GSIS v LOPEZ

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] of the 10 February 2004 Decision[2] and 4 October 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56322. The Court of Appeals reversed the 26 September 1996 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 163, Pasig, which dismissed the complaint for specific performance filed by respondent Abraham Lopez (Lopez) against
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Lopez obtained a loan of P22,500 from the GSIS. To secure the loan, Lopez mortgaged on 6 June 1982 his house and lot on No. 15 M.
Cruz Street, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila. When he defaulted on the loan, GSIS foreclosed on the real estate mortgage on 6
February 1984 and obtained title to the property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125201. Meanwhile, GSIS allowed Lopez
to remain on the property for a monthly rent of P1,200.
Thereafter, Lopez accumulated arrears in rent. Thus, in a letter dated 20 October 1986, GSIS demanded payment as follows:
Our records disclose that you have been remiss in the payment of the rentals for the premises you are now occupying. Your arrears
have accumulated to the total sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P22,800.00) as of 9/30/86.
You are, therefore, advised to pay in full the aforementioned arrears, plus interest, and to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days
from receipt hereof, otherwise, this Office will be constrained to file the corresponding legal action against you for ejectment, x x x[5]
When no payment was made, GSIS sent another letter dated 8 April 1988, inviting Lopez to bid for the subject property on 22
April 1988.[6] The scheduled bidding was cancelled when Lopez obtained on 21 April 1988 a temporary restraining order from the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CLX of Pasig.[7]
In a letter dated 7 July 1988, Lopez offered to repurchase the property from the GSIS, thus:
This refers to our former property at #15 M. Cruz St., Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila which was foreclosed by the Government
Service Insurance System, Manila.
In this connection we would like to inform you that we are requesting your good office to please allow us to repurchase the said
property.
It will be highly appreciated if you could please inform us about the outstanding obligation we will pay the GSIS, as of July 31, 1988.
[8]
The GSIS, through its Acquired Assets Administration, sent a reply dated 2 August 1988, which reads:
x x x we wish to inform you that you may be allowed to repurchase the property subject to the approval by our Board of Trustees on
cash basis for an amount based on the current market value of the property plus unpaid rentals and accrued real estate taxes, if any.
Accordingly, you should put up a 10% deposit as earnest money subject to refund, should the Board reject your offer, or forfeiture
should you fail to come up with the terms that may be imposed by the Board.
As determined by this Office, the current market value of subject property is P155,000.00 and the back rentals as of July 31, 1988,
amount to P62,919.80.
If you are, therefore, willing to repurchase your former property for the amount of P155,000.00 plus back rentals, please remit to this
Office the required 10% deposit earnest money of P15,500.00 either in cash or cashiers/managers check payable to the GSIS within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter, otherwise, subject property will be included in the public auction sale of GSIS acquired
properties to be conducted at some future date.[9] (Underscoring in the original)
On 22 August 1988, Lopez paid GSIS P15,500, as evidenced by a receipt which indicated that the amount represented
payment of 10% cash deposit.[10]
No contract of sale was executed. Instead, in notices dated 25 September 1989 and 18 October 1989, GSIS demanded from
Lopez payment of arrears in rent.[11] The notice of 18 October 1989 reads:
Our records disclose that you have been remiss in the payment of the rentals for the premises you are now occupying. Your arrears
have accumulated to the total sum of SIXTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P66,000.00) as of September 30, 1989.
You are, therefore, advised to pay in full the aforementioned arrears, plus interest, and to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days
from receipt hereof, otherwise, this Office will be constrained to file the corresponding legal action against you for ejectment, x x x

Thereafter, GSIS filed a complaint for ejectment against Lopez with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 76, Marikina City
(MeTC).[12] The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, which the MeTC approved in a Decision dated 7 March 1991.[13] The
Compromise Agreement is quoted as follows:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective counsels and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submit this
Compromise Agreement for the approval of this Honorable Court under the following terms and conditions to wit:
1. The plaintiff is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 15 Marcos Cruz (G. Luna) Street, Sto. Nio, Marikina,
Metro Manila.
2. The defendants, despite demands, failed to execute a lease contract and were in arrears in the payment of the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the said premises.
3. To forestall their inevitable and justified eviction from the premises as a result of their inexcusable failure to comply with
their legitimate obligations, the defendants have agreed to liquidate their arrearages in full and to execute a formal lease agreement.
4. As a manifestation of their good faith, the defendants offered a compromise settlement by paying the reasonable
compensation as follows:
1. P30,000 payable within five (5) days from receipt of notice of Board approval;
2. P10,000 monthly thereafter until the balance of the rental arrearages is fully paid;
3. P1,200 monthly starting January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1991.

5. The defendants offer was recommended to the plaintiffs Board of Trustees and approved in toto under Board Resolution
No. 55 adopted on February 14, 1991 with additional condition that the defendants shall be charged a new and reasonable rental rate
based on current rates starting January 1, 1992.
6. In case the defendants fail to comply with any of the terms and conditions hereof, and the terms and conditions of the lease
contract that will be executed by them, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the immediate issuance of a writ of execution without the prior
notice to the defendants. This compromise agreement shall be immediately executory.[14]
In a letter dated 13 February 1992, GSIS-Acquired Assets Administration Vice-President Z. C. Beltran, Jr. wrote Lopez as follows:
This refers to your letter of January 14, 1992 offering to buy back your former property located at 15 M. Cruz St., Sto. Nio, Marikina,
Metro Manila.
Please be informed that the property now commands a current market value of P844,000.00. Our records also show that you have
incurred rental arrearages of P9,600.00 from May 1991 to January 31, 1992.
Commission on Audit rules and our policies require that we sell our acquired assets thru public bidding. We may, however,
recommend an exception to your case, if you are willing to buy it back at its current market value at P844,000.00 plus all rental dues
but unpaid, to be paid for in full and in cash 30 days from receipt of notice of Board approval. If agreeable, please inform us
immediately so that we can submit your offer to our Board of Trustees for consideration.[15]
There is no copy of the 14 January 1992 letter referred to in Beltrans letter. At any rate, Lopez, through counsel, replied on 5
March 1992, thus:
With respect to your letter dated February 13, 1992 to my client x x x I would like to request your office in his behalf for a reduction of
the price set by your office from P844,000.00 to the previous agreed price of P155,000.00.
Way back August 2, 1988, the Acquired Assets Administration of GSIS has set the price for said repurchase at P155,000.00 with the
notice that my client may deposit a 10% earnest money of P15,500.00 x x x. Accordingly, Mr. Lopez deposited said amount x x x. Mr.
Lopez [has been waiting] up to the present for your Boards action for said repurchase x x x. Unfortunately, x x x, your Board has not
yet acted on said repurchase though he has already made the required deposit.[16]
GSIS did not act on his request. Instead, it sent a notice dated 1 February 1993 of the inclusion of the subject property in a
public auction scheduled on 19 February 1993.[17] This prompted Lopez to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, a
Complaint for Specific Performance to enjoin the sale of the subject property and compel GSIS to execute the necessary contract of
sale upon full payment of the purchase price of P155,000.[18]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court agreed with the contention of GSIS that there was no perfected contract of sale for lack of consent. Exhibit A
(GSIS letter dated 2 August 1988) is clear that the sale shall be subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees. No such approval
has been secured. Therefore, despite the payment of P15,500, the transaction could not be considered a perfected contract of sale.
The trial court found that the P15,500 was a mere deposit, which was for the purpose of holding the inclusion of the subject property
in the public auction.
The dispositive portion of the 26 September 1996 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff ordering:
1.
The dismissal of this case for lack of merit;
2.
The plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P30,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses in the publication for the invitation to
bid;
3.
The plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P20,000.00 for attorneys fees;
4.
The cost of suit.[19]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals similarly found that the P15,500 paid by Lopez to GSIS was earnest deposit. According to the Court of
Appeals, earnest deposit is only a deposit of what would become earnest money or down payment should a contract of sale be
executed. It merely guarantees that the seller would not back out of the sale. In this case, the money paid was not treated as proof
of perfection of contract. In fact, it was made subject to refund should the Board of Trustees reject the offer of Lopez.
However, the Court of Appeals found that there was tacit acceptance of Lopezs offer to repurchase the property. Indicative of
such decision of the GSIS is its failure to refund Lopezs deposit. The deposit was paid on 22 August 1988. Yet, GSIS did not refund
the same even up to the time Lopez filed the complaint for specific performance in February 1993. There was no explanation offered
for the retention of the deposit.
The Court of Appeals also found that GSIS sought to enforce the terms of the contract to sell. GSIS sought to collect from Lopez
arrears in rent. The appellate court opined that the arrears in rent were part of the repurchase price under the contract to sell. In
demanding payment of the arrears in rent, GSIS was in effect implementing the contract to sell.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that promissory estoppel would operate against GSIS from backing out of its commitment
to allow Lopez to repurchase the property at the price mentioned in its 2 August 1988 letter. Under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, the act and assurance given by GSIS to Lopez to allow the latter to repurchase the property at the price indicated in its offer
bind GSIS, which should not be allowed to turn around and adopt an inconsistent position in its transaction with Lopez to the prejudice
of Lopez who relied upon them.
In view of these findings, the Court of Appeals held that there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties since all the
elements of such a contract exist in this case, namely, (1) consent or meeting of the minds;
(2) determinative subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent. GSIS must, therefore, execute the necessary contract of sale upon full payment in cash by
Lopez of the purchase price of P155,000 plus arrears in rent and real property taxes, if any.
The dispositive portion of the 10 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, under the premises, the assailed decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendant-appellee is
ENJOINED from conducting the public auction of the subject property, and is further ORDERED to execute a contract of sale in favor of

plaintiff-appellant upon payment in cash of the full purchase price of PhP155,000.00 plus arrears in rent and accrued real property
taxes, if any.
The Issues
GSIS raises the following issues:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT GSIS TACITLY ACCEPTED LOPEZS OFFER TO REPURCHASE UNDER THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF GSIS LETTER DATED 2 AUGUST 1988.
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THERE WAS PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.[21]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The stages of a contract of sale are: (1) negotiation, starting from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest
in the contract to the time the contract is perfected; (2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements
of the sale;[22] and (3) consummation, which commences when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract
of sale, culminating in the extinguishment of the contract.[23]
In the present case, the parties never got past the negotiation stage. Nothing shows that the parties had agreed on any final
arrangement containing the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, (1) consent or the meeting of the minds of the parties;
(2) object or subject matter of the contract ; and (3) price or consideration of the sale.[24]
The 2 August 1988 letter of the GSIS cannot be classified as a perfected contract of sale which binds the parties. The letter was
in reply to Lopezs offer to repurchase the property. Both the trial and appellate courts found that Lopezs offer to repurchase the
property was subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, as explicitly stated in the 2 August 1988 GSIS letter. No
such approval appears in the records. When there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance by the other, there is no
contract of sale.[25] Since there was no acceptance by GSIS, which can validly act only through its Board of Trustees,[26] of Lopezs
offer to repurchase the property, there was no perfected contract of sale.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that there was a tacit approval by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS of Lopezs offer to
repurchase the subject property since GSIS never returned the P15,500 paid by Lopez.
This is error. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that in an ejectment suit, GSIS and Lopez entered into a court-approved
Compromise Agreement regarding the lease of the property. The Compromise Agreement was approved on 7 March 1991, or almost
three years after the 2 August 1988 letter. The Compromise Agreement pertinently states, thus:
1.
The plaintiff (GSIS) is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 15 Marcos Cruz (G. Luna) Street, Sto. Nio,
Marikina, Metro Manila.
2.
The defendants (Lopez), despite demands, failed to execute a lease contract and were in arrears in the payment of the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the said premises.
3.
To forestall their inevitable and justified eviction from the premises as a result of their inexcusable failure to comply
with their legitimate obligations, the defendants have agreed to liquidate their arrearages in full and to execute a formal lease
agreement.[27]

The acts of the GSIS in seeking to evict Lopez from the property and in demanding payment of arrears in rent emphasize its
ownership of the subject property and clearly negate any form of approval by GSIS of Lopezs offer to repurchase the property.
Likewise, Lopezs recognition of GSIS ownership of the property and his status as a defaulting lessee in the Compromise Agreement,
which was entered into after Lopezs offer to repurchase, undoubtedly refutes his claim of a perfected contract of sale. If Lopez was
under the impression that he had a perfected contract of sale with GSIS, which meant that Lopez could compel GSIS to perform its
obligations as a seller, then Lopez could have objected to the Compromise Agreement. However, Lopez assented to the contents of
the Compromise Agreement.
Considering that there was no perfected contract of sale, the concept of earnest money is certainly not applicable to this case.
Article 1482 of the Civil Code states that: Whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the
price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. The earnest money forms part of the consideration only if the sale is
consummated upon full payment of the purchase price.[28] Hence, there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can
speak of earnest money. As found by the trial court, the P15,500 paid by Lopez is merely a deposit for the exclusion of the subject
property from the list of the properties to be auctioned off by GSIS.

In principle, GSIS should return the P15,500 deposit made by Lopez since the Board of Trustees rejected Lopezs offer to
repurchase the property, as evidenced by the Compromise Agreement where GSIS asserted its ownership of the property. However,
Lopez admittedly owes GSIS for the accumulated rental arrears in the sum of P16,800 as of 26 February 1993.[29] Considering these
circumstances, partial legal compensation,[30] under Articles 1278, 1279, and 1281 of the Civil Code, applies in this case. In short,
both parties are creditors and debtors of each other, although in different amounts which are already due and demandable. Hence,
GSIS is justified in retaining the P15,500 deposit and automatically applying it to Lopezs unpaid rentals totaling P16,800 as of 26
February 1993.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issue raised by GSIS.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE the 10 February 2004 Decision and 4 October 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56322 and REINSTATES the 26 September 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 163, Pasig in Civil Case No. 62890.
SO ORDERED.
ALEXANDER B. GATUS, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No.
88691 (the assailed Decision) and the Resolution[2] dated August 7, 2006 issued by the same court in said case.cralawlibrary
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[Petitioner Alexander B.] Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac beginning on January 1, 1972. He was a covered member
of the SSS (SS No. 02-0055015-6). He optionally retired from Central Azucarera de Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of service on
January 31, 2002, at the age of 62 years. By the time of his retirement, he held the position of Tender assigned at the Distillery
Cooling Tower.cralawlibrary
In the course of his employment in Central Azucarera de Tarlac, he was certified fit to work on October 21, 1975 and was accordingly
promoted to a year-round regular employment.cralawlibrary
He suffered chest pains and was confined at the Central Luzon Doctor's Hospital in Tarlac City on August 12, 1995. Upon discharge on
August 17, 1995, he was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His
medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits: (a) 8 monthly
pensions effective September 1, 1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner
on February 1, 2002.cralawlibrary
Sometime in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on the ground that his CAD, being
attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-related. He was notified thereof through a letter dated July 31, 2003.cralawlibrary
Convinced that he was entitled to the benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS maintained its position. The SSS also denied
his motion for reconsideration.
He elevated the matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal on December 10, 2004, essentially ruling that although his
CAD was a cardiovascular disease listed as an occupational disease under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on
Employees' Compensation, nothing on record established the presence of the qualifying circumstances for
responsibility; that it was incumbent upon him to prove that the nature of his previous employment and the conditions
prevailing therein had increased the risk of contracting his CAD; and that he had failed to prove this requisite. The
ECC concluded:
As explained medically, the development of IHD or otherwise termed as Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) is caused by
atherosclerosis, the hardening of the inner lining of arteries. One of the risk factors considered by medical science for
the development of atherosclerosis is smoking. Appellant had been documented to be a chronic smoker and such
factor which is not in any way related to any form of employment increased his risk of contracting heart disease.
Hence, this recourse, wherein he contends that he had contracted the disease due to the presence of harmful fuel smoke emission of
methane gas from a nearby biological waste digester and a railway terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines had "spew(ed)
black smoke;" and that he had been exposed for 30 years to various smoke emissions that had contained carbon monoxide, carbon
dioxide, sulfur, oxide of nitrogen and unburned carbon.[3] (Emphases added.)
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not entitled to compensation benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, affirming the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which was likewise a confirmation
of the audit conducted by the Social Security System (SSS).cralawlibrary
Thus, this petition wherein, even without assistance of counsel, petitioner comes to this Court contending that "the appellate court's
decision is flawed [and] if not reversed will result in irreparable damage to the interest of the petitioner." [4]
Petitioner lists the following as errors in the questioned Decision:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I.

The appellate court's decision is against existing jurisprudence on increased risk theory of rebook condition and progression
and deterioration of illness that supervened during employment and persisted after optional retirement.cralawlibrary

II.

Violation of due process.[5]

The Court of Appeals agreed with the ECC's findings that based on his medical records, petitioner has been hypertensive for
ten (10) years and smokes 20 packs of cigarettes a year. [6] His medical condition was explained in the following manner by
the ECC:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ischemic Heart Disease (IHD) is the generic designation for a group of closely related syndromes resulting from ischemia - an
imbalance between the supply and demand of the heart for oxygenated blood. Because coronary artery narrowing or obstruction
owing to atherosclerosis underlies MI, it is often termed coronary artery disease (CAD).Atherosclerosis which is primarily due to
smoking, diet, hypertension and diabetes is the main culprit in the development of CAD. (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Robbins,
5th edition.)[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that he was in good health when he first entered the Central Azucarera de Tarlac as a factory worker at the Alcohol
Distillery Plant in 1972.[8] He alleges that in the course of his employment he suffered "essential hypertension" starting 1995, when
he experienced chest pains and was confined at the Central Luzon Doctor's Hospital in Tarlac City; that he was diagnosed as having
"Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) [Triple] Vessel and Angina Pectoris" and hypertension; that he was initially granted disability benefits
by the SSS but his request for additional benefits was denied; and that the ECC denied his appeal due to allegations of smoking. He
asserts that he has cited "technical, scientific and medical authorities to bolster his claim" including the exposure he experienced for
thirty (30) years from the alcohol distillery to "hydrocarbons and [locomotives]," carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur,
phosphorous, nitrogen oxides and soot (particulate matter). [9]
Petitioner uses various references, including encyclopedia and medical books, to discuss the general effects of pollution, mostly
caused by the burning of fossil fuels, to people with cardiovascular diseases; and the aggravation of coronary artery diseases brought
about by exposure to carbon monoxide.[10] Petitioner claims that "air pollution (carbon monoxide and lead from gasoline) contributed
to the development of essential hypertension and its complications: [c]oronary artery disease, hypertensive cardiovascular disease
and stroke."[11]
Petitioner insists that the allegation of cigarette smoking was not proven and that the ECC did not present a document signed by
competent medical authority to back such claim. Petitioner claims that there is no showing that the ECC records were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and that the latter had completely ignored his evidence.cralawlibrary
In its Comment[12] dated December 11, 2006, respondent SSS alleges that the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision
of the ECC was in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence. Respondent SSS further alleges that as viewed from the records of
the case, the petitioner failed to show proof by mere substantial evidence that the development of his disease was work-related;
[13]
that petitioner's heart ailment had no causal relation with his employment; and that "[as] viewed from by his lifestyle, he was
a chain smoker, a habit [which had] contributed to the development of his heart ailment." [14]
Respondent further alleges that medical findings have revealed that nicotine in cigarette smoke damages the blood vessels of the
heart, making them susceptible to the hardening of the inner lining of the arteries. As to petitioner's contention that there were
harmful fuel and smoke emissions due to the presence of methane gas from a nearby biological waste as well as a railway terminal

where diesel-fed locomotive engines spewed black smoke, respondent counters that these were mere allegations that were not
backed by scientific and factual evidence and that petitioner had failed to show which harmful emissions or substances were present
in his working environment and how much exposure thereto had contributed to the development of his illness. Respondent points out
that petitioner's "bare allegations do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
conclusion that there is a causal relationship between his working conditions" and his sickness and that "the law is clear that award of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions." [15]
The sole issue to be determined is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the finding of the
ECC that petitioner's ailment is not compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.cralawlibrary
The grounds for compensability are set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation (the "Amended
Rules"), the pertinent portion of which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE III
Compensability
Sec. 1.Grounds -- x x x
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A"of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Further, under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules,For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
all of the following conditions must be satisfied:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.

The employee's work must involve the risks described herein;

2.

The disease was contracted as a result of the employee's exposure to the described risks;

3.

The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;

4.

There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.

Cardiovascular diseases are considered as occupational when contracted under any of the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.cralawlibrary
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24)
hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.cralawlibrary
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac
injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. [16]
The burden of proof is thus on petitioner to show that any of the above conditions have been met in his case. The required proof is
further discussed in Ortega v. Social Security Commission[17] :chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt
nor preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial
evidence abounds.[18]
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence that might have shown that he was entitled to the
benefits he had applied for. We thus affirm in toto the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in the questioned Decision
and quote with approval the following pronouncements of the appellate court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Accordingly, the claimant must show, at least by substantial evidence, that
the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is
a reasonable work connection, not a direct causal
Gatus was diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina, diseases or conditions falling under the category
of Cardiovascular Diseases which are not considered occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. His disease not being listed as an occupational disease, he was expected to show that the illness or the fatal disease
was caused by his employment and the risk of contracting the disease was increased or aggravated by the working conditions. His
proof would constitute a reasonable basis for arriving at a conclusion that the conditions of his employment had caused the disease
or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting the illness or the fatal disease.cralawlibrary
Under ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, cardiovascular disease is deemed compensable under any of the following
conditions, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was
clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.cralawlibrary
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 28 hours of the
clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.cralawlibrary
xxxx
Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof imposed under the Labor Code to show that his ailment was work-related. While he
might have been exposed to various smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he did not submit satisfactory evidence proving that the
exposure had contributed to the development of his disease or had increased the risk of contracting the illness. Neither did he show
that the disease had progressed due to conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any physician's report in
order to substantiate his allegation that the working conditions had increased the risk of acquiring the cardiovascular
disease.cralawlibrary
Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the working environment for a period of time does not ipso
facto make the resulting disability compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions, for the
claimant must prove a positive proposition. As pronounced in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission:

x x x What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical
scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must,
however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by
existing law is real... not merely apparent...
Moreover, he failed to show the presence of any of the conditions imposed for cardio-vascular diseases by Sec. 18. Hence, the
affirmance of the SSS decision was properly made.cralawlibrary
The petitioner's plight might call for sympathy, particularly in the light of his 30 years of service to the company, but his petition
cannot be granted on that basis alone. The policy of extending the applicability of P.D. 626 as many qualified employees as possible
should be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.cralawlibrary
In fine, Gatus was not qualified for the disability benefits under the employees compensation law.cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.[19]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in itsResolution dated August 7, 2006,
which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finding nothing cogent and persuasive in the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated June 20, 2006, we DENY the
motion.cralawlibrary
We point out that our decision of May 24, 2006 has fully explained the bases for the ruling we have made, including the matters being
discussed by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. We consider it repetitious and redundant to discuss them herein again.
[20]

The questioned Decision deemed as established fact that petitioner is a cigarette smoker; but petitioner vehemently denies this,
saying there is no competent evidence to prove he had that habit. What petitioner would like this Court to do is to pass upon a
question of fact, which the ECC, the SSS, and the Court of Appeals have used to deny his claim for compensation. This is not allowed
under Section 1 of Rule 45, which states that "[t]he petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."[21]
Hence, questions of fact may not be taken up in a petition for review on certiorari such as this case now before us. As we have held
previously:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if the issue requires a review of the evidence presented
or requires the re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. However, if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence, the question is one of law. [22]
This was emphasized in La Union Cement Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission,[23]thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the doctrine
that pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as this mode
of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions of law,
not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court
cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them to
ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. [24]
The matter of petitioner's cigarette smoking, established by two competent government agencies and the appellate court, is thus a
matter that cannot be questioned before us via petition for review.cralawlibrary
There is no doubt that petitioner deserves sympathy because even the benefits already given to him were questioned after the SSS
found that he was a chronic cigarette smoker. For humanitarian reasons, as he pursued his claim all the way to the Court as an
indigent litigant, and due to his advancing age, we would like to clarify that what had already been given him should no longer be
taken away from him. But he is not entitled to further compensation for his condition.cralawlibrary
We have once more put great weight to the factual findings of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, namely the SSS and
the ECC, as they have acquired expertise in all matters relating to employee compensation and disability benefits. As we have held
in Ortega v. Social Security Commission[25] :chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose
function is to resolve factual matters. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. Moreover, findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.cralawlibrary