Automatic Flight Control Systems

Automatic
Control
Flight
Systems
An Interactive Video Teletraining and Self-Study Course
a5na
Weight
Developed and Presented by
Anthony A. Lambregts
National Resource Specialist for
Advanced Controls
Federal Aviation Administration

January 27,1999
GETTING STARTED
How Do I Use This Guide?
.................................
I.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CURRICULUM

What Does the Curriculum Cover? .................................
Two-Week Job Function Course .............................
Overviews of Technical Subjects ............................
Core Technical Subjects Courses ............................
II.
IVT COURSE ORIENTATION

About This IVT Course ..................................................
What Is IVT? ..................................................................
Who Is the Target Audience? ..........................................
Who Is the Instructor? ..................................................
What Will You Learn? ...................................................
How Will This Course Help You On the Job? ..............
What Topics Does the Course Cover? ...........................
What Are Some Good References? ................................
7
8
9
9
10
11
11
12
III. SELF-ASSESSMENT & EXERCISES

Pre- & Post-Course Self-Assessment Questions ............ 14
Job-Related Exercises ..................................................... 16
APPENDICES
A.
Automatic Flight Control Systems
Presentation Visuals
Course Evaluation Forms
B.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
i
Getting Started
How Do I Use
This Guide?
This document is to be used for both the initial IVT broadcast

and the self-study course. The guide provides you with the
position of this course in the Systems Curriculum, an orientation
to the IVT course, support materials for use during the broadcast
and self-study, self-assessment and practice exercises, and both
an IVT and self-study course evaluation.
Fo How these steps to complete your study.
1. Read Section I, Systems Curriculum, to familiarize yourself
with the the overall scope and format of the curriculum.
3 Review Section II, IVT Course Orientation, before the
-.
broadcast, if possible, or before you watch the tape to get an
overview of the purpose of the course, the target audience, the
instructor, what you will learn, how this course will help you
on the job, the topics covered in the course, and some good
references on the topic.
3. Answer t,he pre-course self-assessment questions in Section
III, Self-Assessment crnd Exercises.
4. Turn to Appendis A, Automatic Flight Control Systems
.
Presentdon Visuds, and refer to it during the broadcast OI
while watching the videotape. Appendix A contains the
visual support material used by the instructor during the
broadcast. You can use these visuals to take notes and follow
along with the broadcast presentation. Begin the videotape
here if vou
are completing this as a self-studvd course.
5. Complete the post-course self-assessment and exercises in
Section III, Self Assessment crnd Exercises.
6. Complete the appropriate form (IVT or self-studv ) from
Appendix B, Course Evnluntion Forms. For the IVT course,
you will use the keypad you have been using during the
course to complete the evaluation.
I VT Self-Stud> Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
I
Systems Engineering Curriculum

I.
What Does the

Curriculum
Cover?
The Systems Engineering Curriculum fits into the broader AIR

Training Program that is summarized in the following figure.
The AIR Training
Program
An Overview
Within the context of the AIR Training Program, the Systems

Engineering Curriculum is designed to effectivelvd meet the
critical safety mission of the FAA by addressing the following
Service goals:
Stnnhrdizntion
l
IVT Self-Stud> Course

Promote standardization throughout the organization in task

accomplishment and application of airworthiness
regulations in order to achieve uniform compliance.
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
3
SystemsEngineering Curriculum
Job Performance Proficiencv
Reduce significantly the time required for newly-hired
engineers to attain full job performance proficiency.
Customer Service
Establish and maintain appropriate, effective, and
responsive communication, collaboration, leadership, and
teamwork with both internal and external customers.
In addition to the Service goals, the Systems Engineering

Curriculum is designed to provide ASEs with job function
training in three domains:
Tasks and procedures governing the work of engineers in
design approval, technical project management, certificate
management, and designee management.
FAR airworthiness requirements that are the purview of

electrical and mechanical systems engineers. Generally
they are Subpart F of FAR parts 23, 25, 27, and 39.
Technical subjects essential for all new engineers to meet
both introductor\vw requirements and, later, minimum
technical proficiency level requirements.
I t7eresulting Systems Engineering Curriculum structure

consists of three main types of training opportunities -
l-l
1. Two-Week Job Function Course

3. Overviews of Technical Subjects
3. Follow-on Core Technical Subjects Courses
Two-Week
Function
Course
Job
The Two-Week Job Function Course uses an instructor-led,

classroom-based format with lecture, discussion, and individual
and group activities. Supporting materials used in the course
include print, overhead transparencies, videotapes, job aids,
and documents and sample reports.
IVTSelf-Stud!;
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
3
The course is divided into the following two major sections:
Section I
Certification Tasks - includes design approval, technical
project management, certification management, and DER
management.
Section 2
FAR Requirements and Key FAR Sections - includes
training in the subparts of the FAR that apply to electrical
and mechanical systems engineers (Subpart F) at two levels:
an overview of those subparts across FARs 23, 25, 27, and
29; and in-depth discussion of significant sections of the
FAR that are important to the Service. The importance of
these sections may stem from problems in interpretation an-d
application of requirements, technical complexity of a
design, ihigh visibilitvd projects, or safety considerations
that Lre paramount.
0l.e rliews of
Technical
Subjects
High-level overviews of 13 technical subjects are presented bv

NRSs, Technical Specialists or other senior engineers. TIlesed
overviews are available in two modes:
l
An initial live four-hour IVT satellite broadcast with

accompanying course material is received at each
Directorate and other downlink sites.
A Video/Self-Study Training Package adapted from the
initial IVT presentation is available through the Directorate
Training Manager.
Basic concepts and FAA-specific applications and examples

are provided for each of the following 13 technical subjects:
For electrical engineers
l
Advanced Communications
Advanced Display Systems/Heads-Up Displays
IVTSelf-Stud!
Course
Automatic
Januar!,.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
4
l
Advanced Navigation
Low Visibility
For mechanical engineers

l
Crashworthiness and Interior Compliance
Doors
0 Icing
For both elecrical and mechanical engineers
l
Complex Electronic Hardware
Lightning and HIRF Protection
Human Factors
Software
Svstem
Safetvd Analysis
I
w
Each technical subject overview is designed to not only

provide ASEs with the FAA perspective on the topic, but also
serve as an indicator of what further training may be needed.
Core Technical
Subjects
Courses
As a follow-on to the Overviews of Technical Subjects, the

curriculum will provide more in-depth training in the following
two subject areas:
l
System Safety Assessment
Reliability & Probability
These core technical subjects are essential to the technical work

of the systems engineer in a regulatory environment regardless
of product or technology. Training in each of the core subjects
will be designed to bring systems engineers to a minimum level
IVT5elf-Stud!,
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
5

of technical proficiency and to help promote proficiency in the
application of the technical knowledge in an office work
environment.
Additional technical training for engineers beyond these core
subjects will depend largely on AC0 organizational needs
stemming from customer requirements, products certified,
emerging technology, and the number of staff requiring more
specialized training. In short, the more advanced the technical
training required, the more individualized it becomes.
Such training topics could be as follows:
.
HIRF
Lightning
Software Fundumentals
Dynamic Seat Testing
Icing Certification
Accident Investigation
Human Factors
Flammability
Interior Compliance & Crashworthiness
IVTSelf-Stud!,
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
6
,IVT Course Orientation
II.
IVT Course Orientation
About This
IVT Course
Automatic Flight Control Systems is one of 13 Overviews of

Technical Topics in the Systems Engineering Curriculum
designed to prepare you to effectively meet the critical safety
mission of the FAA. [For more information on the Curuiczrla,
refer back to Section I of this guide. /
Through a four-hour Interactive Video Teletraining (IVT)
format, Anthony Lambregts, National Resource Specialist for
Advanced Controls7 will introduce you to the fundamental
concepts of automatic flight control. He will discuss some
aspects of the applicable regulations and the equally important
design aspects for which no regulations exist. His aim is not to
make you a control theory expert, but rather to lead you stepby-step through the thicket of current and future automation
designs. The emphasis is on functions more than on hardware
and software implementation. The course will stay close to the
physics of flight, introducing only those control theory
elements necessary for you to communicate with the controls
experts and to ask pertinent questions related to automation
safety. The course will show how the historic, one-function-ata-time evolution of automation designs has led to very capable,
albeit extremely complex, systems architectures in hardware
and software, with much undesirable and unnecessary
functional overlap. The vulnerabilities of the traditional
automation designs to crew errors and confusion will be
discussed and related to the underlying root cause design
practices. Mr. Lambregts will give his vision on needed
improvements in future automation design standards and
needed updates in the regulations. Finally, recent advances in
automation designs will be discussed, showing reduced
complexity, improved performance, standardized / portable
design and reduced vulnerability to crew errors are well within
the current state of the art and technology.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
7
IVT Course Orient&ion
What Is IVT?
Interactive Video Teletraining, or IVT, is instruction delivered

using some form of live, interactive television. For the
overview courses, the instructor delivers the course from the
television studio at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.
Through the IVT broadcast facility instructors are able to use a
variety of visuals, objects, and media formats to support the
instruction.
Participants are located at various receive sites around the
country and can see the instructor and his/her materials on
television sets in their classrooms. The participants can
communicate with the instructor either through a microphone
and/or the simple-to-use Viewer Response System keypads.
During the live presentation, when a participant has a question
or thelnstructor asks for specific participant responses to
questions. the participant(s) can signal to the instructor using
their keypad. The collective participant responses or the name
of a specific participant signalling a question are immediately
visible to the instructor on the console at the broadcast site.
The instructor can then respond as needed. When the instructor
calls on a specific participant to speak from a site, participants
at each of the other sites can simultaneously hear the
participant who is speaking.
This guide provides you with the framework for this course as
well as the following appendices to be used for both the IVT
and the self-study courses.
l
IVT Self-Stud>, Course

Appendix A contains the actual visual support material used

by the instructor during the broadcast. You can use these
visuals to follow along with the videotape and record notes
directly on the pages.
Appendix B provides the Course Evaluation Forms for the
IVT broadcast and the self-study video course.
Automatic
Januar!.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
8
IVT Course Orientation

Who Is the
Target
Audience?
This course is designed for:

Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) who
review and approve automatic flight control/flight
management systems designs.
FAA systems engineers with a limited background in

airplane flight dynamics and automatic control systems who
wish to gain a basic familiarity with automatic control
systems design concepts and practices, control theory,
certification requirements, and issues and trends in future
automation.
Who Is the
Instructor?
Anthony
Lambregts
Anthmy A. Lnmbregts received his BS and MS in aeronautical

engineering from the University of Delft, the Netherlands.
From 1968 to 1995 he worked for the Boeing Commercial and
Military Airplane Company in design, research, and
engineering management related to automatic flight control
systems for a wide variety of commercial, military, unmanned
autonomous and research airplanes. In 1995, Mr. Lambregts
joined the FAA as a National Resource Specialist.
Mr. Lambregts is recognized internationally as an expert in
advanced control systems. He holds 16 patents, 5 Boeing
Invention Awards, and three NASA Recognition Awards. He
was involved in variou aircraft certification efforts, including
the B747 autopilot/Autothrottle and the B737/B767 Autoland
designs. He managed advanced research programs, including
the NASA TCV AFC Function Integration project, the Condor
Autonomous Flight Control System development, the HSCT
avionics/flight controls development, Enhanced Vision System,
and the NASA/Boeing FBL program.
Since joining the FAA, Anthony Lambregts has taken special
interest in automation safety and getting needed design
standards improvements adopted by the industry and in getting
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
9

the applicable FARs and Acs updated. To this effect, he is
participating in the FAAIJAA All Weather Operations and
Flight Guidance Systems Harmonization working group
meetins and in the Autopilot review team, as well as in the
NASA/NASA Aviation Safety Program planning and proposal
evaluations. He is also working with industry and academia on
advanced flight control systems designs, such as the Bell 609,
as well as controls and displays research. Mr. Lambregts is a
member of the AIAA.
What Will You

Learn?
After completing this course, you will have a basic

understanding of automatic flight control systems (AFCS) in
use today, including:
How todays svstems have evolved over a period of more
than 50 years. *
FARs/ACs related to automatic flight control design
certification (what is covered and what is not).
Important concepts and approaches used in design for safety
and protection against failures.
The basics of aerodynamic flight controls and the
consequences for automatic flight control design; concepts
of stability; and trim and control augmentation functions.
0
AFC system architecture evolution; functional elements;

analog/digital function implementation; hardware
components: actuation; and design assurance methodology.
The various modes of AFCS and how full function/full
flight envelope AFCS evolved, including automatic landing
and FMS.
An overview of control systems theory, concepts, design
approaches, and analysis techniques.
Fly-by-wire system concepts; fundamentals in design for
handling qualities; and PI0 avoidance.
IVT!Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
IO

l
How Will This

Course Help
You On the
Job?
A look at what is coming: future functionally integrated

designs and systems architectures.
At the end of this training session you will:

.
Have a background on the historical evolution of automatic

control systems and design practices.
0 Understand the basic functional architectures of automatic
control systems: How they are put together, what the

assumptions and groundrules are that can provide safe
operation, and what the limitations are.
0
What Topics
Does the
Course Cover?
Know where to look for automation design safetvd

vulnerabilities, using better insight in the control strategies
and design approaches employed.
The following topic outline is intended to give you an overview

of the course content. In addition to this outline, Appendix A
contains the visual presentation material used by the instruct01
during the broadcast.
I.
Historic perspective on the evolution of automatic flight

control systems
II.
FARs covering AFCS: What is and isnt covered
III.
Safety: Basic concepts and definitions and design

approaches
IV.
Manual airplane control, basic flight, and control

dynamics of conventional airplanes
V.
Stability and control augmentation, control theory

fundamentals
VI.
Automatic control modes
IVl Self-Stud> Course

Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
II
What Are
Some Good
References?
VII.
Control algorithms functional structure, design

provisions
VIII.
Sensors, sensor information blending
IX.
Automatic landing, function, performance, design

implementation
X.
AFCS function hosting, system hardware architectures,

analog/digital computers, actuators
XI.
Design assurance strategies for hardware and software;

failure prevention/tolerance strategies; failure detection,
identification, and isolation
XII.
Fly-by-wire design concepts and issues
XIII.
Automation safety: issues with current state-of-the-art

AFCS design; design limitations; operational problems;
root causes
XIV.
xv .
Needed design standards improvements

Future functionallv d integrated designs and systems
architectures
The instructor has compiled the following references foi

automatic flight control systems.
Flight Controls. Concepts. and Methods, Lambregts, A. A.,
1996 Annual Report Netherlands Association of
Aeronautical Engineers (KNVL). Available from the
author.
Vertical Flight Path and Speed Control Autopilot Design Using
Total Energy Principles, Lambregts, A.A., AIAA paper
83- 2239 CP
Automation Safety: Needed Design Standards Improvements,
Lambregts, A.A., Presentation at the FAA LA DER
Seminar, September, 1998. Available from the author.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
Januap.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
12
I VT Course Orien tution

Elements of Airplane Performance, Ruijgrok, G.J.J., Delft
University Press, 1990.
Airplane Stability and Control, Abzug, Malcolm J. and
Larrabee, E. Eugene, Cambridge Aerospace Series, 1997.
Aircraft Dynamics and Automatic Control, McRuer, D.,
Ashkenas, I. and Graham, D., Princeton University Press,
1973.
Trends in Advanced Avionics, Cur-ran, Jim, Iowa State

University Press, 1992.
Aircraft Flight Control Actuation System Design, Raymond,
E.T., and Chenoweth, CC., SAE 15609 l-376-2.
Aviation Safety and Pilot Control-Understanding
and
Preventing Unfavorable Pilot Vehicle Interactions,
National Research Council, National Academic Press,
1997.
Accidents Direct Focus on Cockpit Automation, Aviation

Week, January30, 1995 and Studies Highlight
Automation Surprises, February 6, 1995.
Integrating Human Factors and Automation with Progress in
Aircraft Design and Flight Management, E. Tarnowski,
Airbus Industry, reprinted in Aviation Safety, pp 169- 187,
1997.
IVT?Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
I3
Self-Assessmentand Exercises
III.
Self-Assessment and Exercises
Pre- & PostCourse SelfAssessment

Questions
The instructor will ask you at the begining and end of the
presentation to respond to the following five questions a.bout
. automatic flightcontrol systems.
Rate your confidence Levelfor each of the following statements
before and after completing the course.
1.
I know the basic AFCS certification regulations and

understand design concepts and failure protection
provisions needed for safety.
Very
Confident
BEFORE
THE
q
q
COURSE:
COURSE:
Moderately
Confident
q
q
Not
Confident
q
q
AFTER
THE
9
A.
I understand the basic AFCS modes of operational and

known safetv issues associated with the use of current
AFCS designs.
Very
Confident
BEFORE
THE
q
q
COURSE:
COURSE:
Moderately
Confident
q
q
Not
Confident
q
q
AFTER
THE
3.
I understand the basic AFCS design safety assurance

process, what tvpes of design analyses documentation
are needed for certifjcation, and where to find the
guidance materials.
Very
Confident
BEFORE
AFTER
IVT?Self-Study
Course
THE
THE
COURSE:
COURSE:
q
q
Moderately
Confident
q
q
Automatic
January.
I999
Not
Confident
q
q
Flight Control
Systems
14
Self-Assessment & Exercises

4.
I can review, understand, and assessa complete

automatic flight control system description,
performance, and safety analysis documents that arrive
in the office for certification approval.
Very
Confident
BEFORE
THE
COURSE:
COURSE:
Moderately
Confident
Not
Confident
III
III
AFTER
THE
5.
I understand the weaknesses in the current AFCS designs

and know what operational safety aspects need to be
addressed in the planned regulation updates.
Very
Confident
BEFORE
AFTER
IVT.Self-Study
Course
THE
THE
COURSE:
COURSE:
ModerateI!
Confident
Not
Confident
cl
Automatic
Januar1,. 1999
Flight Control
Systems
IS
---
Self-Assessment& Exercises
Job-Related
Exercises
After viewing the IVT broadcast with the support visuals in

Appendix A, complete the following questions to test your
knowledge about automatic flight control systems.
You can check your answers beginning on the page that
follows the questions.
1.
What do the regulations say about automatic control

a. Functions?
b. Modes / mode interactions?
c. Hosting of modes?
d. Use of control surfaces?
e. Performance?
3
-.
How does a conventional airplane respond to an elevator
control input?
3.
How does a conventional airplane respond to a throttle
control input?
4.
How did the functional use of elevator, and throttle for

certain automatic modes come about?
5.
What is the pre-requite condition for the autopilot to be

able to control flight path ? What will happen when this
requirement is not met?
6.
Can the autothrottle control speed unconditionally?
7.
What led to the development of the full flight regime

autothrottle?
8.
Name some of the recurrent complaints about autothrottle

designs.
9.
Why is the VNAV mode running into performance

problems when controlling to a predicted idle descent
path?
I VT Self-Stud>, Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
16
10. What is speed stability and why is there such a
requirement for manual airplane control?
11. What happens to speed stability when the autopilot path
mode is engaged? Is there an equivalent substitute for
speed stability?
12. What variable speed or altitude is the most critical to
control?
13. Which variable can be controlled faster, speed or altitude?
Why, how?
14. How is the autopilot stabilizer trim different than the pilot
trimming the stabilizer manually? What are the
consequences?
15. Which automatic control modes are considered flight
critical?
16. What are the underlying assumptions for the operational
safety of the non-critical automatic control modes?
17. Name key design provisions that are used to assure that no
single automatic control system failure, or combination of
failures not shown to be extremely improbable, can
prevent continued safe flight and landing.
18. What is a transfer function?
19. What is the significance of the denominator of the transfer
function?
20. What role does the numerator of the transfer function play
in the system stability and command response?
2.1. What design strategy is often used to alter the command
response without altering system stability?
IVT Self-Study Course

Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
17
22. An overshooting response to a step command is caused
by:
a) Low system damping.
b) Ill-conditioned numerator of the transfer functi,on.
c) Possibly both.
23. What design strategies may be employed to quicken the
response to a step command?
24. What design element is used to assure steady state
command tracking under a variety of trim conditions?
-35 . What possible design problems can be encountered when
using integral control of error feedback?
36. What non-linear control algorithm design elements are
often used? Why?
37. Whve is a pitch attitude command limit often ineffective as
a safety devise?
28. What has led to the recent questioning of the safety of
automation designs?
I?9 . Name five automation safety issues.
30. What is envelope protection?
31. What are some of the limitations of single-input/single
output control?
3?3-. Name some of the consequences of a not fullv4 automated
rudder?
33. What are possible advantages/disadvantages of a multiinput/multi-output control strategy?
34. What additional automatic control design elements are
needed to reduce critical dependency on the pilot for
operational safety?
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
I8
Answers
1.
I.7
3.
Nothing about functions; nothing about modes;

inappropriate mode combinations should be locked out;
nothing about control mode hosting; nothing about the use
of control surfaces and performance; FAR 25.1309 states
that a system should be shown to perform its intended
function.
A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of
freedom to an elevator control input: pitch angle, speed,
and flight path.
A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of
freedom to a throttle control input: speed, flight path and

pitch angle.
4.
Flight path control (Altitude Hold/Select) autopilot

development using the elevator came first, next ILS glide
slope control; speed control on elevator were also
developed; tinallvI the approach speed control using the
throttles completed the first round of SISO flight control
automatic control modes in the vertical plane.
5.
The airplane must be on the positive slope part of the

speed-drag curve in order to provide sustainable flight
path control, without speed runaway. If, in the process of
controlling flight path the speed drops below the minimum
drag speed and the drag rises above the thrust, the
autopilot path control will tend to induce airplane stall.
6.
No. The control authority of the autothrottle is limited at

best to - .25 g (level flight), allowing active speed control
only as long as the autopilot path control keeps the flight
path angle within the steady state climb/descent
performance boundary. However, it is generally possible
to select autopilot vertical path commands (in principle 90
degrees vertical) that far exceed the needed thrust to
sustain speed.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
Januar!..
1999
Flight Control
Systems
19
7. The desire to fly at minimum drag speed in cruise, for best
fuel economy. At minimum drag speed, the airplane
becomes neutrally speed stable when the autopilot controls
the flight path, any flight path correction will result in a
corresponding speed deviation which tends not to self
correct, requiring high pilot workload by the pilot
manipulating throttles to control speed. The full-flight
regime autothrottle development was the answer to the
problem, but not the answer to the pilots prayer.
8.
Recurring complaints by pilots about autothrottles include:

a. Throttles are much too active, especially when there
is turbulence
b. Autothrottle does not maintain speed close enough,
especially on approach in turbulence and windshear
C.
Autothrottle is pretty dumb: it does not take airplane

energy situation into consideration
d. Autothrottle and autotpilot exhibit too much control

coupling, causing undesirable flight path, speed and
throttle gyrations after small disturbances 01
command inputs.
9.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
When thrust is .at the limit, the elevator can control either
flight path or speed, not both. At idle thrust the steady
state control of flight path by the elevator away from the
idle thrust flight path angle will cause large and
unacceptable deviations from the intended speed.
However? the elevator can be used to control the speed
without any restrictions, but the idle descent inertial flight
path angle will be affected by airplane weight,
configuration, and wind conditions.
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
20
10. Speed stability is the desirable characteristic of an airplane
to return to the trim speed when the control column is
slowly returned to neutral, after the airplane is first
maneuvered away from the trim speed by an initial
column input. Speed stability is required for safety during
manual control, to help keep the airplane within a safe
flying speed envelope.
11. When the autopilot path control mode is engaged speed
stability may be defeated, if the airplane is operated at or
below the minimum drag speed. The only compensating
safety strategy is to turn on the autothrottle speed control,
but even the autothrottle cannot always prevent a speed
run away if excessive flight path commands are selected.
l3A. It depends. Maintaining speed is essential for safe and
controllable flight. At low altitude obstacle clearance and
flight path control, to touchdown on the runway becomes
an equally important objective. For up and away flight,
maintaining the assigned altitude is an important safety
concept for safe air traffic control, but when caught in an
emergency (e.g., engine out), maintaining safe flying
speed is more important than maintaining assigned
altitude. In a life-threatening windshear close to the
ground, it is preferable to allow speed to bleed off to just
above stall in order to avoid or postpone hitting the
ground, but not further, because a stall close to the ground
virtually assures a crash.
13
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Speed and altitude are both energy-related quantities that

can be changed equally fast (in relative energy level) by
the throttles. At constant thrust the use of the elevator
changes altitude and speed in equal and opposite quantity,
in terms of energy level change (no net energy change).
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
21
14. The autopilot trims when the flight path control algorithm
computes a continuous command that is greater than a
certain threshold, therefore, it will continue to trim even if
the power setting for the airplane is wrong to sustain the
commanded flight path. As a result, the airplane can end
up far out of trim relative to the intended speed. The pilot,
on the other hand, trims the airplane to trim the control
forces to zero for the intended speed he wants to fly. This
means that when the airplane departs the trim speed, the
pilot will need to hold a control force to keep the airplane
at a speed away from the trim speed. This is a safety
feature so the airplane will naturally return to the trim
speed if the pilot relaxes his control force.
15. Only the Category III automatic landing function is
considered flight critical, because in that case the pilot
cannot be expected to provide adequate backup for a
failure of the automatic flight path control function and
assure continued safety of flight and landing.
16. The underlying assumption for the safety of the noncritical
flight control functions is that the pilot can and will
correct any failure or malfunction of the automatic flight
control system, to assure continued safe flight and landing.
This implies that at least one of the crew-members must
monitor the operation of the AFCS continuously. Another
assumption is that the crew will operate the AFCS
correctly and within its intended flight and performance
envelope.
17. Limited-control authority (e.g. 1 g); split control surfaces;
parallel redundant functional paths; fail passive/fail
operational design concepts; in-line performance
monitoring/failure detection, identification and isolation.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
22
18. A transfer function is a mathematical function describing
the dynamic time-dependent relationship between control
input and a specific control state variable output.
19. The denominator of the transfer function describes the
characteristics of the dynamic modes of the system in
terms of natural frequency and damping.
20. The numerator of the transfer function does not affect the
stability of the system dynamics, but plays a very
important role in the dynamic response characteristics of
the system to a command input.
21. The command response of a system can be changed
without affecting system stability by certain
rearrangements of the feed forward command paths and by
adding feed forward command augmentation functions.
33
--.
C. Possiblvd both.
33 .
Feedforward signal command paths, emanating from a

suitable response model, fed into the corresponding state
feedback loops.
34. Integral control of the outer loop error feedback is often

used to assure steady state tracking of the command for a
variety of trim conditions.
25. Integral control of outer loop error feedback will add a
low frequencv control mode; it tends to destabilize the
existing modes; if no special design implementation
provisions are made, integral control can add a zero in the
numerator of the transfer function of interest, causing a
whiplash command overshoot characteristic.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
23
26. Non-linear design elements often used in control elements

include:
a. Signal amplitude limiters (e.g., pitch or bank angle
command limit).
b. Rate limiters -- to slow down or smooth out control
responses.
c. Mode switches with associated mode logic (e.g., to
control the capture and tracking sub modes of a
control algorithm).
-37 . A pitch attitude command signal limit is often ineffective
and sometimes dangerous because:
a. Such a limit is often placed on a proportional control
innerloop, where there is no assurance the error signal
between the command and the feedback will go to
zero, because of steady state control surface trim
requirements and other non-zero steady state
feedback signals downstream of the command-limited
control loop.
b. It is verv difficult to dynamically compute a correct
pitch attitude limit based angle of attack and flight
path angle performance limits, because of turbulence
and wind effects.
c. An arbitrary static limit may not prevent stall or allow
available performance extraction under all possible
flight conditions.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
Januar\,.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
24
38. A string of catastrophic accidents and incidents involving
automatic flight control systems and crew-systems
interfaces:
a. A320 accidents near Strasbourg and Habsheim
b. A330 accident near Toulouse
c. B747 incident of spiral dive over Pacific
d. B737 shutdown of remaining good engine
e. A300 accident neat Nagoya
f. A310 accident near Bucharest
g. Etc.
39. Significant automation safety issues include:
a. Autopilot flight path control without consideration of
available performance (thrust) and effect on speed.
b. Loss of speed control due to lack of control priority
strategy when thrust reaches limit.
C.
Autopilot flight path control causing speed bleed

down to stalrwithout warning or timely disengage.
d. Lack of disengage logic for condition of imminent

control authority limiting, causing function failure.
e. Crew difficulty in judging adequacy of system
performance due to control strategy that differs from
the manual control strategy.
f. Operational complexity making it difficult for the
crew to maintain situation awareness.
30. Envelope protection 1sa aeslgn provtston to assure mat tne
airplanes speed, bank angle and normal acceleration will
remain within the safe operational envelope.
I VT Self-Study Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
25
3 1. Limitations of single-input/single output control strategy
include:
a. Undesirable control coupling
b. Unnecessary high controller activity
c. Loss of control when controller authority limit is
reached
d. Lower performance
e. Possible violations of envelope limits not directly
controlled by SISO mode (spill over)
32. The incomplete automation of the rudder means that the
pilot must be vigilant to provide dynamic compensating
for asymmetric thrust. The autopilot must be turned off in
case of an engine failure and the pilot must manually
retrim the rudder before he can re-engage the lateral
autopilot. Difficulty of trimming sideslip to zero,
especially in asymmetric trust or lateral imbalance
conditions (no sideslip instrument).
33. Advantages of multi input-multi output control strategy:
a. Precise control command coordination to achieve
decoupled command responses
b. Lower gains, higher/smoother performance, better
design robustness (gain/phase margins)
c. Better control/design strategies providing more
functionality with simpler more generalized design,
e.g. flight and performance envelope protection based
on control priority and control authority allocation,
inherent engine out dynamic compensation and
automatic rudder re-trim.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
26
34. To reduce critical dependence on pilot to assure safety of
automatic flight systems, future designs will need:
a. More general mimo control strategies.
b. A generalized reusable functional architecture that
allows up-front integration of modes using standard
building blocks.
c. Built-in performance/flight envelope protection
functions, covering all modes.
d. Fully automated rudder, providing inherent functions
of yaw damper/turn coordination, asymmetric thrust
compensation, automatic rudder trim, etc.
e. Better performance and failure monitoring with
suitable system state annunciation and timely
automatic disengage, if needed.
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
27
Appendix A
Appendix A

Presentation Visuals
IVT,Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A
Appendix A
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT
CONTROL
FUNDAMENTALS
Anthony A. Lambregts
National Resource Specialist
Advanced Controls
1.
23..
.$
b;:b .
*l&; 2.
*G= :;p
h
3.
5$@id
.v;..
Historic perspective
on the evolution of
automatic flight control systems (AFCS)
FARs covering
AFCS:
What is/isnt
Safety: Basic concepts

design approaches
covered
& definitions
and
4. Manual airplane control, basic flight and

control dynamics of conventional
airplanes
5. Stability and control
theory fundamentals
augmentation,
control
2
IVT,SeIf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authority
Automatic
Januaq.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
Al
Course
6. Automatic
Outline,
control
cont.
modes
7. Control algorithms
design provisions
functional
structure,
8. Sensors, sensor information

blending
(c,~
.
<i;b
b:,
$+@
III
9. Automatic
landing, function,
q-g-.
performance,
design implementation
:?> 10. AFCS function

a,
51
?h
f,A
-,;
.
architectures
a:+;;
2
1-q
*-
Analog/digital
Actuators
hosting,
system
hardware
computers
11. Design assurance strategies

and software
Failure prevention/tolerance
l
Failure detection,
12. Fly-by-Wire
identification
design
concepts
for hardware
strategies
and isolation
and issues
A
IVT;SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A2
Appendix A
13. Automation
safety: Issues with current
state of the art AFCS designs
l
Design
limitations;
Root causes
14. Needed design

52
a, . 1;9
b&.
h
.L...
%.@<.
7I
operational
standards
problems
improvements
15. Future functionally

integrated
and systems architectures
designs
s Historic Piecemeal Evolution

of Automated Functions
&
+ 1909: Wright stabilizer

:+ 1920: Sperry attitude
patent
stabilization
y&a
,I + 1930: Speed and heading angle modes
+ 1930 - 1960: Continued automation
34,
%
:p
&.
Elevator;
ailerons;
+ 1960s:
Fully automated
liil
... 1980s:
Flight management
system
rudder;
throttles
flight control
computer
6
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit>,
Automatic
Januar>.
I999
Flight Control
Systetns
A3
Append.. A
&@p
*4 t: .
Traditional
Pitch Autopilot
and Autothrottle
Autothrottle
I----------,,---,
I---------e-----m,
I
Autopilot
I
I
5,
y*
@CT.,
I,
$C&.
$3.r&,
I
;&
+,
$&$I
c+l+
I
-j
Elevator
I Control
j
i
:
I
Actuator
;T.cl
I
I
I
I
I
---a-------_-----
j??
Airplane
;
1 I
I
*cum;; .,
:
$?.
A:+& I
1/i> -I
Traditional
i Outerloop
Roll Autopilot
Modes
IVT Self-Stud\: Course

Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A4
Appendix A
&$p
9& ,
FARs and ACs Affecting

Automatic
Flight Control Systems
FAR 25.1329 and FAR 23.1329 - Automatic

AC 25.1329-IA - Automatic
(being revised)
Pilot Systems
Pilot
Approval
+ AC 23.1329-2 - Automatic Pilot Systems

,J+ Installations
in Part 23 Airplanes
+ AC 20-57 - Automatic Landing Systems (ALS)
+c+ AC 120-29 - Criteria for approval of Category I and
Category II landing Minima for FAR 121 Operations
f&J<,
I
kg&T.
L,;y.
/_
(being revised)
:a
y-g+
i
9
+
S.
3
:;;~>a
;$,&;:r
~,
g&:
+
?-A
p+ +
AC 120-28C - Criteria for approval of Category Ill

WeatherMinima
(being revised)
AC 90-45 - A - Flight Management Systems
FAR 25.671 - Control Systems (basic mechanical
system requirementsjam,
etc)
+ FAR 25.777 and FAR 23.777 - Cockpit Controls
+ FAR 25.779 and FAR 23.777 - Motion and Effect of
Cockpit Controls
+ FAR 25.673 and FAR 25.675- Static longitudinal
stability; demonstration
+ FAR 25.177 - Static lateral stability
l( )
IVT.SeIf-Stud!,
Course
Automatic
Januar! . I999
Flight Control
Systems
A5
Appelzdix A

AFCS, cont.
+ FAR 25.181 - Dynamic Stability
+ FAR 25.629 - Aeroelastic
stability
+
>I,.
-$zps
2
.CSF,
%W..,
yf>r
I::;
$>.&-f;
+
+%%:g:
_,
c..
$,$b
,*
&$,
*rc*
*(
h
g*
$.;
,;Y,?.
Z*/
.
+
requirements
FAR 25.672 - Stability Augmentation

and
Automatic and Power-Operated
Systems
FAR 25.1309 and FAR 23.1309 - Equipment,
Systems and Installations
AC 25.1309-IA - Systems
(being revised)
Design and Analyses
+ AC 23.1309-18
- Equipment Systems and
Installations
in Part 23 Airplanes (being revised)
11
g;sp
T6,
3%Selected
SAE and RTCA
x.
_ + SAE ARP 4761 - Safety Assessment
$0
+&:+ SAE ARP 4754 - Certification
Considerations
for
,,
F$.r,
Highly Integrated
or Complex Aircraft Systems
a$.
_ 3% + SAE ARP 4975 - Autoflight
ry2
Guidance System
$;s;
&,
I
P&g-:
;,ci
._;-:,
(Autoflight)
Issues Discussion
(draft)
+ SAE ARP 5366 - Autopilot, Flight Director,

Autothrust
Systems (draft)
and
+ RTCA I DO -1788 - Software Considerations

in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
12
IVTSelf-Stud>.
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit>
Automatic
Januq..
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A6
AppendiMvA
@p
S-p?-,@,,;
FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329
Have quick disconnect

Not produce hazardous
flight path deviations
-During
-As
normal
- for both pilots

loads or
use
a result of malfunction
13
FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329
lb
7$?.
h .lP
~~~;
I,
$39
I%.
g51
;Q,h
<@y:,&.,:.
y&y
Have positive interlocks

improper operation
to prevent
Have protection against adverse

interaction due to malfunction
Not produce multiple
due to single failure
axes hardover
Provide mode indication,

switch position
other than
1A
IVTSelf-Stud),
Course
Federal Aviatiorl Author-it>,
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
S>.stems
A7
Appendix A
and autopilot
at all times
and corrective
l
action
Longitudinal
- Climb, cruise, descend:
3 seconds
-Low approaches:
1 second
I_
j&p
h-p-,
@g+
h
&c&.1*
;ry:,y
*?-
&
Lateral/directional
or maneuvering
AC 2513294A
q;,:,.
-, + Malfunction
yp2.
!&>,
I
Evaluate
i&g
l
2:.k./
g+-.
I
@&;
-%Gi
:.-I
flight
& 23.1329-2
test must
cumulative effects on one axis

due to any single signal
Evaluate cumulative effects on all axes
due to any single signal
Not result in dangerous dynamic
conditions
of flight path deviations,
speed and attitudes (23.1329):
Gi!*
i
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A8
Appendix A
-,c
9,.
AC 25.1329~IA
-.1
g?$.
!Gh
I
+ Malfunction
l
& 23.1329-2
test must
Evaluate oscillatory failures

frequencies
> .2 cps
Evaluate hardovers
feedback loop
for
due to open
Demonstrate recovery by over

powering or quick disconnect
&@,$.~
-t/J.
;. !I
:I+:Forces
for pitch, roll, yaw respectively

-%Qc 50, 30, 150 Ibs
$3
$Iy;
f<h
k::>
b$$.
Loads during malfunction
test and recovery
l
.a;P
$7
2&f;
I,
I
&,;L
%;$;
must not exceed structural limits, or An, = +I

unless analysis shows adequate structural
margins
Demonstrate
adequate annunciation
of
automatic disconnect
by aural warning (23.1329)
Demonstrate
intended function for
- All intended maneuvers
- Environmental
conditions,
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit>.
including
turbulence
Automatic
Januar) , I999
Flight Control
Systems
A9
Appendix A
+ For automatic
l
pilot instrument
Demonstrate lateral deviation due to

engine failures less than 3 deglsec,
with no hazardous attitudes
Demonstrate
-Vertical
-Altitude
satisfactory
deviation profile (coupled)

loss (uncoupled)
19
+ AC 25.1329~IA & 23.1329-2

+ AC 25.1329~IA - Being rewritten
:x;
,;P
#j&,
I + AC 23.1329-2
f@g;
.
i%
*%- Last rewritten in March 1991
0 _ Z.77
$&>.
I
i~jp~
l
--,.
^
More detail than AC 25.1329-IA

Spells out alternate means for
compliance with requirement to
demonstrate/evaluate
malfunctions
designs using electronic monitors
control authority limiting devices
for
or
20
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
Januaqf,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
AI0
--
.-
Appemliv A
@p
+.;
FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309
::+:Equipment, systems and

installations
must be designed
so that failure conditions
Preventing continued safe flight and
landing will be extremely improbable
kr
c &
pj$--sI
-Q>
I.&
I%+&;
I
p&$
*
:J.
;;r
;p
3%
1
,4,.
&:,;I
. Reducing crews ability to cope with

adverse operating conditions will be
improbable
21
FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309
;p
&&I
g:$$
y!-*
i
+ Equipment, systems and installations

must be designed to
l
Perform
intended
Provide
warning
function
of unsafe operating
conditions
Minimize crew errors due to controls,

monitoring
and warning means
Minimize hazard on single engine airplanes
due to probable malfunctions
Prevent hazards on multiengine
due to probable malfunctions
airplane
22
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January,. I999
Flight Control
Systems
Al I
Appendix A
$9 ;+iCompliance
must
&*
I-&
,A
Be shown
by analysis
or test
Consider probability of failure modes,

multiple failures, undetected failures
Consider effects on airplane
occupants
and
Consider detectability
of faults, crew
warning cues, corrective actions
9-3
4.,
..9-
+
T.,
,.:.:
c:!..,
r3;F
,:,
i?,. +
,-I.
w:h.
u,y
:
g;:;;
j;.
-*;,*:
1
(.
>.
&;;
.,,r
P
I&y:>::i&dw$~
+
Lb
I *
~g.$
w>s&..
&l i2
4$::
IVT.SeIf-Stud\:
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit\.
Defines FAIL-SAFE
design concept
Provides definition of terms

(catastrophic,
major, minor failure
conditions,
associated probabilities)
Provides compliance guidelines
based on system complexity
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
Al2
Appenclix A
Summary,
cont.
+I:Defines acceptable design analyses

techniques, including
l
Functional
Hazard Analysis
Required qualitative and quantitative

safety analysis for various failure
categories and system complexity,
considering
environmental
conditions,
latent failures
25
it:+
AC 25-l 309-l B & 23.1309-l
I.,
0:*Provides warning guidelines
.A
4,
I<..
*:.-:
,:;;:-,
~.
h systems, controls, monitors,
Y.:6
-+f+:
la.)h L$.
Unsafe operating conditions
@
@T;$;
: I~
IVTSelf-Stud\,
Course
for
for
Automatic
Januar?.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
Al3
Appendix A
Whats
NOT in FARs
flight control
l
Definition
of functions
or modes
Minimum required set of functions

Partitioning
of functions
between
automatic flight control sub-systems
-
.:<p
system
Autopilot
Autothrottle
Flight management
system
Primary and secondary flight
displays
27
Whats
NOT in FARs
(.&.+ Performance requirements

,
+ System integration requirements
,:$5
l
::3>
2
l
Operations concept: how should

mode and mode display function
Regulations
or guidelines
each
about
-Mode overlap
-Crew- machine interfaces
Hardware architecture/redundancy

Automatic
Januar>.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A14
Appemlix A
Whats
::+Specific
NOT in FARs
automation
safety
Lock out of incompatible
modes
Mixed manual and automatic
modes
- Pitch / roll control

-Pitch / throttle control
-;-.. :.y
ifi;+:
@~~;:~
I,
Q&,
.y.
- Roll I yaw control
Thrust limited climb/descent

performance envelope protection
Whats NOT in FARs

and ACs?, cont. .
h*$&,p6%
IIi:
ci;.
:,
&.;,f.X
L,,a,,
&?Ati
III +
*.&J
.>
pii !$?a
.i;<
r/
$,h
9:
b-:
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Maneuver
Performance
limits for normal operation

and failure monitoring
Mode reversion and automatic

disengage criteria
Automatic
System disengage
system
I manual trim operation

on pilot take over
30
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
S>rstetns
Al5
Appendix A
-..
Design
Safety:
Definitions
impact on safety or ability of flight crew

f:+Major Failure Condition:
Significant
reduction in safety margin and/or ability
of flight crew to cope; higher workload or
physical distress
continued
safe flight and landing

31
Design Safety:
Definitions.
cont.
(FHA):
h,-.+Functional Hazard Assessment
*L
,
:+>
High
level
system
examination;
classifies
:A_,
g$$
;;:+:
Q&
).
t
effects of functional failures, determines
?T
:4h 3 need and scope of additional analyses
$:;F);2..
$+~$%
*.,$G
*I!
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis:
Structured inductive analysis; describes
failure of function, component, mechanism,
effects on system and safety of aircraft
32
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit\,
Automatic
January,, I999
Flight Control
Systems
Al6
Appendix A
Design Safety:
Definitions. cont.
. i:+:Fault Tree or Reliability Block Diagram
Analysis:
Structured top-down analysis;
identifies all contributing
faults and
probabilities
to determine overall
probability of defined failure condition
iq$$$$ ,:-,
-2, +. .
+ Redundancy:
Presence of more than one
independent
means for accomplishing
given function or flight operation
33
Design Safety:
Basic ConceMs
failures not shown to be extremely improbable,

@ will prevent continued safe flight and landing
&E;;
h
ifgrg?J;
(AC 25 13294A paraphrased)
1-
: Fail passive:
System will disconnect
for any
single failure that interferes with its intended

function, without significantly
reducing pilots
ability to cope with the resulting situation and
continue safe flight and landing
IVT:SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
34
Flight Control
Systems
Al7
Appendix A
::+iFail operational:
System will continue
to perform its function, without pilot
assistance or actions, after any single
shown to be extremely improbable
Critical function:
Function whose failure
would prevent the continued safe flight
and landing of an airplane (AC 23.13094 B)
35
Design Safety:
::+Essential
function:
Function
cope with adverse

(AC 23.1309-I B)
operating
whose failure
conditions
3
fik;;
g&h
&,v.
Y +. Extremely improbable:
Probability
occurrence < I* 10 E-9
Improbable:
occurrence
Probable:
of
I*10 E-5< probability

c I*10 E-9
Probability
of
of occurrence
>I*10
E-5
36
IVT!Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A18
Appendix A
+ Flight Critical
::+iNon-flight
functions
- CAT III autoland
Critical
- All other automated
+ Limited control authority is used to

assure that pilot can cope with any
failure of the non-flight critical
automation functions
Qyp:7!;
-4,G: I...
Flight Critical / Non-flight

Critical Design, cont.
,,
-+ Pilots have full burden of operational

safety for non-flight critical
automation functions
+ Operational
l
Correct
safety depends
on
use in normal operation
Correct pilot response if unsatisfactory

operation is encountered
38
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A19
Appejz dik A
f:+.:Fail-safe
provisions
Redundant load paths

In-line monitoring
and disconnect
+ Redundancy
of functional
elements
Dual with
- Equal force authority--fail

- Comparison
monitor
passive
to disconnect
and alert pilot
Triple or dual-dual
- Detection,
identification,
elimination
of faulty
element
39
8; p&q
v.&y$
_*
R Basic Design Approaches
for
Sizing of individual actuator force and servo

torque capability, e.g., lg single channel A/P
Splitting of control surfaces
pilot override capability of A/P & A/T
* Control algorithm G-limit, e.g., Fly-by-wire
airplanes
+ Placarding (operating restrictions)

+ Flight envelope monitoring
l
Stall, VmolMmo warning

Envelope protection for automatic
modes
40
IVTSeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A20
Appendix A
y = Flight Path Angle

m = Aircraft Mass
w/g
* v 5=TCOS~ - D - WSiny
Weight
L - Wcosy + Tsina
Level Flight Thrust And Drag
peed
Neutral Stability
42
IVT:SeIf-Study Course
January, 1999

A21
Appendix A
Longitudinal
Control
IF: (T - D)/W = Constant
energy
distribution
between
altitude
L = C, l/Z - vz,,
*s
C,= c/ -+c -a ; 1/2-P- V&7

(1
"
M
.a+v
..&I
41
G
P
1/2-P,,- v2,
c;
=F
& speed
= Lift coefficient
= Air density
pr1 = Air density

sea level
at
1
/ Vtrue= True airspeed
S
= Wing span
Ve
= Equivalent
airspeed
44
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A33
--
Appendk A
On Vertical Speed
Ymax
T max
hi mas
Down
py .,., xl.<, 1
-7&V
i
Ij.
Flight
Path Control
+: At constant throttle, autopilot

@ induces speed deviation
l
flight
idle
Using
path control
If speed stays above Vneutra,stability , speed tends to

recover naturally
If speed drops below Vneutra,stability , autopilot tends to
drive airplane into stall, unless pilot manages power
; At idle power, controllability

of a predicted idle
S : descent path through elevator is very poor
l
*,,I-?-,
Speed tends to diverge as result of flight path control,

the fundamental
reason for difficulties
experienced
in
VNAV idle descents
I VTSelf-Study Course
46
January, I999

A23
Appemh A
peed Control:
7~~~
-Rq.p*<
;* 1., %
4 @, T :
Observations
+j To maintain speed, Thrust controlled to

compensate for changes in FIight Path Angle
and Drag
Drag smallest of terms; drag changes often
negligible,
except due to flaps, gear, and
spoilers
..+:iElevator/stabilizer
sized to provide pitch and
trim control over entire flight envelope;
&
autopilot path control authority using elevator
p$&
%X@; far exceeds available thrust necessary to
&7 maintain speed
Yq,,
I
A7
@j;?
d A- Therefore,
?F.
&
i,I,
conditional
&;>
riv,:g,
,;*;,
autothrottle
speed control
on pilot or autopilot not
performance limit
is
:!S.. exceeding
$$%?*
.>T~$,
I
ff:
&+;Q:
- autothrottle
&i$,
*::I
1, + Fixed elevator/stabilizer
speed control may be unstable due to
positive thrust pitching moments
48

Automatic
Januar> . 1999
Flight Control
Systems
A24
Appendix A
Flight Path and Speed

,<
. +
A!
Using elevator to control flight path at

constant power setting does not always
work
:.+:Autopilot path control

speed stability
defeats
basic
;:+Using thrust to control speed will not

work satisfactorily
unless elevator
control is active
Flight Path and Speed

Control:
Conclusions,
cont.
@iip&j~:,
4. ii. Pilot must play a crucial safety
p .
p-&
during mixed manual/automatic
II
g&$
TC
Cf
role
operations
+: Elimination of operational and safety

limitations
in future designs will
require integrated flight path and
speed control with control priority for
limit thrust conditions and speed
envelope protection
50
IVT/Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A25
Appemiix A
Lateral Directional
Static Equations
cosp
7G
g;;*>,:
$@;
Sideslip
. .I0
=P
=0
Lateral Directional Static

Equations, cont.
Static
Side Slip
Weight
$$s T,+T,
= Drag
Fyr=
FY,
Current
IVT,Self-Stud)
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit)
LcOsq = Weight
F yf = Lsinv
M,
autopilots
do not control
= Mg
sideslip
Automatic
January.
I999
(I
47
Flight Control
Systems
A26
Appendix A
g@g
ub
,99
Lateral Directional
Static
View from Rear
P
Weight
1 Drag
= Lsinq
Fyt-xt
= T, -Ye
Current
= Weight
autopilots
do not trim the rudder

53
g+-:q$$;y
* ^j
,::@.
; Airplane Dynamic Model &
f%
4gp$,
.;,:l
State Variables
,I_
:p State variables describe linear (u,v,w) and angular

( v, 0, p ) and
@. % (p, q, r) velocities, orientation
I
p&f>>
position
(X,
Y,
Z)
of
airplane
relative
to specific
-,>q,?
reference coordinate systems
;3
$
IA
:t*+.J
3.
+ Three coordinate systems are used:
I
B
@&+z.
%&?.I
i>
1. Earth-fixed,
arbitrary coordinate
center
2. Airplane-fixed,
coordinate
center at cg (airplane
body axes), used for u,v,w and p,q,r
3. Airplane cg-centered,
axes aligned with initial
airplane velocity components
relative to airmass
~8:X, Y, Z (latitude, longitude, altitude):

airplane
position relative to earth reference system
IVT.SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.. I999
Flight Control
Systems
A27
Appendix A
axes:
X, Y, Z
Final aircraft body

axes: X, ,Y, , Z,
55
Kinematic
Relationshi
V = (r cosp +q sin p) lcos0

Q=qcosp-rsiny
Q =p+ y+sinQ
56
w-r Self-Stud!. Course

Federal Aviation Authorit!
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A28
Appendix A
1.
- nl( -q
w + r v) - \\
-I,,)
r.p
sin 0. cos V,
+I,,
.(r
-p)
- ni( -p 1 --q .u) +-\\ ~0s U~cos V
-(I,,.
-I,, ) .q .r I,,
+m(-r.u
6.
+p.w)
.(I+ p .q)
+W .cosO.sin
Izz t = ~J1z~,,,,-,,,,,,
+(I,, -I,! ) I) c(+I,, O-cl .r)
57
Stability to Body Axes

Transformation
;:+Aerodynamic
:> Axes System
forces defined
+ Equations of motion
% Axes System
defined
in Stability
in Airplane
!I+Stability to body axes transformation

5@ requires angle of attack (a) and side slip (p)
a= angle between X, axis and plane formed by
$b
:
airplane
velocity
vector
and Y, axis
p= angle between X, axis and plane formed

airplane velocity vector and 2, axis
by
58
I VT,Self-Study
Course
Automatic
Januar!,.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A29
Appendix A
Stability to Body Axes

cont.
Transformation.
<+iAccelerations
Therefore:
velocitv
irmass
always
inertial
Integrated
referenced
acceleration
and inertial
I$J+..
+v U V
c =air
l
39..1.
1&yr
tjv:;:
.-;:
t@@$;;
= air
= inertial
velocities
+ tsind
wind
(earth referenced)
Wair
wind
wind
9 Wwind
in earth axes)
W,,,ind
:* I
Angle of Attack and
W air
IVTSelf-Stud>.
Course
Automatic
Januaq,.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A30
Appen dik A
Control
Force and Moment

Dependencies
&q&VT
and propulsive
forces and
yw. + Aerodynamic
2x+.
,
moments generally non-linear functions of
kI;&:,
$+
.-.
basic state variables and control inputs
,>*,1
If force and moment dependency
functions
defined and all airplane states and control
inputs given, total sum of force and moments
can be calculated
In that case, these nonlinear equations solved
by numerical integration
techniques
using
digital computers,
assuming initial aircraft
states also given
For analysis, often necessary to linearize

equations of motions
In many cases, particularly
for commercial
aircraft with relatively low maneuver rates,
terms involving products of perturbation
states
are small relative to other terms; may be
neglected without appreciably
affecting resulting
dynamics characterization
For example:
l
l
l
IVT.Self-Study
Course
eq. 1: vr and qw
eq. 2: rp and r2, p2
eq. 3: pv
l
l
l
eq. 4: qr and pq
eq. 5: pw
eq. 6: pq and qr
Autotnatic
Januaq : I999
Flight Control
Systems
A3 I
Appendix A
::::Linearization
Change
specific
l
of Equations,
cont.
in force or moment/unit
change of
state variable called stability derivative
Derivatives X,,, X,,, X(,, X0 denote changes

along the X axis due to u, n, q,Q.
Derivatives
defined for all state variable
of force and moments equations
Assume
Divide eq. 3 & 5 through
Divide each equation
of forces
dependencies
vfI, wI!, po, qn, r, are zero and u = 1~ +
Result: linearized
y$j&+ eq. 5 in p, p
l
by rt,; neglect
by leading
equations
Au
A 1r.q and
mass or inertia
Au.r
factor
with eq. 3 in LZ,LZ and
r
P
b,, ...
... bZ2
Form:
IVT Self-Stud>, Course

-i- = [A]--;+ [B]. u
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A32
Appendix A
yielding
+ Controls
executed
aircraft
motion
time history
&AT = j&l (t) and 6,& = f;r,.,.,(t) may be

manually or automatically
unaugmented
airplane to understand
how to
improve responses by feedback and sometimes
feedforward
control augmentation
and how
65
Unaugmented
State equations
l
$J$.
@&v,
,s$w
i
@.;
>yPh
.:jq-
i = /A/
Airplane
l
x + /B/
ti
A (state transition)
matrix elements reveal
many of the dynamic system properties
B (control)
matrix determines
effectiveness
of each controller to influence each degree
of freedom
Larger off-diagonal
SD is relative to
on diagonal SD, more modes are
cross coupled
66
IVT/SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
Januar)..
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A33
Appemk A
Longitudinally
- determined by cr,,(Cm,)
Lateral-dir. - determined by ~(Cnp)
*+ Dynamic Stability:
See FAR23125181
Means that modes describing
dynamic system behavior have
positive damping
l
67
Linear Control Analvses

+ To conduct linear analyses on aircraft
responses for given control input requires
formation of specific transfer function of
,j&
vjgj&.
interest
!Ii
,p.
&%
y%
&$I
.
j$g+ Transfer function defines

output relationship
control
input to
& + Specific input to output transfer function

may be formed applying Cramers rule to
equations of motion, or by matrix algebra
IVT/SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A34
App enclix A
:T Linear Control Analyses,

l
Example:
AU
-
=
6,
e&-ff$Yr
ct[e.
f$& s@
h
t$@.
%.%,t
hp..
;c+
:I~gbg&
$r&
*<
h
!
r&.1;;
Tzw
v. ;
*c;
$$
j:Ev;;,<
,
-&.:
(4
F1p*
.I&;<
I
(polynomial
characteristic
cont.
in s)/h,
polynomial
in S
S is LaPlace operator, signifying

differentiation
(numerator)
or integration (denominator)
of
state variable with respect to time. Powers of
S signify successive differentiations
or
integrations
Numerator and denominator
polynomials
may
be factored into lSf and 2nd order elements,
yielding real and complex conjugate roots of
69
Denominator
roots called poles; poles also
referred to as eigenvalues
of system
Denominator
polynomial
(characteristic
polynomial)
is same for any transfer function
and determines natural frequency (03~) and
stability
(damping, < ) of system dynamic modes
Numerator roots called zeros; zeros only
affect time response shape, not stability
70
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A35
Appendix A
dynamic
l
behavior
of an aircraft:
Eigenvalues / poles and zero location in

complex plane; each real or complex pole pair
characterizes
a dynamic mode of airplane
. Root locus
l
Time response
simulation
. Bode or frequency
l
response
plots
Bode plots gain and phase margins/Nichols
charts
71
+ Computer control analyses

programs available to quickly
$9 perform any desired analysis
!Pt&
h
g$t?,
- MATLAB
I?G.
- MATRIX X, etc.
72
IVT%elf-Study
Course
Automatic
January,. 1999
Flight Control
Systems
AX
Appendix A
Unagmented
Characteristic
polynomial
qfh order in S
Factoring and rooting CP yield two 2nd

order rigid body dynamic modes
- Short period:
hp
Y
:r;
h
ay
c
:q,~
t+>
Airplane
- Phugoid
q=o-.I
cc)0 = h .5 - 1 seconds,
or long period:
Order of TF numerator
specific TF
L?+fP
<= .3 - .7
m 0 = -30 - 60 seconds,
depends
on
73
Unagmented
General Dynamic
Airplane
Characteristics,
cont.
.22++Lateral directional
Characteristic
yielding
polynomial
- Is order Roll mode
z = I/U
qfh order,
= -I
set
- lst order Spiral mode z = I/w = -10 -03 set

1) Mode sometimes
- Dutch Roll mode
IV-I- Self-Study Course

Federal Aviation Authorit:,
unstable
T, = 10 -m set
,wO= - S-10 set, c = 0 - .3
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A37
Appendix A
Location of pole in complex plane indicates

natural frequency cc)0and damping < of mode
a
IVT.SeIf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authorit:
=I
Short Period
i Imaginary
..... .. . ...__.....
ijw
I 4
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A38
Appendix A
Imaginary
Characteristics
IVTSelf-Study
Course
of
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A39
Appendix A
Transter
Function
Elements
,p-. Bode Plots (frequency

inteqrator:
(low pass)
1
S
differentiator:
(high pass)
1.0
gain
(W
(d b-*() z
+
y?@ Transfer
-20
t
phase +go
degr.
0
w radlsec
Function
T.7,
Bode Plots (frequency
f3 radkec
Elements
response),
washout:
(high pass)
0
gLin
NW
t
= -
t +*O/
t +*O\
gain 0
t
phase
(degr.)
response)
cont.
- r, S
: s+l
-20
\
+
CI) radlsec
phase0
Wegr.) 1.
-90 --------.L
+

w radkec
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A40
Appendix A
iggg;;
2
Transfer
-troae . Plots
rr. .
lead-lag.
Function
Elements
(frequency
response),
-&!cond
order
2 S+4ead-lag:
s2 + 2<,w, s + 0:
s2 + 2<202s
II)
tcu radlsec
+ 0;
+2
gain
w
phise +g() _--___.__
--------_
degr.
0-
cont.
phase
degr.
o
z
+mr
lad/set
-1 -1
rl rz
n egative
@I w,l
z, or c, changes
sign of num. phase

01
/, .,/
01
I
is
:.,
I
.k*
Transfer
:A
,_
,,.
Function
Analyses
&Sk.
&y+
+-&.:z
P
.&G
I.. + Given transfer function for unaugmented or
e*;
byfor augmented airplane, approximate
gain
9;~
cL..:* and
~>A
kQ&
phase plots may be sketched using break
%B&frequencies
i!&,<y.
q$&.
and asymptote
method
t!, + Computer programs quicker and more

necessary
9 accurate, but basic understanding
I%&
I J, for good control law design work
G&yI
@c
Negative z:or 6 in numerator - non-minimum
phase response (initial response opposite
-I
-,
I
(IL
IVT!Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A41
Appendix A
Unaugmented
Airplane
Observations
Basic airplane
Weight,
design
configuration
center of gravity,
Speed, altitude,
math
moments
of inertia
number
ne has unacceptable
HQ, may be
possible to improve characteristics
by stability/
command augmentation
83
Y~,$
::+.Stability augmentation
- way to externally
I&,
,,%?i,
hI ac*alter certain natural internal feedback s
t$::,:
%
(stability derivative) of airplane dynamic
T&
model
%&,
I
@+k
tr$y+
9;.
:.FPure feedback of existing aircraft states will
not change order of dynamic airplane model
Addition of dynamic elements in feedback
loops will change order of airplane dynamic
model
84
IVTSeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A42
Stability augmentation
sometimes used
to restore stability to desired level after
design configuration
and/or operations
decisions result in poor stability of
unaugmented
airplane
*.)*
1,.
*Ii!;a,,.
h
.<a,,,
+&f
L,2
-+-tqq
W
*
&I;,*
+@
h + Issue: Control authority and priority
i&&g
*.*_
L.
between SAS and pilot control
of+%
$9
Relationship
&z,,.
Open/Closed
Transfer
Loop
Function
Given TF G(S) of interest of basic airplane,

$+ loop TF may be derived using blockdiagram
closed
algebra
ssa, x,, = fxi - H(s)X,))G(S)

X0 (I + H(S)G(S))
;s+
;v
x,,
Xi
= Xi G(S)
G(S)
= 1 + H(S)G(S)
Example:
g.
I VTISelf-Study
Course
G(S) =-$
G(S)
1 + K, G(S)
H(S) = K,
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A43
Appendix A
**i.
$&
.06 5 w,, 5 F.E.M: GM2 6db

+goo ...................................................... ........ ..........
I phase o
&$$..
f:
:.
:i
PM 2 45
co,, 5.06 : GM 2 4db
PM 130
-900
-1 800
87
qg&
-. :-: Pitch
:-.
,v;;$;;I I
Short
&$
!
-%c.
;>
?;
+.
!)?ig+
;
h
I,:L.9,
y*?y,
L&
damper- improves damping of

Period mode, feeds back pitch rate
and sometimes pitch attitude or angle of
attack to elevator on airplanes with
relaxed static stabilitv
+: Yaw damper- improves damping of

Dutch Roll mode on swept wing
airplanes, feeds back body axis yaw rate
to rudder
IVl Self-Study Course

Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A44
Appendi- A
++ Pitch Damper or Pitch Innerloop
Complex
conjugate
root
89
input
rl,rK, I-
1
IVTSelf-Study Course
Filter may be washout or bandpass filter

At frequencies
2 short period frequency a= 8
Reliability
and cost of sensors may affect choice
Possible to use lagged 4 in lieu of 8
Feedback - different response to turbulence
8 than
Q feedback
January,. 1999
Automatic Flight Control S>xtems

A45
Appendix A
Typical Yaw Damper
,_
3% Yaw damper
command
added in series with pilots
input
91
I +: Simplest modes used in early autopilots

$+
k..:
Pitch attitude hold (structure - see slide 89)
,g;
l
$w&.
*::<;$
L
Roll attitude
hold
Vertical
Vertical speed/fpa
. Go around
Altitude hold/select
ILS glideslopelflare
Vertical navigation
Lateral
Heading/track
VORllLS localizer
Lateral navigation
(LNAV)
l
l
(VNAV)
92
IVT Self-Stud), Course

Automatic
Januarq.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A46
Appendix A
fb :+.:Command or outerloop modes

cannot function without innerloop
feedbacks (simplest form: y / 8 and r / q )
+ In general, for any particular mode,
feedbacks are required, besides the
characteristic
mode feedback, of each
higher frequency state variable to achieve
satisfactory
damping and performance
& ?
. Feedback gains may be determined by
*p*
analyses, using transfer function I root
!:a$ locus, time response; or modem optimal
g;,
y
con&o/ analyses techniques
q$;
3k:.,.
+p
Control surface effectiveness
change
generally compensated
by 1 I qc gain
schedule
I
f$&
,,,
94
IVT:Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A47
Appendix A
Control
Performance
+ Performance
requirements
generally
& desired bandwidth for control mode
specify
ii.! Bandwidth
indicates swiftness of response
follow up to a command; bandwidth (in radlsec)
is product of all steady state throughput
gains,
9 going around main control loop
integrations
in loop
96
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A48
Appendix A
5S change of innerloop feedbacks

prevent droop of h/h, TFfrequency
and
+ Integral control also compensates

for
innerloop sensor errors and needed trim
control surface position
+: Traditional designs use

proportional
+ integral control
on modes most outerloop
+ Approach
v-
IC
can lead to trouble

98
IVT,SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A49
Appendix A
6q&F
*: Nonlinear
Control Algorithm
+ Integral signal path reduces

damping, necessitating
low K,, resulting
in new low freq. mode
integrators
need proper initialization
and
HOLD submode to prevent windup
when control surface limits
99
+ Large step commands cannot

tolerate integrator, need u,-limit:
$$ designers often revert to non-linear
h
&&
design elements
4:
I.
*+.
l
CAPTURE and TRACK submodes
Switching
Limiters,
logic
rate limiters,
etc.
10(
IVT.SeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
AS0
Appendk A
+sz
k +g
Altitude
Appropriate
Hold/Select
&limit
difficult
Mode
to determine
@$&;..*\ r
Control
Vertical
IVT,SeIf-Study
Course
Mode Algorithms
Speed & Glide Slope Modes
Automatic
Januar4.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
AS1
Appendix A
i&g
? ,, A.
Stabilizer
Automatic
Trim
::+ Automatic
stabilizer trim ensures longterm
the elevator returns to faired position to
maintain control authority and minimize drag
+ Trim activated when elevator position
exceeds a threshold value for longer than
,:
+ Trim stops when elevator returns within a

*aA
&gF,
;j
threshold
band around neutral for a certain
I
c@+;
i.r
~
C,<
ueriod of time
Automatic stabilizer trim with

autopilot path mode engaged defeats
speed

trim/
stability
concept,
possibly
leaving airplane
disengage
out of trim upon A/P
Design integrity
failure)
(e.g., run-away
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A52
Appendix A
Command overshoot
Control activity
Acceleration
limiting
Tracking perf.
Loss of control
Poor energy
management
105
Lateral
Issue: 0.1. gain schedule

106
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A53
Appendix A
volume,
Rate gyros,
Vertical gyros,
IRU Euler angles
Accelerometers
::+In most cases,

sensor dynamics
are negligible
+ Air data sensors

l
,.
$
eg,
,ir..7
h~.<
-a;-;
,f
1*@
. .i
a,hyi..
weight
True airspeed/
Mach Number
Angle of attack
Sideslip
Temperature
107
Air Data Sensors

contamination,
icing, flow field effects,
maintenance
abuse
Not favored in flight critical
integrity issue
designs
+ Static PreSSure
side slip
sensor
sensitive
+I. Long pressure
tubes add significant
handling/
- reliability/
to position
error/
response
iags
@%. Remedies:
Probe heaters; L/R cross plumbing;
pressure transducers
close to probe;
complementary
filters
lot
IVT,SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authorit\.
January. I999

A54
Appelzdix A
Disturbance Rejection
Performance
f
ii: Control
* include
tracking
Sensor
Atmospheric
disturbance
(process)
sources
noise (high frequency)
disturbances
Dominant sources
- Windshear
- Temperature
l
.y )
gg,
-2..
Configuration
changes
Trim changes in pitch and power due to fuel

burn, speed, and altitude changes
$*q. Effects of Turbulence

,p
and Windshear
*q>;,c; :
1-:, ~
+
R.
:!@
$?a,
&q;;>.
&&i
(I.
Xi
b
.I,
+
pi+,<
h ,+
7%&+?,;
i
&,u G+
$g;;:Tr
&
I
Turbulence and wind shear are

distinguishable
only by frequency
Airspeed is affected directly by
horizontal gusts, indirectly by
vertical gust, due to energy transfer
through elevator control
1 II
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A55
Appendix A
Effects of Turbulence
horizontal
and vertical
path and speed control
gusts
bandwidth;
for
$3 Control Effectiveness
df.@&;
k-.
Turbulence
in
; open
gain-db
0
thrust
control
~C~~~~~~~
closes
.........
CA<.
:...................
ac%pen
......
.............
l.
.....
.;..+.
........
-20
Ah
CIR
loopi
x.&./-y,
. +3n
10
,lelevator
- u Pnntrnl
I .&II
....+.........
............................--...i..............
. ...i.......................
-20
:/:
.Ol
.;
i.0 Y
i
+ cu rad/sec
11;
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A56
Appeizdix A
Control Activity in Turbulence Versus

Speed Tracking in Windshear
Throttle
Pos
~sgllst
+
LO --/L
Increasing
gust filtering
--
2O/o/ft/s -
b
J0
L,
7
4h/(kn/sec)
+
ma
verror
Udofwindshe3r
113
W~,~i 7
T;q~;
Qi iy+
Effect of Horizontal
& Vertical
Winds
on Trim Thrust at Constant7J,

t+or descent causes change
gravity component along
in
Conclusion
weight
amplify speed
deviation
114
IVTiSelf-Study Course
January. 1999

A57
Appendk A
&;y
k y;,
Balancing
control
Flight Pat
and increase
throttle
activity
* + Traditional
autopilots
and autothrottle
systems designed independently,
without
regard to undesirable
control coupling
.+ Proper balancing of altitude/speed
tracking
and control activity in turbulence
requires
integrated design and correct turbulence
$p modeling and analyses
alancing Flight Path and Speed Control

in Turbulence and Windshear, cont.
+ Options
tracking
l
for balancing
performance
altitude and speed

in turbulence:
Synthesis of feedback signals

frequency-dependent
blending
inertial and airmass referenced
by
of
states
Pitch controller:
Choice of innerloop
feedbacks -- discussed for flare algor
Choice of altitude and speed control
bandwidths
(not good option)
llf
IVTiSeIf-Study
Course
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A58
Appendix A
Baro altitude
Baro altitude
rate
Inertial
speed
Inertial
acceleration
Geodesic
altitude
Geodesic
altitude
Vertical
Vert. airmass
fl pth angle
rate
acceleration
Inertial
angle of attack
Inertial
angle of attack
rate
Inertial
sideslip
= drift angle
Inertial
sideslip
rate
Vert. Inertial
fl pth angle
117
K$-K25f
K&K2$-+Kfi+l
K&l
+ K$+Kz$+K,S
+I
ill
IVTYjelf-Study Course
January. 1999

A59
App endix A
:::j
3
1%
Second
t+ Order
Third
Order
-%qy:
measure
2,.. + Accelerometers
b
;..
accelerations
due to contact
~@yQ&
*=:>
c
jp.
g-
IVT!Self-Study
Course
Using Euler equations
of motion:
e-sin
P I=-=
a,. + g.cos
-
forces
q
-r
Automatic
Januar>*. I999
Flight Control
Systems
A60
Appendix A
Classic Landing
Algorithm
Flare
GS control
4a
o-, innerloop
1
command
Flare control
0
Performance
issues
Flare initiation
. Terrain sensitivity
Initialization
0 Flare gains
0 Innerloop design
Note: Flare trajectory variation due to Vqround

may be eliminated by making K, (:) to Viround

Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A61
Appendk A
+ Classic flare algorithm can meet

performance
requirement of
AC20-57A (&&KS 1500 ft )
+ Variable flare initiation
not desirable
height is
~~,,
rl.:,%+Algorithms
with significantly
better
+;g:&
h Y performance and constant flare initiation
&.&$,
*&
height developed and flight tested by
F- NASA TCV program:
+ Variable Tau alg. with K, (:)Vgrou@q,. = 500 ft)
l
Explicit
Flare Trajectory
alg. @
2400ft)
x
Algorithms
use high gains and advanced
inner loop design for turbulence
rejection
124
IV? Self-Study Course

Automatic
Januar>,. I999
Flight Control
Systems
A62
Appendix A
Performance Improvement
Gust and Windshear
1o-2
10-l
FAEQUENCY
for1
I
10
w - RADt8EC
l3EWONSE OF h/u*
132
Trajectory:
/-:?
I:P
k! -k2.v 4k2
kI c -?k++ k,.y+ k, command
/&) = 2~
?
1
computation:
- h:.v=
0
Y
= I
-1 II
-*
s =
-\-;I- I =
--

A-,, = 0
v<; . clt
AT,, +
yn-, = y,,(l-
Automatic
January.
I999
v,;
k,V,
* at
. at)
Flight Control
Systems
A63
Appendix A
y,t*q
ww,.y
k
+$&
.,
Evolution Toward Full Function

Automatic Flight Control
requiring
airplanes exhibit poor speed stability,

cruise autothrottle
to reduce workload
+ Introduction
of Inertial Navigation System and
other function automation
reduced workload
+ Introduction
of EFIS and FMC in 1980s
+ lnadverfent
result; F/WC introduced
guidance and control algorithms
new set of
127
Current Architectures
IVTSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January.
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A64
Appendix A
Traditional Control Algorithm

Design Process: Observations
(2: In traditional
design process, functional and
performance
requirements
often dealt with by
separate design features
::+.iThis approach
quickly
leads to undesirable
mode
ince each mode/flight

condition approached
as
separate design problem, overall complexity
can
be overwhelming
and mode integration difficult
algorithms
etter way to structure

. ..
control
Process and Tools

vg&
,
F&
h
;;g;
conceptual design and

function integration critically
depends on human ingenuity
%
i:++
Correct conceptual design is

paramount
sc ::+Classic and modern design tools

give little insight in concept design
G and function integration
130
IVT/Self-Study
Course
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A65
Appendix A
;I+:Classical and modern

are both useful
;:+:Optimal
control
control
is misnomer;
methods
does not
:+:Linear design and gain determination

is
trivial - nonlinear design, mode integration
and design validation/verification
far
Avionics
Architecture:
...- m. .
IVT/Self-Study Course
January, 1999
Typical
132

A66
Appendix A
AFCS Digital Computer
IVT/SeIf-Study Course
January, 1999
Architecture

A67
Appendix A
lVT/SeIf-Study Course
January, 1999

A68
Appendix A
System Failure Probability

SYSTEM COMPARISON
WtTH AHRS IN LIEU OF
STRAPiX3WN
DultExCAK
PAmmE
8rnLW
to-2
WADWPLEX
DWLSUAL
. Hardware components
separate function
Parallel processing
Less opportunity
functions
of parallel functions
for undefined
Reliability/availability
related to complexity
January, 1999
for every
inversely

A69
9 Same hardware
. Parallel functions
many solutions!
. Need correct
. Software
l
for many functions

must be serialized
/ detailed
design
software
expertise
design
/ discipline
Overall effort shifts to validation

verification
is crucial
and
Control Actuation
positioning
actuators
+ Because of irreversibility,
system is used
+z-Actuator redundancy
flight critical function
an artificial
feel
needed to meet
reliability/availability
+I:As a result, manual/AFCS control

actuation interfaces can become complex
January, 1999

A70
Appendix A
Smart Actuator
Command
Typical Actuator
Voting (B-2)
Loop Closure (B-2)
I-
I*
KNICE I :UlW
-TION
I-#
i
,
K~RCEECUUIZER
I uz
s
-.
I -
c-l
142
January, 1999

A71
Appendix A
Actuator
Force & Rate Capability

(Typical)
VELOCITY
ACTUATOR
STALL
---v---
EXCESSFORCE
!
!
I
I
!
I
143
+- Must provide safety assurance

commensurate
with criticality of
loss of function
l
Flight critical function:

Pilot not
expected to provide sole safety
backup - safety must be built in
. Non-flight critical funcfion:

Pilot
assumed to be able to provide
adequate backup for safety
IVT,?SeI!-Study Course
January, 1999

A72
Appendix A
Design Safety, cont.

Hardware
component
Design (specification)
Design implementation
or software)
. Operator
error
error (hardware
error
Unacceptable/unsafe
failure
performance
145
@,
..+ Suitability of conceptual design

+ Validity of design requirements
(3 Correctness
+ Correctness
l
$@
Function as specified; no unintended function
+ Performance
l
,r
i,I
of design and specification

of implementation
requirements
Intended envelope
Specified environmental
within
conditions
:+.iFailure characteristics/management
!.+ Design error tolerance
:* Human operator error resistance/recovery
..4f
I VT/Se1 f-Study Course
Automatic
January,
1999
Flight Control
Systems
A73
Appendix A
. Airplane-system
safety assessment,
i.e., per SAE 4761
- Functional
System
hazard assessment
(FHA)
safety assessment
)) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)

)) Fault tree analysis (FTA)
)) Common mode analysis
1) Specific risk analysis
Random
hardware
failures
Similar redundancy
- Environmental
stress testing
l
Generic
errors
- Dissimilar
redundancy
January, I999

A74
Appendix A
Strategies,
cont.
Generic errors
- Requirements
validation
- Multiple version software
(parallel
/ series)
Software verification,
i.e., RTCA DO 1786
i:++
Hardware / software design
integration / acceptance testing
14s
Hardovers,
Common
Transients, and
Mode Failures
. Must be safe I manageable

- Single channel
-wJq$
E:.
<::
L
w Engage/disengage
- control
if not extremely
force/g-limit
authority
transients
9 Must be safe I manageable

- Issue:
Autopilot
1) Failure
monitor
disengage
logic
trip
)) Departure of design envelope (speed; angle of
January, I999

A75
Appendix A
Hardovers,
critical
l
Transients,
design safety
Examples:
Design error in
microprocessor
or in redundancy
management software
Need exhaustive design
sneak circuit analysis
. Reasonableness
l
checks
In-line/red-line
monitors:
Performance;
sometimes
. Parity check; memory

data wrap around
l
and
Watchdog
on sensor
values
Check function
uses function
model
check sum;
timer or heartbeat
Miscompare
design)
review/
check
(e.g., dual channel
fail passive
152
January, I999

A76
Appendix A
and Isolation,
cont.
. Majority voting: Need minimum of three

independent
sources (can include
analytically
redundant sources)
. Parity equations (e.g., skewed axes inertial
reference sensors:
Deselection of sensor
with highest residue)
+I: Definition:
Airplane control concept whereby
surfaces commanded
through electrical wires
Weight reduction
Lower maintenance
-. Design freedom to optimize aerodynamic
performance
by RSS and achieve standardized
handling qualities through SAS and CAS
Cost reductions
January, 1999

A77
Appendix A
FBW Genesis
+; Mid-1980s, Airbus developed

FBW control featuring
l
C* control
algorithm
. Speed and n,envelope

l
A-320 with
Sidestick
controller
Autothrottle
without
protection
with passive
throttle
feel
drive servo
155
+ Boeing followed
l
C*U control
algorithm
. Conventional
. Hydraulic
suit with B777 featuring
column/wheel/throttle
servo
feel; autopilotxolumnlwheel
January, 1999

A78
Appendix A
characteristics,
::K:Speed stability
HQ
or equivalent
safety
+:;Mode changes for up and away

and takeoff / landing
+ Manual and automatic
electronics
electronics
mode
bay versus remote

loop closure at actuator
January, 1999

A79
Appendii A
fl stick
throttle
..Boeing
......................?Vi
......
C* Criterion
in aircraft
l
c*
(n,),,
response
+
W,,kh
(C*-variable)
V,, speed at which contributions

( n z) PS and q are equal
of
. Assume airplane has good handling qualities

when response of C*-variable falls within
Appendix A
Feedback
of
I(
C*)dt = h + 8
provides path stability, but not

path tracking; there is no speed
Certification
based on equivalent
safety obtained by speed / angle
of attack envelope protection
161
lVT/Self-Study Course
Speed feedback causes n, /stick

response to be overridden long-term
by speed response, resulting in
conventional
delta V/stick command
Handling qualities deteriorate on
backside of drag curve due to
reversal of nz response
January, I999

A81
Appendix A
TYPICAL COMMAND RESPONSE

n,U algorithm HSCT .25 g pull-up
W=400k, &=I55 kn, gamma=3O
.
162
:+ Boon to airline economics
I safety
+I.Most automated airplanes

best safety record
have
;:+Recent publicity about accidents

and incidents involving automation
criticize automation, calling
human centered design
January, 1999
for

A82
Appendix A
;:+Most automation design deficiencies

rooted in historic systems evolution,
using incremental function design
;.+Poor control
l
strategies
Elevator flight path control without

regard to thrust
Loss of AIT speed control when at
. Automatic stabilizer trim - defeating

speed stability
. Inadequate control coordination,
high
January, 1999

A83
Appendix A
Deficiencies,
can overpower!
. Throttle wake up (automatic
Unsafe disconnects
+ Failure
l
engagement)
close to stall & out of trim
to disconnect
or annunciate
Vertical speed mode

improper thrust
Automation
cont.
when
fail due to
Design
No rudder control and trim for

asymmetric thrust
+ Inappropriate
control authority
limits - on pitch attitude
::+Unclear control references
(e.g, speed in A/T, A/P, FMS)
January, 1999

A84
Appendix A
Automation Design
Deficiencies, cont.
;.+I!
Inadequate mode status
annunciation
i:+Inconsistent
operation between
modes
+ Operational complexity leading
to pilot confusion / errors
use of control
f:+Over-reliance
automation
authority
on pilot as integrator
limitations
/ deficiencies
. Mixed manual I automatic modes

with altered safety
. Handling performance
limits and
failure conditions
January, I999

A85
Appendk A
Deficiencies:
Root Causes
Too many/overlapping
together by intractable
Poor / incomplete
and integration
. Flawed conceptual
processes
loss of control
function
automation
design
and design
will require
Better control strategy

integration
concept
modes, cobbled
mode logic
and mode
Fewer modes, elimination
Elimination
of mode overlap
of sub modes, simpler
. Better integrated
mode logic
mode concepts
- No open ended climbs/descents
January, 1999

A86
Appendix A
$9,
gT$,
* fg.i;
Needed Design Standards
- Autopilot mode control panel

- No mixed mode operation
. Better thought
out first & second
tier protection
- First tier: Performance envelope protection

- Second tier: Speed envelope protection
l
Fully automated
More effective
reconfiguration
function
. Mission;
rudder to handle thrust

failure monitoring/
management
strategy
operations;
functions;
systems
. Process management
Synthesis / analysis
January, 1999

A87
Appendix A
for commonality
- Up-front function integration
. Decoupled
l
Pilot-like
command
control
responses
strategy
- Energy efficiency
- Control authority allocation
. Envelope
safeguards
- Priority control on elevator when thrust limited

- VminNmax protection, covering alI modes
January, 1999

A88
Appendix A
Future Flight Control
Reduced system
maintenance
Systems
complexity,
less
Design portability:
Faster/lower
system development
Reduced
risk
customization
Less flight testing,
less pilot training
+ All-encompassing
control strategy
for all modes, including FBW manual
:+ Integrated pitch I thrust and
roll I yaw control
+ Consistency
of operation and
performance
between modes
and flight conditions
January, 1999

A89
Appendix A
Functionally Integrated
Architecture
Rational function
partitioning
No function
Simplified
Airline operations
Oriented functions
Path definition
. Altitude/vertical
Heading/track
spd
safety functions
reusable design
179
+ Outerloop control is a trajectory

kinematics problem; should be
designed independently
of airplane
characteristics
l
Conventional
design methods do not
cater to this approach
Output is a trajectory acceleration
command
January, 1999

A90
Appendix A
Outerloophnerloop
Design
Design Observations,
cont.
;:+Innerloop generates forces and

moments to satisfy commanded
accelerations
l
Feedback gains may need to be

compensated
for changes in the
airplane dynamics
;:+I;
Examples:
autothrottle
Altitude
control;
Concatenation of Control
LOOPS: Altitude Control
outerloop-
Control
authority
;e
(8
max
January, 1999
innerloOp
) depends
on max

A91
Appendix A
Loops,
cont.
:I+!Simple rule for bandwidth separation requirement

between adjacent loops can be derived; example:
K, (h, - h) - K, h = h, assume h, = - h, then
B: K, and K;, represent
bandwidth
::+ VP 154 shows
between
disjoint
of h and h modes
/ii and OC
+ Most designers ignore problem and adjust

feedback gains for each flight condition to obtain
satisfactory
bandwidth and damping
+ Physical insight allows more accurate solution:
January, 1999

A92
Appendix A
Control Mode Functional Architecture
consist of proportional
and integral terms with
scheduled gains to assure consistent
6 By placing integrator at innerlouterloop
boundary
and following preceding rules for concatenation
of control loops, a dramatically
simplified
provided that accommodates
modes by reusable building
all possible
blocks
control
18:
Integral
control
now
Requires V referenced
to V -0uterloop
in turbulence windshear
l
Issue:
Performance
186
January, 1999

A93
Appendix A
New Generalized
Airplane independent 0
design
0 Airplane tailored
design
Guidance
error
Normalization
(any mode)
* Innerloop
Force &
moment
* control
Targets
I I
I w
1I ---w
I
I-t
*
Design Process
* Control
Commands
Coordinatior
*
Airplane
--)
I
1 Feedback
L
Designed to provide:
Decoupled control
+
Standard trajectory dynamics
l
187
in speed and altitude

+ Pilots intuitively
speed control
decouple
flight
path and
;:+ Current automatic control modes fail to

account for control coupling; operation like
giving throttle to one pilot to control speed
and elevator to other pilot to control flight path
+ Both front side and back side control
technique exhibit same type of difficulties
January, 1999

A94
Appendix A
Longitudinal
Control
Revisited.
Consider elevator and thrust
l
Elevator
Control
b
In detail the process
cont.
control responses:
Decompose speed and

flight path errors into into
energy (throttle control)
and energy distribution
(elevator control)
components
Gather up terms to form
total control commands
works as follows.....
189
Total Energy Control
+ For any path mode, feedbacks are

normalized into flight path angle
command using loop concatenation
+ Likewise, for speed mode feedbacks
are normalized into dimensionless
acceleration command
IVTiSelf-Study
Course
Automatic
January,
I999
Flight Control
Systems
A95
Appendix A
use same normalization

gain constants
(first order mode control time constant)
y + ii/g
components:
+I!Elevator
controls
difference:
y - irlg
191
Total Energy Control System

Architecture
energy
control-
and Mode Hierarchy

i
energy
rate control
lizcd
and
r
mds
nation
19
January, 1999

A96
Appendix A
Total Energy Control System

Core Algorithm - Energy Rate Control
fq Airplane independent
design 0
10
Airplane tailored design
Specific Net Thrust
Pitch Attitude Command
TECS Algorithm
Features
+I.Energy Strategy achieves pilot-like
control qualify in automatic control
l
No inefficient
Decoupled
responses
Priority
throttle
overshoot
control
Simultaneous
maneuvering
free command
when thrust
limits
flight path/speed
at limit T
. Normal acceleration
activity
January. I999
maneuver
limit

A97
Appendix A
TECS Algorithm
Features, cont.
outerloop boundary, structured to avoid

cmd overshoot, satisfies VF 155
:+ Transient free mode switching;
no re-initialization
+ Complete consistency
between modes
and predictability
195
ALTlCAS
Descend/Acceleration
- _-_.---
ALTCMD
10 000
CASCMD
fl/sec*
THROTTLE
Modes, Combined
270
-4
55.0
Negligible
Throltle
Response1
196
January. 1999

A98
Appendix A
::+I!
When throttle
limits, elevator
. SPEED control,
dedicated
to
if in
- ALTITUDE HOLDISEL
- FLIGHT PATH ANGLE
TO I GO AROUND
. PATH control,
if in
- MANUAL FPA
- GLIDE SLOPE
)) Except when VMIN or VMAX becomes
)) Controlling speed mode
Go-Around Mode - Engage at 100 ft;

Weight, 560,000 lb; Flaps 30; Altitude Loss 31 ft
ALT 2000
-CAS
1000
n
VERT
ACCEL
fthed
HDOT
Weec
kn
15 THETA
-5
-15
-5
15 GAMMA
10
-30
-5
THROl-lLE 60
0
0.00
deg
5 ELEV
40
deg
deg
50
-5
10.00
20.06
30.00
40.06 50.00
Tlme,sec
60.'0&
70.00
60.00
60.00
-15 deg
100.00
196
IVT!Self-Study Course
January, 1999

A99
Appendix A
- High-Speed-Gl-ide-Slope-Capture-with
Flap Extension and V,,,Control
-____---_-__-. _-.. _,-..---_.--___
GSE 0.70
.- ---__-_ - .---------
-.--.--I
.__
0 GAMMA
0.00
-2
deg eo.70
ALT
-4 dog
2000
200 CAS
150
100 kn
FLAPP
deg
THROTTLE
deg
40
Down
20
GEAR
UP
55.0
6 ELEV
30.0
5.0
o -2
Time, set
deg
*..*
+ In speed priority mode, when thrust

is at limit, speed commands are
executed with limited longitudinal
acceleration,
so as to maintain
preferred part of energy rate for
vertical path control
January, I999

Al00
Appendix A
An Example
+ Y ) allowing
execution by reducing
temporarily
by half
by temporary
speed command
climb gradient
level off
ALTICAS Modes, Descent with

Su bsequeit--Deceleration
1
I
(100% Deceleration
Priority)
13 000
1t 10 ooo*
* - .a.=
I; ---~~...~z.x
-i
i
;.Y.~z,~,T,-----------
-C;t...., a**.. . ..*
\
\-Descent
CASCMD
kn
VERT
ACCEL
ftls2
THROTTLE
1
310 . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2ao---C--;--i
E.,-_ --2.
1 j
I
250
--_.
Rate Reduced
16 000 ALT
-13
I-
000
~10 000
it
to Decelerate
310 CAS
-------4.
IT**0
--
u25C
kn
50 HDOT
-4
-50
55.0
It/s
6 ELEV
2
deg
b2
5.0
deg
202
1VT/Self-Study Course
January, 1999

Al01
Appendix A
FBW Manual Control Implementation
FPA-Based
Augmented
Desired y Response
Manual Mode
for Constant
&,, Input
Good HQ requires
l
Low response
Good damping
Coordinated
response
lag Ty
y /z
No x. overshoot
Good pitch attitude
Time
January, 1999

Al02
Appendix A
TECS - FPA Augmented

Effect on 8, E
Manual Mode
a Response
basic TECS
FF command
augmentation
time
gains for desired
Velocity CWS Res-pans-es -to- GM b

Column
Pull/Push: B747-TECS-. __. __
-. ^._
Flaps
30 Gear
Down
I1
:MD
leg
.UMN
ICE
0.10
1 GAMMA
0.00
-0.10
-1
20
0 i--g..
lb
.*,I7
CAS
174
kn
lTTLE
deg
--
p
---,*
,,.. .*
_-*
LI
,. . . .. ..
------
*...
I\,
---
-8
11/S
6000
170
5000
166
4000
80
ALT
II
4 ELEV
40
-4
12
18
~~
24
30
.
36 1,
42
-.
48
-
.-.
54
-.
60
-----.
January, 1999
de3
.---.---
.-
deg
T 8 VERT
ACCEL
0
__-_-
206

Al03
Appendix A
Total Heading Control System

12 Architecture
and Mode Hierarchv
Roll Attitude
L1-Command
Command
Cross Track
Velocity Cmd
Generalized
Roll Attitud
and Yaw
Rate
Commands
Coordinatio
I
Cross Track
Deviation
207
6 Typical AFCS Mode Control Panel

Y
V.
::
Current Generation:
747-400
+I!No apparent grouping and hierarchical

ordering of related mode functions
:I+:No indication of command execution
status
IVT,SeIf-Study Course
January, 1999

Al04
Appendix A
Mode Control
:.+ Related functions

(.+:Mode & command
grouped together and ordered

execution status indicated
Integrated
Design - Payoff
strategy
for manual and automatic
++Primary flight display

enhancements
l
/VT/Self-Study Course
Panel with
Thrust / elevator
guidance
cues
cmd cues
January, I999

Al05
Appendix A
. Continuity
manual - automatic
control
Easier pilot monitoring
of automatic
+ Large cost reductions,
lower risk
Faster design cycle, less HW/SW, less
January, I999

A106
Appendix B
Appendix B
Course Evaluation Forms

There are two course evaluation forms in this appendix. Please select
the one appropriate for your course of study.
l
IVT broadcast
Self-study video course
If you are taking this course via IVT, then you will probably complete
the course questionnaire by using the Viewer Response System
keypad that youve been using during the course. Your IVT
instructor will provide directions on how to complete the course
evaluation.
IVT!Self-Study Video Course

January, I999

B
Appendix B
IVT COURSE EVALUATION

AIR - Automatic
Flight Control Systems
l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your
evaluation of the IVT course is important to us, and will help us provide the best possible
products and services to you.
Use your Viewer Response keypad to answer the following questions.
very
Good
Good
Average
Poor
Very
Poor
1. Length of course
2. Depth of information
3. Pace of training
4. Clarity of objectives
5. Sequence of content
6. Quality of course materials
7. Quality of graphics/visual aids
8. Readability of text on monitor
Press the Flag
IVT Course
Federal Aviation
key to indicate when you are ready to go to the next page.
Automatic
Administration
January,
1999
Flight Control
Systems
B-l
Appendix B
very
Good
Good
Average
Poor
Veq
Poor
10. Communication between

student and instructor
11. Applicability
to your job
12. Overall quality of the course
13. Overall effectiveness of the

I VT format
9. Effectiveness of instructor(s)
of material
14. Would you like to take other IVT courses?

A. YES
B. NO
C. UNDECIDED
15. On the keypad: enter your number of years of FAA experience.

(n irmeric answer )
Wlrenjinislretl,
press the Next Quest key on your keypad and answer YES, then Enter.
Additional Comments may be faxed to

the IVT Studio:
405-954-0317 / 9507
IVT Course
January, 1999

B-2
Appendix B
Self-Study Video Course Evaluation

AIR - Automatic Flight Control Systems
Original Broadcast Date: l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your
evaluation of the self-study video course is important to us, and will help us provide the best
possible products and services to you.
Date(s) You Used the Self-Study Video Course Package:
Number of years of FAA experience:
(Optional)
Office phone: (
Name:
For
the following. please completely darken the circle appropriate to your response.
Very
Good
Good
Average
Poor
3. Pace of training
4. Clarity of objectives
5. Sequence of content
6. Amount of activities/practice
7. Quality of course materials
8. Effectiveness of instructor(s)
9. Overall quality of the course
Automatic
Flight Control
1. Length of course
-.
?
Depth of information
10. Overall effectiveness of the

self-study video format
Self-Study Video Course

January.
1999
Very
PO01
N/A
Systems
B-3
Appendix B
11. Rate your level of knowledge of the topic before and after taking this self-study course.
Low
Moderate
High
Very
High
BEFORE THE COURSE: 0
AFTER THE C.OURSE:
Very
Low
12. What did you like best about the course?
13. What would you improve in the course?
1-t. What pre\,ious experience. if any. have you had with self-study courses?
0 None
0 Moderate
0 Considerable
15. Were you comfortable with the self-study video format?

If not. why not?
0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided
16. Would you like to take other self-study video courses?

If not. why not?
0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided
17. Additional comments:
PLEASE SEND THIS COMPLETED FORM TO YOUR

DIRECTORATE/DIVISION
TRAINING MANAGER (ATM). THANK YOU.
Self-Study Video Course
Automatic
January.
I999
Flight Control
B-4

Automatic Flight Control Systems

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Automatic Flight Control Systems

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Automatic

An Interactive Video Teletraining and Self-Study Course

Federal Aviation Administration

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CURRICULUM

IVT COURSE ORIENTATION

III. SELF-ASSESSMENT & EXERCISES

This document is to be used for both the initial IVT broadcast

Systems Engineering Curriculum

Systems Engineering Curriculum

What Does the

The Systems Engineering Curriculum fits into the broader AIR

The AIR Training

Within the context of the AIR Training Program, the Systems

IVT Self-Stud> Course

Promote standardization throughout the organization in task

In addition to the Service goals, the Systems Engineering

FAR airworthiness requirements that are the purview of

I t7eresulting Systems Engineering Curriculum structure

1. Two-Week Job Function Course

The Two-Week Job Function Course uses an instructor-led,

High-level overviews of 13 technical subjects are presented bv

An initial live four-hour IVT satellite broadcast with

Basic concepts and FAA-specific applications and examples

Advanced Display Systems/Heads-Up Displays

For mechanical engineers

Crashworthiness and Interior Compliance

Automatic Flight Control Systems

Complex Electronic Hardware

Lightning and HIRF Protection

Each technical subject overview is designed to not only

As a follow-on to the Overviews of Technical Subjects, the

System Safety Assessment

Reliability & Probability

These core technical subjects are essential to the technical work

Systems Engineering Curriculum

Dynamic Seat Testing

Interior Compliance & Crashworthiness

,IVT Course Orientation

IVT Course Orientation

Automatic Flight Control Systems is one of 13 Overviews of

IVT Course Orient&ion

Interactive Video Teletraining, or IVT, is instruction delivered

IVT Self-Stud>, Course

Appendix A contains the actual visual support material used

IVT Course Orientation

This course is designed for:

FAA systems engineers with a limited background in

Anthmy A. Lnmbregts received his BS and MS in aeronautical

IVT Course Orient&ion

What Will You

After completing this course, you will have a basic

AFC system architecture evolution; functional elements;

IVT Course Orient&ion

How Will This

A look at what is coming: future functionally integrated

At the end of this training session you will:

Have a background on the historical evolution of automatic

0 Understand the basic functional architectures of automatic

control systems: How they are put together, what the

Know where to look for automation design safetvd

The following topic outline is intended to give you an overview

Historic perspective on the evolution of automatic flight

FARs covering AFCS: What is and isnt covered

Safety: Basic concepts and definitions and design