C. Dekker, H. Soly, J. H. Van Stuijvenberg, A. Th. Van Deursen, M. Müller, E. Witte, P. W. Klein, Alice C. Carter (Auth.) Acta Historiae Neerlandicae 8 - Studies On The History of The Netherlands

ACTA HISTORIAE NEERLANDICAE
STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS
EDITORIAL BOARD:
I. Schaffer (Leiden); Johanna A. Kossmann (Groningen); H. Balthazar (Ghent); A. Th. van

Deursen (Amsterdam); W. Prevenier (Ghent); J. J. Woltjer (Leiden).
EDITORIAL ADDRESS:
Alexander Numankade 199, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
ACTA HISTORIAE NEERLANDICAE

STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS
VIII
MARTINUS NUHOFF / THE HAGUE /1975
1975 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands.
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or
to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.

Softcoverreprintof the hardcover 1st edition 1975
ISBN-13:978-94-011-5953-1
e-ISBN-13 :978-94-011-5951-7
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-011-5951-7
Table of Contents
Preface
C. DEKKER, The Representation of the Freeholders in the Drainage
Districts of Zeeland West of the ScheIdt during the Middle Ages
VII
H. SOLY, The 'Betrayal' of the Sixteenth-Century Bourgeoisie: A Myth?

Some Considerations of the Behaviour Pattern of the Merchants of
Antwerp in the Sixteenth Century
31
J. H. VAN STUDVENBERG, 'The' Weber Thesis: An Attempt at Interpretation
50
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN, History and Prognostication
67
M. MULLER, Ten years of Guerilla-Warfare and Slave Rebellions in

Surinam, 1750-1759
85
E. WITTE, Political Power Struggle in and around the Main Belgian Cities,
1830-1848
103
P. W. KLEIN, Depression and Policy in the Thirties
123
ALICE C. CARTER, ed., Survey of Recent Historical Works on Belgium and

the Netherlands Published in Dutch
159
Preface
Volume VIII of Acta Historiae Neerlandicae again presents studies on the history
of the Low Countries which it is hoped will be of interest to foreign scholars.
The intention has been to deal with a fairly long period, and many differing aspects,
of the subject. So institutional, political, economic, social and cultural history
all receive a fair share of attention, and together the studies cover a considerable
number of centuries.
It is, however, striking to note how even this restricted number of studies
reflects prevailing viewpoints among today's Low Countries' historians. Clearly
there is considerable stress on economic and social questions. Traditional studies
such as those of former Belgian historians on medieval history, or those of the
Dutch on the seventeenth century, are now giving way to works that are problemdirected. Power structures, the position of the bourgeoisie, reactions of the intelligentsia and theologians to societal problems, have now more attraction for
scholars than the glories of late medieval wealth in Flanders or Holland's Golden
Age. Terms such as Guerilla warfare, Struggle, Depression, typify today's critical
approach to society in general.
Be this as it may, it can be argued that the Survey published in this volume,
of recent Dutch-language historical pUblications in Belgium and the Netherlands,
prepared as heretofore by a team of English scholars with the assistance of Belgian
colleagues, cannot as yet be said to give cause for alarm. A glance at overall
production in the field of historical studies reveals that further emphasis on social
and economic history is not harmful but helps to rectify earlier overemphasis
on political and cultural history. Moreover long-term publication programmes
of existing institutes and research centres promise to make good any balance
that may seem to be lacking because of variations in individual interests and more
or less fashionable trends. There is also the likelihood that research plans, some
projected and some even now getting under way, will help to counteract any overemphasis of particular aspects.
The editorial borard of these Acta presents these studies and this survey in
the hope that they will prove that historical research and writing in the Low
Countries is not only alive but also full of life.
I. Scheffer
The Representation of the Freeholders in the Drainage Districts

of Zeeland West of the ScheIdt during the Middle Ages
c.
DEKKER
THE ZEELAND AMBACHTSHERENl
What makes the study of regional history so interesting is the discovery of

peculiarities specific to a particular region as compared with neighbouring regions.
Even though these prove in most instances after further study to be only variations
on a general theme, they nevertheless compel the historian to dig deeper in order
to find the origins of the local form and to explain it in the historical context.
One of the most striking phenomena of the mediaeval history of Zeeland is
the great power of the ambachtsheren (lords), which is obviously reflected first
in the political, administrative and legal spheres, but also to an almost equal
degree in the ecclesiastical sphere and in the administration of dikes and drainage.
This power largely determined socio-economic relationships outside the small
number of towns and was even felt in the cultural and literary spheres. The
ambachtsheren themselves were not peculiar to Zeeland, but the great power
which they possessed collectively, and often individually as well, was peculiar
to that province. Ambachtsheren were also to be found in the neighbouring territories of Flanders and Holland and, if one overlooks the term ambacht (district
held in fief by an ambachtsheer), local lords were to be found everywhere, invested
with the authority of government and possessing lower judicial powers. Nowhere,
however, far and wide was their power as great as in Zeeland, nowhere else did
they constitute at certain times a real threat to the count's authority, nowhere
was the ruler so dependent in his actions upon the co-operation of the local
lords.
The legal basis from which the Zeeland lords operated was not unusually
great. As local executive officials of the count they occupied a position of importance in the judicial organization of Zeeland, a position which increased greatly
in significance during the last quarter of the twelfth century because of the institu1. Ambachtsheer (hereafter translated as lord): hereditary holder of the office of local judge,
with responsibility for the dikes etc. in his district. Ambacht: district held in fief by an ambachtsheer. Cf. below. For the characteristics of the Zeeland ambachten and ambachtsheren, C.
Dekker, Zuid-Beveland. De historische geografie en de instellingen van een Zeeuws eiland in de
middeleeuwen (Assen, 1971) 386-97 and the literature quoted there.
C. DEKKER
tion oflocal courts of justice, presided over by the lords. In addition, they functioned as receivers of the county taxes. The strong position which they succeeded
in obtaining can be explained only against the background of the political situation in Zeeland from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. Politically, Zeeland
was an area that offered great opportunities to local worthies because of the lack
or shortcomings of effective higher authority. This was already the situation
during the tenth century when the area was ruled directly by the German king,
whose seat of government was at a great distance from Zeeland and who never
visited the province himself. It remained the situation in the eleventh century
when Zeeland East of the Scheldt2 found itself within the sphere of influence of
the count of Holland, who incidentally had the greatest difficulty in maintaining
his authority effectively, even in Holland itself, while Zeeland West of the Scheldta
formed part of the county of Flanders from 1012, as a separate castelry with its
own burghgrave and its own court of echevins. The latter, however, could function
only with the presence of local executive officials, which meant that the count
of Flanders had to call upon the local notables. These, in their turn, used their
involvement in the count's administrative machine to extend their power. They
succeeded in extending the state of dependence to which, as landed proprietors,
they had brought the people living on their land, over the district within which
they exercised their legal powers. They dealt with the district itself, the ambacht,
as they dealt with their own land, i.e. they divided it on inheritance, sold it or
alienated it in other ways. Although the relationship between the count and the
lords had been conceived as a feudal tie, the count had to tolerate the districts
within which his authority was exercised being fragmented contrary to the original
feudal principle.
The Flemish count probably had no choice, because his authority in Zeeland
West of the ScheIdt had not been strong enough to prevent a rising of the Zeelanders in about 1067. This revolt, which took the form of refusing to pay the
count's taxes and also involved the abbey of Echternach, which had large interests
in Zeeland, was crushed by the Flemings, but Zeeland remained politically unreliable. When, as a result of the crisis in the Flemish authority, caused by the murder
of Count Charles the Good in 1127, the count of Holland gained a firm footing
in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt and had to win the support of the local notables
in this hitherto Flemish territory, the possibilities for local consolidation of power
only increased. This was even more the case when the Flemings returned in 1167
2. Consisting of the islands of Schouwen, Duiveland and the western part of the, later, island
of Tholen.
3. Consisting of the islands of Walcheren, South Beveland, North Beveland, Wolfaartsdijk,
Borsele, Baarland and Rilland. The latter three islands were already endiked during the Middle
Ages and brought within the dike surrounding South Beveland.
THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND
to share the authority over Zeeland West of the ScheIdt with the Hollanders
under the Treaty of Bruges. 4 This meant in fact that the area remained a bone
of contention between Flanders and Holland for more than a century.
As late as the second half of the thirteenth century the count of Holland was
compelled, in order to gain the lords' political allegiance, to grant them a privilege
in respect of the collection of the schot (ground-tax), which amounted to their
being able to pocket a large part of the proceeds and so secure a firm economic
basis for the future. 5 Even in about 1290, when the authority of Holland seemed
to be established, the lords still tried to get their way with the count of Holland
by offering their services en masse to the count of Flanders. Although the count
of Holland was able to put down this rebellion, he still had to take the lords into
account in the fourteenth century in all internal measures, not only in the former
Flemish part of Zeeland, viz. Zeeland West of the ScheIdt, but also, to a lesser
extent, in Zeeland East of the ScheIdt.
Apart from the political field, the lords in the fourteenth century also made
their influence felt particularly in ecclesiastical affairs and in matters concerned
with the administration of dikes and drainage. They believed their powers greatly
threatened, both as a result of the exercise of the advowson and in respect to the
maintenance of the dikes and drainage system, but they succeeded, not without
great difficulty sometimes, in consolidating their position. 6
Before continuing, a little more should be said in explanation of the term
ambachtsheren (lords). We use the word in its general sense and, for convenience,
without qualification. Yet, in reality, those belonging to the class of lords did
not form a monolithic block; there was, in fact, a certain degree of stratification.
The majority of the many hundreds of lords had only very small areas of jurisdiction as a result of a centuries-long process of subdivision of their ambachten and
they individually counted for very little, even locally. On the other hand, there
were also the big lords who had succeeded in acquiring a steadily growing number
of ambachten, through inheritance, marriage and, particularly, purchase. Although
disagreements between the big and small lords were not uncommon, they usually
acted in common, particularly in relation to the count, with the potentes giving
the lead. The show of force that the lords were repeatedly able to muster was
principally the power of the potentes, but it was all the stronger because the lesser
lords lined up behind them and were not trying to form a counterweight, which
would have caused a breach in the ranks of the lords. The small lords filled a
4. A. C. F. Koch, Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot 1299, I (The Hague, 1970) no. 160
(1167 March 7).
5. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 462, 463.
6. The struggle for the possession of the advowsons of the Zeeland churches was directed
mainly against the Abbey of Our Lady at Middelburg and the chapter of Saint Saviour at Utrecht
and usually resulted in a divided advowson, ibidem, 362-81.
C. DEKKER
role in the politics of Zeeland, but a role under the leadership of the big lords.
We shall limit ourselves here to their function in the water management.
INDEPENDENCE AND CO-OPERATION OF THE LORDS IN THE SPHERE OF ADMINISTRATION
OF DIKES AND DRAINAGE
The organization of water administration in Zeeland was closely related to

that of the ambachten. The establishment of local courts of justice was partly
and, perhaps mainly, stimulated by the need for a quick and expert prosecution
of water control offenders, for in Zeeland the administration of dikes and drainage
had long been the task of the local authorities, i.e. the lords. 7 The freeholders
were compelled to contribute to the maintenance of dikes, roads and watercourses
in proportion to the size of their land holding. The lord carried out the inspection
of the dikes and, where neglect was established, fined the culprit after sentence
had been passed by the echevins. In order to escape the sharp control of the lords
in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Cistercian abbeys struggled
to obtain and succeeded (against their rule) in obtaining for themselves the feudal
rights over their lands. S As lords they could act almost autonomously in water
management matters, because the count's supervision of the lords was as poorly
organized as the lords' supervision of the freeholders, under the Zeeland ordinances, was well regulated.
We do not find reference in the sources to a direct intervention by the count
in matters affecting the dikes and drainage before the thirteenth century and then
only by exception at first. This is undoubtedly partly a result of the scarcity of
sources, however, since it is unlikely that the systematic embanking of the Zeeland
islands, which took place during the middle and second half of the twelfth century,
was exclusively the work of the lords and their dependants. With works of such
great importance and such magnitude, which were also being carried out simultaneously on different islands in both Zeeland and Holland, the counts may be
imagined giving encouragement in the background. 9 It is perhaps significant in
this connection that clear evidence does exist of the role played by the count of
Flanders, Philip of Alsace, and Count Florence III of Holland in the arrival of
the Cistercians from Ten Duinen and Ter Doest on the islands of South Beveland
and Rilland during the 1180's to complete the difficult work of closing the dikes,
7. Ibidem, 506-12. Concerning the law in relation to the administration of dikes and polders
in Zeeland and the neighbouring areas, see P. H. Galle, Beveiligd bestaan. Grondtrekken van her
middeleeuwse waterstaatsrecht in Z. W.-Nederland en hoofdlijnen van de geschiedenis van her
dijksbeheer in dit gebied (J 200-1963) (Delft, 1963).
9. Ibidem, 98-133, 522.
a task that the lords were evidently unable to perform. 10 However, once the Zeeland islands had been safeguarded by dikes and their surplus water was being discharged through the numerous sluices in the dikes, while the lords supervised
the maintenance of the dikes and watercourses, there were evidently few problems,
for the time being, which made intervention from above necessary or desirable.
Nevertheless, there were problems. Soon the drainage of the pool lands, situated
inland, must have caused difficulties. The lords and freeholders of these lands
were dependent for their drainage upon the co-operation of those with lands
on the outer side of the islands, while the costs of maintaining the sluices fell
precisely upon the latter, because they were situated in their ambachten. Cooperation was necessary. Accordingly, the landholders, represented by their
lords, combined to manage jointly the drainage of their lands and to maintain
the necessary works at joint expense. These drainage corporations, which were
formed on a communal basis and without the intervention of the ruler, were
called wateringen in Flanders and Zeeland West of the Scheldt. l l The common
designation and its absence in Zeeland East of the ScheIdt indicate that this institution must have come into existence during the period when the Flemish influence
was still strong in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt. The Vijf Ambachten drainage
district, later called the Noordwatering of Walcheren, is probably the oldest
in Zeeland. Although it is not mentioned until 1273, as Quinque Officia,12 its extent
indicates a much greater age. It must have originated when the twelve ambachten
(parishes) of which it later consisted still formed only five ambachten (parishes),
a stage in the splitting of parishes that can be dated to the end of the twelfth century.
We do not have such clear evidence of dating for the other drainage districts on
the island of Walcheren-the Oostwatering, the Heyensluus drainage district,
the Zuidwatering and the Westwatering,-but just as the Vijf Ambachten was
completely bounded on one side by dunes so also was the Westwatering, and its
drainage problems will therefore not have occurred much later than in the Vijf
Ambachten. The two large drainage districts of the island of South Beveland,
those of Bewesten and Beoosten Yerseke, were probably also formed before the
mid-thirteenth century.
The drainage districts were larger than the ambachten, but they were based
on them. There was no separate administration and the great independence which
the lords showed in water management affairs was limited to only a small extent
by the creation of drainage corporations. Henceforth, the lords who participated
10. Ibidem, 143, 144.
11. Ibidem, 512-20. Hereafter watering will be translated as drainage district, and the more
general waterschap as dike district.
12. 'De hevina terre et dimidia iacentis in Quinque Officiis ac in officio de Brigdamme', L. P. c.
van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland (2 vols.; Amsterdam-The Hague, 18671873) II, no. 257 (1273 Aug. 29).
C. DEKKER
in them had to make jointly certain decisions that they would otherwise have been
able to take individually and each according to his own lights. The drainage
districts came into existence on a voluntary basis and could have arbitrary boundaries, as on South Beveland, because it was by no means necessary for all the
lords to participate in them. The joint drainage districts, therefore, did not extend
over the whole of the territory; some ambachten remained outside them.
Within the territory of the count of Holland the drainage associations in
Zeeland West of the ScheIdt had their own special features and a different name,
but they were otherwise certainly not unique. The whole of the alluvial zone of
the Netherlands was sooner or later faced with the task, after the embanking
or reclamation in the eleventh, twelfth or thirteenth centuries, of ridding itself
in an efficient manner of the surplus precipitation, and everywhere people discovered sooner or later, according to the degree of urgency, that the discharge of
water could be effectively controlled only by means of co-operation between communities. Fockema Andreae has referred to the early associations of interest
in the reclamation areas of the Nedersticht (approximately the present province
of Utrecht) and Central Holland. I3 Their form of administration was more highly
developed than that of the Zeeland drainage districts and they functioned as
separate bodies for the implementation of water management matters, divorced
from the ordinary administrative organization and with their own governing
body and laws. Because, however, in large parts of Holland, as in Zeeland, the
task of water control was carried out by the ordinary, local administration, i.e.
within the framework of the ambacht, there also appeared drainage associations
in the form of groupings of ambachten, such as the Zeven Ambachten in what
later became Delfland,14 No matter what form the associations took, in Holland
or Zeeland, they shared the common feature of having arisen independently
of the count. The latter recognized them, but did not interfere with them initially,
undoubtedly because they functioned well.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COUNTS AND THE LORDS' RESISTANCE
TO THEM
It may indeed be assumed that the drainage associations functioned well.

It would be wrong to suppose that the counts of Holland had no interest in water
management affairs or that they neglected this part of their administrative task.
13. S. J. Fockema Andreae, Studien over waterschapsgeschiedenis, IV, Het Nedersticht (Leiden,
1950) 2-7; VIII, Overzicht (Leiden, 1952) 2-4.
14. J. P. Winsemius, De Zeven Ambachten en het hoogheemraadschap van De/jland(Delft, 1962).
Outside Holland see, for example, for Groningen and East Friesland, Fockema Andreae, Studien,
VI, Oostelijk Groningen (Leiden, 1950) 6-13; for Friesland, M. P. van Buijtenen, De Leppa,
een rechtshistorisch-waterstaatkundige bijdrage (Dokkum, 1944).
After Count Florence III dammed off the Old Rhine before 1165 by means of the
Zwammer DamI5 in order to protect Holland from flooding from the side of
Utrecht, his thirteenth-century successors repeatedly intervened in the water
economy of the area with the same aim in view. 16 In other places, too, they left
their traces behind. The number of water control works attributed by Fockema
Andreae to Count William I (1203-1222) is considerable,l? even though this author
has over-emphasized William's role somewhat and detailed research may reduce
the number of his achievements. It is clear, however, that the counts did intervene
where necessary, although, with one exception, without infringing upon the
existing forms of administration.
This single exception concerns the Great or South Holland Waard (an area
east of Dordrecht that was largely submerged in 1421 and subsequently only
incompletely reclaimed), which was probably the first example of intervention
by the count in the administrative sphere. In 1230, probably some fifteen years
after the completion of the ring dike a high regional college with power of inspection was in operation there, under the chairmanship of the count himself as magistrate. IS It is highly doubtful whether this was also already the situation in Rijnland. It did possess a college of scrutatores,19 of communis terre consiliarii qui
hemenrade vuigariter nuncupantur,20 but this was probably the administration
of a water management body functioning on a communal basis. There is no reference to the count himself or one of his representatives as chairman. 21 Not until
15. About half-way between Leiden and Woerden, north of Gouda.
16. S. J. Fockema Andreae, Het hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland, zijn recht en zijn bestuur
van den vroegsten tijd tot 1857 (Leiden, 1934) 27 ff; S. J. Fockema Andreae, Willem I en de Hollandse hoogheemraadschappen (Wormerveer, 1954) 7, 8, 21, 25-30. See also, by the same author,
'Waterschapsorganisatie in Nederland en in den vreemde', Mededelingen van de Koninklijke
Nederlandse Akademie v. Wetenschappen, A/d. Letteren. Nieuwe Reeks, IX (Amsterdam, 1951)
309-30.
17. Idem, Willem 1,61.
18. Van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek, I, no. 322 (1230 May 7). Cf. Fockema Andreae, Studien,
III, De Grote 0/ Zuidhollandse Waard (Leiden, 1950) 14, 15.
19. K. Heeringa, Oorkondenboek van het sticht Utrecht, II (The Hague, 1940), no. 740 (1226
Jan. 26).
20. Van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek, II, no. 621 (1255 Oct. 11).
21. Fockema Andreae's view of the nature of the administrative body functioning in Rijnland
in the 13th century is not completely clear. He assumed at first that the hoogheemraadschappen
were institutions of the central government and he referred at that time to the 13th century dike
reeves in Rijnland as a comital college, Rijnland, 37. Later he emphasized more strongly the communal aspects and also made reference in Studien, IV, Het Nedersticht, 5, in respect of Rijnland,
to a 'communal' origin, although a little further on, on p. 14, he considers again the 'probable
existence' in about 1230 of a college appointed by the central government. Although we have
found no evidence for the latter in respect of Rijnland, we otherwise share the supposition of
this author, ibidem, 14, that in Utrecht, from about 1230, an episcopal, i.e. centrally appointed,
dike administration carried out the inspection of the Lek dike above the dam. M. van Vliet,
Het hoogheemraadschap van de Lekdijk Bovendams (Assen, 1961) 65, even accepts this as certainty.
C. DEKKER
18th February 1286 did Count Florence V (1256-1296) establish a dike administration in Rijnland under central control by placing his bailiff of Rijnland at
the head of the existing college of heemraden (dike reeves).22 He had to inspect the
dikes and act as magistrate and law enforcement officer in the whole territory
of the dike district. A number of general and local calamities also gave Florence V
repeated occasion to act in matters of dike administration. Sometimes his measures
related only to the law in respect of the administration of dikes and drainage,
but he often took advantage of the opportunity to subject the existing regional
dike district administrations to his control and, elsewhere, to introduce new administrations under direct central control. The aim he had in view was undoubtedly
the realization of an efficient control of the administration of dikes and drainage,
although he probably had, at the same time, the concealed intention of tightening
his grip on the local aristocracy, who usually had their own way in the dike
districts. To achieve his aims, he made use of his bailiffs. Apart from the example
of Rijnland in 1286, we see a bailiff presiding over a dike college in 1270 in the
Great Waard,23 but, as we have seen, there was already an administration there
under central control in 1230. We may assume the same for Schieland in 1273,24
for Kennemerland in 1288 and for the Riederwaard in 1292. 25 A particularly
clear example is the institution of a dike administration under central government
control in 1277 in the Alblasserwaard, presided over by the bailiff of South Holland,
for which an agreement was necessary with a number of manors outside Holland. 26
It was now only a short step to the separation of dike and drainage administration
matters from the office of bailiff and the appointment of a separate official under
the count to enforce the dike laws in a particular area of jurisdiction. This official
was the dijkgraaf(dike bailiff). It is again the Great Waard where he is first encountered, in 1275,27 and the ordinance of Count John II of 9th June 1303 already
takes as its starting point the common occurrence of this functionary: Item in
each waard there shall be a dike bailiff, whose real estate inside the waard is
22. Van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek, II, no. 583 (1286 Febr. 18, Style of Easter).
23. Ibidem, II, no. 208 (1270 Dec. 21).
24. Ibidem, II, no. 250 (1273 May 14). See on this: S. Muller Hz., Over de oudste geschiedenis
van Schieland. Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letteren,
Nieuwe Reeks, III (Amsterdam, 1914) 55-7.
25. Ibidem, II, nos. 641 (1288 Aug. 16) and 814 (1292 March 18).
26. Ibidem, no. 331 (1277 April 1).
27. He is called pro visor magnae insulae dictae Groet Wart, ibidem, no. 300 (1275 Dec. 22).
The first information about the dike bailiffs outside Holland, in Utrecht and the Betuwe, dates
from about the same period: iudex seu visitator aggerum (Lek dike below the dam), F. Ketner,
Oorkondenboek van het sticht Utrecht tot 1301, IV (The Hague, 1954) no. 1837 (1272 Nov.);
iudex et visitator aggerum (Betuwe), ibidem, no. 1905 (1276 June 28); dikgrave (Lek dike above
the dam), ibidem, no. 1938 (1277 May 23).
valued at three hundred pounds or more, of the lord's money.28 Elsewhere,

where the dike district and the area of the bailiff's jurisdiction were wholly or
largely coincident geographically, as in Rijnland, the double function was retained
for a considerable time longer.
In contrast to Holland, Florence V did not concern himself with the administration of dikes and drainage in Zeeland with the one exception of the island of
Schouwen, i.e. East of the ScheIdt. There he twice appointed, after the flood of
1288 and again in 1291, a temporary college of sworn men to apportion the burden
of the repair and maintenance of the dikes. 29 On the same island of Schouwen
an earlier count, we do not know which, had already instituted a division of the
territory into six parts in order to make the maintenance of the dikes more effective. 30 At that time the lords had retained their full authority, but now their farreaching autonomy in matters of dike and drainage administration was temporarily
curtailed by the sworn men of Florence V. This was a clear difference from Zeeland
West of the ScheIdt. The drainage districts there, although created for drainage
purposes, must also on occasion have functioned as an appropriate framework
for dike maintenance, while, conversely, the sixths of Schouwen may also have
regulated the drainage, but the great difference is that the drainage districts were
a creation of the lords, while the sixths had been created by the intervention of
the count. Zeeland West of the ScheIdt also suffered badly from the flood of
1288, but Florence V did not interfere with the existing structure there, even temporarily. At a time when the quarrel between Flanders and Holland for the control
of Zeeland West of the ScheIdt had risen to fever pitch and a large proportion
of the lords had taken the side of Count Guy of Flanders, it is indeed inconceivable
that he could have done so.
The lords, however, were defeated and Florence V was successful in establishing
the authority of Holland definitively and effectively in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt.
The introduction of a dike administration under central government control
on the model of Holland occupied an important place among the measures which
he and his successors took after the victory of Holland. It was important particularly because the count did not have any regional bailiffs in Zeeland as he did
in Holland, so that he considered that he could at least partly make good this
deficiency by appointing dike bailiffs answerable to the central government. The
dike bailiff would be able to control the lords in the sphere where they had until
now been able to act quasi-autonomously, i.e. in the administration of dikes and
drainage. By giving the new official additional powers in matters not concerned
with the dikes and drainage, such as the nomination of echevins when the lords
28. F. van Mieris, Groot charterboek der graven van Holland en Zeeland en heeren van Friesland,
(4 vols; Leiden, 1753-1756) II, 31.
29. Van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek, II, no. 762 (1291 Feb. 26).
C. DEKKER
could not agree and the prosecution of debtors, he would also be able to strengthen
the authority of central government generally.31 The count wanted his Zeeland
dike bailiffs to be more than just officials in matters concerned with the dikes.
They were also intended as a means by which he could control and chasten the
lords, in their striving for autonomy, in a wider field than that of dike and drainage
administration.
We do not know exactly when the new measure was introduced, nor whether
it was already introduced by Florence V, but from about 1317 we find in the Zeeland texts references to dike bailiffs answerable to the central government, each
enforcing the dike laws in a particular area of jurisdiction with a college of sworn
men. 3S Remarkably enough, the first references to dike bailiffs also occur at this
time in West Friesland. 33 This area had also been completely subdued under
Florence V and here, too, the central dike administration was evidently one of the
measures considered by the count to be effective for bringing the territory under
control. The term heemraad (dike reeve), which was native to the lowland of
Holland and the bishopric of Utrecht as a designation of both local and regional
officials concerned with dike and drainage administration, was introduced into
West Friesland, but not into Zeeland West of the ScheIdt. The count was evidently
afraid of resistance there to this term with its strong overtones of Holland and
for psychological reasons he chose the neutral appellation, 'sworn man' (iuratus).
The institution of dijkgraajschappen (dike bailiwicks) meant that the administration of dikes and drainage, the checking of the payments to be made by the
freeholders in money and kind and the prosecution ofthose who failed to meet their
obligations were transferred from the administrations at the ambacht level of
lord (scultetus) and echevins to the regional administrations of dike bailiff and
sworn men. In Holland, too, the lords had been confronted with this loss of their
powers, sometimes at a very early date through the institution of administrations
in the voluntarily formed dike districts and, elsewhere, through the establishment
of dike administrations under central government control. Nowhere, however,
was the administration of dikes and drainage so concentrated that the ambachten
no longer had a part to playas districts. Taxation and payments in kind for the
maintenance of the dikes almost always continued to be regulated within the
framework of the ambachten, with certain powers reserved for the lords or their
sculteti. 34 The lords also often succeeded in retaining certain powers concerned
31. R. Fruin, De keuren van Zeeland (The Hague, 1920) 118, 119 (1328 April 7).
32. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland. 524-27.
33. A. de Vries Az., Het dijks-en molenbestuur in Holland's Noorderkwartier onder degrafelijke
regeering en gedurende de Republiek (Amsterdam, 1876) 29.
34. As examples, see: Fockema Andreae, Studien, III, De Grote of Zuidhollandse Waard,
18; idem, Rijnland, 95-112; Th. F. J. A. Dolk, Geschiedenis van het hoogheemraadschap Delfland
10
with the inspection of the dikes, such as preliminary inspection, a delegated

inspection, or ajoint inspection with the centrally controlled dike administration. 3s
In Zeeland the traditional position of the lords was a guarantee that they would
not let themselves be ousted without a fight. They were also able to integrate
the old situation into the new and, what is more, after having recovered from the
blows suffered after 1290, they even succeeded in getting rid of the dike administrations instituted by the central government.
In Holland, the count had made use of the existing associations of interests
in establishing the centrally controlled dike administrations, but in Zeeland he
did that only in part. There he thought initially in wider terms than the drainage
districts. For example, he appointed dike bailiffs for the whole of Walcheren,
the whole of North Beveland, probably for the whole of Schouwen, and only
on the large island of South Beveland were two dike bailiffs appointed, one for
Bewesten Yerseke and one for Beoosten Yerseke. In the latter instance, the boundary between the drainage districts was indeed chosen as the boundary between
the two areas of jurisdiction. As early as the 1320's the count rejected these large
units and began to split the areas under the control of the dike bailiffs. From
1323 three dike bailiffs were operative on Walcheren: one for the northern part
of Walcheren (Oostwatering and Heyensluus drainage district); one for the
southern part of Walcheren (Westwatering, Zuidwatering and a few parishes
not included in a drainage district) and one for the Vijf Ambachten (drainage
district of the same name). In 1323 a separate dike bailiwick was also established
in the south-eastern part of South Beveland, where there was no previously existing drainage district. It was known as the dike bailiwick of Between Honte and
Hinkele. In 1328 North Beveland was divided into two dike bailiwicks, Bewesten
and Beoosten Wijtvliet while, at the same time, the dike bailiwick of Schouwen
must have been split into three: the northern and southern part of Schouwen
and the Quaalambacht of Zierikzee. In 1357 the dike bailiwick of the southern
part of Walcheren was further divided into a dike bailiwick of the Zuidwatering
and one of the Westwatering. 36 The conclusion to be drawn from all this is clear:
the count had gradually to adjust his centrally controlled dike organization,
against his original intention, to fall wholly in line with the existing drainage
districts, which had been created by the lords.
(fhe Hague, 1939) 48-57; A. A. Beekman, Bet dijk- en waterschapsrecht in Nederland voor 1795.
(2 vols.; The Hague, 1905, 1907) in vocibus ambacht and ambachtsheer.
35. Preliminary inspection in the Alblasserwaard: Van den Bergh, Oorkondenboek, II, no.
331 (1277 April 1); Van Mieris, Groot charterboek, III, 308 (1375 April 26); IV, 243 (1413 July 26).
In the Great Waard: ibidem, II, 139 (1395 Jan. 20). In the Krimpenerwaard: ibidem, IV, 658
(1422 Sept. 20). Delegated inspection in Delfland: Dolk, Geschiedenis De/j/and, 83. Joint inspection
of the Doeswatering in Rijnland by dike bailiff and chief dike reeves and the administrations
of 24 ambachten: Fockema Andreae, Rijnland, 29, 59.
11
C. DEKKER
This emerges even more clearly if we also take into account the ambachten
which had remained outside the drainage districts in the late twelfth century and
the thirteenth century. It appears unambiguously from a number of texts from
the first half of the fourteenth century that they had been included in the large
dike bailiwicks. The dike bailiffs and the sworn men exercised their functions
there, but during the second half of the fourteenth or the first half of the fifteenth
century, the lords of these ambachten succeeded in forcing out the dike bailiffs and
regaining their former independence in matters relating to dike and drainage
administration. They even obtained recognition by the count of what was, in
fact, a return to the thirteenth-century situation. In the fifteenth century the
dike bailiff and the sworn men could carry out dike inspections and sit in judgement only in those villages which formed part of the drainage district in the thirteenth century. The dike bailiwick of Between Honte and Hinkele, for example,
which extended over a number of parishes that had never previously formed a
drainage district, functioned practically only in theory during the fifteenth century.
Only in one parish, Hinkelenoord, did the centrally controlled dike administration
still possess effective authority.37
Nor were the lords slow to act in the drainage districts. They almost immediately 'usurped' the office of dike bailiff. At first the count recruited his Zeeland dike
bailiffs from his bedrivers (agents), who had the task of furthering his personal
and estate interests in the different parts of Zeeland. 38 Where, in Holland, he generally invested the highest nobles with the office of dike bailiff, he found it advisable
for tactical reasons to approach for this function in Zeeland men upon whom he
could fully rely and who would owe all their power and dignity to this office and
would not misuse it for their own interests. This meant no lords, therefore. It was
just at the period from which our earliest information about the Zeeland dike
bailiffs dates that the count began to abandon this practice. 3D The ascendancy
of the early dike bailiffs over the lords does not seem to have been so great as he
considered desirable. On this point, too, he had to accede to the lords, who,
where they could not get the new institution abolished, wished to exercise the
office of dike bailiff themselves, not in order to serve the count, but in order to
avoid control by a third party. The ambition to keep the office of dike bailiff
within their own circle probably had a further reason, lying more in the field
of water management. With a centralized dike regime the safety of the land and
its inhabitants depends largely upon the policy of the dike bailiff. The more
one had to lose, the more strongly would this dependence be felt. This is why the
great lords, who possessed the most land and so would suffer most from a bad
37. Ibidem, 529-33.
38. Ibidem, 534.
39. C. de Waard, Inventaris van de archieven der besturen van het eiland Walcheren, 1511-1870
(Middelburg, 1914) Appendix VI, 798.
12
dike administration, aspired after the office of dike bailiff. On the other hand,
their self-interest was a guarantee to the count that the duties would be properly
discharged. The dike bailiffs in Zeeland appointed their own sworn men,40 so
that the latter, too, came from the circle of the lords.
To sum up, we may say that, during the fourteenth century, after a short period
during which the count held a strong grip on the control of the administration
of dikes and drainage, the lords succeeded in recovering the position they had
held in the thirteenth century. In the ambachten outside the drainage districts they
regained unlimited power. In those within the drainage districts their old position
was adapted to the new situation only to the extent that where, during the thirteenth century, every lord had a share in the control of the administration of
dikes and drainage, during the fourteenth century only a number of them carried
out the actual administration. It would incidentally be mistaken to believe that
the lords who did not form part of the centrally controlled dike administrations
permitted themselves to be excluded entirely from the control of the adminstration
of dikes and drainage. On the contrary, they continued to form a factor of importance throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which even the strongest
dike bailiff had to take duly into account.
THE ORIGINS OF THE STATES OF ZEELAND
The same can be said mutatis mutandis of the general political situation. The
power of the lords no longer reached such heights in the fourteenth century as
it did in the thirteenth century, but by profiting skilfully from certain changes in
society, the lords remained so important collectively and, in many instances individually that the count could not act without them. In order to be able to understand their position in respect of their dependants as well as in relation to the count
(and this is important for what follows), we should pause a moment to consider
the three forms in which the Zeeland lords manifested themselves: as nobles,
as territorial lords and as vassals. From early times there had been two conditions
in Zeeland: noble and ignoble, nobiles and ignobiles. The lords belonged to the
nobility. To put it more strongly, if one ignores the female element, one may even
say that the nobility and the class of the lords approximately coincided. 41 This
was a consequence of the infinite divisibility of the ambachten. The lords held
their ambachten in fee from the count and were therefore homines comitis. Here,
too, they occupied an exclusive position, since, apart from a very few lands in
fee and-after 13IO-tithes, there were no other fiefs in Zeeland than ambachten,
40. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 549.
41. I. H. Gosses, De rechterlijke organisatie van Zeeland in de middeleeuwen (Groningen-The
Hague, 1917) 73; Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 389.
13
C. DEKKER
so that the terms lord and vassal also coincided in practice. 42 In their quality of
homines comitis the lords formed a court of vassals, the comital court, which,
under the presidency of the count himself or his oldest son, exercised the highest
judicial powers in the whole of Zeeland. 43 One of its tasks was to pass an order
in respect of the schot, an old annual tax, levied on the land, paid by the freeholders,
collected by the lords and benefitting the count.44 No permission was required
from the interested parties for this levy (Philip of Leiden called the Zeeland schot
one of the three 'hidden treasures' possessed by the count),45 only a formal order
from the comital court, legalizing the collection by the count and declaring nonpayers in default. 46
Lastly, in their quality of lord (scultetus, officiatus, dominus temporalis), the
Zeeland nobles not only occupied an important place in the judicial organization,
but they also represented the ignoble inhabitants of their ambacht in law relative
to the outside world. They had traditionally acted as their guardians. 47 This latter
aspect came conspicuously to the fore during the fourteenth century when the count
repeatedly appealed to his subjects to assist him financially in respect of the necessitas terre. The count could not impose these extraordinary aids (preces) without
infringing the property rights of his subjects. He had to obtain consent for them.
Because these extraordinary aids were levied according to the old pattern of the
schot, the consent had to be given by the freeholders, represented by their lords.
In other words, the formality of the passing of an order by the homines comitis
in respect of the increasingly frequent extraordinary aids was henceforth to be
preceded by a prior deliberation by the lords (but these were the same people
as the homines comitis), which might or might not result in a consent, with or
without conditions, by means of which the vassals-lords placed the count in their
debt. 48 In addition, the count also called upon the homines comitis, certainly as
early as 1318, to deliberate upon certain matters without an aid being directly invol42. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 438.
43. Ibidem, 400-2. A monograph has been devoted to the comital court of justice: L. W. A. M.
Lasonder, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de hooge vierschaar in Zeeland (The Hague, 1909). The
view of the Middle Ages expressed there has been largely corrected by Gosses, Rechterlijke
organisatie, 205-300.
44. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 426-30.
45. Philip calls the preces mensurarum in Zeeland a iocale. The other 'hidden treasures' are the
servitia in Zeeland and the wood of Mourmal in Hainaut, Philipp us de Leyden, De Cura reipublicae et sorte principantis, facsimile ed. by R. Feenstra (Amsterdam, 1971) cas. 43, 15 (ed. p. 176)
folio 30. Elsewhere he relates the Zeeland schot to regalia, ibidem cas. 41, 4 (ed. p. 167) folio 28v.
46. This order was originally given by the court of echevins of the castelry. When this regional
bench disappeared during the 13th century, the task passed to the court of vassals, Gosses,
Rechterlijke organisatie, 183, 184. See, further, R. Fruin, De provincie Zeeland en hare rechterlijke
indeeling voor 1795 (Middelburg, 1933) 20.
47. Gosses, Rechterlijke organisatie, 91-6; Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 387, 388.
48. Fruin, Provincie Zeeland, 19, 20; F. H. J. Lemmink, Het ontstaan van de Staten van Zeeland
en hun geschiedenis tot het jaar 1555 (Roosendaal, 1951) 49, 53.
14
ved,49 probably on the grounds of an old feudal mutual obligation for the granting
of consilium et auxilium.
A by no means negligible area of land was in the possession of the citizens of
the towns. They had long escaped the tutelage of the lords and, to the extent
that they did regard themselves as being represented, it was certainly not by the
lords, but by their own municipal administration. It happened that the payment
of both the schot and the extraordinary aid was so arranged that the freeholders
paid the money to their lord, who paid it in his turn to the count's rentmeester
(general tax collector), retaining as he did so a proportion for himself, unless
otherwise stipulated in respect of the extraordinary aids. During the course of
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries certain religious institutions and citizens
of certain towns received the privilege of ieveringe, i.e. they were permitted to
pay the money due directly to the count's rentmeester so by-passing the lord
in whose ambacht their land was situated. 50 As far as the towns were concerned,
it became the custom during the fourteenth century for the money owed by
the citizens in taxes to be paid in a lump sum from the municipal treasury as
an advance to be recovered from the taxpayers by the municipal authorities. 51
This circumstance, which was advantageous for the count, who generally wanted
to have the sum voted at his disposal as soon as possible, was one of the reasons
why, from the end of the fourteenth century, he also summoned the towns
of Middelburg and Zierikzee to participate in the deliberations about the aids, 52
which is only a variant of a universal phenomenon. The rulers increasingly
needed the support of the economically prosperous towns and the latter benefitted
in their turn from a powerful administration to encourage their development. In Holland and Zeeland, particularly during the turbulent period around
1350, under the rule of Countess Margaret (1345-1354) and Count William V
(1354-1358), the towns began to play an important role. They were repeatedly
consulted in financial and, consequently, also political matters relating to the
county and they increased their strength with the privileges which they wrung
from the count in exchange for their support. It should be noted that their
influence waned as soon as the count felt more independent financially. 53
49. Lemmink, Ontstaan Staten van Zeeland, 47, 48, 56, 57.
SO. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 440-9, 457-67. During the 13th century only the citizens of Middelburg possessed the privilege of leveringe, during the first half of the 14th century the citizens
of Zierikzee also gained it, at the end of the 14th century the citizens of Reimerswale and, from
1421, those of Kortgene. The land-holding citizens of Goes never possessed the privilege.
5!. Lemmink, Ontstaan Staten van Zeeland, 49; R. Fruin, 'Schot en bede in Zeeland', Verslag
van de algemeene vergadering van het Historisch Genootschap (Utrecht, 1903) 55-95, especially 91.
52. They originally met, however, in separate assemblies, Lemmink, Ontstaan Staten van Zeeland,
49, SO, 57, 74.
53. J. F. Niermeyer, 'Henegouwen, Holland en Zeeland onder het huis Wittelsbach', in: Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, III (Utrecht, 1951) 19, 101 fr. and the literature quoted there.
15
c.
DEKKER
While the involvement of the towns introduced a new element, the consultation
of the lords presented a mixture of old and new. A new element was the necessity
for the count to summon the lords as representatives of the ignoble freeholders
in order to obtain permission for an aid. An old element was the consultation with
the homines comitis in order to obtain the feudal consilium. The enormous number
of lords in Zeeland (in 1331, 410 on the island of South Beveland alone 54) made
it most improbable, if not unthinkable, that they would ever appear anywhere
in full strenght either to sit in judgement or to give consent for the aids. Even if
only a tenth of them were to appear, it would have been impossible to work with
such a clumsy body. We are not well informed about the number of lords who
generally attended to give consent for the aids. For his political hearings, however,
the count called upon a few potentes among the lords. There were usually less than
ten, not always the same ones and of differing geographical origin, such as the
lord of Veere from the Borsele family, members of the Brigdamme family, the
abbot of the Abbey of Our Lady at Middelburg (Walcheren), members of the
Maalstede, Kruiningen and Reimerswale families (South Beveland), members of
the Oostende family (Borsele), the lord of Kortgene (North Beveland), members of
the Haamstede family (Schouwen), the lord of St. Maartensdijk (Tholen) etc. SS
Under Count Albert (regent from 1358, count 1389-1404) these representatives
of the lords were called his Zeeland council, but the council did not have permanent members at that time. In their assembly they could also have delegates of
the towns beside them (den raet ende steden van Zeelant-the council and towns
of Zeeland).S6 During the fifteenth century, under the Burgundian princes, there
grew from these occasional assemblies, with their varying composition, the increasingly rigidly defined college that came to be called the States of Zeeland.
The term 'States' calls to mind a representative body of the people to assist the
ruler, consisting of a number of members organized according to condition, but
that was not quite the case in Zeeland. Influences from elsewhere (from Hainaut
via the count and from France via Hainaut s7), where the state ordered according
55. Lemmink, Ontstaan Staten van Zeeland, 67-71.
56. Ibidem, 74, 75. Fruin, Provincie Zeeland, 21, considered that the States of Zeeland originated
in the comital court of justice. Lemmink, however, drew attention to the fact that the court
was convened at different times and perhaps with a different (in any event smaller) number of
members for giving a direction in respect of the aid than when consenting to the aid or discussing political matters, and that the towns took part in the latter meetings, but did not attend
those of the court.
57. Lemmink, Ontstaan Staten van Zeeland, 51. According to D. T. Enklaar, 'De opkomst van
den grafelijken raad in Holland", in: Biidragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, I (The Hague,
1946) 16-30, English influences also played a role at an earlier stage, but this seems to us rather
far-fetched. Cf. also the review of Enklaar's article by P. W. A. Immink, 'Landsheerlijke raad
en statenvergadering', ibidem, I (1946) 242-8.
16
to condition was more clearly defined, certainly played a part in Zeeland, but it
is nevertheless going too far in this province to speak of 'the nobility', 'the clergy'
and 'the towns' as members of the States, even though this did happen later.
Each town represented only itself or, if one prefers, its citizens. There was no
question of Middelburg, for example, also representing Domburg and Westkapelle,
towns that were not summoned to the States Assembly. From the count's point
of view, the potentes summoned from among the lords may be regarded as representatives of their fellow lords and even of the ignoble inhabitants of the ambachten.
In any event, they sat in the States as lords, not as nobles, and the abbot of
Middelburg, who was not a noble, formed one of their number as lord of a few
ambachten on Walcheren. The other clergy in Zeeland were not lords (with
the exception of the abbot of Ter Doest, who never played a part in the politics of Zeeland, since he lived outside the county) and there is nothing to show
that the abbot of Middelburg was considered to speak on their behalf as a representative of the clergy.
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATES IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS
The fairly long digression on the developments in the political sphere was
necessary to give a better understanding of the parallel evolution in the sphere
of dike and drainage administration. Here, too, the lords were able to make
their influence permanently felt, but they had to acknowledge the towns as formidable rivals for power. An important factor in the creation of the States of Zeeland
was the aid. A comparable factor in relation to dike and drainage administration
were the taxes for the maintenance of the civil engineering works, such as watercourses, sluices, dams, dikes, roads etc. Like the aid, the dike and drainage dues
were levied within the framework of the ambacht. The ordinary dike maintenance
was paid by the freeholders in kind under the responsibility of the lords. The
maintenance of the sluices and the carrying out of extraordinary dike works
were financed through taxation levied on the freeholders, collected by the lords
and spent by the centrally controlled dike administrations. 58 The latter is applicable
only to the areas of jurisdiction of the administrations, i.e. to the drainage districts.
Outside the drainage districts the lords themselves attended to the spending of the
monies. The lords, therefore, occupied an important place in the financial organization of the drainage districts through their responsibility for the collection of
the monies owed by their dependants. Even more than to their role as collectors,
however, they owed their key position to the circumstance that their consent was
required for the levying of extraordinary contributions. Just as the count could not
levy an extraordinary aid on his own authority without infringement of the
58. Dekker, Zuid-Bel'eland, 579-81, 594.
17
C. DEKKER
property rights of his dependants, but had to summon the lords to obtain their
consent, so did the dike bailiff have to obtain the co-operation of the freeholders,
represented by their lords, before he could impose an extraordinary levy. Moreover, just as the homines comitis were consulted by the count in respect of political
decisions, so were the views of the ghemene manne (common vassals) heard in
matters relating to dike law. It appears from two deeds of 1323, appointing dike
bailiffs in two different areas-the southern part of Walcheren and Between Honte
and Hinkele on South Beveland-that the lords possessed legislative powers in
respect of dike law. 59 Another probable prerogative of the lords was the right
of consultation in the appointment of the dike bailiff. As far as North Beveland
is concerned, we know that the lords there in 1328 were permitted to propose
dike bailiffs for nomination by the count and that was probably also the situation
elsewhere in Zeeland, although we have no evedence of this from before the
fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. 60
The parallelism ofthe situation in the political sphere and in that ofthe administration of dikes and drainage is also apparent in relation to the leveringe. This
is seemingly a detail, but it is important for the relationship between the dike
administrations and the towns. Although, in contrast to the aid, the lords had
to pay the whole of the sum that they had collected from their freeholders in
drainage or dike dues to the dike adminstration and were not allowed to keep
anything for themselves, there also existed here the privilege of the leveringe
for certain ecclesiastical bodies and freeholder citizens of towns. 61 They were
permitted to pay their dues directly to the dike administration, which was much
less circuitous than going through the many lords in whose ambachten they had
land holdings. Here, too, we now see the towns paying the money owed by their
citizens in a lump sum and sometimes in advance. Moreover, and we might almost
say, as a matter of course, the towns had a say in the apportioning of the dike
district charges. We unfortunately have too few sources to be able to study closely
the role of the lords in the first half of the fourteenth century, but the Walcheren
sources show from the middle of that century a development which exhibits
many similarities with the evolution in the political sphere.
It is no coincidence that it is specifically the Walcheren sources which show
this development. This island, with the influential town of Middelburg and the
powerful abbot, set the tone in this respect. Here, too, it was Count William V
59. Van Mieris, Groot charterboek, II, 312 (1323 March 31) and 313 (1323 April 1). Cf. Dekker,
Zuid-Beveland, 568. In the Flemish drainage districts the freeholders (probi viri, meentucht) had
the same authority, Galle, Beveiligd bestaan, 127-9.
60. Van Mieris, Groot charterboek, II, 420 (March 1); Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 535; A. J. F.
Fokker, Het bestuur van het waterschap Schouwen (Zierikzee, 1883) 13.
18
who first permitted the town of Middelburg to play an important role. He gave
it temporarily in 1355 the control of the dikes in the whole of Walcheren, because
the lords and the dike administrations could not take united action to deal with
the precarious condition of the dikes at this time. 62 From this we have indirect
evidence that not only the dike administrations, but also the lords were concerned
with the management of the dikes. Because they failed at a crucial moment through
differences of opinion, the count permitted the municipal administration to intervene. Although the intervention was temporary, it had consequences for the
future. Like the town, there were also among the lords in Walcheren a few who
had interests in all the drainage districts of the island. During the second half
of the fourteenth century we see the magistrate maintaining constant contact
and co-operating with the most important of them, i.e. the lord of Veere and
the abbot of Middelburg. The joint action of the Walcheren potentes encouraged
co-ordination in matters of dike and drainage administration, which had until
then been dominated by the self-interest of the various drainage districts. Their
de facto leadership in times of emergency was repeatedly recognized in law and
strengthened by the count. For example, in 1396 and 1406 he placed the magistrate,
the abbot, the lord of Veere and the rentmeester (general tax collector) of
Zeeland West of the ScheIdt in supreme charge of the repair and maintenance
of the dikes of the whole of Walcheren. In 1411 a similar authority was given to
the rentmeester alone. Leaving aside the rentmeester, there is a striking parallel
with the political evolution. In the political field in the second half of the fourteenth
century, there existed the comital court of justice and the lords came together to
deliberate jointly over the aids, on which occasions the towns also had a voice.
On the other hand, the count discussed occasional matters requiring a swift decision with a few important representatives of the lords and the towns. In the field
of dike and drainage administration, the lords had at the same time in Walcheren
the power to make by-laws in the drainage districts, apportioned the extraordinary
contributions and were present at the closing of the accounts, which the town
corporation of Middelburg also attended. At a time of emergency, however, the
count left it to a few prominent lords, including the abbot, and the town to save
the country, with or, if necessary, without the dike administrations. Although their
number was not fixed throughout the fifteenth century, they are to be regarded
as a representative body of the freeholders of Walcheren and they were called
the States of Walcheren.
A similar development can be observed in the Beoosten Yerseke drainage
district of South Beveland, although by comparison with Walcheren it began
considerably later. There is no mention of the town of Reimerswale being given
62. A. Meerkamp van Embden, 'Nieuwe gegevens over het bestuur van Walcheren in den landsheerlijken tijd', Archie! Zeeuwsch Genootschap (1933) 81-96; Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 570-2;
De Waard, inventaris besturen Walcheren, 51, 52.
19
C. DEKKER
a voice during the whole of the fourteenth century. When the dike administration
failed in its duties in 1419, John of Brabant charged three of the greatest lords,
i.e. Nicholas Kervink of Reimerswale, Arnold of Kruiningen and the abbot of
Ter Doest, as well as the magistrate of Reimerswale, with the supervision of the
dike administration, a mandate that was renewed a year later by John of Bavaria. 63
A few ordinances are known from the second and third quarters of the fifteenth
century concerning the dike laws and the extraordinary contributions in Beoosten
Yerseke, from which it appears that they were enacted with the approval of lords,
prelates and the town of Reimerswale. The draftsmen in the ducal chancellory
should not be blamed for referring separately to the prelates, but this term could
have been omitted in the Zeeland circumstances, especially since it is given in the
plural. Only the abbot of Ter Doest, lord of Krabbendijke and surroundings,
was a member of the States of Beoosten Yerseke, and not as a prelate, but as a
lord.
The States of Bewesten Yerseke came into existence much later again than in
Beoosten Yerseke. 64 While, in the latter drainage district in the middle of the
fifteenth century, extraordinary dike dues were determined after consultation
with the lords, including the abbot of Ter Doest and the town of Reimerswale,
in Bewesten Yerseke such a contribution was decided in 1452 at a meeting at
which were present, in addition to a delegate of the ruler and the dike administration, only the lords and the freeholders. The town corporation of Goes was
present (naer ouder costume/according to ancient custom) in 1501 at the closing
of the account, but after that time decisions were still repeatedly taken after consultation with only the lords and the freeholders. The position of the town of
Goes differed in two respects from that of Reimerswale. In the first place, Goes
was not situated in the drainage district of Bewesten Yerseke, but had, as one of
the parishes traditionally lying outside the drainage district, its own (manorial,
later municipal) system of dike management. In the second place, the citizens
of Goes never obtained the privilege of the leveringe from the count, so that
they had to pay through the lords and the town had little significance financially
for the drainage district. In view of this, it is remarkable that constant reference
is made in connection with Bewesten Yerseke to lords and freeholders. Although
the corporation of Goes had no voice in the drainage district, a number of landowning citizens of Goes probably did have.
From the second decade of the sixteenth century the municipal corporation
of Goes was consulted in all financial matters. But if its location outside the drainage district was evidently no longer an impediment for Goes to exercise an
63.
64.
20
Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 572, 573.

Ibidem, 574-6.
influence on the administrative affairs of the drainage district, nor was it for Middelburg, which also had citizens with freehold land in Bewesten Yerseke. The magistrate of Middelburg also had a voice from that time. In addition to the lords
and the representatives of the two towns just mentioned, more clerics also gradually began to take part in the closing of the drainage districts' accounts. They
included the abbot of the Abbey of Our Lady at Middelburg, the prior of the
Crutched Friars at Goes, the abbot of Ter Doest (represented by the magister
grangie of Monsterhoek at Kattendijke) and the dean of the chapter of Our
Lady at Kapelle. None of these clergy was a lord in the drainage district of Bewesten Yerseke, but were they nevertheless members of the States? They need not have
been. In Walcheren in 1456, besides the abbot of Middelburg, the provost of the
Premonstratensians at Zoetendale, the commander of the Knights of St. John
of Kerkwerve and the abbess of the Cistercians of Waterlooswerve had a voice
in matters relating to dike and drainage administration, as did the towns of Domburg and Westkapelle in addition to the town of Middelburg. 6 But when the
States of Walcheren were a mature institution in the sixteenth century, a welldefined college with a limited number of members, operating according to rules
laid down by the ruler, there proves to have been only one prelate and onetown. 66
The States of Beoosten Yerseke were still evolving when this area was permanently
inundated by the flood of 1532 and the States of Bewesten Yerseke never developed
fully. The term 'States' was used passim in the records of the latter drainage
district which have been preserved from 1501 onwards, but there is no question
of a closed college and one cannot say precisely who were the members. The
combination 'States and freeholders' does occur constantly in the sixteenthcentury texts. In other words, it must have been clear to contemporaries that
not everyone who had a voice was a member of the States.
Indeed, an emancipation of the freeholders is to be observed in all the drainage
districts during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 67 Where they were at first
represented by their lords and later, insofar as they lived in towns, by their municipal corporation, they gradually wanted to speak for themselves. The process
began with the religious houses. In Walcheren, as appears from the quotation
above, they had already achieved this goal by 1456. In Bewesten Yerseke this
stage was not reached until the first half of the sixteenth century. Other, nonclerical, freeholders, however, also considered themselves no longer to be represented by the lords. Times had indeed changed. The contact between the lord
and his dependants had greatly diminished. In many instances, the lord was a
member ofthe high nobility, who lived outside Zeeland and he was little concerned
65.
66.
67.
Ibidem, 573, 574 and note 1.

De Waard, Inventaris besturen Walcheren, 51, 52,792-8 (Appendix VI).
Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 576, 577.
21
C. DEKKER
with the well-being of the inhabitants of his ambacht. There was no longer any
question whatever of tutelage. Moreover, there had arisen a social middle class
of farmers whose wealth rivalled that of many lesser lords. Accordingly, it was
they, the very rich farmers, the main freeholders with substantial landed property,
who attended the closing of the drainage district accounts beside the lords (prelates) and towns and were consulted on questions of extraordinary dike works.
But they were not regarded as belonging to the States, because they did not
achieve their influence until a time when the meaning of the term 'States' was
no longer susceptible to change. According to the politically influenced usage then
current, 'States' meant nobility, clergy and towns, and the other freeholders fell
outside this definition. This did not prevent them gaining constantly in influence,
however. They gained so much, in fact, that the distinction between States and
other freeholders diminished on South Beveland during the second half of the
sixteenth century. In addition, because the lords could no longer maintain their
special position during the seventeenth century, there remained in the drainage
district of Bewesten Yerseke a representation of freeholders of town and country,
in which those of the town played by far the leading part. The development was
somewhat different in Walcheren. Not only did the prelate disappear here with
the Reformation, but in 1574 all the lords except one were excluded from the
representation. The so-called first nobleman, in the person of the Prince of Orange
as Marquis of Veere, would henceforth represent all the lords. Besides the delegates of Middelburg, those of the towns of Veere and Flushing also obtained
seats in the States of Walcheren. The influence of the institutionalized delegates
of the main freeholders in Walcheren remained small until the middle of the seventeenth century.68 The representative body itself, on the other hand, became so
powerful that it completely overshadowed the administrations of the dike bailiff
and sworn men. This was possible because of the personal distinction of the members, but also because of the urgent need to create a co-ordinated dike administration for the whole of the island, a need that could be met only by the States. 69
Although the development of the representation of the freeholders in Zeeland
West of the ScheIdt appears to have occurred according to a clear pattern, approximating to that on which the States of Zeeland had been based, there are nevertheless a number of differences between the various areas. The representation of
the freeholders on Walcheren, which was initially based on the individual drainage
districts and consisted only of the lords, developed into a college with a number
of members for the whole island. On South Beveland two such colleges developed,
one each for the drainage districts of Beoosten and Bewesten Yerseke and both
68.
69.
22
Fruin, Provincie Zeeland, 88; De Waard, Inventaris besturen Walcheren, 53-6.

Ibidem, 49, 50.
clearly less well-developed than the college on Walcheren. In North Beveland and
in Between Honte and Hinkele the representation by the lords never developed into
States because of the lack of towns (and prelates). Indeed, only in Walcheren and
Beoosten Yerseke did the prelates, namely the abbots of Middelburg and Ter
Doest, respectively, belong as lords clearly and from the beginning to the States.
The matter is not so clear for Bewesten Yerseke. They probably belonged here
to the main freeholders, who remained outside the States. The reason for the
emergence of a single representation in Walcheren and of two in South Beveland
is to be found in the central position occupied by the town of Middelburg on
Walcheren. Goes and Reimerswale were each the centre of a part of South Beveland, as Middelburg was of the whole of Walcheren. While the interests which
Reimerswale had in Bewesten Yerseke and those which Goes had in Beoosten
Yerseke were negligible, Middelburg had interests in all the drainage districts
of Walcheren. The citizens of Middelburg owned land in all the drainage districts
and, if one of the districts were to be flooded, all the others would inevitably
follow. There were no inner dikes to limit such a disaster to a part of the island.
In such an event even the existence of the town would be threatened. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the town corporation was constantly concerned about
the dikes of the island, as were indeed the abbot of the Abbey of Our Lady and
a few powerful lords, who owned land in more than one drainage district. The
other lords had scarcely any interest in what happened outside their own drainage
district and the dike administrations were equally short-sighted.
REPRESENTATION OF THE FREEHOLDERS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTY OF HOLLAND
Small as the differences were between the representations of the freeholders

in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt, all the greater is the distinction between this
region and the remainder of the county of Holland. In a few of the dike districts
in Holland proper there existed in the Middle Ages nothing that at all resembled
a representation of freeholders and, where something of that kind was present,
it only seldom formed a real counterweight to the centrally controlled dike administration and nowhere do we find the title 'States' used for such a representation.
Not until the sixteenth and, particularly, the seventeenth century could the colleges
of main free holders formed at that time stand the test of a comparison with
fourteenth-century Walcheren. The special characteristic of Zeeland West of the
ScheIdt is that the representation of the freeholders played a role there from the
beginning. Although the ambachten continued to play a part in the organization
of the dike districts in Holland, the lords as such or as homines comitis did not
form a group with whom the dike administrations had to reckon in all their doings,
23
C. DEKKER
nor upon whom they were greatly dependent from the beginning, particularly
from the financial standpoint. The powers which the lords had sometimes still
retained, such as the inspection of certain dikes, were less far-reaching, or were
limited to exercising influence on the dike administration itself, such as the right
of nomination in the appointment of dike bailiffs or the selection of dike reeves. 70
In contrast to the hoogheemraadschappen (extended dike districts) on the mainland of Holland, such as Rijnland, Delfland and Schieland, the influence of the
lords did extend a little further in the waarden of South Holland. The lords in
the Lopikerwaard on the borders of Holland and Utrecht, for example, had a
voice in the taking of decisions and control over expenditure, at least if they were
summoned by the dike administration,71 while in the Great Waard there were
annual meetings between the dike administration and the lords and delegates of
the towns. 72 In the big hoogheemraadschappen of Rijnland, Delfland and Schieland
the lords played practically no role, although the high nobility was well represented
in the dike administrations, which filled their vacancies by co-option. 73 From the
end of the fourteenth century the so-called ambachtsbewaarders (keepers of the
ambacht), known elsewhere as waarslieden (Woerden, Putten) or grootwaarslieden
(Great Waard), acted there as intermediaries between the lords and the hoogheemraadschap.74 They were representatives appointed occasionally by the lord, but
generally by the scultetus and echevins and sometimes by the freeholders of an
ambacht to further their interests in relation to the outside world, and particularly
in relation to the hoogheemraadschappen. They generally placed the contracts,
on behalf of central dike boards, for inland works for the maintenance of which
their ambacht was responsible, supervised the carrying-out of such works, collected
the necessary money from the freeholders and rendered accounts to the ambacht
and, sometimes, to the central dike boards. The origin of the institution of ambachtsbewaarder or waarsman in Holland has not yet been adequately studied.
70. The choice of dike reeves in Holland was only rarely a matter for the dike bailiff, although
it was the case in the Zwijndrechtse Waard, Van Mieris, Groot charterboek, 11,511 (1332 Apri16)
and in a few dike districts in North Holland, De Vries, Dijks- en molenbestuur, 485. Besides the
lords, the towns particularly played an important role here. A brilliant survey of the manner of
appointing the heemraden in Holland is to be found in Beekman, Dijk- en waterschapsrecht,
779-81 in voce heemraad.
71. J. van de Water, ed., Groot placaatboek ... 's lands van Utrecht, II (Utrecht 1729) 106, 107
(1328 July 24), 109-14 (1454 Aug. 10).
72. Fockema Andreae, Studien, III, 19, 20.
73. Fockema Andreae, Rijnland, 44; Dolk, Geschiedenis De/fiand, 24, 27, 28, 59. Co-option
was also introduced in the Great Waard in 1401, Fockema Andreae, Studien, III, 20.
74. Concerning the ambachtsbewaarders and waarslieden in general, see Beekman, Dijk- en
waterschapsrecht, 71-4 in voce ambachtsbewaarder. See also, inter alia, Fockema Andreae,
Rijnland, 100-12, 132; idem, Studien, III, 17, 18; Dolk, Geschiedenis De/fiand, 61-9, 73; J. L. van
der Gouw, De ring van Putten. Onderzoekingen over een hoogheemraadschap in het Deltagebied
(The Hague, 1969) 64, 65.
24
Nor does the existing literature enlighten us about the financial relationship
between ambacht and hoogheemraadschap during the period before the first appearance of the waarsman in the sources in 1375. 75 Where ambachtsbewaarders or
waarslieden occurred, the consequences of the financial decentralization which
accompanied their appearance differed according to the strength of the dike
district administration's grip on the ambachtsbewaarders. The consequence of
the institution for the Great Waard was that the whole economy of the ambacht
came to fall completely under the authority and supervision of the central dike
board. In Delfiand, on the other hand, the central dike board declined into a
state of virtual tutelage as far as accounting was concerned. The rise of the ambachtsbewaarders must be seen as an expression of the struggle of the freeholders
to gain a voice in matters affecting the administration of dikes and drainage.
Sometimes the ambachtsbewaarders were heard as representatives of the freeholders by the dike administrations in the taking of decisions, whether or not
accompanied by the delegates of the towns.
The towns of Holland, which had grown in power particularly from the end
of the fourteenth century, benefitted as much from strong water defences and
controlled land drainage as did those of Zeeland. In Holland, too, perhaps even
more than in Zeeland, the citizens of the towns owned or had the use of extensive
areas of land in the dike districts. At an early date, i.e. from the thirteenth century,
the towns succeeded in gaining an influence in the dike and drainage administration, in a manner which differed from place to place and in each instance to a
varying degree. Examples were Dordrecht in the Great Waard, the Tieselijnswaard, the Zwijndrechtse Waard, the Alblasserwaard and the Krimpenerwaard,
Gouda and Schoonhoven in the Krimpenerwaard, Rotterdam in Schieland,
Delft in Delfland, Leiden and Haarlem in Rijnland, Amsterdam in the Diemer
Zeedijk, etc. This influence was sometimes institutionalized and sometimes
exercised only de facto. Here it was expressed through participation in the administration, there through control of expenditure, in one place through a voice in
decision making, elsewhere through special treatment for the citizens.
One does not find in Holland before the sixteenth century, when assemblies
of main free holders were instituted in a few dike districts, a permanent representation of the freeholders such as existed from the beginning in the lords and, later,
in the States, in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt. In Rijnland the institution of such
a representation was preceded by a long period of preparation. In 1396, the dike
land drainage authority was not permitted to levy ground taxes without the agreement of the towns of Haarlem and Leiden. During the fifteenth century consent
was required for the carrying out of certain works from both or one of these
towns and from the ambachtsbewaarders, while, in the sixteenth century, it was
75. Van Mieris, Groot charterboek, III, 315 (1375 Nov. 14).
25
C. DEKKER
also required from representatives of the high nobility and certain prelates.
The permanent college of main freeholders, which arose from this in 1577, was
copied in Schieland in about 1580, in Delfiand in 1589 and in certain other dike
districts in the seventeenth century.76 In Putten, where the chapter of Our Lady
at Geervliet had gained a voice in matters of dike and drainage administration
as early as 1451, a permanent assembly of main freeholders was created in 1516. 77
All the same there remained a notable difference between Holland and Zeeland
West of the ScheIdt arising from the difference in time at which the representation
of freeholders came into existence. The assemblies of main freeholders in Holland
(hoofdingelanden) are comparable with the States of the drainage districts in
Zeeland, while in Zeeland the term 'main freeholders' (brede geerfden) is generally
used to denote precisely those landed proprietors who were not originally members
of the States, but became so later on.
Separate mention should be made of the dike administration system of Schouwen, the principal island of Zeeland East of the Scheldt. We have seen that three
dike administrations functioned there in the first half of the fourteenth century,
i.e. those of the northern part of Schouwen, the southern part of Schouwen and
the Quaalambacht. Later there were five such administrations, one for each of
the fifths, to which the six sixths of 1291 had meanwhile been reduced. The town
of Zierikzee had the right of nomination in appointing the dike bailiff of the Quaalambacht, one of the fifths, while the lords probably had this right in respect of the
other dike bailiffs,78 but they otherwise played only a small part in the dike administration. Disagreement between the administrations and poor dike management
were occordingly here the order of the day, but even in times of emergency the
lords played no significant part. The ruler did intervene in 1426, not by granting
extensive powers to a few leading representatives of the freeholders, but by instituting a central dike administration for the whole island, consisting of a chief dike
bailiff and seven dike reeves. The appointment of the dike reeves, always for a
period of one year, was to be made by the municipal corporation of Zierikzee. 79
The power of Zierikzee in matters of dike and drainage administration constantly increased, while that of main freeholders, whether or not they were lords,
did not appreciably increase. In the sixteenth century people also spoke in Schouwen of 'States', by analogy with Zeeland West of the ScheIdt, but a text of 1519
shows that the term had quite a different content there: the first member of the
76. Concerning the rise of the colleges of main landholders in general, see Beekman, Dijk- en
waterschapsrecht, 845-54 in voce hoofdingelanden. See also, inter alia, Fockema Andreae, Rijnland,
130-2, 165-72; Dolk, Geschiedenis Delfland, 208-15.
77. Van der Gouw, Ring van Putten, 78, 79.
78. Fokker, Waterschap Schouwen, 13, 14.
79. Ibidem, 29, 30.
26
States of Schouwen was the chief dike bailiff, the second the comital rentmeester
of Zeeland East of the ScheIdt and the third element the dike administrations of
the fifths. One can scarcely call these three forms of central administration, combined in a single college, a representation of the freeholders. In 1543 the States
were defined as follows: the chief dike bailiff with the seven dike reeves, the rentmeester of Zeeland East of the ScheIdt and the magistrate of Zierikzee with the
main freeholders. Here, too, there existed a tendency, therefore, towards greater
influence on the part of the freeholders, but more through infiltration into and
co-operation with, than as a counterweight to, the administrations. so
CONCLUSION
Reviewing the situation as a whole, there is evidence throughout the territory

of the count of Holland of the existence during the Middle Ages of a striving towards the freeholders obtaining a voice in matters affecting dike and drainage
administration. This striving understandably found expression first and foremost
in relation to the assessment, spending and payment of the taxes which they had
to raise. This participation was everywhere realized only gradually, after a passage
of time and with difficulty, except for Zeeland West of the ScheIdt, where it seems
to have been the obvious solution from the beginning, i.e. from the beginning
of the fourteenth century. The participation took a form appropriate to that age,
namely, in a representation by the lords. This form evolved parallel with the
evolution in society towards a representative body consisting of a number of
members. Such a body appeared first in Walcheren, later also in South Beveland.
The early existence of a marked dualism in power relationships in the drainage
districts of Zeeland West of the ScheIdt derives from the dual origin of these drainage districts: the draining corporation as a creation of the lords and the dike
bailiwick as an institution of the central government. In a dike bailiwick imposed
from above, a representation of the freeholders was not a necessary element.
Although entirely understandable under the circumstances, it was nevertheless
essentially alien. In the drainage district it lay at the basis of the institution.
In the water management bodies which originated in Holland from the communities of interest, this was equally the case, but here there already existed before the
intervention of the count central administrations of interested parties.
The filling of vacancies in these administrations by co-option was later the only
reminder of their communal origin. In Zeeland West of the ScheIdt every lord previously participated in the administration, and the traditional collective power
of the lords and the striving for independance which survived from centuries
80. Ibidem, 32-5; Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 567; Beekman, Dijk- en wate,schaps,echt, 1528,
1529 in voce staten van den lande van Schouwen.
27
C. DEKKER
of conflict were the reason why the old set-up was preserved with a number of
adaptations in the new situation. Two closely related factors played a decisive
role here: firstly, the important position occupied by the lords in the apportionment and collection of the dike and drainage dues and, secondly, the circumstance
that almost nowhere else than in Zeeland was the condition of the dikes so critical,
necessitating the frequent imposition of the extraordinary levy. (A voice in taxation
matters becomes more effective as the levies increase in frequency). While gatherings of (representatives of) the freeholders in Holland were generally a crisis
phenomenon, in Zeeland, which was in a semi-permanent state of emergency
throughout the Middle Ages, such meetings soon became a regular institution,
legally sanctioned by the ruler. In those dike districts of Holland where the situation was most critical, we also see a growth in the influence of the freeholders, as
in the Great Waard in the late fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century
and in Putten in the sixteenth century. In this last instance, the dike administration was even completely overshadowed by the college of main freeholders,
as in Walcheren by the States. 81 Within this context, the poor management of
the dikes by the centrally controlled dike administrations should also be remembered. This was a universal phenomenon during the late Middle Ages, but the
consequences were fatal in such emergency areas as Zeeland. While initially,
in the fourteenth century, the exercise of the office of dike bailiff by the lords
appeared to be a guarantee for a good administration, later, because lords resident
outside the drainage districts or even outside Zeeland altogether were appointed
to this function as favourites or creditors of the count, indifference, ignorance,
mismanagement and self-interest were rampant. Moreover, when the office of
dike bailiff had become purely a sinecure and, in addition, during the second
half of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth century, was let to the highest bidder,
so that it came into the hands of the high nobility (including women), the abbot
of Middelburg or the town corporations, there remained so many possibilities
for the holder to exploit it for his own benefit, that the safety of the country often
depended upon the opposing forces offered by the representations of the freeholders. 82
Emergencies and poor dike management occurred as frequently in Zeeland
East of the ScheIdt as in Zeeland West of the Scheldt and there, too, the freeholders strove to gain an influence on the administration. The solution which
was achieved there of a strong infiltration of the town of Zierikzee into the centrally controlled dike administration was certainly advantageous for the free81. Van der Gouw, Ring van Putten, 79-81.
82. Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 537-48; De Waard, Inventaris besturen Walcheren, 805, 806, Appendix VI.
28
holder citizens, but for the rural freeholders the form in which the representative
bodies functioned in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt probably better suited their
interests. The example of Schouwen, incidentally, clearly shows that emergencies
and poor dike management did help the freeholders to gain a voice in affairs,
but that the form in which they participated was determined by the historical
development of the dike district itself. In Schouwen, where no drainage districts
had arisen at the end of the twelfth century, where the lords had not profited during
the thirteenth century from the struggle between the counts of Flanders and Holland for the control of Zeeland West of the ScheIdt and where the interest of the
count of Holland in the maintenance of the dikes was already being felt in the
thirteenth century, the lords as a group were not able during the fourteenth century
to form a real counterweight to the centrally controlled administrations. The
town of Zierikzee would do it alone and in its own manner.
We must take care not to be led astray by the suggestion that the representation
in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt was more democratic than in Schouwen, for
example. We are using a modern concept that is not relevant to the circumstances
of the period under discussion. If we assume that the great majority of the freeholders with a real interest consisted of farmers, we must conclude that, in the
most favourable instances, there existed only a voice for and not of the interested
parties. In Zeeland West of the ScheIdt, where the freeholders were traditionally
represented by their lords and, later, by the States, their tutelage was probably
even greater than in those areas where they did not obtain a voice until the
sixteenth century, when their emancipation had progressed further. This is an
example of the law of the restraining advantage.
29
"
".
The organization of water administration

in Zeeland West of the ScheIdt c. 1350
~~-' Boundaries between Zeeland
West of the ScheIdt and Zeeland
East of the ScheIdt
+ ++ + Boundaries between
the dike bailiwicks
II II / / II II Drainage districts
NORTH BEtELAND
'-'-'-'
SCHOUWEN
.....
"
"
.J
SAARLAND
"
"
""
"
"
....
~SSE
1-++++++'"
)l1.t
Between Honte anJ

Hinkele
-t.l(~Jo:)<.
The 'Betrayal' of the Sixteenth-Century Bourgeoisie: A Myth?

Some Considerations of the Behaviour Pattern of the Merchants
of Antwerp in the Sixteenth Century*
H. SOLY
J. Sentou concludes his study of real-property-based wealth in Toulouse at the

close of the eighteenth century with the pronouncement that
dans la mesure ou Ie profit cherche a s'investir presque uniquement dans la rente fonciere,
comme Ie negoce nous en foumit un bon exemple, Ie capitalisme commercial toulousain
sera finalement dans l'incapacite de devenir un capitalisme industriel. L'infiation, au lieu
de foumir des capitaux neufs qui auraient pu orienter les investissements dans un sens
novateur, a ete utilisee par la grande bourgeoisie toulousaine dans Ie sens Ie plus conservateur qui rut, c'est-a-dire l'accroissement de son capital immobilier.l
We give this extensive quotation as a striking illustration of the now classic

thesis that the majority of merchants and industrialists in modern times have been
ambitious to acquire property (with or without an aristocratic title) and thus
to repudiate as soon as possible the status to which they owe their rise in the
social scale. The use of the expression 'trahison de la bourgeoisie',2 however,
for this changeover on the part of the middle classes from the economically
profitable employment of capital in commerce and industry, to 'pernicious'
investment in real property, i.e., in capital whose aim was no more than inertly to
accumulate interest (rent) also seems to us largely unjustified.
, Our opinion is that, firstly, this phenomenon took place on a large scale only
from the moment when commercial or industrial opportunities in the economic
centre where the entrepreneur was established were severely limited by internal
or external factors, and, secondly, that far too little attention has been paid to the
important way in which capital invested in property under the Ancien Regime
functioned as an instrument of credit, in other words the credit which an entrepreneur could draw on was usually in direct proportion to the extent and worth
of the real estate he owned. 3
This article is a translation of 'Het verraad der 16de-eeuwse burgerij: een mythe?' in Tijdschri/t
voor geschiedenis, LXXXVI (Groningen, 1973) 262-80.
1. J. Sentou, Lafortune immobiliere des Toulousains et la revolutionfran~aise (paris, 1970) 174.
2. P. Jeannin, Les marchands au XVle siecle (Paris, 1957) 175-76; F. Braudel, La Mediterranee
et Ie monde mediterraneen d l'epoque de Philippe II, II (2d edition; Paris, 1966) 67-74.
3. In this connection we should mention that L. Bergeron in a penetrating review of Sentou's
31
H. SOLY
The question is of the utmost importance in as much as in elucidating the behaviour pattern of a given social group attempts must be made not only to define that
group's objective position in society but to investigate the group's own subjective
image of itself.4 Hence the crucial significance of the notion 'betrayal of the bourgeoisie'. If one accepts the classic thesis, one is implicitly stating that the bourgeoisie in the modern era did not constitute a homogeneous class aware of itself
and with its own specific aims, distinct from and opposed to those of other social
groups. A critical investigation into the significance of real property for the bourgeoisie engaged in commerce and industry under the Ancien Regime is consequently of fundamental importance for the question of how far the bourgeoisie
had its own group mentality, in other words to what extent it was or was not
class-conscious.
It is no part of our present aim to provide an extensive treatment of capital
investment in real property under the Ancien Regime. The problem is too complex
and there is far too little reliable material. We propose to concentrate our attention
on one individual city in one particular period: Antwerp in the sixteenth century,
the most considerable international market north and west of the Alps and the
most important financial center in Europe.
That the merchants in Antwerp in the sixteenth century constituted the dominant economic group is beyond dispute. Detailed calculations as to the social structure of the popUlation of Antwerp have shown that in 1584/85, of the 10,176 men
classified by occupation, 32.8 per cent belonged to the propertied classes and
67.2 per cent to the arme ghemeynte (poor people). The propertied classes may
be subdivided into four groups: the lower-taxed (less that two and a half guilders
per month), the well-off (21/2 to 25 guilders per month), the wealthy (30 to 100
guilders per month) and the very rich (over 150 guilders per month). Now, the
greater number of the higher-taxed (more than two and a half guilders per month)
consisted of representatives of commerce: no less than 60 per cent belonged to
this sector, even though it claimed 'only' 24.8 per cent of the men classified by
occupation. 6
work, quoted above, stressed the point, among others, that the French bourgeois' investment
in property during and after the Revolution was not fruitless but on the contrary did a great
deal to encourage the reorganization of commercial and industrial credit. L. Bergeron, 'A propos
des biens nationaux: la signification economique du placement immobilier', Annales E.S.C.,
XXVI (Paris, 1971) 419.
4. Cf. R. Mandrou, Classes et lutles de classes en France au debut du XVlIe siecle (MessinaFlorence, 1965) 16-9.
5. J. Van Roey, 'De correlatie tussen het sociale-beroepsmilieu en de godsdienstkeuze te Antwerpen op het einde der XVle eeuw', in: Bronnen voor de religieuze geschiedenis van Belgie.
Middeleeuwen en moderne rijden. Bibliotheque de la Revue d'Histoire ecclesiastique, XLVII
(Louvain, 1967) 246-8.
32
THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?
The outstanding importance of real property in Antwerp in the sixteenth century

emerges clearly from the figures published by M. A. Arnould. The levying of the
'hundredth penny' (one per cent) on houses, lands and merchandise in 1569
provided Antwerp with 160,493 guilders (not including annuities). The amount
of this derived from houses and lands came to no less than 122,716 guilders or
76.5 per cent!6 At first sight this enormous proportion of real property in the total
wealth of the city seems extravagantly large; when one reflects that stocks and
shares and other means of investment were unknown in the sixteenth century,
so that capital could ultimately be invested more or less safely only in real property,
then the proportion becomes comprehensible. For all the towns of the Southern
Netherlands, indeed, in the sixteenth century, the same phenomenon is to be
observed: in Bruges the proportion of real property in the total assessment of
the city's wealth was 67.6 per cent, in Lille 78 per cent, in Ghent 85.4, in Brussels
87.8. 7
Checks on the property holdings of some of the most important international

traders in Antwerp in the sixteenth century show that a considerable proportion
of the capital of these figures of major importance in the metropolis of the time
was invested in real property.
Vincent de Smit, the richest Antwerp merchant in the third quarter of the sixteenth century was certainly no exception. The position of this international
dealer in madder among the Antwerp merchants is clear from the forced loan
of 1574: 'Vincent de Smit d'oude ende compagnie' were obliged to contribute
8,600 guilders. The second richest Antwerp merchant, Fran90is van de Cruyce,
was next with 5,000 guilders. 8 At his death in September 1577 Vincent de Smit
was in possession of the following properties: some 736.35 acres of land in the
neighbourhood of Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom, eleven dwelling-houses and
nine warehouses in Antwerp, perpetual annuities to the amount of 3,051 guilders
and a life annuity of 60 guilders. 9 A considerable estate, particularly if we reflect
that Vincent de Smit had never retired from business or married into merchant
6. M. A. Arnould, 'L'impot sur Ie capital en Belgique au XVle siecIe' in: Le Hainaut economique,
I (Mons, 1946) 17-45.
7. Ibidem. Cf. W. Brulez, 'Bruges and Antwerp in the 15th and 16th centuries: an antithesis?',
Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VI (The Hague, 1973) 6.
8. F. J. Van den Branden, 'De Spaansche muiterij ten jare 1574', Antwerpsch Archievenblad,
first series XXII (Antwerp, 1885) 226-7; W. Brulez, De firma della Faille en de internationale
handel van Vlaamse firma's in de I6 e eeuw (Brussels, 1959) 222.
9. Stadsarchief te Antwerpen (SAA), Genealogisch archieffonds nr. 86. Rijksarchief te Antwerpen, Familiepapieren Leenboek (Censier) van Vincent de Smit. Abbreviations used: A: Gilden
en Ambachten (Guilds and Crafts); Cbk: Certificatieboek (Register of Departures); IB: Insolvente Boedelskamer (Bankruptcy Court); Not.: Notariaat (Notaries Public Registers); Pk:
Privilegekamer (Chamber of Privileges); R: Rekenkamer ('Chambre des Comptes'); SR:
Schepenregister (Aldermen's Register); T: Tresorij (Treasury); V: Vierschaar (Town law Court).
33
H. SOLY
families. In the 1570's and '80's two grandsons, Joos and Vincent, founded a
company trading with England and France (Abbeville, Caen, Rouen). A granddaughter, Anna, married the silk merchant Joos van de Steene. Numerous descendants were active in the trade with Spain, in Antwerp at the end of the sixteenth
century and the beginning of the seventeenth or settled as merchants in Seville.lo
Let us compare these holdings in land with those of the well-known international
trader Jacob della Faille the Older, who, like Vincent de Smit, remained primarily
a merchant: some 890 acres of land at Wilrijk (near Antwerp) and in various
villages in Brabant and Flanders, eleven houses in Antwerp and perpetual
annuieties amounting to some 137 guilders. l l There is some similarity between the
two estates, though Vincent de Smit has nine warehouses and twenty times
Jacob della Faille's income from rents. With a yearly income from annuities of
3,111 guilders Vincent de Smit could easily keep an all but princely household. 12
Let us consider the properties of another of Antwerp's international traders:
Pauwel van Gemert, one of the four richest citizens of Antwerp in 1574. 13 In the
'scheyding ende deyling' (the division of the estate) in 1574/75 appeared not only
an inventory of all the property left by this merchant, but also a statement of
its value. 14 This last amounted to no less than 97,902 guilders,15 including 49 per
cent invested in 29 dwellinghouses in Antwerp, 35 per cent in 305 acres of land
and two huizen van plaisantie (country houses) in the neighbourhood of Antwerp
and 16 per cent in perpetual annuities. One is struck by the following:
1) The enormous amount invested by Pauwel van Gemert in real property. Jan
della Faille the Older, in comparison, invested 'only' 46,362 guilders.l 6
2) The preponderance of capital investment in houses in Antwerp and the small
proportion of rent.
3) The interest in huizen van plaisantie, typical of the rich sixteenth-century
Antwerp merchant. 17
We should like to emphasize that this is another case of a wholesale merchant
who never retired from business, any more than did his eldest son, also named
Pauwel, after his father's death. 1s
10. SAA, SR 367, fO 508-13vo, Not. 528, fO 29, 40vo, 56vo, 60vo, 62vo-63, 81, 84, Processen
Supplement 1048; E. Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke
Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld (1598-1648) (Brussels, 1971) appendix 62, nr. 505.
11. Brulez, Firma della Faille, 190-2.
12. The household expenses of Jan della Faille in 1574-78 averaged 222 pounds Flemish or
1,332 guilders per year.
13. F. J. Van den Branden, 'Spaansche muiterij', 227, 239.
14. SAA, SR 338 fO 322-42vo.
15. In addition to which a further 9,328 guilders arrears of annuities must be reckoned.
16. Brulez, Firma della Faille, 192.
17. Ibidem, 190.
18. SAA, V 1960, Dossiers Charles Cocquiel en Peter van Gernert.
34
The same holds good for the spice merchant Peter van Breusegem, member of
a leading merchant family and in 1574 one of the ten r~chest men in Antwerp.1s
Our information as to his property comes from a deed drawn up in December
1580 shortly after his decease. 2o The value of houses and annuities amounted
to 37,352 guilders and that of the 67 acres of land in the polder of Borgerweerd
to some 23,100 guilders. Peter van Breusegem thus possessed a total of some
60,452 guilders in real property without his or his sons' ever having retired from
business. 21
The proportion of real property in the total assets of the Antwerp merchant
Jan Gamel has been carefully calculated by H. De Smedt. 22 The fortune of this
merchant amounted at his death in 1572 to some 245,418 guilders, 76,265 guilders
or 31 per cent being invested in property (houses, land and annuities). Thus although not a merchant on the scale of a Jan della Faille or a Peter van Breusegem,
Jan Gamel invested even more money in property than those international
wholesalers.
The real estate of the famous Gillis Hooftman23-to give a final example-was
estimated at his death at 82,252 guilders, a sum which did not include the manors
of Aartselaar and Cleydael, the 'Hof Stoovers' with its extensive woodlands
near Niel and Schelle and two houses in Antwerp.24
To establish all the differences in value and content of the properties of the
sixteenth-century Antwerp merchants would obviously demand an exhaustive
study. Still, the examples above are representative enough to lead one to the conclusion that the interest of the sixteenth-century Antwerp merchants in real
property was particularly great. It is striking too that these merchants, all in the
top class of the Antwerp business world, remained active in commerce. Not
one of the merchants whose properties we have listed showed any aspiration to
19. Van den Branden, 'Spaansche muiterij', 227-35, 238; Brulez, Firma della Faille, 222.
20. SAA, SR 361, fO 675-91v".
21. Three of the five sons we know with certainty to have been active in business. One of the
daughters, Dimpna, married to the spicemerchant Hendrik van Onsen. SAA, Not. 3639, fO 38vo,
Pk 2059 (Informatie 30-3-1565), T. 1702 (5de wijk); H. De Smedt, 'De Antwerpse koopman Jan
Gamel', Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis inzonderheid van het oude hertogdom Brabant (Antwerp,
1971) 212-3.
22. H. De Smedt, 'Antwerpen en de opbloei van de Vlaamse verhandel tijdens de 16e eeuw.
Rijkdom en inkomen van de Antwerpse koopman Jan Gamel volgens zijn staat van goed,
1572'(Unpublished thesis; Louvain, 1970) 84.
23. For him see in particular O. De Smedt, De Engelse Natie te Antwerpen in de 16e eeuw
(1496-1582) (2 vols; Antwerp, 1950) passim; E. Coomaert, Les Franfais et Ie commerce international a Anvers. Fin du Xve_xv/ e siecle (2 vols; Paris, 1961) passim (particularly I, 344-5);
Brulez, Firma della Faille, 16, 30, 209, 223, 271, 452, 453.
24. SAA, SR 459 fO 59-65v"; A. Thys, Recueil des Bulletins de la Propriete, XV (Antwerp,
1883) 143-7.
3S
H. SOLY
retire from business on acquiring valuable properties. What then inspired such
an interest in real property? There were four factors which played a role in this.
In the first place the wish to make some part of one's capital secure. It was
true that capital in the form of merchandise or promissory notes was more profitable but it was also at every moment under threat from bankruptcy, shipwreck
and other disasters. Only when the merchant's wealth was invested in farmland
or houses was it out of immediate danger. 25
In the second place, the wish to have at one's disposal an assured and regular
income. As to the profits from farmland in the Antwerp region in the sixteenth
century we have no information. Exploitation of dwelling-houses, warehouses
and industrial premises, however, was not a particularly lucrative undertaking;
workmen's dwellings in Antwerp in the first half of the sixteenth century brought
in no more than an annual 5 per cent net profit on the capital invested, more expensive houses only 2.4 to 4.6 per cent throughout the century, warehouses in the
third quarter of the century 6 per cent, breweries 4 to 5 per cent. 26 Capital tied
up in real property was thus no doubt relatively unprofitable, but at the same time
it was subject to very little risk.
In the third place the credit function of real property must be stressed. This
last aspect was strikingly expressed in 1544 by the Italian merchant Francesco
Juliani. He had settled in Antwerp in about 1528 and bought a big house near the
St.-Jacobuskerk; its value was assessed in 1544 at 11,000 guilders. Juliani declared
that the possession of such a valuable house in Antwerp made him 'onder de
coopluyden geacht voer een rijck ende weI gestadich man van eeren'27 (respected
among the merchants as a wealthy man and a good solid man of honour). His
opinion was endorsed in 1548 by the Antwerp entrepreneur Gilbert van Schoonbeke, who testifies that there is only one means in Antwerp to pass as rich and
to obtain credit and that is the possession of real property, 'since their possessions,
being mostly in merchandise, are abroad, so that it is impossible to know of a
man's losses until he has gone bankrupt'.28
25. Brulez, Firma della Faille, 207. In december 1551 16 ships, laden with gold and silver to the
value of 100,000 ducats and with a great cargo of pearls, spices, sugar and oil on board, were
captured by the French on their way from the Iberian peninsula to Antwerp. The Antwerp
authorities wrote immediately to the central government 'qu'il y a cent et cent marchands qui ont
travaille toute leur vye pour gaigner ce que en ung jour ilz ont perdu'. Algemeen Rijksarchief,
Brussels, Papiers d'Etat et de l'Audience, 1634/2.
26. SAA, IB 2174, nr 11/2, SR 242fo 28, R 2268, fO 28, R 2268,f0 43 ff.; W. Brulez, Firma della
Faille, 199; H. Soly, 'De Antwerpse onderneemster Anna Janssens en de economische boom
na de vrede van Cateau-Cambresis (1559)', Bijdragen Geschiedenis van Brabant, LII (1969)
ISO-I, 162 n. 126; Idem, 'Huurprijzen en de reele opbrengst van arbeiderswoningen teAntwerpen in de eerste helft der 16de eeuw', ibidem, LIII (1970) 90.
27. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels, Raad van Brabant 590, nr. 20.
28. SAA, IB 2154 nr. 51
36
The possession of real property in the sixteenth century made it possible to

raise credit in two ways; selling annuities on the property or mortgaging it. An
illustration of the first possibility, of which thousands of instances are to hand
in the Antwerp registers of the aldermen: on 21 January 1524 the Spanish
traders Francisco de Vaglie and Francisco de Moxica sold Pierro de Salamanca,
merchant of the 'Spanish Nation' at Bruges, for 14,400 guilders, a redeemable
annuity of 900 guilders on their houses in the Hoogstraat in Antwerp.29 Here
the case is evidently one of using annuity as a means to obtain credit. i.e., as a
long-term loan against a low interest (6.25 per cent per year) with a profit made
on the increase in value of the houses. The second possibility-property as a
means to extension of payment-was also frequently resorted to in sixteenthcentury Antwerp. A single example: in January 1546 the English merchant Thomas
Giggs 30 owed the Genoese dealer Octavio Lommelin 8,700 guilders for velvets
and silks; Giggs declared that the debt would be paid within seven months
and as security gave Lommelin a mortgage on his property in Antwerp: 1,633
square yards of ground and fourteen houses in the st. Annastraat, a courtyard
of some 5 1/2 roods, with frames, rinsing vats and other equipment in Kipdorp,
nine houses and assorted small houses on the Ossenmarkt, two dwelling-houses
and four smaller houses in Kipdorp.31
Fourthly and lastly, speculative considerations had a role to play. These were
what motivated the Antwerp cloth-merchant Frans de Pape when in 1534 he
dyked and reclaimed 321,23 acres of polder in Zeeland as is evident from the
profit he realized in the year of dearth 1556/7 from the sale of grain harvested on
his own lands. 32 This kind of reclamation on the part of leading merchants was
the stuff of daily life in sixteenth-century Antwerp. Thus considerable capital
was invested by the South German merchants and financiers Hans Baumgartner,
Joris Meuting, Conrad and Jacob Rehlinger, Lienhard and Lorenz Tucher,
Frans Werner and Marcus Ehem in the 'thirties and 'fourties in the reclamation
of thousands of acres of polderland at Bath and Enckevoort in Zeeland, an undertaking in which the Antwerp merchants Balthasar Charles, Jacob Grammeye,
Andreas Manriques and Bernaerd Pels, among others, also had an interest. 33
The well-known trader and financier Erasmus Schetz and his nephew Arnold
Pruynen also reclaimed hundreds of acres at this time at Ossendrecht. 34
29. SAA, SR 164, fO 386-7.
30. For him see: O. De Smedt, Engelse natie, II, 12-7, 126, 295, 340,449, 589-90.
31. SAA, SR 2170 , fO 123-5.
32. SAA, T 1064, IB 486; H. Soly, 'Ben Antwerpse Compagnie voor de levensmiddelenbevoorrading van het leger in de Nederlanden in de 16de eeuw', Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVI (I'he Hague, 1971) 360 n. 57.
33. Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussels, Raad van Brabant 591, nrs. 82-83; J. Strieder, Aus antwerpener Notariatsarchiven (Stuttgart, 1930) nrs. 167, 193, 224, 230, 244, 257, 281, 330, 352.
34. SAA, SR 232, fO 351-7.
37
H. SOLY
We do not deny that the prestige attached to the possession of certain properties
may have had a role to play, but we nevertheless maintain that the acquisition
of manors by the wealthy businessmen of Antwerp was motivated primarily by
rational considerations. This may be illustrated by the purchase of Kontich by
the cloth-merchant Fran90is Schot and of Hemiksem by the merchant Jacob van
Hencxthoven. Philip II found himself in 1559 obliged by lack of money to sell
the two manors to these Antwerp merchants. The interest of the latter was clearly
commercial; the first sold Kontich in 1572 for an unknown sum to Cardinal
Granvelle, while the second was interested in Hemiksem only because he owned
various brickworks there. It is noticeable too that these merchants never settled
in the country but went on living in Antwerp where they remained active in business to the end of their days. Moreover all the farmsteads and farmlands acquired
by Schot in the latter half of the sixteenth century were situated at Kontich,
a concentration which quite definitely indicates the wish to exploit assets as
rationally as possible. 35
Two important aspects of dealings in real property must here be further stressed.
In the first place the Antwerp merchants throughout the first three quarters of
the sixteenth century bought dwelling-houses above all in the periods of boom.
Only then, apparently, was enough cash available for some of it to be laid out
in the purchase of real property without injuring the basic interests of commerce
and industry. Hence in 1548 the aforementioned Gilbert van Schoonbeke advised
the Antwerp city council to sell land: not for twenty years had such wealth been
known nor had there been so much money in circulation, so that 'the great companies have no need of the money of the common merchant, so that many a common merchant has much money in his possession'.36 A few years later saw the
turn of the economic tide; the malaise of the 'fifties hit most of the Antwerp population so hard that the city authorities could sell not a single property 'a cause
de la mauvaistie du temps et cessation du train des negoces'.37
In the second place the possibility of redemption of perpetual annuities meant
that more than 60 per cent of the real property that changed hands in Antwerp
in the sixteenth century was not sold for cash but for annuities with real estate
or fixed revenues as surety. Thanks to redeemable annuities, the credit device
par excellence in property deals, the sixteenth-century Antwerp merchants were
35. Archief van de Commissie van de Openbare Onderstand te Antwerpen. (Archives of the
Committee for Poor Relief in Antwerp) Testamenten, d. 175, f 9; L. De Schepper, Oud en Nieuw
Hemiksem met de Sint-Bernardusabdij (Antwerp, 1957) 172; R. Van Passen, Geschiedenis van
Kontich (Kontich, 1964) 431-3.
36. SAA, IB 2154, nr. 52.
37. SAA, R 1578, fO 153.
38
THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISm; A MYTH?
able to acquire extensive properties without having immediately to immobilize

a considerable part of their capita1. 38
It was after 1585 that the great rush for land first manifested itself in Antwerp
and many merchants gave up business, firstly on account of the decline in trade
and secondly on account of the crisis agriculture was going through. Business
activity was for some years if not paralysed then at any rate so hard hit that for
most of those engaged in commerce there were few if any hopeful prospects. 39
The rapid fall in land prices, however, owing to war operations which depopulated
whole areas, making them worthless,40 offered those with plenty capital in this
period the opportunity to buy extensive lands for almost nothing. Maarten della
Faille, for example, who in spite of great difficulties managed to find enough liquid
capital to make the most of the favourable opportunity, had the flair required to
make large-scale land purchases after 1585. When a few years later the agricultural
crisis was over, it was clear that his speculation had justified itself; the value of
the ground, based on agriculture, went up. In consequence this merchant retired
from business to live on the income from his lands. 41 The structural changes
that took place in Antwerp after 1585 in the economic field were thus reflected
in the 'trahison de la bourgeoisie'. If in Antwerp after 1585 there really is any
question of a 'betrayal' by the commercial and industrial middle class, its origins
are to be sought in the circumstances that put a brake on further commercial
expansion. The great Antwerp rush to the countryside in the first decades after
1585 is evidence rather of the adaptability and insight of many businessmen into
the radically changed economic possibilities than of a 'slackening' in their commercial zeal. One might well ask in which sectors of Antwerp economic life these
merchants could so profitably have invested their capital after 1585-orto putit
another way; is it possible to indicate sectors of the Antwerp economy whose
further growth after 1585 was hindered or prevented through sheer inadequate
capital investment ?42
38. SAA, IB 2161, nr. 142; G. de LongeS, Coutumes du pays et duche de Brabant. Quartier
d'Anvers, I (Brussels, 1870) 194-230; Ch. Laurent and J. Lameere, Recueil des Ordonnances des
Pays-Bas, 2e series, II (Brussels, 1898),36-9. For the nature and significance ofthe various annuity
transactions: B. Schnapper, Les rentes au XVI" sieele. Histoire d'un instrument de credit (paris,
1957) and P. Godding, Le droit foncier a Bruxelles au moyen age (Brussels, 1960). A concise
and clear exposition is to be found in J. H. Kernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven van Noordnederlandse steden (Groningen, 1961).
39. In this connection see the important article by W. Brulez, 'Anvers de 1585 a 1650', Vierteljahrschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, LIV (Leipzig, 1967) 75-99.
40. H. Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (fourteenthsixteenth Centuries), II (The Hague, 1963) 248-50.
41. Bru1ez, Firma della Faille, 194-200.
42. Cf. the important exposition by P. W. Klein, Kapitaal en stagnatie tijdens het Hollandse vroegkapitalisme (Rotterdam, 1967) concerning an analogous problem: the increasing employment
of capital in the financial sector in Holland during the 18th and 19th centuries.
39
H. SOLY
However this may be, before 1585 there was among the overwhelming majority
of Antwerp merchants no question of any aspiration to use the acquisition of
property (with or without a noble title) to repudiate as quickly as possible the
status to which their social ascent might be attributed. Business motives alone
spurred the Antwerp merchants of this 'Golden Age' to invest their money in
real property.
Recent studies have shown that this was also the case with certain commercial
groups outside the Netherlands. Take the greatest of the commercial families of
the sixteenth century, the Fuggers, who all through the sixteenth century invested
a considerable portion of their capital in farmland. In Swabia alone at the end
of the sixteenth century the Fuggers possessed some hundred villages with a
total area of c 93 square miles and a value of about two million guilders. The
acquisition of an aristocratic title had nothing to do with this, seeing that the
title of count acquired by Jacob Fugger in 1511 had been declared hereditary
by Charles V in 1526, nor had the ideal of the aristocratic way of life, since in
the sixteenth century the Fuggers never settled in the country. Nor does the
cyclical explanation hold; although the extension of their properties gathered
momentum in the last quarter of the sixteenth century the Fuggers had systematically invested large sums in land in the previous decades as well. The considerations
which weighed most with the Fuggers were essentially the securing of a portion
of their enormous fortune and the assuring themselves of fixed and regular income.
Thanks to the most rigorous control this amounted to an average annual six
per cent of the capital invested. 43
At Lyons, another great sixteenth-century commercial city, much the same
development as at Antwerp may be observed. The securing of capital and the
wish to have a steady income at their disposal motivated the merchants of Lyons
to put their money into real property. As for the wish to retire from trade and
to live on the income from their properties or to emulate the aristocratic way
of life, this simply did not arise. Only the profound economic crisis in the second
half of the sixteenth century increased the relative significance of investments
in property for the merchants of Lyons. Trade difficulties and the rise in grain
prices then increased the tempo of land purchase. The hard reality of riots
had a double aspect-for farmers: plundering and devastation by the numerous
troops, high taxes, mediocre harvests and finally the infernal sequence of povertydebt-dispossession; for merchants: loans at exorbitant interest, land purchase. 44
43. R. Mandrou, Les Fugger, proprietaires jonciers en Souabe (1560-1618). Etude de comportements socio-economiques Ii la fin du XVle siec1e (Paris, 1969).
44. R. Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVle siec1e. Lyon et ses marchands (environs
de 1520-environs de 1580), II (Paris-The Hague, 1971) 811-70.
40
We have shown that the Antwerp merchants before 1585 had no intention of
abandoning trade for landed possessions. But did these merchants constitute
a homogeneous social group with a class-consciousness of its own? It is not within
our scope to give a decisive answer to this question. 45 We shall merely attempt
to assemble a few facts which may throw light on the problem.
Our information is drawn from 1) the memorial inscriptions of the sixteenthcentury Antwerp merchants, 2) the Antwerp landjuweel (a contest of rhetoric)
of 1561 and 3) political events in Antwerp in the late 1570's and early 1580's.
Firstly the epitaphs, since the way in which a person in extremis describes himself
may be an indication of the significance ascribed in a particular period to a particular social status. Secondly the plays put on during the Antwerp landjuweel of
1561, since these rhetorical plays are an invaluable, if not always easily interpretable reflection of the social life of the time. Thirdly and lastly the political
events in Antwerp in the late 1570's and early 1580's since it was in this crucial
period of the history of Antwerp and of the entire Netherlands that dynamic
social groups first had the objective opportunity to seize political power.
On the gravestones of sixteenth-century Antwerp merchants almost always
appears the description coopman (merchant),46 negotiator or mercator, usually
preceded by the epithet den eersaemen (honourable) or insignis probatus. Of the
35 merchants who were buried in the sixteenth century in Antwerp cathedral and
whose gravestone have survived, 32 are described as coopman. 46 The exceptions
are members of the Della Faille family; Jacob the Older, Jan the Older and
Maarten. The first is called toparcha, the second armiger, the third toparcha and
counsellor. 47 Since Maarten della Faille had retired from business a good twenty
years before his death it is understandable that he did not have himself characterized on his gravestone for eternity as a merchant. As regards Jacob and Jan: the
former possessed a manor and the latter had acquired the right to bear arms. 48
It might consequently be suggested that the Della Faille family were no exception and that other tradesmen followed much the same course if they too had
made the 'happy' acquisition of a manor or a coat-of-arms. This argument however
will not hold; although the linen-merchant Fran~ois Schot bought the manors
of Boutersem (with its castle), Pluysegem and Ykele in 1567 and was still in possession at his death in 1587, he is characterized on his gravestone in the first place
as 'merchant' and only in the second place as 'Lord of Boutersem'. 49 The same
45. Firma della Faille by W. Brulez is the only publication to contain the detailed study of an
important 16th-century Antwerp business-family.
46. P. Genard, Verzameling der gra!- en gedenkschriften van de provincie Antwerpen, I (Antwerp,
1856) 95, 105-6, 114, 126, 136, 141, 152, 180, 182, 197, 227, 229, 231, 232, 240, 242, 254, 266,
270,291,296,332,347, 355, 357, 364, 376, 385, 417.
47. Ibidem, 67-8, 250; Brulez, Firma della Faille, 208.
48. Brulez, Firma della Faille, 190-2,205.
49. Van Passen, Kontich, 431; Genard, Gra!- en gedenkschriften, I, 105-6.
41
H. SOLY
is true of merchants who had held important city offices; Jan Comperis the Younger, for instance, who at his death in 1592 was under-treasurer of the city of Antwerp, is described on his gravestone as, in the first place, 'merchant'. 50 It might
further be suggested that the difference in fortune had a part to play, in other
words that the Della Faille family were so high in the social scale that they wished
to distinguish themselves from other merchants and thus not to be labelled as
such. But this explanation will not hold either, for Jan du Carne and Fran<;ois
van de Cruyce, both considerably richer than Jan and Jacob della Faille51 are
described roundly on their gravestones as 'merchant'.52 To sum up, we may conclude that the Della Failles were the exception that proved the rule; the majority
of sixteenth-century Antwerp merchants were proud to be remembered as such
by posterity. There was, then, no question of trade in sixteenth-century Antwerp
being in any way a despised calling. This is even more evident in the texts of the
landjuweel held in the city in 1561.
Since the Antwerp chamber of rhetoric 'de Violieren' had won the first prize at
the sixth Brabant landjuweel, the organization of the next contest, according to
tradition, fell to them. It was not until after the peace of Cateau-Cambresis (1559)
that plans for such a celebration could be made. The seventh Brabant landjuweel
eventually took place in Antwerp in 1561. Somewhat apprehensive about the
possible expression of heretical notions which might be worked into the set
pieces, the central government, in co-operation with the Antwerp authorities,
chose the following uncontroversial question as the general theme of the contest:
'What is it that most inspires man to art'. 'De Violieren' had however also provided
a prologue, that is, the treatment of a less serious and less all-embracing theme,
viz., 'How much profit is brough to us by our brave, ingenious and true-dealing
merchants'. 53 The fact that the well-known financier Melchior Schetz was 'Prince'
of the 'Violieren' in 1561 makes it not unlikely that the Kamer was able to rely
on monetary support from the Antwerp merchants. The fourteen chambers54
taking part at any rate used their prologue to sing the praises of the (Antwerp)
merchants in all manner of ways. All concentrated on the 'true-dealing' merchant
50. Genard, Graf- en gedenkschriften, I, 270.
51. Brulez, Firma della Faille, 22.
52. Genard, Graf- en gedenkschriften, 197, 332.
53. All the texts were printed in Antwerp in 1562 by Willem Silvius under the title (here abridged)
Spelen van sinne vol scoone moralisacien, uutleggingen ende bediedenissen ... ghespeelt ... binnen
der stadt van Antwerpen op dLantjuweel by die veerthien cameren van Retorijcken die hen daer
ghepresenteert hebben den derden dach Augustus int jaer ons Heeren MDLXI. See W. M. H. Hummeien, Repertorium van het rederijkersdrama, 1500-ca. 1620 (Assen, 1968) 168-83 with references
to further literature.
54. The three Antwerp chambers, 'de Violieren', 'de Olijftack' and 'de Goutbloem' and the
chambers of Bergen op Zoom, Brussels, Diest ('de Christusoogen' and 'de Leliebloeme'),
Herentals, Bois-Ie-Due, Louvain, Lier, Mechlin, Vilvoorde and Zoutleeuw.
42
without picking out any negative aspects for criticism. One striking example is
the Herentals chamber's prologue, a dialogue between 'villages', 'town' and 'country' represented by a farmer, a citizen (= merchant) and a nobleman. The farmer
has heard a good many unfavourable reports about the activities of the merchants.
Needless to say he is soon talked out of his suspicions. The piece ends with a
song in praise of the deserving merchant, who brings the welfare all long for and
on whom all social groups depend.
Another illustration may be found in the prologue of the Antwerp chamber
of rhetoric 'de Olijftack'. Enter three personages: an artisan or 'commonweal',
brotherly love and righteousness. The two latter soon convince the artisan of
the great deserts of the merchants: without them any kind of welfare is impossible.
In this connection it should be mentioned that there was a fundamental opposition between the small independent master craftsmen on the one side and the
great international traders, financiers and industrialists on the other. Both sides
were undoubtedly primarily out for profit. The carftsmen, however, were interested in maintaining the corporation system, with all its restrictions, while the
big entrepreneurs saw their profits in the setting of unrestricted economic development in which no attention was paid to the corporative 'balance'. So long as the
boom lasted, no problems arose between the two social groups. Each got a share
of the cake, or felt that it was getting one. But as soon as the economic tide turned
the fundamental antagonisms between the options and perspectives of the two
groups were sharply felt. Hence the violent reactions to Gilbert van Schoonbeke's
attempts at monopoly, attempts which in July 1554 resulted in a movement of
revolt. 55 Hence too the request of the Antwerp ward representatives to the city
council in May 1555 for a number of 'policyemeesters' to be appointed to put
a stop to 'the unregulated monopolies, usuries and other unseemly contracts now
made and done in the exchange'. 56
It is thus important to realize that the 'landjuweel' of 1561 was held in a period
of real 'boom' for the Netherlands; after 1559 both commerce and industry
flourished. Antwerp trade with Seville and the Baltic lands expanded enormously
while there was a period of rapid growth in the production of say in Hondschoote,
linen in Flanders and tapestries in Flanders and Brabant. 57 This economic expansion
was reflected in wages: in 1561/62 the real wage of the journeyman bricklayer
in Antwerp reached a level until then unknown in the sixteenth century: 66.7
pounds of rye bread for the day's wages. 58 The wage increases were so considerable
55. H. Soly, 'Economische vernieuwing en sociale weerstand. De betekenis en aspiraties der
Antwerpse middenklasse in de 16de eeuw', Tijdschri/t voor Geschiedenis, LXXXIII (Groningen,
1970) 520-35.
56. SAA, Pk 1396, fO 39.
57. Good survey in Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp market, 223-6.
58. E. Scholliers, Loonarbeid en honger. De levensstandaard in de XV" en XVI" eeuw te Antwerpen
(Antwerp, 1960) 134-5.
43
H. SOLY
that proposals were made throughout the Netherlands to bring the wage level
down again to that of 1550. 59 In any but these extremely favourable material
circumstances the propaganda stunt of the Antwerp merchants in 1561 would
have been unthinkable. In years of dearth the praise of the 'true-dealing' merchants
would have sounded deeply cynical or at least totally incredible.
However that may be, the fact that such a theme was treated in such a way
in the Antwerp of 1561 does indicate that the merchants in that city had gained
a dominant position and that they wanted to make the importance of their social
group clear to the other classes of society. The landjuweel of 1561 may be characterized as a splendid example of social affirmation on the part of the Antwerp
merchants, a real sign of a no doubt stil embryonic but nevertheless growing class
consciousness. Twenty years later the Antwerp merchants were to demonstrate
a good deal more powerfully and above all more actively how very conscious they
were of the dominant position they occupied in the social-economic order.
In June 1577 the governor of the Netherlands, Don John of Austria, seized
the fortress of Namur and began to muster a new army, upon which the States
General broke with him and summoned the prince of Orange to Brussels. Since
it was most improbable that Don John would patiently allow the country to repudiate the royal authority if not de jure then certainly de facto, military countermeasures were taken-as soon as possible. After the appalling experience with the
Spanish garrison-the 'Spanish fury' at Antwerp on the 4th November 1576,60
which made that city opt definitively for the States General-most towns were,
however, unwilling to house the troops of the States General and went over to
mobilization of all men fit to bear arms, and to a reorganization of the schuttersgilden (trainbands).61 Antwerp introduced compulsory military service for all
men from twenty to sixty on 12th December 1577. The command of these troops
was however not entrusted to the wardmasters and their four lieutenants as was
usual 62 but-on the advice of Orange-to eight trusty men, the so-called 'colonels',
who were officially appointed on 2nd February 1578. This new arrangement was
59. C. Verlinden en J. Craeybeckx, Prijzen en lonenpolitiek in de Nederlanden in 1561 en 15881589. Onuitgegeven adviezen, ontwerpen en ordonnanties. Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, 1962) 7-23.
60. Spanish fury: mutiny of the Spanish troops sacking Antwerp, cf. the recent study by E.
Rooms, 'Een nieuwe visie op de gebeurtenissen die geleid hebben tot de Spaanse Furie te Antwerpen op 4 november 1576', Bijdragen Geschiedenis van Brabant, LlV (1971) 31-55.
61. H. A. Enno van Gelder, 'Van opstand via vrede naar oorlog, 1576-1578', in: Algemene
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, V (Utrecht, 1952) 85-97; L. P. L. Pirenne, "s-Hertogenbosch
tussen Atrecht en Utrecht. Staatkundige geschiedenis, 1576-1579', Bijdragen Geschiedenis
van Brabant, XLIII (1960) 67-79.
62. Antwerp intra muros consisted in the last quarter of the sixteenth century of thirteen
wards, each headed by two wardmasters. R. Boumans, Het Antwerps stadsbestuur voor en tijdens
de Franse overheersing (Brussels, 1965) 164-7.
44
to last until 19th August 1585, the day when Antwerp 'made it up' with Philip II.
In the authority of this establishment two periods may be distinguished. From
the outset until March 1581 the colonels constituted an independent power alongside the city authorities and the Brede Raad. 63 They were responsible for the city's
security (censorship, suspects, etc.) and had full control of the city's military
preparations (defence works, troops, weapons). At the beginning of 1581 the
Brede Raad set out to put an end to this exceptional arrangement. Owing to the
city's dire need of money, new taxes were necessary. The Brede Raad, however,
refused to vote the levy of these new taxes unless the colonels were put under
its command. Much as the colonels might protest, the crafts were adamant.
After much demurring the colonels found themselves obliged to take the oath
of obedience to mayors and aldermen. Although in the course of the succeeding
years the colonels continued to hold a dominant position in the city, they were
forced to acquiesce in the yearly replacement of half of their members. 64
From 2nd February 1578 to 19th August 1585, 31 persons in all exercised the
function of colonel in Antwerp.65 In setting up the new city security apparatus
it had been determined that the buitenburgemeester 66 should also be first colonel.
The following four buitenburgemeesters succeeded one another over this period:
Jan van Stralen, Jan Junius de Jonge, Philips van Schoonhoven and Philips
van Marnix. Since the buitenburgemeester had so many affairs to deal with he
could not involve himself in the actual military business of the city and his colonelship was thus a mere honorary title, so that in fact only 27 persons carried out
the duties of colonel. 67
No less than 21 of these were merchants! The others included two financiers,
one brewer, one alderman and two whose profession we have been unable to
determine. The fact that merchants were so very much in the majority is certainly
no mere coincidence. Why did these entrepreneurs take on the demanding,
unpaid and above all compromising office of colonel? Some undoubtedly made use
of their authority to further their own material interests: Cornelis Daems, Philips
63. The so-called Brede Raad consisted of a full 100 persons, grouped in four leden (members,
that is groups); seats were held by burgomasters, aldermen, treasurers and stewards (first member),
a number of city functionaries (second member), thirty representatives of the moneyed burghers
(third member) and the representatives of 26 privileged crafts (fourth member).
64. F. Prims, Geschiedenis van Antwerpen, XIX (Antwerp, 1941) 147-218; idem, De kolonellen
van de 'burgersche wacht' van Antwerpen (1577-1585) (Antwerp, 1942); idem, De groote cultuurstrijd (1578-1585) (2 vols; Antwerp, 1942); idem, Beelden uit den cultuurstrijd (1577-1585) (2 vols;
Antwerp, 1942-1943) Antwerpiensia, XVth en XVIth series.
65. The full list was published by Prims, Kolonellen, 16-8.
66. From of old Antwerp recognized two burgomasters. The first, the 'binnenburgemeester'
presided over the council of the aldermen. The second, the 'buitenburgemeester', headed the city
'police' and represented the city in its dealings with the outer world (Prince, States General,
etc.).
67. A survey of names and professions in Soly, 'Verraad der 16de-eeuwse burgerij', 276.
45
H. SOLY
de Lantmeter and Louis Malapart, for example, were-toghether with the dealer
Valerius van Dale-the most important buyers of goods seized from the monasteries. 6s On the other hand it may be said that they risked a good deal. It is true
that they did not form part of the small group of the very richest Antwerp merchants but they were certainly rich enough. Nine of them in 1584/85 were obliged
to pay 71/2 to 20 guilders a month and were thus classed as well-off.69 Ten others
were taxed at 30 to 100 guilders a month and so belonged to the category of the
wealthy.70 It is noteworthy, too, that nineteen of these merchant-colonels were
Calvinists, who showed no inclination in this period to hide their conviction under
a bushel. 71 If the Catholics72 might still expect pardon if the States General should
prove the loser, this was certainly not the case with the Calvinists. Why then did
these merchants take so radical a stand?
Like H. Liithy and J. Delumeau 73 we are of the opinion that the great attraction
exercised by Calvinism on many merchants is to be sought in the fact that Calvin
was the first to make a religious approach to the economic practices of his time
from a realistic standpoint. The theologian of Geneva certainly did not give
the merchants carte blanche nor gloss over all aspects of their unbridled profit
urge but he made no further attempt to deny or to interfere with a seemingly
inevitable economic development. Thus he justified among other things, certain
types of loans with interest; such loans could no longer be excluded from sixteenthcentury economic life. He did however stress that money was the most efficient
means towards helping one's neighbour-hence the sharp distinction that he
made between loans for consumption and loans for business purposes. Every
Christian with capital had a duty to lend money to the poor and needy 'without
68. F. Prims, 'De erfenis van Valerius van Dale', Antwerpiensia, Vllth series (Antwerp, 1934)
198-204; idem, 'Beelden', II, 22, 34, 73.
69. Jan Godin, Philips de Lantmeter and Jacob van de Walle: 71/2 guilders; Jacob Crabeel
and Louis Verbeke: 10 guilders; Fran~ois van Arke, Balthasar de Moucheron and Adriaen
Vierendeel: 15 guilders; Jacques de Velaer: 20 guilders. SAA, R 2427, fO 49vo, 51, R 2429, fO 16,
R 2430, fO 14, 34, 35, 43vo, R 2436, fO 29, R 2443, fO 13VO.
70. Aert Hooftman and Embrecht Pellicorne: 30 guilders; Hans de Laet and Arnout Helmans:
40 guilders; Adriaen Bardoul, Steven Racquet and Jasper van Surck: 50 guilders; Bartholomeus
Pels: 60 guilders; Jacob della Faille and Louis Malapart: 100 guilders. SAA, R 2427, fO 9-10,
R 2428, fO, 1, R 2429, fO 46, R 2430 fO 12VO, R 2434 fO 10vo, R 2435, fO 1, R 2443, fO 13. About the
taxes paid by Cornelis Daems and by the widow of Adam Verhult we have been unable to find
information.
71. SAA, A 4617 and 4830, passim. On Jacob della Faille: Y. Schmitt, Les della Faille, I (Brussels, 1965) 267-94. For this last information thanks are due to Professor W. Brulez.
72. Although Philips de Lantmeter and Adriaen Vierendeel took a favourable view of Calvinism
they never unequivocally spoke out for it.
73. H. Luthy, La banque protestante en France de la Revocation de [,Edit de Nantes Ii la Revolution, I (Paris, 1959) 758 ff; J. Delumeau, Naissance et affirmation de la Reforme (Paris, 1968);
cf. too the outstanding status quaestionis of P. Besnard, Protestantisme et capitalisme. La controverse post-Weberienne (Paris, 1970).
46
hope' of gain. H. Luthy has summed up Calvin's attitude towards the economic
practices of his time in the remark '(que) Calvin n'a pas fait sauter les barrages
contre l'esprit du lucre, il a fait sauter un barrage eleve contre l'intelligence
des faits economiques'. 74
We need feel no surprise then, that in a cosmopolitan city like Antwerp, where
easy contact existed with other forms of belief, many merchants felt the attraction
of Calvinism. J. Van Roey's study of the correlation of profession, fortune and
religion in Antwerp in 1584/85 establishes the following: of the 1520 merchants
whose religion could be definitely determined 623 were Calvinist, 557 Catholic,
255 Lutheran and 85 unspecified protestant, or, expressed as percentages, 41 per
cent Calvinist, 36.6 per cent Catholic, 16.7 per cent Lutheran and 5.7 unspecified
protestant. In other sections of the population, on the other hand, the Calvinists
were much less strongly represented: only 31.6 per cent of the total as against
51.9 Catholics, 14.5 Lutherans and 2 per cent unspecified protestants. 7 In sixteenth-century Antwerp the merchants were thus undoubtedly the strongest
support of Protestantism, in particular Calvinism.
If one considers the relation between profession and religion on the one side
and fortune on the other it is evident that Calvinism recruited its followers primarily among the lower-taxed merchants, the well-off and the wealthy: 44.6 per
cent of the lower-taxed merchants (less than two and a half guilders per month)
were Calvinist, 43 per cent of the well-off (2 1/2 to 25 guilders per month) and 35
per cent of the wealthy (30 to 100 guilders a month). Among the very richest
merchants (over 150 guilders a month) not one Calvinist is to be found. 76 The
implication is that the hope of social advancement had its important role to play
in the choice of religion. The very richest had already made their fortune. The considerable middle group nursed the hope of rising to the highest rank. This explains
the large number of Calvin's supporters among these merchants: the new form
of belief was no doubt seen by them primarily as an ideology completely adapted
to their own social-economic aspirations. 77
In the attitude of the Antwerp merchants during the years 1584/85 there is
no need to see personal sympathy for either of the parties involved or any particular
political commitment. 78 Nevertheless they realized quite well what objective
possibilities were being offered them at that moment. The power vacuum which
had come into existence in 1577 was the long-dreamed-of opportunity to seize the
74. Liithy, La banque protestante en France, I, 762.
75. Percentages calculated on the basic of data provided by J. Van Roey, 'Correlatie', 254.
Merchants whose religious position is unknown or dubious have not been taken into account.
76. Ibidem, 254-5.
77. Cf. J. Craeybeckx, 'Handelaarsenneringdoenden. De 16" eeuw',Flandria Nostra, I (Antwerp,
1957) 414.
78. Cf. the apposite remarks of Brulez, Firma della Faille, 213-4.
47
H. SOLY
political power that the merchants wished to exercise for the long-term safeguarding of their primary commercial interests. It must not be forgotten that Holland
and Zeeland had already de facto won an independent position. At Antwerp
every opportunity was taken to move towards a union with these regions, to
prevent trade from shifting completely to them. Hence too the attempts of the
merchant-colonels in 1581 to buy the estates of Veere and Flushing. 7s
The merchant-colonels met little or no opposition in the years 1578-85 from
other sections of the population. It is true that they did not enjoy the sympathy
of the craftsmen and wardmasters who saw the rule of the colonels as in the
first place the dictatorship of the merchants, but the many attempts on the part
of the craftsmen to get rid of the new system ended in complete failure. 80 They
did however succeed in making the colonels subordinate to the Brede Raad. It
should be pointed out in this connection that craft opposition would no doubt
have taken a much sharper form if the economic circumstances had not been so
favourable; in the period 1577-1584 wages reached their highest level in the sixteenth century.81 On the material level the colonels certainly left nothing to chance;
their rationalizing of the alms system is convincing evidence of this.82 The manufacturing experiment of Jan Nuyts is typical. This cloth merchant received permission from the colonels to set up in a convent of friars minor a workshop
where 'youths and maidens' 'picked up' from the street made woollen cloth under
the direction of 'masters'. His aim was thus 'mettertyt aIle de arme leechheyt
int wercke te stellen' (in tyme to fynde worke for aIle ye ydle poore).83 A notable
example of businessman's philanthropy!
When in July 1584 Parma began the siege of Antwerp the situation seemed virtually hopeless. The colonels, however, were not prepared to compromise. Not one
of them was to be found in October 1584 among the peiswillers, the peace party of
citizens who demanded that the city surrender. 84 It is striking that the majority
of the peiswillers were recruited from the members of the old city authority
and from among the richest Antwerp merchants (Jacob della Faille the Older).
The latter had indeed little to fear from a Spanish victory; they had never held
office as colonels and never shown any open sympathy with Calvinism. After the
surrender only one merchant-colonel remained in the city, Philips de Lantmeter;
79. Prims, Cultuurstrijd, II, 93-94.
80. Idem, Kolonellen, 69-70, 80, 133-141,206-209.
81. Scholliers, Loonarbeid, 142.
82. Prims, Geschiedenis van Antwerpen, XXI (Antwerp, 1943) 93-4; idem, Beelden , I, 273-80;
idem, Cultuurstrijd, II, 67-9, 78, 265.
83. A. K. L. Thijs, 'Een ondememer uit de Antwerpse textielindustrie, Jan Nuyts (ca. 1512-82)',
Bijdragen Geschiedenis van Brabant, LI (1968) 63-5. The fact that in 1580 poor-boxes were set
up for the very numerous silk-weavers and lace-makers (A. K. L. Thijs, De zijdenijverheid te
Antwerpen in de zeventiende eeuw (Brussels, 1969) 76, 119-20) must be seen in the same light.
84. F. Prims, 'De peiswillers', Antwerpiensia, VIIth series (Antwerp, 1934) 227-34.
48
he forswore his Calvinism and re-embraced 'the true faith'.s5 Jacob della Faille,
who had moved up north during the siege returned to Antwerp before his death.
All the other merchant-colonels-except for Adriaan Vierendeel and Adam
Verhult, who were deads6-left Antwerp for good. s7
In the most crucial period of the history of Antwerp and of the entire Netherlands the Antwerp merchants demonstrated not only that they were well aware
of their dominant social-economic position but also that when circumstances
offered them the opportunity they were capable of effective group organization.
The majority of the colonels were merchants, most being convinced Calvinists.
Supported by the members of their social group, predominantly Calvinist, they
attempted in a complex and confused era to carry out a policy which-in their
opinion-would in the long run best serve the interests of commerce in Antwerp.
That military political events would ultimately decide things differently could
be foreseen by no-one in 1577/78. It seems to us wrong in this connection to use
an expression like H. Van der Wee's 'deed of desperation'.ss
After 1585 the class-consciousness of the Antwerp merchants could develop
no further. Although Antwerp was still to play an important role as Dispositionsplatz, S9 the commercial centre of gravity shifted permanently to the north. All
traces of the social-economic revolution which had taken place in Antwerp were
swept away by the political revolution and its aftermath.90 In the centralized
society of the seventeenth-century Southern Netherlands, permeated by the culture
of the Counter-Reformation, further development of the bourgeois ideal was
impossible. Limited in numbers and denied all political expression, many members
of the merchant class of the Southern Netherlands could no longer resist the fatal
attraction of the aristocratic way of life. 91 In the north, in contrast, the classconsciousness of the ruling merchants was to reach a pitch until then unknown
in western Europe. 92
85. Prims, Kolonellen, 277.
86. SAA, R 2339, fO 120VO, R 2425 fO 24; Prims, Kolonellen, 68-9.
87. F. Prims, Beelden, II, 77-85; Idem, Kolonellen, 275-8; W. Brulez, 'De diaspora der Antwerpse
kooplieden op het einde van de 16e eeuw', Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden,
XV (The Hague, 1960) 286, 289, 290, 293; R. van Roosbroeck, Emigranten. Nederlandse vluchtelingen in Duitsland (1550-1600) (Louvain, 1968) ISS, 156, 334.
88. Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp market, II, 254-5.
89. Brulez, 'Anvers de 1585 a 1650', 94-8.
90. Cf. the conclusion of R. Van Uytven, 'What is New SocialIy and EconomicalIy in the Sixteenth-Century Netherlands', Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VII (The Hague, 1974) 43.
91. H. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, IV (Brussels, 1919) 440-4; Brulez, Firma della Faille,
208; StoIs, Spaanse Brabanders, 421. We remark in passing that the Della Failles retired from
business a few years after the faII of Antwerp. In contrast the merchant-colonels played abroad
a role of the first importance in the economic field. Brulez, 'Diaspora', passim.
92. Cf. I. Schaffer, 'La stratification de la Republique des Provinces Unies au XVlIe siecle',
in: Problemes de stratification sociale. Actes du Colloque International (1966), (Paris, 1968) 121-32.
49
'The' Weber Thesis: An Attempt at Interpretation*

J. H. VAN STUINENBERG
To study is: to read what is written.
(Z. W. Sneller)
By way of introduction to our subject we shall present here the version of
Weber's thesis as this is generally accepted-with certain variations and differences of emphasis-in the literature. It is this variant which we have in mind
whenever there is reference in this article to 'the' thesis of Weber's.
Weber's point of departure is that every economic order functions by the grace
of a particular 'economic attitude', present in the economic subjects belonging
to it. This also applies to modern, bourgeois capitalism which formed the object
of his research in 1905. It is characterized by him as the rational organization of
formally free labour and of rational calculation of profit. This capitalism is
being borne by the 'spirit of capitalism', that is, by 'that attitude which as a calling
seeks profit rationally and systematically' (54).1 An ethos of labour underlies
this mentality which was lacking in earlier forms of capitalism (43). It expresses
itself in occupational duty, an obligation which each individual feels and must feel
in respect of the content of his occupational activities. 'It is this idea', says Weber,
'that is most characteristic of the 'social ethic' of capitalist culture, and is indeed
in a sense the fundamental basis of it' (45). Man sees 'acquisition as the ultimate
purpose of his life' (44), the making of money is looked upon as a calling by the
entrepreneurs (185 ff.).
This article is a translation of' 'De' these van Weber: een poging tot interpretatie' in: Economie dezer dagen. Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. drs. H. W. Lambers (Rotterdam: Universitaire
Pers, 1973) 251-71.
1. The numbers appearing in brackets in the text refer to the corresponding pages in: M. Weber,
Die protestantische Ethik, ed. by J. Winckelmann (Munich and Hamburg, 1965). In it appears
Weber's essay on 'Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus'.
Weber published his essay originally in the form of two articles in the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XX and XXI (Tiibingen, 1905). Before his death in 1920 Weber prepared
a new edition of these articles, the printer's proofs of which he was still able to correct.
A comparison of the content of the original with the new edition mentioned reveals that several
changes and additions of an illuminating nature had been brought about. Moreover Weber makes
a stand in it against the criticism which had in the meantime been levelled at his thesis by Sombart
and Brentano. The content of the new edition however does not deviate fundamentally from
that of the articles. There is absolutely no question at all of Weber having modified his views.
For this reissue Winckelmann has made use of the reprint. Since it contains Weber's final
words on his thesis, it is this edition that has been used here.
50
'THE' WEBER THESIS
Now Weber only wishes to ascertain to what extent religious influences have
been involved in the qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of
this mentality all over the world and which concrete aspects of our capitalistic
culture may be traced to them (77).
In respect of Calvinism-to which we shall confine ourselves in principle-he
reverted, with a view to that, to the most characteristic dogma of this faith: the
doctrine of predestination (118). This confronted the inwardly lonely individual
with an 'anxious fear of death' (125). How to attain certitude about predestination ?
In the practice of pastoral care it was among others-and this concerns our
subject directly-impressed, upon the individual that in order to attain 'that
self-confidence' 'intense worldly activity' served as 'the most suitable means'.
Weber goes even so far as to remark immediately thereupon: 'This and this alone
disperses religious doubts and gives the certainty of grace' (129). It is thus clear
that the doctrine of predestination constitutes the hinge in Weber's thesis around
which everything revolves. In order to secure certitude of salvation it was moreover
necessary to gain systematic self-control over the question: eternally blessed or
eternally doomed? (132). This rational self-examination is likewise of especial
importance to Weber's thesis. For it had as effect that it too pervaded the conduct
of the faithful in the economic sphere and led to a methodization and systematization of the entire style of life (134), exclusively 'to the greater glory of God' (126).
Asceticism served as the most important means whereby the systematization
of the way of life was effected as well as order brought into it (136). In the Middle
Ages, within the cloister-walls, asceticism led an ausserweltlich (other worldly)
existence. During the Reformation it underwent a process of secularization:
it was transferred to the market-place of life, so that it assumed a innerweltlich
(innerworldly) character and with its methodicalness and systematics it came to
penetrate the daily routine of life (165). Protestant asceticism restricted consumption, especially of luxury goods. On the other hand, it not only legalized
acquisition but looked upon it as being willed by God (179). This 'limitation of
consumption' combined with the 'release of acquisitive activity' resulted in:
'accumulation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save' (180). In this way
the spirit of capitalism-the primary factor therefore-gained the necessary
capital-the secondary factor-for economic expansion (58).
Thus the general survey of the Weber thesis, which tranformed the fear of death
into a dynamic power leading to life and activity, to the origin of capitalism-a
brilliant stroke, that continues to fascinate, even though it would appear to have
been a mistake theologically.
Weber's thesis, now published almost seventy years ago, is still very much alive.
Not only do publications continue to appear which have as subject-matter Weber's
51
J. H. VAN STUUVENBERG
conception or particular aspects of it2 but in recent work in the economichistorical field moreover reference is repeatedly made to it or its influence on such
works is clearly discernible. s
The vitality of Weber's thesis emanates from its nature. It concerns in essence
a theory of social dynamics, similar to the historical materialism of Marx or the
effect of the 'challenge and response', put forward by Toynbee. Now, in the modern
practice of economic history great pains are taken, under the influence on the one
hand of the Keynesian revolution and the confrontation with the problems of the
developing countries on the other, over the explanation of the movements in the
real income per head, which is taken as representing prosperity. Diligently one
searches for growth factors and conditions of growth. Anyone who moves about
in this field inevitably comes across Weber's theory. Economic growth presupposes
a change in the economic attitude of mind-and not only in that. Weber has sought
to trace the cause of this change in western society and to indicate its effects.
Therein lie the significance and the topicality of his conception, which constitutes
an integral part of modern economic history-writing-whether accepted or rejected.
Sombart belongs to the past, Max Weber is still with us.
Weber's theory is highly controversial; it has evoked fundamental disagreements. These can probably be ascribed in part to his unfortunate style and use
of words. He writes obscurely, his complicated formulations are at times virtually
inextricable, significant observations are to be found in the notes. The essence of
his argument-the accepted variant of which we have given-is therefore difficult
to grasp. In respect of some points we shall now endeavour to find out precisely
2. Anyone who wishes to orient himself in the relevant literature can among others make use
of the excellent surveys of Beerling, Wieringa and Besnard, who provide considered, well-grounded
observations about the state of the discussion and about the development which had taken
place in it up to the time of the appearance of their publications. Cf.: R. Beeriing, Protestantisme
en kapitalisme (Groningen, 1946); W. J. Wieringa, 'Kanttekeningen bij Webers these inzake
Protestantisme en kapitalisme', in: Kritisch Kwintet (Amsterdam, 1964). Wieringa discusses
the later developments; Ph. Besnard, Protestantisme et capitalisme (Paris, 1970). This treatise
on the 'Controverse Post-Weberienne' contains a bibliography of 165 titles.
3. Cf. e.g.: W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 1960) 26, 52; R. T.
Gill, Economic Development: Past and Present (Englewood Cliffs, 1964) 42; Phyllis Deane,
The First Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 1965) 159; Ch. Wilson, England's Apprenticeship
(London, 1965) 121; F. Eulen, Vom Gewerbefleiss zur Industrie (Beriin, 1967) 76 ff.; M. W. Flinn,
Origins of the Industrial Revolution (London, 1967) 276; R. M. Hartwell, The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England (London, 1967) 19; Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson,
Human Capital and Economic Modernization in Historical Perspective. Report for the Fourth
International Congress of Economic History (University of Indiana, 1968) 8; P. Mathias, The
First Industrial Nation (London, 1969) 8, 11, 15, 158 ff.; John Hicks, A Theory of Economic
History (Oxford, 1969) 78; J. G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten (The Hague, 1970) 326;
R. M. Hartwell, The Industrial Revolution and Economic Growth (London, 1971) 114, 170, 176,
303; J. Gould, Economic Growth in History (London, 1972) XIX, 159, 164,435.
52
'TIlE' WEBER THESIS
what Weber has written. Indeed: a hazardous undertaking. Strictly speakmg,

it is impossible to determine 'what was meant precisely'.
TIlE PROVISIONAL, TENTATIVE AND INDEFINITE NATURE OF TIlE THESIS
In the literature Weber's thesis has mostly been viewed, andinanyeventtreated,

as an absolute whole, complete in itself. In reality however it is incomplete,
does not stand out clearly, is not definitive, but provisional, tentative, indeed by
nature indefinite.
This is already evident from the 'Introduction' and from the manner in which
Weber approaches the concept 'spirit of (modern) capitalism' which occupies
such an essential and central position in his theory. Initially Weber decides not
to define this concept. Instead he gives a 'provisional illustration' of it, modelled
on the rules of life of Benjamin Franklin, which were based on an ethos of labour
(39 fr.). Weber considered this ethos as representative of the economic ethic of
later Calvinism. When he finally formulates the-already mentioned-content
of the concept 'capitalist spirit' he does so 'provisionally' (54) and later draws the
attention once more to the fact that he is 'at all times' treating this concept 'in
the provisional sense of the term employed here' (77). In accordance with that
he gives to the term 'traditionalism', which he employs to describe the phase of
economic development preceding modern capitalism, likewise only a provisional
content (49).
Nowhere in Weber's essay does one find a definitive description of his central
concept 'spirit of capitalism'. That nonetheless does not alter the fact that he
proceeds to make very categorical pronouncements. To these he apparently
wishes to revert at the close of his exposition. Then suddenly he refers to the
'significance' of ascetic rationalism which 'has only been touched' upon. It is
then stated that he has only attempted to reduce the facts and the nature of
ascetic Protestantism to the motives underlying it (190).
He next sums up a number of problems which should still be investigated
before any definitive pronouncements relating to the subject-matter of his study
would be possible: the relationship of ascetic rationalism to humanistic rationalism,
to the development of philosophic and scientific empiricism and to spiritual
and cultural values still need among other things to be analyzed. The tentative
nature of Weber's thesis can hardly be demonstrated more clearly than by the fact
that he deliberately kept the possibility open that besides the Protestant ethic
other factors too could be recognized as having influenced the development of
capitalism.
However Weber goes still further. Repeatedly the view has been put forward
that Weber, in whose conception the modern capitalist order has been evoked
S3
by religious forces, has had the intention of turning himself with it against the
historical materialism of Marx. which in its more or less unadulterated form was
still in vogue at the time. 4 It would however appear to us that there is ground
for maintaining the necessary reserve on this point. It is undoubtedly a fact
that almost throughout the entire length of his essay Weber is rejecting the Marxist
philosophy of history. Thus he asks himself how it could be explained historically
that what in the Florence of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the financial
centre of the world at the time, was considered as morally questionable or, at
best, to be tolerated could in the hinterwiilderisch (backwoods) petty bourgeois
circumstances of, economically speaking, almost undeveloped Pennsylvania in
the eighteenth century constitute the essence of a morally praiseworthy, indeed
imperative style of life. 'To speak here of a 'reflection' of material conditions in
the 'ideal superstructure' would be arrant nonsense', he remarks rather sternly (63).
After observing that he only wishes to indicate which part of particular characteristic elements of our specifically diesseitig (this-worldly) directed culture could
perhaps be attributed to the Reformation Weber immediately expresses himself
again critically on historical materialism: 'At the same time we must free ourselves
from the idea that it is possible to deduce the Reformation, as a 'historically
necessary result', from certain economic changes' (76). But let that suffice: we
do not deem it necessary to give further analogous examples. 5
Anyone who now is of opinion that Weber is rejecting the materialist philosophy
of history is however very much mistaken. What is the position? Weber reminds
those whose causal conscience is not at rest without an economic ('or 'materialistic'
as it is unfortunately still called') explanation 'that I consider the influence of
economic development on the fate of religious ideas to be very important'. According to him, an interaction took place between religious convictions and economic
development (269).
With this observation Weber takes a step in the direction of historical materialism; with it he explicitly goes counter to the whole tenor of his thesis. There is
however still something more to be said about this. For at the end of his exposition
he asserts that it had of course not been his intention 'to substitute for a one-sided
'materialistic' an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture
and history'. Does Weber desire to retract his fulminations against historical
materialism? That is not improbable for he unexpectedly remarks thereupon,
briefly, snappily, as conclusion to his argument:
each is equally possible, but each, if it does not claim to be the preparation, but the
conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth
(190).
4. Thus A. Bieler, La pensee economique et sociale de Calvin (Geneva, 1959) 480.
5. Cf. Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 46, 237 n., 254 n., 255 n.
54
'THE' WEBER THESIS
This assertion confirms the tentativeness of Weber's conception. It however

extends much further: Weber thereby keeps open the possibility and acceptability
of the materialist vision of history. In our opinion he has thereby opened the possibility of an unlimited number of gradations in the relationship between the
Calvinist mentality-which as driving force has been dethroned-and the capitalist
spirit, even negative, after he had initially made very positive and far-reaching,
albeit insufficiently qualified pronouncements about it.
What it was that induced Weber to remove, on the final page of his essay,
the ground from under the propositions which he has defended with such verve and
conviction before that is not known to us. Did he come to the conclusion that in
the course of his argument he had lost sight of the prudence and moderation
initially displayed in his formulations and wished to revert to them in the end by
relativizing his utterances? We are in the dark about this.
THE DEGREE OF CAUSALITY OF THE CALVINISTIC ETIDC
To begin with a short explanation of the unusual term 'degree of causality'.

What we understand by it can perhaps-following Weber's method-best be
veranschaulicht (illustrated) by an example. It appears that 88 percent of the
yearly fluctuations in the prices of cherries in our country during the period
1921-1939 (the dependent variable) can be attributed to the movement of two
(independent) variables, namely the annual fluctuations in the supply of cherries
and the annual changes in the purchasing power. Sixty two per cent of the price
fluctuations appears to have been brought about by the movement of the supply,
whereas the fluctuations in the purchasing power account for twenty six per cent. 6
The degree of causality of the changes in the supply in respect of the price
fluctuations now amounts to 62 per cent, that of the movement in the purchasing
power 26 per cent. Here we have an example of multi-causality: a phenomenon
can be attributed to the operation of more than one factor. In such a case the
degree of causality of one of the factors is partial and naturally always less than
100 per cent. This percentage is only obtained in the event of exclusive or monocausality, when a phenomenon can thus be brought about only by one factor.
To what extent has, according to Weber, the Calvinist (c.q. Protestant) ethic
(c.q. asceticism) contributed to the origin of the capitalist mentality? It may sound
incredible but it is nonetheless a fact: to this question-which relates to nothing
less than the central issue of his work-Weber has given different anwers which
clearly diverge in degree of causality.
6. J. H. van Stuijvenberg, Enkele economische aspecten van de kersenteeltin Nederland (Haarlem,
1947) 91.
ss
Several writers interpret Weber's thesis mono-causally. Tawney: 'Weber in his

celebrated articles expounded the thesis, that Calvinism in its English version was
the parent of capitalism'.? Bieler: 'Max Weber pretend que c'est l'esprit capitaliste
et lui seul qui a engendre les structures capitalistes'.8 Henri Hauser presents
Weber's thesis briefly with the equation: 'puritanisme = capitalisme'.9 Besnard
has no good word for this conception of mono-causality-as gist of Weber's
ideas. In this 'interpretation ... schematique et dogmatique' the relationship
established by Weber is presented, according to him, 'd'une maniere caricaturale' .10
With that he finds himself in the good company of Weber himself who similarly
declares himself against the 'foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that capitalism as
an economic system is a creation of the Reformation' (77).
Whence nonetheless the persistent continuance of this causally exclusive conception of Weber's thesis? One does not have to look very far for the answer to
this question: Weber himself has given rise to it. Thus he remarks that he has
attempted to show how notwithstanding the anti-mammonistic doctrine 'the spirit
of this ascetic religion' nonetheless 'gave birth to economic rationalism because
it placed a premium on what was decisive: the fundamentally ascetic rational
motives'. He underlines this mono-causality yet further by directly adding to the
passage just quoted, presumably not to be misunderstood: 'that fact alone [! v.S.]
is under discussion and is the point of this whole essay' (246). That is clear enough.
Equally explicit is the following excerpt: '... rational conduct on the basis of
the idea of the calling, was born-that is what this discussion has sought to demonstrate-from the spirit of Christian asceticism' (187).
Weber therefore expresses himself more than once in causally exclusive terms.
However, one also finds in him less extreme gradations in the degree of causality:
'Calvinism was historically one of the agents of education in the spirit of capitalism' (92). Here an unmistakably multi-causal note is heard. This applies equally,
although to a lesser degree, to the following remark-oft quoted in the literature:
... the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling ...
must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward
life which we have here called the 'spirit of capitalism' (180).
He who founds his argument on this passage must concede that Besnard is right.
One thing however seems clear to us. Weber recognizes a scala of relationships
within the framework of multi-causality, including mono-causality. His formulations are expressive, but his metaphors do not cover a uniform degree of causality
between the Calvinist ethic and the capitalist spirit.
7. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Paulton, 1938) 205.
8. Bieler, Pensee economique, 480.
9. H. Hauser, 'Les idees economiques de Calvin', in: Les debuts du capitalisme (Paris, 1927) 69.
10. Besnard, Protestantisme et capitaiisme, 22, 24.
56
'THE' WEBER THESIS
This has far-reaching consequences. His theory turns out to be not consistent.
That means that it is not operational. Because of the indefiniteness of its content it
cannot be applied. This implies that all inquiries into the question whether 'the'
Weber thesis was applicable in a particular country during a particular time is
without meaning-unless the starting-point is one specific variant of Weber's
theory. Strictly speaking, Weber did not conceive one thesis, but several, depending
upon the gradation established by him in the degree of causality. And those
theses he has moreover, as we have seen already, put on an insecure footing on
the last page of his study. Weber's exposition tends to cause confusion; to that
factor must-besides the obscureness in his formulations noted earlier-without
doubt be attributed part of the controversy which has developed around his thesis.
THE TRANSFORMATION IN THE CALVINIST ECONOMIC ETHIC
As a result of his masterful study Tawney discovered that the Calvinist economic
ethic in England showed a break about 1650: 'It had begun by being the vehicle
of an almost utilitarian regimentation; it ended by being the vehicle of an almost
utilitarian individualism'.ll According to Tawney, there were two contradictory
elements present in the Calvinist doctrines right from the beginning: on the one
hand, an intense individualism, a revolutionary attitude; on the other, a rigorous,
traditional conservatism, a Godly discipline,12 In Scotland and Geneva, where
Calvinists were in the majority, they succeeded in saturating the social order with
their ideals. In England on the other hand where they were in a minority and
distrusted by the government individualism, the 'religion of trade' predominated. 13
The transition to economic individualism of the later Puritan movement took
place as a result of the democratic agitation of the Independents. The liberal
tendencies revealed themselves under pressure of commercial interests, when
'political and economic changes had prepared a congenial environment for their
growth'.14 Thus according to Tawney economic development by itself also has
had as outcome the emergence of an economic ethic adapted to it. As we have
seen, this idea is also to be found in Weber. Tawney now generalizes the break:
'In all countries alike, in Holland, in America, in Scotland, in Geneva itself,
the social theory of Calvinism went through the same process of development'.
11.
Tawney, Religion, 205.

Ibidem, 112, 192.
13. This was not a new idea. Weber had already pointed out that it was of decisive significance
to many Protestant sects, also as regards their participation in the economic life, that they
represented a small and therefore homogeneous minority. Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 80.
14. Tawney, Religion, 113, 198.
12.
57
For this assertion he offers no substantiation; he is apparently arguing by analogy.ls

As regards Holland: the well-known investigation by Beins into the Calvinist
economic ethic up to 1650 confirmed Tawney's view. This ethic was conservative
and could only be viewed 'as a very imperfect ethic of capitalism ... '. Beins
concluded: 'Therefore the result of our work does not enable us to support Weber's
thesis; on the contrary, doubt is justified .. .' .16
Like Tawney, Beins is furthermore of opinion that the Calvinist ethic in Holland
after 1650 had undergone a transformation and had developed in the individualistic direction 'of an adequate ethic of capitalism'. Beins gives reasons for this
view, although he does so in a 'hypothetical' manner: human reason became more
self-conscious, the influence of the religiously neutral ideas increased and the rising
mercantilism attached great value to supplies of money. His pronouncement
evidently rests upon his vision concerning the general cultural development
after 1650.
Tawney's discovery of the 'transformation' was less spectacular than he thought
or is stated in the literature. In this respect he did not come forward with anything
new. For Weber had already known all about it. Tawney's criticism of Weber
to the effect that he
appears greatly to over-simplify Calvinism itself ... he apparently ascribes to the English
Puritans of the seventeenth century the conception of social ethics held by Calvin and his
immediate followers
is consequently wide of the mark.17

Weber clearly distinguishes two phases in the development of Calvinism.
There was a 'spirit of the old Calvinism' (51) and a Calvinism 'in the form which
it assumed in the main area of its dominance in Western Europe, especially in the
seventeenth century' (ll5). Tawney could very well have written this. He furthermore contrasts the views of 'the later Puritan' and 'the genuine doctrine of Calvin'
(140) and refers emphatically to the fact that 'the actual evolution to the proof
of faith through works, which is characteristic of asceticism, runs parallel to a
gradual divergeance from the doctrines of Calvin' (206). Let this suffice. 1s
Weber has based his reflections on later Calvinism. About that there is now
a consensus of opinion. This restriction which he brought about in the object
15. Ibidem, 205. A question arises here. In Scotland Calvinism retained its majority position
so that it penetrated the social order there with its conservatism. Why then did a change in the
ethic in an individualistic direction also take place there?
16. E. Beins, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Calvinistischen Kirche der Niederlande 1565-1650 (The
Hague, 1931) 71 fr.
17. Tawney, Religion, 284.
18. Cf. further Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 137, 195.
58
'THE' WEBER THESIS
of his research is clearly stated and justified scientifically. On this point one nonetheless still frequently encounters misunderstanding and confusion. Thus Weber is
unjustly reproached among others by Bieler, that he had equated later Calvinism
with the Calvinism of Calvin,1t by Van Dillen, that he had made no distinction
between original and later Calvinism20 and by Liithy that he used later Calvinism
as his starting-point: this could no longer be considered as Calvinism. 21
By using later Calvinism as foundation for his thesis Weber provided himself
with the possibility of according to the dogma of predestination the pregnant
hinge function which it fulfills in his conception. For one of the modifications
that Calvinism had undergone 'in the course of its development' (137)wasthegreatly increased emphasis which Calvin's followers laid upon the doctrine ofpredestination. 22 In Calvin and original Calvinism this tenet assumed a secondary position.
Weber himself points out that it was only with and after the synods of Dordrecht
(1618) and Westminster (1647) that it came into prominence (121).
Weber does not offer any explanation for the change in the Calvinist economic
insights. Other than Beins he accepts this without comment.
THE REPUBLIC, THE COMMON PEOPLE AND BEINS
'Nevertheless, the innerwordly asceticism of Calvinism and Pietism was', says

Weber, 'an important influence in Holland in the same direction as elsewhere' (264).
Eulen agrees with that: 'It [Calvin's doctrine, v.S.] most successfully influenced
the economic development in the Netherlands'.23 Both writers fail to substantiate
their assertions. Are they correct?
In so far as Weber occupies himself further with the Republic he rather argues the
contrary. He points out that the Calvinist ethic only saturated the actual daily
life to a slight degree. Dutch Puritanism exhibited a limited power of expansion
(263). Already at the beginning of the seventeenth century a weakening of the
ascetic spirit occurred in Holland, especially under Frederik Hendrik (263).
The Calvinist theocracy prevailed in Holland briefly, only seven years, from the
decapitation of Van Oldebarnevelt in 1618 till the death of Prince Maurits in
1625. It led, according to Weber, in religiously serious circles during this period
to an excessive drive to capital formation. Mter that Calvinism in Holland lost
19. Bieler, Pensee economique, 494.
20. J. G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten (The Hague, 1970) 326.
21. H. Luthy, La banque protestante en France de la revocation de l'Edit de Nantes a la revolution
(Paris, 1961) II, 752 ff.
22. Bieler points out four disparities between original Calvinism and later Calvinism. They
relate to: 1. the primacy of predestination; 2. the ascetic conception oflabour; 3. the denial of pleasure and 4. the virtue of saving. Bieler, Pensee economique, 494.
23. F. Bulen, Vom Gewerbefleiss zur Industrie (Berlin, 1967) 77.
S9
I. H. VAN STUUVENBERG
markedly in respect of ascetic proselytising power (180 ff.). That however does not
alter the fact that in the eighteenth century the significance of Dutch religion for
the 'ascetic' compulsion to save still appears clearly (264).
From this account of Weber's it is evident that there could never have been
any question of a long influence of the Calvinist mentality penetrating the economic life of Holland. Weber is contradicting himself. Besides, the merchant patricians had never been at bottom strictly Calvinistic (270). The big merchants were
Arminians, Libertines or Erasmian Christians; they were averse to 'innerworldly
asceticism' (191). Their style of life was characterized by luxury, pomp and ostentation.
No, a different population group featured as representative of the Calvinist ethic
and-also-of the capitalist spirit: 'The middle and petty bourgeoisie, moving
upwards to become entrepreneurs'. (92). According to Weber, the exponents of
the 'innerwordly asceticism' were in the main the rising strata of the lower middle
classes' (55), 'the broad mass of the common people' (127), 'the average Christian
of the Protestant faith' (132).24
Once they had succeeded in ascending to the group of beati possidentes they
however very often repudiated their old ideals (182). In other words, their sober
life style and thrift were replaced by a non-Calvinist life of luxury as their influence on the expansion of capitalism increased!
This construction of Weber's appears rather tortuous. In an attempt to rescue
his thesis he evidently has had to take recourse to the 'emerging' common people
of Calvinist faith on account of the fact that the regents and big merchants were
not Calvinist. What he gained thereby in respect of Calvinist ethic he lost again
on the score of capitalist spirit: middle class Calvinism did not leave an imprint
on the economic life of the Republic.
Weber does not show that the Calvinist ethic, as formulated by him, has had
a similar influence in Holland as elsewhere. On the contrary, from his exposition
it may be concluded that the influence of Calvinism on the origin of the capitalist
mentality in the Republic must have been so negligible that it can be ignored.
From the above it is clear how Weber has had to squeeze his construction into
a strait-jacket in an attempt to make it acceptable. He evidently based his thesis
on later Calvinism otherwise he would not have been able to accord to the doctrine
of predestination the decisive influence on the economic ethic; he based it furthermore on the petty bourgeoisie because the leaders in the economic sphere did
not wish to have anything to do with the Calvinist economic ethic; he based it
further on modern, bourgeois, rational capitalism, because the early capitalism
24. cr. Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 134, 141, 162, 262, 266. Also O. J. de Jong, 'De kerken
der hervorming van 1517-1813', in: Geschiedenis van de kerk in Nederland (Utrecht/Antwerp,
1962) 116, 123, 136.
60
'THE' WEBER THESIS
that preceded It naturally lacked the impetus of the Calvinist ethic; he was thereby
obliged to class it under the comprehensive term 'traditionalism'.
In this connection it has to be pointed out that Beins, as a result of his own
thorough and imposing study, does not come forward with anything really novel
in his conclusion that reads: 'After all it must appear questionable whether ascetic
Protestantism-at least Calvinism-has had a substantial and practically effective
share in the origin of the 'spirit of capitalism' '.25 For in respect of the question
whether his thesis is applicable to Holland, Weber maintains a large measure of
reserve.
And to this something must still be added. Beins' study relates to the period
1585-1650, that is to original Calvinism, which by 1650 was perhaps undergoing
a process of transformation as postulated by Tawney and Beins. Weber however
bases his argument on later Calvinism. Beins' conclusion therefore does not.
strictly speaking, touch on Weber's thesis. This is all the more remarkable since
Beins in his brief presentation of Weber's thesis does appear to be aware of the
fact that Weber took as starting-point Calvinism as it 'had developed in West
European countries in the seventeenth century'. 26
THE ETHIC IN WEBER'S THESIS
The ethic of restless labour in a calling, which leads to certainty of salvation

places a psychical premium on the industria (96. Weber is of course confronted
by the question as to how we can know this ethic. Where is it to be found?
In Weber's opinion the mere fact of Church membership and belief is not of
essential significance (113); it does not matter what is being taught theoretically
and officially in ethical compendia (117), by the 'ethical writers' (191), or what the
content of the social ethics is (210), nor what the theological ethical theory has
developed (256).
Now, what is certainly of significance is the concrete 'values and ideals' which
played a role at the time of the rise of capitalism (113), the 'practical effects of
religion' (28). What does matter is what in daily life had been the effective morality,
that is, how the religious background of the economic ethic affected practice (256),
'the practical morality of the common people' (256).27
What now was the essence of the morality that was applied to the practice of
daily life? Which rules oflife did Calvinists apply in everyday life? For this information Weber refers to the theological writings emanating from the 'practice
of pastoral care'. They constitute the sources by means of which to durchschauen
(perceive) the maxims for everyday economic conduct in their relationship to
25.
Beins, Wirtscha/tsethik, 72.

Ibidem, 1.
27. Cf. further Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 117.
26.
61
1. H. VAN STUUVENBERG
the 'fundamental religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism' (165). For that purpose
he chiefly draws upon the writings of the English clergyman Baxter (166),28
a source which, as has been pointed out by Wieringa, must be regarded as of highly
questionable value to the problem under discussion. 29 It thus appears that Weber
uses the concept 'ethic' as meaning: the morality which is applicable to the daily
life of the faithful.
His exposition induces one to make a few observations. Is the sharp distinction
made by him between on the one hand 'theological ethical theory' and the works
emanating from the practice of pastoral care on the other fully justified? It seems
to us that in this respect Weber draws too fine a distinction. For it is decidedly
unlikely that the whole Calvinist theological literature, in all its gradations,
would not have rested upon an-in broad lines uniform-ethic, of which the economic formed but one aspect. What the Church and theological science taught
officially in this regard permeated the pulpit, the catechism class, the conventicles
of the faithful and pastoral discussions during parish visiting. For the examination
of the economic ethic--one only has to consult Beins-there are far more sources
extant than the writings relating to practical pastoral care. Where for that matter
must the dividing line be drawn? Did not all the activities of the Church in the
final analysis relate to pastoral care?
But even if we did have a knowledge of the ethical rules which were held up
to the Calvinists as maxims to be followed in everyday life then still we are faced
with a second problem. Weber has made a leap by assuming that these rules were
adhered to strictly in daily life. However, he did not offer anything in proof of
this leap: in reality a cleavage could have existed between these norms and the
actual behaviour of the faithful. Beerling has rightly drawn attention to this. 30
Now, if and in so far as there was an ecart between them-we are in the dark
about this point-'the' Weber thesis does not hold good. The effect of the capitalist
spirit remains in consequence shrouded in haziness.
With that the acceptability of Weber's conception remains, in this respect as
well, problematical.
THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION
Initially it has been our intention to examine whether Weber's thesis would
be applicable to the economic life of the Republic in the period 1650-1795, linking
28. Baxter (1615-1691) was a pietistically orientated Puritan who looked with some sympathy
on the differently-minded. He had serious objections against the episcopal character or the
Anglican Church. Between 1641-1660 he served as minister at Kidderminster. He wrote several
popular Christian works, which gained great popularity in Puritan circles, among others A
Christian Directory. cr. Wieringa, 'Kanttekeningen', 95.
29. Ibidem.
30. Beerling, Protestantisme en kapitalisme, 64.
62
'THE' WEBER THESIS
up thereby with the study already conducted by Beins. We had however to abandon
the attempt to do so because-as we think we have indicated-Weber's theory
turns out to be not conclusive and therefore not applicable. Thereupon we decided
to investigate the development of the Calvinist ethic 'as such' during the period
mentioned with a view to determining whether in the Republic after 1650 similarly
a change in pro-capitalistic direction had taken place. Some progress has already
been made with this fairly time-consuming investigation.
On the understanding that there is a possibility of our coming to a different
conclusion eventually-although this seems unlikely-we should like to mention
here some ofthe results obtained thus far. They relate to the theological anchorage
of Weber's thesis in the dogma of predestination. As far as we could determine
this aspect of Weber's thesis has remarkably enough never yet been examined by
the theologians. Did they not perhaps occupy themselves in the past too much
with the eventual destination of man's individual soul? Is there not a germ of
truth in Hicks's observation that the church 'was concerned with the soul of the
slave but not with his status'?31 Is the present generation of theologians on the
other hand not intensely absorbed by attempts at achieving social reconstruction?
It will be recalled that in Weber's view only restless work in a calling and this
alone would drive out the doubt about the elect and would give the certainty of
grace. This is a point central to his thesis. Now, in this respect the result of our
investigation thus far has been negative. Nowhere in the Calvinist theological
literature covering the years 1650-1795-already studied-have we found any
trace of this view. None of the Calvinist theologians commends restless labour in a
calling as the-in a literal sense-only true means whereby the certainty of
salvation may be attained. Nowhere does one read that this, and this alone, as
premium on it, would destroy religious doubt. It may consequently be accepted as
definitely established that there never was this theological hinge around which
everything turns in Weber's thesis. On this point the theological base which Weber
lays under his thesis has never existed. It can hardly be regarded as anything other
than the fruit of Weber's imagination. This observation is fatal to the tenableness
of Weber's thesis.
Now a second question, which similarly relates to the theological aspect.
In Weber's view the systematic self-control of the state of grace would lead to
the rationalization of labour and this in turn would have as effect a 'methodical
quality of ethical conduct' (140). In this way he lets the rational life style rest
upon the doctrine of predestination.
Indeed, all the Calvinist writers studied thus far considered self-control,
'proving' one self or self-examination necessary for a determination of the state
31. J. Hicks, A Theory of Economic History (Oxford, 1969) 131.
63
1. H. VAN STUUVENBERG
of the soul. Nevertheless, nowhere in the literature has it been found that this
control ought to take place systematically.
In one writer only, E. Meiners, who in this regard goes farthest, is there a beginning pointing in this direction. 32 He mentions as one of the means of fostering sanctification 'a daily, exact and impartial 'testing' and examination of hearts and
ways'.33 As far as the deeds are concerned, the 'self-examination' should take
place: 'accurately ... calmly ... with attentiveness and regularity ... impartially
... Daily he has to investigate his business, especially every evening'.34 How
should, more specifically, work be done?
With wisdom ... by an assiduous investigation ... with intelligence, deliberating in which
manner ... with willingness ... with diligence, exerting all strength ... With a proper neatness
... With humility ... With cheerfulness and with steadfastness ... 35
In the passages just quoted a suggestion is undoubtedly to be detected about

the desirability of a certain rationalization of self-examination, work and style
of life. Meiners, who definitely goes less far than Weber asserted, is in this regard
however not representative. On the contrary, he adopts on this point the most
extreme stance that we have come across in the literature.
Smytegelt36 too must be mentioned here, strictly speaking, 'pour acquit de
conscience'. For he-as the only writer as yet-recommends as one of the ways
that one must follow in order to strengthen one's heart with God's grace: ' ...
take a note-book and write them down on a list',37 He is here alluding to the distinctive marks of the state of grace, hundreds of which he names. About all that
one was supposed to keep notes. Into this one would be able to read an inclination to the systematization of self-control. In our opinion one would then become
guilty of hineininterpretieren, of giving an explanation or interpretation of a passage which is not borne out by the actual words of the text concerned. But even
32. E. Meiners, born in Emden, 1691, died there in 1752. He studied theology at Leiden from
1707 to 1712 and served as minister in Emden from 1723 to 1752. The AdelungJRotermund,
Gelehrten Lexikon (Bremen, 1813) IV, col. 1252, calls him 'one of the greatest Reformed theologians in East Friesland'.
33. E. Meiners, Kort ontwerp van de praktijk des Christendoms of de praktijkale godgeleertheit
etc. (fifth edition; Groningen, 1757) 108.
34. Ibidem, 315.
35. Ibidem, 91 if.
36. B. Smytegelt, born in Goes, 1665, died in Middelburg in 1739. In 1683 he qualified with
distinction for registration as a theological student in Utrecht, where he completed his studies
in 1687. Thereafter he served as minister and exponent of the pietistic school within Calvinism
respectively in Borssele, Goes and from 1695 to 1735 in the town of Middelburg. He died in 1739.
He was an influential shepherd and minister, beloved by many. His writings are still being read and
reprinted. Cf. F. Nagtglas, Levensberichten van Zeeuwen (Middelburg, 1893) II; M. J. A. de Vrijer,
Bernardus Smytegelt en zijn 'Gekrookte riet' (Amsterdam, 1947).
37. B. Smytegelt, Het gekrookte riet (Gorinchem, 1928) II, 478.
64
'THE' WEBER THESIS
if one held a different opinion about this, the fact still remains that Smytegelt
does not have a single word on the rationalization and methodization of labour
and style of life, which were to emanate from it.3s
On this point too our conclusion cannot be other than the following, that
the theological grounds for the rationlization of labour and the life style by Calvinists which Weber anchored onto the dogma of predestination does not receive
any support in the Calvinist theological literature during the period 1650-1795.
In this regard too the theological background to Weber's thesis ought to be rejected
as inadequate.
Neither the inculcation of restless labour nor the rationalization and methodization of labour and life style turn out to have-in contradistinction to what Weber
has argued-their foundation in the doctrine of predestination. The theological
basis, on which Weber rests his thesis, did not exist, at least not in the Calvinist
theological writings that appeared in Holland from 1650 to 1795. 39
SUMMARY
Weber's thesis, published in 1905, on the influence of Calvinism-to which

we have limited ourselves in principle-on the spirit of capitalism is still topical.
Not only do treatises on it continue to be published, but moreover it can repeatedly be found-in the variant that has become acceptable-in economic-historical
publications.
In essence it is provisional. Because Weber has left open the possibility of an
interaction between economic development and religious ethic, indeed even of the
materialist conception of history, he has put his thesis on an unstable footing.
Weber recognizes gradation in the degree of causality between the Calvinist
ethic and the capitalist mentality. This shows a scala of multi-causal possibilities,
38. As is known, Benjamin Franklin also kept a 'moral diary' in which he noted his progress in
certain virtues. According to Weber, the 'religious diary' would have been a normal phenomenon
in the 'more zealous Reformed circles' (139). We did not discover any of this, except for Smytegelt's recommendation of the 'list' in a note-book. It may be taken for granted that Weber greatly
overestimates the significance of 'religious bookkeeping'.
39. The historian Chr. Hill, a student of Tawney's,raised anew the theological aspect of the
relationship between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism in his penetrating article 'Protestantism and the Rise of Capitalism' in: Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and
Stuart England (Cambridge, 1961). He pursued a different line of investigation to that of Weber's
by using as starting-point the doctrine of sola fide, the essence of Protestantism in general: 'the
central doctrine of Protestantism is justification by faith ... We must begin here' (16). 'It is here,
through its central theological attitude, that Protestantism made its great contribution to the rise
of capitalism' (27). His starting-point meant that the influence of Calvinism on the emergence
of the capitalist mentality was shifted to the background. The decisive significance accorded
by Weber to the dogma of predestination for the rationalization of the way of life is not to be
found in him. Cf. further Wieringa, 'Kanttekeningen', 100 ff.
65
including mono-causality. This means that Weber has not, strictly speaking,
constructed one but several theses. His 'thesis' proves not to be consistent and is
in consequence not operational. Besides he has on the last page of his essay cut
the ground from under it. He himself has in his formulations given rise to the fact
that his theory, evidently against his intention, has come to be presented monocausally.
In Weber's opinion too a transformation of the Calvinist ethic in pro-capitalist
direction occurred in the seventeenth century. In this respect Tawney did not
come forward with anything novel. In his speCUlations Weber himself has con
ciously used later Calvinism as his starting-point. The doctrine of predestination
appears therein on the foreground. Weber uses it as an explanation of the
economic rationalism in bourgeois capitalism.
His argumentation permits of the conclusion that there could not have been
any question of a marked influence of the Calvinist ethic on the development of
the economy of the Republic. The lower middle classes, the common people,
served as exponents of this ethic. They however did not occupy prominent, influential positions in the economic field; these were in the hands of the big merchants
and regents who in outlook were libertine.
Weber's view that the Calvinist ethic may only be culled from the writings
relating to the practice of pastoral care is not sufficiently substantiated; he neglects
too much the unity of ethics which is in principle present in Calvinist theology.
Finally, as regards the anchorage in the dogma of election of the necessity for
restless labour and the rationalization of labour and the way of life, this particular
contention of Weber's finds no buttressing in the Calvinist theological literature
of the period 1650-1795. In the writing of no theologian does the doctrine of
predestination serve as such a foundation. The theological substantiation of
Weber's thesis falls short in this respect; stronger still: it is not even to be found
in the literature. This is fatal to his thesis. 40
40. Besides the works mentioned in the text, the section entitled 'The Theological Foundation'
-the content of which, we repeat, is of a provisional nature-is furthermore based on: Wilh.
it Brakel, AOrIKH AATPEfA, dat is Redelyke Godtsdienst (4th ed., with privilege 1699; Rotterdam,
1713); A. Driessen, Evangelische zedekunde (2d ed.; Utrecht, 1717); H. de Frein, Hondert en
zeventig oeffeningen (2 vols; Middelburg, 1746, 1753); A. Hellenbroek, De kruis-triomph van
Vorst Messias (approbated 1737, with privilege 1737; Amsterdam, 1737); J. van der Kemp,
De Christen geheel en al het eigendom van Christus (13th ed., approbated 1716, with privilege
1738; Rotterdam-Amsterdam, 1737); P. Nahuys, Kort begrip der Christelijke religie (8th ed.,
with privilege 1776; Dordrecht, s.a.); E. Schrader, Ene gemakkelijke handleidinge, om, over de
catechismuspredicatiiin te catechizeren (4th ed., with privilege 1753; Amsterdam, 1767); H.
Sibersma, Het woord des levens (Amsterdam, 1732); B. Smytegelt, Des Christens heil en deraat
(with privilege 1739; Rotterdam, s.a.); Idem, Des Christens eenige troost in leven en sterven (2d
ed; The Hague-Middelburg, 1747); J. Vermeer, Verzameling van eenige oefeningen (approbated
1746; Nijkerk, 1856).
66
History and Prognostication*

A. TH. VAN DEURSEN
At the present time, there are judges of a certain type who consider themselves
to be men of taste and intelligence and will approve nothing which does not accord
with their own flatulent wisdom. And these men now regard the knowledge of
earlier times as of no value. The more recent past, since the Golden Bull or
Maximilian I for instance, does have its uses for us, but of what relevance are the
Hebrews, the Greeks or the Romans, of what value are the Middle Ages? How
can all that history help one to prepare a sermon, to win a case or to heal one's
patients?l
It was in this vein that the Utrecht professor, Christopher Saxe, spoke almost
200 years ago when handing over the Vice-Chancellorship of the University
to his successor. Disturbed by the growing interest shown by students in contemporary history, he decided to make a final attempt to dispel the vapours ofthis
caprice of fashion in a sharp protest against the delusions of the day: Oratio de
veteris et medii aevi historia in academiis potissimum discenda docendaque.
Saxe was not very successful. On the contrary, even during his lifetime the situation went from bad to worse. When Saxe made his plea on behalf of the ancients,
the history of the eighteenth century was virtually ignored in higher education.
The best text-books went no further than 1700;2 nor did the lectures. Only Leiden's
Professor Pestel took his historia politica foederum up to 1748. 3 Twenty-five to
thirty years later, however, Wyttenbach in Leiden was to call a halt only at 1787,4
Kemper was to accept a teaching assignment on European history since 1500,5
and Jacob de Rhoer in Groningen would even announce a course of lectures
* This article is a translation of A. Th. van Deursen, Geschiedenis en toekomstverwachting.

Het onderwijs in de statistiek aan de Universiteiten van de achttiende eeuw (Inaugural Lecture
Free University Amsterdam; Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1971).
1. C. Saxe, Oratio de veteris et medii aevi historia in academiis potissimum discenda docendaque
(Utrecht, 1776) 7.
2. A. Th. van Deursen, Leonard Offerhaus (Groningen, 1957) 43, 51.
3. This is apparent from Pestel's lecture-notes in Utrecht University library, MS no. 1644.
4. P. C. Molhuysen, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Leidsche universiteit, Rijks Geschiedkundige
Publicatien, Grote Serie LVI (The Hague, 1924) 87*.
5. Ibidem, 343. J. M. Kemper was appointed professor juris naturae, gentium et publici Europaei
nee non historiae Europae reeentioris inde a Maximiliano I.
67
A. TH VAN DEURSEN
on 'historiam patriae novissimam, Revolutiones, quas vocant, et statum hodiernum'.6

What gave rise to these changes? They form a part of a general process of
reorientation in the universities. 'Science is of little interest', observed the journal
De Recensent in 1787, 7 'unless it is practised for and applied to the security and
comforts of society'. Science had to be useful. Of course, this had always been
asserted by scholars, but in earlier times they had taken usefulness to mean contributing to the progress of virtue and morality,S or they had been satisfied to
demonstrate the importance of their own discipline for the study of other subjects. 9
The late eighteenth century was much more concrete and practical. Io The physician
Wijnold Munniks went into the fields to inoculate cattle against rinderpest. l1
His colleague Nahuys wrote his doctoral thesis on the ventilation of prisons and
hospitals,12 The mathematician Nicolaas Ypey designed a new table for the distribution of provincial quotas and won a prize with an essay on the export of hay,13
The philosopher Van de Wijnpersse wrote his 'Thoughts on the means of combatting the silting up of the river Y',14 Even the theologians, busy assimilating a new
theology, could find time for a word or two about society. Carolus Boers argued
in a rectorial oration that religion was good for one's health,Is while Regenbogen
published a prize essay on 'Abraham, a model for all heads of families'I6-one
hardly knows whose inventiveness to admire most.
So every faculty joins in. But the historians in particular have a special task
in the eighteenth century for their subject above all represents the social sciences,17
6. cr. the Ordo Lectionum ror 1801 in Groningen University library and A. Th. van Deursen,
Jacobus de Rhoer (Groningen, 1970) 79.
7. De Recensent (1787) I, 349.
8. It was said or Tiberius Hemsterhuis that his lectures on Dutch history were inspired by
'un amour dominant de la vertu, de la liberte, de la verite'. cr. an 'In Memoriam' in the Bibliotheque des sciences et des beaux arts, cited by W. B. S. Boeles, Frieslands hoogeschool en het rijks
athenaeum te Franeker, II (Leeuwarden, 1879) 397.
9. Van Deursen, De Rhoer, 20. For history in particular cr. Ph. W. van Heusde, Ter nagedachtenis van Cornelis Wil/em de Rhoer en Wil/em Hendrik de Beaufort (Utrecht, 1830) 32.
10. The point is made clearly and concisely in P. J. B1ok, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche
volk, III (2nd ed.; Leiden, s.a.) 543.
11. W. B. S. Boe1es, 'Levenschetsen der Groninger hoogleeraren', in: W. J. A. Jonckbloet,
Gedenkboek der hoogeschool te Groningen (Groningen, 1864) 95.
12. A. P. Nahuys, Dissertatio de qualitate noxia aeris in nosocomiis et carceribus ejusque remediis
(1770) mentioned in H. Bouman, Geschiedenis van de voormalige Geldersche hoogeschool en hare
hoogleeraren, II (Utrecht, 1847) 343.
13. Boeles, Franeker, II, 479.
14. Boe1es, 'Levenschetsen', 78.
15. De religione, praec/aro sanitatis praesidio, cited in M. Siegenbeek, Geschiedenis der Leidsche
hoogeschool, II (Leiden, 1832) 224.
16. Boe1es, Franeker, II, 692.
17. For this reason, rationalism took great pains over history. Geyl's assertion that it 'had
68
HISTORY AND PROGNOSTICATION
They can gather material which provides insight into human behaviour and the
social structure. They can use history to show how the world has changed and
advance hypotheses about future improvements. They are in a position 'from their
knowledge of the past both to judge the present and predict the future'.Is At
least that is what a progressive professor like C. W. de Rhoer hoped to achieve
in his lectures, while the young regent's son Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp also
believed that the past offered us instruction which 'relates to the shadows of the
future' .19 The entire past could be useful in this respect and Hogendorp accordingly
did not consider the study of ancient and medieval history superfluous.
However, he who cannot dedicate the whole of his life to the history of the Fatherland,
should apply himself more diligently to the period following Charles V than to the centuries
preceding him.20
The later period was, after all, the most instructive. He who wished to have a
say and participate in current affairs should be familiar with modern history.
It is not surprising therefore to see a new discipline arise from within history
itself21 during the eighteenth century,22 which worked with facts both past and
present using them to obtain some clarification about the future: the subject which
at that time was called statistics.
What actually was this 'science of today', this 'statistics'? Let us first of all
free ourselves from our own 'today' which leads us on hearing the term to think
immediately of numbers. 23 The old subject of statistics was one of words. Of
course it welcomed numbers,24 but was able when necessary to do its work without
them. The word itself, statistics, is not derived from 'state' in the archaic sense
pushed history aside impatienty and with contempt' is an extremely one-sided pronouncement.
Cf. P. Geyl, Kernproblemen van onze geschiedenis (Utrecht, 1937) 223.
18. Van Heusde, De Rhoer, 44. Italics in the original.
19. Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA) G. K. van Hogendorp, 62e.
20. Ibidem, 62z.
21. Called a daughter of history by H. Tollius, Oratio de fine statistices, quae vocatur, hodiernae
(Leiden, 1809) 40.
22. In the Netherlands at least. In Germany statistics is older, usually considered to commence
with Conring, cf. V. John, Geschichte der Statistik, I (Stuttgart, 1884) 40. Statistics in other countries such as France and England can be ignored as it was the German example which was followed
in the Republic.
23. Already at that time statistics was popularly regarded as the science of 'square miles and
head-counts'. Cf. G. G. Strelin, Versuch einer Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaft
(Erlangen, 1827) 227. There were also statisticians who wished to move in this direction but
they were ridiculed by the Gottinger school which was so influential in the Netherlands for being
'Tabellenknechte' who wished to express nothing in words and everything in numbers. R. von
Mohl, Die Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften in Monographieen dargestellt (3 vols;
Erlangen, 1855-1858) III, 647.
24. The lack of good quantitative data was certainly felt, cf. J. de Vries, De economische achteruitgang der Repub/iek in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam, 1959) 12 n. 105.
69
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN
of statement or table but from the Italian statista meaningstatesman. 25 We have

here to do with a political science. The great German statisticians, Achenwall
and Schloezer, placed their subject within the corpus of political sciences as follows:
political science shows what a State should be; statistics describes what it actually is; political
history tells us what it was. 26
So there is actually no difference between statistics and history. Both are concerned with the same thing-the factual reality relating to the State-only the
historian remains as it were a step behind. Today's statistics are tomorrow's
history. Indeed Achenwall and Schloezer say: statistics is history at rest, history
is statistics in motion. 27 Statistics is the snap-shot, history the complete film.28
Statistics represent as it were the final page of a history book, not as an appendix,
but as an integral part of the whole. This partially determines the nature of statistics. The old historical compendia had always limited themselves to the history
of Church and State, interspersed with chapters on the scholarship of each period,
as if the authors felt that there was more to life than Church and State but being
innocent of the ways of the world had nothing else to offer than a description
of those processes which used to take place in the familiar surroundings of the
study. In the eighteenth century, however, Voltaire had widened the historian's
horizon with his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations. It was now a matter
of the totality of man's activity and the stages of development through which he
had grown. Man in all his diversity and therefore all history, all times, all lands
and all peoples. 29
This is what the statisticians meant by history. Achenwall's son-in-law, Christoph
Meiners, wanted men to write about food and drink, houses and clothes, women
and children, fashion and mores. 30 Schloezer believed that the history of tobacco
25. John, Statistik, 9. Statista was itself a derivation from ragione di stato. In the ordines lectionum
it was called ratio status, disciplina de ratione status or disciplina de statu. This certainly means
statistics, but it is not therefore correct to derive the word statistics from status as is done e.g.
in J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A history 0/ historical writing, II (New York, 1942) 231.
26. Gottfried Achenwall, Staatsver/assung der heutigen vornehmsten europaischen Reiche und
Volker im Grundrisse (2 vols; Gottingen, 1781-5) 5 (the first edition is of 1749); Hans L. Stoltenberg, Geschichte der deutschen Gruppwissenscha/t (Soziologie) mit besonderer Beachtung ihres
Wortschatzes, I (Leipzig, 1937) 256.
27. A. L. von Schloezer, Theorie der statistiek o/staats-kunde, naar het Hoogduitsch door H. W.
Tydeman (Groningen, 1814).
28. Ibidem, 100: 'history is the whole; statistics but a part thereof'. Statistics as a snapshot is
not tied in principle to the present. Sprengel defined statistics (1793) as 'the historical science
which paints a complete and reliable picture of the condition, past or present, of a people',
John, Statistik, 97.
29. Van Heusde, De Rhoer, 49.
30. Christoph Meiners, Grundrisz der Geschichte der M enschheit (Lemgo, 1785); cf. Stoltenberg,
Gruppwissenscha/t, 199.
70
could be quite as interesting as the history of Timurlenk. But he did make one
condition: one must be able to show that tobacco had brought about great changes
in the world. 31
For the statistician was not interested in mere facts; he was also concerned
with their effects. Statistics is a description of dynamic forces, not of static situations. Achenwall and Schloezer express this in their own manner when they say
that the statistician is concerned with 'political remarkabilities' (Staatsmerkwurdigkeiten). By this they mean facts which provide an insight into the power
of the State. All other facts are left out of consideration. To illustrate this by an
example used by Schloezer himself in his lectures: travellers assert that English
girls are beautiful. That is not a Staatsmerkwurdigkeit. In Circassia, on the other
hand, it would be because there the girls are sold,32 and their beauty increases
the value of the national export. The remarkableness lies not in the fact of beautiful
women but in the effects of that fact. If the Circassians were to abolish the trade
in women, the beauty of the women would be of interest only to themselves,
and no longer to the statistician. What is 'politically remarkable' today may not
be tomorrow, and vice-versa. It is statistically unimportant how many dogs
there are in the Kingdom of Naples. But that figure could suddenly be transformed
into a 'political remarkability' if the King of Naples were to introduce a tax on
dogs. 33
Thus the boundaries of the statistician's sphere of activity lie not in the nature
of things but in their use. Nothing is excluded a priori; and a good statistic is the
typical result of interdisciplinary co-operation. One can describe a country in
twenty different ways; geographically, economically, historically etc. The statistician makes of these twenty a twenty-first description which brings together
everything relating to the might and prosperity of that State. 34 He must therefore
be a jack-of-all-trades; of international law, politics, administration, economics,
mineralogy, chemistry, biology, to mention but a few. 35 As Achenwall warned
his students:
Besides, statistics is not a discipline which can instantly be practised by anyone with an
empty head. There must be a well-organised philosophy, a ready knowledge of European
political and natural history, together with amass of concepts and principles from nearly every
aspect of jurisprudence in order to understand sufficiently the many completely different
articles of the constitution of the present-day Empire. 36
31. Wilhelm Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland (2 vols; Mtinchen,
1874) II, 582.
32. ARA, Fagel 249, 3. These are Fagel's notes of Schloezer's lectures of 1784, 'Vorlesungen
tiber die Statistik'.
33. Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 41.
34. Roscher, National-Oekonomik, II ,588.
35. Strelin, Versuch,4.
36. Achenwall, Staatsverjassung, preface to the third edition (1781).
71
A. TH VAN DEURSEN
He could not have assumed such knowledge on the part of his students. Perhaps
it was a desire to provide the necessary foundations himself which led Achenwall
to give no less than nine different courses oflectures at a time when,37 at Gottingen
at least, main lectures were given not weekly but daily.3s
Achenwall's head of course was far from empty but it could not contain everything, and neither he nor the great majority of statisticians developed any great
concern for the natural sciences. 39 Their sources were usually to be found in the
law, the State-directory, traveller's tales, newspapers: 40 no new material therefore,
either for the researcher, or, any longer, for teaching. Fairly early on in Germany,
newspapers were being read under the guidance of teachers possibly in the
schools,41 certainly in the universities. 42 But the reluctance felt by the historian
to use newspapers as a source43 was passed on to the statistician. The newspaper
left him dissatisfied. What he wanted was exact and verifiable truths. Achenwall
could not have known how curious it would seem to us that his Compendium
should be dedicated to the Baron von Miinchhausen. 44 For, surely, information
could never be precise enough for the statistician.
They had to fight hard for their data. The Bishop of Spiers solemnly declared
Schloezer an enemy of the Empire. 45 But whoever didn't make a nuisance of himself ended up looking at empty pages. Metelerkamp in his statistical description
of the Netherlands of 1804 could give no figures for imports or exports for
the preceding fifty years.
The servants of the Admiralty are, so I am assured, sworn to secrecy on the matter of incoming and outgoing commodities; it would be considered extremely hazardous for the Republic should such state secrets be revealed. 46
And if at times the government were more forthcoming, it would be the public's
turn to show concern about its privacy. The decision of the Frankfurt city council
37. Johann Stephan Putter, Versuch einer academischen Gelehrten-Geschichte von der GeorgAugustus-Universitat zu Gottingen (Gottingen, 1765) 150.
38. Ibidem, 277.
39. Schloezer, however, had taken an interest in medicine and natural science as a student.
Cf. E. Winter, August Ludwig von Schloezer und Rusland (Berlin, 1961) 1. He also wrote a treatise
on the harmlessness of smallpox in Russia (ibidem, 16).
40. Schloezer, Versuch, 76 ff.
41. Melissantes added an index of newspapers to his Geographia Novissima (1708) so that
pupils might learn to read newspapers, cf. Max Hasl, Zur Geschichte des geographischen Schulbuches (1913) 47.
42. In 1740 Schmauss gave a course of lectures on modern history at Gottingen based on newspaper reports. Cf. Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 86. AchenwaII regularly gave 'newspaperlectures' (Zeitungs-CoIIegium). Putter, Versuch, 150.
43. D. G. Morhoffius, Dissertatio de historia ejusque scriptoribus (Leiden, 1750) 3.
44. AchenwaIl, Alte Zuschrift, at the front of the compendium.
45. Mohl, Geschichte, II, 443.
46. R. Metelerkamp, De toestand van Nederland in vergelijking gebragt met die van enige andere
landen van Europa, I (Rotterdam, 1804) 121.
72
to publish regular lists of births, deaths and marriages at the start of the eighteenth
century was decried as a violation of the private sector. 47 True, such scrupulousness
was not completely maintained; nevertheless, the first census in 1790 took place
not in Europe but in the United States. 48
For this presumably the governments were to blame. A census figure revealed
the power of a State: so many soldiers, so many workers, so many taxpayers.
States preferred to keep their sources of power secret. And with reason: Schloezer
acknowledged that 'the spirit of secrecy in the Prussian State' was one of Frederick
the Great's main supportS. 49 Nevertheless, the statisticians could not do their
work without reliable data and so naturally found arguments to show that greater
openness would be in the interests of the State. Administrative openness would
encourage conscious obedience, claimed the Dutch statistician H. W. Tydeman.
It is in the interest of every knowledgeable citizen to be aware of his country's true condition.
And because of this, it is also in the interest of the government to provide the data which
after all, it alone is adequately able to provide ... Every thinking subject naturally desires,
without any prejudice to his loyalty, that commands should be accompanied by reasons;
and the father of the people, for his part, knows that he does not lead a nation of infants,
neither would he wish to nor take pride in so doing. 50
But it was already 1814 when Tydeman wrote that. And even the father of the
people whom the Dutch had just then acquired did not always have such patience
with his thinking subjects. How much more difficult was it when statistics was
just emerging in the eighteenth century. Then, it needed a man like A. L. von
Schloezer, the rough-hewn 'research fanatic' (Forschungsfanatiker),51 who would
brave all suspicion and obstruction in order to scrape together his material. 52
Schloezer was well satisfied with the results. In 1781 he claimed with great satisfaction that in a matter of a few years he had given statistics a new form. 53 However,
governments were not always quite so pleased, and we can understand why.
It was not just considerations of security but rather those very arguments which
Tydeman was to put forward on behalf of greater openness: hand over information
to one's subjects and they would be able to form opinions and condemn the government. 'Statistics and despotism cannot go together', said Schloezer himself. 54
47. Roscher, National Oekonomik, II, 586.
48. W. H. Vermooten, De mens in de geografie (Assen, 1941) 40.
49. Roscher, National Oekonomik, I, 384. Kluit too says that France had gained an erroneous
impression of England's economic and financial position, much to her own disadvantage. Leiden
University Library, L. T. K. 944 I, 20.
50. Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 185. The passage is by the editor, H. W. Tydeman.
51. Winter, Schloezer und Russland, 4.
53. In the preface to the sixth edition of Achenwall, Staatsverfassung: 'so many quite new and
such reliable sources have appeared recently that the science has acquired a completely different
form.'
54. Schioezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 54.
73
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN

Innumerable political mistakes are the consequence of shortcomings in government; statistics
reveals these failings, acts as a check on government and even becomes its accuser. The
despot resents this enormously as he can read in such reports a black list of all his sins.
It was secrecy which kept tyranny in existence. Experience has shown, wrote
the Church historian J. W. te Water of Leiden,
that most tyrannies bear enmity towards the sciences and their practitioners because it is
easier to impose unlimited and arbitrary rule upon an indolent and stupid people than
upon a civilized, intelligent and knowledgeable people. 55
If Te Water was right, life has certainly become more complicated since then.
There cannot be many tyrannies nowadays desirous of an indolent population
and hostile to science. However, if we ignore the sermonizing aspects of Te
Water's words, he really says the same thing as Schloezer: an enlightened people
is in a position to be critical, and statistics provide them with the kind of information necessary for criticizing governments.
So we have been introduced to statistics as a science which collects information
about the power of the State. Furthermore, we have seen that the collecting of
such facts almost automatically induces a critical frame of mind towards the State
concerned. So we might well expect statistics to accept the consequences and
start functioning in a critical, reforming and corrective way herself. And yet,
ask bluntly if that is what she wants and she appears to beat a hasty retreat.
Statistics is a daughter of that passion for facts which was so marked in the
eighteenth century and which in Germany even gave rise to a new word: Tatsache. 56
The delight in discovering new facts appears to have completely satisfied the
earliest statisticians. Statistics
takes those facts which the practical statesman needs to know about the present state of
history, geography, ethnography, constitutional and administrative law and finds permanent
satisfaction in their orderly arrangement and presentation. 57
She is the statesman's handmaiden, collecting facts for his convenience, observing
which have consequences but making no attempt herself to influence those consequences. Strictly speaking, it is not even her task to show what the causes and consequences of her facts are. 58
But statisticians do not possess that degree of selfcontrol. In any case, opined
Achenwall, it is sometimes essential to trace the causes of a Staatsmerkwurdigkeit
55. Algemene Konst- en Letter-bode voor het jaar 1806 (Haarlem, 1806) II, 86, report of Te
Water's discourse to the Maatschappij van Letterkunde (Society of Literature).
56. Stoltenberg, Gruppwissenschaft, 171.
57. John, Statistik, 14.
58. G. A. Boutelje, Bijdrage tot de kennis van A. Kluit's opvattingen over onze oudere Vaderlandsche geschiedenis (Groningen, 1920) 26.
74
'for otherwise one whould not be seeing the State, but merely looking at it'. 59
So the statistician should look back into history and exploit it to the advantage
of his own discipline. Indeed, the eighteenth century believed that all the various
sciences could benefit from a generous dose of history-if only to lighten their
own natural dryness. 6o Van Heusde claimed that history could put life into geography61 and Schloezer thought that it was equally true of statistics. Of course,
one had no right to expect more from the statistician than pure fact, but
as a rule, everything he puts forward will remain dry if on suitable occasions he neglects
to make it lively and interesting by an admixture of history, cause and effect.
When we learn that Spain has a population of eleven million, we will surely want
to know why such a large country has so few inhabitants, how it came about,
and why the population does not grow. 62 We automatically start asking questions
of our material.
But of course, statistics is more than the mere transmission of data. Some states
are organized entirely in the interests of war or commerce. Such states, says
Schloezer, are sick. 63 In this or that country, he might add, trade seems to flourish
and the people prosper. But such prosperity is too one-sided and the price will
one day have to be paid. The statistician who has done his work well must be
able to prognosticate. It is his duty 'to seek amidst the infinite mountain of all
that is found in the State, that which shows the strength and weakness of a particular country' and to enquire exactly what 'raises one nation on high, causes
another to tremble and brings a third to destruction; what portends durability
for one and swift decline for the others'. 64
If the statistician can so easily point out the ailments, will he not also want
to prescribe the remedies? That this is most certainly the case is revealed through
his love of comparisons. An English peasant works harder than a Spanish peasant,
though a Spanish printer achieves more than his German counterpart, who
undoubtedly spends too much time at table, for a German eats more than an
Italian. 6.; The remedy often emerges automatically from the comparison. Achenwall
claimed, moreover, that one could easily deduce from the description of a State
what rules the people should follow to further their well-being. 66 French statis59. Mohl, Geschichte, III, 648.
60. Cf. Joseph Priestley, Lessen over de geschiedkunde en algemeene staatkunde, I (Deventer,
1793) 3: without reference to or use of history, the treatment of any subject becomes 'practically
intolerable' .
61. Van Heusde, De Rhoer, 32.
63. Stoltenberg, Gruppwissenschaft, 257.
65. Achenwall, Staatsverfassung, 15.
7S
A. TH VAN DEURSEN
ticians at the time of Napoleon, such as Peuchet, used statistics quite deliberately
as a method of discovering the best means of achieving the Emperor's goals.&?
Here, statistics is wholly a political science, concerned with the power and potential of the state. It can thereby become highly dangerous for the citizen. For in
effect it becomes a political philisophy which prescribes what the State should
be, on the basis not of ethical principles but of rules which practical experience
has shown to be effective. The German statisticians do not appear to have taken
much account of these possibilities. They want a powerful State, but in the interests of the subject. They appear to take for granted that power will always be
used on behalf of the people and will therefore never be dangerous. Thus J. H. G.
von Justi claims 'a State can never have too much power and happiness',68 as
if power and happiness were siamese twins-only strong and healthy when together.
The reproach levelled frequently at German statistics, that its only concern was
power, is quite unjustified. 69 For the object of that power remains, for Achenwall,
the advancement of 'the happiness of each and every member [of the State]'.70
That is why the statisticians regard the manifest increase in the power of the
State with such approval. To take just military developments: the military system,
writes the delighted Achenwall, is now so far developed that only with difficulty
can it be improved upon. 71 Half a century later Metelerkamp was even more impressed by progress: man can subject the entire world to his will.
Whenever he combines his natural and moral forces with those of other men, he fells forests,
replaces wild moorland with fertile fields and drains lakes and pools. This combining of
energies enables him to improve the nature of the soil which he inhabits and make it capable
of producing the necessities and conveniences of life; yes and even, [he concludes with an
enthusiasm which we can no longer wholeheartedly share] alter the very make-up of the
air.72
The results so far are well-known: we have not heaven on earth, but the Department of the Environment. Statisticians are only partially responsible for
that. They do not try and force themselves into positions of command. They
desire happiness for humanity and at times will indicate how it can be achieved.
However there is one thing which we shall never hear from statisticians. They
66. Ibidem, 37.
67. Mohl, Geschichte, III, 651.
6S. Hans Maier, Die iiltere deutsche Staats- und Verwaltungslehre (Polizeiwissenscha/t) (Neuwied
a. Rh., 1966) 224.
69. Sir John Sinclair, in his Statistical account 0/ Scotland (179S) claims that his concern is
to determine how much happiness, that of the Germans to determine how much power, cf.
Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 20.
70. Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Geschichte der neueren Staatswissenscha/t (Munchen, ISSI) 4S0.
71. Ibidem, 4S1.
72. Metelerkamp, Toestand, I, IS.
76
mSTORY AND PROGNOSTICATION
will never plead the necessity of revolution. 73 Although Schloezer might assert
continually that statistics and tyranny are mutually exclusive, when it comes
down to it, he is happy enough so long as the government gives him his beloved
statistical data. He suggests improvements but they are not radical. 74 He is
satisfied with the freedom to criticize, and for him competence to criticize
seems to be limited to scholarly circles. He only respects knowledge and education
and not only despises the masses-that, of course, was common to nearly all
rationalists-but has no time for the self-conscious bourgeoisie. He is against
the American War of Independence, against the French Revolution, against the
Dutch Patriots. 75 Like Achenwall before him, Schloezer saw the maintenance
of the stadholdership as in the true interest of the Dutch people. The prosperity of the Republic has declined, so we read in Schloezer's revised reprint
of Achenwall's compendium, but the events of 1747 have opened up new perspectives. 76 'Through the re-introduction of the stadholdership, the State has had,
as it were, new life blown into it'.77 It is to be expected that the estates will now
also make a recovery.
The Netherlands are assured of a bright future so long as they adhere to the
lesson taught by history and statistics that the interests of the Republic are best
served by a stadholder. It here becomes apparent in which direction the statisticians are seeking their solution, and this will be confirmed when we examine
Dutch statistics more closely.
The Dutch statisticians, almost without exception, were Orangists. Certainly,
there were many Patriots among the historians of the time, but devotees of that
form of contemporary history known as statistics were generally to be found in
the other camp: Pestel, KIuit, J. de Rhoer, H. Tollius, M. Tydeman. 78
Is history then, and with it statistics, a reactionary discipline? It would be a
rash conclusion to reach. We do not even need to cite Marxism as a revolutionary
political doctrine which sought its roots and its justification in history. We can
stay nearer home and call on Dutch Patriots like Wiselius, Stuart or C. W. de
Rhoer who believed their ideas to be confirmed by history. These men must have
had very good reasons for failing to use the statistical tools and methods available
to them. And indeed two reasons in particular should be mentioned.
73. Cf. Tydeman in Schloezer, Theorie der Statlstiek, 166: 'without knowledge of the existing
civil laws and old institutions, the regent, the law-giver and the high officials will be able to bring
about revolution, but never be able to reform or administrate'.
75. Ibidem, 442.
76. Achenwall, Staatsverfassung, 400.
77. Ibidem, 444.
78. H. W. Tydeman in Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 165 also names C. W. de Rhoer, whose
many-sided interests and special concern for the process of historical development suggest he
was cut out to be a statistician. Yet his biographer Van Heusde makes no mention of it. Cf.
Van Heusde, De Rhoer, 10,62.
77
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN
In the first place, statistics came to the Netherlands via Germany. Achenwall
and Schloezer, the great exemplars, rejected the reforming ideas of the eighteenthcentury revolutionaries. They sought improvement not in comprehensive theories
but in comparisons with other countries and other times. They enjoyed gazing
backwards, and wanted to hold on to the good that they discovered. Schloezer,
for instance, remained a confirmed mercantilist all his life 79-on the whole,
Dutch statisticians were also mercantilist if only because so few of them had
read Adam Smith.80 The Dutch professors took the G6ttingen statisticians as
their model,81 and this alone was enough to make the subject less attractive to
Dutch revolutionaries.
In the second place, statistics in the Netherlands had a tradition of its own. In
1726, Professor Otto of Utrecht published a small book with concise descriptions
of the countries of Western Europe. 82 Actually this too was a German import,
for Otto was a German and his lectures on the book accordingly were usually
confined to his current and previous Fatherland. 83 As a jurist, Otto approached
the subject through constitutional law, but after his death his mantle passed to
Wesseling, historian and philologist. Many future statisticians must have been
introduced to the subject there: Meinard Tydeman, Jacobus de Rhoer and Adriaan
Kluit were all pupils of Wesseling's .As Wesseling was a first-rate teacher, this
proved to be of great benefit to statistics. He understood perfectly the art of sharing
with others the enjoyment he himself experienced in his work. He usually made
an unforgettable impression on his students 84 which often left its mark upon
their later political convictions. Another leader in the field of statistics was Leiden's
Professor Pestel-one of those who lost their chairs during the Batavian Revolution of 1795. His students too will have belonged to the Orangist party, for
eighteenth-century students do not appear to have had much patience with professors whose political beliefs they did not share. There was no better historian than
Kluit, but few attended his lectures because 'the students were either Patriots or
Jacobins'.85 One could hardly expect great recruitment from the ranks of the
patriots so long as statistics was being taught by Orangist professors.
79. Roscher, National-Oekonomik, II, 583. Achenwall less so; cf. Bluntschli, Geschichte, 481.
80. Tydeman, in Schloezer, Theorie der Statistiek, 169.
81. S. Vissering, 'De statistiek aan de hoogeschool', De Gids, IV (Amsterdam, 1877) 248,
says this of H. Tollius as well as of his successor H. W. Tydeman.
82. E. Otto, Primae lineae notitiae rerum publicarum (Utrecht, 1726). It deals with Germany,
Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.
83. With an eye to his audience, many of whom were Germans. This was normal in Dutch
universities at that time, cf. Tydeman in Schloezer, Theorie der Statistik, 157.
84. This was also true of his course on Otto's Notitia. Meinard Tydeman described it in a letter
to Kluit as 'doctissimum sane et amoenissimum', cf. J. Wille, De litera tor R. M. van Goens en
zijn kring, I (Zutphen, 1937) 69.
85. Boutelje, Bijdrage, 24.
78
So statistics in the Netherlands was an Orangist subject. The large manual

which was to supplant Otto's brief chapters was Pestel's Commentarii de republica
Batava of 1782.86 This compendium shows clearly how statistics had grown out
of history. Pestel wanted to sketch the contemporary structure of the Republic.
Elucidation is provided in a lengthy historical introduction of 130 pages which
takes the reader up to 1648. Apparently that is when the present day began.
Pestel clearly saw so little difference between the conditions of 1648 and those of
1782 that he felt able to treat the intervening period as a single entity.
This is not as strange as it might appear. We would not make the present stretch
back to 1848 in a description of the present-day Netherlands. But time passed
more slowly under the Ancien Regime. It was easier to transfer oneself in mind
back a century and understand it, at least partially, from one's own experience.
One did not have to make such demands upon the historical imagination as a
comparable jump through time would necessitate now. So we can understand why
Pestel should give an early start to the present. But why 1648?
Of course, it provides an obvious historical caesura. Most eighteenth-century
surveys of Dutch history begin a new period in 1648: Wagenaar in his shortened
history for the young;87 Hering in his 'scenes';88 Van Hamelsveld89 and many
others. But it was not always merely because of its convenience. Martinet, in
his 'United Netherlands',9o also starts a new chapter at 1648 but places no more
emphasis upon it than on 1672, 1702 of 1748. The changes which occurred at
these other times are to him equally significant. But then Martinet is no Orangist.
For the Patriot, France is the friend and England the foe. To the Orangist, on
the other hand, these roles are reversed and, moreover, have been unchanged ever
since 1648. Thus Hering claims that the interests of the country have remained
the same since 1648: 91 when France had finally displaced Spain as the leading
power, the Republic had repeatedly to resist French ambition as she had Spain
before. Likewise, the young Van Hogendorp in his notes on Dutch history argued
that until 1648 it was in the Republic's interest to humble Spain, after 1648 to
humble France. One should not be misled by the wars against England which
86.
87.
I have used the editio nova (Leiden, 1795).

Vaderlandsche historie verkort, en by vraagen en antwoorden voorgesteld (Amsterdam,
1759) 99.
88. J. H. Hering, Toneel der oude en nieuwe geschiedenissen des Vaderlands, vooral die van de
Vereenigde Nederlanden, beginnende met het jaar 1555, tot op den tegenwoordigen tijd (4 vols;
Amsterdam, 1789-93).
89. Ysbrand van Hamelsveld, Kort begrip der algemeene geschiedenis. Van de schepping der
wereld af, tot het einde der agttiende eeuw (Amsterdam, 1802).
90. J. F. Martinet, Het vereenigd Nederland (Amsterdam, 1788).
91. Hering, Toneel, III, ii. Similarly, Van de Spiegel wrote: 'the more detailed knowledge of
history which one ought to possess begins with the Peace of Munster', ARA, Van de Spiegel,
600, 'groote epoques in de historie'.
79
A. TH VAN DEURSEN
arose from the self-interest of England's rulers,92 not from the true interests of
the English people. France has always been the real enemy.93 Now if the essential
interests of the Republic have remained unchanged since 1648, and if one is able
to regard the years since then as a single period, then that period may, nay must,
be treated as a single unit in statistical observation.
Pestel's so-called description of the present time naturally has a strongly
historical flavour. But the aims remain manifestly statistical. Pestel began it in
order to lay bare the roots of the prosperity and vigour of the Batavian people. 94
Observe that Pestel here adopts a typically Orangist position: the economy is
healthy, as one would expect of a land blessed with stadholderly government,
so statistical research can direct itself to delineating the healthy state. Pestel hereby
betrays his political position,95 though his questions do not thereby become less
statistical: how powerful is the country, how happy, what are the bases of its
prosperity and power? Already in the purely historical section, Pestel starts to
let his thoughts revolve around these questions. His account of the Middle Ages
does not entirely ignore the counts and dukes but nevertheless takes as its main
theme the 'incolarum libertas et prosperitas'.96 For the eleventh century, for
instance, he is less concerned to give a recital of the names of the counts of Holland
than to investigate how the development of trade and shipping and the laying
of dikes caused prosperity to increase: 'non tam providentia principum, quam
sollertia et industria incolarum'97 he emphasizes, while at the same time deploring
their superstition and quarrelsomeness. 98
In the statistical section Pestel is concerned with similar questions. Libertas
is his theme in the chapters on the state of law, personal freedom and the security
of the citizen. 99 Prosperitas is illustrated in discussions of shipping, fishing, trade
and colonies. 100 That it is not all prosperity is shown in a paragraph on poverty
hidden away in the chapter on the natural and moral condition of thecitizens. lOl
Pestel admits that there is poverty in the country and suggests a few reasons for
it. In the first place the Republic is over-populated. A multitude of foreigners
92. ARA, G. K. van Hogendorp, 62e.
93. This tradition died hard and is particularly evident in the work or Groen van Prinsterer,
cr. H. Smitskamp, Groen van Prinsterer als historicus (Amsterdam, 1940) 161.
94. Pestel, Commentarii, I, v.
95. De Vries, Economische Achteruitgang, 4, alleges that the Patriots see economic decline
around them.
96. Pestel, Commentarii, I, 20. Pestel italicises libertas and prosperitas.
97. Ibidem, 21.
98. Ibidem, 23.
99. Ibidem, cap. v, 'De pari et dispari incolarum conditione civili'; vi, 'Bona civium. Primo
loco Iibertas'; vii. 'securitas civium'.
100. Ibidem, cap. x-xiii, 444-617.
101. Ibidem, 254-63, cap. iv, 'De conditione civium naturali et morali'.
80
mSTORY AND PROGNOSTICATION
without means have been washed up on our shores to earn their keep in the army,
the navy, in commerce or in construction. Furthermore, there is a shortage of
foodstuffs and wages are not enough to support the large families produced by
the Dutch in their enthusiasm for marriage and procreation. And finally, the people
are becoming slower and lazier, not by nature, but through habit and faulty
education. Charity from the rich merely increases improvidence.lo2
Pestel does not dig particularly deeply. It is possible that he made a better showing in the lecture theatre than in this Compendium, but it is certainly surprising
to see how he sets the causes of poverty next to each other-causae eius calamitatis
sunt variae-over-population, low wages, little desire to work, without any
suggestion that this trio might in some way be connected with each other. Pestel's
Commentaries lead us to suspect already what Metelerkamp was later to admit
openly:
it has gone with this science, to which men have given the name statistics or political economy,
as with so many other arts and sciences. For a century we surpassed the other European
nations in practically every discipline, certainly in most of them. But at best we have remained at the same level, while others have made great strides forward. loa
It was thus necessary to relearn the subject from foreigners-and no-one took
more trouble to do so than Adriaan Kluit.l o4
Kluit's lectures on statistics were like a cuckoo's egg in the nest of the Batavian
Revolution. The governors dismissed him without ceremony in 1795 because
the principles revealed by Professor Kluit in his recent publications, and especially in the
piece entitled 'Concerning the English War' are totally in conflict with the eternal and immutable rights of Man.IOI>
Kluit made no effort to regain favour, but neither did he wish to give up teaching.
So he began to give private lectures on statistics to a small group of students l06
which only in 1802 received official recognition becoming in 1806 a part of the
formal curriculum. lo7
Kluit did not have his own compendium, but from his lecture notes and annotations we can get an idea of the content and aims of his lectures. Kluit saw statistics
primarily as describing the economic situation-though we shall see that this
was in fact no more than appearance. He considered the terms 'statistics' and
'political economy' as synonymous. 'One can call this subject economic statecraft
102. Ibidem, 256.
103. Metelerkamp, Taestand, I, 13.
104. I shall here only discuss Kluit as so little is known about the other statisticians. For Jacobus
de Rhoer see my De Rhaer, 79 and 101.
105. Molhuysen, Leidsche Universiteit, VI, 477.
106. Boutelje, Bijdrage, 27.
107. Tydeman, in Schioezer, Thearie der Statistiek, 158.
81
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN
or the political housekeeping of a country, or more briefly, political economy,

currently better known by the name of statistics'.lB
If, in this definition, we take political economy to mean economics, it means
that Kluit has substantially limited the objectives of statistics. But that is not
what he intended. Kluit wished to teach statistics 'according to the definition of
Achenwall' .109 He is concerned with 'the vigour, power and wealth' of country
and people 110 and consequently discusses many matters which are not of primary
interest to economists: national character, Churches, structure of public administration, state of the army and navy.lll
However, three quarters of Kluit's statistics are indeed economic description.
There is little which escapes his attention from the whale catch to apiculture,
from slave trade to Church property.ll2 But he is not particularly consistent
as an economic thinker. Van Rees has shown how Kluit unconsciously contradicts
himself repeatedly. Mercantilism and Free Trade are both able to win his praise.
Generally, he presents himself as a mercantilist: he believes that trade enriches
one country-the supplier of industrial products-and impoverishes anotherthe supplier of money or raw materials. If the Republic imports grain from the
Baltic she gains thereby-and why? Because she converts the grain into gin and
vinegar, thus using it as a raw material for industry.ll3 Evidently, Kluit would
consider it harmful to import grain for consumption, as if it were more damaging
to public health to consume corn in the form of bread than in the form of liquor.
In fact the question of how the people should be fed does not appear to have interested Kluit very greatly. Despite his avowed mercantilism, he is opposed to an
export ban on grain in times of scarcity, or compUlsion on grain dealers to market
108.
109.
110.
voor
111.
Vissering, 'Statistiek aan de hoogeschool', 246.

Ibidem.
O. van Rees, 'Het collegie van Adriaan Kluit over destatistiekvanNederland', Tijdschrift
staathuishoudkunde en statistiek door B. W. A. E. Sloet tot Oldhuis, XII (Zwolle, 1855) 249.
Kluit makes the following classification:
I. The natural condition of land and people
1. Situation
2. Borders and neighbours
3. Area
4. Climate
5. Soil and Cultivation
II. The moral condition of land and people
1. Inhabitants
i. Population
ii. Character
iii. Means of support
2. Government
3. Defence (Van Rees, 'Collegie van A. Kluit', 249)
112. Cf. the synopsis of Kluit's statistical notes in Leiden University Library, L.T.K. 944, I.
113. Van Rees, 'Collegie van Adriaan Kluit', 253.
82
their stocks instead of hoarding them in the hope of yet higher prices. After all,
if this were done merchants would lose all interest in this type of trade. 1l4 One
wonders whether Kluit would not have done better with Schloezer's pithy judgement: it is the art of commerce to become rich, the politics of commerce to prevent
one rich man from impoverishing a thousand others.l15
But perhaps Kluit's muddled thinking was due to his belief that commerce
was really no more than a makeshift. He quotes Oudermeulen with approval:
trade brings in its wake endless disasters which do not occur in agriculture, involving
crews, fleets, colonies and wars; it is only good for those who inhabit infertile or inconsiderable territory. And, one might add [and here it is Kluit speaking], who are too numerous
for the soil to support. U6
The Netherlands find themselves in just such a situation. Unfortunate, perhaps,

but one must accept facts and try to discover the silver lining which is undoubtedly
there. It must at least have been with some satisfaction that Kluit noted the following sentences written by the German Hermans about the Batavian Revolution: ll7
if the Republic consisted of people who lived solely by agriculture, the republican form
of government might well be the most suitable. But for a State whose existence depends
on all manner of activities, a government which comes the closest to democracy is totally
unsuitable. us
There is a statement after Kluit's own heart. He enjoyed searching for links between economic activity and forms of government. In his lectures, he frequently
draws comparisons and discusses the influence which the location and produce
of two different countries have had upon their respective histories, general situ ation l19 and in particular their forms of government.
So after all, Kluit's basic concern is surely with the form of government. Certainly, his lectures on statistics deal mainly with economics. But is that not because
they necessarily exert influence upon the institutions of government and prove
that to remain prosperous a country's government must be suited to its type of
economy? In one of his published works, Kluit says that 'the most important thing'
in the study of history, 'consists in the prosperity and well-being of a nation'. 120
But where does he say that? In the Introduction to his 'History of the States of
114. Ibidem, 258.
115. Roscher, National-Oekonomik, II, 584.
116. Leiden University Library, L.T.K. 944 III, 213.
117. In: 'Holland vor und nach der Revolution in Beziehung mit der Statthalderwiirde betrachtet'
(1795).
118. Leiden University Library, L.T.K. 944, I, 32.
119. Van Rees, 'Collegie van Adriaan Kluit', 250.
120. A. Kluit, Historie der Hollandsche staatsregering tot aan het jaar 1795, I (Amsterdam,
1802) v.
83
A. TH. VAN DEURSEN
Holland'. A book with many qualities but not likely to appeal particularly to
specialists in economic history, it is nevertheless in Kluit's opinion a treatise
on the prosperity of the nation. And indeed, in the pages of his book, KIuit
assures us more than once that in the old Republic the country's finances were
wisely managed, that the taxation-system was fair and equitable l2l and that the
years following the restoration of the stadholder-1749-80-were a period of
prosperity.122 For KIuit a supplementary proof that the constitution was completely satisfactory and perfectly adapted to economic prosperity.
That is why it is only on the surface that KIuit's statistics take the form of
economic description. All his economic particulars remain Staatsmerkwurdigkeiten. They provide insights into the true nature and supports of the State and
show which form of State is best for the Dutch people. So the Dutch might suffer
from all manner of afflictions: they might drink too much coffee,123 they might
idolatrously worship sex,124 but any improvement will essentially be of a political
nature. The solution lies in the past: the historically established political structure,
of which the stadholderate was an essential part. Thus Kluit remains within the
German tradition of statistics. His orientation towards history makes him look
backwards; for him too, statistics means the opposite of revolution. 12s
121. Ibidem, IV, 601.
122. Ibidem, III, 402-10.
123. Leiden University Library, L.T.K. 944, I. 192.
124. Ibidem: 'foreigners have observed that the Dutch would be stronger physically if their
passion for sensuality were not so exaggerated that it amounts almost to idolatry'.
125. Ibidem, 65, 66. Kluit argues, for instance, that redistribution of property cannot lead
to greater equality. For human nature would automatically seek to reestablish inequality based
upon the wide differences in ability and proficiency. In his De rechten van den mensch in Vrankrijk,
geen gewaande rechten in Nederland (Ansterdam, 1793) he does not speak of equality as an
established good, but only of 'possible equality'; cf. W. J. Goslinga, De rechten van den mensch
en burger (The Hague, 1936) 83.
84
Ten Years of Guerilla-Warfare and Slave Rebellions in Surinam,

1750-1759*
M. MOLLER
The social unrest, characteristic of the history of the West Indian slave colonies,
also affected Surinam. While in some territories such as Berbice, Cura~ao and
Domingue it was expressed incidentally and explosively, in Surinam the slaves'
rebelliousness was chronic from the beginnings of colonization until the nineteenth
century. In this article attention will be focused on a number of seemingly specially
important years.l In 1750 the truce which had been made in the previous year
between the colonial government and the Maroons2 of Saramacca was broken.
It was not until 1759 that a new treaty was made which preceded peace treaties
with the Djuka and Saramacca Maroons. During the 1750s the export of the staple
product, viz. sugar, had decreased considerably and this may have been due to
the slave rebellions and the struggle with the Maroons. In this paper the social
and economical situation in these colonies will only be dealt with in so far as
it is related to the slave rebellions and the course of the guerilla-warfare.
I. THE CONDITIONS OF SLAVERY LEADING TO REBELLION
The food supply of the field-slaves was always scanty.3 It was laid down by
Shortened version of 'Tien jaren Surinaamse guerilla en slavenopstanden, 1750-1759',

Tlidschrift voor Geschledenis, LXXXVI (Groningen, 1973) 21-50.
1. The records of the Societeit van Suriname (Surinam Company) are at the Algemeen Rijksarchief. The Hague, and contain a large collection of letters mostly addressed to the Societeit
in Amsterdam. These 'Brieven en papieren van Suriname', inventory number 84, are indicated
here as ARA, Soc. Sur., and with date. Two or three times per month parcels with letters were
sent to Holland by boat. The main topics of these letters seem to us rather trivial. They were
often 'parochial' affairs about which people had been disturbed for months. It seems therefore
safe to conclude that the 'Brieven en papieren' give a very reliable picture of the extent and the
frequency of the rebellious movements in the plantations-even if this picture is not complete.
The journals of the governors of this period in the 'Oud archief van de gouvernementssecretarie
der kolonie Suriname' have been used mainly for comparison and cross-checking (quoted as
ARA, GA, and numbered in accordance with inventory number 34). The chartered Societeit
van Suriname was founded in 1683 by the three owners of the colony: Cornelis van Aerssen,
the municipality of Amsterdam and the West Indian Company; it appointed the governor,
who was assisted by a board of Councillors who represented the planters.
2. The 18th-century term wegloper is synonymous with 'Maroon', but it also means a 'fugitive
slave'. In this article Maroons are only those slaves who ran away from plantations and settled
in villages in the forests with a particular social organization of their own.
3. Cf. Eugene D. Genovese, 'The treatment of slaves in different countries' in: Laura Foner
85
M. MULLER
law that for every two slaves one field of c. 21/2 square poles of pro visiegron d
or kostgrond4 had to be provided, so that they could grow vegetables, peanuts,
tajers (yams), bananas etc. for their own consumption, or could raise chickens
and ducks. Moreover, three or four times per year the planters supplied each slave
with three or four pounds of seafish and sometimes with fruit as well.5 The supply
of drinking-water was often far from adequate, especially in the dry season.
Then the river water in the lower areas became undrinkable through pollution
by the plantations in the upper regions, while the water-wells dried up quickly
and became contaminated 'so that the negroes on such plantations either drink
bad water or suffer from thirst-both of which often cause dangerous fevers
and diarrhoea, and cause many a negro to lose his life'. 6
The housing of the slaves was also far from adequate. The stuffy wooden shacks
in which all the family activities took place after sunset, were only three yards
high and no bigger than three and a half by five yards. Sometimes there were
barracks divided into 'small cells'.7 In order to keep out the cold and insects the
slaves had a fire in the middle of the floor 'without bothering about the smoke
which nearly suffocated them'.s
As far as the labour conditions were concerned the domestic slaves were the
most fortunate. 9 Their personal-and as far as the women were concerned often
intimate-relations with the whites made them better off from a material point
of view than the field slaves. The black craftsmen who had had a training as cooper,
blacksmith, carpenter etc. could rely on more decent treatment than their unskilled
fellow-men, since they were worth four or five times more.1 They did not only
work on the plantations, but also in the city for the citizens or the government. l l
By far the majority of slaves worked in the fields 12 on the sugar, coffee, cacao
and E. D. Genovese, ed., Slavery in the New World, a Reader in Comparative History (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1969) 202-10, especiaJly 203.
4. R. van Lier, Samenleving in een grensgebied (2nd ed.; Deventer, 1971) 122. Cf., e.g. Th.
Pistorius, Korte en zakelijke beschrijvinge van de colonie van Zuriname (Amsterdam, 1763) art.
xvi,97.
5. A. BJorn, Verhandeling over den landbouw in de colonie Suriname (Haarlem, 1786) 118;
Van Lier, Samenleving, 122.
6. BJorn, Verhandeling over den landbouw, 349-50.
7. J. D. Herlein, Beschryvinge van de Volk-plantinge Zuriname (Leeuwarden, 1718) 82; Ph.
Fermin, Nieuwe, algemeene beschryving van de colonie van Suriname (2 vols; Harlingen, 1770) I,
129.
8. Fermin, Nieuwe algemeene beschrijving, I, 130.
9. Van Lier, Samenleving, 120, records for 1853 (!) 11 per cent of the total population of slaves.
10. Fermin, Nieuwe algemeene beschryving, I, 106, 108.
11. Ibidem, 88; the government slaves worked mainly in the harbours and forts.
12. Van Lier, Samenleving, 120, records about 80 per cent including those who were unfit for
work, and for the 18th century this percentage is also feasible, because of the lack of accurate
figures.
86
GUERILLA-WARFARE AND SLAVE REBELLIONS IN
1750-1759
and cotton plantations or in the forests. The 'timber-slaves' in 'particular did

very heavy work, but they also enjoyed a certain independence. The African division of labour between men and women was kept up by them: the women cultivated the kostgronden. 13 The timber-plantations were in an out of the way part
of Surinam, however, and were of little economical significance. 14 The labour
conditions on the other plantations are, therefore, typical for slavery as a whole,15
The slaves worked from six o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the evening, with a two-hour break; during harvest time it could be as much as fifteen or
twenty hours per day on the coffee and sugar plantations. Everyone who was
not too old, young or ill had the same task which made discipline simpler. An
overseer who was generally black (a negro officer, called 'Bastiaan' or 'Bomba')
plied a whip if orders were not obeyed. On Saturday afternoons and on Sundays
the slaves could work in their own kostgronden, or go fishing and 'spend the rest
of the time enjoying themselves'.16
Nearly all the eighteenth and nineteenth century treatises on Surinam abound
in lengthy descriptions of diseases which were common on the plantations. Moreover we have eighteenth century reports on an annual decrease in the population
of about five per cent, not counting the importation of new slaves. All this makes
it clear that disease and death for which bad conditions must have been the basic
reason were frequent visitors at the plantations.
The chances of an independent social and cultural life for the slaves were very
limited in Surinam. The family unit-with the mother at the centre-remained,
however, intact,17 Until at least 1770 it was customary for mothers and children
to be sold together and the authorities saw to it that this custom was adhered to. 18
On the plantations kinds of communities developed, groups of Creoles who had
been born in the colonies, or negroes of common ethnic and cultural origin. 19
For the whites this grouping on the plantations was not advantageous, but
they could do little about it.20 They did, however, manage to suppress co-operation
between communities in different plantations. 21 Great religious singing and dancing
13. Ibidem, 121-2.
14. According to Pistorius, Korte beschryvinge, 26, there were 10 to 12 timber plantations in
1761.
15. Van Lier, Samenleving, 121.
16. J. J. Hartsinck, Beschryvinge van Guiana (2 vols. paginated as one volume; Amsterdam,
1770) 916.
17. Van Lier, Samenleving, 116.
18. Ibidem, 114, based on J. G. Stedman, Narrative of a five years' expedition against the revolted
negroes of Surinam (London, 1813). Stedman was a Scottish officer in the punitive expedition
against the Cottica Maroons in the 1770s.
19. Ibidem, 117-8 (Stedman).
20. Blom's remark in: Verhandeling over den Landbouw, 388: 'Their secrets are unfathomable'
is typical.
21. Cf., e.g. Van Lier, Samenleving, 107 fr.; Hartsinck, Guiana, 917; Blom, Verhandeling over
den landbouw, 389.
87
M. MULLER
festivals, such as 'water mama' and 'doe' were all sooner or later prohibited.
At night the slave could only leave the plantations with written permission from
the owner. In the British slave colonies the slaves had to provide for themselves
out of the produce from their kostgronden, and grew crops for the Sunday market
as well. In Surinam slaves were not allowed to have boats which could be used
as a means of transport, nor to trade without permission. Assemblies were also
forbidden. A 'market Sunday' did not exist.
Possibilities for freeing slaves were almost non-existent. Manumission which
was customary in Brazil (which was in most respects very similar to Surinam)
was very unusual here. From 1738 to 1787 the number of free, coloured people
and negroes rose from 578 to not more than 650. 22 The means with which the
system was maintained were based on physical violence. The brand which the
negroes got as they arrived, was the first instance of the continual ill-treatment to
which they were subjected. The owner was allowed to inflict all forms of physical
punishment except those resulting in death or mutilation. The latter punishments
were the prerogative of the government. 23
II. SLAVE REBELLIONS -
SORTS AND FREQUENCY
On many plantations the relationship between the slaves and the owners seems
to have been good. This can be deduced from the fact that the slaves frequently
defended the plantations against attacks of the Maroons. 24 In other plantations
there was never complete subjection or voluntary acceptance of slavery. Various
characteristics which the whites ascribed to the negroes-viz. laziness, mendacity,
vindictiveness-were in fact often symptoms of rebelliousness. It is understandable
that owners who prided themselves on managing their slaves well, did not recognize
that these were symptoms of serious discontent. Open revolt was punished with
the death or mutilation.
There are no concrete facts known about how often instances of passive resistance occured, apart from some traditional examples and some general remarks
in the historical sources of this period. 25 Sometimes, if the situation at a particular
plantation became unbearable, the slaves turned to the manager or owner request22. Van Lier, Samenleving, 71.
23. J. Wolbers, Geschiedenis van Suriname (Amsterdam, 1861) 129-30; Hartsinck, Guiana,
916-7.
24. Cf. e.g. ARA, GA 7, the entry in the journal of 12-9-1754 and 16-2-1754 records that two
plantation raids in Wanica and Para were unsuccessful, because of the loyalty of the slaves;
an unsuccessful attack on l'Esperance pleases governor Crommelin exceedingly, because the
negroes 'have given striking proof of their loyalty in this case'. ARA, Soc. Sur., 205-1 (6-5-1758).
25.Van Lier, Samenleving, 105-9. This was said more frequently of the slaves in the towns, because
there were more whites there to be irritated by it than that in the plantations.
88
1750-1759
ing him to redress their grievances-such as the cruelty of an overseer, excessive

working hours, bad food etc.-or else they would not work any longer. To refuse
to work or to threaten not to work was very dangerous. Solidarity among the
slaves had to be quite strong, otherwise the 'ringleaders' would be singled out in
order to break the resistance. 26 Sometimes the spokesmen who turned up at the
police court to complain about abuses, were whipped and chased away for their
insolence. 27 A united action usually forced the plantation owners to give in: the
risk of a rebellion or of a decrease of output was too great. 28 Sometimes humane
motives must have played a role too. The planters often complained about the
laziness of their slaves without either wanting or perhaps being able to see the
causes. It is difficult to decide in how far laziness and slovenliness were expressions
of passive resistance or symptoms of an almost endemic despair. According to
Patterson in Jamaica it was not unusual for slaves to induce illnesses in themselves,29 and this seems to have taken place in Surinam also. The Historische Proeve
(Historical Essay) relates how negroes 'in order to be excused from work at the
plantations, are always managing to obtain means to keep wounds open for a
long time'.30
There were many suicides: there were negroes who would rather swallow their
own tongues or eat dirta l than toil any longer. This is why a slave often, before
he was whipped, had a burning stick pushed into his mouth so that his tongue
and lips would swell so much that it became impossible for him to swallow his
tongue. 32 Did this show resistance, despair or both? The slaves will centainly
have been aware how furious the whites were, at each case of a suicide-which
cost them several hundred guilders. Religious motives may have played a role
too. Some African peoples, like the Ibos and the Angolans, believed that they
would return to Africa after death, or in any case to a better hereafter. 33 It was
also believed that the spirit of the person who had been driven to suicide could
avenge himself on the person who had driven him to this act. 34
26. In a report by ensign, Smidt, ARA, Soc. Sur., 207-363, mention is made of 'unprecedented
impertinencies', because the slaves of lucemonbo told their owner Biertempel that if 'they had
not been so good-natured, they would all have run away long ago' (23-3-1759). Three months
later they did. In a place called Goede Vreede this affair ended badly: seven slaves that had been
arrested were executed, ARA, Soc. Sur., 206-15, 19,23 and 111 (sept. and Oct. 1758).
27. Wolbers, Suriname, 132.
28. This is why Biertempel promised to remain in Paramaribo henceforth and not to interfere
with his slaves.
29. H. O. Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (London, 1967) 261.
30. Geschiedenis der kolonie Suriname, ... samengesteld door een gezelschap geleerde Joodse
mannen aldaar. Historische Proeve over de Kolonie van Suriname (2 vols; Amsterdam, 1791) 11,66.
This is a Dutch edition of Essai historique sur la colonie de Surinam (Paramaribo, 1788).
31. Cf. Blom, Verhandeling over den landbouw, 418, on grondeters ('mud eaters').
32. Herlein, Beschryvinge, 112-3.
33. Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 264-5; Hartsinck, Guiana, 903.
34. Silvia W. de Groot, Djuka Society and Social Change (Amsterdam, 1969) 29.
89
M. MULLER
The normal way of escaping from slavery was running away. As a rule the 'fugitives' or deserters were people who had adapted themselves least to the life of
a slave: primarily negroes who-in contrast with the Creoles- had been imported
from Africa. In so far as we can ascertain, the more intelligent, individualistic
plantation slaves dared rebel and incite others to do the same. 3S Whether the running away was accompanied by violence depended on the number of slaves that
left the plantation at anyone time. It there were only a few, then they usually
escaped into the jungle unnoticed. If there were large groups of fugitives, then
sometimes heavy fighting occurred and this can be looked upon as a slave rebellion.
Cases of murder or manslaughter of the white master seem to have been exceptions. Violence was almost always collective and resulted in a more or less massive
exodus from the plantation. The rebels disappeared into the jungle and tried to
start a new life there.
In the course of the eighteenth century Surinam had dozens of greater or smaller
slave rebellions. In the ten years after the failure of the truce with the Saramacca
Maroons (1749) there were fifteen rebellions, not counting the attacks on the
plantations by the Maroons. All in all there were 900 to 1,000 slaves belonging to
21 plantations involved in these rebellions. Nearly all the rebellions took place in
one plantation at a time. The slaves of six timber-plantations revolted simultaneously only in Tempatie. A general, co-ordinated rebellion never took place. We
have already shown that the slaves had little liberty of movement and that measures
existed to keep the plantations isolated. This made communication between the
slaves of various plantations difficult and promoted rivalry rather than unity
between the various groups of slaves, because their social life took place entirely
within the plantation. 36 Differences in African origin probably caused plans
for general action to be betrayed, or their execution to be carried out by one particular ethnic group.37
It seems that the rebellions were usually not spontaneous outbreaks of fury,
but carefully planned. Firstly it is striking that the number of successful attempts
is many times greater than the number of failures. Such a series of successes
against a well-organized and well-armed opponent presupposes a certain
amount of organization on the part of the slaves. There was a clear preference
for running away during the dry season. This was not accidental. 38 One had to wait
till the water level in the forests had dropped after the rainy season in order to
35. Cf. the character descriptions of Baron, Bonni and Jolicoeur by Wolbers, Suriname, 327-9;
Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 263.
36. Cf. Van Lier, Samenleving, 116-7.
37. Ibidem; Monica Schuler, 'Ethnic Slave Rebellions in the Carribean and the Guianas',
Journal of Social History, III (Berkeley, Calif., 1970) 379.
38. Of the 22 rebellions or attempts at rebellion only 4 took place during the rainy season over
a period of ten years.
90
1750-1759
be able to keep sufficiently ahead of the inevitable search-parties. As soon as the

slaves had chased away or killed the whites or their helpers, they withdrew into
the forests with as many provisions as they could carry.
There are six cases in which previous consultation or active co-operation with
the Maroons can be demonstrated, and these were certainly not the only ones.
From the interrogation of a captured slave, David, from Palmeniribo, it appears
that the 'fugitive slaves had corresponded with the negroes from the plantation
for seven months'39 without anything having leaked out. The whites in consequence, talked about 'plots' and 'conspiracies'. There were, however, exceptions:
the beginning of the revolt in Tempatie was spontaneous. 40
A large number of negroes escaped from the many search-parties and expeditions against the Maroons. They were used by the whites as carriers and marksmen.
There was hardly an expedition in which the leader did not have to report the loss
of some and occasionally even dozens of slaves. Of the nearly 300 slaves hired
for the Hentschel expedition in the fall of 1755 about 30 deserted with their guns
and loads to the Maroons. 41 During Koningh's expedition which set off in the
spring of 1756 with 345 slaves, nearly 200 marksmen and cariers deserted within
six weeks. 42
Recently some scholars have strongly emphasized the role of the Acan-speaking
Africans in the West Indian slave rebellions. These Cormantines or Ashanti were
originally from Ashanti, a centralized and militaristic realm which covered a
large part of West Africa. 43 They had the kind of experience and traditions
which made them suitable leaders in the struggle against slavery. In Surinam
their influence cannot, however, be demonstrated. Most rebels remained anonymous. Of the rebels named in the historical sources hardly any have an indication
concerning their Mrican origin. The most famous leaders of the Maroons in
the eighteenth century, Adoe, Samsam, Arabi, Baron, Bonni and Jolicoeur were
none of them known as Cormantines. 44 In the seventeenth century only chief
Jermes is known as a Cormantine who fought the English. 46 The negative results
of an investigation into this problem in relation to Bush negro communities
are of importance in this connection. According to Sylvia de Groot
39.
40.
41.
42.
873,
43.
44.
775,
45.
ARA, Soc. Sur., 204-354 (7-4-1758).

Wolbers, Suriname, 151-3; ARA, Soc. Sur., 201-278 (25-2-1757).
'Journaal van Hentschel', ARA, Soc. Sur., 198-201 (16-9/26-12, 1755).
Intermediate reports by Koningh to the governor, ARA, Soc. Sur., 198-769, 757, 869,
199-61 (middle of March to end of April 1755).
Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 276; Schuler, 'Ethnic Slave Rebellions', 375 ff.
Adoe was a Creole, Samsam a Papa negro and Arabi a Bush Creole. Hartsinck, Guiana,
777, 779. See for the others Wolbers, Suriname, 327-9.
Hartsinck, Guiana, 755.
91
M. MULLER
Neither from literature, nor from unpublished documents, nor from the Djuka traditions
handed down by word of mouth is it possible to ascertain from which African tribes the
Djuka society (or other Bush negro communities) is derived ... The Bush Negroes ... did
not proceed on the basis of their West African tribal connections but formed clans according
to the plantations from which the fugitives came.46
Herskovits' description of the Saramacca society also does not demonstrate a

special role of the Cormantines. 47
III. THE MAROONS -
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF FREEDOM
Those who had managed to escape from the search-parties, were faced with
the difficult task of living in the jungle. In the seventeenth century the first, small
groups of fugitives settled between the rivers Coppename and Saramacca. It
is known that in 1684 they made peace with Governor Van Sommelsdijck48
and that they presumably joined the Maroons who lived between the Saramacca
and the Surinam. 49 Around 1700, fugitives had also settled along the Para creek
and in the forests along the Commewijne and Cottica. 50 As more and more inland
regions along the rivers were reclaimed, the fugitives had to penetrate further
in order to stay out of the reach of the punitive expeditions. Around 1760 a
notorious leader of such expeditions, Thomas Pistorius, writes that from Auka,
the southernmost plantation on the river Surinam 'one has to travel for about
a fortnight over mountains, creeks, and vallies before one reaches their villages'.51
The fugitives had to travel a long and dangerous road before they had reached
safety.
The first large community of fugitive slaves started in 1712. The French admiral
and pirate, Cassard, attacked the flourishing Dutch colony. In order to avoid
having to pay ransom money the planters sent their slaves into the forests. This
remedy proved to be worse than the disease. More than 700 negroes never returned
to the plantations and from then on formed a large part of the Bush negro community of the so-called Saramaccaners. 52 By 1749 their number was approximately
1,600. 53 Further north up the rivers Saramacca and Surinam there were also small
46. De Groot, Djuka Society, 13. E. Wong already thought that 'In the relations within the
tribe it is hard to observe at this time any differentiation according to African origin in: 'Hoofdenverkiezing, van Suriname in de 18e en 1ge eeuw', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
van Nederlandsch-Indie, XCVII (The Hague, 1938) 300.
47. M. J. and F. S. Herskovits, Rebel Destiny (New York, 1934) e.g. 50, 323.
48. Hartsinck, Guiana, 649.
49. Ibidem, 755, talks about a 'commonwealth'.
50. Ibidem, 755 ff.
51. Pistorius, Korte beschrijvinge, 5-6.
52. See among others Herlein, Beschryvinge, 57-62, 93; Historische Proeve, I, 84-5.
53. Hartsinck, Guiana, 776.
92
1750-1759
groups of Maroons, like the Moesingas who separated from the Saramaccaners
in 1762. 54 Along the Marowijne lived the Djukas. In the eighteenth century they
were called Aukaners-a group that became an important tribe after some hundreds of rebels from the Tempatie area had joined them in 1757. 55 They were
then presumably just as numerous as the Saramacca Maroons.
Scattered over the inner regions there must have been a number of small,
isolated villages whose inhabitants in the long run had to give up the unequal
struggle against the jungle and the soldiers of the whites. Among them were the
Cottica Maroons who organized themselves into a new and very belligerent tribe,
after the Djukas and the Saramacca Maroons had made peace with the government. After years of guerilla-warfare led by Baron, Bonni and Jolicoeur, they were
overwhelmed by the superior military strenght of the whites. 56 In French Guiana
there are still some hundreds of 'Bonnis'.
Eighteenth-century historical sources do not offer an adequate description
of the society of the Maroons and in particular of the Saramacca Maroons and
the Djukas. Such a description is only possible by working back from facts of
a later date.57 The tribes were divided into los, consisting of heres formed by the
members of related, matrilineal families. The latter usually obeyed the eldest
male relative; the political leader of the los was the hedeman, later on called kapten
or grankapten. The chief was the granman whose authority was based on the size
of his family or on the fact that his predecessors had been among the earliest
settlers. 58
That the African origin of the negroes hardly played a role in the social organization of the fugitive slaves can be deduced from the names of several los. The
common origin in a particular plantation was, however, of importance. Of the
fourteen Djuka-Ios mentioned by Wong, eleven names were derived from the
plantations or the slave owners. 59 A couple of the twelve Saramacca los clearly
have an ethnic name, however, in particular the Loango-ningre and the Dahomeyningre. This is also the case with the eighteenth-century Papa village of which
Samsam was the chief.
There were only slight differences between the social organization of the Djukas
and the Saramacca Maroons. The latter's villages were further apart which made
defending them easier, and their los were not so dependent on the granman as
54. Wong, 'Hoofdenverkiezing', 324 and on the way the tribes were distributed in general.
Ibidem, 319 fr.
55. De Groot, Djuka Society, 14. This tribe probably also originated in 1712.
56. Wolbers, Suriname, 325 fr.
57. Eighteenth century sources are inadequate for this purpose, so that a 'histoire a rebours'
is the result. Herskovits says, however, in Rebel Destiny, xii, that 'they live and think today
as did their ancestors who established themselves in this bush'.
58. Wong, 'Hoofdenverkiezing', 328.
59. Ibidem, 311 fr.
93
M. MULLER
those of the Djukas. Their language had quite a lot of Portuguese elements, presumably because many of them had run away from Portuguese Jewish slave owners.60
As a rule each los built its own village which could consist of a few dozens to
c. 300 houses; to often had a stockade and watch-towers.61 Each 10 had a particular
area at its disposal and each here received a part of it; each family had one
to three acres per grown-up as kostgrond. 62 Mainly cassava, rice, bananas, yams,
maize, sugar and peanuts were cultivated. After two years the soil would become
too infertile for further cultivation and this made people regularly reclaim new
fields. While the women worked the land, the man went hunting and fishing.
The fields were at some distance from the villages. They were situated high
enough not to become flooded during the rainy season. 63 Because it was of vital
importance to the Maroons that their kostgronden should not be destroyed if
they were attacked by the whites, they often reclaimed more fields in reserve and
camouflaged the paths leading through the forest by deceptive side-tracks. 64
Certain necessities of life such as pots, kettles, metal tools, arms and salt were
unobtainable in the jungle. There was also an urgent need for women, for the
fugitives were mainly men whose family occasionally followed them later on.
What the jungle could not provide had to be stolen from the plantations and
this caused an endless series of raids during the eighteenth century. It is not true
that the Bush negroes 'became more and more aggressive as their numbers
increased',65 a rather simplistic argument dating from the eighteenth century.66 A
sudden increase in numbers brought pressure to bear, however, on resources
which were slight in any case. These difficulties are described in a story which
was written down a century later by a Matuari Bush negro, Johannes King:
They then had a terribly difficult, miserable and appalling kind of life, but what they lacked
most was food. They did not even have peace to cultivate the land in order to get food. The
whites kept on persecuting them. 67
60. Ibidem, 316, 320.

61. Hartsinck, Guiana, 761-2. 'Informatie over de neger Quassi ... ', ARA, Soc. Sur., 195-343
(Oct. 1754).
62. On the agricultural methods and customs of the Maroons see: D. Geyskes, 'De landbouw
bij de bosnegers van de Marowijne', West-Indische Gids, XXXV (Amsterdam, 1955) 135-53.
He rightly points at the harmful effects of the inefficient food production.
63. Cf. Herskovits, Rebel Destiny, 95.
64. ARA, Soc. Sur., 192-141 (29-1-1753), the 'examinatie' (interrogation) of the captured Marroon, Janpietje, in which it says among other things that the 'fugitives always have two villages
with fields'; 'Informatie ... Quassie'; Herskovits, Rebel Destiny, 93.
65. J. G. van Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten (The Hague, 1970) 588.
66. Historische Proeve, I, 122.
67. U. M. Lichtveld and I. Voorhoeve, Suriname. Spiegel der vaderlandse kooplieden (Zwolle,
1958) 92-5. The text which is given there with the translation is a fragment of the 'krekiboekoe'
(book of visions) of 1888 which has not been published.
94
1750-1759
It has to be admitted though that the whites were not always very successful
in their activities.
Little is known about the raids for provisions by the Maroons, except through
the interrogation of a captured Maroon, called Janpietje. 68 According to him
some dozens of able men would go downstream in their korjalen (primitive kind
of boats) with provisions for a few weeks. Close to the plantation they had decided
to raid, they would hide their boats, and after the raid would paddle upstream
as quickly as they could. They mainly aimed at obtaining gunpowder, iron goods
and salt, axes and pots for cooking salt, arms, textiles and liquor. The purpose
of a raid could also be to capture women. 69
V. THE COMPROMISE WITH THE WHITES
The first attempt at peace with the Saramacca Maroons-a treaty made by
Governor Mauricius in 1749-failed because of the inconsistent policy of the Councillors of Surinam, a body of delegates from the planters. 7o In 1759 there was
a truce with the Djukas. During the preliminaries a Maroon, called Boston,
played a rather special role. He was a Jamaican who obviously on account of his
standard of education had obtained an important place among the Djukas. 71
He was undoubtedly aware of the favourable conditions on which the Jamaican
Maroons had come to an agreement with the English in 1739,72 and he successfully
used his influence in order to obtain a similar result for the Djukas. He avoided
fighting himself and wrote letters in which he expressed the wish for peace among
the Djukas. These letters were subsequently left in conspicuous places by plantation raiders. 78 After the government had deciphered his rather cryptic language
the proposals were agreed to. 74 There is no doubt that without his help there
would have been peace eventually, but it is interesting that the Maroons-as
well as the colonists75-were inspired by the experiences of the Jamaicans.
In 1762 the Saramacca Maroons reluctantly followed the example of the Djukas,
except for a few members of the tribe who separated from them and continued
68. Cf. above n. 64.
69. 'Examinatie van de gevangene Tromp', ARA, Soc. Sur., 196-739, 197-178, 180 (May 1755);
'Informatie ... Quassie', 20.
70. ARA. Soc. Sur., letters by Crommelin, 186-54 (15-1-1750) and Mauricius, 186-493 (22-51750), 187-265 (12-9-1750; Historische Proeve, I, 117-8.
71. He could read and write and was the granman's adviser; cf. 'Relaes van de twee negers
Coffyen Charlestown ... op de reyse nearde Wegloopers', ARA, Soc. Sur., 209-47 (3-9-1759).
72. Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 270.
73. 'Relaes van de twee neegers'.
74. Cf. Crommelin's letter to the Society, ARA, Soc. Sur., 209-1 (1-9-1759).
75. In 1758 Crommelin writes: 'And it is even more deplorable that the amnesty granted to
the rebels following the example of the government of Jamaica has not been put into practice
by the unfortunate objections ... ', ARA, Soc. Sur., 204-273 (11-3-1758).
95
M. MULLER
the struggle. 76 The most important conditions of both agreements were : I) the
Maroons were recognized as free people and were allowed-with some restriction-to trade within the colony: 2) the Maroons had to hand over in return
those fugitives who arrived after the peace treaty: 3) the government was to give
an annual supply of tools, arms, clothes, liquor, salt, etc. to the Maroons. The
second point naturally was the hardest to put into practice, but the Maroons
stuck to the agreements which had been made.?? They did, however, warn the
whites from time to time to be less cruel and they did not guarantee that they
would send back slaves who had been seriously ill-treated. 78 The result was,
in any case, that 'the desire for such conspiracies was considerably curbed'.79
The material circumstances of a tribe determined whether there was to be
war or peace. The political awareness of the Maroons was hardly more than
elementary group solidarity. An incident during the rebellion in Tempatie in
1757 is characteristic of the general attitude of the rebels: 'We are now the whites
[i.e. rulers1 of Tempatie', the rebels declared and then they allowed those white
soldiers who were still there to retreat safely.80 They wanted to free themselves
and to safeguard their independence, and they were not very interested in the fate
of other groups of slaves-who were after all hardly known to them-nor were
they at all interested in overthrowing the socio-economical pyramid. It is therefore not in the least paradoxical that the success of the Maroons indirectly contributed to the preservation of white supremacy, as Patterson argues. 81 We may
call it a tragic coincidence that these dense tropical forests which enabled the
slaves to escape and start an independent life, offered such scanty means of
existence that an agreement with the whites was unavoidable.
V. THE ATTITUDE OF THE COLONISTS IN FACE OF THE DANGER THREATENING THEIR
POSITION
According to the authors of the Historische Proeve the planters originally lived a
very quiet and even a rather happy life, until the slaves ran away and the frequent raids
by the Maroons on their plantations made them lose the sweetness and the pleasures of life
in the country.ss
76. Hartsinck, Guiana, 800 fr.; Wong, 'Hoofdenverkiezing', 317.
77. Draft of treaty with Djukas; ARA, Soc. Sur. 209-77; treaties with Djukas and Saramacca
Maroons; Hartsinck, Guiana, 780 fr., 802 fr. Fermin, Nleuwe algemeene beschryving, I, 115,
calls the agreement a 'law which they (the Maroons) do not observe to the letter, but which they
have nevertheless subjected themselves to, and to which they are more or less resigned' (1770);
cf. e.g. M. D. Teenstra, De landbouw in de kolonie Suriname (2 vols; Groningen, 1835) II, 43,
who remarks with pleasure that 'the satisfied negroes struck to their contracts faithfully'.
78. Cf. Hartsinck, Guiana, 799.
79. Ibidem, 813.
80. Statement by three soldiers, ARA, Soc. Sur., 201-280 (25-2-1757).
81. Patterson, Sociology of Slavery, 279.
82. Historische Proeve, I, 97.
96
1750-1759
In order to regain the old happiness they had to solve a dilemma-which Herlein,
in 1718, formulated so nicely: 'if they [i.e. the slaves] are treated too cruelly, they
run away out of despair, and if they are treated too gently, they run away out
of wantonness'.SS Since the economy of eighteenth-century Surinam plantations
could not allow this running away, people tried to stop it by severe punishments:
by mutilation until the beginning of the eighteenth century, and later on (from
1720 onwards) by capital punishment. S4 The barbarity with which these punishments were sometimes carried out does not seem to agree very well with the rational
capitalistic nature of the economy of the plantations. Some contemporaries show
an understanding of this discrepancy. The French ex-governor of Cayenne,
Pierre-Victor Malonet who visited Surinam regularly wrote in 1777:
Ne nous dissimulons pas que cette distance d'un homme It un homme, I'habitude et Ie pouvoir de faire It chaque instant sa volonte den:gle les mouvements, degrade les caracteres,
qu'il faut une excellente education et des principes bien etablis pour resister It cette impulsion
et que Ie plus grand nombre des hommes n'en est pas capable. 85
An important factor was the 'fear of the multitude of the slaves'. The behaviour
of the colonists and the relationship between master and slave were partly determined by the numerical inferiority of the whites (one white to 25 or more negroes)
and partly by the real danger of rebellions.s6
Governor Mauricius (1742-51) was convinced that unbridled cruelty was
economically harmful to the colony.'The anger and passion with which legal
proceedings against negroes are hurried along here by clamorous councillors's7
irritated him endlessly. Capital punishment and torture were to his mind irresponsible management of capital and an unnecessary risk. In 1744 he proposed not
to kill rebels, but 'to employ them for the rest of their lives on public works,
after having cut out their tongues and castrating them'. 88 In the many treatises
written for the benefit of future plantation managers it is pointed out continually
that unrest was not in the interest of the master. It is doubtful if such rational
objections had much influence on the slave owners.
The same holds good for the religious arguments against cruel treatment
and slavery in general. The planters liked defending themselves against critics
83. Herlein, Beschryvinge, 86.
84. Ibidem, 113; Wolbers, Suriname, 139.
85. G. Debien and I. Felhoen Kraai, 'Esclaves et plantations de Surinam vus par Malouet,
1777', West-Indische Girls, XXXVI (1955-6) 56.
86. Cf. the speech by Crommelin who was normally so energetic, on the rebellion in Tempatie,
ARA, Soc. Sur., 201-577 (18-4-1757) in which he says: 'And everyone also should be convinced
that the properties of the owners stand on bad soil ... and that more such rebellions must be
expected ... which will spread over the colony like a fire and destroy it, and in which the whites
will ail be murdered or given up to utter misery'.
87. Mauricius to the Society, ARA, Soc. Sur., 187-1 (13-6-1750).
88. Quoted by Wolbers, Suriname, 135.
97
M. MULLER
in their fatherland with quotations from the Bible and with the argument that
it was permissible to use negroes, who were heathens, as slaves. Pistorius, both
planter and writer (c.1760), put it as follows:
If one wants to act like a Christian and to free one's conscience from accusations, then
Christian charity demands that these slaves who are also human beings and have the same
Creator-although it has not pleased Him to shine on them, as on us, with the blessed light
of his Gospel-are also treated like human beings ... 89
What the slave lacked was not a soul, but faith. It stands to reason that missionary
activity among the heathens was not encouraged. The Reverent J. G. Kals who
was an advocate of evangelization in the 1730s was told; 'No, Vicar, let us convert
those that have the same skin and colour as we have and let '" these damned
sons of Cham go to the devil; they have been created to plant coffee and sugar for
US'.90 The treatment of slaves only began to improve when the slave trade was
stopped (1808), i.e. when the loss of slaves could not be compensated by importation.
VI. THE FAILURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAROONS
The expeditions or 'commandos' against the Maroons started from the moment
slaves ran away. In the beginning of the eighteenth century 'Maroon hunting'
was open to everybody and a reward was offered for catching or killing a fugitive
slave. 91 The enthusiasm with which some people set out diminished as the Maroons
became stronger and withdrew further into the forests. When it appeared necescary to use regular troops for these expeditions, the planters of whom only a
small group was troubled by the raids, tried to make the Societeit van Suriname
(The Surinam Company) pay for the cost. About 1750 the governor and the head
of the Surinam militia were very active in upholding a policy which was aimed
at wiping out the Maroons or at protecting the plantations against attacks by
some other means. The government was afraid that the Maroons would get a
hold on the slaves and, in general, that the colony would get a bad name-which
would affect its solvency.92
Whereas in 1718 Herlein could speak of varying success in this struggle, the
whites were clearly at a disadvantage in the 1740s and 1750s. 93 A somewhat later
89. Pistorius, Korte beschrijvinge, 98.
90. 'Reedenvoeringe gedaan voor de Synodus van Suyd-Holland, 1735', VIII in: J. G. Kals,
Neerlands hoo/t- en wortelsonde, het verzuym van de bekeringe der heydenen ... (Leeuwarden, 1756).
91. Hartsinck, Guiana, 756; cf. Wolbers, Suriname, 138-9, 146; D. C. Nassy who was one of
the parnassim of the Portuguese Jewish community and who fell in a campaign against the
Maroons in 1743, seems to hold the record with c. 30 expeditions.
92. Letter by Governor and Councillors, ARA, Soc. Sur., 201-219 (4-4-1757); letter by Crommelin, ibidem, 204-273 (11-3-1758). For Societeit van Suriname, cf. above note 1.
93. Herlein, Beschryvinge, 115.
98
1750-1759
writer, Hartsinck, says that the results of the more than 20 large and small expeditions between 1730 and 1749 were negligible. 94 The next ten years give the same
picture. Of more than 28 search-parties and expeditions only two were successful.
If we leave out of account the smaller search-parties which consisted of 20 to 60
men, whites and black carriers, we can say that the main causes of failure were:
1) losing the way or being led astray; 2) lack of discipline among the soldiers and
incompetence of the officers; 3) bad provisions; 4) physical and mental exhaustion
in the jungle; 5) sabotage and desertion on the part of the black marksmen and
carriers. The journals which we have of some of these expeditions are long tales
of endless sufferings as people progressed into the jungle. Led by unreliable
guides 95 people waded in files for weeks on end through marshes and creeks,
climbed steep mountains, ate food that had gone bad from moisture and vermin,
buried their dead and counted the number of fugitive slaves. One expedition of
161 whites and 345 slaves that went into the jungle in March 1756 in order to fight
the Saramacca Maroons came back after two months without having seen one
enemy village and having lost approximately 50 soldiers and over 200 slaves whoas explained above-had mostly deserted to the Maroons. 96 Other expeditions
fared very little better. 97
Originally the aim of an expedition was to destroy a village and, if possible,
the inhabitants as well, and then to return, but this was rarely successful. 98 A
new method which consisted of occupation of the villages and the kostgronden
proved to be impracticable. 99 The failure of these expensive expeditions and the
continual attacks on the plantations made a different policy necessary. Because
so many slaves deserted during the expeditions and the route along the rivers
bacame more and more known,1o the military effort even had adverse results
on the whole.
VII. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE MAROONS: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS
It was frequently said that the Maroons brought the colony to the verge of
ruin.1 01 Governor Van der Meer (1754-6) feared that their attacks 'would even
94. Hartsinck, Guiana, 759-67.
95. 'Examinatie van de gevangene Tromp'; in 1755 this slave made a group of soldiers go round
in circles for a fortnight. The negro, called Quassie, who led several white expeditions to the
Maroons was very exceptional.
96. See above, note 42.
97. Journals and letters, ARA, Soc. Sur., 197-331 and 198-47 (Sept. and Nov 1755), 200-19
and 200-154 (Sept. 1756), 198-791 and 199-25 (April 1756).
98. Letter by the intermediate Governor Van Verschuur, ibidem, 191-246 (7-10-1752); Hartsinck,
Guiana, 767.
99. Decision of Governor and Coucillors, ARA, Soc. Sur., 196-1 (16-1-1755).
100. Cf. Historische Proeve, I, 117.
101. Ibidem, 122.
99
M. MULLER
precipitate the total destruction of the colony',102 and the temporary Governor
Jan Nepveu (1756-7) agreed with him.103 As late as 1854 Van Sijpesteijn writes
about the 'wars against the Bush negroes which very nearly ruined the colony,
Surinam, in the middle of the eighteenth century'.104 Recently there has been
an increasing tendency among historians to consider the financial crises of the
1760s and the 1770s and the fall of the world market prices as the causes of the
decline of the Surinam economy.105 Before 1760 financial dependence and foreign
competition had hardly played a negative role.l o6 It is possible therefore to give
a reasonably accurate evaluation of the economic consequences of the destruction
of the plantations from 1750 to 1760 by comparing the frequency and scale of
the destruction with the main export in those years (see table). The products
of the Surinam plantations were almost exclusively for the European market/ o7
and their home consumption was negligible.
Such a comparison proves that there could have been no connection between
the fluctuations in the export which were sometimes considerable 108 and the frequency of the raids and rebellions. At that time Surinam had about 450 plantations 109 of which not even one per cent was attacked per year. The actual damage
caused by the raids consisted of plundering and sometimes even burning down
of buildings; it was exceptional for fields and orchards to be destroyed. A
group of buildings had a value of some tens of thousands of guilders, depending
on the size and the nature of the plantation. l1O We know that there were 116
sugar plantations and 280 coffee plantations,lll but since we do not have serviceable inventories ll2 we do not know to which category the plantations that were
attacked belonged and how big they were. It is therefore impossible to give an
approximately accurate description of the nature and extent of the damage.
102. ARA, Soc. Sur., 195-324 (4-11-1754).
103. Ibidem, 200-127 (29-9-1756).
104. c. A. van Sijpesteijn, Beschrijving van Suriname (The Hague, 1854) 28.
105. Van Dillen, Rijkdom en Regenten, 586-8; R. M. N. Panday, Agriculture in Surinam,
1650-1950 (Amsterdam, 1959) 28-34.
106. Foreign competition started especially after 1770, in particular in the coffee trade, at a
time when there were also other adverse developments in the economy of Surinam. Cf. Van
Dillen, 'Memorie betreffende de kolonie Suriname', Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek, XXIV
(The Hague, 1950) 162-7.
107. Pan day, Agriculture, 20.
108. Panday, ibidem, attributes these to bad harvests because of bad weather, plant diseases etc.
109. Cf. H. D. Benjamins and J. F. Snelleman, ed., Encyc/opaedie voor Nederlandsch WestIndie (TheHague, 1914-7) 440; R. Bijlsma, 'Surinaamsche plantage inventarissen uit het tijdperk
1713-1742', West-Indische Gids, III (1922) 325-32; Historische Proeve, II, 31.
110. See Blom's calculations, Verhandeling over den landbouw, 120, 133, 223, 235, from which
it appears that the buildings and the equipment of the sugar plantations were about twice as
expensive as those in the coffee plantations.
111. Pistorius, Korte beschrijvinge, 26 (1761).
112. Cf. Bijlsma, 'Plantage-inventarissen', passim.
100
GUERILLA-WARFARE AND SLAVE REBELLIONS IN 1750-1759
We have to be just as careful about the loss of fugitive slaves. If a hundred slaves
ran away from one plantation in one year, we can be quite sure that mention
would be made of this. But if one slave at a time ran away from a hunderd different
plantations, we cannot expect this. In the period from 1750-9 about 1,200 slaves
joined the Maroons, as far as we can deduce from the reports and journals of
the expeditions; it is possible that their number was, in fact, some 50 per cent
more. If we estimate the price of each fugitive slave at 400 guilders,1l3 then we
can calculate a loss of 48,000 to 72,000 guilders per year. How much this meant
to the owners, out of a total of 45,000 slaves,114 can hardly be expressed in percentages. At that time one well-to-do planter S. L. Neale had a yeady profit of approximately that amount.l15 In this decade there is only one known case of a planter
who wanted to abandon his land because of the Maroons. ll6
The indirect economical results are also hard to assess. About the military
expenses there are very few data. In 1759 we have a vague reference to '100,000
guilders per expedition', but no mention is made ofthe duration nor of the number
of participants, and it is also not clear if the normal pay and provisions are included in this sum.1l7 According to a 'calculation' in 1759 a yeady amount of
130,175 guilders was required for the 600 men who were then employed. Governor
Crommelin pleaded for an extra 625 men -which would cost 159,930 guilders, us
but this increase in the expenses was more than the planters were willing to pay.
The income of the 'anti-fugitives fund' which was founded in 1750 could be pushed
up at the most to a good 137,000 guilders, but until 1759 it had never been more
than 109,758 guilders per year. l19 There is, however, reason to suggest that the
financial 'ceiling' of the war expenditure had not been reached at all and that
action against the Maroons was primarily hindered by the difficulties of distributing the expenses between the planters and the Societeit van Suriname.
The loss of slaves made some planters 'borrow as much money as they needed
from Dutch merchants'.12o Dependence on the Dutch money-market which later
on became very disadvantageous for the colonists was thus promoted by the running away ofthe slaves. But the immediate and the indirect effects of the rebellions
113. HerIein, Beschryvinge, 84: 250 guilders in 1718; according to a calculation by Blom, Verhandeling over den landbouw, 120, 133, 123, 235, it was 500 guilders in 1786.
114. Panday, Agriculture, 45.
115. C. F. Giilcher, 'Ben Surinaamsche koffieplanteruit de 18de eeuw (S. L. Neale)', West-Indische
Gids, XXV (1943) 55.
116. Request from holders of quarter shares of the plantation La Providence, ARA, Soc. Sur.,
205-105 (23-2-1757).
117. Letter by Governor and Councillors, ibidem, 209-230; Hartsinck, Guiana, 767-8.
118. ARA, Soc. Sur., 208-139 and 208-115 (30-6-1759).
119. Ibidem, 208-142; the income of the fund was derived from a 4 per cent tax on profits,
plus extra hoofdgeld (money per caput) from the plantation owners of which the percentage
varied; these taxes were, however, often evaded.
120. HistoTische Proeve, I, 137.
101
M. MULLER
and raids on the economy of Surinam were not so big in the period we have dealt
with that they could account for the decline of the colony later on.
The willingness of the colonists to make a truce and to conclude peace treaties
can be explained first of all by their military weakness at that time, which meant
that there was the danger of their being overrun by the Maroons whose numbers
had greatly increased since 1757. It would seem that the fear oflosing prestige
in fact discouraged the colonists from a new peace initiative. The proposal of
talks by the Djukas in the summer of 1759 came as a relief to them. Crommelin's
reaction was: 'We have reason to flatter ourselves that the proposals made by
Governor Mauricius in order to make a treaty with that rabble, will now be met
with general enthusiasm, from sheer necessity,,121 The price of peace was negligible in comparison with the cost of war and once it appeared that the other party
fulfilled their obligations, it was even advantageous. The feelings of superiority
of the colonists were slightly affected though, from that time onwards the Maroons
were referred to as that 'small people' instead of the well-known 'rabble'.
TABLE I.
EXPORT OF THE MAIN PRODUCTS, IN COMPARISON WITH THE

NUMBER OF PLANTATIONS RAIDED PER YEAR, 1750-9
(column a)
Plantations hit
by rebellions,
or destroyed in
other ways
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
2
5
3
3
4
1
3
7
3
4
(column b)
main exports in Amsterdam
pounds*
(column c)
Ships to Holland
sugar
coffee
cacao
24,603,800
22,522,800
22,659,200
12,224,000
15,427,200
13,134,000
18,000,800
14,535,200
11,998,400
14,990,200
3,536,339
4,331,798
5,356,480
2,888,650
6,350,745
2,872,572
6,763,627
8,696,486
6,789,286
10,859,313
338,882
205,307
313,318
140,319
145,392
85,332
163,712
107,404
123,842
102,012
49
49
59
39
56
38
52
55
46
53
121. ARA, Soc. Sur., 209-1 (1-9-1759).

* These figures are from the Historische Proeve, II, opposite p. 76. The rounding off of the
figures of sugar exports is based on the conversion of the original oxhoofden (hogsheads) into
Amsterdam pounds by J. J. Reese, De suikerhandel van Amsterdam van het begin der XV/Ie eeuw
tot 1813 (Haarlem, 1908) cxxiv. It should be noted that the year 1750 was an absolute peak year
for sugar crops in the 18th century and that the subsequent decline was compensated by an
increase in the coffee production. There are no figures for the market value of the export.
102
Political Power Struggle in and Around the Main Belgian Cities,

1830-1848*
E. WITTE
When the French army was defeated in 1814 by the European powers it signified
also for Belgium an important turning-point in her political existence. After having
endured French domination for more than twenty years, she was joined to the
Netherlands by the decision of the Congress of Vienna.
As far as social structure was concerned, the southern regions of the United
Kingdom still largely exhibited an agrarian character. The landed proprietors
had a fundamental share in the economy of the country. The French Revolution
had brought about a number of alterations in the position of this class: the once
so powerful clergy had to make room for persons from the middle class who
had invested their money in property and who now, together with the nobles,
formed part of the land-owning class. But on the other hand Belgium already
possessed a few fully-fledged mechanized industries at that time, in particular
the cotton and woollen industries centralized respectively in Ghent and Verviers.
The coal industry and metallurgy were only in course of expansion but possessed
nonetheless at that time already a number of persons who belonged to the
economic establishment. A similar observation may be made in respect of a
number of wholesale dealers and financiers. Besides this economic managerial
class the country also had a socially highly mobile and rapidly expanding group
which can only be described by the far from satisfactory term 'middle class persons' and which included the small middle class as well as the well-to-do upper
middle class. In the system prevailing at the time these people enjoyed too little
social standing to be able to join the establishment as yet, but on the other hand
they also kept themselves completely aloof from the lower classes, in particular
the small trading class, the small farmers who had to engage in domestic industry
in order to make ends meet, the extensive artisan proletariat and the less numerous
factory proletariat.
The enlightened-absolutist government of King William I was experienced
differently by each of these groups. In general the upper middle class of industrialists, wholesale dealers and financiers were grateful to the monarch for the stimulus
This article constitutes a brief summary of E. Witte, Politieke machtsstTijd in en om de VOOTnaamste Belgische steden 1830-1848 (Historische Uitgaven, XXXVII, 2 vols.; Brussels: Pro
Civitate, 1973, 496, 134 pp.).
103
E. WITTE
that he gave to their economic activities. Moreover, they enjoyed the advantages
of an extended market. The position was different in the case of the clergy and
the middle class. The laicizing measures of William I thwarted the aspirations
of the clergy to a large extent, while the authoritarian structure of the regime was
likewise opposed by the emancipatory middle class. The intellectuals among them
gave to the social reflections of this group an ideological superstructure and
translated them into concrete demands: sovereignty of the people, a parliamentary
regime linked to ministerial responsibility, the recognition of modern liberties, etc.
Although the last word on the causes of the Belgian Revolution of 1830 has
by no means been said yet, it can nonetheless be posited that the resistance to
William I emanated mainly from a hard core of middle class persons. It may be
assumed that their opposition was able to lead to so much success thanks to the
powerful currents of opposition that were to be found also among the other population groups. The clergy very soon became a powerful ally of the resistance group,
together with other Catholics. Between both groups there existed moreover an ideological parallelism of interests: for both the clergy and the middle class began
to see in the recognition of liberty the solution to their problems. A union was
consequently formed between them towards the close of the 1820s. The willingness
to act which the revolutionary-minded in the end found among the lower population groups as well explains also the range that the events of 1830 acquired. They
led to the eventual recognition of Belgium as an independent State by powers
such as England and France, Prussia and Austria. It would however still last
till 1839 before William I was to sign the Treaty of the XXIV Articles which
officially and definitively made an end to the existence of the United Kingdom.
The Revolution of 1830 confronted Belgium with the problem of the existence
of divergent views on essential aspects of political policy. There was in the first
place a fundamental difference of opinion with regard to the matter of independence itself. A considerable section of the politically matured considered the
new state not at all fit to live in. The Reunionists among them aimed at the annexation to France. The politics of the big powers could of course not countenance
this, and already in 1831 they gradually began to join the second and most powerful group of counter-revolutionaries, namely the Orangists who aspired to a
restoration of the United Kingdom or wished in any event to get William's son
on the Belgian throne. That it here concerned mainly industrialists and wholesale
dealers who were economically motivated and avowed anti-clericals who in
practice had approved of William's policy, causes little surprise. The more so
if one takes into account the fact that these counter-revolutionaries very soon came
to the conclusion that the new regime initially showed marked tendencies to give
priority both to the interests of the Church and to those of the big landowners.
But also within the ranks of the revolutionary-minded tensions prevailed. The
104
POWER STRUGGLE IN AND AROUND THE MAIN BELGIAN CITIES,
1830-1848
avowed anti-clericals among the Unionists ascertained with as much aversion as

their Orangist fellow-believers that the interests of the Church were gaining the
upper hand, and that only moderate liberals, that is, those who were prepared
to accept the Catholic majority position, were able to come into their own. The
democrats among the revolutionaries had to contend with similarly great disappointments. It is true that Belgium was fortunate enough to have a parliamentary
regime that recognized modern liberties, but there was no question at all of any
fundamental concessions being made to the overwhelming majority comprising
the middle and lower social strata. Only those who did not subscribe to democratic
ideas that were too intransigent and who were prepared to compromise, gained
a position in the new administration. The radicals were brushed aside.
These mutual contradistinctions led to a conscious formation of groups and
to an aspiring to political leadership in the young Belgian Kingdom. The developments that occurred there in the years between 1830 and 1848 are not only of
significance to the political history of Belgium but also to the discipline ofpolitical
science, because they provide insight into the formation of political power. It
therefore seemed profitable to us to study the changes that took place in the
political structure of Belgium in those years and in doing so to make use of
concepts and analytical methods employed in political science and to test a number
of theses formulated by political scientists on this score in the light of the Belgian
data. 1
In three different ways did 'acquisition of power' take place in Belgium in the
1830s. As a result of the Revolution, the group that previously dominated the
opposition gained power in 1830. In the following years we notice how a group
that was at first in the minority, namely the anti-clericals, develop into a party
which was able to get the majority of the voters behind it. Within this latter group
we observe finally the display of power on the part of a (radical) minority movement.
To be able to arrive at general conclusions about the trends in the formation
of political power it becomes necessary to study the phenomena on the basis
of as large a number of instances as possible. In this article we should like to
present the main outlines and conclusions of an inquiry into the course of events
in the twenty most important Belgian cities-all having more than 12,000 inhabitants-which we have previously set down in an extensive study.2
1. In the planning of this study use was made among others of the theses propounded by the
following political scientists: R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power (2nd ed.; New
York, 1966); R. Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Freiheit (Munich, 1961); M. Duverger, Les partis
politiques (Paris, 1954); C. Merriam, Political Power (Glencoe, 1950); R. K. Merton, Social
Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1957); R. I. Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens
(2nd ed.; Stuttgart, 1928).
2. In this study we made use of the following types of archival sources: 10 documents of the
lOS
E. WITTE
REVOLUTIONARIES VERSUS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES
We began our research with the change in governmental authority, brought

about by the Revolution of 1830. To us the question was to determine how
authority passed into other hands and how the revolutionary movement consolidated itself. In our inquiry we endeavoured to test the hypothesis that the taking
over of power in a revolution is invariably determined by the germs already present
in the old system, in other words, by the circumstance that the position of the
established authority is being corroded from within and, on the other hand, that
outside of the governmental apparatus nuclei of power exist which offer opposition to that authority.3
To that end we firstly investigated how the power of the authorities in Belgian
cities had been affected. It was then found that a number of courts of burgomaster
and aldermen, city councils and governors of provinces did indeed show an absolutely loyal pro-government disposition, but that other administrative organs served
the existing (pre-revolutionary) administration in an extremely disloyal manner
and did not refrain from expressing their opposition to the government. Between
the attitude of the burgomaster of Turnhout, who was designated as 'quelqu'un
qui verserait plutot son sang que de souffrir que Ie moindre acte illegal se commettrait'4 and the burgomaster of Bruges, Ph. Veranneman, who himself took the
initiative in the presentation of a petition in favour of the separation between
North and South, there was a world of difference. The same contrasts could be
observed in the city councils. In Brussels the current of opposition was so strong
that the legitimists were very soon worsted; in Antwerp councillor F. Dubois
d'Oultrement was the only one to vote against the pro-Dutch petition which the
council had drawn up. The unceasing zeal and the sense of duty with which the
governor of East Flanders, H. J. Van Doorn, served the government likewise
contrasted sharply with, for example, the conduct of the Liege and Hainaut
governors, S. Sandberg and F. de Macar, who openly tolerated the development
of power on the part of the resistance groups.
The opposition outside the governmental apparatus likewise exhibited fundamental local differences. In some cities it was well organized, and had at its disposal
municipal, provincial and national administrations of Belgium and The Netherlands; 20 private
documents relating to institutions and persons who were directly and indirectly involved in the
process of political evolution (Church and Masonic dignitaries, ministers, members of parliament,
councillors and party militants); 30 diplomatic correspondence of the British, Austrian, French
and Dutch envoys in Belgium; 40 newspapers (about a hundred), pamphlets and brochures.
3. P. Amman too attempted to test this thesis on the basis of the French Revolution of 1848,
'Revolution: a redefinition', Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII, i (New York, March, 1962).
4. 'Rapport sur la situation de la ville de Turnhout, 5 octobre 1930' in : Algemeen Rijksarchief,
Brussels, Gouvernement provisoire de la Belgique, no 33.
106
1830-1848
a number of (potential) leaders among the middle classes who were ready to
take over power, and it had sufficient support among the lower social classes
to make a rebellion succeed. In other cities the opposition was much weaker.
Thus we were able to divide the cities into two categories. Liege, Brussels, Verviers, Tournai, Namur, Courtray, Bruges and Alost proved to be cities where
the existing political system had been greatly hollowed out, within as well as
outside the apparatus of government (type I); Ghent, Antwerp, Sint Niklaas,
Turnhout, Ostend, Lokeren, leper and Mechlin represented the type of city where
the old system was left almost unaffected (type II). If our thesis were to hold
good, then the taking over of power during the revolution must have proceeded
differently according to whether the city concerned belonged to type I or type II.
This indeed proved to be the case.
In the cities belonging to type I the acquisition of power took place as follows.
It was preceded by a preparatory phase in which the revolutionary leaders gained
the opportunity to penetrate governmental institutions. At first they necessitated
the taking of action by the civic guard through the stimulation or instigation of
disturbances by persons from the lower social classes; next they made certain
that they acquired influential positions within those civic guards whereby they
were able to help in the establishment of commissions of security by the city
councils, and finally they attempted to penetrate the municipal governments
themselves. Once there, they had no difficulty in corroding the existing order
still further: on the one hand, they compelled the municipalities to take measures
that ran counter to government policy; on the other, they limited more and more
the area in which the administrations were able to exercise their authority until
its impairment was almost total. That these cities spontaneously proceeded to
recognize the Provisional Government in 1830 as soon as the change of authority
had become a reality in the country as a whole need therefore cause no surprise.
Totally different, almost the very reverse, was the course of action in the cities
where the existing municipal system was left unaffected. A preparatory phase
did not occur here. It was entirely out of the question that municipal governments
or governors would have tolerated the penetration by subversive elements of
the civic guards or governmental institutions. No concessions were made to the
insistent demands of revolutionary minded groups. On the contrary, the old
order was maintained here till the very last moment. Spontaneous messages of
support for the Provisional Government were not forthcoming from these quarters, and the new government was only able to compel these cities into recognizing
it after having brought considerable pressure to bear upon them. A city council
like that of Lokeren for example first went to sound the reaction in the neighbouring Sint Niklaas and only on learning that the Provisional Government was also
able to enforce recognition by violent means did it hastily proceed to express its
107
E. WITTE
solidarity. In short, the degree to which the political system in the cities had been
corroded prior to the revolution was indeed determinative for the course of events
at the time of the taking over of power.
As regards our second problem, that of the consolidation of the power of the
revolutionaries: it proved to be an exceedingly slow process that lasted almost
a decade. This was mainly connected with the bourgeois aspect of the revolution
and the semi-democratic aims of the revolutionary Unionists. The revolutionaries
were obliged to make the strengthening of their power in 1830 dependent upon
elections, held among those citizens who paid a certain share of the taxes. This
obligation had important consequences for the revolutionaries. For in these
elections they had to manage without the support of the lower social classes,
their main followers. In the rural parts this loss was made up by the pressure
which the clergy brought to bear upon the electors; in the cities this was not
the case. Nationally, the revolutionaries had passed an electoral law that accorded
the revolutionary minded rural electorate, dominated by a clergy which supported
the Provisional Government, a sizable share of the votes. 5 In the cities it proved
less easy to mould the electoral system in favour of the revolutionaries and in
consequence the support for them was not so big. The nature of the counterrevolutionary movement, consisting largely of anti-clerical industrialists, merchants
and civil servants, a social stratum which is found principally among the electorate
of the big cities, moreover hampered the revolutionaries in their endeavour to
consolidate their position also in the cities.
That does not mean that they did not attempt through participation in municipal elections to strengthen their position. Both in respect of the composition of
the municipal electorate and in that of the electoral procedures, they endeavoured
to make the best of a bad job. They established 'revolutionary' electors' associations with a view to pooling the votes of the supporters of the Revolutionary
Government. But notwithstanding the efforts they made during the election
campaign lasting from October to November 1830, it proved impossible for them
to consolidate their power everywhere. Only in four of the twenty cities studied
did the revolutionaries gain a complete victory and in no more than 55 per cent
of the cases did they manage to obtain a substantial majority. On the other hand,
a powerful counter-revolutionary grouping remained in power in cities like Ghent,
Sint Niklaas, Lokeren, Ostend, Mechlin, Tournai and Verviers, while in others,
5. Of the twenty cities studied there were only four (Louvain, Brussels, Antwerp and Bruges)
where the urban voters obtained a bare majority in the electoral colleges. Elsewhere the rural
voters dominated: in Turnhout with 83.5%, in Verviers with 72.7%, in Courtray with 69%,
in Sint Niklaas with 69%, in Mons with 68.7%, in Alost with 63.8%, in Namur with 67.4%,
in Ghent with 57 %, in Tournai with 55.9 %, in Liege with 53.9 %, in leper with 53.5 % and in
Ostend with 52.3 %.
108
1830-1848
among which Liege, leper and Lier, a not inconsiderable counter-revolutionary

minority was able to offer opposition.
In the period from 1831 to 1839, when Belgium had already chosen a king of
her own but when her status as an independent State had not yet been settled
finally so that a counter-revolution was in principle possible, the counter-revolutionaries still managed to maintain their position in several cities and even to
strengthen it. Thanks to a well-developed talent for organization-they established
electors' associations and formed electoral coalitions when that seemed opportune
to them-they were able to gain several electoral successes as the years went
by. In Ghent, where they were moreover led by a well-nigh genial political strategist, Hippolyte Metdepenningen-an advocate in the service of the Ghent bourgeoisie-, they even held, comparatively speaking, an extraordinary strong position. It is really not strange at all that the counter-revolutionaries were able,
in a period that they did not take part in the central government, to make their
influence felt forcefully-the more so according to whether they were more fully
represented on the city councils. We see a clear example of this in the effective
and systematic opposition the city council of Ghent waged throughout this whole
period. 6
One thing was obvious: the consolidation of the new regime could only then
be considered as having been successfully completed once the power of the
counter-revolutionaries had been totally destroyed. Eventually the dissolution
did indeed begin to reveal itself. The powerlessness of the counter-revolutionaries
in the sphere of national politics led irrevocably to decline also in the cities.
The point in time at which this process had completed itself differed from city
to city, but the outcome was the same all over. In Antwerp their 'rule' was ended
after only a few months; in Ghent it lasted till the early 1840s. Whence the difference
in time? The personality of the leaders was here clearly of decisive import. Were
the counter-revolutionaries led by leaders like Metdepenningen, who considered
the systematic opposition on the part of the city councils as a constructive contribution to the counter-revolution, then the dissolution did take long to occur.
The Treaty of the XXIV Articles, accepted finally in 1839 by both The Netherlands
and Belgium, however deprived the counter-revolutionaries also in those cities
of the raison d'etre of their movement. Elsewhere, where the counter-revolutionaries could see no point in an active opposition and did not wish to have anything
to do with the new Belgian State, their absenteeism and defeatism naturally hastened the decline of their power, as was for example quite clearly the case in Antwerp.
But whatever the case may be, the result was the same all over: the counter-revolu6. The Ghent Orangist city council was for example able, by pursuing a policy of opposition
that lasted four years (1836-40), to compel the king into nominating an Orangist as burgomaster.
109
E. WITTE
tionary movement was doomed since it had become a prisoner within the urban
strait-jacket, far removed from the centre of the power of the State.
The breaking up of the counter-revolutionary movement had one additional
facet, to which we should like to draw the attention: as a movement it disappeared
from the political arena, but not so however its members. They all merged into
another political movement, namely that of the anti-clericals. Since they too had
always made anti-clericalism a part of their political programme this was quite
a logical development. It was more or less self-evident that they began to support
the anti-clerical movement at a time when such support seemed more than ever
necessary. In view of the fact that it was precisely during the years 1839 and 1842
that the anti-clericals launched their counter-offensive against the policy of the
Catholics it is hardly surprising to learn that this period also witnessed the definitive collapse of the counter-revolutionary movement. The revolution had finally
triumphed in the cities as well. All attention could now be concentrated on other
controversies.
CLERICALS VERSUS ANTI-CLERICALS
The anti-clericals-liberals who did not see much point in the policy of cooperation of the union with the Catholics-increased their influence and power
in the years following 1830. How much their power increased we may observe
by comparing the situation obtaining in the years 1830-36 with that of the middle
of 1847. The anti-clerical liberals emerged as the losers from the Revolution of
1830 which they had supported; the clericals, on the other hand, built their position of power on the furtherance of Church interests. Seventeen years later the
roles were reversed in the cities: the clericals had by then become a minority group
and only in three small cities-Alost, Turnhout and Lokeren-did liberalism not
get off the ground.
In 1830 the anti-clericals had only in two cities-Brussels and Tournai-the
majority within the camp of the revolutionaries; in 1847 this was the case in no
fewer than thirteen out of the twenty cities studied by us, that means, in more
than 65 per cent of the cases. In 1830 an exclusively liberal city council was unthinkable; in 1847, on the other hand, there were already three: Brussels, Liege and
leper, while but for a few percentages that situation was also obtaining in Antwerp
and Ghent. This phenomenon is all the more remarkable since it is to be found
precisely in the four largest cities in the country. In 1830 there were also no councils which had a substantial to a very substantial majority, varying from 60 to 75
per cent; in 1847 however we find a group of six cities which belonged to this
category.
110
1830-1848
More telling figures with which to illustrate the increase in power of the anticlericals are hardly imaginable. In this connection we must moreover take into
account the fact that a qualitative change did also occur: between the fairly moderate anti-clericals who were councillors in 1830 and the younger generation of
militant liberals who became councillors over the years there yawned an enormous
gulf.
In the investigation into these changes, we used as starting-point the hypothesis
which holds that the formation of political power invariably takes place in a
situation of conflict. 7 A political structure in which one group dominates another
must be present. The latter gradually comes to realize that it is being discriminated
against and loses the conviction that the existing structure is acceptable-the
consensus on this point which originally existed between these two groups crumbles away until it has disappeared completely. In studying the data relating to
the period after 1830 it was indeed possible to identify a dominant group whose
domination was clearly felt by another group to be too oppressive. We have already
pointed to the fact that the clericals gained power thanks to the revolution, whilst
the anti-clericals were rather manoeuvred into a corner by it. Supported by the
Church and the organizational structures of the Church, by King Leopold I,
and with the aid of an electoral law which operated in their favour, they succeeded
in retaining the reins of State in their hands throughout the entire period. 8 Initially
the same situation obtained in the cities. Where authority passed into different
hands immediately after the revolution, the Catholics gained already in 1830 a
dominating position in the city council; where a more gradual change-over
took place the influence gained by the Catholics was inversely equal to the decline
in importance of the counter-revolutionaries. The anti-clerical liberals became a
minority in the period immediately following the Revolution of 1830.
It is also evident that the clerical supremacy entirely prevented the anti-clericals
from realizing their goals. The constitution satisfied the essential demands of the
Catholics, the electoral law of 1831 worked to their advantage, the municipal law
of 1836, which made the nomination of burgomaster and aldermen a prerogative
of the crown, found favour only in the eyes of a section of the liberals, the amendment of the law in 1842, whereby the electorate in the big cities were divided
into 'quarters' was likewise to the advantage of the Catholics, 9 who had also
profited by the procedure followed in the nomination of burgomaster and alder7. See amongst others C. Merriam, Political Power and R. Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft.
8. It is true that there were still 'Unionist cabinets' in these years in which moderate liberals were
represented, but their participation in those cabinets diminished rapidly.
9. On the assumption that a city is built up of wards with each having its own social and thus
also political character and that Catholic voters were better able to come into their own in such
small entities than when they were brought together in one single electoral college, the clerical
members of parliament voted in favour of this act in June 1842.
111
E. WIITE
men. The Primary Education Act accorded the Catholic Church the possibility
of gaining a hold on municipal schools. All this seems to us to constitute proof
that in these years the clericals exhibited little evidence of tactical moderation
in the handling of their power.
The episcopal denunciation in January 1838 of Freemasonry, 10 whose recruits
were drawn mostly from anti-clerical circles, was evidence of the fact that the
Church authorities were also using their moral authority in the struggle against
the liberals. After 1840 the liberals suffered even greater frustrations than in the
preceding years. The formation in 1846 of the uniformly Catholic cabinet under
De Theux following the electoral successes that the liberals had gained in 1845 gave
them a feeling of utter frustration.
The consensus among the various revolutionary movements in respect of government policy disappeared within only a few years after 1830. The distrust of the
Catholics increased among those anti-clericals who as supporters of Unionism
were in favour of co-operation with the clericals. Fairly soon already as they
came to realize more clearly that they were being disappointed in their expectations, their willingness to follow the clerical line diminished. Another group
of anti-clericals had always kept themselves aloof from Unionism. That they
would consider accepting the policy of the government was out of the question.
When the counter-revolutionary anti-clericals now sought rapprochement with
their revolutionary minded kindred spirits and when they began to co-operate
with them during the elections and merged with them in the end, there could
no longer be any question of a consensus between liberals and clericals. The
hypothesis from which we proceeded turned out to hold good on this point as
well.
It is quite natural to assume that those who had come to the conclusion that
they could not realize their political goals within the existing political system
would proceed to the establishment of a political movement. In the Belgium of
the 1840s this was not really necessary any more; anti-clericalism as a political
current afterall dates already from the eighteenth century. What the movement
lacked however was a properly functioning party machine. The feelings of frustration now resulted in the setting up of such an apparatus. The political events of
the years 1838-1846 mentioned above, which were experienced as highly frustrating, each in turn acted as stimuli to the organizational skill of the liberals. The
pronouncement of the episcopate on Freemasonry had as effect that the lodges
10. Although the Vatican had already at the end of the 18th century condemned Freemasonry,
the Belgian bishops had until then adopted rather a tolerant attitude towards Freemasons.
In their letter of January 1838 they appealed to the papal Bull and proceeded to excommunicate
the Belgian lodge members as well.
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1830-1848
began to concern themselves very actively with politics, which led to the formation
of a number of (political) parties-avant la lettre.
The introduction of urban electoral districts in 1842 resulted in the establishment, under the influence of the lodges, of parties organized on modern lines
in several cities, and led also in other cities, where Freemasonry had no influence,
to the pooling of liberal forces; the formation in 1846 of the De Theux cabinet led
also here to the founding eventually of truely liberal parties. The Liberal Congress,
convened at the insistence of the Brussels liberal society, L'Alliance-formed by
the lodges and controlled by radical liberals-, had as consequence the federation
of all these groupings and with that the founding of the Belgian Liberal Party.
This organizational work-we should like to emphasize here-took place at
an incredibly rapid pace. To have been able to refashion within the span of thirteen years an unorganized political movement into a modern and permanent
party in a period in which political parties were generally still in an initial stage,
seems to us to be an enormous achievement.
This success can in our opinion be attributed to two factors. To begin with,
the liberals had at their disposal leaders of the organizer type. In this period
they no longer required theoreticians who were able to expound a liberal vision
of society. On the contrary, they had urgent need of organizers who, on the basis
of the political programme, could build up a political organization and who would
not shrink from joining battle. In this connection the Brussels liberal, Theodore
Verhaegen, professor at the (liberal) Free University which was founded on his
initiative, and Member of Parliament since 1837, played a remarkable role.
He combined within himself all the qualities of a leader with a fighting spirit:
he knew how to gather around him militant comrades, knew the secret ofthe formation of hard cores as well as the art of indoctrinating those around him. He did
not stand alone. In Brussels he was able to count upon the support of several
forceful personalities such as Eugene Defacqz, Andre Fontainas and August
Orts. There were also good leaders in the other cities: Nicolas Defuissaux in Mons,
N. J. A. Delfosse (who with Verhaegen was one of the few who in 1842 voted
against the Primary Education Act) and Walthere Frere-Orban in Liege, Henri
Carton in leper, A. Fizenne in Louvain, C. De Brouwer in Mechlin, P. Jacobs
in Antwerp, the Allards in Tournai-it would be possible to supplement the list
by tens of other names. All these names were household words in that period; a
number of their bearers played an important role in the national history of Belgium; all were party leaders who knew how to overcome the inertia of the liberal
voting masses and how to canalize into parties the anti-clerical forces within
their own cities.
The rapid pace at which a genuinely liberal party was able to be formed is
in our view, secondly, the result of the circumstance that there already existed
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E. WITIE
an organization, namely Freemasonry, which could serve as point of departure

for the anti-clerical party apparatus. It is certainly not too rash to aver that without
the activities of the lodges the organization of the liberal party would not have
made much progress by 1847. As likely as not it would still have been in the initial
stage. That the lodges did indeed constitute the bases for the various local parties
is well-known and has been confirmed by the data that we have discovered. In the
cities where lodges had been active an enormous advantage in respect of party
organization was discernible: here the first electoral committees were formed,
the first electors' associations-avant la lettre, the first local parties. This is also
understandable since it was the members of the lodges who-by taking part in
public activities-time and again laid the basis for these forms of organization.
It is therefore only logical that we should have established a considerable leeway
in the cities without lodges, which was only made up in 1846 as a result of the
Liberal Congress. And even in those cities development was unthinkable without
the influence of Freemasonry. For there the local committees were regularlystimulated by the Brussels society, L' Alliance. On the other hand, several of the liberal
leaders mentioned above were in their turn responsible for the fact that Freemasonry began to concern itself intensely with politics. Particularly Verhaegen's
contribution on this score was considerable. It was both these factors-the fact
of having good leaders and the presence of a sort of parent organization-that
explain the rapid pace at which the liberals were able to build up their organization
in the period 1833 to 1846. 11
The outcome of our inquiry allows no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition which holds that the degree to which a political movement is organized
determines whether it will be able to gain a growing influence. At every election
this was to be gleaned from the election results: where the anti-clericals had a
good organization they gained a victory time and again; if such an organization
was not to be found in a city then there was consequently no electoral success
forthcoming either. This was evident in Liege in 1834 when the liberals made their
mark for the first time, and subsequently elsewhere in 1836 and more markedly
in 1839 and especially in 1842. The electoral successes gained subsequently by
cities where a liberal 'party' had been in operation only after 1846 are consistent
with this analysis. More cogently: in every city where after 1830 the power of the
liberals increased it turned out that there was a liberal party active, while in
places where this was not the case, such as in Lokeren and Turnhout, the clericals
were able to maintain their original position.
11. On the political action of the lodges, see E. Witte, Politieke machtsstrijd, 188-215, 304-6.
The original Masonic documents which led to the drawing up of these pages were published under
our editorship in the following source publication: Documents relatifs a la Franc-Ma~onnerie beIge
1830-1855 (Centre Interuniversitaire d'histoire contemporaine, LXIX; Louvain-Paris, 1973,
823 pp.).
114
1830-1848
The reason why the liberals owed their electoral successes again and again to
their organizing ability is in our opinion fourfold. It goes without saying that
it was due in the first place to the co-operation with the Orangists which the liberals
enjoyed and with whom they merged eventually that a flourishing party could
develop. This is indeed to be seen consecutively in Liege, leper, Tournai, Ghent
and Mons. Those who formed the committees and parties also undertook to build
up a party press of their own with which they could influence the urban electorate.
From the very outset the anti-clericals concentrated their attention on this instrument and were thereby able to gain a lead rather quickly over their opponents
which proved very difficult to make up. The better that party press was able to
function the more powerful too could the liberal propaganda become. As the anticlericals came to be better organized their campaigns became more dynamic;
their writings became more polemical, articles in cutting words replaced the neutral
texts of an earlier period, the struggle came more and more to be waged ad
hominem. Also in this application of psychological means their opponents were
not always able to match them.
But if we wish to explain the success of the liberal organizations then discipline
seems to be the pivot on which everything hinged. This was the point on which
the clericals were worsted by the anti-clericals in the cities. They too had in the
cities forceful leaders who tried to impose their will on the voters. But the manner
in which the liberals set about things was more refined and more adapted to the
mentality of the townsman than was the case with the clericals. The Catholic
leaders made use of means which gave the voters too much the feeling that they
were being kept in a state of pupilage. The powerful backing ofthe authority of the
bishops and the pressure of the clergy in general made an impression on the pious
rural electors, but met with less response on the part of the more emancipated
townspeople. The liberals understood that very well. That is why they erected
a democratic fa<;ade in front of their party structure and gave the voters the impression that they had a voice in the matter. In this manner they provided their
party with a broad base and were their leaders able to exert their influence successfully on a large circle of followers. The clericals on the other hand continued to
have recourse far more to private committees whose activities remained concealed
from the general public. The result was that while the clericals had no difficulty
in maintaining their influence in the country, the liberals were gaining more and
more ground in the cities.
Besides the inquiry into the manner in which the liberals gained power we also
endeavoured to find out how they utilized that power in order to realize their
political objectives. In all this they made a stand against both the government
and parliament. Since the Municipal Corporations Act left little room for some
such activity, the councils could only playa part as pressure group, a procedure
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E. WITIE
which they applied frequently, sometimes with success. Thus for example they
were able to thwart the nomination in 1834 of a Catholic alderman in Liege by
conducting a vehement campaign of opposition. A similar obstructionist policy
led in Brussels (1842) and in Louvain (1847) to an analogous result. In 1838 the
liberal capital city even came into open conflict with the rightist-oriented De
Theux government. A financial issue was the underlying cause but the anti-clericals
seized the opportunity in order to place the cabinet in an invidious position. But
on the whole their actions did not however proceed beyond the protest stage.
Massive petitions against the electoral act, at the time of the bringing down
by the Catholic senate of the liberal oriented Lebeau ministry, against a proposal
to better the legal status of (only) the University of Louvain (the so-called Du
Bus-Brabant proposal), against certain changes in the Municipal Corporations
Act and against the Primary Education Act-all these were severely convincing
demonstrations, but they did not produce any immediate effects. That could
hardly be expected since during this whole period the anti-clericals had too few
representatives in parliament to exercise any influence on national policy.
Within the cities on the other hand their policy did bear fruit. In the field of
education they were able to limit the role of the Church to a far greater extent
than the clericals deemed tolerable. We have already seen how in 1834, on the
initiative of Verhaegen, a Free University was established in Brussels. The city
of Brussels rendered it material support. In some cities (Brussels, leper, Mons,
Liege and Tournai) the urban secondary schools were taken out of the charge
of the clergy, whereby an important plank in their platform was realized. The
refusal by several city councils to grant the clergy control of the urban schools
for primary education also clearly fitted in with their policy. Since education
invariably fulfills a not to be underrated role in the shaping of political opinions
this meant that the anti-clericals succeeded in exploiting the advantages of
their improved position as best they could already in the first phase of their active
participation in politics-when the issue for them was in fact still the gaining of
political power.
RADICALS VERSUS CONSERVATIVES: THE FATE OF A RADICAL MINORITY WITHIN THE
ANTI-CLERICAL PARTY
It is no less interesting than the foregoing to enquire how during these years
a radical minority within the nascent anti-clerical party initially gained such
a growing influence only to see this being lost after a few years. The radicals,
to whom we are referring now, constituted a very small group. They were the
people who were dissatisfied with the existing structure of society which did not
allow various categories of citizens to come into their own. Social-utopian and
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1830-1848
democratic ideas became popular within this circle, to which men such as L.
Jottrand, the brothers BailIet, Bartels and Delhasse, A. De Robaulx, Ch. Spilthoorn, V. Tedesco and E. Ducpetiaux belonged. They were conscious of the fact
that they were too weak to form a party of their own and therefore sought affiliation with the far stronger anti-clerical political movement whose anti-clericalism
they shared. The rising Liberal Party, whose members subscribed to conservative
theories on social matters, accepted their support in the knowledge that they
would be able to utilize it to the utmost.
The radicals, once they became part of this movement, proceeded from three
considerations. Firstly, they realized that in this phase of development the anticlericals had urgent need of experienced organizers and militant members who
could perform the hum-drum electoral duties. The radicals were able to fulfill
this need and could thus acquire the position of an indispensable hard core within
the party. Secondly, they proceeded on the principle that when a minority exerts
itself sufficiently within a group it becomes superbly placed to put pressure on
such a group and, possibly, to dominate it. They saw to it that they formed a
closed unit and were thus able to impose their will on the more conservative membres. They aimed at increasing their support among the active members of the
party, which generally speaking could not pride itself on having particularly militant followers. Through the application of a highly skilful meeting technique
the radicals eventually succeeded in reaching the top of the party and were thereby
able to take part directly in decision-making.
In the third place, they were not averse to allowing a latent clashing of viewpoints within the party to develop into an open conflict, in the belief that there
would be no risk involved as long as the position of the opponents was weak.
In three cities, Brussels, Liege and Verviers, the power of the radicals had increased
so much that a group of conservative liberals felt themselves threatened by it
and broke with the party of the anti-clericals. This split did not bring any disadvantage to the radicals since they could now continue to build on what they had
already accomplished and could strenghthen their position further now that
they were acting as an independent group of councillors. It thus boiled down
to the fact that the radicals who in the build-up of the anti-clerical party had proved
themselves to be an indispensable minority, came to form a powerful wing within
the party with a distinct point of view and proceeded to leave their imprint on
the leadership until in the end they could even afford to expel their opponents
in the cities mentioned already.
Electoral successes had as effect that the radicals could make a modest beginning
in the years 1842 to 1847 with the establishment of some form of power in Ghent,
Courtray and Mons, while in Liege, Brussels and especially Verviers they formed
a solid and powerful block. To be sure, in Brussels and Liege, in contrast with
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E. WITTE
Verviers, they were a long way from constituting the majority in the anti-clerical
movement, but if we take into account the modest size of the group of genuine
radicals then we may certainly describe the results of their actions as impressive.
Within the city councils the members with a radical mandate endeavoured to
utilize their power efficaciously, which however did not lead to striking results.
Their approach to political, social, economic, financial and cultural matters was
after all too unco-ordinated and spontaneous for that purpose. The weight of the
bourgeoisie was also too great to allow them much room for development. The
radicals as group had however the merit of bringing various very urgent social
problems-like slum clearance-to the attention of a wide audience and were
thus able to make a modest contribution to the process of the awakening of the
socially oppressed classes.
It is important to determine how it came about that the so carefully built-up
position of the radicals collapsed completely within a few months-between
March and August-in 1848. Apparently the composition of the group was too
heterogeneous, the following too small to prevent their structure from tumbling
down at the first hard thrust. It was the French February Revolution that provided the thrust in 1848. Under the stress of that event the clericals and anticlericals once more sought rapprochement. And the extremely skilful and tactful
policy of the conservatively liberal Rogier Government, which caused the menacing
revolutionary storm that was hovering also over Belgium to blow over, at the
same time meant the collapse of the radical movement. When the city council
elections were held in 1848 it turned out that they had lost all power.
In our opinion the cause of that sudden dissolution lay in the nature of the group
itself. There was too little cohesion among the different elements which made
up the radical movement. Apart from a hard core of avowed social democrats
and republicans they had only a few weak pillars of support. They shared a
common interest with the lower middle class only as long as the latter group was
deprived of the franchise. When in 1848 the qualified franchise-based on the
amount of taxes to be paid-was changed in such a way so that a larger group of
tax-payers gained the right to vote, the radicals lost the support of this section of
their comrades. The socially conscious anti-clerical bourgeoisie who had been
sympathetic towards the movement in the beginning turned their backs upon
it in the crisis year of 1848: they neither shared the repUblican ideas nor the social
revolutionary theories of the radical core. Thus the radical movement shrunk
until it reverted to its original size of not more than a few dozen members-a
process that took place at an extremely rapid pace.
There was no question at all of the radicals being able to call upon the support
of the working masses in this critical situation. At that time the proletarians did
not as yet constitute a class-conscious group and were consequently completely
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1830-1848
unorganized. One is therefore unable to state that the radicals enjoyed genuine
support among the workers. The base on which their movement rested was in
consequence far too narrow to allow their power to become stabilized. The stability of society generally was still too great. To begin with, there was no question
at all of new insights having taken root among a broad stratum of the population
which could have led to the assailing of the political and social relationshipscertainly not amongst the middle classes who were dominating the State. But
also the workers were still accepting the existing state of affairs-for the time being.
Secondly, the largely utopian social ideas which were cherished by a very small
group of true radicals did not have sufficient appeal to stir that section of the
population which harboured feelings of discontent. In other words, it was not
surprising that the position which the radical minority had succeeded in gaining
was not of a permanent nature and that the movement suffered a silent demise
in August 1848.
Although the main purpose of the inquiry consisted in the analysis of the acquisition of power in the three aforementioned controversies, it also cast a light on
a few interesting side aspects. The first related to the phenomenon of the 'formation
of parties'. It was possible to establish that a democracy, based on the principle
of elected representation, whether at city or national level, is unable to function
without a 'party' organization, not even when it is still in its initial phase. By
'party' we understand in this context a more or less well organized groupofpeople
that wishes to build up society in accordance with a particular social vision and
that attempts, with a view to that, to gain control of the administrative apparatus
(of the city-in the case studied by us).
Of course, we do not wish to maintain that there had already existed fullyfledged national parties in the period 1830 to 1848. On the other hand, we wish
however to defend emphatically the proposition that those who characterize the
years 1830 to 1846 as 'partyless' are in the wrong and that local 'parties' began
to emerge from the moment that the Provisional Government started to function
and the first elections were held. Granted that the parties still found themselves
in a period of development and that there was not any question of institutionalization by a long way yet. That, however, does not alter the fact that the first organizations exhibited similarities with truely modern parties in all essential respects.
If as illustration we take a closer look at a few aspects of these organizations,
at aspects of the revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries, of the clericals as well
as the anti-clericals, then it turns out that all these organizations fulfilled precisely
those tasks which belong to a modern political party: they activated and canalized
the political action ofthe time. Firstly, they occupied themselves with the recruting
of candidates for the seats on the town councils, for which purpose they convened
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E. WITIE
preparatory meetings. That those meetings did not always have a broad basis
is less relevant here. What matters is to establish that these committees and associations did indeed draw up lists of candidates. A second task which the organizations fulfilled was that they canalized the votes of the electors in the direction of
their candidates. Not only did they do this by mobilizing their active members
as propagandists during election campaigns but they were also familiar with the
phenomenon of the 'party press'. For the very close ties that existed between the
editors and the political organizations do indeed justify the use of that term.
That of course does not imply that all newspapers that appeared in the years
between 1830 and 1848 were linked to parties, but it most decidedly does mean that
each political organization in that period already had at its disposal its own press
organs. That the party papers co-operated fully in election campaigns is beyond
doubt. And however much change the party propaganda underwent in the period
in which the parties were still in a process of development-from a fairly moderate
agitation in the initial years into a tough personal struggle in the years from 1845
to 1847-the main object continued to lie in the bringing into line of the will of
the electors with that of the party leaders.
A final characteristic which made all political organizations into true 'parties'
was party discipline. The efforts of the leaders everywhere were directed at the
same objective: the maintenance of a certain discipline among the electorate
and among the elected representatives. This aspiring to the subordination of the
supporters of the party we see in the Liege bishop Van Bommel as well as in Verhaegen in Brussels and Delfosse in Liege, in the radical Jottrand as well as in the
Catholic Felix Bethune of Courtray, in the revolutionary Du Bus as well as in
the Orangist Metdepenningen. And usually they succeeded in achieving their
ends. 12 In short, even though the first political organizations did certainly still
deviate from modern parties on a few specific points in respect of their structure,
we may nonetheless assert without hesitation that they functioned in a fairly
analogous manner and that therefore nothing prevents us from concluding that
the formation of political parties was very closely related to, and even resulted
from, the spread of parliamentary democracy.
A striking phenomenon in the evolution of the nineteenth-century parties
is the importance of organizational structures already in existence, which contributed considerably to the build-up of the party apparatus. It has nowhere been
found that a small group of notables, unified into a committee, possessed sufficient
power in order to establish some sort of party. IS Both in the case of the clericals
12. This is at variance with the preconceived opinion held on this score by M. Duverger,
Les partis politiques, 2 ff.
13. We are here inclose agreement with the trend towards oligarchy formation whichR. Michels,
Sozi%gie, had discovered in democratic parties. We too established that politicians from the
different movements made themselves indispensable by being active in the organizational field,
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1830-1848
and the anti-clericals did the existing administrative machinery play a decisive
role in the building up of their parties. The clericals relied on the hierarchy,
discipline and leaders-bishops and deacons-of the Catholic Church, whereby
they initially had a lead over the anti-clericals. The latter owed the rapid rise of
their party in turn to the support of Freemasonry, from the moment the Freemasons began to concern themselves actively with politics. It was indeed found
that new lodges had been established with the specific aim of founding a local
party,14 Besides, we should not forget that the counter-revolutionaries, especially
in Ghent, were likewise supported by the Freemasons' lodges and it is to that support that they owed their long survival. 15 That the administrative machinery of
government could also be utilized in strengthening the position of a party goes
without saying. Consequently, we see how in the period in which the Catholics
had the upperhand their followers were highly favoured, among others, in the
nominations of burgomasters and aldermen and that ministers and civil servants
had a considerable share in the organizational development of the Catholic movemenU 6 Where in an isolated instance the Church and Freemasonry for some reason
or other did not exert direct influence they were helped in the formation of parties
by lesser organizations: in Bruges by a debating club, in Louvain by a cultural
society.
In conslusion, one is justified in posing the question: to what extent did the
course of events in the cities influence national policy? From what we have seen
regarding the origin of the Liberal Party and its radical wing we are able to deduce
without much ado that new political parties always had their inception in the cities.
City politics always anticipated national politics. In 1842, the liberal P. Devaux
very properly prophesied: 'Si les 20 principales villes sont animees du meme
esprit, vous aurez beau faire, cet esprit finira par envahir Ie gouvernement'Y
That is really not surprising in view of the fact that political organization constitutes
that they thereby came to secure a place in the party saddle, that they strengthened their position
in the party top with the aid of a skilful meeting technique, an art of manipulation and sometimes
with demagogic oratorical talent so that in course of time they were able to hold sway over their
subordinates like little dictators. The most striking examples we found in Ghent, Brussels,
Liege, Antwerp, leper, Verviers and Courtray.
14. This was the case in leper and in Nijval. See E. Witte, Politieke machtsstrijd, 205.
15. Within the ranks of the Ghent Freemasons, H. Metdepenningen could count on the support
of the dignitaries of the most important lodge, namely 'Le Septentrion', all of whom formed
part of a militant Orangist committee. The worshipful master of the lodge 'Les Vrais Amis',
K. Vervier, was likewise an avowed Orangist. According to their opponents, the Orangists were
able to mobilize up to about four hundred Masons at each election.
16. Moreover, it should be pointed out that although the Catholics at that time were thus
certainly not lacking in organizational forms it is however only in the last quarter of the 19th
century that one may truely speak of a national party. As a consequence of the school struggle
(1879) the forces ofthe clergy and those ofthe lay Catholics were joined togetherin the 'Federation
des Cercles et des Associations' (1884).
17. Le Moniteur beIge, 11 juin 1842, supplement, 3 col. 2.
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E. WITTE
the prerequisite for the acquisition of political power. It goes without saying that
the densely populated cities proved to be more fertile soil for political organizing
ability than the rural areas. On the other hand, the rural areas were able to exercise
a conservative, inhibiting influence in the field of national politics, and that is
precisely what they did do. The anti-clericals for example were thus able to realize
all sorts of objectives in the cities which could not (yet) be realized within the
framework of national affairs. When once they had gained a powerful position
within the cities, they could also endeavour to bring pressure to bear from there
upon the policy of the government of the country. To what extent this thesis also
holds good in the case of other, recent political movements, is a problem which
falls outside the scope of our inquiry.
122
Depression and Policy
III
the Thirties*
P. W. KLEIN
Any period of history chosen at random reveals uncertainties, and the modern
age is decidedly no exception. Society is more complex than ever before, and is
constantly in motion. The sources are so abundant as to be confusing, and so
inaccessible as to be invisible. Recent events evoke more prejudice, emotion and
bias than the tales left to be told by the historian. The last half-century, which
in human terms embraces contemporary history, certainly affords ample material
for discussion.
It is thus remarkable, to say the least of it, that the 1930s, which appeal strongly
to the imagination, scarcely became a subject of discussion in the Netherlands.
As far as I can see they have so far failed to give rise to any profound differences
of opinion.
Broadly speaking, the 1930s went down in history as a period of depression
dominated by the squalid and uninspiring rule of the petite bourgeoisie. At least
this is the point of emphasis in documentary reconstructions in sound, on film
and in print. All summon up the spirit of the time: the ghost of the thirties.
The lack of ability to overcome the problems of the day is also stressed by the
historians and economists who have concerned themselves with the period.
They, too, are convinced of the shortcomings of the Netherlands. More specifically, they seem to agree that the nation, by reason of its conservative mentality,
failed to fully comprehend reality and was therefore unable to overcome its
difficulties. The manner in which this conclusion was reached does not always
stand up to criticism. Thus, for example, L. de Jong, in his history of the Second
World War, concluded that the Dutch nation had 'lost sight of the inexorable
* The following pages contain a slightly abridged version of an article which was previously
published under the title 'Depressie en beleid tijdens de jaren dertig' in: J. van Herwaarden, ed.,
Lo.f der Historie (Rotterdam, 1973) 289-335. This in turn was the greatly modified and expanded
text of a speech delivered by the author on the occasion of the 58th dies natalis of the Nederlandse
Economische Hogeschool in Rotterdam on 8th November, 1971. Many of the thoughts which
formed the basis of that article were formulated during animated discussions with students
who, during the academic year 1970-1971, attended the Seminar on the subject of economic
history. They too contributed a great deal of material in the form of examination papers. The
author also owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. J. Teijl, who repeatedly showed himself to be a critical
partner in discussion, and who will doubtless concur only partly in the contents of the article.
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P. W. KLEIN
hardness of the progress of affairs in the world'.1 There were not sufficient leading
figures capable of giving timely warning of the storm which had been gathering
since 1933. De Jong does not specify the causes of this estrangement from reality:
he describes rather than explains. But there are good grounds for assuming that
he, too, attributes it to the dominant conservatism. In this context, the fourth
chapter of his work, which is entitled 'Een conservatief land' (A conservative
country) speaks volumes. His version of events, however, at times seems somewhat
exaggerated. For example, he concludes his review of the Plan van de Arbeid
(Labour Plan)-which was drawn up on the instructions of the SDAP (Social
Democratic Labour Party) and the NVV (National Federation of Trade Unions)
and appeared in 1935-with the observation that 'not a single proposal' related
to defence. 'The SDAP had not then accepted the concept of national defence',2
despite the fact that Hitler had been in power for two and a half years. Reading
between the lines, one senses the accusation that if the socialists had not clung
so conservatively to old pacifist ideals, they would have acted more intelligently.
In terms of logic, the implied charge is misplaced. In a plan which is expressly
concerned with the solution of problems of living standards which are caused
by economic factors, it is scarcely the natural thing to raise the matter of national
defence. Those who favour a strong defence policy would, I assume, reject the idea
of it being subordinated to economic policy. It could hardly be said to be in the
interest of national defence if the funds available for it depend upon the vicissitudes of economic life. The veiled accusation also lacks in some degree a historical
basis. The architects of the Plan were less naive towards national socialism than
De Jong's interpretation at that point suggests, even though they did not perhaps
reveal the fact in public. The Plan was partly rooted in the view that the bad
economic situation was a breeding ground for national socialism and fascism,
and that for this reason also it was desirable to bring about an improvement. 3
It would seem to me that the postulation that the Netherlands had become alienated from reality in consequence of conservatism in various respects merits critical
examination. Only those who by nature are unsympathetic towards conservatives
are sufficiently prejudiced to characterize any and every effort towards preservation as stupidity. And since, even in the 1930s, not every Dutchman was of conservative disposition, there arises the question who were the conservatives, and
why? The answer might well show that the premise could be reversed, i.e. that
the conservatives were conservative for the very reason that they were alienated
1. L. de long, Her Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 1939-1945, I, Voorspel
(The Hague, 1969) 724.
2. De long, Voorspel, 235.
3. Information provided verbally by the late Mr. H. Vos, who was among the principal authors
of the Plan van de Arbeid.
124
DEPRESSION AND POLICY IN THE THIRTIES
from reality. If this be so, it is first necessary to define precisely the term 'alienated
from reality'. I submit that discussion of the 1930s is worthwhile, and I propose
to try to stimulate that discussion with the aid of facts from the economic history
of the period. From an economic point of view, the 1930s were dominated by
an exceptionally long and deep depression. Little or no blame for the depression
can be laid on the Netherlands, yet the malaise persisted longer there than in
other Western countries. 4 According to a highly current theory, the Netherlands
was out of touch with reality in economic as well as other terms.
Partly as a result of a conservative mentality which had increasingly lost contact with reality,
and partly as a result of a mismanaged democracy which indulged in a great deal of theorizing but proved capable of little action, the Netherlands was late in adapting to the changed
economic circumstances, which demanded a totally different mentality,
is the view expressed by the economist Keesing more than twenty years ago. 5
The economic historian Brugmans wrote in somewhat more nuanced terms.
He makes no mention of 'little action'. On the contrary, he states that 1931 saw
'the great change' in Dutch economic policy.6 The change of course was accompanied by a whole series of crisis measures. But according to Brugmans these had
little success. The failure he attributes on the one hand to certain circumstances
over which the Netherlands, as a minor economic power, had no control, e.g.
the collapse of international trade, and on the other to the nature of the policy.
The 'knowledge and experience' necessary 'to make the policy effective' were
lacking. 7 In pointing to the lack of knowledge and experience, Brugmans reveals
that he had also observed an alienation from reality, although he does not indicate
where the cause lay. At any rate, the government's economic policy fell short
in his eyes, and he holds the government partly responsible for the continuation
of the depression. It is none the less a fact that Brugmans has already convincingly
disposed of the myth that the government, anticipating that the storm would
pass, remained inert. Moreover, he has displayed understanding of the shortcomings of the many measures introduced.
Nevertheless, there is more to be said about the various issues than appears
possible at first sight.
To start with, it is questionable whether a better understanding of economic
reality would have greatly helped the country. The best insight in the world is
4. This at any rate can be deduced from the literature on the subject. The validity of this proposition has not been examined here. Cf. I. J. Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht,
sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Nederland 1795-1940 (The Hague, 1961) 536 ff.
5. F. A. G. Keesing, 'De conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland en de evolutie van deeconomische overheidspolitiek 1918-1939', De Nederlandse volkhuishouding tussen twee wereldoorlogen,
III (Utrecht-Brussels, s.a.) 316.
6. Brugmans, Paardenkracht, 519. F. de Roos and W. J. Wieringa, Ben halve eeuw rente in
Nederland (Schiedam, 1953), rightly reported the great activity on the part of the Dutch government in the 1930s.
7. Brugmans, Paardenkracht, 552.
125
P. W. KLEIN
no guarantee of success. Conversely, a lack of understanding of economic life

does not automatically preclude good fortune. Even conservatives have luck
sometimes! One can only say that the chances of arriving at an effective economic
policy are proportional to the extent to which the workings of economics are
understood. Just how great, or small, the chance is, depends upon the yardstick
employed to measure insight into economic reality. As far as I can see, no such
yardstick exists. In any case, the failure of an economic policy-the very phenomenon which some seek to attribute to a lack of knowledge-does not serve as
one. Circular reasoning may convince, but it never explains anything.
Perhaps the willingness to become familiar with new economic views, which
were later recognized as valuable, gives an indication of the measure of understanding with which the Netherlands faced its depression. But I am bound to add that
even the economists have done their best to hide that willingness. One searches
in vain in the pre-war issues of De Economist and Economisch-Statistische Berich ten for a discussion of pioneer works such as Keynes's 'General Theory'.
Not that reference to Keynes was avoided altogether, for De Economist reported
that he had exchanged the psychic basis of the economics of the classics for the
mentality of a bookkeeper.s That, whatever it may be, was none to the good,
for it is
symptomatic of a trend in economics which is widely followed nowadays, but which leads
to nothing; indeed, it cannot lead to anything, for ... it is a tautology in the overall way of
thinking and explaining.
Obsolete opinions such as this are always ludicrous. But were the Dutch
economists really so backward? This is open to doubt. Keynesian revolution was
not greeted with thunderous applause in the rest of the world either. Prominent
journals such as the Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv and the Revue d'economie politique
did not discuss the 'General Theory' at all, while the American Economic Review
devoted less than three editorial pages to it. 9 This does not indicate that the aftermath of the publication of the work was foreseen. But in the Netherlands, the
students at the Netherlands School of Economics, thanks to their professors,
A. M. de Jong and P. Lieftink, found the work, which was published in February
1936, on their list of recommended books in September of the same year. 10 Such
speed is anything but indicative of backwardness or lack of insight.
8. Tj. Greidanus, 'De ontwikkeling van Keynes' economische theorieen', De Economist, LXXX
(Amsterdam, 1936) 697.
9. American Economic Review, XXVI (New Haven, 1936) 490.
10. Jaarboekje van de Vereeniging voor Studiebelangen aan de Nederlandsche Handelshoogeschool, 1936/37 (Rotterdam, 1936) 76.
126
My object in citing these examples is to show that they mean nothing. While
history continues to be bogged down in exemplary thinking, it affords no measure
and thus imparts little knowledge. There is therefore little significance in the fact
that Keynes's theories soon found an echo in certain political circles. At the same
time, it is to the credit of the Socialistische Gids (Socialist Guide) that, as early
as 1936, it praised Keynes for his attack on the classic theory.l1 Indeed, ideas
which correspond to the economic policy propounded by Keynes had appeared
in the Plan van de Arbeid a year earlier. Public works as a means of combatting
unemployment was among the proposals. But, unlike Keynes, the socialists
were unwilling to accept the corollary, a deficit on the Budget. But that was not
all. The Plan van de Arbeid also provided for the Budged to be balanced by cutting
government expenditure by 44 million guilders net and raising revenues by 10
million. 12 This was no new idea, for in 1933, in a general review of policy, the leader
of the parliamentary Socialist party had spelled it out in unmistakable terms:
'It would be a disaster for the mass of the people if adequate steps were not
taken to ensure that the Budget is duly balanced ... '.13 The dichotomy in the socialist approach perhaps contributed to the fact that, outside the party circle, the
immense propaganda made for the Plan van de Arbeid evinced so little conviction
and attracted so few supporters. One can well imagine that the party's approach
was viewed not as fresh progressivity, but as stale half-wittedness.
On the other hand, it would have been difficult to accuse the Colijn-Oud duo
(prime Minister and Minister of Finance, respectively, from 1933 to 1937) of
failing to listen to the orthodox utterances of their socialist opponents. The reputation of their policy shows that they did. But to what extent the criticism of their
policy was soundly based, remains to be seen. The fact that the policy missed
the target is, as stated, not in itself a sufficient reason for condemning it. Nor
do the contradictions in the crisis policy of themselves constitute proof of ignorance, even though no one would deny that they existed. For example, the agricultural policy, which tended to increase prices, conflicted with the notorious policy
of adaptation, the aim of which was to reduce price levels. But whether such a
contradiction must be judged simply as folly, or as a normal political action in
the face of a need to reconcile the irreconcilable, depends upon the circumstances.
There are good reasons for assuming that in the case in point there were indeed
irreconcilable factors at work.
11. B. van den Tempel, 'Keynes' jongste boek General Theory 0/ Employment, Interest and
Money', De Socialistische Gids, XXI (Amsterdam, 1936) 730.
12. Het Plan van de Arbeid (Amsterdam, 1935) 71.
13. Verslag van de handelingen der Staten-Generaal, lIe Kamer 1933-1934 (The Hague, 1934).
General deliberations concerning the Budget Estimates for 1934, dated 7th November 1933.
The credit for the discovery of this passage is due to Mr. J. Glaubitz and Mr. W. Bleijie, both
of whom attended the Seminar referred to in the introduction to these notes.
127
P. W. KLEIN
As far as the agricultural policy is concerned, it is difficult to see what other

realistic alternatives existed. This sector was the first to be hit by the depression
and suffered the most from it. Because of its significance for the national economy,
agriculture could not be ignored: active support was called for. And this was
an area in which the Netherlands had had experience since the agricultural depression in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was also the point that
the agrarian sector had organized itself since the end of that century, with the
result that the various groups now formed a bastion of vested interests. This
was something which no government could afford to ignore.
As regards the policy of adaptation, the government appeared to have more
freedom for deviation in charting its course. The efforts towards adaptation may
be seen as a product of short-sighted stubbornness on the part of the government,
which clung to the policy only because it continued to view the depression as a
transient economic phenomenon. It mistakenly allowed itself to be influenced
by past experiences and the matching orthodox economic theories, which postulated that a disturbance of this nature could be remedied by cutting one's coat
according to one's cloth. Viewed in this light, the only constraint on the freedom
of the government was its own lack of insight.
This interpretation, however, threatens to ignore the hard fact that the policy
of adaptation as a whole was not particularly effective. In spite of all the economies,
the share of total government expenditure in the national income rose during the
1930s to 23.5 per cent, compared with 17.4 per cent in the preceding decade.1 4
At the same time, the share represented by tax revenue rose only from 13 per cent
to 15.5 per cent. Expenditure on the social services in the period 1931-1938, as
a percentage of national income, was more than twice as high as in the years
1921-1930 and in fact even exceeded the level in the Dutch welfare state of the
early 1960s. As the following Table shows, no real economies were achieved in
the State's finances in absolute terms either:
TABLE I. STATE FINANCES AND NATIONAL INCOME
(YEARLY AVERAGES, IN MILLIONS OF GUILDERS)lS
1926-1930
1931-1935
1936-1939
Govt.
expenditure
Tax
revuene
Net demand on Nat. Income

money jcapital at factor cost
market
700
932
1,025
758
521
618
-125
140
148
5,812
4,534
4,818
14. De Nederlandse economie in 1970 (The Hague, 1966) 276, table B 6. Calculated as a percentage of the national income at market prices.
128
While the yearly tax revenue, like the national income, fell sharply, annual expenditure by the State eventually proved to have risen by more than 300 million guilders.
This development served to increase the national debt by more than 1,500 million
guilders. 18
One is forced to the conclusion that in the area of State finances the government
did not practice what it preached, and that little effort had been made to match
the coat to the cloth. In practice therefore, the consequences of the policy of
adaptation had in certain ways been less catastrophic than one would be inclined
to assume if one ignored the relevant quantitative data. For those who were still
actively concerned in the labour process, for example, the policy appears even
to have allowed of a slight improvement in material standards. At any rate, the
fall in the price index of family consumption exceeded the fall in the index of
gross wages, as the following Table reveals:
TABLE II. FAMILY CONSUMPTION AND HOURLY WAGES
Price
index
of
family
consumption
Gross
hourly
wage
(1929 = 100)17
1929 1930 1931
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
100
97.5
91.5
82.9
82.9
82.9
80
77.1
80
82.9
100
100
98.3
89.7
87.8
84.5
81
79.3
82.8
84.5
15. Compiled from Zeventig jaren statistiek in tjjdreeksen, 1899-1969 (The Hague, 1970) 126 ff.,
138 ff. The inclusion of the whole of the public finances in the calculation would not affect the
result of the comparison. In order to avoid mathematical complications, the government finances
alone were included.
16. The national debt rose from f 2,500 million on 31.12.1929 to f 4,000 million at the end of
1939. In keeping with the moderate boom, the national debt fell by f 500 million between 1923
and 1929. During the depression of the 1930s, the government correctly employed conversion
to lighten the burden. It exerted only an incidental influence on interest rates. Anticipating our
later conclusions, we may observe here that in Britain there was an equal lack of active government policy to reduce interest rates. Cf. F. W. Paish, The Post-War Financial Problem (London, 1950) 16 ff. In the Netherlands, the yield from the perpetual government loans fluctuated
in the 1920s between 3.08 per cent (1925) and 4.82 per cent (1929), and in the 1930s between
0.21 per cent (1938) and 3.15 per cent (1935). The unemployed were not alone in suffering from
the depression: the investors were also its victims. The developments concerning the government
debts are dealt with at length in De Roos and Wieringa, Halve eeuw rente, 173 ff. Cf. Zeventig
jaren statistiek, 115.
17. Extracted from Zeventig jaren statistiek, 151, 155. The gross hourly wage relates solely to
the average hourly wage earned by adult male workers in industry. In certain sectors of industry,
129
P. W. KLEIN
The foregoing remarks do not preclude serious and well-founded criticism of

the policies of the government of the day, which in shape and presentation made
a mockery of one of the most elementary rules of parliamentary democracy.
Parliament and the electorate had effectively been deprived of every opportunity
to express their views or influence events.
The prime cause lay in the circumstance that the government, in drawing up its
Budget estimates, adopted the attitude that the policies relating to Exchequer
income and expenditure constituted a primary and sovereign datum. In the estimates, the economic policy was considered to be subordinate to this. But in reality,
of course, this was out of the question: the economic developments repeatedly
demanded greater government intervention, something which had scarcely if at
all been taken into account when the estimates were prepared, but which greatly
influenced the policies relating to income and expenditure. This course of action
made it, and continues to make it, impossible to judge the merits of the economic
policy on the basis of the Budgets. As a result, the government could not even
manage to explain the aims of its Budget in plain terms. These amounted to
no more than beating the air; they had no real significance then and none can
be found for them now. The government made no attempt to disguise the fact.
In 1932 the Minister of Finance, in his Budget speech, had to admit that the estimated deficit possessed 'no more than coincidental significance'. IS It was 'merely
a step on the road to equilibrium', which meant that the true extent of the estimated
deficit would emerge in time, whereupon the government would decide what it
could do to close the gap and what effect its measures would have on economic
developments. Six years having passed without any change in the situation, it
was then stated that: 'It is the intention of the Minister to promote the changes
necessary to arrive at a meaningful Budget' .19 Caught in the maelstrom of economic
events, the government had completely lost its grip on developments, and as
far as this area was concerned it could just as well have sent parliament into recess.
This having been said, the 'unforeseen' deficits of various types which have arisen
in recent years make one wonder how much progress has been made in the seventies towards ending the tragicomic helplessness of parliament and government
in the Netherlands.
We are faced with the question: ought the government to have raised the level
of its expenditure even higher? It is not easy to answer this. In the face of all
e.g. metalworking, the pattern was more favourable; in agriculture, on the other hand, it was
less favourable. Wage data relating to the agricultural sector do not constitute a particularly
reliable pointer to the level of prosperity in view of the possibility of recompense in kind and
supplementary earnings. This Table should be interpreted with due reserve.
18. Taken from the Budget Speech of 1932, published in Economisch Statistische Berichten
(1932) 743.
19. Budget Speech 1938, ibidem (1938) 708.
130
manner of contradictory developments relating to the distribution of incomes

and wealth, and to the money and capital markets, it is hard to see just where
the government could have found the resources to finance any significant increase
in expenditure. One thing is certain: with the national income declining, it would
have been difficult to obtain the excess from the current income sector of the
economy.
Events had not failed to affect the nation's wealth either. Private capital, which
in 1929 totalled 15,700 million guilders, fell by more than 4,000 million to a nadir
of 11,100 million in 1936. 20
The decline, however, had little effect on the level of loans and share issues
on the Dutch capital market. These averaged 250 million guilders annually in
the period 1930-1936, compared with 266 million in the years 1922-1929. 21 It is
thus questionable whether there was indeed so great a surfeit offunds on the capital
market. It is conceivable that funds were released by the drastic reduction in the
volume of mortgages. In this sector, the decline in building caused investment in
new business to fall from 837 million guilders in 1929 to 295 million in 1936.
On the other hand, it may be that the surplus was diverted to savings banks
and life assurance companies. Savings bank deposits rose by nearly 300 million
guilders in this period, while the per capita value of life policies, expressed in
fixed purchasing power, increased from 299 guilders in 1929 to 448 guilders in
1936. This drastic shift in the use to which savings were put adds to the difficulty
of drawing clear conclusions as to where the government, assuming that it comprehended the shift, could have found additional idle funds. Changes in the pattern
of capital movements to and from the Netherlands added considerably to the
complexity of the situation. 22 In view of the uncertainty regarding the development of interest rates, it is probable that many investors--<:ertainly a number
of institutional investors-preferred to leave a significant portion of their money
uninvested. The quantitative developments and shifts could indicate that the
government had got into a tight corner, not only by reason of the ideologically
limited task which it had set itself, but also of the prevailing circumstances and
their effect on the opportunities for investment and income. One is forced to the
conclusion that those who criticized the policy of that government failed to take
due account of the conditions under which it was called upon to operate.
If one views the policy pursued in the Netherlands against the background
of the international situation, one is similarly forced to the conclusion that a
rigorously pursued policy of adaptation just did not exist. Goudriaan calculated
20. Zeventig jaren statistiek, 138.
21. Zeventigjaren statistiek, 111 fr. The sharp fall in share issues was largely ofrset by the fioating
of debenture loans. The devaluation of the guilder was followed by a mild revival of share issues,
but this was of short duration.
22. Cf. De Roos and Wieringa, Halve eeuw rente, ch. v and vi.
131
P. W. KLEIN
in 1936 that after five years of adaptation the level of prices, expressed in gold
terms, was still considerably higher in the Netherlands than in England, despite
a sharper fall in the cost of living. The cause of this discrepancy is not hard to
find: between 1931 and 1936 the pound sterling had fallen by about forty per cent
against the guilder, and of this devaluation only about one-third had been compensated by adaptive measures. Under identical circumstances, and without
changes in Dutch monetary policy, it would therefore require a further ten years
to achieve complete adaptation to the price level in England. 23 For this reason
the policy of adaptation was unreal: it was not effective.
Viewed in this light, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that the Netherlands government made a demonstrable, fundamental mistake in the 1930s by
maintaining the parity of the guilder until September 1936. This monetary policy
placed the country in economic isolation. Furthermore, the government's action
shifted an unnecessarily large portion of the burden of the depression on to the
shoulders of the unemployed. Doubtless the increase in expenditure in the social
sphere was totally inadequate to compensate the additional burden. Against this
it could be argued that a different monetary policy would certainly not have
automatically led to the recovery of the economic life of the country. It is true
that the economy rallied somewhat after the devaluation of the guilder. But
within a year the situation again deteriorated. 24 This shows that the monetary
policy exerted a relatively small influence on the economic fortunes. After all,
other monetary policies pursued abroad produced only dubious results. This
seemed to apply particularly to Great Britain. The floating of the pound in 1931
did indeed increase the chances of an economic recovery. In reaching a judgement,
however, one must pay due regard to the specific circumstances in which the
shift in Britain's monetary policy took place.
In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands, the depreciation of the pound
followed years of mismanagement in the monetary field. The blame for this lay
with Churchill. He was the minister responsible when, in 1925, after long and careful consideration, Britain returned to the gold standard, which she had abandoned
during the First World War. The error lay in restoring the pound to its pre-war
23. J. Goudriaan, 'Wat is Uw plan', Economisch Statistische Berichten (Rotterdam, 1936)
636 ff, 659 ff.
24. This has already been observed by Keesing, 'Conjuncturele ontwikkeling'. The fact that
the revival gave way to a relapse is reflected in various quantitative data. As the principal effect
of the devaluation will have been in the area of exports, we have confined ourselves to the data
relating to these. Following the devaluation, the monthly total rose in fits and starts, reaching
a maximum of f 113 million in September 1937. By July 1938 it had declined to f 78 million,
after which it settled down at a slightly higher figure. The nadir was reached in June/July 1936,
when the monthly exports amounted to only f 50 million. See Maandschrift Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek (The Hague, 1936, 1937, 1938).
132
gold value. This meant that the currency was overvalued. The measure turned
Great Britain into a dear country, thus exacerbating the economic problems with
which it had wrestled in the 1920s. This monetary policy had become a target for
expert criticism long before the onset of the world crisis. No such criticism could
then be levelled at the monetary policy pursued in the Netherlands. The worldwide crisis soon showed that the pound could not be maintained at that level.
In the Netherlands, the uncertainty in this respect was of longer duration; it is,
however, untrue to say that it lasted until 1936. In the light of developments
the Dutch government should have abandoned its rigid attitude in 1933 at the
latest.
For that matter, the British government was also still in a state of uncertainty,
for the estimates of the extent to which the pound had been overvalued in 1925
ranged from 11/2 per cent to 10 per cent. 25 The depreciation of the pound was
thus not a result of a well-considered economic policy. It was in fact brought
about by developments over which the British government had no control. Like
its Dutch counterpart, the government proclaimed its determination to defend
the value of the currency. And like the Dutch government it sought to stave off
devaluation by a policy of adaptation which did not differ in essence from the
policy pursued after the return to the gold standard in 1925. Within the framework
of this policy the government announced, among other things, that naval pay
would be cut. The demonstration which greeted this measure, and which was
labelled a mutiny, found its way into the world press. 26 The reaction to this
situation was financial panic, which the already depleted gold reserves were unable
to withstand. The government had no choice but to take an immediate leap in
the dark. It subsequently transpired that luck rather than judgement had been
on the side of Britain.27 Forced by the consequences of protracted monetary mismanagement, she acted quickly; other countries later took similar steps, but
with less success because the British had already gathered the benefits. These later
devaluations were also rendered less effective by the fact that the British step
heralded a period of immense international confusion. This was by no means in
Britain's favour in all respects. The country's balance of payments showed a
marked deterioration in the 1930s, compared with the preceding decade. s8 'The
external problem was never solved. The balance of payments stayed passive
25. S. Pollard, The Gold Standard and Employment Policies between the Wars (London, 1970) 6.
26. A rather amusing description of the sequence of events is given by L. C. B. Seaman, PostVictorian Britain 1902-1951 (London, 1967) 216 if. The author describes the protest by the Navy
as 'the politest possible form of mutiny', but one which brought a reminder of Kronstadt and
Kiel.
27. The beneficial consequences of the devaluation were not ancitipated at the time. Cf. A. J.
Youngson, Britain's Economic Growth 1920-1966 (London, 1967) 84 if.
28. A. Feavearyear and E. V. Morgan, The Pound Sterling (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1963) 376 if.
133
P. W. KLEIN
throughout the 1930s; Britain was living on her capital'.29 This could not be said
of the Netherlands; although the relevant statistics have no claim to accuracy,
it may be assumed that the country's balance of payments for the 1930s as a
whole showed a substantial surplus. 30 Great Britain, on the other hand, was living
on the resources with which, as a creditor nation, she had long served the world
economy. The weakening of British financial power produced an overall deterioration in the economic situation,31 and this in turn diminished the beneficial effect
of subsequent devaluations.
Even after 1931 there was no country which gladly sacrificed the stability of
its currency. The pernicious, unsystematic arrangement which superseded the
gold standard could scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory method of dealing with
international monetary relations, for against the unmistakable advantages of
depreciation stood equally unmistakable drawbacks. In 1930 the Netherlands,
for example, was estimated to have 5,700 million guilders invested abroad (about
two-thirds of this sum in Europe and America), on which heavy losses were
reported to have been suffered. 32 In spite of its many mistakes, the Dutch government perhaps deserves some sympathy for its efforts to put virtue before necessity.
Broadly speaking, it would be quite wrong to jump to the conclusion that the
government's reticence to adopt ad hoc measures in the economic field is evidence
of an erroneous policy. This reticence merely illustrates the government's motives;
it reveals nothing concerning the effect of the policy pursued. There is no reason
to assume that devaluation in itself was an effective means of overcoming the
depression. Practice has shown that the effect of devaluation is limited and transitory.33 Even Great Britain failed to derive lasting benefit from the step. The
advantage, measured in terms of the index of wholesale prices, which she gained
over the United States in 1931 was wiped out by the devaluation of the dollar
in 1934. Admittedly Britain's share of world exports had risen in the interim, but
in the light of the absolute decline in world exports that does not say much. As
other countries proceeded to devalue their currencies, the British share of world
exports again decreased, and all the devaluations together could not prevent
world trade remaining at a level below that of the 1920s. During the 1930s, world
A. Lewis, Economic Survey 1919-1939 (London, 1949) 85.
Zeventig jaar statistiek, 123. According to these data, the current account of the balance
of payments in the period 1930-1939 showed a surplus of f 419 million. Only in 1933 did a realIy
serious deficit occur. This shows once again that the government should have resorted to devaluation at that stage.
31. Youngson, Economic Growth, ch. iv and Feavearyear and Morgan, Pound Sterling, 376 ff.
32. W. Woodruff, Impact of Western Man (London, 1966) 150.
33. In simple terms, this can be explained by the fact that devaluation produces a rise in the
cost of imports. This in due course leads to increases in domestic cost prices, which then have
to be passed on in the form of higher export prices.
29.
30.
134
output rose faster than world trade. This implies that the foreign markets had
ceased to function as the motor of economic growth, and no monetary policy,
including devaluation, could restore that function in its former glory.34
Faced with the contraction of world trade, devaluation was at best no more
than a means by which a country could maintain its relative share of world exports.
This did not always succeed. Britain's share in 1937 was less than it had been prior
to the depression, and this fitted in with the pattern of her economic development
in the long term: the disintegration of Britain's relative position in the field of
international trade had been going on since the end of the nineteenth century.35
There is also the point that the depression did not stem solely from monetary
factors. Thus, if countermeasures of a monetary character had been successful,
it would have been a case of luck. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Colijn and Oud
waited too long, and by doing so failed to cushion the impact of the crisis.
The damage which their action caused cannot easily be determined with accuracy. In assessing it, one must of course proceed not only from the actual
policy, but also from an alternative model in which it is presumed that the
guilder was devalued at an earlier date. Just such a calculation was made
by Goudriaan shortly before the devaluation. In this he assumed that the Netherlands, like Britain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, had devalued her currency
in 1931.36 By comparing the pattern of unemployment in these four countries,
he was able to deduce the pattern which would presumably have existed in the
Netherlands under the assumed circumstances. He concluded that between onehalf and two-thirds of the real unemployment in the Netherlands was a direct
result of the policy of defending the guilder. The figures which he produced established prima facie that the defence of the currency had cost 'many hundreds
of thousands of man-years'.
Yet the result of his calculations is less than fully convincing. The pattern of
unemployment after the devaluation does not correspond to his findings. What
in fact occurred could be interpreted as showing that about one-third-and not
one-half to two-thirds-of the real unemployment was attributable to negligence
on the part of the government. Even this figure, however, seems exaggerated,
for the starting point of Goudriaan's calculation is unrealistic for the simple reason
that the Netherlands had no pressing reason to devalue in 1931. It would have
been more correct if he had chosen a later date, i.e. 1933, as his datum point.
We would reiterate that the British were forced to the point of devaluation not
by economic considerations, but by pure monetary and financial necessity.
Considerations relating to macro-economic policy did not play a significant role
34. See A. K. Caimcross's excellent treatise on this subject in Factors in Economic Development
(London, 1962) especially 220 if.
35. Lewis, Survey, 82.
36. Goudriaan, 'Wat is Uw Plan'.
135
P. W. KLEIN
in the process. As Graph I shows, no such necessity existed in the Netherlands

at that juncture. 37 Since the second quarter of 1931 the country had not eaten
into its gold reserves; on the contrary, these had risen to between two and two
and a half times the mid-1931 total, indicating that the guilder-in contrast to
the pound sterling-enjoyed confidence everywhere. It was not until the first
and second quarters of 1933 that the guilder came under pressure, and this fact
could indicate, from both the monetary-financial and macro-economic points
of view, that that was the moment for devaluation-the more so since it was then
that the dollar was allowed to depreciate.
GRAPH I. GOLD RESERVES ACCORDING TO THE WEEKLY BALANCES
OF THE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK
In millions of guilders
''''r--------------------:~--~;;;;~~----------~
1000
900
900
BOO
eOO
700
700
600
600
500
400
400
In that case, however, the beneficial effect of the devaluation would, as earlier
explained, have been less than in 1931. Moreover, the basis of Goudriaan's
calculation has the appearance of oversimplicity. One cannot, as he has done,
take the more or less parallel pattern of the unemployment coefficients in the
countries which devalued their currencies and derive with certainty from this
37. The data are taken from Verslag van de Nederlandsche Bank N. V. (Report of the Nederlandsche Bank N.V., 1929/30-1935/36).
136
DEPRESSION AND POLICY IN THE llDRTIES
that the monetary policies pursued in those countries are of equal importance
for the respective magnitudes of these coefficients. Added to this, Goudriaan
overlooked the variation in the magnitude of the coefficients in the devaluing
countries. For example, he did not attribute any significance to the circumstance
that in 1932 the British coefficient was 10.4, while that for Norway was a mere
2.8. If, as is obvious, other than monetary factors playa part in determining the
magnitudes of the coefficient one might well speculate on the question to what extent the variability of the coefficients depends on their magnitude. In this context
it is noteworthy that only Great Britain, with her extremely high coefficient,
succeeded in 1936 in achieving a real reduction in unemployment compared with
1931. It is thus conceivable that in this sense the effect of devaluation was proportional to the scale of unemployment. Given the circumstance that unemployment
in 1931 was more than twice as high in Britain as in the Netherlands, it is conceivable that Goudriaan overestimated the adverse aspects of Dutch monetary policy.
This does not detract from the fact that, in his judgement of the government's
policy, he in principle followed the correct path. The economic policy pursued by
the Colijn cabinets (1933-39) can indeed only be soundly judged by weighing
it against realistic alternatives.
No good purpose would be served by basing such a judgement on abstract
models such as Keynes's anti-cyclic budget policy, which envisages manipulating
public expenditure and taxation in order to achieve full employment, thereby
maintaining economic equilibrium. In times of underexpenditure in the private
sector, public expenditure must be increased and the burden of taxation reduced
in order to balance the shortfall in consumption and investment in the private
sector. In times of overexpenditure, the reverse procedure is required. The systematic and consistent application of this policy is among the prerequisites for its
success.
During the 1930s this condition was not met in practice anywhere; it is therefore
pointless to compare the concrete policy pursued in the Netherlands at that time
with abstract ideas which were then current. Countless political, social and psychological obstacles stood in the way of the implementation of those notions, just as
countless obstacles impede the combatting of inflation today. Perhaps Colijn was
thinking of these difficulties when he observed that the policy was incapable of
being implemented unless the government possessed dictatorial powers. 3S It
may well be that as far as the Netherlands in the 1930s was concerned he was right.
Insofar as policies which reflected Keynesian thinking were pursued in other
countries, there is still a deep division of opinion as to their success.
An example is the New Deal in the United States. Not that this can be viewed
as a series of measures consistently devised and implemented. The New Deal was
38.
ce. 'Theorie en Praktijk', Friesch Dagblad (Leeuwarden, 16.12.1971).

137
P. W. KLEIN
a gigantic improvization, the nature of which was subject to drastic modifications. As a means of decisively breaking through the malaise, the New Deal failed.
The measures introduced by Roosevelt increasingly met with opposition from
powerful conservative groups in industrial and political circles. Truly, the Netherlands did not possess a monopoly of conservatism! Even more significant perhaps
was the failure of the budgetary policy on which the emphasis rested during the
so-called Second Phase of the New Deal. In 1935 Roosevelt decided to proclaim
the necessary evil of Federal budget deficits a virtue. Under the circumstances
this was in keeping with Keynes's ideas. The deficit rose from 2,800 million dollars in 1935 to 4,400 million in the following year. The economy reacted promptly
and in accordance with expectations. Signs of threatening overexpenditure soon
became apparent, and with these the time had come to change course. In 1937
the deficit was brought back to 2,800 million dollars. The consequences-this
time contrary to expectations-were disastrous. Within a year, unemployment
had risen from three milion to five million. The economy sank back into the malaise
and remained there until rescued by the circumstance of war.39
The budgetary policy adopted in Sweden appears to have been more effective,
even though that country did not strictly apply the Keynesian theories either,
For example, the government economized on current expenditure in order to
ensure the funds required for public works. And this policy was successful. Its
success was primarily manifested in the area of public finances. The budget
deficits which had accumulated in the period 1933-35 were turned into surpluses
in the years 1936-38. A second and even more significant factor was that, in contrast to the situation in the United States, employment and production withstood
the adverse effects of the reversal of budgetary policy with relative ease.
To what extent this favourable situation resulted from the budgetary policy
and the allied execution of public works is debatable, however. Some tend to
attach greater weight to other factors and circumstances. For instance, the emphasis has been placed on Sweden's exceptionally favourable position in international trade. With the exception of Japan, Sweden was the only country in the
world in which, as early as 1933-1936, exports rose by a greater margin than the
volume of industrial output. This endowed the country with a growth mechanism
which still fitted in with the nineteenth-century constellation, but which during
the interbellum had ceased to operate for the majority of Western European countries.
39. The New Deal formed the subject of many studies. Global treatises include D. Dillard's
Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community (Englewood Cliffs, 1967) 590 ff. More
critical works include L. V. Chandler's America's Greatest Depression 1929-1941 (New York,
1970).
138
Sweden owed her good fortune in this respect partly to the specific composition
of her range of exports and partly to the (temporary) undervaluation of her
currency. Furthermore, Sweden's economy was closely linked with Britain's,
and thus she benefited from the revival which took place there. Those who maintained that Swedish policy was pursued under more favourable conditions than
existed elsewhere, partly by reason of the preceding economic development
were probably justified. 40 Whether, and to what extent, Sweden's economic policy
would have been effective in other circumstances, is still a moot point. The question becomes more pressing if one takes account of the fact that the execution
of public works had a lasting effect in Sweden, but not in the United States.
It is probable that the Swedes were more thorough in their approach than the
Americans; but it is also probable that other factors and circumstances favoured
them.
Needless to say, the execution of public works is not synonymous with the implementation of Keynesian theories. The concept of public works as a remedy
for unemployment is so obvious that some researchers have attempted to trace
its origin to Ancient Egypt. 41 Coming to more modern times, we find that all
manner of experiments in this area were conducted in the western world round
about 1900. As, moreover, the existence of regular economic cycles had then been
known for several decades,42 it was an equally natural step to grasp at public
works as a means of combatting unemployment caused by economic recessions.
This explains the inclusion of the idea in the programme of the International
Labour Conference of 1919. 43 In Sweden, it was put into practice during the 1920s.
In the United States, the idea was adopted by Roosevelt while he was still governor of New York. 44
For Keynes, however, the concept was essentially of greater importance.
His theory related to total economic equilibrium. In analysing his theory, he
demonstrated that economic equilibrium need not necessarily be accompanied
by full employment. It is this which distinguishes his doctrine from that of orthodox classic economics. According to Keynes, budgetary-cum-employment policy
was not merely an end, but also functioned as the means of maintaining economic
40. See H. W. Arndt, The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties (London, 1944) ch. viii.
A less critical view is taken by A. A. van Rhijn and J. E. van Dierendonck, 'Economic Policy in
Sweden', The Economist (London, 1950) 81 if.
41. E. Jay Howenstine, Compensatory Employment Programmes (Paris, 1968) 31.
42. See C. Juglar, Des crises commerciales et de leur retour periodique en France, en Angleterre
et aux Etats Unis (1st ed.; Paris, 1862).
43. Howenstine, Employment Programmes, 23. It is worthy of mention that in 1922 the Rotterdam City Council also took on labour to carry out public works as a means of combatting the
prevailing unemployment. Cf. C. Hoek, Rotterdam en omgeving na het einde van de middeleeuwen
(Rotterdam-The Hague, 1972) 42.
44. P. K. Conkin, The New Deal (New York, 1967) 21.
139
P. W. KLEIN
stability-at least insofar as this was disturbed by cyclic economic influences.

It was this vision which more or less found its true echo in modern budgets-not,
however, in the 1930s, but only after the Second World War.45 But by the very
act of placing so much emphasis on the stabilizing of the economy, Keynes
followed the orthodox line of thought inasmuch as he aimed his analysis at stable
economic equilibrium and not the labile variant which was subsequently analysed
in the post-Keynesian growth theory. For this reason his recommendations were
naturally limited to the adoption of measures to control the fluctuations in the
business cycle.
In the meantime, however, we have come to know that the world depression
in the 'thirties was not simply a disturbance of the usual kind in the cycle of business and that the cause lay partly in incidental and structural disturbances. Now
it is not per se necessary to know the origin of a disease in order to deal with
it, or even to cure it completely. But as the complexity of the symptoms increases,
the diagnosis and the remedy become more difficult. This renders it impossible,
even at this juncture, to say with certainty how exactly the depression should
have been dealt with. If, for example, the cause could be traced to obscure but
autonomic slowdowns in the growth of the population46-as Arthur Lewis,
among others, has asserted-it is questionable whether it could have been countered by policy measures aimed against economic disturbances. One is reminded
that other protracted, deep economic depressions equally failed to respond to
government policies. Examples of this in the last century were the 'Hungry
'Forties' and the 'Great Depression' (1873-1896).
There are reasons for viewing protracted disturbances of this nature as disruptions of a long-term economic development in which each phase is governed
by the developments in the preceding phases. Since the birth of industrialization
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the economic development of the
western civilization has been characterized by economic growth. Naturally,
it has been accompanied by drastic structural changes in the national economies
concerned. In sofar as Dutch historians to date have devoted attention to the
structural aspects of the depression in the 1930s, they have placed great emphasis
on the institutional changes in the economic order; moreover, they have done
so in a predominantly descriptive manner with little theoretical correlation and
without regard to the significance of time series. It would be no exaggeration to
say that, by adopting this approach, they have given too little thought to a systematic investigation of the variable factors which, within the circuit flow of economics, determine the magnitude and composition of the national product. This
45. W. Drees Jr. and F. Th. Gubbi, Overheidsuitgaven in theorie en praktijk (Groningen, 1968)
76.
46. Lewis, Survey, 151.
140
article does not purport to fill the gap. Its aim is to contribute, however modestly,
to an insight into certain aspects of the structural changes which are linked to
economic growth but which have so far been ignored in historical writings concerning the Netherlands.
The starting point (which is very simple and therefore least true to reality)
is derived from the classic form of the macro-economic production function y=f
(I,c), which merely indicates that the quantities of labour (1) and capital (c)
combine to produce a given quantity of national product (y). An increase in y
depends upon an increase in I and c and a change in the production function f,
which represents an increase of productivity. Productivity rises when the coefficient
of labour t-l=l/y and the coefficient of capital t-c=c/y decrease. The decrease
of these technical coefficients clearly indicates that less I and c are required per
unit of y.
It is not difficult to see that in the past economic growth in the long term has
to a large extent depended upon transformation of the production function.
In practice, this transformation took the form of modification of production
methods, changes in production techniques and thus in the input-output relationships between raw materials and end products, the development of new products
and the redistribution of production factors over various sectors and branches
of industry. These changes undoubtedly constituted in part an autonomic development in the sense that they were governed purely by the advance of technology.
But this does not detract from the fact that economic growth in turn favours
the transformation of the production function. 47 The rise in production not only
makes the transformation possible, but also stimulates it. Viewed thus, deceleration or stagnation of economic growth leads to stagnation of the transformation
and thus to stagnation of the growth of production.
In reality the tempo at which, and the extent to which, the transformation
of the macro-economic production function progresses is governed by a host
of more or less interdependent processes which occur in numerous sub-areas
of economic life; the pattern of these processes is determined by the development
of supply and demand ratios on the markets for raw materials, end products,
capital and labour. Deviations within the framework of productivity developments
elicited in sections of the market, can under certain circumstances lead to protracted disruption of macro-economic development.
If it is right to regard the depression of the 1930s as a disruption of structural
origin in the trend of economic growth rather than as a phenomenon related
to the ups and downs in the business cycle, it is natural to assume that the relation47. The thinking manifested here is principally based on the treatises of I. Svennilson, Growth
and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva, 1954) nos. 3-15, from which it diverges only
on relatively subordinate issues.
141
P. W. KLEIN
ship between supply and demand in certain markets served to place economically
unsurmountable obstacles in the path of the transformation. If this be so, the
Dutch government should have adopted a structural policy which, on the basis
of the system of comparisons employed here, would have stimulated the fall of t-l
and t-c by exerting influence on the relevant sUP.-lly-demand ratios.
It is evident that the government did little or nothing in this direction. But
apart from the question of whether, under the prevailing circumstances, this
would have been feasible, it would be wrong from a historical point of view
to accuse the government of serious neglect in this respect. There was, after all,
no question of the government seeking refuge in the theoretical economy, for
at best this was still in the Keynesian phase. Nor could it model itself on concrete
examples abroad. In any case, one cannot indulge in loose comparisons with other
countries. For example, it is true that employment in National-Socialist Germany
was restored to a satisfactory level in a short space of time, but the means and
ends used can scarcely be said to be worthy of copying. Democratic Great Britain,
which had considerably more success than the Netherlands, is surely a better
example.
When the crisis broke out, the British economy had already passed through
many difficult decades. The disintegration of Great Britain as a trading nation
has already been referred to. In addition, the tempo of her economic growth
had slowed markedly in comparison with the last quarter of the nineteenth century. During the 1920s, the difficulties centred around the three key sectors
which had long been the pillars of economic growth: coal, iron and textiles.
It was these very branches of industry which faced growing export problems.
The result was that in the 1920s more than ten per cent of the working population
were permanently unemployed. It would be a miracle if this ailing economy
did not suffer more than others from the crisis. But, of course, reality is full of
miracles. Within a short space of time, Britain learned how to deal with the crisis.
From then on, in spite of certain important imperfections and shortcomings,
she not only fared better than during the 1920s but also better than the majority
of Western countries.
The relative prosperity is most evident from the pattern of real national income
per head of the population. 48 Graph II shows that the only decline in the per
capita income in Britain occurred in the period 1929-1933 and was ofa mild nature;
by 1933 the figure had risen above the 1929 level. The upward trend continued
in the 1930s. During this period the per capita income, at 1900 prices, rose to an
48. Concerning the foregoing: D. H. Aldcroft and H. W. Richardson, The British Economy
1870-1939 (London, 1969), q.v. Youngson, Economic Growth. The data in Graph II are derived
from B. R. Mitchell's Abstracts of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962) 368 and Zeventig
jaren statistiek, 119.
142
average of 53 per annum, compared with 46 in the 1920s. Viewed in the long
term, this means that the world depression did not disrupt the trend of economic
growth. In spite of the serious difficulties relating to her extensive export sectors,
Great Britain had during the 1920s succeeded in turning a process of deceleration
of growth into one of acceleration. After sinking to a low of 1.1 per cent in the
period 19001913, the rate of growth rose in the 1920s to 1.5 per cent. The rise
continued, reaching 1.7 per cent in the period 19291938 and 2.1 per cent in the
years 1951.1960. 49 Initially, the rate of economic growth in the Netherlands
had also risen-indeed by a greater margin than in Great Britain, namely from
1.1 per cent in the period 19001913 to 2.6 per cent in the years 19201929.
It then fell steeply, and instead of rising the real income per capita fell by 0.9
per cent annually between 1929 and 1938.50 The upward trend in the rate of growth
was thus interrupted. Only after the Second World War were there signs of a
resumption of the trend: during the 1950s the rate increased to 3.2 per cent.
In this context it should be noted that in the period 19341939, as in the 1920s,
the per capita income had risen by 2.6 per cent.
GRAPH II. REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER HEAD OF THE POPULATION IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS,
(1929 = 100;
19201938
CONSTANT PRICES)
INDEX
GREAT BRITAIN
THE NETHERLANDS
120
120
110
"0
100
100
....
90
,,
,
'....
'...... ..... _--' ,,'"

.
..
90
80
70
70
60
80
192!)
1920
YEAR
49.
SO.
1930
193!)
Aldcroft and Richardson, British Economy, 4.

Calculated from Zeventig jaren statistiek, 119.
143
P. W. KLEIN
TABLE III. UNEMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS51
Year
As % of working population
Gr. Britain
Netherlands
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
14.6
21.5
22.5
21.3
17.7
16.4
14.3
11.3
13.3
11.7
3.4
6.6
11.3
12.8
13.8
15.6
17.4
14.3
12.3
9.6
Deviation (%) from average

unemployment in the 1920s
Gr. Britain
Netherlands
3.3
10.2
11.2
10.0
6.4
5.1
3.3
0
2.0
0.4
-0.8
3.0
7.7
9.2
11.2
12.0
13.8
10.7
8.7
6.0
In comparison with Great Britain, the development during the 1930s was
much less favourable. The fall was sharper and, moreover, continued until 1934
(see Graph 11). The recovery which then commenced to manifest itself and which
preceded the fall of the guilder did not-in spite of the fall of the guilder-result
in incomes reaching, let alone exceeding, the level of the 1920s.
In certain respects, the situation in regard to unemployment in Britain also
underwent a relatively favourable development during the 1930s, even though
the level was higher than in the Netherlands for almost the whole of the period.
The gap had been even greater during the preceding decade. Then, the annual
average in Britain had been 11.3 per cent, compared with only 3.6 per cent in
the Netherlands. But following a peak of 22.5 per cent in 1932, Britain, as Table
III shows, succeeded in reducing unemployment to the level of the 1920s.
In Great Britain, the unemployment which occurred in the early 1930s had almost
been eliminated by the second half of the decade. In the Netherlands, in contrast,
unemployment rose steadily, reaching a peak of 17.4 per cent in 1936. In the years
which followed, the Netherlands did not succeed in expanding employment opportunities on the scale which existed in the 1920s. Countries such as Denmark,
Sweden and Belgium similarly failed to reduce unemployment to the earlier level. 52
51. Data obtained from Mitchell's Abstracts, 67; Zeventig jaren statistiek, 56. The figures do
not purport to be complete or accurate. However, there are no grounds for assuming that they
fail to reflect the discrepancy in development.
52. Cf. A. Maddison, Economic Growth in the West (New York, 1967) appendix E, and Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 30 tf.
144
To what extent did these contrasts in the development of these two important
variables (real national income per head of the population and unemployment)
stem from contrasts in economic policy? Was the British government's structural
policy perhaps more effective than that pursued in the Netherlands? There is
nothing to indicate this. Did the British government follow the Keynesian line?
On the contrary, it, too, expressly avowed itself to be a supporter of the orthodox
economic course, which implied a deflationary price policy, a balanced budget,
such economies as were feasible and a halt to public works. More significantly
still, the British government, unlike the Dutch, put this policy into operation.
This is evident from the real cuts in overall government expenditure which, in
contrast to the situation in the Netherlands, were achieved both in absolute
terms and as a proportion of the national income. From an average of 867 million
per annum in the period 1920-1929, the total fell to 762 million in the ensuing
decade. 53 Expressed as a percentage of net national income, this corresponded
to a reduction from 20.6 per cent to 18.3 per cent. Against this, the burden of
taxation in Britain-in contrast to the Netherlands and in spite of increases
in the rate of taxation-fell from 22.5 per cent to 20 per cent. In its loan policy,
the British government pursued the same line as the Dutch. Its activities on the
money and capital markets from 1926 to 1930 had resulted in a deficit of 179.6
million. Between 1931 and 1935, however, they produced a surplus, as was the
case in the Netherlands; this amounted to 314.2 million. 54
If it be true that British policy was responsible for the economic revival, that
must be attributed to the fact that the British were more serious in their approach
to economies. This conclusion conflicts with the current interpretation of the
financial and economic policy of the Colijn cabinets. That would not matter if
the interpretation should turn out to be valid, but so far there is little sign that
it will. Leaving aside the monetary policy-which, in the longer term at any
rate, was not very effective-one would appear to be justified in assuming that
the similarities between the British and Dutch policies were more striking than
the differences. Nowadays it is clear that Britain's economic policy did not contribute significantly to the resumption of her economic growth. 55
If two countries broadly pursue the same economic policy, yet display significant
differences in economic development, one is moved to inquire into the reason.
In this case, an obvious starting point is that Great Britain evidently made better
use of her production factors, notably capital and labour, during the 1930s.
The manner in which a country utilizes its production factors in the production
process in a relatively short period such as the 1930s depends upon the composition
53. P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation (London, 1969) 463.
54. Calculated from Mitchell's Abstracts, 381 If.
55. Aldcroft and Richardson, British Economy, 239 If.
145
P. W. KLEIN
of its national production. It may be assumed that this is scarcely if at all determined by the economic policy pursued in the period concerned, but principally
by the preceding long-term economic development. As regards the economic
development in the long term, it can also be said that the more efficiently a country
has succeeded in utilizing its production factors, the higher is the level of development which it has attained.
To what extent this can be applied within the framework of the western economies can best and most simply be judged by the level of the national product
or income per head of the population.
In the period 1921-1929, the per capita income in Great Britain, expressed
in current prices, averaged 90 per annum. 56 At a fixed rate of exchange of 12.11
guilders to the pound,57 this is equal to approximately f 1,100. The per capita
income in the Netherlands at that time was only f 800 or thereabouts. 58 From
this it can be established that the level of prosperity in Britain at the onset of the
depression was about 40 per cent higher than in the Netherlands. Broadly speaking,
this corresponds to the estimates made by Maizels, from which it can be deduced
that in 1929 the gross domestic product per capita, expressed in 1955 prices,
amounted to $ 915 in Britain, compared with $ 560 in the Netherlands. 59 This
representation of the situation, which once again is very general, is certainly not
at variance with the considerably better calculations made by Denison, which
show that the per capital income in Britain in 1960 was still about 20 per cent
higher than in the Netherlands, although the rate of growth since the Second
World War has been considerably greater in the Netherlands than in Britain.60
Clark, too, drew from his calculations the conclusion that the level of prosperity
in Britain round about 1930 was considerably higher than in the Netherlands. 61
It can be deduced from these estimates and calculations that the British economy
had reached a higher level of development than the Dutch in the 1920s.
A historical explanation for this difference in development levels is to be found
in the simple circumstance that modern economic growth commenced earlier
56. Mitchell, Abstracts, 368.
57. Based on the rate of exchange of f 12,1071 to the pound which existed following Britain's
return to the gold standard: Verslag van de Nederlandsche Bank 1929-1930, 27. As is known, this
method of calculation is far from perfect for the purpose of comparing international variations
in income levels. In seeking to make comparisons of this nature, one generally meets with very
great difficulties. In view of the imperfections in the statistical material, among other factors,
no attempt was made in the foregoing to achieve accuracy, but rather to give a broad impression
of the difference in the levels of prosperity. More refined methods of calculation could erroneously
give the impression of being accurate.
58. More accurately, f 789. Cf. Zeventig jaren statistiek, 119.
59. A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade (Cambridge, 1965) 533.
60. E. E. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ (Washington, 1969) 22.
61. C. Clark, The Conditions 0/ Economic Progress (3rd ed.; London, 1960) ch. iii, tables
XXIII and XXIX.
146
in Britain than in the Netherlands. Britain's economic growth had been accompanied by a far-reaching transformation of the national economy. Viewed in terms
of the sectoral origin of the national product, this transformation had followed
a pattern which had meanwhile become more or less classic. In this connexion,
it is a theoretically plausible fact of experience that as economic growth progresses,
the percentage of the national output contributed by the primary sector diminishes.
In spite of the continuing rise in productivity in the primary sector, the development in Britain in the 1920s had progressed to a point where only four per cent
of the national product originated in that sector.62 In this respect, the Netherlands
was clearly lagging behind, for there the primary sector still accounted on average
for nearly twelve per cent of the net national product in the 1920s. The lion's
share of this-which averaged nearly 9.5 per cent-was provided by the agricultural sector. 63
Because the primary sector, notably agriculture, occupied a much more important position in relative terms in the Netherlands, the country suffered far more
than Britain when, in the 1930s, world prices of agricultural products fell more
sharply than those of industrial products. At the deepest point of the depression,
world prices of primary products were down by 60 per cent compared with 1929,
while those for industrial products showed a drop of only 40 per cent. 64
The British export package consisted mainly of industrial products, and the
import package mainly of food and raw materials. Britain thus received a greater
volume of imported goods for a given quantity of exports than previously, and
both consumers and producers benefited from this. Graph III shows that Britain's
terms of trade in the 1930s were higher than in the preceding decade. 65 In the prevailing circumstances, and in view of the composition of her trading package,
the Netherlands derived little or no such benefit. The structure of Britain's production apparatus thus afforded her cost advantages which the Netherlands,
by reason of her production structure, could not share. There was no short-term
remedy for this situation.
62. S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven, 1966) 88.

63. J. B. D. Derksen, Het nationale inkomen van Nederland 1921-1939 (Utrecht, 1948) 37, 28.
The averages were calculated over the period 1921-29. The remaining sectors of primary production comprise horticulture, hunting and fishery. Forestry was ignored for this purpose. Agriculture consists of arable crops and animal rearing.
64. Maizels, Industrial Growth, 80 ff.
65. Ch. P. Kindleberger, The Terms of Trade. An European Case Study (London, 1956) 13:
Cf. De Nederlandse economie in 1970, 237 and Zeventig jaren statistiek, 92. The advantages thus
obtained by Britain are dealt with by, among others, Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 86 ff.
147
P. W. KLEIN
GRAPH III. TERMS OF TRADE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS,
1921-1928 (1929 = 100)
INDEX
,--------r130
120
1~0
~'
110
/
100
... ,
....,
'---,
"110
\
90
80
"/~
"
100
90
GREAT BRITAIN
THE NETHERLANDS
70
80
70
YEAR
It has already been established that agriculture was among the sectors of the
Dutch economy which suffered most during the 1930s. In a normal economic
recession, which has a rationalizing effect, it would have been natural for this
sector, by consolidating and increasing its mean productivity, to have trimmed
its sails to the prevailing wind.
But, as will be shown, this did not happen. During the 1930s the agricultural
product tended to increase, albeit somewhat erratically, and the agricultural sector
gained in relative importance,66 its share in the national income rising from 6.93 %
to 9.81 %. Given the fact that the national income depended increasingly on the
economic activity in a primary sector such as agriculture, one may deduce that the
country was hampered in its efforts towards industrialization, and was obliged to
settle for a lower level of economic growth. Viewed in the framework of long-term
development, the economic recession had degenerated into a process of structural retardation.
66.
148
Derksen, Het nationale inkomen, 28.

GRAPH IV. SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE NET NATIONAL PRODUCT IN
1921-1939
THE NETHERLANDS,
0/0
11
\
10 -\
\
\
9
\ I
'\
I \
11
\
10
TRIENNIAL PROGRESSIVE AVERAGE

I
I
I
I
'J
\
\
IANNUAL FIGURES
r-"/
't~~1
1925
YEAR
1930
+--+-i-l--t-+-t-l
11135
This is also evident from the circumstance that the output of the agricultural
sector requires an increasing input of production factors. First and foremost
there was the factor of land. Between 1932 and 1939 the acreage of grassland and,
to an even greater extent, arable land increased. 87 The increase resulted partly
from investment decisions taken earlier. The occupation of the Wieringermeer
polder in 1934, for example, was a result of a decision taken in 1918 to carry
out the Zuider Zee Plan. 88 But in addition large-scale reclamation of waste land
was undertaken in pursuance of decisions taken during the depression.
Secondly, an increase in agrarian investment can be deduced from the growth of
the stock of cattle. The principal increases related to beef cattle, pigs and chickens. 89
Investment is generally regarded as a contribution to the modernization of
68. Brugmans, Paardenkracht, 499.
69. Zeventig jaren statistiek, 69. The stock of pigs, in contrast, declined. The stock of beef
cattle rose from 2,366,000 head in 1930 to 2,817,000 head in 1939. In the same period the number
of sheep rose from 485,000 to 690,000, and the number of chickens from about 24.6 million to
about 32.8 million.
149
P. W. KLEIN
the economy. It is frequently accompanied by technical innovation of the production process and thus stimulated economic growth. But there was little or no
innovation on the Dutch agricultural scene in the 1930s. In contrast to Great
Britain, where the tractor found wide acceptance in that period,70 farm mechanization made no headway in the Netherlands. In this context it is noteworthy that
the number of farm horses, having fallen by 65,000 in the 1920s, rose by 23,00071
in the 1930s. This pattern of events could be indicative of a disruption in the
changeover to a higher level of development, not only in the economy as a whole
but also in the agricultural sector itself.
TABLE IV. NET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE NETHERLANDS,
1921-1939
I
fmln
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
575
425
487
585
537
514
482
546
488
406
286
294
349
326
311
338
394
374
511
as % of total
net national product
III
Triennial prog. average of
col. II
10.49
8.37
9.72
11.17
9.77
9.33
8.60
9.13
7.99
6.93
5.58
6.45
7.95
7.51
7.32
7.77
8.20
7.63
9.81
9.53
9.75
10.22
10.09
9.23
9.02
8.57
8.02
6.83
6.32
6.66
7.30
7.50
7.53
7.76
7.87
8.55
II
70. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 99 if.

71. Zeventig jaren statistiek, 69. Their number fell from 364,000 in 1921 to 299,000 in 1930,
ising again to 322,000 in 1939.
150
DEPRESSION AND POLICY IN THE TIllRTIES
Thirdly, there is the fact that a greater call was made upon labour as a factor
of production, and this points in the same direction. Accordingly to very rough
estimates, the agrarian labour force rose during the 1930s by 50,000-55,000. 72
This rise was probably due in part to the active support given to agriculture by
the government, which thus certainly contributed to combatting the unemployment caused by the depression, but thereby created an obstacle to the recovery
of industrial growth.
Nevertheless it would be wrong to lay the blame for this retardant mechanism
on the depression of the 1930s, for even before that, in the 1920s, the agricultural
sector had exerted a braking influence on the economic growth of the Netherlands.
This partly explains why the depression paralyzed the economy to the extent
which it did.
The reversion to a lower level of development had in fact loomed on the horizon
in the 1920s, but at the time the events which presaged it were still overshadowed
and masked by the growth of other sectors. While the national income during
the 1920s had displayed an increase, the agricultural income had declined to the
point where its share in the total fell by about one-quarter (see Graph IV).73
Under normal circumstances, a decline of this magnitude in the relative significance of agriculture might be regarded as a sign of economic growth; but in view
of the decline in its absolute significance, this does not apply.
This is the more valid by reason of the fact that the relative and absolute decrease
of the income from agriculture was accompanied by increased use of labour,
as a factor of production, in the agrarian sector. In this sense, the preceding
development had been considerably more favourable. Up to the outbreak of
the First World War, the salient feature had been a sharp rise in productivity.74
Between 1909 and 1920 the total working popUlation rose by 460,000, while the
number employed in agriculture remained unchanged at 640,000. 75
But in the 1920s, in spite of the fact that the agricultural sector had clearly
run into structural difficulties, the agrarian labour force increased by 15,000.
This implies that the nature of the economic growth achieved in the Netherlands
in the 1920s was not such as to permit sufficient alternative employment to be
created to offset the adverse situation in agriculture. For balanced economic
growth, it would, under these circumstances, have been normal to withdraw
72. Zeventig jaren statistiek, 54. Given the fact that the population census due in 1940 did not
take place until 1947, it is impossible to trace accurately the growth in the 1930s. The author has
limited himself to a simple interpolation between 1930 and 1947. In any case, the quantity of
labour increased: Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 249. To what extent the growth was absorbed by arable farming and animal rearing, and to what extent by other sectors of agriculture
is not known with certainty.
73. Derksen, Het nationale inkomen, 1.
74. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 93 if.
151
P. W. KLEIN
labour from the distressed agrarian sector for the benefit of industrial development. The fact that no such shift took place in the 1920s shows that difficulty
was already being experienced in bringing the economy to a higher level of industrial development.
When the crisis of 1930-1931 bit into the economy, the absence of real opportunities for investment precluded an adequate expansion of employment opportunities in industry as a means of relieving the difficulties in agriculture.
GRAPH V, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
1921-1939
NETHERLANDS,
(IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, TOTALS IN POUNDS
STERLING AND GUILDERS;

INDEX
110
1929 = 100;
CURRENT PRICES).
' '\
90
.80
\
70
/--.J
/'
I::
,...
"\
90
BO
\ ....... "
60
\
\
GREAT BRITAIN
WE NETHERLANDS
60
r,
I ,
\
\
\
50
40
70
"-
"-
"
"-
I
I
f
"- "-
,,/
'-50
40
30
30
YEAR
..
1925
1930
1935
In the foregoing we have attempted to demonstrate that in the Netherlands,

unlike Britain, the primary sector blocked, or at least delayed, the recovery of
the economy. This, however, does not imply the view that Britain owed her
recovery to her primary sector. Although Britain, given the relatively small size of
her primary sector, obtained cost advantages in the field of international trade,
foreign trade did not playa decisive role in breaking through the crisis situation.
152
The world depression also dealt a severe blow to Britain's trade (see Graph V).76
The value of her foreign trade fell below the level of the 1920s. The nadir was
reached in 1933, in which year the figure was 47 per cent below the average for
the years 1925-1929. It is true that the situation afterwards improved but a full
recovery cannot be said to have materialized, especially if one takes into account
the unsteady development of British trade during the 1920s.
In the Netherlands, however, the development was even less favourable. The
effect on trade was more profound and of greater duration. The lowest point
was not reached until 1936, when the total was 65 per cent below the average for
the period 1925-1929. The ensuing recovery did not match that in Britain. But
despite the timely devaluation of the pound, and despite the Ottawa Agreementunder which Britain and her dominions obtained mutual trading advantages-the
significance of all Britain's export markets declined drastically during the 1930s. 77
It is clear that Great Britain was forced to base her recovery on her domestic
market. Viewed in isolation, the prospects were, of course, more favourable than
in the Netherlands by reason of the fact that the existing and potential markets
were larger in absolute terms.
In this connexion, particular importance must be attached to the spectacular
growth of house building in Britain, a factor which contributed greatly to the economic revival. In this context, it would be hard to find a greater contrast between
Britain and the Netherlands. This contrast had nothing to do with government
policy, which in both countries was aimed at reducing building costs and rents,
thereby stimulating the demand for homes. Indeed, building costs in Britain
in the 1930s were about 20 per cent lower than in the preceding decade. In the
Netherlands, they fell by as much as 40 per cent or thereabouts. 78 The extent
to which rents followed this development cannot be verified from the available
statistics, but it is logical to assume that they also displayed a downward trend.
But only in England did the demand for homes increase. The number of dwellings built annually rose from an average of only 241,000 in the period 1925-1929
to 297,300 in the years 1930-1938. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the average fell from 48,200 to 42,600. 79 The pattern of activity of the building industry
as a whole merely serves to emphasize the difference between the two countries
in terms of development (see Graph VI).80
The causes of the increase in house building in Britain cannot be stated simply.
It is difficult to believe that it stemmed purely from favourable factors of supplyin particular the decline in building costs-for in that case a revival in the Nether76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Data obtained from Mitchell's Abstracts, 284 and Zeventig jaren statistiek, 82.
J. M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire (London, 1972) 19.
Calculated from Mitchell's Abstracts, 240 and Zeventig jaren statistiek, 148.
Mitchell, Abstracts, 239; Zeventig jaren statistiek, 75.
Mitchell, Abstracts, 375; Zeventig jaren statistiek, 75.
153
P. W. KLEIN
lands would also have ensued. Evidently an interaction between factors of supply
and demand in this area occurred in England which was not repeated in the Netherlands.
GRAPH VI. BUILDING ACTIVITY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS,
1921-1938 (1929 = 100;
CONSTANT PRICES)
INDIE~0~-----------------------------------------------r180
~o
~o
NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED

140
140
120
100
120
100
eo
60
60
40
40
YEAR
1925
1930
1935
We must not ignore the possibility that this interaction was rooted in the fact
that, as has already been explained, the British economy had reached a higher
level of development than the Dutch. In this context, it is noteworthy that the
service sector, in particular, had achieved a higher level of development in Britain
than in the Netherlands. This can be deduced from the fact that, according to
the calculations made by Clark, productivity per man-hour in the service sector
was nearly fifty per cent higher than in the Netherlands. 81 According to his estimates, the Dutch service sector, in terms of development, lagged about thirty
years behind the British in the 1930s and also round about 1950. 82 It would appear
81. Clark, Economic Progress, 377.
82. Ibidem, ch. vii, tab. II. Concerning the building industry in Britain: cf. Aldcroft and Richardson, British Economy, 244 If.
154
that the latter was more modern and more efficient. It is also possible that the
capital investment per employee was higher than in the Netherlands.
There is also a probability that this had a bearing on the demand for housing.
The demand for housing on the part of employees in the modern service sector
is generally on a higher plane than that of, say, domestic staff or the demand
by workers in agriculture and industry. This is a consequence of their social status.
Because price levels fell more sharply than wage levels during the depression,
the real income of those who were not unemployed rose. In view of the relatively
high level of development of the service sector in Britain, it is possible that this
rise was manifested in demand for more and better housing, and that this in turn
produced a further rise in income. A similar, but in itself less pronounced, rise
in income in the Netherlands made little impact, possibly owing to the relatively
old-fashioned nature of the service sector.
A similar contrast between the two countries also appears to have occurred
in the industrial sector. According to the recent study by AldcroftandRichardson,
it was the modernization of British industry-on which a start had been made
in the 1920s-which was decisive for the economic success achieved in the 1930s. 83
The scope of this article does not permit us to deal at length with the contention of these authors. Suffice to say that they have not limited themselves to
factors of demand or supply, but have attempted to demonstrate that the interaction between the two types of factors brought about a restructuring and transformation of the production apparatus. In their view, a redistribution oflabour
and capital, as factors of production, was effected in the 1920s and continued,
in intensified form, in the 1930s under the pressure of the economic crisis. This
redistribution served to elevate the British economy to a higher level of development.
The transformation was at the expense of the basic industries upon which the
economy had long rested, and which were obsolete in two ways. Firstly, they
had long had difficulty in selling their products, because the world output of
coal, ironware and textiles had for several decades been rising more rapidly than
the demand. The British industrial production apparatus gave the impression of
being out of date inasmuch as it had largely or completely failed to adapt to the
change in market conditions since the nineteenth century and had simply gone
on producing what it had always produced.
Secondly, the organization and means of production in these respectably aged
branches of industry were hopelessly outdated. Similar industries established
later elsewhere were thus able, under normal circumstances, to produce at lower
unit cost. Yet the British, in the, hope of better times, continued to a certain
83.
Ibidem, particularly 190-288.
155
P. W. KLEIN
extent and for longer than was justified to throw good money after bad. It took
the crisis of 1930 to shatter their illusions. The ensuing purge of the traditional
industries produced an increase in productivity. More important still, it led to
the release of capital and labour.
The surplus of these factors of production was directed towards new industries
which engaged in the manufacture of consumer durables such as motor cars,
radio sets and domestic and electrical appliances. From the supply point of view,
these industries thus had no bottlenecks in their efforts to expand, the more so
since the technological basis for their growth had been laid in the 1920s.
Nor was the transformation hampered by problems in the area of demand.
Given the rising incomes of the working population, the new industries benefited
from the fact that the income elasticity of demand for their products was greater
than the income elasticity of demand for the 'old' products. For example, the
income elasticity of demand for the new consumer durables was nearly three
and a half times as great as that for textiles and clothing. 84
The newly established branches of industry employed better production techniques and organization, and had a higher ratio of capital goods per employee.
Therefore the transformation of the production structure of the industrial sector
resulted in an increase in industrial productivity. Under these circumstances,
the labour-saving effect of the transformation had an unfavourable effect, for
it stood in the way of full employment. But if the transformation had not taken
place, the economic situation in Great Britain would in all probability have been
far worse.
The situation in the Netherlands was in any case less favourable. As has already
been pointed out, the industrial development which took place in the 1920s was
evidently inadequate to create the employment opportunities needed to deal with
the necessary reduction in manpower in the agricultural sector. The industrial
expansion continued to be of a limited nature even during the favourable second
half of the 1920s. 85 Few new factories were established in that period, and in the
opinion of De Roos and Wieringa the explanation for this lies not only in the
low return on capital investment, but also in other factors including shortcomings
in the technological field. It was these shortcomings which hampered the mediumsize firms, in particular, in their efforts to expand. Only the large concerns, whose
number was limited, distinguished themselves by their large-scale demand on
the capital market. But in the climate of depression these giants proved too
narrow a basis upon which to achieve the necessary transformation of the entire
industrial production structure of the economy. Indeed, their development during
84.
85.
156
Maizels, Industrial Growth, 42.

De Roos and Wieringa, Halve eeuw rente, 148.
the depression does not make particularly good reading. Although it does not
tell the full story, the dividend pattern of these firms affords an impression of
their fortunes.
TABLE V. DIVIDENDS PAID ON ORDINARY SHARES OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS86
Koninklijke
Olie
Unilever
Philips
Aku
Hoogovens
'29
'30
'31
'32
'33
24
17
10
10
6
0
4
6
6
6
0
0
6
4
6
0
4
6
8
4
0
0
'34
7.5
4
11
11
0
0
0
0
'35
4
6
0
0
'36
'37
'38
16.5
5.5
18.5
0
0
17
7.5
17
7.5
11
11
2.5
0
2
3
'39
11
4
4.5
It is noticeable that the performance of Philips, an example par excellence

of the firms which comprised the new branches of industry which made such headway in Great Britain, was relatively stable, but that the company did not succeed
in making a positive internal contribution to the expansion of employment.
The company's work force in the Netherlands, which totalled more than 20,000
in 1929, fell to a low of 16,000 in 1933/1934, from which it rose slowly to 19,000
in the last pre-war financial year. The other major concerns also reduced their
labour forces, although the extent to which they did so is not clear in all cases.
It should, however, be noted that these companies provided only a fraction of
the total employment in the country. The image presented by Dutch industry
was principally determined by the medium-size companies, which had undergone
little expansion in the 1920s and which in terms of their products belonged to
the 'old' branches of industry rather than the 'new'.
Insofar as the Netherlands failed in the 1930s to achieve a far-reaching transformation which could have led to the recovery of economic growth, the cause
almost certainly lay in an incongruity in the framework of the industrial production apparatus. On the one hand, key industries such as those concerned with
coal, iron, textiles and food experienced exactly the same marketing difficulties
as did their British counterparts. In this context they were out of date, for their
products were no longer aimed at the most expansive areas of demand-and
86. The data in this Table were obtained from J. A. Dat, F. N. van Es and C. Hogersteeger,
'De Industrie tijdens de depressiejaren 1929-1939', produced in duplicated form for the purpose
of the 1970/71 Seminar on economic history at the Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool.
Cf. Joh. de Vries, Hoogovens-1Jmuiden 1918-1968 (IJmuiden, 1968); Ch. Wilson, The History of
Unilever (2 vols; London, 1954).
157
P. W. KLEIN
purchasing power-at home and abroad. The pattern of this demand had undergone significant changes. These stemmed from a number of developments, both
short and long term, namely variations in the level and distribution of income,
changes in the rate of growth and age group breakdown of the population,
and shifts in the political sphere. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the
Dutch had more success than the British in dealing with their marketing difficulties. Dutch industry was unmistakably more up to date in terms of organization
and equipment than its British counterpart. After all, industrialization did not
get under way in the Netherlands until after 1895, which was much later than in
Britain. 87 In the Netherlands, the young branches of industry-which had spearheaded the process of industrialization in all the economies of western societyhad had no opportunity to become outdated from a technical point of view.
Accordingly it would appear that Dutch industry was better equipped than the
British to withstand the depression on the world market. At least this could be
deduced from the fact that Dutch industrial exports, at constant prices, in 1937
showed a decline of only a little over one per cent, while Britain's were down
by 22 per cent. 88 This could indicate that Dutch industry, by reason of its ability
to produce at a comparatively low average cost per unit of output, was in a relatively favourable competitive position in the world market. In this sense, at least,
there is no question of Dutch backwardness.
On the basis of the foregoing, it would appear defensible to assume that the
depth and duration of the economic depression in the Netherlands were governed
less by the shortcomings of government policy than by the structure of the economy as this had developed prior to the 1930s. Given this structure, there are also
grounds for assuming that, broadly speaking, the government of the 1930s had
little or no real opportunity to pursue an alternative course. This does not,
however, imply that no serious errors were made in certain facets of the policy.
Whether we like it or not, the past is always current in the sense that it imposes
limits on what a policy can achieve. Social problems are not rooted in historical
vacuity. Therefore critical appraisal of the past should be among the principles
of any policy, at whatever level, which is aimed at the solution of social problems.
This is surely not the least important factor in the social justification for the pursuit of history.
87.
88.
158
J. A. de Jonge, De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914 (Amsterdam, 1968).

Maizeis, Industrial Growth, 481, 484.
Survey of Recent Historical Works on Belgium and the Netherlands

Published in Dutch
ALICE C. CARTER, editor
INTRODUCTION
This article is the work of members of the Dutch history seminar meeting under
the chairmanship of Professor K. W. Swart at the Institute of Historical Research
in the Senate House, University of London, and of several Belgian historians.
A list of contributors will be found at the end. The section on Belgian history
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was regretably not completed in time for
inclusion in this article but will be incorporated in the next volume's historiographical survey. An encouraging feature of this year's article is the number
of solid works in English on Dutch history which have been summarized but not
fully reviewed. There are still too few works in English, however, on Dutch history
in the late eighteenth century, and none on the later modern period.
This year there are a number of works which are general in scope. We have a
new official guide to Dutch archives,l which summarizes, to 1 July 1972, the contents of State collections and indicates roughly the extent of different categories.
Necessary details of such matters as addresses, opening hours and particulars
of personnel are included. This is the most up-to-date guide available (its predecessor being twenty years older), but it should be noted that it does not deal with
municipal archives or with those of private firms or families unless these have
found their way into the keeping of the State.
The newly published fifth volume of the Belgian biographical dictionary in
Dutch,2 confirms the value and importance of this undertaking. Its objective is
to furnish biographical notices of persons previously overlooked or inadequately
treated by French-language Belgian historians, such as protagonists of the
Flemish Movement or public figures of particular importance to Flanders or the
Low Countries in general. Among the 230 articles of the latest volume some are
devoted to prominent politicians such as Artevelde, Rockox or Verlooy; others
to distinguished lawyers like Wielant and De Damhoudere or to cultural figures
L. P. L. Pirenne e.a., ed., De Rijksarchieven in Nederland (2 vols; The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij,
1973, 754 pp., ISBN 90 120017).
2. Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek, V (Brussels: Paleis der Academii!n, 1972, VIII
1022
+XXpp.).
1.
159
ALICE C. CARTER
such as Plantin and Balthasar Moretus, Permeke, Spilliaert, Maeterlinck, Rodenbach and Streuvels. There are, however, also many articles on less well-known
personalities, including a number of socialist militants, hitherto neglected in biographical dictionaries, but of great interest to the historians because they were
representative figures in their time. From the cumulative index, to the five volumes
already published, there emerges an impressive picture of the number of biographies which have been brought up to date.
The abundant archives of the towns of Flanders and Brabant, which bear witness
to their precocious urban consciousness, have been skilfully exploited by C.
Verlinden and his colleagues to throw light on the movement of wages and prices
from the late middle ages to the First World War. The pattern of the earlier publications has been followed in the two most recent, with each contributor providing
a brief bilingual introduction to the data, usually arranged in tables or presented
diagrammatically.3 Though these publications have been criticized for inadequately
explaining the pitfalls and dissimilarities in the sources used, the enterprise has
enabled historians to pinpoint regional variations and to discover the secular
trends. The range of material is indicated by the contents of the most recent publications, the first of which lists the rents of houses at Bruges, 1500-1796, ground
rents around Antwerp and Ghent in the eighteenth century and the price of grains
and other foodstuffs for Ghent, Antwerp and Brussels in the nineteenth century.
In the late eighteenth century the Austrian government, aware of the importance
of having accurate data about prices, ordered the magistrates to make regular
returns to Brussels of the local prices for cereals, flax and yarn and these have
been edited in the second volume, along with the prices for foodstuffs at Bruges,
1796-1914. The disparate and haphazard information about prices and wages
on the estates of the great abbeys of Ghent in the later middle ages have been
collected in the hope that, with the recovery of similar random information elsewhere, it may yet be possible to construct the longterm movements of prices
and wages for this early period.
During the ancien regime the history of the United Provinces is, in many respects,
the local history of the constituent provinces. Consequently the student of Netherlands history is bound to take into account the lively tradition of amateur local
historiography. Often valuable articles appearing in regional periodicals are
3. C. Verlinden, E. Scholliers, F. de Wever, B. Goffin, F. Masson, C. Vandenbroecke and
W. Vanderpijpen, Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant,
III (XVle-XIXe eeuw). Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van Letteren en Wijsbegeerte,
Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, CLlII (Bruges: De Tempel, 1972, xxxviii + 468 pp.); C. Veriinden,
E. Scholliers, K. Deblonde-Cottenier, L. Van Damme-De Mey, J. Mertens, W. Prevenier, M.
Toch, C. Vandenbroecke and W. Vanderpijpen, Dokumenten ... prijzen en lonen ... , IV, (XIIleXIXe eeuw). Werken Faculteit van Letteren en Wijsbegeerte Gent, CLVI (ibidem, 1973, xxx +
420 pp.).
160
SURVEY OF RECENT mSTORICAL WORKS ON BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
difficult to trace and for this reason the publication of an exhaustive bibliography of historical writing on South Holland is most welcome. 4 There are other
new local histories covering extended periods which have been published recently.
One is a study based not only on historical but on geographical and geological
sources, and on those concerned with water, to be found in museums as well
as archives all over the Netherlands, in London, in Paris, in Brussels and Vienna. 5
This work deals with the Dutch war against the sea at the northern tip of the
Noorderkwartier and West Friesland (province of North Holland), from around
1150 until the middle of the eighteenth century. It is divided into two sections,
one terminating in 1600 and one covering the remaining 150 years. In the first,
changes in land-formation are shown to be due to natural hazards such as alterations in the direction of sea-currents, heavy winds or changing deposits of silt.
In the second period Dutch strategy and tactics in the unending war against
the sea are shown to have become more sophisticated. The history as a whole
of this struggle has yet to be written, and the effects of its expenses, always large,
and of its many independent commands, diversifying still further decision-making
centres, have yet to be evaluated. But although this work deals only with a small
area, the campaigns fought there were of the utmost importance, the study is
a model of its kind, and the extended bibliography of much more than local
interest.
In 1272 Gouda obtained its town rights from Count Florence V and this
milestone in the history of the town has been marked by the publication of a
collection of essays on various aspects of Gouda's past. 6 As with all such publications, where the authors direct themselves primarily to a local audience, the essays
are of uneven quality and varying importance. There are here several contributions
on the local economy, including chapters on the cloth-industry and rope-making;
but the most important is that devoted to the brewing industry, the author attempting to explain why this particular industry flourished in Gouda in the late fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries. Other authors discuss, among other things, the
craftsmen and artists who produce stained glass. Nearby Woerden received its
charter a century after Gouda, and N. Plomp has written a workman-like account
of the vicissitudes of this town, sited on the once-sensitive Holland-Utrecht border
4. A. E. Balen-Chavannes, Bibliogra/ie van de geschiedenis van Zuid-Holland (Delft: Culturele
Raad van Zuid-Holland, 1972, 310 pp.).
5. H. Schoorl, Zeshonderd jaar water en land: bijdrage tot de historische geo-en hydrografie
van de Kop van Noord-Holland in de periode 1150-1750. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk
Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, II (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1973, 534 pp.,
ISBN 90 01 78893 9).
6. Gouda zeven eeuwen stad. Hoo/dstukken uit de geschiedenis van Gouda (Gouda: Oudheidkundige Kring 'Die Gouda', 1972, 442 pp.).
161
ALICE C. CARTER
ending with the French occupation of 1672.7 Plomp's work brings out the tenacious
existence of a Lutheran congregation in this town.
The schutterijen (civic guards) once occupied a prominent place in Dutch life,
but now only survive in the predominantly Catholic southern and eastern Netherlands. Using local sources A. van Dalen has written the history of the guilds
and schutterijen of the former county of Bergh.s The interest of this avowedly
popular publication is enhanced by illustrations recording the ceremonials of
these fraternities. The same author9 has also produced the first of a two-volume
history of the little-known region of the Liemers, situated on the borders of Cleves
and Gelre. He begins by narrating the complicated political history down to the
treaty of Venlo (1543), when the Habsburgs finally defeated the duke of Gelre,
before turning to the peculiar social structure and institutions of this comparatively
remote region.
Dutch Church history has to be written from different denominational standpoints. Apart from the standard handbook of Reitsma and Van Veen, O. de Jong
is the first to attempt a consideration of the impact made by the Churches on the
history of the Netherlands. lO This is a brisk, businesslike survey, perhaps a trifle
staccato, which readers will find helpful on most aspects of ecclesiastical history
including Church architecture and liturgy, as well as the more obvious doctrinal
issues. Perhaps inevitably in a book of this scope the ecclesiastical controversies
bulk larger than the piety of ordinary christians.
K. Bertels wrote a doctoral thesis on historical methodologyll which has aroused
some controversy and would have been given more attention in this review
article had it been more directly concerned with the study of Dutch history.
The author criticizes Dutch historians for neglecting recent developments among
French and American scholars, and for sticking too closely to traditional methods.
As a treatment of specifically historical methodology this work seems more appropriate to periods in which source material is abundant than to earlier times when
it is meagre and random. He presents a well-informed account of more or less
recent trends in European (especially French-he is an ardent Annales man-)
and American historiography, distinguishing between historians who investigate
7. N. Plomp, Woerden 600 jaar stad (Woerden: Stichting Stichts-HoIIandse Bijdragen, 1972,
150 pp.).
8. A. G. van Dalen, Gilden en schutterijen in de Graafschap Bergh (Zutphen: Walburg Pers,
1971, 218 pp., ISBN 90 60 11 321 7).
9. A. G. van Dalen, Gelderse historie in de Liemers, I (The Hague; Nijgh en Van Ditmar,
1971, 358 pp.).
10. O. J. de Jong, Nederlandse Kerkgeschiedenis (Nijkerk: CaIIenbach, 1972, 442 pp., ISBN
90 266 0542 O).
11. K. Bertels, Geschiedenis tussen struktuur en evenement: een methodologies en wijsgerig
onderzoek (Amsterdam: WetenschappeIijke Uitgeverij, 1973, 381 pp., ISBN 90 214 2747 and
thesis Faculty of letters, Leiden).
162
SURVEY OF RECENT HISTORICAL WORKS ON BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
'structures' and those who study 'events'. The approach of the latter is considered
'unscientific', therefore outdated. The argument is not by any means always
convincing; but questions are raised about the methods and objectives of historical
research which deserve to be debated between historians and philosophers.
One number of Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis concerns itself with the history
of what could be translated as the mental climate of the past, or even the obsessions
which afilicted our forbears. It contains an interesting article by H. Soly on the
'betrayal of the bourgeoisie' theory placed against the attitude of sixteenthcentury Antwerp entrepreneurs. 12
Professor I. J. Brugmans' revised edition of his father's multi-volumed History
of AmsterdamI3 is now on the market. The new edition retains the basic features
of Brugmans' highly readable, primarily narrative and descriptive account of
the town's history. Like the original it does not carry the story beyond 1925.
It is less luxuriously printed than the first edition, published between 1930 and
1935, and some sections have been abbreviated, but on the other hand important
information has been added on the town's economic development, a subject on
which much new research has been done during the last forty years.
ANCIENT HISTORY AND MIDDLE AGES
The prosperity of the vicus Tienen in the period of the late Roman Empire
has been clearly shown by J. Mertens, who has thoroughly investigated a wealth
of archeological finds. 14 Also J. Mertens' and L. Van Impe's report of the excavation and the detailed analysis of the burial place (215 graves) of the late Roman
garrison of Oudenburg deserve attention. IS The conclusions of H. Van Bostraeten
who has studied the Merovingian necropolis at Ghent-Port Arthur and sees an
affinity with the settlement found at Sloten (East Flanders), appear to be disputable if only because at Ghent there is some evidence of cremation burials. 16
In preparation for a scholarly edition of the estate book (polyptycum) of the
Abbey of St. Bertin at Arras, drawn up between 844 and 859, Professor Ganshof
12. H. Soly, 'Het verraad der 16de-eeuwse burgerij: een mythe', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,
LXXXVI, ii, Menta/iteitsgeschiedenis (Groningen, 1973) 262-80, translated supra, p. 131-49.
13. H. Brugmans, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, 2d revised edition by I. J. Brugmans (6 vols;
Utrecht: Spectrum, 1972).
14. J.Mertens, 'Tienen, een gallo-romeinse nederzetting', Mededelingen van de Geschied- en
Oudheidkundige Kring van Leuven en omgeving, XII (Louvain, 1972) 113-62; also separately:
Acta Archeologica Lovaniensia, V (Louvain, 1972).
15. J. Mertens and L. Van Impe, Het laat-romeinse grafveld van Oudenburg. Archaeologia
Belgica CXXXV (2 vols; Brussels, 1971,247 pp.).
16. H. Ch. Van Bostraeten, De nederzetting Sioten en de Merovingische begraafplaats te GentPort Arthur. Historische Uitgaven in 8, XXV (Brussels: Pro Civitate, 1972, x + 141 pp.).
163
ALICE C. CARTER
has published a description of the various manuscripts of this important documenU 7 At the same time he has edited the part covering the demesne at Poperinge
(West Flanders) and made detailed comments upon it. The absence of the standard
distinction between free and tied mansi is arresting, as is the over-all uniformity
of the dimensions of the mansi and the simple and uniform character of the rents
and corvees for which they were responsible. Ganshof ascribes these deviations
from the usual Carolingian dual pattern to the traditionalism of the demesne
at Poperinge.
The difficult problem of Bruges' connection with the sea is approached afresh
by M. Ryckaert from an original standpoinU8 During the time when the city
was growing, from the ninth to the twelfth century, the location of the harbours
often needed to be changed because of variations in sea-level. The author has
been able to arrive at precise locations and dating of harbours by a variety of
means, including soil-core analysis.
Professor Prevenier has completed his publication of the records of the counts
of Flanders with a third volume, which contains the indexes and a detailed summary of the documents, both manuscript and in print, as well as a few additions
and corrections. 19 Examination of an inventory of the archives of the counts
of Flanders, compiled in 1336 by the chancellor at the time of the transfer of these
documents to the repository in the castle at Rupelmonde, has enabled M. Vandermaesen to establish that the practice of systematically arranged comital archives
originated some time in the period between 1242 and 1272. 20 He has also ascertained the existence of a chancery register as early as 1291 and published the various
documents concerning the making of the inventory.
17. F. L. Ganshof, Aantekeningen over het grondbezit van de Sint-Bertijnsabdij en in het bijzonder
over haar domein te Poperingen tijdens de IXe eeuw. Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie
voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgie, Klasse der Letteren, XXXIV,
i (Brussels, 1972, 35 pp.). Also of interest are some German contributions: S. J. De Laet, 'Das
altere und mittlere Neolithikum in Belgien von etwa 4200 bis etwa 2000 B. C.', in: M. Schwabedissen, ed., Die An/tinge des Neolithikums vom Orient bis Nordeuropa, V, Westliches Mitte/europa
(Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 1972) 185-230; W. Meier-Arent, 'Zur Frage der jiingeriinienbandkeramischen Gruppenbildung', ibidem, 85-152; H. von Petrokovits, 'Fortifications in the NorthWestern Roman Empire from the third to the fifth Centuries A. D.', Journal 0/ Roman Studies,
LXI (London, 1971) 178-218.
18. M. Ryckaert, 'De Brugse haven in de middeleeuwen', Handelingen van het genootschap
'Societe d'Emulation' Ie Brugge, CIX (Bruges, 1972) 1-23.
19. W. Prevenier, De oorkonden der graven van Vlaanderen (1191-aanvang 1206), III, Documentatie en indices. Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels: Paleis der Academien,
1917,309 pp.).
20. M. Vandermaesen, 'Het slot van Rupelmonde als centraal archiefdepot van het graafschap
Vlaanderen (midden 13de-14de eeuw)', Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis, CXXXVI (Brussels, 1970) 273-317.
164
The most important contribution to the 1971 congress of the Nederlands

Historisch Genootschap on the change from medieval to modern times, was that
by Professor Van Uytven, who approached the topic along socio-economic lines 21
and meticulously dissected the varied factors commonly regarded the decisive
turning-points between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: monetary changes,
price revolution, the sudden demographic explosion, wage-levels, the rise of
commercial capitalism etc. Under close scrutiny it can be seen that in none of
these matters are there fundamental differences between the fifteenth and the
sixteenth centuries; the decisive change occurred shortly after the middle of the
sixteenth century and was determined by both political and purely economic
circumstances.
There are still few studies of the level of nutrition in the Netherlands in the
middle ages. Therefore Mrs Roelandt's attempt deserves attention. With the aid
of the accounts of the two large abbeys at Ghent, she has been able to determine
some of the dietary habits of the abbot and monks at the end of the fourteenth
and during the fifteenth century.22 There is however no trace in the accounts
examined of entries concerning items such as vegetables and bread, which the
monks produced for themselves on their estates. Nevertheless these accounts do
make it possible to reach the important conclusion that the clergy fared well
so far as quality was concerned-their menu was rich and varied, and often fastidious. Fresh meat and dairy produce played an important part in the diet of
what should be emphasized was decidedly an elite.
On the basis of a systematic investigation of the Flemish customs accounts
bearing on trade relations between England and Flanders M. De Laet concludes
that Flemish commercial activity (mainly concentrated around Boston) remained
of importance until at least 1314 and thereafter became more subject to fluctuations.23 Such a revision of the current theory according to which Flemish trade
became 'passive' from about 1280, is supported by evidence drawn by O. Mus
from particular customs accounts to establish the nature of the goods and the
origine of the traders.24 Nevertheless, this evidence also shows that a definite
21. R. Van Uytven, 'Sociaal-economische evoluties in de Nederianden v66r de Revoluties
(veertiende-zestiende eeuw)', Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVII
(1972) 60-93. Translated in Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974) 18-53,
'What is new in the sixteenth-century Netherlands'.
22. D. Roelandt, 'De voedingsgewoonten in de Gentse Sint-Pieters en Sint-Baafsabdij, tijdens
de late middeleeuwen', Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te
Gent, XXVI (Ghent, 1972) 41-68.
23. M. De Laet, 'De Vlaamse aktieve handel op Engeland in de eerste helft van de l4e eeuw
aan de hand van de customs accounts', Actes du Col/oque: Histoire economique de la Belgique.
Traitement des sources et etat des questions (Brussels, 1973) 223-31.
24. O. Mus, 'Het aandeel van de Ieperiingen in de Engelse wolexport 1280-1330', ibidem,
233-59.
165
ALICE C. CARTER
decline took place after 1303, especially in the Ypres trade. The author cogently
argues that the interruptions to trade were caused by political difficulties on
both local and international levels. In spite of these adverse developments the
people ofYpres were able to maintain a presence in England, and indeed increased
their presence in London. Merchants from Bruges, who developed a more diversified trade, also made advances.
Using magistrates' deeds, Dr Asaert has evaluated Antwerp's trade in dyestuffs during the fifteenth century.25 From 1480, Toulouse became exclusively
the supplier of woad to the Antwerp textile industry which had, up to 1480,
obtained this substance mainly from the Rhineland, and to a lesser degree from
northern France and Hesbay. The extent of the Antwerp market for the re-sale
of this product to the smaller textile centres of Brabant should not be underestimated. Fewer magistrates' deeds refer to madder which, perhaps because it was
obtained from areas closer at hand, did not invariably necessitate the drawing
up of such documents. Madder was not bought by Antwerp dyers, but exported to
England.
The extremely important study made by Dr Asaert of fifteenth-century Antwerp
shipping, is based on evidence from the town's official records and English customs
accounts. 26 The author greatly adds to our knowledge of the subject by establishing
that as early as the end of the fifteenth century Antwerp owned a considerable
fleet of sea-going vessels and river-craft which was one of the largest in Europe.
In the last third of that century the town had more than 400 active shipmasters.
The most prominent of those who chartered ships were engaged in trade between
Cologne and England. Their role in linking central Europe and England was
already evident. The author also includes important new material on the techniques
of shipping and shipbuilding and on the social status of shipmasters.
The team which earlier produced a number of studies on the medieval social
structure of Ghent, Bruges and Courtrai has published a third volume. 27 In
the form of detailed lists of tax-payers and property-owners in the three Flemish
towns, it presents many of the data on which the previously published studies
were based. It also includes a new study of the social structure of Ghent at the
end of the fourteenth century based on analyses of inventories of estates, as well
25. G. Asaert, 'Randel in kleurstoffen op de Antwerpse markt tijdens de XVe eeuw', ibidem,
261-71, and, in an extended version: Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der Nederlanden,
LXXXVIII, 377-402.
26. G. Asaert, De Antwerpse scheepvaart in de XVe eeuw (1394-1480). Bijdrage tot de ekonomische geschiedenis van de stad Antwerpen. Verhandelingen Koninklijke Academie, Klasse dec
Letteren, LXXII (Brussels, 1973, xli + 505 pp.).
27. W. Blockmans, C. Pauwelyn and L. Wynant, Studien betreffende de sociale strukturen te
Brugge, Kortrijk en Gent in de 14e en 15e eeuw, III, Tabel/en en register van persoonsnamen.
Standen en Landen, LXIII (Reule: Administratieve Uitgeverij, 1973, 289 pp.).
166
as a critical over-all evaluation of the possibilities, and limitations, of using quantitative methods for late medieval social history.
The renewed interest in the Grand Council (Grand Conseil) of Mechlin as
attested by the recent publication of two stout volumes summarizing the sentences
of this institution, is also evident from a soundly based study of the origin of
the highest Court of Justice in the Burgundian Netherlands. 28 From around
1435 onwards, after Namur, Holland, Zeeland and Hainaut had been added to
the Burgundian territories, the increasing load of judicial business conduced to
a growing autonomy within the curia ducis of a specialized Grand Council composed of trained lawyers. In 1473, the setting up of this body at Mechlin as a Frenchstyle parlement with its own president, clerk, and a great number of magistrates
was a logical consequence of these developments. The author also deals with
the powers of the highest Courts of Justice in the provinces and their procedures.
The publication of excerpts from records which throw light on the working
of representative bodies in Flanders is being continued along systematic lines.
w. P. Blockmans is now dealing with the documentation of the time immediately
following the reign of Charles the Bold. 29 That period was one of serious political
troubles and this hitherto almost unknown material helps us to arrive at a new
interpretation of this crucial phase. Completely new is the conclusion that during
two periods at the time of the minority of Philip the Fair, totalling over three
years, the representatives of the three large cities dominated the Regent's Council.
This far-reaching influence of representative bodies can moreover be observed
in all matters regarding the county's policy. The author records as many as 419
meetings during this fifteen-year period, including those of the States General.
The acts of the States General which pertain to the part played by Flanders
during this period are published here for the first time.
In the field of Dutch medieval history production remains at a depressingly
low ebb. Monographs are scarce and so are articles of more than local importance. There are however a number of interesting source editions. Thanks to
P. C. Boeren we now possess an up-to-date edition of the Vita S. Servatii,30
Jocundus' biography of the first bishop of Maastricht (bishopric of TongerenMaastricht-Liege), who died in 384. In his long introduction Dr. Boerenexplains
that Jocundus was a man who had come all the way from Aquitania to write,
before 1076, this vita, which has come down to us in a twelfth-century version.
28. J. Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad van de hertogen van Boergondii! en het Parlement van Mechelen. Verhandelingen Koninklijke Academie Belgiti, LXXIII (Brussels, 1973, xxxii + 576 pp.).
29 W. P. Blockmans, Handelingen van de Leden en van de Staten van Vlaanderen. Regeringen
van Maria van Bourgondii! en Filips de Schone (1477-1506), I, (1477-1492). Koninklijke Commissie
voor Geschiedenis (2 vols; Brussels, 1973-4, xxxi + 606 pp.).
30. P. C. Boeren, Jocundus, biographe de Saint Servais (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972, 233 pp.).
167
ALICE C. CARTER
Dr H. Bruch has published his eagerly expected, scholarly edition of the fourteenthcentury Chronographia written by Johannes de Beke. 31 The author of this famous
chronicle made extensive use of the library of Egmond Abbey for his combined
history of the county of Holland and its rival, the bishopric of Utrecht. The fact
that he reached beyond the limits of narrow regional history constituted a new
element in the historiography of the Northern Netherlands and his work became
enormously influential. Dr Bruch, in his introduction, discusses, inter alia, the
identity of Johannes de Beke.
Source material on medieval town finance is relatively scarce in the Northern
Netherlands, although there are good collections of accounts in some IJssel
towns. Mrs De Meyer has recently published the third volume of her series of
late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century accounts of the town of Deventer. 32 Zwolle,
too, is well provided for in this respect: it possesses not only a number of fifteenthcentury annual accounts but also a near-complete series of monthly accounts
from 1399 onwards, which allows us to follow the financial activities of the town
government in detail. A modestly edited series, started by the Town Archive of
Zwolle, gives an impression of their importance for local history.33
F. F. X. Cerutti, whose sudden death in 1970 was a great loss to Dutch history
of law, left a nearly finished manuscript of his edition ofsource material concerning
the town and seigneury of Breda from 1405 to 1477.34 Like the preceding volume,
published by Cerutti in 1956, this one contains documents of predominantly
juridical interest: feudal law, questions of competence between local courts,
rights of property, the administration of justice are all well represented.
As professor at Nijmegen University the same author lectured on such divers
subjects as the introduction of the canonical will (testamentum) in the Netherlands,
the history of property transmission since the Merovingians, and nineteenthcentury constitutional issues. The summaries of these lectures, together with the
anthology of source material with which Cerutti used to provide his students,
have now been published in a modest volume that will be useful to historians
working in these fields. 35 In this connection we may also mention E. M. Meijers'
31. H. Bruch, ed., Chronographia Johannis de Beke. Rijks Geschiedkundige publicatien, Grote
Serie CXLIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973, Ix + 384 pp., ISBN 90 247 1562 8).
32. G. M. de Meyer, ed., De Stadsrekeningen van Deventer, III, 1411-1415 (Groningen: Tjeenk
Willink, 1974, 299 pp., ISBN 9001 85715 9).
33. S. EIte t and F. C. Berkenvelder, ed., Maandrekening van Zwolle 1399 (Zwolle: Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst, 1970, 140 pp.); idem, Maandrekening van Zwolle 1401 (ibidem, 1973, 154 pp.).
34. F. F. X. Cerutti, ed., Middeleeuwse rechtsbronnen van stad en heerlijkheid Breda, II, Rechtsbronnen 1405 tot 1477. Oudvaderlandsche Rechtsbronnen, 3d series XVII (Utrecht: Kemink,
1972, 749 pp.).
35. F. F. X. Cerutti, Hoo/dstukken uit de Nederlandse Rechtsgeschiedenis, edited by G. C. J. J.
van den Bergh (Nijmegen: Gerardt Noodt Instituut voor Rechtsgeschiedenis der Katholieke
Universiteit Nijmegen, 1972, 395 pp.).
168
Etudes d' Histoire du Droit 36 edited by R. Feenstra. Although twenty years have
gone by since the death of the eminent Leiden jurist, his work has not lost its
freshness and interest. The present volume consists of articles on the Netherlands
and Germany, among which a study on the concept of territorial waters in Flanders during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is of special interest.
Archeologists have studied the history of the St Walburg Church at Groningen,
dating from the eleventh century though pulled down in the seventeenth century.
In 1961 the late professor Van Giffen (d. 1973) published the first results after
digging up the remains of a remarkably large and strongly built central church,
apparently inspired by the Palatine Chapel at Aix-la-Chapelle. Continued research
under Van Giffen and his collaborator H. Praamstra revealed new aspects and
now a final version of earlier publications on the subject has been published,s7
which, although mainly of interest to archeologists, provides historians with useful
information about the period when the town of Groningen was still in its beginnings.
The Abbey of Egmond was considerably older than St Walburg's. It dates
back to around 950, but was deserted and destroyed during the revolt. It was rebuilt
in the 1930s when once more a Benedictine community settled on the site of the
old premises. One of the monks, Dom J. Hof, though not a professional historian,
undertook the task of writing the history of the old abbey.3s The erudite author
based his study on the well-preserved abbey archives and an extensive literature.
He describes the events in detail with due stress on the narrow ties between the
abbey and the dynasty of the counts of Holland, and pays full attention to the
successive reform movements that touched the abbey. The duties and spiritual
occupations of the monks, the seignorial rights and feudal obligations of the
abbot are all clearly shown. In an interesting chapter on the abbey's properties
and income the author has successfully used fourteenth- and fifteenth-century
abbey accounts. He calculates that the area of the Egmond properties totalled
about 2700 ha. (c. 6672 acres), which makes the abbey the third largest in the
Northern Netherlands, after Aduard (5600 ha.) and Rolduc (4000 ha.).
D. P. Oosterbaan, the town archivist at Delft, who died in 1967, left a detailed
study of the Old Church at Delft during the middle ages. 39 In this he committed
36. E. M. Meijers, Etudes d'Histoire du droit, II, Histoire du droit des Pays-Bas, de la Belgique
et de I'Allemagne, edited by R. Feenstra. Leidse Juridische Reeks, VI (Leiden: Universitaire
Pers, 1973, 319 pp., ISBN 90 6021 1545).
37. A. E. van Giffen and H. Praamstra, De Groninger St. Walburg en haar ondergrond. VerhandeIingen der KoninkIijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afdeIing Letterkunde,
Nieuwe Reeks LXXVIII (1 vol. text, 1 vol. maps and illustrations; Amsterdam-London: Noordhollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1973, 126 pp., text, ISBN 72048241 0).
38. J. Hof, De Abdij van Egmond van de aanvang tot 1573. Hollandse studien, V (The Hague:
Historische Vereniging voor Zuid-Holland Vigilate Deo Confidentes, 1973, 527 pp.).
39. D. P. Oosterbaan, De Oude Kerk te Delft gedurende de middeleeuwen, edited by G. van
Schravendijk-Berlage (The Hague: Voorhoeve, 1973, 407 pp., ISBN 90 297 0337 7).
169
ALICE C. CARTER
to writing his intimate knowledge of the considerable amount of source material

on the subject. The book is brimming with information on the church, its building
(probably started in the eleventh century), the clergy attached to it, its finances,
the many ceremonies that took place inside and around it, etc. The method is
purely descriptive-the author did not feel tempted to arrange his material around
some central theme or problem-but this old-fashioned type of local history will
no doubt prove useful to more ambitious scholars. Mrs Van Schravendijk has
very ably cut down the original, far too voluminous, version of the book to more
reasonable proportions.
Those who have difficulty in finding their way through the complicated history
of what to-day constitutes the Dutch and Belgium provinces of Limburg, will
find a practical guide in Dr Albert's concise History of both Limburgs, volume I,
which deals with the period up to 1632. 40
EARLY MODERN PERIOD
The importance of the Antwerp market for the sale of copper ore mined in central Europe by the Fuggers compelled this banking firm to take a close interest
in relations between the Baltic and the Netherlands from the early sixteenth
century: above all the Fuggers were concerned to ensure the unimpeded passage
of this commodity through the politically sensitive and militarily vulnerable Sound. After finally breaking with the Hanse in 1511, the Fuggers
chose Amsterdam as their centre of operations in northern Europe, partly
because of its hostility to the Hanse, but also because it was situated
at the entry to the relatively safer and cheaper binnenvaart through Holland.
Pompejus Occo was chosen to watch over Fugger interests there from 1511 till
his death in 1537. Hitherto Occo has been considered only as a patron of humanist
scholarship and the factor of the unfortunate Danish king Christian II. Dr Niibel
has now succeeded in showing the importance of the career of this respected,
though secretive, East Frisian in the service of the Fuggers and, as a result, has
made a significant contribution to the diplomatic history of the Baltic and to the
early commercial development of Amsterdam. 41 He is however less convincing
when dealing with Occo as a maecenas, largely because he has not made use of
Dr Kolker's study of Alardus van Amsterdam and Cornelius Crocus,42 both of
whom were patronized by the Fugger factor.
40. W. J. Alberts, Geschiedenis van de beide Limburgen, I, tot 1632. Maaslandse monografieen,
XV CAssen: Van Gorcum, 1972, xxvi + 210 pp.).
41. O. Niibel, Pompejus Occo, 1483 bis 1537. Fuggerfaktor in Amsterdam (Tiibingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1972,313 pp., ISBN 3 168339423). For his earlier contribution on the Fuggers and the
Netherlands see Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VI, 181.
42. A. J. Kolker, Alardus Aemstelredamus en Cornelius Crocus. Twee Amsterdamse priesterhumanisten (Nijmegen, 1963).
170
Intellectual history in the late middle ages and the early modern period formed
the theme of one issue of the Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis. 43 This included articles
analysing the matriculation of students from Gelre attending the university of
Cologne from 1389-1500 and another listing the academic institutions connected
with Erasmus. 44 On the vexed question of the emergence of the early modern
period professor Weiler (Nijmegen University) argues that, in the realms of grammar and theology, the change from scholasticism to humanism was in both cases
characterized by the disintegration of the synthesis with logic, which had been
elaborated in the high middle ages. 45
By editing the chronicle kept by Christiaan Munters from 1529 to 1548 Dr
Grauwels has enabled historians to see the world as observed by an ordinary
chaplain in the bishopric of Liege. 46 Besides the random information on a range of
topics which include the weather, prices, the casting and hanging of a bell and
the visits of notables to Kuringen, near Hasselt, his notes contain interesting
material on the anticlerical temper of the mercenaries fighting for Charles V in
1542-3, witchcraft and, of course, heresy. The miraculous accounts he sets down
about the untimely and unhappy ends of those who remained obstinate heretics
shed light on popular Catholic propaganda.
The reformation in Den Briel has been thoroughly re-examined on the basis
of source material taken from the municipal records as well as the central records
in The Hague and Brussels. 47 Though few heretics there found martyrdom,
thanks to the characteristic leniency of the local courts, the new ideas had made
considerable progress by the late 1550s. But it was only in 1566 that the Protestants
were openly able to challenge the established Church, when the pusillanimity
of the town government and the lethargy of the local Catholic clergy permitted
them to seize the initiative. Though the core of the dissidents was made up of
avowed reformed Protestants, there coalesced around it a hotchpotch of protestantizing Catholics, imagebreakers and political rebels. This pilot study suggests
that a close examination of local quarrels, often trivial in themselves, can go far to
explain the conduct of individual towns in 1566 and the formation of parties at
43. Tijdschri/t voor Geschiedenis, LXXXV, iii Universiteit en Wetenschap (Groningen, 1972)
299-455.
44. M. F. F. Scheelen-Schutgens, 'Gelderse studenten aan de Keulse universiteit van 1389 tot
1500', Tijdschri/t voor Geschiedenis, LXXXV, 350-73; M. A. Nauwelaerts, 'Erasmus en de universiteiten van zijn tijd', ibidem, 374-89.
45. A. G. Weiler, 'Een keerpunt uit de universitaire wegenstrijd: de veronderstelIingen van de
'moderne', terministische logica', ibidem, 301-24. Idem, 'Tussen middeleeuwen en nieuwe tijd.
Veranderingen in de Nederlanden: van scholastiek naar humanisme', Bijdragen en Mededelingen
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVII (1972) 1-25.
46. J. GrauweIs, Dagboek van gebeurtenissen opgetekend door Christiaan Munters 1529-1545
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972, 213 pp., ISBN 90 232 0949 4).
47. W. Troost and J. J. WoItjer, 'Brielle in hervormingstijd', Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVII, 307-53.
171
ALICE C. CARTER
the outset of the revolt. The politico-religious disturbances of 1566-7 obliged

the central government to conduct extensive investigations with a view to punishing the ringleaders. Though only a small fraction of the records generated by the
Council of Troubles has survived, it allows the student not only to discover the
course of events in many parts of the Low Countries, but also to obtain an impression of the social and intellectual standing of those subsequently summoned by
the Council. The detailed inventories oflanded property and moveables persuaded
the late Dr. H. A. Enno van Gelder to edit the most significant in an endeavour
to give historians a clearer idea of the economic and intellectual background of
the gentry, farmers and merchants involved in those disturbances: to these he
has added inventories composed at other times so as to broaden his canvas. 48
Though scholars will still have to consult the original documents, since the editor,
understandably, was unable to publish all the available inventories, they will
find here an almost inexhaustible quarry on the estates of the nobility, annuities,
domestic art and book ownership. The utility of this publication would be greatly
enhanced by the provision of an index which we may hope will accompany the
concluding volume dealing with the inventories of the manufacturing and professional classes.
The quatercentenary of the start of the revolt continues to leave its mark on
the historiography. The Evangelische Reformierte Kirche of north-west Germany
has celebrated the four hundredth anniversary of the synod of Emden with an
extravagant publication containing surprisingly little of interest to the Church
historian, though the scholarly German translation of the acts of the synod is
useful. Professor Goeters' contribution on the background and significance
of the synod is however a notable exception, for he has been able to demonstrate
the influence exerted by the Palatinate Church Order in the sphere of ecclesiastical
polity.49
The history of the early revolt in Holland continues to attract attention. B.
Ringeling has achieved more chronological precision than formerly in his brief
account of the transfer from Catholicism to Protestantism in the southern Holland
village of Naaldwijk in the summer of 1572. 50 The Beggar successes that year were
hardly calculated to inspire confidence in the hearts of stalwart Catholics like
48. H. A. B. van Gelder, ed., Gegevens betreffende roerend en onroerend bezit in de Nederlanden
in de 16e eeuw, I, Adel, boeren, handel en verkeer. Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote
Serie CXL (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972,636 pp. ISBN 90 2471511 3). Since this review was written,
the concluding second volume with index has been published: II, 1ndustrie, vrije beroepen.
Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote Serie CXLI (ibidem, 1973, ISBN 90 247 15695).
49. J. F. G. Goeters, 'Die Bmder Synode von 1571', in: B. Lomberg, ed., 1571 Emder Synode
1971. Beitriige zur Geschichte und zum 400 jiihrigen Jubileum (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener
Verlag, 1973, 373 pp., ISBN 3 7887 0369 5) 183-202.
50. B. Ringeling, 'De overgang van de Sint Adrianuskerk te Naaldwijk naar de nieuwe religie
in 1572', Holland, regionaal-historisch tijdschrift, V (Haarlem, 1973) 33-41.
172
SURVEY OF RECENT mSTORlCAL WORKS ON BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
Willem Jansz. Verwer, a prominent citizen of Haarlem, yet his recently edited
chronicle gives a remarkably detached view of the course of events in that city from
1572-1581.51 But for this very reason his memoriaelbouck cannot afford the insights
furnished by the moving diary kept by his coreligionist brother Wouter Jacobsz.
as an exile in neighbouring Amsterdam. 52 Nevertheless his account reminds us
yet again that for the bulk of the population, both townsfolk and peasants, irrespective of their loyalties, the enemy par excellence was the military. Particularly
interesting too is his account of the psychological warfare used by both sides during
the siege, while his interminable stories of miraculous escapes from cannonballs
remind us of the extent to which even a sober chronicler like Verwer saw everywhere the hand of God. Local worthies and places have been painstakingly identified, though the decision to omit the passage concerning the siege of Alkmaar
seems strange, the more so since this account was hitherto unknown.
For more than a century now the withdrawal of the government forces from
Alkmaar beginning late in September 1573 has been celebrated, so it was fitting that
the quadricentennial should be marked by the publication of a collection of essays.
Though it is hard to find anything new about a subject on which so much has
been written, the straightforward account of the siege, firmly based on the printed
source material, by C. M. Schulten is useful, as also is the reconstruction by
T. P. H. Wortel, the former town archivist, of the condition and type of fortifications hastily put up between the summer of 1572 and the arrival of the besieging
army a year later. 53
The religious persecution, the long drawn out conflict and the consequent
decline of the cities of Flanders and Brabant helped to create a diaspora from the
Netherlands, comparable in many ways to the better known Huguenot exodus
a century later. Many spent long years in exile and some settled permanently
abroad. H. Schilling has written a stimulating study of the exiles' impact on the
economic and social life of selected centres of refuge in Germany and England: 54
in so doing, he has made a contribution to the debate concerning the relationship
of Protestantism to commercial capitalism. The influence of the immigrants
depended on the political, social, economic and religious conditions prevailing
51. Willem Janszoon Verwer, Memoriaelbouck. Dagboek van gebeurtenissen te Haarlem van
1576-1581, edited by J. J. Temminck (Haarlem: Schuyt, 1973, 238 pp., ISBN 90 6097 035 7).
52. I. H. van Eeghen, Dagboek van Wouter Jacobsz (Gualtherius Jacobi Masius) prior van Stein,
Amsterdam 1572-1578 en Mont/oort 1578-1579. Werken Historisch Genootschap, 4th series
V-VI (Groningen, 1959-60).

53. C. M. Schulten, 'Het beleg van Alkmaar', in: I. Schtifl'er, T. P. H. Wortel, e.a., Alkmaar
Ontzet, 1573-1973. Alkmaarse Studilln, II (Alkmaar: Ter Burg, 1973, 226 pp.) 61-82; T. P. H.
Wortel, 'De vesting Alkmaar anno 1573', ibidem, 41-60.
54. H. Schilling, Niederliindische Exulanten im 16. Jahrhundert. Ihre Stellung im SozialgeJiige
und im religiosen Leben deutscher und englischer Stiidte. Schriften des Vereins fUr Reformationsgeschichte, CLXXXVII, Jahrgang 78 und 79 (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn,
1972, 200 pp., ISBN 3 579 04323 4).
173
ALICE C. CARTER
in the host communities: whereas the magistrates and merchants welcomed the
well-to-do refugees with their capital, commercial contacts and skills, the native
craft guilds feared the flood of impoverished workers, especially as many came
from parts of the Netherlands where the guild tradition was weak. Where the predominantly reformed refugees worshipped with the native town congregations
e.g. Emden and Wesel, they left their confessional stamp, but where they were
segregated, by force of circumstances or from choice, their religious influence
was slight, e.g. London and Hamburg. The most momentous shift of population
occurred following the submission of the southern provinces to Parma in the 1580s,
when many uprooted themselves to settle in the north, especially in Holland and
Zeeland. Though there is disagreement as to the extent to which economic or
religious motives prompted such an exodus, there can be no doubt that it greatly
contributed to the efflorescence of the young Dutch republic in commerce and
the arts.
The dependence of the schools of Holland and Zeeland on teachers from the
south is brought home by J. G. C. A. Briels. 55 Before 1572 schooling in Brabant
and Flanders was plainly superior to that in Holland, but the rapid improvement
in the north thereafter was in large measure the consequence of the migration of
more than 400 teachers: two-thirds of all those who taught at Leiden (including
the university56) between 1570 and 1630 started life in the southern provinces. As
the bulk of these schoolteachers, though by no means all the university professors,
were convinced reformed protestants, this influx greatly assisted the eventual
triumph of Protestantism in the north, at the same time as it gave a fillip to the
teaching of French in Dutch schools. Making extensive use of municipal records,
the author has compiled biographical notices of all the southern Netherlanders
known to have taught in the north, in whatever capacity.
While some of the exiles who remained abroad became more or less assimilated,
even losing their fluency in their mother tongue, others preserved their links
with the Low Countries. Professor Brummel shows Hugo Blotius as an exile
who adapted to life in a foreign country. After leaving the Netherlands shortly
before the troubles of 1566, Blotius led the life of a dilettante academic before
being appointed as the first imperial librarian in Vienna in 1575, a post which
he occupied until his death in 1608. Of greater interest are the same author's
two essays on Emanuel van Meteren. In the first he unravels the complicated print55. J. G. C. A. Briels, 'Zuidnederlandse onderwijskrachten in Noord-Nederland 1570-1630:
een bijdrage tot de kennis van het schoolwezen in de Republiek', Archie! voor de Geschiedenis
van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland, XIV (Amsterdam, 1972) 89-169; 277-98; XV (1973) 103-49.
56. H. J. Witkam has produced a further volume in his useful source publication on the early
history of Leiden University: De dagelijkse zaken van de Leidse universiteit, VI (in 2 parts) (Leiden:
privately printed, 1973, 218 and 60 pp.).
174
ing history of the first Dutch editions of Van Meteren's account of the revolt
As a result of his detective work, Brummel is able to reconstruct the probable
chronology of the several editions which appeared in 1599. This is followed by
an assessment of Van Meteren's methodology and his achievement, although,
as the author shows, he never aspired to be a historian. In his quest for material
Van Meteren cast his net wide, drawing on the knowledge of his numerous correspondents in the United Provinces and England and using even Catholic and
Spanish authors in his bid for objectivity. After discussing the sequence of the
editions down to the definitive version of 1614, Brummel concludes by refuting
the charge, levelled by Robert Fruin, that the 1614 edition amounted to a 'deliberate
falsification on the part of the States' (of Holland): in Brummel's opinion there
are no grounds for believing that the text was tampered with in a way Van
Meteren would have found objectionable. 57
The United Provinces was exceptional in seventeenth-century Europe for its
freedom from witchcraze which was so prevalent elsewhere. In a review of current
historical writing on witchcraft, I. SchOffer has suggested that the enlightened
approach to the problem owed something to the prosperity and security of the
regent class in Holland. 58
J. den Tex concludes his massive study of Oldenbarnevelt with a volume containing corrections to the text of his masterly though discursive biography of
that many-sided statesmen. 59 In addition he provides numerous genealogical
tables and appropriate maps, the whole being rounded off with an exhaustive
index, as a key to this magnum opus.
R. B. Evenhuis has brought his detailed study of the Reformed Church in
Amsterdam during the seventeenth century to a close with a third volume covering
the second half of the century.60 His subtitle, 'Late flowering and decline', indicates
to some extent his approach to this period: he regards the Reformed Church
as a body increasingly marked by a rigid orthodoxy which, in part at least, stifled
its spiritual life. Indeed, it is perhaps significant that a considerable part of the
book is concerned with individuals and groups outside the Reformed ChurchJews, Catholics and Mennonites; and also the numerous prophets of a further
reformation so typical of the religious life of the Dutch Republic in these years.
Even when attention is directed more specifically at the Reformed Church the
57. L. Brummel, Twee bal/ingen 's lands tijdens onze opstand tegen Spanje (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1972, 190 pp., ISBN 90 247 1461 3). On Blotius, 180: on Van Meteren, 81185.
58. I. Schtiffer, 'Heksengeloof en heksenvervolging, Ben historiografisch overzicht', Tijdschrift
voor Geschiedenis, LXXXVI, 12535.
59. J. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, V, Stambomen, kaarten en register (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink,
1972, 209 pp., ISBN 90 01 85968 2). See also below, p. 198.
60. R. B. Evenhuis, Ook dat was Amsterdam, III, De kerk der hervorming in de tweede helft
van de zeventiende eeuw: nabloei en inzinking (Baam: Ten Have, 1971, 382 pp.).
175
ALICE C. CARTER
stress is on the opposition between the narrowly orthodox and those who were
seen as contravening the teachings of the Church as laid down at the synod of
Dordt. The conflict between the followers of Voetius and those of Cocceius is
discussed, and a separate chapter is devoted to the case of Balthasar Bekker,
with his attack on the belief in witches and the active intervention of the devil
in everyday life and the fury of denunciation which this caused. It is perhaps a
little disappointing that the author does not really make it clear in what ways
Bekker was considered to have diverged from orthodox teaching in this matter,
nor indeed why his arguments stirred up such fervent opposition.
The history of Dutch whaling in the early modern period is the subject of a
book which covers more ground than the title would suggest. 61 This work is
the first of a projected two volumes, and a full half of the text is devoted to a
consideration of the general history of Dutch whaling in an international context,
its organization, and the techniques involved in the hunting and processing of
whales in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only in the second half of
the book does the author concentrate on the period 1612-1642, when Dutch whaling was chiefly characterized by the activities of the Noordsche Compagnie.
C. de Jong points out that the monopoly enjoyed by this company was restricted
largely to the so-called 'bay-fishery' off the coasts of Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen
Island, and broke down in part at least through the development of whaling
in the open sea, which fell outside the octrooi granted by the States General.
This is a welcome synthesis of a great deal of scattered and often inaccessible
material, and a second volume is promised which will take the story on to the end
of whaling in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century.
The Linschoten Vereeniging continues its series of source publications on early
Dutch colonial history with a volume on the expedition ofPieter Willemsz Verhoeff
to the East Indies in 1607-12.62 The editor provides a lengthy introduction (pp. 1181) discussing the leadership and organization of the fleet, its aims and achievements, and giving a detailed narrative. The last is rendered more useful, but less
readable, by a detailed consideration of the sources. Then follows the official
Instruction (182-90) for the fleet, and the Journal of the expedition (191-298).
The second volume consists of other documents, letters and journals, relating to
this important phase in the establishment of the Dutch in the East Indies, which
61. C. de Jong, Geschiedenis van de oude Nederlandse walvisvaart, I, Grondslagen, ontstaan
en opkomst 1612-1642 (Pretoria: Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, 1972, 430 pp. With summary in
English. Thesis Tilburg. Commercial edition available at Gijsbers and Van Loon, Arnhem).
62. M. E. van OpstalI, ed., De reis van de vloot van Pieter Willemsz Verhoeff naar Azie 16071612, met inleiding, journaal en bijlagen. Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging.
LXXIII (2 vols; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972, 441 pp., ISBN 90 247 1286 6 and thesis Faculty of
Letters, Utrecht, 1972).
176
brought a noticeable strengthening of their position in the Spice Islands despite

heavy losses and a defeat in the Philippines.
The gloomy view of the economy of the southern Netherlands in the seventeenth
century has attracted considerable criticism in recent years, and it is further
challenged by E. Stols in a work dealing with the activities of merchants from the
'obedient' provinces in the commerce with Spain, Portugal, and their colonies
in the first half of the century.63 Concentrating on individual merchants, or
rather merchant families, he is able to show tha t many of these were able to enjoy
an active and profitable role in the trading system of the 'Iberian world', and notably that the restrictions placed by the Spanish authorities on their relations with the
Iberian colonies were, to a large extent at least, ineffectual. Moreover, he stresses
the importance of the Iberian market for a wide variety of goods produced in
the southern Netherlands-particularly textiles, but an intriguing passage indicates
that there was also a considerable demand for Flemish art-and argues that neither
the consequences of the closure of the ScheIdt nor the effectiveness of the blockade
of the Flemish ports were as great as has usually been supposed.
A fascinating picture emerges of the techniques employed by these merchants,
of the problems and opportunities they faced, and of their way of life. However,
the significance of this group and their activities for the economy of the southern
Netherlands as a whole remains uncertain, and Dr Stols himself is forced to admit
that the exclusion of the merchants, both in Spain and at home, from any positive,
independent, social or political role had unfortunate consequences for their morale
as a social group. In short, this work further undermines our confidence in the
traditional picture of stagnation and depression, but it does not present us with
a substitute. It does, however, help to define what is really at issue, and to indicate
the areas where more research is required.
Other problems of Dutch colonial history are dealt with in articles by E. Stols
and P. C. Emmer. The first 64 is an interesting attempt to relate the founding of
the Dutch East- and West-India Companies to the 'crisis' of the economy of the
southern Netherlands, and more generally to the economic implications of the
Eighty Years War. He emphasizes that merchants from the Netherlands were
able to take an important part in the colonial trade of Spain and Portugal, both
directly and indirectly, from at least the middle years of the sixteenth century,
and argues that the foundation of the trading companies in the northern Netherlands was more a response to the uncertainties in this trade caused by the activities
63. E. Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden
met de Iberische wereld (1598-1648). Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie Belgie Klasse
der Letteren, LXX (2 vols; Brussels, 1971, 421 + 265 pp.).
64. E. Stols, 'De Zuidelijke Nederlanden en de oprichting van de Oost- en West-Indische Compagnieen', Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVIII, 1-18.
177
ALICE C. CARTER
of privateers and to distribution problems facing those trading in colonial goods,

than a consequence of the Spanish embargoes on Dutch trade with Spain and
Portugal. Merchants in the south, however, found that they could maintain a
satisfactory share in this colonial trade by working through the Spanish monopoly,
and did not need to develop an independent trade with the colonies or to work
through the Dutch companies. The second article 65 is concerned with the slave
trade to and of New Netherland. At least, such the title would suggest, but in fact
the author makes it abundantly clear that although the inhabitants of this colony
were given permission in 1652 to trade in slaves on their own account (in order
to 'promote population and agriculture') Cura9ao was and remained the centre
of the Dutch slave trade-which, he argues, was second in importance only to
that of Portugal in the years 1640-75-acting as a collecting and distribution
point for the supply of slaves to Spanish America. The share of New Netherland
in the trade, on the other hand, remained totally insignificant-even as a market.
Dr Everaert has used the commercial archives of only two firms as the foundation of an impressively detailed, informative and thought-provoking study of
trade between Flemish ports and Cadiz.66 Between them, the records cover a
mere thirty years. But following the leads provided, the author gives a picture over
a much longer period of the structure of this trade, and takes his readers across
the Atlantic and all over the Iberian peninsula, into central Europe, and even
to the East Indies. Seventy-five per cent of the trade from Flanders to Cadiz was
in the form of draperies and laces, much of these finding their way ultimately
via Cadiz to the Spanish Americas. In the introduction we are given necessary
basic particulars about the geography of Andalusia and the entry to the port of
Cadiz. We are reminded of the politico-economic situation under the last Habsburg; there is a clear description of the tripartite Spanish monetary system and
information on exchange rates. There is a section on the basic structure of the
trade between Flanders and Cadiz, with unusual matter on recruitment of personnel, training of young men for merchanting, difficulties about keeping books
up to date, insufficiency of accounting techniques. We hear about how trade between Cadiz and Spanish America was organized and how the methods of collecting port dues at Cadiz were streamlined by one particular officer and his sons.
We are informed about measurements and values of different textiles. Dr Everaert's evidence shows the break-down of the Spanish monopoly, by the end of
the seventeenth century, of their trade to their own part of the New World. This
65. P. C. Emmer, 'De slavenhandel van en naar Nieuw-Nederland', Economisch en SociaalHistorisch Jaarboek, XXXV (The Hague, 1972) 94-147.
66. J. Everaert, De internationale en koloniale handel der Vlaamse firma's te Cadiz 1670-1700.
Werken Fakulteit van Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Gent (Bruges: De Tempel, 1973, 974 pp. With
70-page summary in French).
178
was due not only to corruption and inefficiency on the part of Spain, but to the
enterprise of the Flemings. One way to entry into Spanish-monopolized trading
enterprises was to become naturalized. Dr Everaerts thinks at least a third of
naturalized Spaniards were of Flemish origin, and he also sees 'men of straw'
under Flemish control in many capacities in the chain which brings Flemish
products via Cadiz to South America. There is much of interest on the ways in
which fluctuations in demand, for Flemish products in the trans-Atlantic market,
could be anticipated. We hear about transport costs, calculated in such a way
that better-quality wares could be transported at a lower ad valorem rate than those
which were cheaper. There is information on insurance. Moorish pirates are
their usual dangerous selves, affecting costs and causing losses. We are told something of the overland European postal system, which was expensive but very
regular.
Of return cargoes from the New World 85-90 per cent consisted of precious
metals. An 'official' report of 1670 assesses the Flemish share of returns from the
Spanish colonial trade as between eight and ten per cent; but credit had to be
given for over 60 per cent of all purchases from Flemish merchants, and ready
cash appears to have been, in spite of the imports of precious metals, always
a scarce commodity. There is much about smuggling, the activities of privateers,
administrative corruption and corruptibility, many useful details about pricefluctuations and measures taken to deal with the (mis)fortunes of war and natural
disasters. Towards the end of the century these increased, and were followed by
social disorder; attacks of xenophobia which resulted therefrom mark the approaching downfall of Flemish traders in Cadiz, and of a more passive phase in the
trade of Andalusia, of Spanish America and of northern Europe. Dr Everaert's
conclusion, drawn from a final study of trends of trade cycles between Flanders,
southern Spain and the Spanish part of the New World, is that the seventeenth
century can be regarded as a stabilizing phase and one of consolidation after the
expansion and violence of the preceding period.
A collection of studies has appeared relating to the European cultural significance of the poet (and secretary to successive princes of Orange) Constantijn
Huygens. 67 What is unusual is that it is the product of a student seminar in the
University of Nijmegen. These seem to have been remarkably advanced students,
however, and the limitations of the book spring rather from the sources used
than from the competence of the authors. Probably it was inevitable that the
decision had to be taken to concentrate on Huygens' published correspondence
together with his published poems, and only incidentally to use unprinted material.
67. H. Bots, ed., Constantijn Huygens. Zijn plaats in geleerd Europa. Studies van het Instituut
voor intellectuele betrekkingen tussen de Westeuropese landen in de 17e eeuw, I (Amsterdam:
University of Amsterdam Press, 1973, 493 pp., ISBN 90 6041 143 4).
179
ALICE C. CARTER
However, the authors of the various contributions have demonstrated amply

the considerable possibilities of this material. The twelve studies include consideration of Huygens' cultural contacts with France, England, Italy and Germany;
of his correspondence with Rivet, Mersenne and other prominent intellectuals;
of his contacts with the Muiderkring in Holland; and of his scientific interests.
Much of what is said is necessarily tentative, and the whole question of the importance of Huygens as a mediator in cultural matters remains extremely difficult
to assess. Nevertheless, the ground has to some extent been cleared, and further
investigation of this complex and interesting figure will be greatly facilitated as
a result of this publication, not least because of the comprehensive nature of
the references and the bibliography.
The tercentenary of the death at Delft of Reinier de Graaf, a promising young
doctor born in a Catholic professional family in 1641, is commemorated by the
publication of a biography by a well known medical historian. 68 De Graaf is associated with investigations into the origins of life, thus into the reproductive processes of the male but especially of the female sex. He was educated firstly at
the University of Louvain (like many Dutch Catholics), but then studied at
Utrecht and Leiden under some of the most famous physicians of the day. After
a short stay in France he set up in private practice in Delft. His output of medical
works, listed in the book, is impressive; he was in correspondence with medical
specialists all over Europe; and he contributed to the discussions of the Royal
Society. Some of his findings paralleled those of William Harvey on the circulation of the blood and those of his fellow townsman Van Leeuwenhoek concerning
the microscope; his early death removed him from an acrid dispute following
the publication by Jan Swammerdam in 1672, almost simultaneously with De
Graaf, of somewhat similar discoveries about the processes of human and animal
reproduction. The book contains a full critical apparatus and bibliographies,
together with an index of names and a detailed list of contents.
Cornelis Troost was indisputably the finest artist produced by the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, and J. W. Niemeijer has done him justice in a
thorough and attractively-produced study.69 The author makes a number of imp ortant points, arguing, for example, that Troost was strongly influenced by his
Dutch seventeenth-century predecessors, particularly Jan Steen, and denying
that contemporary French painting had an especially powerful direct impact
on him. If he is not entirely convincing on either of these matters, he has certainly
ensured that any opponent will have to argue his case very carefully and cogently
68. G. A. Lindeboom, Reinier de Graaf, [even en werken (Delft: Elmar, 1973, 143 pp.).
69. J. W. Niemeijer, Cornelis Troost 1696-1750 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973, 450 pp., ISBN
90 232 1064 6. Thesis Faculty of Letters, Groningen, 1973. With summary in English).
180
indeed. In this comprehensive survey of the painter's life and works the importance of the theatre-piece {i.e. a representation of a scene from a play), treated
as genre, emerges very clearly in Troost's work, as indeed does the artist's close
connection with the world of the theatre in general. The very full apparatus
includes a complete oeuvre-catalogue, bibliography, and a chronological list of
dated works.
The contribution of the Outer Provinces of the Netherlands to the initiation
and advancement of the reform movements of the late eighteenth century and
of the major political developments of the nineteenth century has been marked.
It is the belief, and the argument, of Mrs. A. H. Wertheim 70 that, in the case of
Gelderland, its contribution to the Patriot movement has been undervalued,
in the sense that a precursor of that movement is to be found in the 'Plooierijen'
of the early eighteenth century-a reference to the widespread commotions
in town governments sparked off by the death of William III in 1702. The thesis
is not new, and although Dr Wertheim has provided a welcome general account
of these commotions in Gelderland, based on provincial and municipal archival
material, which has added some detail, it cannot be said that she has taken the
argument much further. There are too many assertions which seem over-simple,
or lack documentation, and the argument is not helped, when dealing with the
'Nieuwe Plooi' and the 'Oude Plooi', and the triumph of the latter, by extravagantly anachronistic references to Jacobins and Girondins, and the reaction of
Thermidor, even though such terms are then immediately withdrawn-after the
damage has been done-because they are admitted to be anachronistic. Further,
the period covered has proved too long for consistent treatment in depth, with
the result that, in dealing with the Patriot period, there is no reference to any
unpublished documentary material. More important, the approach is too narrowly
political and 'Gelders', and insufficiently analytical. Nevertheless Dr Wertheim
deserves credit for having drawn attention to an interesting historical phenomenon
which was not confined to Gelderland, and had both supra-provincial and interprovincial dimensions.
More successful as a contribution to a wider, and much more ambitious collective historical endeavour, undertaken by the Centre d'Etudes des XVlIe et XVII/e
siecles at the Sorbonne with the object of abstracting according to a fixed set
of themes, materials from all the French language periodicals of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, is Marianne C. Couperus' study of Le Glaneur historique
(1731-1733).71 Essentially a piece of literary history, and not much concerned with
70. A. H. Wertheirn-Gijse Weenink, Democratische bewegingen in Gelder/and 1672-1795 (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1973, 183 pp., Thesis Faculty of Letters, Nijrnegen, 1973).
71. Marianne C. Couperus, Un periodique franfais en Hollande. Le Glaneur Historique (17311733). Publications de l'Institut d'etude fran~aises et occitanes de l'universite d'Utrecht, VI
(The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1971, 337 pp. Thesis Faculty of Letters, Utrecht).
181
ALICE C. CARTER
the political contents of the periodical, this is a thoroughly professional piece of

research which succeeds as a contribution to the at-present very shadowy history
of journalism and of journalists in the Dutch Republic in the early eighteenth
century; it is also an example of the way in which a systematic and thematic
investigation of a single periodical can be made to yield a rich harvest of
information on the cultural life of the Republic. Dutch intellectual history is
also well-served by J. Bots' examination of the special relationship between
religion and science in the eighteenth century.72 In the Netherlands, as elsewhere in Europe, but more particularly in Protestant Europe, fear of unbeliefasserted to have reached panic proportions in the Dutch Republic in the late
1760s-produced and sustained a new genre of physico-theology, which fused
a theology based on the discoveries of experimental science and an experimental science committed to emphatically theological pre-occupations and
practiced by scientists who were without exception believing Christians. Perhaps
at times Dr Bots confuses professions of belief with belief itself, a real distinction
in a situation where pressures to outward religious conformity were strong and
where, as is admitted, certain kinds of religious unconformity could provoke
a strongly hostile reaction. Nevertheless,73 the main argument is developed with
considerable erudition and a wealth of examples, ranging from the writings of
the one Dutch physico-theologian to achieve international stature, Bernard
Nieuwentijt, through a host of smaller men-poets, preachers, educationalists,
and journalists, as well as scientists and theologians-and a good many foreign
importations.
Dutch colonial history is the subject of two contributions. Professor Brummel
documents some of the excesses and corrupt practices of servants of the Dutch
East India Company in the last decades of the eighteenth century from the correspondence of Johan Frederik van Reede, a servant of the Company who became
in 1796 a governor of North East Java, with his father.74 J. P. van de Voort,
in a solid piece of archival research, describes the efforts of the Republic to become
less dependent on foreign-principally French-colonial imports by stimulating
agricultural production in Surinam in the second half of the eighteenth century,
and the social and economic consequences of such efforts.75 Since planters were
72. J. Bots, Tussen Descartes en Darwin. Geloof en natuurwetenschap in de 18e eeuw in Nederland
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972,216 pp. With 30-page summary in German).
73. Apart from a slight gaffe in which Bots shows himselfless familiar with the House of Hohenzollern than the 18th-century writer he purports to correct (128).
74. L. Brummel, 'Achttiende-eeuws kolonialisme in brieven', Bijdragen en Mededelingen
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVII (1972) 171-204.
75. J. P. van de Voort, De Westindische plantages van 1720 tot 1795. Financien en handel (Eindhoven: De Witte, 1973, 367 pp. Thesis Faculty of letters, Nijmegen. With summary in English.
Copies obtainable from the author, Amalia van Solmslaan 6, Vlaardingen, f 35.-).
182
unable to finance increased production out of their own resources, from 1751,
and especially during the years between 1765 and 1773, proven mortgage loans of
upwards of 69 million guilders were advanced by merchants of the Republic-83
per cent of which came via the agency of Amsterdam-on the security of the
plantations themselves. The experiment failed, both for the planters and for
debenture holders, partly because the loans pushed up costs of production, partly
because of rivalry between Holland and Zeeland, partly because of French competition. In Surinam itself the plantations passed into the hands of overseas
creditors, who remained absentee-proprietors and handed over the management to administrators.
Social change in the Republic itself, or, to be precise, the origins, character,
and operation of those forces and values making for a changed social consensus
in the Republic at the end of the eighteenth century, is the subject of a somewhat
abstract, sociologically replete article by Dr Theo P. M. de Jong, who also suggests
some future lines of enquiry.76
The A.A.G. Bijdragen contains an article by P. M. M. Klep on the structure
of and changes in households in north-western Brabant between 1750 and 1849,
as well as the text, edited and annotated by A. M. van der Woude, of the enquiry,
set up by Johannes Goldberg for the government of the Batavian Republic,
into the resources of the Department of Texel. 77
Of some interest to historians are the well documented and illustrated biographies of two literary figures. In his interesting study of Hieronymus van Alphen
(1746-1803), P. J. Buijnsters seeks to display the paradoxes in the career of a man
perhaps best remembered today for his children's verse. 78 An 'enlightened'
literary innovator who broke away from the sterility of the literary-society tradition of the 1770s, Van Alphen achieved high office as an Orangist regent in Utrecht
and Leiden and was Treasurer General of the Republic during its last two years.
Van Alphen's innovatory work in aesthetics and poetry was not, however, transferred to the social and political field and there is no indication that his social
aspirations and desire for office gave rise to an internal conflict of conscience.
His translation of Vom Verdienste by the German patriot, Thomas Abbt, indicates
a sympathy with 'statist' rather than libertarian aspects of eighteenth-century
patriotism. Thus, although Van Alphen's early period of office is presented as
being characterized by an a-political Orangism, the conservatism which is depicted
76. Theo P. M. de Jong, 'Sociale veranderingen in de neergaande RepubIiek', Economisch- en
Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, XXXV, 1-27.
77. P. M. M. Klep, 'Het huishouden in westelijk Noord-Brabant: structuur en ontwikkeling,
1750-1849', A.A.G. Bijdragen, XVIII (Wageningen: Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis LandbouwhogeschooI, 1973) 23-94; A. M. van der Woude, 'De Goldberg-enquete in het Departement van
TexeI, 1801', ibidem, 95-250.
78. P. J. Buijnsters, Hieronymus van Alphen (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973, 414 pp., ISBN 90
2321062 X).
183
ALICE C. CARTER
as having been activated by the events of the Patriottentijd and of the revolution,
appears to have been already deeply ingrained. He has been considered a moderate,
but his moderation is relative to the actions and writings of others and its appearance arises out of the religious rather than pro-aristocratic origin of his conservatism, which remains essentially intact. He emerges from this study therefore as
a character very much of a piece: a man whose strong religious orthodoxy put
him firmly on the side of the status quo and whose natural predilections were
strengthened by his political experience. The very full appendices include a
catalogue of Van Alphen's correspondence.
In contrast to Van Alphen, the pre-Romantic who never quite achieved the
popular note, was Hendrik Tollens (1780-1856), a poet from a very different
milieu;79 also a Romantic, but one who did not experience difficulty in tuning
in with popular opinion, Tollens was from a mildly bohemian, immigrant, Roman
Catholic family, industriously working its way to respectability and security in
the relatively flourishing city of Rotterdam. Perhaps this helps to explain the surprising accuracy with which he mirrored, in a genuinely popular and direct voice,
the changing moods of the middling urban population of his time. After a youthful and brief flirtation with active radicalism, he withdrew from political involvement and concentrated on business and literature. He expressed in turn admiration
of the French, antipathy to the French, admiration of William I, and always
love of freedom and country. An autodidact, he turned from French to German
and English models as his patriotism took the form of romantic nationalism set
in the heroic mould of historical romance, ballad and legend. His work is permeated by a type of naive sentimentality which eschewed the intensities both
of the revolutionary and the religious-aristocratic Romanticism of the early nineteenth century.
The colourful early years of Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp (1747-1811),
founder of the Netherlands Missionary Society and pioneer of the London Missionary Society among the Kaffirs and Hottentots, are the subject of a new biography. so
Dr I. H. Enklaar's purpose is to produce a study free of the sensationalism and
the family piety, with its inevitable lacunae, which have informed earlier biographies. While succeeding in this, he has given rather an external account of
a complex character. The changes in direction in career, the declasse marriage,
the intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage are charted rather than explained. However, we are promised that a shortened version of this volume is to be incorporated
in a full length biography in English, from which a fuller analysis may emerge.
79. G. W. Huygens, Hendrik Tol/ens, de dichter van de burgerij: een biograjie en een tijdsbeeld
(Rotterdam; Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 1972, 305 pp.: ISBN 90 236 9226 8).
80. I. H. Enklaar, De levensgeschiedenis van Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp tot zijn aankomst
aan de Kaap in 1799 (Wageningen: Veenman, 1972, 168 pp.).
184
A. Alberts has written a lively history of the Republic from 1780 to 1800. 81
Although this is a book intended for the general reader, its thesis, that the traditional view of the United Provinces during this period as a dull and weak country
should be revised, deserves serious consideration. Unfortunately, Alberts concentrates on the familiar ground of foreign affairs, and the Dutch naval and military contribution to successive alliances, which gives a distorted view of the
situation. Undeniably the Dutch alliance was much sought-after, but we are lacking the specialist studies on internal history to be able to judge how far the optimistic expectations of potential allies and of the Dutch themselves were grounded
in reality. The climax of the book, the defeat of the Anglo-Russian expedition
(1799), is presented with considerable panache as a military victory, but again,
this cannot be sustained in terms of a general thesis about intrinsic Dutch strength
until the campaign is seriously re-examined in the light of popular and other
political attitudes.
Yvan Vanden Berghe's numerous articles have already contributed to our
detailed knowledge of the Low Countries at the end of the eighteenth century.
In his published doctoral thesis 82 he brings his study of Bruges to a conclusion to
support J. Craeybeckx's theme that the Low Countries were neither culturally
nor economically backward, and that their political revolution, while forming
part of an 'Atlantic revolution' must also be seen in a specifically Belgian context.
The author has used the rich material of a well-disciplined bureaucracy to analyse
in fascinating detail the socio-political groupings which partly explain, and were
partly a response to, the course of events from the reforms of Joseph II to the
second French invasion in 1794. Among the merits of this work is the insight it
affords to the nuances of reactions to Joseph's policies and those of subsequent
imperial regimes and the consequent effect on opinion among would-be reformers,
political and administrative.
According to Vanden Berghe's analysis there were four major socio-political
groupings with considerable overlapping of interests, and subdivisions: the progressive aristocracy of office, the traditionalist notables including the higher clergy,
the partially regressive incorporated tradesmen aud merchants, and the free
legal and intellectual professions. Not quite attached to any of these groups but
with some interests in common with all, were diverse groups of 'new' merchants
and innovatory entrepreneurs, either unincorporated or coming much later to
corporate organization. At no time was there homogeneity, either among those
in control of the town or among the pro-imperialists. Of considerable interest is
81. A. Alberts, De huzaren van Castricum: een geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Republiek van
1780 tot 1800 (Amsterdam: Querido, 1973, 336 pp., ISBN 90 2142001 5).
82. Y. Vanden Berghe, Jacobijnen en Traditionalisten: de reacties van de Bruggelingen in de
Revo[utietijd, 1780-94. Historische Uitgaven in 8, XXXII (2 vols; Brussels: Pro Civitate, 1972,
xlviii + 433, 237 pp.).
185
ALICE C. CARTER
the information about the incorporated tradesmen and merchants. Surprisingly,

they were Josephists in that they supported Joseph's legal, administrative and
clerical policies, which blinded them to the nature of his progressive economic,
and his aristocratic social and political policies. Thus, although they participated
with the traditionalist notables in the Brabant Revolution (co-operated would
be too strong a word) they expected to be able to consolidate their political
revival under the first Imperial restoration both to protect their own interests
and those of the unrepresented classes. The anti-imperialist democrats who had
welcomed all Joseph's reforms centred their hopes on the Empire during the
Brabant Revolution. Only under the restoration, when tradesmen and non-aristocratic progressives alike became disillusioned, did an autochthonous democratic
movement develop in Bruges which was separate from Vonckism and which
emerged as clearly Jacobin during the French occupation. During the brief second
restoration the imperial regime under Metternich's guidance was learning how
to compromise with the new situation, although too slowly and too late to be
effective, and the Jacobins held to their new orientation.
It is clear that the scope of the analysis Dr Vanden Berghe is attempting and
the nature of his material has presented him with serious conceptual problems.
In the first place he had chosen to divide his analysis into seven sections plus
a conclusion. The first two are introductory: the economic and intellectual backgrounds there sketched are deliberately limited to what is necessary for his later
exposition. The other sections are organized chronologically. The exposition
has as a result great clarity, but the method has not helped the analysis of, admittedly, external evidence to establish the inner motivation of the different social
groups. Some of the conclusions do not always flow obviously from the evidence.
For example, the analysis of the 'Jacobin' characteristics of the Jacobin club is
not securely grounded: it is not firmly established that the Jacobins of Bruges
understood by their slogans of unity, freedom and equality the reality of late
eighteenth-century political individualism and the political significance of the
structure of a unified state.
In the second place, Dr Vanden Berghe has concentrated on the town of Bruges
omitting the extensive administrative and juridical complex of the Brugse Vrije
(Franc de Bruges) of which the town was the administrative centre. The major
differences in the problems and reactions of the urban and rural populations,
which are given as a reason for omitting the Brugse V'Ue, might explain the motivation of administrators, landowners and small craftsmen and merchants. To ask
for more when we are given so much is, however, an indication of the importance
of Vanden Berghe's work. This text is supported by extensive and valuable
appendices collected in a separate volume.
186

LATER MODERN PERIOD
L. Wagner-Heidendal's doctoral thesis on philhellenism in the kingdom of the

Netherlands during ~he period 1821-2983 makes an important contribution to
the largely unexplored history of public opinion in the early nineteenth century.
For instance, this study demonstrates clearly that the numerous Belgian and Dutch
publications celebrating the cause of Greek freedom, although literarily undistinguished and containing few ideas which did not originate in other western
European countries, greatly furthered the breakthrough of Romanticism in the
Low Countries. Moreover, the author's meticulous research in local newspapers
and widely scattered archive matrial has revealed some marked differences between
Belgian and Dutch reactions to the Greek revolution, thus throwing new light on
the origins of the split between the two parts of the kingdom. In its northern half,
the sympathy with the Greek revolutionaries was more widespread than in the
south, being shared by personalities of all political persuasions, even by such a
conservative as G. K. van Hogendorp, and as a result this part of the kingdom,
although containing less than half of the total population, outstripped the southern
part in its financial contributions to the Greek freedom fighters. In Belgium, on the
other hand, the support given to the Greek Revolution was due to more purely
political considerations, often constituting a barely disguised form of liberal
agitation against clericalism or royal absolutism. Pointing out that many Belgians
who sponsored the Greek cause later became protagonists in the Belgian Revolution, the author concludes that by promoting liberal and nationalist ideas Belgian
philhellenes played a far from negligible part in preparing Belgian public opinion
for the breakup of the kingdom in 1830.
Thorbecke's political philosophy is not a neglected subject of study, but two
stimulating essays, written on the ocasion of the centenary of the great statesman's
death in 1872, add to our understanding of the political and religious convictions
underlying Thorbecke's reforms. In an article on Thorbecke and the Churches,84
partly based on hitherto unpublished Thorbeckiana, J. A. Bornewasser argues
convincingly that although until his death Thorbecke remained true to the undoctrinaire Protestantism which he had embraced under the influence of Schleiermacher and other progressive theologians during his student days in Germany,
he almost entirely reversed his early view that Churches should be placed under
strict State control once he had become involved in Dutch politics. In another
83. L. Wagner-Heidendal, Het Filhellenisme in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (1821-1829).
Een bijdrage tot de studie van de publieke opinie in het begin van de negentiende eeuw. VerhandeIingen Koninklijke Academie Belgie, Klasse der Letteren, XXXIV, 71 (Brussels, 1972, x + 432 pp.
With summary in German).
84. J. A. Bornewasser, 'Thorbecke en de kerken', Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der
Nederlanden, LXXXVII, 375-95; translated in Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VII, 146-69.
187
ALICE C. CARTER
perceptive article, entitled 'Thorbecke, Challenge and Response',85 J. C. Boogman

analyzes the Romantic, yet pragmatic political concepts which served Thorbecke
so well in overcoming the impasse in Dutch politics in the 1840s, but which failed
to provide him with an adequate solution to the different political crises that
emerged at the end of his life. He portrays Thorbecke as a highly principled, but
obstinate and lonely figure in the political life of his country, fully opposed to
its traditional political outlook, which continued to find its staunchest supporters
in the province of Holland, above all among the old established families of Amsterdam. The mentality of this city's social elite, perpetuating many of the traditions
of the former regent class, has been the subject of various suggestive studies by
F. J. E. van Lennep. In his most recent work, this latter-day Amsterdam patrician
concentrates on the richest Amsterdam family of the nineteenth century, the Borskis.86 His anecdotal family saga is disappointing in that it provides little information on the business activities of the members of the Borski clan, many of whom
held leading positions in Amsterdam's financial and commercial firms, but there
are excellent descriptions of the social life of this plutocratic family, whose greatest
extravagance was to build country houses surrounded by large estates in the dunes
west of Haarlem.
Another well-established, if less affluent, Amsterdam family produced the
political figure who became Thorbecke's most successful opponent, J. Heemskerk
Azn. Hitherto neglected by historians, this leading conservative, who was thrice
leader of the government and carried through one of the main constitutional
revisions of the nineteenth century, has finally found his biographer in J. J.
HuizingaY In the beginning of his well-written doctoral thesis, the author discusses
the formative influences on Heemskerk's political outlook, which incorporated
both authoritarian and liberal views. In the main part of his work, he presents a
clear and detailed account of Heemskerk's political career, which culminated in
his ministry in the 1880s, when he managed to remain in office for five years in
spite of the fact that he commanded no votes in parliament. The author is fully
aware of the important historiographical problems to the solution of which a
biographer of Heemskerk might be expected to contribute. What, for example,
was the political philosophy of nineteenth-century Dutch conservatives and why
did they fail to form a political party and decline as a political force? In his pre85. J. C. Boogman, 'Uitdaging en antwoord' Bijdragen en Mededelingen Geschiedenis der
Nederlanden, LXXXVII, 354-74; translated in Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, VII, 126-45.
86. F. J. E. van Lennep, Een weduwe aan de Amsterdamse beurs. Borski saga 1765-1960 (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink, 1973, 151 pp., ISBN 90 01 53769 3).
87. J. J. Huizinga, J. Heemskerk Azn. (1818-1897), conservatieJzonder partij.(Thesis Faculty of
Letters, Leiden, 1973, 301 pp. With summary in English. Copies obtainable from the author,
Willem de Zwijgerstraat 10, Harlingen, f. 30,-).
188
dominantly narrative biography the author makes some suggestive remarks on

such questions but does not probe them systematically. For example, while noting
that Heemskerk's pro-Catholic attitude lost him considerable support in the
country, no attempt is made to discuss the question of how far the increasing
preoccupation of the electorate with religious issues was responsible forthedecline
of Dutch conservatism. But such shortcomings do not basically affect the merit
of this solid piece of work, which is to be welcomed as an important addition to
the literature on nineteenth-century political history.
In another Leiden doctoral thesis J. C. Charite deals with one of the new problems confronting Heemskerk's last ministry, that of maintaining law and order
in the face of increasing popular unrest caused by the emerging socialist movement under the inspiring leadership of Domela Nieuwenhuis. 88 The study contains
some interesting information on the new repressive legislation favoured by prominent figures in the Dutch government and on the opposition to the proposed
curtailment of constitutional freedom on the part of liberals and members of the
legal profession. Unfortunately, instead of investigating fully the political ideologies underlying such conflicting attitudes and assessing their relative strength
in Dutch society, the author devotes a large part of his study to recounting the
well-known story of socialist disturbances and the trial of Domela Nieuwenhuis.
Most other recently published works on nineteenth-century Dutch history deal
with foreign policy. In the first place a beginning has finally been made with the
publication of Dutch foreign office documents during the period 1848-70 (the
first of the so-called three 'periods' of the general series covering the years 18481919). The first published volume, relating to the revolutionary year 184889
is expertly edited by C. B. Wels and, not unexpectedly, contains many Dutch
diplomatic reports on revolutionary events elsewhere in Europe, most of them
still written in French and revealing ambassadorial disgust with mob violence.
From February to April Dutch diplomats were primarily worried over a possible
attack on Belgium by the new regime in France and made therefore their first feeble
attempts to better the strained relations between the Netherlands and their southern neighbour. The memoranda and correspondence of the rest of the year are
almost exclusively concerned with the formulation of a Dutch policy in response
to the plans made by the new German authorities in Frankfort to establish an
all-German customs union and to create a strong national state inclusive of the
Dutch province of Limburg.
88. J. C. Charite, De Sociaal-Democratische Bond als orde- en gezagsprobleem voor de overheid
(1880-1888). (Thesis Faculty of Letters, Leiden, 1972, 219 pp. With summary in English. Copies
obtainable from the author, Boshuizenlaan 3, Leiden).
89. C. B. Wels, ed., Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. Eerste periode
1848-1870, I, 1848. Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote Serie CXXXIX (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1972, 1+ 846 pp., ISBN 90 247 B 26 G).
189
ALICE C. CARTER
The beginning of the publication of the foreign office documents of the first
period coincided with the completion of the pUblication of the same papers
belonging to the second period (1871-98). Again carefully edited by J. Woltring,
the concluding volume,90 covering the years 1895-98, will primarily be of interest
to the student of international arbitration and commercial agreements. In the
relatively quiet last years of the nineteenth century, no serious problems offoreign
policy taxed the determination of the Dutch government to remain unentangled
in foreign alliances. The published documents show that even in the few trouble
spots of the world in which Dutch interests were involved (China, Turkey, the
Caribbean, South Africa) the Dutch foreign office abstained from taking any
stand which might have antagonized the greater powers.
A far more interesting new publication is C. A. Tamse's doctoral thesis on Dutch
and Belgian foreign policies from 1859 to 1871,91 a period in which the state of
Europe was less favourable to the continued existence of small powers than it had
been before 1859 or became after 1871. In discussing the reasons for the survival
of the Netherlands and Belgium in this time of increased international anarchy,
the author duly considers such factors as the state of their economies, the strength
of their armed forces, the operation of their constitutional monarchies and the
determination which the populations of both countries possessed or appeared
to possess to remain a nation with a government of their own. In this connection
Tamse points to some interesting differences between the Belgian and Dutch attitudes towards their country's foreign policies. Because of their more vulnerable
geographical location and their lingering doubts concerning their national identity, the Belgians attached greater significance than did the Dutch to an active
diplomacy and accordingly appointed persons of greater ability than was customary in the Netherlands to foreign office posts. Yet, as the author cogently argues,
the active neutrality policy pursued by Belgium was not more effective than the
passive neutrality policy pursued by the Netherlands, for the continued independent existence of both states was in the last resort dependent on decisions taken
by the great powers over which small countries had no control. The Low Countries
were saved during the period 1859-71 because the two main aggressive powers,
France and Prussia, were too distrustful of one another to settle their conflicts
at the expense of the Low Countries, while, moreover, neither of them dared to
take unilateral action against Belgium or the Netherlands for fear that Great
90. J. Woltring, ed., Bescheiden betrefJende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. Tweede
Periode 1871-1898, VI, 1895-1898. Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Grote Serie CXXXVIII
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973. With summary in French, ix + 381 pp., ISBN 90 24714974).
91. C. A. Tamse, Nederland en Belgie in Europa (1859-1871). De zelJstandigheidspolitiek van
twee kleine staten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973, ix + 381 pp. With summary in French. ISBN
90 247 1559 8 and thesis Faculty of Letters, Groningen, 1973).
190
Britain would give diplomatic or military support to their opponent. But Belgian
and Dutch diplomats, although largely helpless in influencing the foreign policies
of the great powers, could and did achieve some important results in improving
the strained relations between their two countries, even if by 1871 neither of them
was yet ready for an economic union or a military alliance. These are some of
the most important points developed in this illuminating study, based on fresh
research in Dutch, Belgian and English archives. Apart from some repetition
in the discussion of main incidents in Belgian-Dutch relations, there is little this
reviewer finds to criticize in a work which will be of considerable interest to all
who want to gain a clearer insight into the international position of small European
powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
A doctoral thesis on the Netherlands and the Franco-Prussian War 92 by A.
Doedens covers some of the same ground as Tamse's work, but is more detailed
on such topics as the state of public opinion, the inadequacy of Dutch military
defenses and the ineptness of Dutch displomacy and statesmanship during the
international crisis of 1870-71. But this author is insufficiently aware of the serious
limitations which national and international circumstances placed upon the
capacity of the Dutch foreign service to pursue a policy effectively ensuring the
independence of the Netherlands, and makes such unwarranted statements as
that it would have been possible for the Dutch to have entered into closer economic
and military co-operation with Belgium and to have secured a British guarantee of
their neutral status.
In an essay interpretative of the Dutch economy in the twentieth century, 93
developed from an article in Delta, autumn 1970, Johan de Vries concentrates
not on conventional aspects of economic change, such as developments in trade,
industry, banking and so forth but on the central theme of economic growth. The
author is indebted to I. J. Brugmans's magisterial Paardenkracht en mensenmacht,
and to J. A. de Jonge's De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914,
seeming to choose the years around 1870 as the time for take-off to economic
growth, somewhere between the dates chosen by his two predecessors. The period
is surveyed under the headings of economic structure, cyclical development and
economic policy, with a conclusion which remarks on the slow development
and indeed still incomplete balance in the Netherlands between welvaart in the
sense of material well-being and welzijn, well-being in its fullest possible meaning.
From various official publications, figures and tables are chosen that even by
themselves underline the rapid retreat, from 1900 onwards, of labour from agri92. A. Doedens, Nederland en de Frans-Duitse Oorlog (Thesis Faculty of Letters, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1973,207 pp. With summary in German. Copies obtainable from the author,
Spechtlaan 17, Maartensdijk, f. 15,-).
93. Johan de Vries, De Nederlandse economie tijdens de 20ste eeuw (Antwerp: Nederlandse
Boekhandel, 1973, 207 pp., ISBN 90 289 98 187).
191
ALICE C. CARTER
culture and fishing to manufacture, office-work and public services. Figures also
underline the preponderance of the western area of the Netherlands, with its
long history of greater population density, greater prosperity and stronger political
influence. The question is posed, however, as to whether the preponderance of
the west will last for ever. This study of a period dominated by two world wars
and a world-wide interval of despondency and malaise, is short, pithy, informative
and supported by a well-chosen bibliography.
The latest volume in the series of source publications on the history of the
Netherlands East Indies during the period 1900-1942 contains the most important
state papers relating to the economic policies pursued in the Netherlands East
Indies from 1900 to 1915. 94 The documents chosen are arranged chronologically
within five sections, four of which deal with various aspects of financial affairs
and one with economic planning, development and supporting services. This
publication will be a valuable tool for a student of the history of the Netherlands
East Indies or of the mother country's colonial policy and attitudes during the
first two decades of this century. It is helpful that English translations have been
added of the lengthy editorial sections by P. Creutzberg and the summary of each
of the documents themselves, but it could be wished that the translations had
been looked over by someone who well understood the niceties of English,
especially of word order, for some English passages are rather misleading.
Two studies of mainly local interest bring to light further results of the painstaking demo graphical research now being done with such effect in the Netherlands. J. A. Verduin's study of population trends in Drente in the nineteenth
century,95 with nearly thirty pages of tables, illustrates among other matters the
low birth rate in agricultural areas in the middle years of the century, linking this
with poverty, thus lack of opportunity to set up house independently. Similarly,
W. de Vries's detailed study of a welfare organization which originally concerned
itself with Protestant farmers in mainly Roman Catholic North Brabant96 includes
tables from which it is possible to deduce population growth among both Protestants and Catholics in several communities during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
P. C. Emmer contributes an article to the Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch
Jaarboek on the consequences of the abolition of the slave trade, agreed by the
94. P. Creutzberg, ed., Het ekonomisch beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie, I. Uitgaven van de Commissie voor bronnenpublicatie ... Nederlandsch-Indie 1900-1942 van het Nederlands Historisch
Genootschap, 5 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1972, xlix + 756 pp., ISBN 90 01 198856).
95. J. A. Verduin, Bevolking en bestaan in het oude Drenthe (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972, 152 pp.
With summary in French. ISBN 90 232 1036 O. Thesis Utrecht).
96. W. de Vries, 150 jaar Welstand: de Maatschappij tot bevordering van Welstand, voornamelijk
onder landlieden (Tilburg: Stichting Zuidelijk Historisch Contact, 1972. With summary in French.
Thesis Tilburg).
192
Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1818 (the treaty being printed as an appendix). 97

He looks at the effects of earlier Enlightenment on Dutch attitudes to slavery
('Batavian freedom must be for white and black alike') and differentiates between
the treatment, not so harsh in the Dutch Antilles as in Surinam, by Netherlands
slavemasters.
In the past year a few contributions to the study of socialist and communist
movements in the Netherlands have again been made by historians subscribing
to the ideas of the New Left. In his doctoral thesis H. de Liagre Bohl presents the
first comprehensive treatment of Herman Gorter's political activities including
his relations with leaders of socialist and communist parties in Germany and
Russia. 9s For example, this study contains new details on Gorter's contacts with
Lenin, who took such an interest in Gorter's pamphlet denouncing the First
World War that he tried to read it in Dutch, but who later disparaged the Dutchman's criticism of the opportunist policies pursued by the Soviet leadership.
The author points out that Gorter had certain abilities as political orator and
pamphleteer, but possessed an inadequate grasp of Marxian or any other theory
and lacked all interest in routine party administration. Bohl's study adds to our
understanding of the difficulties the Dutch poet experienced in his relations with
crafty party bosses, but does not disprove the traditional view that Gorter was
more talented as a creative writer than as a prophet of socialism.
In a number of articles published in the political monthly serving as a mouthpiece of the New Left, Te Elfder Ure, G. Harmsen and others examine the early,
on the whole unsuccessful, attempts to organize a radical trade union movement
dedicated to the cause of class struggle, and throw some new light on communistled strikes, especially those taking place after the end of the Second World War,
when the communists for the first time gained considerable influence in the Dutch
Labour movement. 99 The most interesting of the new publications by the historical
New Left is Joyce Outshoorn's brief well-documented study of the attitudes taken
by Dutch socialists toward the problem of the emancipation of women during
the period 1898-1919. 100 The author discusses the various reasons why most
leaders as well as the rank and file of the Dutch Socialist Party (SDAP) displayed
a conspicuous lack of sympathy with the campaign for women's rights. Although
97. P. C. Emmer, 'EngeIand, Nederland, Afrika en de sIavenhandeI in de negentiende eeuw.
Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, XXXVI (1973) 146-215.
98. H. de Liagre BohI, Herman Gorter. Zijn politieke aktiviteiten van 1909 tot 1920 in de opkomende kommunistische beweging in Nederland (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij, 1973, 317
pp., ISBN 90 6168 066 2 and thesis Faculty of Letters, Leiden, 1973).
99. In: Te Elfder Ure, XX (Nijmegen: Sun, 1973) 257-373; 791-919.
100. Joyce Outshoom, Vrouwenemancipatie en socialisme. Een onderzoek naar de houding van
de SDAP ten opzichte van het vrouwenvraagstuk tussen 1894 en 1919 (Nijmegen: Socialistische
Uitgeverij, 1973, 111 pp., ISBN 90 6168 067 0).
193
ALICE C. CARTER
this cause was supported by the party's women's organization, the demands for
equal opportunities for women in Dutch society and economic life were opposed
not only by most male socialists, but even by the few women who held leading
positions within the party. At the end of the period covered by this study, women's
suffrage became a reality but, as the author points out, this victory owed little
or nothing to the socialists, many of whom had failed to give active support to
the new legislation for fear that by granting the vote to women the conservative
parties in parliament would be strengthened.
The concluding two volumes of C. Smit's history of the Netherlands during
the first World War,lOl again almost exclusively based on the foreign office documents previously published by the author, add virtually nothing to our understanding of the profound impact which the war had on Dutch political and economic life. In sharp contrast, L. de Jong's latest volume (in two parts) of his history
of the Netherlands during the Second World Waris a work of major significance,lo2
This volume, covering the first nine months of the German occupation (May
1940-March 1941) has as its main theme the serious attempt made by Reichscommissioner Seyss-Inquart to carry out Hitler's instruction to secure the
maximum amount of Dutch support for the planned nazification of the Netherlands, and at the same time to exploit Dutch economic resources for the benefit
of the German war effort. The author points out that during most of the period
covered in this volume Seyss-Inquart had good reason to be satisfied with the
results obtained. With few notable exceptions both the leaders of Dutch industry
and the Dutch civil service, working under the directives of the secretaries-general
(who, after the departure of the Dutch ministers for London, had become the
leading figures in Dutch administration) were more co-operative than had been
anticipated by the Germans, who, according to De Jong, would not at this time
have resorted to acts of terror if they had met with less compliance with their
orders. In his discussion of the handful of Dutchmen who dared to take an antiGerman stand during the first six months of the occupation, the author pays
special attention to General Winkelman, whose refusal to give in to German
demands is sharply contrasted with the submissive attitude taken by almost all
other members of the Dutch establishment. It was not until the late autumn of
1940, when the chances of an ultimate German defeat began to appear as a serious
possibility and the Germans started to introduce their anti-Semitic legislation
into the Netherlands, that resistance to German occupation policies became more
widespread. This volume ends with an account of the first serious explosion of
101. C. Smit, ed., Neder/and in de eerste were/door/og, II, (1914-1917) and III (1917-1919) (Oroningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1972-3, 172,207 pp., ISBN 90 01 802850 and 90 01 802869).
102. L. de Jong, Bet Koninkrijk der Neder/anden in de tweede were/door/og, IV, Mei '40-Maart '41
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972, xv + 992 pp. in two parts: also available in an edition without scholarly apparatus, The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972).
194
this growing Dutch resentment-the strike by most of the labour force in Amsterdam and its surroundings in February 1941-an event which, according to De
Jong, led Seyss-Inquart to revise his sanguine views as to the willingness of the
Dutch to accept the German New Order.
A large part of this stout volume of nearly 1,000 pages is taken up with a
careful analysis of the various ways in which the leaders or members of numerous
Dutch political, military, economic, cultural and religious organizations reacted
to the more or less overt pressures exerted upon them by the German authorities
or their Dutch collaborators. Although detailed in his coverage, the author has
nevertheless been highly selective in the choice of his data, and the reader never
feels oppressed by the wealth of material presented. This work of great scholarship
is, moreover, written with sustained passion, resulting in many moving passages,
which no sensitive person can read without sharing the author's indignation,
admiration or compassion.
Much of the vast research underlying De Jong's magnum opus was done by the
staff of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, some of whom
have acquired a scholarly reputation of their own for their work in the field of
Second World War studies. A beginning has now been made over the publication
of the more important shorter studies by these researchers. The first volume of
this new series103 has the nazification of the Netherlands as its main theme and
contains contributions by A. E. Cohen on some of Bormann's and Himmler's
representatives in the Netherlands and on the German civil administration in
general, by E. Fraenkel-Verkade on Mussert's relations with Hitler and on Dutch
labourers recruited for work on the Eastern front; by A. J. van der Leeuw on
the nazification of the Dutch press and the confiscation of Jewish assets; and by
L. de Jong on Felix Kersten's claims to have foiled an alleged German plan to
deport the entire Dutch nation to Poland. These various studies, based largely
on a careful interpretation of Nazi documents confiscated by allied authorities
after the end of the last war, throw much new light on the organization, objectives
and activities of the numerous German agencies which operated, often at cross
purposes, in all European countries occupied by the German army.
In conclusion the reader's attention should be called to three publications
each of which deals with the career of a prominent figure on the Dutch political
scene in the period following the Second World War. Unlike many other political
memoirs, W. Drees' brief survey of his life-long efforts to promote the cause of
social-democracy is sober and historica}.lo4 Although it adds little to the informa103. A. H. Paape, ed., Studies over Nederland in oorlogstijd, I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972,
viii + 399 pp. With summaries in English).
104. W. Drees, Neerslag van een werkzaam leven. Een keuze uit geschri/ten, redevoeringen,
interviews en brieven uit de jaren 1902-1972 in collaboration with P. van 't Veer (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1972,283 pp., ISBN 90 232 l000X).
195
ALICE C. CARTER
tion provided in earlier publications by the former Dutch prime minister, the
book under review has a new feature in that it reproduces the texts of numerous
speeches, memoranda, articles and letters by the author. On the other hand,
Luns' attempted autobiography is largely of anecdotal interest,Io5 Although
it gives a good idea of the new, informal style in which this popular minister
conducted foreign affairs, and provides a few hitherto unknown facts about the
two most important questions with which Luns had to deal (the conflict between
the Netherlands and Indonesia over New Guinea, and Britain's application for
membership in the Common Market), these so-called 'frank' reminiscences
contribute disappointingly little to our understanding of Dutch foreign policy
during the many years Luns held office. A historically much more significant
publication is R. Ammerlaan's study of 'the phenomenon of Schmelzer',lo6
which presents a fascinating account of the career of the Dutch politician who, as
the leader of the Roman Catholic party in the Second Chamber during the
1960s, was for a while one of the most powerful figures in Dutch politics. The
work of a journalist who had long conversations with Schmelzer and was given
access to the politician's well-kept diaries and other personal papers, this study
throws much new light on the political rivalries and intrigues accompanying the
formation and fall of Dutch ministries. Historians may deplore that Ammerlaan did not always indicate clearly whether certain statements were made by
Schmelzer or whether they constitute the author's own interpretation or recollection of events. However this extremely informative study of a Dutch master
in the art of political manipulation wilI be indispensable reading to all who want
to understand the actual operation of parliamentary democracy in the Netherlands in the twentieth century.
Contributors to this article:
Mrs. Alice C. Carter, ed. (University of London, London School of Economics)mainly eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
Dr. W. Blockmans (University of Ghent)-medieval history of Belgium
A. C. Duke (University of Southampton)-mainly sixteenth century
Mrs. Rosemary Duke, nee Jones (Southampton)-mainly sixteenth century
Mrs. Renee Gerson (City of London Polytechnic)-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
G. C. Gibbs (University of London, Birkbeck College)-eighteenth century
105. J. M. A. H. Luns, 'Ik herinner mij .. .' Vrijmoedige herrinneringen zoals verteld aan Michel
van der Plas (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972, 268 pp., ISBN 90 218 4151 7).
106. R. Ammerlaan, Het verschijnsel Schmelzer. Uit het dagboek van eenpolitieke teckel (Leiden:
Sijthoff, 1973, 352 pp., ISBN 90 218 4023 5).
196
Mrs. dr. Johanna Kossmann (Groningen)-medieval history of the Netherlands

Professor S. J. De Laet (University of Ghent)-archeology of Belgium
Dr. J. L. Price (University of Hull)-seventeenth century
Professor K. W. Swart (University of London, University College)-nineteenth
and twentieth century history of the Netherlands
RECENT WORKS ON THE mSTORY OF THE LOW COUNTRIES, PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH
I. SchOffer, A Short History of the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Allert de Lange,

1973, 200 pp., ISBN 90 6133 0769).
A revised edition of this perceptive account by a leading historian.
H. Dunthorne, 'Libraries and Archives 8. 'The Netherlands', History, LVII
(London, 1972) 217-20.
Helpful, though readers should note that there have been some changes since
the article was published. Cf. mention of the new Dutch guide De rijksarchieven in Nederland, published in 1973, in the general section of this review
article.
J. A. Van Houtte, 'Economic Development of Belgium and the Netherlands
from the beginning of the Modern Era. An Essay on compared History',
Journal of European Economic History, I (Rome, 1972) 100-20.
A four-century survey, tending to an historical explanation of the complementary, and more recently integrationary, rather than competitive economic
structures of the two countries.
J. A. Hebly, ed., Lowland Highlights. Church and Oecumene in the Netherlands
(Kampen: Kok, 1972, 134 pp., ISBN 90 242 0505 0).
Discusses developments in Church life in the Netherlands, and Dutch claims
to the title of an 'oecumenical model'. Bornewasser on 'Roman Catholicism
in the Netherlands since the Reformation' is of particular interest.
N. M. Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict
(1559-1572) (London-Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973, 373 pp., ISBN 333
136292).
Presents the massacre as an aspect of a longstanding Guise programme to
restore Catholicism. Sheds fresh light on the extent and nature of the
cooperation between the Hugenots and the Beggars.
Jan De Vries, 'On the Modernity of the Dutch Republic', Journal of Economic
History, XXXIII (New York, 1973) 191-202.
Argues that the sophistication of the Republic's economy in the Golden
Age owed much to developments in Dutch medieval society.
197
ALICE C. CARTER
G. Cotterell, Amsterdam. The Life of a City (Boston-Toronto: Little Brown and

Co., 1972; Farnborough: D. C. Heath, 1973, xx + 363 pp. ISBN 0347 00012
6).
Amusing to read, much arresting but insignificant detail, occasional incredible
blunders.
B. Rekers, Benito Arias Montano 1527-1598 (London: Warburg Institute,
1972, 199 pp., ISBN 0426 0616 23).
Provides some astonishing insights into the religious beliefs of the Plantin
circle. The English text provides a revised version of the author's dissertation,
appearing in Dutch in 1961.
G. Teitler, 'Revolt and Banditry. The start of the 80-Year (sic) War and the
Sea-Beggars', Sociologia Neerlandica, IX (Assen, 1973) 150-66.
The story of the sea-beggars is told to illustrate successive changes in armed
resistance through terrorism to guerilla and finally to regular warfare. Thought
provoking but not entirely convincing throughout.
A. Lovett, 'Juan de Ovanda and the Council of Finance (1573-1575)" Historical
Journal, XV (London, 1972) 1-21.
Useful information about the financial position of the Spanish Crown at a
critical juncture in the revolt.
G. N. Parker, 'Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders (15721607)" Past and Present, LVIII (Peters field, 1973)38-52.
Investigates the organization of the numerous mutinies in this period and emphasizes both the discipline of the mutineers and the success of their methods.
J. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt (2 vols; Cambridge: University Press, 1973, 760 pp.,
ISBN 0 521 08429 6).
This abridged translation of the author's monumental biography furnishes
an introduction to the early history of the Republic.
Maria Bogucka, 'Amsterdam and the Baltic in the first half of the Seventeenth
Century', Economic History Review, 2nd series, XXVI (London, 1973) 433-47.
S. Hart, 'Amsterdam Shipping and Trade to Northern Russia in the Seventeenth
Century', Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis,
XXVI (Lei den, 1973) 5-30.
Illustrates yet further the importance of Amsterdam's notarial archives. Shows
that the balance of trade was generally unfavourable to Russia. The author
also looks at the multiple effects of this trade on the rapidly-growing economy
of the Republic in general, and gives exchange rates between the guilder,
the sterling and the rouble.
Sir William Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands,
154 pp.) has
Sir George Clark, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, xix
been recently reprinted.
198
Willem C. H. Robert, The Explorations, 1696-1697, of Australia by Wi/lem de

Vlamingh (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1972, xi + 206 pp., frontispiece, 9
plates and maps, ISBN 90 60225015).
First supplement to second edition of 'Contributions to a bibliography of
Australia and the South Sea Islands' of which four volumes have been
published since 1969 and a fifth is in preparation. Contains translated
extracts from two log books of a voyage of three small ships exploring
the coast of Western Australia in the area of the Swan river, also extracts
from other documents concerned with the voyage. Full texts will be published
shortly in the series sponsored by the Linschoten Society.
R. Raven-Hart, ed., Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1702. The First Fifty Years of
Dutch Colonisation as seen by Callers (2 vols; Cape Town: Balkema, 527 pp.).
Well-produced, easily-read translation, full offascinating detail with supportive
factual background. Bibliographical information, included in the index,
could better have been presented in the usual form.
Henri and Barbara van der Zee, William and Mary (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1973, xv + 526 pp., ISBN 333 12451 0).
A lively written study, weak on political analysis, but perceptive on intimate
relations.
J. Postma, 'West African Exports and the Dutch West India Company, 16751731', Economisch en Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek, XXXVI (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) 53-74.
Shows the great preponderance of gold in exports from West Africa, representing over 75 % of the value in the period. Slaves and ivory, exported by the
Company, make up a further 21.5 %.
Z. Simecek, 'The First Brussels, Antwerp and Amsterdam Newspapers. Additional Information', Revue beige de philologie et d'histoire, L (Brussels, 1972)
1098-115.
Provides an indication of the work which still needs to be done in establishing
the chronology, and even the existence of early Netherlands newspapers,
and of the material for this purpose which lies outside the Netherlands.
J. C. Riley, 'Life Annuity-Based Loans on the Amsterdam Capital Market
towards End 18th Century', Economisch en Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek,
XXXVI, 102-30.
Shows why Dutch investors in life-annuity contracts available from France
were almost universally losers.
Idem, 'Dutch Investment in France, 1781-1787', The Journal of Economic
History, XXXIII (New York, 1973).
An analysis of the role of Dutch capital in maintaining the appearance of
French public solvency during the period indicated in the title. The case made
199
ALICE C. CARTER
out is convincing and based solidly on archive research, but the effect of
political events on Dutch investment habits is perhaps exaggerated.
1. Leonard Leeb, The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution. History
and Politics in the Dutch Republic 1747-1800 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973,
300 pp., ISBN 90 247 5157 8).
Important discussion of historical background of Dutch enlightenment, but
no use is made of archival material.
For works on Belgian history written in French see the annually published Bulletin critique
d'histoire de Belgique (University of Ghent) and the 'Bulletin d'histoire de Belgique', published
in the Revue du Nord (Lille).
200
The Authors
Mrs. A C. CARTER is Senior Lecturer and Tutor in the Department of Economic
History at the London School of Economics.
Dr. C. DEKKER is Director of the State Archives of Utrecht.
Dr. A. TH. VAN DEURSEN is Professor of Modern History at the Free Calvinist
University, Amsterdam
Dr. P. W. KLEIN is Professor of Economic History at the Erasmus University,
Rotterdam
M. MULLER is Lecturer at the Teacher's Training College (Nutsseminarium),
University of Amsterdam
Dr. J. H. VAN STUIJVENBERG is Professor of Economic History, University of
Amsterdam.
Dr. H. SOLY is Lecturer in Economic History, University of Ghent
Dr. ELS WITTE is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Political History, Free
University, Brussels
Translations by:
Mrs. P. van Caenegem nee Carson, Ghent
Dr. Chr. Emery, Hurworth near Darlington (co. Durham)
Derek S. Jordan, Canterbury
A. Mackinnon, M. A, Groningen
J. J. Ravell, De Bilt
R. R. Symonds, Bronley (Kent)
Mrs. J. M. Wilkinson nee Dekhuizen, Groningen
201

C. Dekker, H. Soly, J. H. Van Stuijvenberg, A. Th. Van Deursen, M. Müller, E. Witte, P. W. Klein, Alice C. Carter (Auth.) Acta Historiae Neerlandicae 8 - Studies On The History of The Netherlands

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ACTA HISTORIAE NEERLANDICAE

STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS

I. Schaffer (Leiden); Johanna A. Kossmann (Groningen); H. Balthazar (Ghent); A. Th. van

Alexander Numankade 199, Utrecht, The Netherlands.

ACTA HISTORIAE NEERLANDICAE

MARTINUS NUHOFF / THE HAGUE /1975

1975 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands.

All rights reserved, including the right to translate or

to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.

H. SOLY, The 'Betrayal' of the Sixteenth-Century Bourgeoisie: A Myth?

J. H. VAN STUDVENBERG, 'The' Weber Thesis: An Attempt at Interpretation

A. TH. VAN DEURSEN, History and Prognostication

M. MULLER, Ten years of Guerilla-Warfare and Slave Rebellions in

P. W. KLEIN, Depression and Policy in the Thirties

ALICE C. CARTER, ed., Survey of Recent Historical Works on Belgium and

The Representation of the Freeholders in the Drainage Districts

THE ZEELAND AMBACHTSHERENl

What makes the study of regional history so interesting is the discovery of

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

The organization of water administration in Zeeland was closely related to

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

It may indeed be assumed that the drainage associations functioned well.

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

valued at three hundred pounds or more, of the lord's money.28 Elsewhere,

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

with the inspection of the dikes, such as preliminary inspection, a delegated

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

Dekker, Zuid-Beveland, 572, 573.

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

Ibidem, 573, 574 and note 1.

Fruin, Provincie Zeeland, 88; De Waard, Inventaris besturen Walcheren, 53-6.

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

REPRESENTATION OF THE FREEHOLDERS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTY OF HOLLAND

Small as the differences were between the representations of the freeholders

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

Reviewing the situation as a whole, there is evidence throughout the territory

THE FREEHOLDERS IN THE DRAINAGE DISTRICTS OF ZEELAND

The organization of water administration

Between Honte anJ

The 'Betrayal' of the Sixteenth-Century Bourgeoisie: A Myth?

J. Sentou concludes his study of real-property-based wealth in Toulouse at the

We give this extensive quotation as a striking illustration of the now classic

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

The outstanding importance of real property in Antwerp in the sixteenth century

Checks on the property holdings of some of the most important international

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

The possession of real property in the sixteenth century made it possible to

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISm; A MYTH?

able to acquire extensive properties without having immediately to immobilize

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

THE 'BETRAYAL' OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY BOURGEOISIE: A MYTH?

'The' Weber Thesis: An Attempt at Interpretation*

'THE' WEBER THESIS

'TIlE' WEBER THESIS