO and
CAGABCAB
[G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005]
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FACTS:
Private respondents were hired by JAKA but their services were
eventually terminated on August 29, 1997 due to dire financial straits, It
is not disputed by the parties that the termination was effected without
JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor
Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date of termination.
Respondents filed complaints at Regional Arbitration Branch NLRC for
illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of service
incentive leave and 13th month pay
against JAKA and its HRD
Manager, Rosana Castelo.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the
termination illegal and ordering JAKA and its HRD Manager to reinstate
respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is
not possible.
There from, JAKA appealed to the NLRC,
August 30, 1999 decision: Affirmed in toto that of the Labor
RULING:
Court ruled that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e.,
retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under
Article 283 of the Labor Code but, it is established that JAKA failed to
comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering
the factual circumstances, the court deemed it proper to fix the
indemnity at P50, 000.00, as nominal damages for non-compliance with
statutory due process.
The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay
respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for
every year of service. In all cases of business closure or cessation of
operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is
entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of
treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full
protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the
closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the
right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious
reasons.
13. TARIGA
Arbiters decision.
JAKA filed a motion for reconsideration:.
NLRCs decision on January 28, 2000: It reversed and set
aside the awards of backwages and service incentive leave pay. Each
of the complainants-appellees shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to one month and the sum of P2,000.00 as indemnification
for its failure to observe due process in effecting the retrenchment.
JAKA filed again motion for reconsideration:
MR denied by the NLRC in its resolution of April 28, 2000.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
NLRCs decision on January 28, 2000 is reversed and set
aside. CA ordered JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and full
backwages from the time their employment was terminated on August
29, 1997 up to the time the Decision herein becomes final.
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14. TARIGA
GLOBE TELECOM, INC., DELFIN LAZARO, JR., and ROBERTO
GALANG, petitioners, vs. JOAN FLORENDO-FLORES, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) is a corporation
duly
organized
and
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippines. Petitioners Delfin Lazaro Jr. was its President and
Roberto Galang its former Director-Regional Sales. Respondent Joan
Florendo-Flores was the Senior Account Manager for Northern Luzon.
On 1 July 1998 Joan Florendo-Flores filed with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
an amended complaint for constructive dismissal against GLOBE,
Lazaro, Galang, and Cacholo M. Santos, her immediate superior,
Luzon Head-Regional Sales. In her affidavit submitted as evidence
during the arbitration proceedings, Florendo-Flores bared that Cacholo
M. Santos never accomplished and submitted her performance
evaluation report thereby depriving her of salary increases, bonuses
and other incentives which other employees of the same rank had been
receiving; reduced her to a house-to-house selling agent (person-toperson sales agent or direct sales agent) of company products
("handyphone") despite her rank as supervisor of company dealers and
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Held:
1.) Yes, the respondent was constructively dismissed from service.
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because
"continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay."[16] All these are discernible in respondent's situation. She was
singularly edged out of employment by the unbearable or undesirable
treatment she received from her immediate superior Cacholo M. Santos
who discriminated against her without reason - not preparing and
submitting her performance evaluation report that would have been the
basis for her increased salary; not forwarding her project proposals to
management that would have been the source of commendation;
diminishing her supervisor stature by assigning her to house-to-house
sales or direct sales; and withholding from her the enjoyment of
bonuses, allowances and other similar benefits that were necessary for
her efficient sales performance. Although respondent continued to
have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were reduced to a mere
house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was tantamount
to a demotion. She might not have suffered any diminution in her basic
salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she was
deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits
which she apparently used to receive.
Far from pointing to Santos alone as the source of her woes,
respondent attributes her degraded state to petitioners as
well. Florendo-Flores cited petitioners' apathy or indifference to her
plight as she was twice left out in a salary increase in August 1997 and
May 1998, without petitioners giving her any reason. [17] It eludes belief
that petitioners were entirely in the dark as the salary increases were
granted to all employees across-the-board but respondent was the
only one left receiving a P19,100.00 per month basic salary while the
rest received a basic salary of almost P35,000.00 per month.[18] It is
highly improbable that the exclusion of respondent had escaped
petitioners' notice. The absence of an evaluation report from Santos
should have been noted by petitioners and looked into for proper action
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within corporate ladder until she attained the rank of Full Assistant
Store Manager in 1995.
As a Full Assistant Store Manager, her primary function was to
manage and oversee the operation of the Fashion and Personal Care,
GSR Toys, and Home Furnishing Departments of to ensure its
continuous profitability so as to see to it that the established company
policies and procedures were properly complied with and implemented
in her departments.
v Sometime in 1998, Uniwide received reports from the other
employees regarding some problems in the departments managed by
the private respondent.
v March 15, 1998, Uniwide, through Store Manager Apduhan, issued a
Memo addressed to Amalia summarizing various reported incidents
signifying unsatisfactory performance by Amalia..Uniwide asked her for
concrete plans on how she can effectively perform her job.
v She answered all the allegations contained in the March 15, 1998
Memorandum but Apduhan was not satisfied with her answers which
were all hypothetical and did not answer directly the allegations
attributed to her.
15. SALVADOR
UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB and VIVIAN M. APDUHAN,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and AMALIA P.
KAWADA
FACTS:
Amalia P. Kawada started her employment with Uniwide
sometime in 1981 as a saleslady. Over the years, she worked herself
v On June 30, 1998, Apduhan sent another Memo seeking from the
private respondent an explanation regarding the incidents reported by
Uniwide employees and security personnel for alleged irregularities
committed by the private respondent
v In a letter dated July 9, 1998, private respondent answered the
allegations made against her.
v On July 27, 1998, private respondent sought medical help
company physician, Dr. Zambrano. She was advised her to
days sick leave. But on July 30, 1998, Amalia obtained
Zambrano a medical certificate of fitness to work but with
surname which she presented to Apduhan the following day,
from the
take five
from Dr.
a wrong
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RULING:
No, she was not constructively dismissed because the Court
finds the records bereft of evidence to substantiate the conclusions of
the NLRC and the CA that private respondent was constructively
dismissed from employment.
Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or
both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable
person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up
his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal
but made to appear as if it were not. In fact, the employee who is
constructively dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming to work.
Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise.
v In the present case, Amalia claimed that she had been subjected to
constant harassment, ridicule and inhumane treatment by Apduhan.
Supreme Court found the allegation of harassment was a specious
statement which contains nothing but empty imputation of a fact that
could hardly be given any evidentiary weight by this Court.
v The sending of several memoranda addressed to a managerial
concerning various violations of company rules and regulations,
committed, should not be construed as a form of harassment but
merely an exercise of managements prerogative to discipline its
employees. Precisely, petitioners gave private respondent successive
memoranda to give the latter an opportunity to controvert the charges
against her. Clearly, the memoranda are not forms of harassment, but
petitioners compliance with the requirements of due process.
v Private respondent's bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence
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HYATT vs Catinoy
Facts:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 27, 1999 in the case
entitled "RUSTOM M. CATINOY VS. HYATT TAXI SERVICES INC.,
HYATT TAXI EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION AND/OR MR. JAIME
DUBLIN" that ruled against herein petitioner Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc.
(hereafter petitioner) and of the Resolution dated May 11, 2000 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Rustom Catinoy was hired on October 10, 1992 as a taxi driver
by the Respondent Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. On August 21, 1995 at
about past 10:00 a.m., complainant went inside the union office and to
his surprise found his drawer to have been forcibly opened. Catinoy
asked Saturnino who opened his drawer. Saturnino replied that he was
the one who forcibly opened the drawer to retrieve some documents
particularly the list of union members. An argument ensued and a fist
fight to which resulted to Catinoy being brought to the hospital. After
due investigation by the company the two was indefinitely suspended.
Aggrieved he filed a complaint before the NLRC.
On September 19, 1997, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision
finding petitioner guilty of illegal preventive suspension, requiring it to
pay the wage equivalent of the suspension, and further finding
petitioner guilty of illegal constructive dismissal, ordering petitioner to
reinstate respondent and to pay him backwages and attorney's fees.
The NLRC issued a Decision affirming the decision of the
Arbitration Branch
Upon Catinoys motion for reconsideration the NLRC modified
its earlier decision when it deleted the award of backwages on the
ground that there was "no concrete showing that complainant was
constructively dismissed".
Issue:
16. ALOTA
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Held:
In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are
for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.
Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal,
the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.
Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof taints
the employee's transfer as a constructive dismissal. In the present
case, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden. The NLRC, as
affirmed by the CA, correctly found that the combination of the harsh
actions of the petitioner rendered the employment condition of
respondent hostile and unbearable for the following reasons:
First, the petitioner failed to show any urgency or genuine
business necessity to transfer the respondent to the Makati Head
Office. In fact, the respondent showed the actual motivation and the
bad faith behind his transfer.
Second, the respondents transfer from Dumaguete to Makati
City is clearly unreasonable, inconvenient and oppressive, since the
respondent and his family are residents of Dumaguete City.
Third, the petitioner failed to present any valid reason why it had
to require the respondent to go to Makati Head Office to undergo
branch head training when it could have just easily required the latter to
undertake the same training in the VISMIN area.
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18. RIVERA
WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., UNITED LABORATORIES,
INC., AND/OR JOSE YAO CAMPOS, CARLOS EJERCITO,
ERNESTO SALAZAR, ELIEZER SALAZAR, JOSE SOLIDUM, JR.,
PETITIONERS, VS. RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
Ricardo Samaniego was initially hired by Unilab as Professional
Service Representative of its marketing arm, Westmont. Later, Unilab
promoted him as a Senior Business Development Associate and
assigned him in Isabela as Acting District Manager of Westmont and
Chairman of Unilab Special Projects. He was then transferred to Metro
Manila pending the investigation of his subordinate and physicians of
Region II involved in a sales discount and Rx trade-off controversy. He
was placed under floating status and assigned to perform duties not
connected with his position. This transfer resulted in the diminution of
his salary.
Ricardo Samaniego then filed with the Office of the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal and damages against Westmont and Unilab,
as well as Unilabs Officer
Westmont and Unilab filed a motion to dismiss Samaniegos
complaint on the ground of improper venue and lack of cause of action.
30
They argued that it should be filed with the NLRC in Manila, not with the
Office of the Labor Arbiter in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, and that the
action should be against Westmont, Samaniegos employer.
The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss, Citing Section
1, Rule IV, of the NLRC Rules and Procedure allowing the Labor Arbiter
to order a change of venue in meritous cases, he then set the case for
preliminary conference during which the petitioners expressly reserved
their right to contest the order denying motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed with the NLRC an Urgent Petition to Change or
Transfer Venue. They also filed to suspend proceedings in view of the
pendency of their petition.
The Labor Arbiter issued an order directing parties to submit
their respective papers and supporting documents within 20 days from
notice, after which the case shall be submitted for decision.
The NLRC acting on the petition to change venue, ordered the
Labor Arbiter to forward the records of the case. The Labor Arbiter
retained a complete duplicate original copies of the records and set the
case for hearing. They petitioners filed a motion for cancellation of the
hearings because their petition for change of venue has remained
unresolved. They did not submit their position papers and did not attend
hearing, thus the Labor Arbiter considered the case submitted for
Decision based on the records and the evidence submitted by
Samaniego and rendered a decision finding that Samaniego is illegally
and unjustly dismissed constructively.
Petitioners appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the
petition for change of venue because when the cause of action arouse,
Samaniegos workplace in Isabela over which the Labor Arbiter in
Cagayan has the jurisdiction. However it declared the decision of the
NLRC null and void because it continued to conduct further
proceedings despite the pendency of the appeal-treated Urgent Petition
for Change and Westmont and Unilab are denied due process.
Both Parties applied for motion for reconsideration but both
were denied by the NLRC.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
1. Whether or Not Court of Appeals erred in denying their motion to
dismiss by reason of improper venue.
2. Whether or Not Westmont and Unilab are denied of due process.
3. Whether the Caourt of Appeals erred on holding that Samaniego was
constructively dismissed by Westmont and Unilab.
HELD
The petition to change or transfer venue filed by herein
petitioners with the NLRC is not the proper remedy to assail the Labor
Arbiters order denying their motion to dismiss. Such order is merely
interlocutory, hence not appealable as provided in Section 3 of the 1997
NLRC Rules and Procedures.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper
in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.
Assuming that the petition to change or transfer venue is the
proper remedy, still we find that the CA did not err in sustaining the
Labor Arbiters Order of denying the motion to dismiss because under
the 1997 NLRC rules and procedure under Section 1, All cases which
the Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the
Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of
the complainant/petitioner. The question of venue essentially relates to
the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the parties, rather
than upon the substance and merits of the case. Our permissive rules
underlying the provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience
for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the end of justice. This
axiom all the more finds applicability in cases involving labor and
management because of the principle, paramount in our jurisdiction,
that the State shall afford to full protection of labor.
Because Samaniegos regular place of assignment was in
Isabela when he was transferred to Metro Manila or when the cause of
31
action arose. Clearly, the Appellate Court was correct in Affirming the
Labor Arbiters finding that the proper venue is in the RAB No. II at
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
On the contention that Westmont and Unilab that they were
denied due process, well settled is the rule that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceeding, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor
Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit
their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the
supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their
respective claims, in the even the Labor Arbiter determines that no
formal hearing would be conducted of that such hearing was not
necessary.
As shown by the records, the Labor Arbiter gave Westmont and
Unilab, not only once, but thrice, the opportunity to submit their position
papers and supporting affidavits and documents. But they were
obstinate. Clearly, they were not denied their right to due process.
To recapitulate, Samaniego claims that upon his reassignment
and/or transfer to Metro Manila, he was placed on floating status and
directed to perform functions not related to his position. For their
part, Westmont and Unilab explain that his transfer is based on a
sound business judgment, a management prerogative.
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of
proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds,
such as genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to
show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial
to the employee. It must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution
of salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this
burden of proof, the employees transfer shall be tantamount to
unlawful constructive dismissal.[6]
Westmont and
Unilab
failed
to
discharge
this
burden. Samaniego was unceremoniously transferred from
Isabela to Metro Manila. We hold that such transfer is
19. OLORES
32
20. BACALZO
DIVERSIFIED SECURITY INC VS ALICIA BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Respondent was employed by petitioner as an Executive Pool
Secretary, but petitioner alleged that respondent turned out to be
incompetent. Petitioner then assigned her to perform menial or
insignificant jobs and allegedly transferred her to their branch office in
Makati City. However, respondent allegedly failed to report for work at
said branch office on the day she was supposed to do so.On the other
hand, respondent claimed that petitioner dismissed her on October 31,
33
1997 without any valid reason, neither was she given any notice and
hearing.
In December of 1997, respondent filed a case for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. Petitioner countered that respondent was
not dismissed; rather, she was the one who severed her connection
with petitioner by her "voluntary and unequivocal acts." The Labor
Arbiter, NLRC and Court of Appeals all ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner.
HELD:
YES.In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA were
all consistent in their factual findings that respondent's employment was
indeed terminated without giving her notice and hearing. The NLRC's
finding that respondent had been petitioner's employee since 1990, had
also been affirmed by the CA. A close perusal of the records show that
there is no cogent reason for this Court to deviate from the settled rule
that factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are accorded not only respect but finality.
The petitioners cannot justify their defense of abandonment as
they failed to prove that indeed private respondent had abandoned her
work. It did not even bother to send a letter to her last known address
requiring her to report for work and explain her alleged continued
absences. The ratiocination of public respondent [NLRC] on this score
merits our imprimatur, viz:
The law clearly spells out the manner with which an unjustified
refusal to return to work by an employee may be established. Thusly,
respondent should have given complainant a notice with warning
concerning her alleged absences (Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V,
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code). The notice
requirement actually consists of two parts to be separately served on
the employee to wit: (1) notice to apprise the employee of his absences
34
Issue:
1) whether a valid cause existed to justify the dismissal of respondent;
2) whether he is entitled to reinstatement and back wages.
Ruling:
1) None. Neither of the two infractions committed by Daniel caused
substantive loss or damage. Their company policy does not warrant
dismissal for such infractions. Also worth stressing are the following
facts: Daniel has served the company for 13 years; he was previously
granted a scholarship given only to employees with high performance
ratings; his infractions were minor; and there has been no showing that
he acted in bad faith or with malice. Under the circumstances, there is
every justification for tilting the scales of justice in favor of the
employee.
2) Yes. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that
illegally dismissed employees are entitled to both 1) reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and 2) full back
wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, from the time their compensation was withheld from them
up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Both reliefs are rights
granted by substantive law to alleviate the economic hardships suffered
by an illegally dismissed employee. The grant of one does not preclude
the other.
22. TALAY
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION
VS
35
FACTS:
Imelda Salazar was employed by Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation as general systems analyst, also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations support was
DelfinSaldivar with whom Imelda was allegedly very close. Sometime in
1994, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing,
caused the investigation of the latters activities. The report prepared by
companys internal auditor, Mr Agustin Maramara, indicated that
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial
and Industrial Company with Richard Yambao. The report also
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioners missing air conditioning
unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived
with Yambao to defraud petitioner. It likewise appeared in the course of
Maramaras investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
companys interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to
the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of
the air conditioner but failed to inform her employer.Consequently
petitioner company placed private respondent under suspensive
suspension for one month and giving her thirty days within which to
explain her side.But instead of submitting an explanation, private
respondent filed a complaint against illegal suspension which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick
leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified
her that she was considered dismissed.
Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner company to reinstate Salazar to her
former work or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal
dismissal.Petitioner was also ordered to pay Salazar moral
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner violated Salazars due process when
she was promptly suspended.
Whether or not Salazar was unjustly dismissed.
HELD:
The Suprene Court ruled that it is not correct to conclude that
petitioner has violated Salazars right to due process when she was
promptly suspended.If at all, the fault lay with Salazar when she
ignored petitioners memorandum giving her ample opportunity to
present her side to the management, instead, she went directly to the
Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without
giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
The court ruled that Salazar was unjustly dismissed, there being no
evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of Salazar, she had every right, not only be entitled to
reinstatement, but as well as to full backwages.The Labor Code
provides that in cases or regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause.An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work hall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.The court
also stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his
job except for a just cause has assumed greater importance under the
1987 Constitution.Where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal
has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the
employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act
of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in the
Labor Code, should find application.Thus she is entitled to
reinstatement and payment of backwages.
36
23. BARTOLOME
Baguio Country Club Corporation vs NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner Baguio Country Club Corporation (corporation) is a
recreational establishment certified by the ministry of labor and
employment as an entertainment-service establishment. Private
respondent Jimmy Calamba was employed by corporation on a day to
day basis in various capacities as laborer and dishwasher for a period
of ten months. Calamba was hired again as a gardener and rehired as
such when he was dismissed by the petitioner corporation. Calamba
filed a complaint against petitioner corporation with the ministry of labor
(DOLE) for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and non-payment of
13th month pay. The executive labor arbiter ruled in favor of Calamba,
declaring the latter as a regular employee and ordering petitioner
corporation to reinstate Calamba to the position of gardener without
loss of seniority and with full back wages, benefits and privileges from
the time of his dismissal up to therein statement including 13th Month
pay. Petitioner corporation filed an appeal to the NLRC contending that
Calamba was a contractual employee whose employment was for a
fixed and specific period as set forth and evidenced by Calambas
contracts of employment. However, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit. The latter argued that Calamba having rendered services
as laborer, gardener, and dishwasher for more than one year, was
a regular employee at the time his employment was terminated. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Calamba is a regular employee at the time his
employment was terminated?
Held:
37
24. MIRANDA
38
HELD
The SC held that as Article 281 clearly states, a probationary
employee can be legally terminated either: (1) for a just cause; or (2)
when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with the reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at
the start of the employment. Nonetheless, the power of the employer to
terminate an employee on probation is not without limitations. First, this
power must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements
of the contract. Second, the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer
must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the
contract or the law; and third, there must be no unlawful discrimination
in the dismissal. In termination cases, the burden of proving just or
valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer.
Here, the petitioner did not present proof that the respondent
was evaluated from November 21, 1998 to February 21, 1999, nor that
his probationary employment was validly extended. The petitioner
alleged that at the end of the respondents three-month probationary
employment, Rauber recommended that the period be extended for two
months since respondent Gatbonton was not yet ready for regular
employment. The petitioner presented a Personnel Action Form
containing the recommendation. We observed, however, that this
document was prepared on March 31, 1999, the end of the 4th month
of the respondents employment. In fact, the recommended action was
termination of probationary employment effective April 9, 1999, and not
39
Petition is denied.
40
Immediately upon her return, she confronted Sameer agency and Rose
Mahinay of said agency told her that she was just unlucky and that she
would be refunded the amount of P50,000.00.
Endozo filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, payment of salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of
her contract, illegal exaction, violation of the Labor Code, falsification of
contract of employment, attorneys fees and costs. Meantime, on June
7, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8042, vesting jurisdiction
over claims of overseas workers with NLRC. Consequently, Endozos
claim was transferred to the NLRC, Arbitration Branch.
26. DE GRACIA
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Third Division, Q.C.
and PRISCILA ENDOZO, respondents.
FACTS: Priscila Endozo applied to Sameer Overseas Employment
Agency, a local recruitment placement agency, for overseas
employment in Taiwan as a domestic helper. As she was initially found
to have a "minimal spot" she was advised to rest for at least 2 months.
Sameer told Endozo that she would be finally deployed to Taiwan and
required her to pay the amount of P30,000.00, which she did, but
Sameer did not issue any receipt.
Endozo left for Taiwan. She was to be employed as a housemaid of
Sung Kui Mei with a monthly salary of NT$13,380.00 for a period of one
year. However, she stayed in Taiwan only for 11 days as her employer
terminated her services, and sent her home for alleged incompetence.
41
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