People vs.

Macarandang
G.R. No. L-12088
Dec. 23, 1959
En Banc
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to enjoin respondent Judge from enforcing the preliminary injunction
issued by him against the members of petitioning union restraining them from exercising acts of violence and
intimidation in and around the premises of the San Miguel Brewery Box Factory located in Mandaluyong, Rizal
instituted Gonzalo Sanchez against the members of the same union and other sympathizing with them for damages
arising from said acts of violence and intimidation on the ground that said respondent Judge does not have
jurisdiction to act thereon involving as it does an unfair labor practice that comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations.
On August 2, 1957, one Gonzalo Sanchez filed an action before the Court of Instance of Rizal against the members
of the San Miguel Brewery Box Factory Worker's Union, hereinafter referred to us union, seeking to enjoin the latter
from committing certain acts of violence, intimidation and other unlawful acts in and around the premises of the San
Miguel Brewery Box Factory located in Mandaluyong, Rizal and to recover certain damages arising from the
commission of the aforesaid unlawful acts (Civil Case No. 4655). It was alleged that plaintiff is the contractor of the
San Miguel Brewery Inc. for the manufacture and repair of wooden boxes for all the products of said corporation
with the condition that he would furnish the labor but the materials and the place of the factory would be provided
for by the corporation. It was also alleged that the defendant union is an organization of laborers who were
contracted by the plaintiff to work in the factory, the plaintiff having acted only as an independent contractor.
On May 4, 1947, the members of the union went on strike without giving previous notice to the plaintiff or to the
Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and, together with other members of the Philippine Association of
Free Labor Union with which the union was affiliated, formed picket lines along the streets leading to the box
factory thereby preventing the non-striking laborers and other employees of the corporation from working in the
factory and making deliveries of the materials manufactured therein. On July 2, 1957, an agreement was entered into
between the union and the plaintiff setting forth the conditions under which the striking laborers would agree to
return to work, and after the agreement was executed, said laborers did in fact return to work, but on August 8, 1957,
in violation of the agreement, the members of the union went again to strike and started picketing again the streets
and premises where the factory is situated and in connection with said picketing, they performed and committed
certain acts of violence and intimidation with the aim in view of preventing, as they did prevent, the non-striking
laborers and employees of the corporation and of the factory from doing their work to the damage and prejudice of
the plaintiff. Wherefore, plaintiff prayed that a preliminary writ of injunction be issued pending the trial of the case
on the merits and, thereafter, judgment be rendered making the injunction consisting in not less than P40 per day
representing his unearned profits from August 8, 1957 until defendants shall have actually ceased doing the unlawful
acts complained of.
Defendants, on August 28, 1957, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its subject-matter does not
come within the jurisdiction of the court. They alleged that on April 4, 1957, a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial
Relations, acting on a complaint filed by the petitioning union, filed a charge for unfair labor practice against the
San Miguel Brewery Box Factory owned and operated by the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., including one Pedro
Bautista alleged to be the superintendent of the factory. Respondents therein filed a motion to dismiss contending
that while the box factory by said corporation, it is however operated by one Gozalo Sanchez who acted as an
independent contractor in connection with the work performed in said factory. The union denied that Sanchez was
operating the factory as an independent contractor.

While the unfair labor case was then pending before the industrial court, the members of the union were locked out
thereby forcing them to picket the premises of the factory. In the meantime, an agreement was entered into between
the SMB Box Factory represented by Gonzalo Sanchez on the hand, and the union on the other hand, setting forth
the conditions for the return of the workers. As a result, the workers returned to work, but on August 8, 1957, the
members of the union were again locked-out in violation of the agreement whereupon they again picketed the
premises which gave rise to the institution of the action for damages by Gonzalo Sanchez against the union and
other laborers who sympathized with the them.
In view of the petition for preliminary injunction contained in the complaint, the court set a date for hearing to give
the parties an opportunity to appear and argue their respective points of view, and after the hearing, but without
receiving any testimonial evidence, the court granted the petition and issued the corresponding writ. To set aside this
order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, defendants have interposed the present petition for certiorari.
The only issue before us is whether the Court of First Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 4655 instituted by Gonzalo Sanchez against the members of the petitioning union to prevent them
from picketing and committing acts of violence in the premises of the factory operated by him, and in the
affirmative, if the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it to prevent them form doing the aforesaid acts of
violence during the pendency of the case was issued in accordance with law.
It is contended in behalf of respondent Gonzalo Sanchez that the Court of First Instance of Rizal can take
cognizance of the case instituted by him because the same merely aims at preventing the members of the petitioning
union from committing acts of violence in the premises of the factory he is operating and at recovering the damages
that he may have suffered resulting from said acts of violence. Counsel contends that case does not concern any
labor nor does it involves an unfair labor practice and so it does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations.
We fail to agree with this contention. While it is true that the case instituted by Gonzalo Sanchez is merely one
which concern the picketing or commission of acts of violence by the member of the petitioning union and its
purpose is primarily to prevent them from committing said unlawful acts and incidentally to recover whatever
damages he may have suffered as an incident thereto, it cannot be denied that before the institution of said case there
was already a formal complaint of unfair labor practice filed against the operator of the San Miguel Brewery Box
Factory by the members of the said union wherein the same issue concerning the labor relation between the parties
in said civil case was involved. The claim that Gonzalo Sanchez was not involved in the unfair labor case pending
before the Court of Industrial Relations is not quite correct for precisely the respondents therein moved to dismiss
the charge contending that the factory was then being operated, not only by the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., but by
Gonzalo Sanchez as an independent contractor, which was denied by the union and this placed before the industrial
court the issue of whether it is Sanchez or other subordinate employee of the corporation the one responsible for the
unfair labor practice complained of. In the case instituted by Sanchez the same issue was raised by the union and so
it can be said that the two cases are directly interwoven.
On all fours with the present is the case of National Garments and Textiles Worker's Union-Paflu (Premier Shirts and
Pants Factory Chapter) vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al., 99 Phil. 1067, . * wherein one Vicente Ang filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal against a labor union an action for injunction because of certain acts of violence
committed by its members as a result of a labor dispute that arose between them, and because such labor dispute was
already involved in two unfair labor cases that were then pending between the same parties before the Court of
Industrial Relations, this Court held that the cases belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of the latter court. The
Court said: "It appearing that the issue involved in the main case is interwoven with the unfair labor cases pending
before the Court of Industrial Relations as to which its jurisdiction is exclusive, it is evident that it does not come
under the jurisdiction of the trial court even if it involves acts of violence, intimidation and coercion as averred in

the complaint. These acts come within the purview of Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 which may be enjoined by
the Court of Industrial Relations."
Even assuming arguendo that the Court of First Instance of Rizal could certain the case instituted by Gonzalo
Sanchez, against petitioning union, still we declare that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by said court cannot
have any legal effect because involving as it does a labor dispute between employer and employees, the same can
only be issued following the procedure laid down in Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875. The court a quo failed to do
this but merely followed Rule 60, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. Said order is therefore null and void.
We believe however that in order that an injunction may be properly issued the procedure laid down in section 9 (d)
of Republic Act. 875 should be followed and cannot be granted ex-parte as allowed by Rule 60, Section 6, of the
Rules of Court. The reason is that the case, involving as it does a labor dispute, comes under said section 9 (d) of the
law. That procedure requires that there should be a hearing at which the parties should be given an opportunity to
present witness in support of the complaint and of the opposition, if any, with opportunity for cross-examination,
and that the other conditions required by said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief must be established
and stated in the order of the court. Unless this procedure is followed, the proceedings would be invalid and of no
effect. The court would then be acting in excess of its jurisdiction. (Lauf vs. E.G. Shinner and Co., Inc., supra)
(Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, et al., 99 Phil. 854 53
O.G. (13) 5836).
Wherefore, petition is granted. The Court hereby sets aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent
Judge, without pronouncement as to costs.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is declared permanent.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

People vs. Mapa

G.R. No. 22301
Aug. 30, 1967
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment
to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as
follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further
amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the
accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he
has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or
not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the
understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such
question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity,
the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of
ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila
without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused,
now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The
accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on
his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed
to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of
office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a
secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits
he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as
such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were
admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years
and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess
any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally
clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused
must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the
power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that
this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.