Handout No.

2
Phil. 015
Zoltan Domotor
Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
February 12, 2016
SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX OF PREDICATE LOGIC
Now that you are familiar with the syntactic and semantic structures of
LSL1 (presented in terms of natural deduction rules and truth tables) and
are aware of simple predications and quantification, we can devise a formal
(artificial) language to represent logical forms in predicate logic. All we need
to do is make certain modifications to sentential (truth-functional) logic.
However, now we will need six kinds of symbols:
1. Individual Variables: x, y, z, . . . .
Individual variables in the object language of LMPL2 are lower-case
italic letters, taken from the end of the latin alphabet with or without
primes or numerical subscripts. We use individual variables exclusively
to formalize individual variable words in a natural language or scientific discourse. Given a particular interpretation, individual variables
take their values precisely in the specified domain (universe of discourse) of a given interpretation. For example, if the domain is the
class of all humans, living in the past or present, then the individual
variables stand for humans only.
2. Individual Constants: a, b, c, . . . .
Individual (non-logical) constants are lower-case italic letters from the
initial segment of the latin alphabet, with or without primes or numerical subscripts. We use individual constants to symbolize proper
names of individuals in a natural or scientific language. Granted an
interpretation, individual constants refer to designated individuals in
the specified domain of interpretation.
3. Monadic (unary) Predicate Constants: F, G, H, . . . , F , G , H , . . . .
Predicate (non-logical) constants are primed capital italic letters, often
1
2

Language of Sentential Logic

Language of Monadic Predicate Logic

with numerical subscripts to indicate the number of arguments. In general, we shall omit the primes (e.g., instead of pF q we shall write pF q)
and the subscripts as well. Thus, instead of F1 , G1 , H1 , dots, we write
F, G, H, . . . . Monadic predicate constants formalize one-argument predicate expressions in a natural or scientific language.
4. Binary Predicate Constants: F, G, H, . . . , F2 , G2 , H2 , . . .
Binary (dyadic, two-place) predicate (non-logical) constants are primed
capital italic letters with a numerical subscript 2, indicating that the
predicate has two arguments. As practiced in Modern Logic, we shall
omit primes and subscripts.
For the time being, we shall use only one-place (monadic, unary, or of
degree one) and two-place (diadic, binary, or of degree two) predicate
constants that apply only to, respectively, single individuals or pairs of
individuals. For example, the sentence Alma speaks both French and
German is formalized as F a & Ga. Here a refers to Alma and the
monadic predicate constants F and G symbolize the respective properties (attributes) of being able to speak French and German. Note that
we write the predicate constant first and the individual constant next
with no punctuation between. Likewise, Alma loves Bill is formalized
as Lab. Here a refers to Alma, b refers to Bill, and L stands for the
love relationship. As expected, Bill loves Alma is formalized as Lba.
Ternary (triadic) relations, as in Alma is between Bill and Carl, are
less frequent. This sentence is formalized as Bbac. In general, n-place
predicates (with n 3) lead to additional enrichments of the predicate
language.
5. Sentential Letters: P, Q, R, . . . .
Sentential letters (with or without numerical subscripts) are also included, and are taken from sentential logic LSL. For example, the
sentence It is raining is captured by R, without any reference to
individuals. Thus, predicate logic can be viewed as a natural extension
of truth-functional (sententional, propositional) logic.
6. Logical Constants: logical connectives & , , , , , and quantifiers , .
7. Auxiliary Symbols: parantheses ( and ), brackets [ and ], and braces
{ and }, needed for unique and easy readability.
Using these symbols we can generate an infinite set of formulas in the
language of predicate logic of the form F a, xF x, x[F x Gx], y{F y &
x[F x Hx]}, z[Hz P ], . . . . Only formulas obtainable by obvious
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repeated applications of logical connectives and quantifiers to given formulas

are well-formed. Not surprisingly, just like in the world of natural numbers,
not all well-formed formulas (e.g., formulas taking thousands of pages to
write down) have transparent interpretations in a natural language.
Predicate logic uses the same ten rules of inference as sentential calculus
(and hence the same derived rules and theorems). But it also has additional
introduction and elimination rules for quantifiers. We shall treat these rules
after the semantic approach.
A CRASH COURSE IN FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR PREDICATE LOGIC
Recall that in sentential (propositional, truth-fumnctional) logic we define an
interpretation by assigning truth values to all sentential letters of our formal
language LMPL. For example, in the case of the sentence Q (P Q)
we can assign value T (true) to Q, value F (false) to P , and calculate the
resulting truth value of Q (P Q). We already know that the resulting
value will be T under any truth-value assignment. That is, we can write
|= Q (P Q), indicating that the foregoing formula is semantically valid
in LSL. Unfortunately, this truth value-based semantic method does not work
in predicate logic.
To fully understand what is meant by all and some, we need to know
what individuals constitute the subject of discourse. For example, on one
occasion we can say that All are rotten (symbolized by xRx) and be
talking about just the oranges in a crate. On another occasion we can say
the same All are rotten and be thinking about just the apples in a basket.
On yet another occasion we may be talking about just the members of the
Mafia. And so on. What differs here is what logicians call the universe
of discourse or, for short, the domain. The domain is always a nonmepty
set of individuals talked or reasoned about, needed in any interpretation of
predicate formulas.
Accordingly, an interpretation I of (or simply a model for) formulas in the
language of predicate logic LMPL consists of
(i) a nonempty domain D of individuals;
(ii) an assignment that associates with each individual constant in LMPL
a designated element of D;
(iii) an assignment that associates with each one-place predicate F a designated subset of D (called the extension of F ), namely the subset of
those elements in D that have property F ;
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(iv) an assigment that associates with each two-place predicate R a designated subset of ordered pairs in the Cartesian product DD (called the
extension of R), namely the subset of those ordered pairs of elements
in D that stand in relation denoted by R, and
(v) an assignment of one of the truth-values T or F to each sentential
letter.
For example, the sentence xF x is true under I if and only if for every
element d in the chosen domain D, d belongs to the subset assigned to F .
Similarly, under the same interpretation, the formula xF x is true if and
only if there exists an element d in the domain D such that it belongs to the
subset assigned to F .
For another example, given the universal conditional x[F x Gx], below
we determine its truth value under interpretation I, specified as follows:
(i) The domain is: D =df {1, 2, 3, 4}. I.e., the domain is specified by the
set of the first four consecutive natural numbers. Here =df is short
for is equal by definition;
(ii) the monadic (one-place) predicate F is understood to refer to the property of being even, i.e., formally its interpretation is given by the subset
F = {2, 4} of all even numbers in the chosen domain {1, 2, 3, 4}.
(iii) the monadic predicate G is understood to refer to the property of being
a prime number, i.e., its interpretation is given by the subset G = {2, 3}
of all prime numbers in the specified domain {1, 2, 3, 4}. There are no
other nonlogical constants to interpret. Remember, pF q refers to a
linguistic entity that belongs to the alphabet of the object language of
LMPL, and pFq denotes a set (a mathematical object).
It is easy to see that under the foregoing interpretation which is often
denoted by the ordered triple hD, F, Gi, the universal conditional says that all
even natural numbers below 5 are prime. Since 4 is below 5 and is not prime,
under the standing interpretation I the universal conditional x[F x Gx]
is false. Simply, it is not the case that all even numbers among 1, 2, 3, 4 are
prime. However, under the same interpretation I, the existential sentence
x[F x & Gx] comes out true, because there exists an even number that is
prime, namely 2.
Now, suppose we change the interpretation to I , newly specified as follows:
(i) The domain is: D =df {1, 3, 5, 7}. I.e., the domain is defined by the
set of the first four odd natural numbers;
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(ii) the monadic predicate F is now understood to refer to the property

of being even in the domain, i.e., its interpretation is given by the
empty set F = , which is of course a legitimate subset of the domain
{1, 3, 5, 7};
(iii) the monadic predicate G is understood to refer to the property of being
a prime in the domain, i.e., its interpretation is given by the set G =
{3, 5, 7} of all prime numbers in the specified domain {1, 3, 5, 7}. There
are no other nonlogical constants to interpret.
It is easy to see that this time the universal conditional x[F x Gx]
is true under interpretation I = hD , F , G i, and of course the existential
sentence x[F x & Gx] is false under I . The first sentence is true under
I because the assumption of any number being even is always false in its
domain and hence the conditional is true. The second is false because there
are no even prime numbers among 1, 3, 5, 7.
Now suppose we want to explore the interpretation of Ha yHy. The
previous interpretations I and I are not suitable for this purpose because
they do not include a meaning assignment to the individual constant a but
contain a meaning assignment to G that we do not need. However, consider
a brand-new interpretation J = hD , a, Hi, specified by
(i) D =df {1, 2, 3, 4};
(ii) a denotes a = 2;
(iii) The meaning of H is to be even, i.e., given (as before) by the set H =
{2, 4}. There are no other nonlogical constants to interpret.
Then the conditional Ha yHy is clearly true under J . It now says
that if 2 is even, then there are even numbers in the domain. Observe that
the formula will come out true even if a denotes 1, because falsehood implies
anything. If we mofify I into a new interpretationJ = hD , a, Hi, where
D = {1, 3, 5, 7}, a denotes a = 3, and F expresses evenness, i.e., H = , then
the foregoing conditional still comes out true. As a matter of fact, the conditional Ha xHx is semantically valid because it comes out true under
every possible interpretation. (This can be shown by assuming the opposite
and then deriving a contradiction.)

PROOFS IN PREDICATE LOGIC

This handout includes various proofs (also known as derivations) of logical theorems and argument-forms in predicate logic with identity (equality),
using the usual ten basic rules of inference in sentential logic LSL, four basic
inference rules for quantification in LMPL, two basic rules for identity in
LPLE, and some previously proven theorems. Along traditional lines, we
proceed from simple theorems and arguments in predicate logic to increasingly more complex ones that often depend on other theorems and arguments.
Feel free to use any of these solved problems in your work by quoting their
labels PL0, PL1, PL2, etc.
The basic inference rules an introduction rule and a corresponding elimination rule for the universal and existential quantifier are symbolized in an
argument form as follows:
1. Introduction and Elimination of the Universal Quantifier:
Introduction of , symbolized by I: From any formula of the form
Z(a), containing an individual constant a not occurring in any
assumption A or in any hypothesis H in effect at the line on which
Z occurs, we may infer the formula of the universally quantified
form xZ(x) (or yZ(y), etc.), where by a syntactic definition
Z(x) = Z(a/x) is the result of replacing all occurrences of a in
Z(a) with individual variable x, not already in Z(a). (If x occurs
in Z(a), then we use another free variable, say y that is not in
Z(a).)
The requirement that a not occur in any assumption or in any
hypothesis already in effect at the line on which Z occurs ensures that we assume nothing that distinguishes the individual
designated by a from any other individual. The rule I must be
applied strictly as stated. Thus, intuitively speaking, for I to be
applicable, the individual constant a must refer to a generic (the
all American boy/girl) individual. Obviously, from Einstein is
a brilliant physicist it certainly does not follow that everybody
is a brilliant physicist. Stated in another way, the rule I applies
to Z(a) if constant a does not occur outside the subproof where
it is introduced. (A subproof is a proof that occurs within the
context of a larger proof. As with any proof, it may, and usually
will, begin with an assumption or hypothesis, indicated by A,H
respectively. In this case the subproof ends when the hypothesis
is discharged. You get out of a subproof via conditionalization or

RAA.) Another important point: all rules apply only to sentences

in their entirety and not to subsentences.
Z(a)
xZ(x)
where a does not occur outside the subproof where it is introduced.
Elimination of , symbolized by E: From any universally quantified sentence xZ(x) we may infer any sentence of the form Z(a)
(or Z(b), etc.) which results from replacing each occurrence of the
free variable x in Z with an individual constant a of your choice,
whether or not it has been used elsewhere in the proof. That is,
we have Z(a) = Z(x/a). Of course, the same rule applies to any
individual variable, including yZ(y), zZ(z), etc.
xZ(x)
Z(a)
2. Introduction and Elimation of the Existential Quantifier:
Introduction of , symbolized by I: From any formula of the form
Z(a) we may infer the existential formula of the form xZ(x) (or
yZ(y), etc.), where Z(x) = Z(x//a) is the result of replacing
all or some occurrences of a in Z with the individual variable x,
not already in Z. Thus, from F a & Ga we may infer both
y[F y & Gy] and y[F y & F a] (or y[F a & Gy]). In addition, we can also use other variables, as in x[F a & Gx] or
z[F a & Gz]. Observe that the rule I places no restrictions on
previous occurrences of the individual constant a. The individal
constant a may occur legitimately in an undischarged hypothesis
or in an assumption, as above.
Z(a)
xZ(x)
Elimation of , symbolized by E: Given an existentially quantified sentence xZ(x) and a derivation of some conclusion Y from
an existential hypothesis Z(a) = Z(a/x) (the result of replacing
each occurrence of the variable x in Z(x) with an individual constant a not already occurring in Z), we may discharge the existential hypothesis Z(a) and reassert Y . Here the following restriction
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applies: individual constant a may not occur in Y , nor in any assumption A, nor in any hypothesis H that is in effect at the line
at which E is applied. Alternatively, the restriction states that
constant a is not allowed to occur outside the subproof where it is
introduced. We may think of the name a introduced at the beginning of the subproof as the formal counterpart of the English Let
a be an arbitrary individual (e.g., John Doe) such that Z(a). The
restriction is handled automatically by introducing an individual
constant a that has not been used in any of the assumptions or
hypotheses before. Intuitively, in any proof, the rule E allows
us to put xZ(x) on hold and work instead in the subproof with
the temporary existential hypothesis Z(a) about a John Doe a,
until the desired result is obtained. At that point, by the rule E
we can return to the use of xZ(x) and at the same time discharge
the temporary existential hypothesis Z(a).
xZ(x)
Z(a) H
Y
Y
where constant a does not occur in Y or any assumption, or hypothesis.
3. Introduction and Elimation of the Identity Relation:
Special logical (unary, binary, etc.) predicates may be added to predicate calculus for special purposes. One of the most useful binary logical
predicate constants is the classical identity =, where a = b expresses
the fact that individual a is identical to individual b or a is the same
thing as b, or simply a is equal to b. For example, if a denotes Mark
Twain and b denotes Samuel Clemens, then a = b expresses the fact
that Mark Twain is the same individual as Samuel Clemens. The identity predicate = is special because like all logical symbols and unlike
all predicate constants, its interpretation is fixed. It always means it
is identical to. Specifically, given an interpretation with a domain D
in which individual constants a and b are interpreted as suitable designated elements in D, say a and b respectively, then a = b is true under
the extant interpretation just in case a = b, i.e., if and only if a and b
are the same objects in D.
Also, note that = is syntactically peculiar in that unlike all nonlogical
binary predicate constants, it is written between the individual constants or variables (as in a = b or x = y) to which it applies rather
than in front of them (as in Lab or Lxy). The so-called Polish notation
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= ab is hard to read. Of course, the identity requires a customary pair

of rules of inference.
Introduction of Identity =, symbolized by I=:
For any individual constant a, b, etc., we may assert a = a, b = b,
etc., at any line of the proof.

a=a
Observe that rule I= introduces formulas into proofs without deriving them from previous lines. In particular, the proof of the law
of reflexivity of identity xx = x consists of two simple steps:
1 a=a
I=
2 xx = x 1, I
Note that the use of I in step 2 is legitimate because the proof
does not use any assumptions or hypotheses containing a. This
should be clear, since a is generic. We could have started with
b = b, and so on.
Elimation of Identity =, symbolized by E=:
From a formula Z(a) (containing individual constant a) and a = b
or b = a we may infer Z(b), the result of replacing one or more
occurrences of a in Z by b.
(i)
(ii)
Z(a)
Z(a)
a=b
b=a
Z(b//a)
Z(b//a)
where the expression Z(b//a) denotes the formula that results
from Z(a) upon replacing one of more occurrences of a in Z with
b. Clearly, the inference rule E= is the traditional substitution
law : If a and b are really one and the the same (i.e., a = b), then
anything true of one of them must be true of the other as well.
Specifically, Z(b//a) must be true if obtained from the truth of
Z(a) by substituting equals for equals.
A proof or derivation in predicate logic with identity is a finite sequence
of consecutively numbered lines, each consisting of a sentence belonging to
the language of predicate logic together with its line number (on the left) and
all rules used (on the right), such that on each line the sentence is a given
assumption or a temporary hypothesis, or it follows from previous lines in
accordance with any of the 14 rules of sentential, 4 rules of predicate and
two rules of identity in quantificational logic, itemized above and in Handout
9

No.1. If based on assumptions X1 , X2 , . . . , formula Y appears on the last line

in which all premises belong to X1 , X2 , . . . , then the sequence of sentences
under consideration is called the proof (derivation) of Y from X1 , X2 , . . . . If
such a proof (derivation) exists, we write X1 , X2 , Y .
SOLVED PROBLEMS IN PREDICATE LOGIC WITH IDENTITY
Here are the problems solved earlier.
M0

F a xF x
Proof.
1
2
3
4
5

F a
xF x
Fa
F a & F a
F x

A
H (for RAA)
2, E,H
1,3 I & ,H
2-4 RAA,H


Observe that here we have not used I at all.

M1

x[F x (Gx Hx)], xGx x[F x Hx]

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

x[F x (Gx Hx)]

xGx
F a (Ga Ha)
Ga
Fa
Ga Ha
Ha
F a Ga
x[F x Hx]

A
A
1, E
2, E
H (for C)
3,5 MP, H
4,6 T, H
5-7 C,H

8, I

Observe that constant a does not occur in any of the assumptions. Its
occurrence in the hypothesis does not matter because the hypothesis
with its sub-subproof is discharged before the use of I.
M2

xF x xGx x[F x Gx]

Proof.

10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

xF x xGx
xF x
Fa
F a Ga
x[F x Gx]
x[F x Gx]
xF x x[F x Gx]
xGx
Ga
F a Ga
x[F x Gx]
x[F x Gx]
xGx x[F x Gx]
x[F x Gx]

A
H (for C)
H (for E)
3, I, H,H
4,I,H,H
2,3-5, E,HH

2-6 C, H

H (for C)
H (for E)
9, I, H,H
10,I,H,H
8,9-11,E,HH

8-12, C, H

1,7,13 E

Additional Problems, with new labels, are solved below.

x[F x Gx], xF x Ga

PL0

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5

x[F x Gx]
xF x
F a Ga
Fa
Ga

A
A
1, E
2, E
3,4 MP

xyLxy Laa

PL1

Proof.
1
2
3

xyLxy
yLay
Laa

A
1, E
2, E

x[F x & Gx] xF x & xGx

PL2

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

x[F x & Gx]

F a & Ga
Fa
Ga
xF x
xGx
xF x & xGx

A
1, E
2, E &
2, E &
3, I, a generic
4, I, a generic
5,6 I &

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x[F x Gx] xF x xGx]

PL3

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

x[F x Gx]
F a Ga
Fa
xF x
xF x xGx]
F a (xF x xGx)
Ga
xGx
F x xGx
Ga (F x xGx)
xF x xGx

A
1, E
H (for C
3, I, H
4,I,H
3-5, CH

H (for C)
7, I,H
8,I,H
7-9,C
2,6,10,E

xF x xF x

PL4

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6

xF x
Fa
xF x
xF x & xF x
F a
xF x

A
H (for RAA)
2, I,H
1,3,I & ,H
2-4,RAA, H
 (a is now outsdide H)
5, I

xLax, xy[Lxy M yx] xM xa

PL5

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

xLax
xy[Lxy M yx]
Lab
y[Lay M ya]
Lab M ba
M ba
xM xa

A
A
1, E
2, E
4,E
3,5 MP
6, I (b is generic)

x[F x F x]

PL6

Proof.
1
2
3

Fa
Fa Fa
x[F x F x]

H (for C)
1,1 C, H

2, I

Here in step 2 we apply conditionalization of F a to itself. Notice that

on line 2 individual constant a is generic, because it falls outside the
scope of hypothesis H. Remember that H is discharged in step 2. We
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could have started with F a F a on line 1, because it is a substitution

instance of P P , known to be logically valid.
[xF x & xF x]

PL7

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

xF x & F x
xF x
xF x
F a
Fa
P & P
P & negP
[f orallxF x & xF x]

H (for RAA)
1,E & , H
1,E & ,H
H (for E),H
2,E,H, H
4,5, T7, H, H
3,4-6,E H, H

1-7, RAA, H


Solved problems for Identity:

F a, F b a = b

PL9

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Fa
F b
a=b
Fb
F b & F b
a = b

A
A
H(for RAA)
1,3 E=, H
2,4 I & , H
3-5,RAA, H


xy[x = y y = x]

PL10

Proof.
1
2
3
4
5
6

a=b
a=a
b=a
a=bb=a
y[a = y y = a]
xy[x = y y = x]

H (for C)
I, H
1,2 E=
1,3 C, H

4 I, b is generic
5 I

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