I6

(D-

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

"Monterey,California

THESIS
HEAVY FORCE ANALYSIS OF JAVEUN
By
David Anthony Cannella
September 1994
Thesis Advlsor.

So Young Sohn

Second Reader.

Charloe A.Pate

Approved for

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159

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HEAVY FORCE ANALYSIS OF JAVELIN

by

David Anthony Cannefa

Captain, United States Army
B S., West Point USMA, 1954
Subntied in partial fulfifnment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

from the
P'AVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1I"4

Ovd A. CaRIiela
Approved by:__

esA"

_-

,Second Reader
SUnanmonoced

-*aoeauton For'
XTIS QTRA&I1
TAB
JuStlf t et

Department of Operations Research

QTIC
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Distrilution
Availabillty

Avail aud/or

121tf

Speolal

iv

ABSTRACT
Present

mission

requirements

technology dictate that there is

and

increased

weapons

a need to replace the US

Army Infantry's medium antiarmor Dragon weapon system.

lieu of the Dragon,
System called

In

the US Army is opting to field a new

the Javelin Antitank Weapon

System.

This

thesis explores the potential for the Javelin to enhance the

operational effectiveness of the Mechanized Infantry assets
of the 113 Army.

This analysis includes the development of

Mechanized Infantry scenarios which employ the Janus(A) high

resolution

combat

model.

These

:!*enarios

model

force-on-force trials of mechanized versus fully mode.-ized

armor heavy threats in

deliberate defense and movement to

contact missions.
Results of the experimental data analysis indicate that
the Javelin performs superior to the Dragon in

terms of the

mechanized

engagements,

force's

range

of

antiarmor

lethality, target stealing, and survivability.

to this thesis could benefit the US Army in

The findings

force structure

and antiarmor weapon requirements vith the future fielding

of the Javelin to Mechanized Infantry units.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cf INTRODUCTION

...............................................

A. BACKGROUND ..........................................

........... I

B. LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................

C. PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................................

10

D. SCOPE ........... : .....................................................

10

II. EQUIPMENT AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS ................ 13

A ANTIARMOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ......................................

13

1. Dragon .................................................................

13

2. Javelin .................................................................

15

3. Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) .........................................

16

B. SC ENAR IO S .........................................
1. Friendly Forces

Mechanized

................

... 19

.................... ..............

21

a. Organization and Equipment ...................................... 21

b. Tactics of the Antiarm t..........................

f'
.............
2. Enemy Forces - MArmor

Heavy

22

............................. 25

a. Organization and Equipment ......................................

25

b. Tactics wd Doctrine ..........................................

26

III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ......................................

29

A JANUS(A) AS A HIGH RESOLUTION COMBAT MODEL ................... 29

1. The Model ..............................................................

29

2. Terrain .................................................................

31

vi

3 . A U T O JA N

.............................................................

B. METH O D O LO G Y ..........................................................

31

32

1. G eneral .............................................................. . 32
2. A ssumptions ............................................................

33

3. Mann-Whitney Nonparametric Test ..................................... 34

C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) ................................

IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS ....................................

35

37

A. ANTIARMOR ENGAGEMENTS ............................................

37

B . S URV IVA B ILITY ...........................................................

39

C . TA R G ET STEA LIN G .......................................................

40

D . LE T HALITY

42

...............................................................

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................

A. CONCLUSIONS

..........................

B. RECO MMENDATIO NS ....................................................

45
45
49

LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................

51

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....................................

53

viii

EXECUTWE SUMMARY
E

Present

mission

requiremen-;s

technology dictate that there is

and

increased

weapons

a need to replace the US

Army Infantry's medium antiarmor Dragon weapon system.

lieu of the Dragon,

weapon

called

Integrating

the US Army is

the

Javelin

the . Javelin

opting to field a new

Antitank

into

the

Weapon

System,

infantry's

weapons

inventory could be costly and unnecessary or it

beneficial and worthy combat multiplier.
evaluating the weapon,

In

may be a

In the interest of

this thesis explores the potential

for the Javelin to enhance the operational effectiveness of

Mechanized Infantry assets of the US Army.
This

analysis

includes

the

development

of

Mechanized

Infantry scenarios which employ the Janus(A) high resolution

coLlat

model.

These

scenarios

represent

force-on-force

trails of mechanized infantry versus fully modernized armor

heavy threats in deliberate defense and movement to contact
missions.

Each slasion generates data output from multiple

simulation

runs

effectiveness.
mechanized

lethality.
Mann-Whitney

regard

to

four

measures

These measures of effectiveness

force's

survivability,

with

range

target
Deta
Test

of antiarmor

stealirg

analysiv
is

used

by
:f

to

ix

the

include the

engagements,

antiarmor
output

compare

the

of

force

weapons,

and

using

the

operational

of the mechanized

effectiveness

and without

with

infantry

the Javelin.
data analysis

Results of the experimental

indicate that

the Javelin performs superior to the Dragon across all four

These results

measures of effectiveness.

support evidence

that the Javelin equipped mechanized unit has the ability to

kill

from greater distances

enemy forces

lethality,

while

the military
make it

commander,

the

of

contributions

effectiveness
enhanced

as

Javelin.

of
a

The

favorable

the
result

of

to

be

Infantry

replacing

characteristics

alternative

proves

Mechanized

for

the

worthy

of

the

the

Dragon.
combat

Mechanized Infantry's drsenal.

Xb

the

is

Javelin

forces.
operational

the

that

suggests

evidence

For

survivability.

possible to improve heavy conventional

Conclusive

Javelin

improved

maintaining

and with greater

significantly

Dragon

with

Javelin

make

In

study,

this

multiplier

to

the
it

a
the
the

L
A.

NrMODUCrnON

BACKGROUND
In

recent years the United States Army has rigorously

analyzed the events of a changing world order.

Cold War years at an end,

democratic

With the

nations

around

the

world celebrate the freedom from the overbearing impasse of

a superpower communist threat.
divided,

changing

structure

only to make it

Former Soviet nations hava

politics

their

and

their

more difficult

military

for the United

States to assess their intentions or hostilities.

Moreover,

the advances in technology among third world nations causes

nore concern each day as their potential for a mid-to-high
intensity of war increases.
qeo-political
domestic

strengths,

As a result of the changing

enyiroaament

political

the

and

the

United

intolerance

for

current

US Army

is

transitioning

States'

own

military

end

from

forward

deployed force to a maller, more rapidly deployable force.

This force will maintain the goal to a*ssrt an overwhelming,
modernized

advantage

in

strength

and

firepower

in

contingency operations when and wherever necems.ry.

Support for such a contingency force must be designed to
provide critical

weapon systems that provide higher

survivability and lethality.

The Javelin Antitank Weapor

Syetem may provide such support.

undergoing

the Department

force

The Javelin currently in

of Defense's
S!

(WOD)

acquisition

______

iiIiiI -- I

process to enhance the robustness of Light Infantry forces.

It

is intended to be fielded by 1995 in order to replace its

less effective predecessor, the Dragon [Ref.

1 and Ref. 2].

The availability of the Javelin raises a new issue to

the Operational Test and Evaluation Command
States

Army

Infantry

School

Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

(USAIS),

(OPTEC),

and

United

Training

and

The question, "Should the Javelin

also become part of the antiarmor arsenal of the Mechanized

Infantry?" now must be considered.
B.

LffERATURE REVIEW
As proponents for analysis of new weapon systems,

TRADOC

Analysis Center Research Activities at Monterey,

California

(TRAC-Monterey)

support of

is

conducting model research in

initial operational tests and evaluations

by OPTEC.

TRAC-Monterey

combat model

as

uses Janus(A),

its primary

tool

(IOTE)

conducted

a high resolution

to conduct

simulations

research.
Masters thesis research
simulations

and military

Javelin versus Dragon

specific

measures

performance.

(Ref.

operational

indicate

of

3 and Ref.
tests

significant

effectiveness

and

4]

involving

analyzing

the

differences

in

measures

of

These models and tests were performed with

modeling and field exercises with the Light Infantry.

The

methodologies and conclusions of these earlier works provide

inordinate

amounts

of

practical
2

information

that
b

is

pertinent to this study.

thesis is

that it

is

In

fact,

the motivation of this

follow-on work to both JaveriUn: A Case

Study in Model-Test-Model by Charles A.

and Javelin vs.

Pate (December 1992)

Drsaon II: A Conwarative Analysis by Michael

J. McGuire (September 1993).

The initial

work by Pate [Ref.

3] addressing the Javelin

weapon system and modeling on Janus(A)

are the original

efforts to begin Model-Test-Model research for an infantry

antiarmor weapon system.

The Model-Test-Model paradigm is

procedural analysis adopted by TRAC-Monterey and other test

agencies to test,

evaluate,

of new weapon systems.

in

Janus(A)

involved

in

conditions

Pate's work in

involves
these
of

and validate the effectiveness

four

combat

scenarios

the

are

initial

modeling the Javelin

scenarios.

modeled

operational

Factors

to represent
tests

the

that

are

conducted as part of the PIodel-Test-Model analysis.

For a vigorous analysis,

Pate's work models

scenarios

with and without Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP).

Other considerations
and opposing
from a

include size of friently

(red) forces.

platoon conducting

Pate's

work Is

conditions.

forces

Pate varies the force strengths

defensive missioni to a

conducting offensive operations.

for Javelin and Dragnm

(blue)

company

Due to ins ,ficient

data

night engagements at the time, all of

limited

to esenario

modeling

in

day

time

The scenarios conducted were hasty defense

in

deliberate defense,

MOPP-4,
to

(30

elehent

size

platoon

employ a

missions

two defensive

first

The

contact.

and movement

deliberate attack,

The

soldiers).

defense

hasty

mission is conducted in MOPP-4 for the purpose of simulating

a

in

conditions

A MOPP level of four in this case is

environment.

(NBC)

chemical

or

biological,

nuclear,

factored

into Janus(A) modeling to reduce the soldiers effectiveness

would during the actual operational tests conducted by

as it

The remaining two offensive missions are conducted

OPTEC.

with a strength of a 90 soldier force,

representative of a

These missions are modeled in an

typical company size unit.

NBC free environment.

Opposing forces are typical in size for missions against

forces.

blue

Hence,

consisting of eight

T-72 tanks

three

BMPs and

paired

is

a platoon size

Likewise,

against the blue force platoon.

unit

mechanized

size

company

red force consisting of two BMPs and two T-72 tanks opposes
the blue

force

company

element.

In

all

scenarios,

the

simulations are run until total annihilation of one force by

the

other

or

until

offensive

the

unit

gains

its

march

objective.
Each simulation run produces data output as required by
(MOEs).

the measures of effectiveness

MOEs
(COIC)

from

the

Critical

Operational

developed at TEXCOM.

Pate derived these

Issues

and

Criteria

The MOEs are categorized into

4

three areas, engagement range, lethality, and survivability.

Typically then the data requirements used for the MOEs are,
respectively,

average

engagement

kills/number of shots fired,

range,

number

of

and number of blue soldiers

survinging/number of blue soldiers starting.

Pate applies several analytical tools including pairwise
comparisons

(ANOVA).

of

It

MOEs

is

and

One

Way

Analysis

important to note

that

of

in

hypothesis testing in ANOVA assumes normality.

proves

no

evidence

Kruskal-Wallis

One

of

Way

normality,

Analysis

each

case,

When testing

Pate

by

Variance

Ranks

uses

the

test

as

nonparametric technique for analyzlng the collected data.

This final approach provides a less powerful test but still
offers a robust analysis.
The

findings

scenarios,
hypothesis,

in

Pate's work

the analytical
H,,

concludes

that

that the mean 1OE of Dragon does not equal

Accordingly,

the NOEs for the

Javelin equipped force proves to be statistically

better

than the

Dragon

equipped

percent level of significance

Trends
evident

in

to

all

methods support the alternative

the mean MOE for Javelin.

and

in

be

[Ref.

considered

the analysis

in

force

different
up to

five

3].
Pate's

analysis

of the lethality MOE.

become

While

the

range of percentages for Javelin's lethality dominated that

of the Dragon's,

in offensive operations these ranges for

5

/4

both
41

weapon

systems

were

measures of lethality in

lower

than

the defense missions.

accounted for by the fact that in

doctrine,

their

antiarmor weapon

respective
This can be

defensive operations,

systems are employed

in

by

such a

manner as to take full advantage of their engagement ranges.

This most

desirable

tactic

is

not always

possible

in

an

often unpredictable offensive type mission.

McGuire

[Ref.

4]

extends

Pate's

work

analyzing the Javelin versus Dragon

similar approach,
scenarios

are

are

Janus(A).

divided

into

three

In addition,

systematically

defensive

to

for both day and

night operations.

considered

in

the

free environment.
NBC conditions.
been drawn

the

and

night

and finally, deliberate

Each scenario is

simulated in

an NBC

McGuire mentions no reason for excluding

At the time however,

from Pate's conclusions

conditions,

three

Operations

deliberate day

hasty day and night ambush,

day and night attacks.

and

represent

conditions

defense,

These

with new night time data,

varied

his study are

and

Using a

McGu 4 rc investigates six scenarios.

offensive missions.
factors

in

on modeling

Javelin

equipped

an assumption may have

that regardless

scenarios

are

of NBC

significantly

different then the alternatively equipped Dragon scenarios.

The size of blue and red forces are identical to Pate's
scenarios with regards to mission types.
McGuire

adds

attack

helicopters

to

red

As an exception,
forces "and

two

tubularly

optically

launched,

wire guided

tracked,

(TOW)

antia-mor missiles to blue forces as a supplemental weapon

system to each deliberate

During each run, the TOW missiles engage and

night ambush.
destroy

the

result,

it

in

defense mission and the hasty

Due

attack helicopters.

to

unrealistic

the

is determined that helicopters should not be used

any scenarios involving TOW missiles.

The

design

of

NcGuire's

randomized blgk design,

randomized

is

For

design.

experiment,

treated simply as a completely

each

three

scenario

makes

is

effects

on the

that

the

individuals
Given that,

analysis.

trained

army

The assumption

officers are used to run the simulations.

McGuire

completely

no

cause
McGuire

blocking

varies

the

scenarios by the six levels of missions and by two levels of

weapon types, Javelin and Dragon.
McGuire's results in paJrwise omuparisons of MOE data
are

similar to Pate's

requirements
lethality,

are

findings.
in

categorized

the

Failing

and survivability.

approach similarly proves fruitless

hypothesis testing.
the

Whitney

data,

scenarios there

analyzes

McGuire
is

normality,

of

range,

the ANOVA

for McGuire as did the

Realizing the nonparametric

McGuire

test.

areas

and Kolmogorov-Smirnov text for typical

Shipiro-Wilkes tests

of

the VOE data

Likewise,

also

a significant

the

MOEs

concludes

structure

using

the

Mann

that

for

most

difference

shown between

"q

and

McGuire

discovers
ratios

exchange

vehicles

killed by

are

loss

(FERs),

and

MOEs

ratios

force exchange

(LERs),

lethality,

for

category

the most meaningful

that

of threat

the ratio

the

Under

Dragon.

Javelin

or Javelin

Dragon

divided by the total number of shots by Dragon or Javelin.

In

any

case,

the

to

attack

day

deliberate

for

for

LER

MOEs,

and

one

FER,

the

in

several

offers

McGuire

scenario.

however

the support by fire position for both the

First,

reasons.

result

this

is

There

lethality.

in

Dragon

exception

that

the Javelin proves significantly different

these three MOEs,

than

indicates

analysis

conclusive

the

Javelin and Dragon are within 1000 meters of the objective.

This

from

away

safely

fails

distance

short

red

to provide

standoff

the

Secondly,

engagements.

force

distance

terrain in

the Janus(A) database may influence the operators

to

that

assess

there
Fort

is

there

is

less

cover

and

concealment

than

actually on the corresponding piece of terrain at

thus,

Hunter Liggett,

providing

an unexpected

longer

survivability time for both weapons and allowing more time

to inflict
McGuire

heavier losses to the red forces.

addresses

effectiveness,
fo2

unit

both Dragon

survivability

survivability

using

two measures

and weapon

survivability

UniL. survivability

and Javelin.

of

measures

how many blue soldiers survived relative to how many began

the battle.

Likewise,

weapon survivability

for BragoV and

Javelin measures the number of respective gunners surviving

relative to their starting number.
vith

Pate's with regard

contact

(resulting

into

to the
a

McGuire's results concur

two missions:

hasty

day

work) and the deliberate defense.

ambush

movement
in

McGuire's

These mission pairs show

significant differences between Javelin and Dragon.

other

hand,

McGuire's

to

deliberate

day

On the

attack

mission

indicates no differences between either weapon system and in

essence

contradicts

type.

Similar

characterized
in

Pate's

reasons

to

for

explain

same

th.

this

mission

phenomena

are

by those noted earlier for the discrepancies

the LER and FER results.

an observed

results

inverse

The rational for the outcome is

rulationship between

survivability

and

unit loss.
McGuire and Pate made an important contribution

to the

IOTE of the Javelin weapon system at Fort Hunter Liggett in

early Spring of 1994.

Their findings aided in

streamlining

the design of the operational tests conducted as part of the

Model-Test-Model research of the Javelin weapon system.
recommendations
pairs

of

from

both studies

missions

of

the

same

indicate
nature,

that

The

different

offensive

or

defensive,

need

not

operational

tests

can be tapered to make efficient use of

resources and still

Knowledge

of

these

necessarily

be

performed

so

that

provide sufficient amounts of real data.

particularly

redundant

scenarios

helps

omit

them

conserves

from

any

precious

follow-on

operational

resources

and

tests.

attempts

to

conducting statistically unproductive field tests.

C.

This
avoid
[Ref.

4]

PROBLEM STATEMENT
Successful operational and live fire tests have proven

the Javelin superior to the Dragon.

Unfortunately,

resources have restricted operational

dismounted
know if

infantry

forces

limited

testing of light or

scenarios.

The Army needs

to

the Javelin should be fielded in mechanized units.

The mechanized units today maintain a robust inventory of

millions of dollaks worth of extremely technical equipment.
New and advanced weapon systems also come with a high price
tag

therefore,

the

cost

of

the

system

must

be

weighed

against its contributions to operational effectiveness.

As

a proposal, modeling and simulations will be used to address

this question

as the Army has allotted

no resources

for

additional operational tests and evaluations involving heavy

forces scenarios.
D.

SCOPE
As

advanced

resources
weapon

continue
systems

to
like

increasingly more'difficult if

diminish,
the

acquisition

Javelin

will

of

become

not impossible without prior

analysis of each new system's developmental and operational

performances.

Integrating the Javelin into the- infantry's

1b

10

weapons

inventory could be costly and unnecessary or it

be a beneficial and worthy combat multiplier.

may

The scope of

this thesis is to further explore the utility of the Javelin

for the Army in the interest of potentially fielding the
weapon system to the Mechanized Infantry.
This
Javelin

thesis
for

investigates

the

Mechanized

Janus(A) to determine if
operational

combat

tactics

and

Infantry

using

developed

for

the

by

light

selected for study in

the Janus(A)

based

prior

inplit

from

scenarios

effectiveness
Graphical
determine

the

replacement

by

the

statistical

data

operational

and

Operations

and

requirements

in

terms

author

analysis

effectiveness

Additionally,
of

and

of

for

measures

of

TRAC-Monterey.
is

applied

to

the mechanized

cases modeled with and without the Tavelin as a

for

results from this

the

Dragon

in

te

antia&mor

analysis will directly aid in

of where to field the Javelin for the future,

more elite

current

(dismounted)

TRAC-Monterey.

analyzed

selected

and

infantry in

are

in

mechanized scenarios are

research

analysis by the host agency,

these

the

Janus(A)

applying

mechanized infantry platoon/company size forces.

on

of

modeling

The scenarios used in

operations

doctrine

contributions

the system proves to enhance combat

effectiveness.

reflect

the

US Army.

11

role.

The

the decision
smaller,

and

1b

12

IL EQUIPMENT AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS

This
weapon

chapter
systems,

capabilities
unit.

serves
friendly

as they

Moreover,

to

describe
and

enemy

the

differences

forces,

and

impact upon the mechanized

in

their

infantry

the employment of the Dragon and Javelin is

discussed as appropriate to sach type of scenario,

offensive or defensive.

be it

These descriptions provide a basic

knowledge from which to understand how mechanized infantry

fight.

Gaining an understanding of these tactics makes it

clearer

on

how

modeling.

to

implement

Furthermore,

tactics aids

in

the

systems

into

Janus(A)

a sound knowledge of equipment and

comparing

and contrasting the

systems

in

question.

This understanding helps establish and validate

meaningful

results

of

the

NOEs

in

the

design

of

the

experiment.
A.

ANTIARMOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

1. Dragon
The Dragon is

the

dismounted

company.

the primary antiarmor weapon system for

element

of

the

mechanized

platoon

and

The major components of '.he weapon are the day

sight, attachable thermal night sight, and a single missile.

Although the day and night sights are reusable, the cost for
each Dragon missile is

an estimated $25,000 dollars.

combined weight of the system is

/

13

The

approximately 55 pounds.

Although it
q

is

the bulky size and weight of the

manportable,

Dragon make maneuvers and speed of movement difficult.

To

fire the

Dragon,

the gunner

his aim using

steadies

When engaged,

the bipod stand and firm ground.

the gunner

ensures that the missile has a direct line-of-fire to reach

its

Figure 1 shows the Dragon gunner in the sitting

target.

firing position.

Figure 1.
The

Dragon gunner employed in

Dragon

engages

light

skinned

vehicles up to a range of 1000 meters.

systems

of

machine-gun

caliber

and

firing position.
and

hea-y

armored

Most enemy weapon

higher

are

more

than

capable of engaging and returning fire to the Dragon gunner

at

these

distances.

potentially

exposes

because of its

As

result,

the gunner

to threatening

lack of standoff in

14

employing

range.

the

Dragon

enemy

Additionall~I,

fires
the

muzzle flash and smoke from the missile's launch conmomises

the location and inevitably the survivability of the Dragon
gunner.

(Ref.

5]

Range standoff is
system.

not the only shortfall of the Dragon

The Dragon is a command-linked wire guided missile

with a relatively

slow velocity.

As

a consequence,

the

gunner may remain exposed for as much as 10 to 12 seconds

because of the extensive tracking time of the missile until
target impact.
2. Javelin
The Javelin Antitank Weapon System is

system.

It

Dragon in
Javelin

has been suggested to replace,

is designed to weigh
but it

the

The

field.

itself

one-for-one, the

the antiarmor role for dismou; ted infantry.

the Dragon,

reusable

also a manportable

command
which

is

too is

system
and
a

five to six pounds less than

large

includes
launch

missile

The

and difficult

two

unit

major components:

(CLU)

packaged

to carry in

and the

in

warhead

sealed

tube.

Although currently not in full scale production, the Javelin

missile

itself

costs

an

estimated

$100,000

approximately four times that of the Dragon.

dollars,

The CLU has an

integrated day/night sight which provides target acquisition

even in adverse weather conditions.

As an added benefit,

the CLU zay also be used independently as another means of

target acquisition on the battlefield.
15

Il

The Javelin has an

increased
*

engagement

range

of 2000 meters

range out to 4500 meters.

key

advantage

capability.
target,

of

Technically

the

Javelin

lock

on

the

Javelin

the

is

engagement.

its

engage

launch.

gunner's

trajectory,

of

locate
seek

modes

engage

distances.

enemy

the

cover

feature

of

of

and a flat trajectory

line of sight fi;e mode.

the

target
which

or direct

The gunner selects the top attack

tanks

and

vehicles

at

greater

This allows for the missile to impact the top of

the target vehicle where it

vulnerable

to
the

is

catastrophic
indirect

less heavily armored and more

kills.

flight

When

path

of

gunner selects the direct fire mode.

the Javelin
kneeling

and

Another

selection

the

fire-and-forget

The two modes of fire are top attack mode,

shoots a high

obstructs

and tactically,

is

missile,

upon missile

to

a detection

This allows the gunner to quickly

immediately

mode

and

ready

position.

feature

which

covered

fighting

to

fire

Also,

allows

it

in
the

to

and

[Ref.

the

cover

missile,

the

Figure 2 illustrates

top attack

Javelin
be

positions

signature of the gunner.

the

overhead

fired
helps

mode

from

soft

launch

uses

from

enclosures

reduce

the

and

launch

6]

3. Brdley Fighting Vehicle (BFV)

The

BFV

necessity.

came

to

The advances

Abram Tank left

the
in

Mechanized

Infantry

technology developing

out

of

the MiAl

the Mechanized Infantry behind in firepower

16

and speed.

provide mutual combined

in

giving the Infantry

the tools to

their mission to close with and destroy the eneoy

a combined arms battle.

Figure 2.
The
within

From (Ref.
BFV has the

excellent

2],

Javelin gunner in

capacity

armor

to carry

protection.

operate the vehicle and its

open position.
nine

Three

mounted armament.

(dismounted) element rides in

is

support on the battlefield.

arms

The BFV closes this gap,

succeed in

difficult for the Infantry to

The effect made it

man squad

crew

members

The fire team

the rear troop compartment and

able to mount or dismount the vehicle through the ramp

access door or when the ramp is

down.

the ramp down dismount of the S7V in

17

Figure 3 illustrates
a typical operation.

One of the most important features is the compliment of

weapon systems onboard the BFV.

The vehicle's main weapon

is the M242 25-millimeter fully automatic gun.

three rates of fire: single shot,
It

low rate,

The M242 has

and high rate.

can deliver armor piercing rounds against lightly armored

vehicles

to

maximum

effective

Adjacent to the M242 is

mounted machine

gun.

range

of

1700

meters.

the M240 7.62-millimeter coaxially

The M240

is

used to

suppress

and

defeat enemy dismounted forces out to a range of 900 meters.

The BFV's main antitank weapon is
The

TOW

missile

is

the

missile with accuracy

launcher

can

Internal

storage

load

optically

from

two

of the

the turret mounted TOW.

65 to

missiles

tracked,

3750 meters.
but

BFV can hold

Dragon/Javelin rounds or a mix.

wire

fires

five extra

[Ref. 73

Dismounting the BFV with ramp down.

18

The

TOW

sequentially.

-Nt

Figure 3.

guided

TOW

or

SCENARIOS
Regardless

of

an

infantry

unit's

organsiational

"equipment, the basic tactics are similar.

In particular,

the doc"rinal employment of either the Dragon or the Javelin

in

a mechanized

infantry

light infantry unit.

unit in

identical

to that

of a

In any case, the comnder and platoon

leader =ust cossi4er the employment of both weapon systems.

lach

system's

mission.
are

employment

dependent

upon

the

type

of

Two missleos designed and simulated for this study

the deliberate

These

Is

defense

misslon& encompass

and the movement

both

defensive

to contact.

and

offensive

tactics and maneuvers.

The

main

purpose

of

the

movement

to

contact

establish or regain contact with the enemy.

offensive operation,

It

is

is

to

As with any

the intent of the commander to

develop the situation, gain the tactical advantage, and then

close with and destroy or neutralize his opponent.
the

movement

to

contact

may

often

doctrinal

for

the

forces,

it

locally

superior

is

Conversely,

combat

power

In

expose

the

coanMder
forces

Because
attacking

to establish

and

the role of the deliberate defense is

equipment.
to defeat

an enemy

attack.

defend in

place but rather to defert-3 only until sufficient

strength
offensive.

allows

by doctrine,

one

to

it

is

counterattack

not the intent to

and

return

to

the

Generally, commanders use the delib,-.'ate defense

19

impede enemy forces while other friendly forces

to buy time,

conserve forces, and hold key terrain that poses

may attack,

an advantage to its

[Ref.

occupants.

8]

The different nature of these operations offer a unique

look

at

both

different

systems

weapon

These missions

scenarios.

in

two

will

also

engaged

extremely
deliver

comparatively robust analysis of the unit's effectiveness in

A comparison of results from these operations

either case.

also provide

of Pate and McGuire may

to those

supportive

evidence to the Javelin's potential.

Prior to discussing the employment of the key antiarmor
weapon systems in

either types

threat

forces.

mechanized

infantry

deliberate

defense

Threat

The

platoon
and

forces

and

movement

company

friendly

and

is

best to

infantry and

modeled

are

the

in

the

employed

to contact,

forces consist of a mix of tanks,

personnel carriers,

it

of the mechanized

understand the organization

opposing

of missions,

respectively.
and armor

T-72s,

BMP-2s with dismounting infantry.

Both

to

fight

threat

forces

have

the

capability

their soldiers mounted or dismounted as the situation of the

battle and terrain dictates.
the quantity
currently

of soldiers,

found

Organization

and

in

The friendly forces represent

weapons,

the

Equipment

US

Army

(MTOE)

20

and equipment
Modified
for

each

that are
Table

size

of

unit.

Likewise,

the threat forces are organized and equipped as

typical of any formar Soviet/Warsaw Pact force.

I. Fricud

Fres"1 Mehamhd

a ftes~ix~e" and Equipmeat

At Its

basic level,

the mechanized

infantry company

consists of three platoons of four BFVs each and a company

headquarters.
is

The company headquarters also has a BFV which

manned by the commander,

fire

support

officer.

master gunner,

The

platoons

driver,

operate

and the

under

the

direction and guidance of the commander but to the orders of

the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.

The decentralized

control allows the platoons to fight rapidly in

a variety of

situations requiring mounted and dismounted tactics.

platoon

has

section.
men.
fire

two *sections,

and

B,

with

two

Each

BFVa

Sections A and B consist of two squads

per

of nine

Each squad has three crew members and six members of a

team.

form

the

dismounted

On order,
ground

each squad's fire team dismounts to

maneuver

operations,

element.

the

commanded by the platoon

ground

leader.

During
maneuver

Meanwhile,

sustained
element

the

is

platoon

sergeant controls the movement of the BFVa and provides fire

support to the dismountal portion of the platoon.
Weapon
enable

it

systems

to mass a

antiarmor fires.

organic

to

wide variety

* Complimenting

21

the

mechanized

of both small

the IFV's

(Ref.

7]

platoon
arms and

weapon systems,

the dismounted fire teams each typically have the antiarmor

specialist, two automatic riflemen, and three riflemen.
following

the

of

list

composite

has

thus

platoon

The
key

antiarmor systems and weapons.

1. 4 BFVs with coaxial machine guns.
4 X 7 TOW missiles (basic load).
4 X 1 M242 .25 millimeter automatic guns.
2.

4 Antiarmor specialist.
4 X 2 Dragon/Javelin missiles (Movement to Contact)
or 4 X 4 Dragon/Javelin missiles (Deliberate
Defense).
the Dragon/Javelin

Assuming time permitting,

have

an

deliberate

additional
defense

missiles

remaining weapon

The

mission.

Weapons

Automatic

for

system

per

assigned and carried by certain soldiers in

systems

individually

are

which

(SAWs)

the

and the M249

These include the M16A2 rifles

are small arms.

Squad

two

gunners

the platoon.

b. Tactics of the Antarmorfight

Tactics,
antiarmor

techniques,

and

systems

are

weapon

procedures

prerogative as they are a science.

basic

and

doctrinal

observed.

Based

on

tactical
the

much

as

commander's

There are however,

principles

estimate

employing

for

of

the

that

should

situation,

some
be
the

commander decides where to position the antiarmor weapons.

Ideally, he places the weapon zystems in

such a manner as to

take full advantage of each system's range and capabilities.

The commander,

guided by experience

22

and doctrinre,

btlances

his

decision

the

about

information

with

enemy,

mission,

terrain, available troops and time (METT-T).

During the estimate of the
has

the

Once

contact.

of

positioning

the

plan

the deliberate

in

assets

to

time

more

situation,

defense

than

his

the

in
the

begins,

battle

the commander
antiarmor

movement

conduct

to
the

ok

antiarmor fight in the movement to contact relies heavily on

the

itntent

commander's

Nevertheless,

specialist.
employment

of

actions

resulting

the

and

mission,

given

and guidance,

weapons

such

primarily

commander's
their

that
the

at

goal

enemy's

is

to

the deliberate

flanks

array

of

fire

and

rear.

fields

offense are

the defense.

particularly

defensive operations,
the

antiarmor

the

the

in

of antiarmor weapon systems

defense,

the

the commander's concerns for the

the same as those measures he applies in

In

to

prior

antiarmor

his
are

directed

By

design,

armored vehicles

are more vulnerable when exposed to flank

aY4 rear shots.

The effectiveness of TOW and Dragon fires

are

greatly

frontal

reduced

the

against

slope of armor vehicles.

more
In

heavily

shrouded

these instances,

the

Javelin weapon syptem has the advantage to fire indirectly

at oncoming targets as a top attack veapon.
Antiarmor engagements
Both

the

TOW

obstructions in

and

Dragon

require clear
weapon

of

fire.

cannot

have

fields

systems

the flight paths of the missiles.

23

Any large

obstacles
missiles

may

damage

the

guide

wires

from engaging their target.

and

This

prevent
includes

the
large

bodies of water that potentially cause electrical failure of

the guide wires that trail
The
mutually

position

of

supportive

engagements

Dragon.

weapons

interlocking

capable

of

3750

should

provide

fires.

The

TOW

meters,

cannot

be

2000 meters by either the Javelin or the

Employment

synergistic

antiarmor

and

although

supported beyond

the missile's flight.

effect

of

each

that

system

occurs

when

antiarmor fires to one engagement area.

must

consider

integrating
In the defense,

the
all
the

commander designates this engagement area with trigger lines

which

span the range

engagement

area,

of all weapon systems.

enemy

targets

are

Once

destroyed

in

in

the

mass

by

cross coverage of fire from all weapons.

In
generally

the
play

movement
a

maneuvering units.

to

contact,

supportive,

the

antiarmor

overwatching

role

weapons
for

the

Antiarmor weapons must be able to place

fires rapidly to cover the flanks and prevent enemy forces

from reinforcing the objective or counter-attacking the main
body of the maneuvering units.

The tactics

to employ the

antiarmor weapons are similar to the defense but,

mission occurs,

there is

when the

less time to establish engagement

areas with interlocking fires.

24

2 Enemy Forces - MecbanizedArmor Heavy

a Orhganiaon od Equipmwxf
Enemy soldiers and equipment are representative
mechanized/heavy

force siellar

to the former Soviet/Warsav

Pact.

Weapons capabilities and acquisition

tanks

and

arxored

of a

provide

to

upgraded

are

vehicles

devices of the

contemporary study against a more modernized opponent.

and night

vision

capabilities

devices

are

modeled

as current US forces.

as

Alto,

weapons are considered equivalent in

Iavinq

the

a
Day

same

en.'my small arms

firepower and lethality

agaenst friendly forces weapons of the same caliber.

In

both missions, the opposing forces portray a T-72

tank company task organized with one mechanized platoon with

three DMP-2's and 11 man squadc each.
composed

of

three

platoons

and

Each platoon has three tanks.

compeny maintains tan tars
bore main gun.
range

out

one

The tank company is

headquarters

section.

Including the commander,

with the

the

120 millimeter smooth

The T-72 tank's main gun has an effective

to 2000

meters.

The

range

and high

antitank rounds make the T-72 a significant

explosive

threat to the

I1V.
The SNP-2 is

a light armored personnel carrier.

main weapon systems include

AT-S

Spandrel.

a 30-millimeter cannon

Respectively,

these

weapon

Its

and an

systems

are

capable of suppressing and inflicting damage on the BDV at

25

close ranges within 1000 meters with small arms fire and out
to

3000

meters

with

the

BMP-2's

advantmge,

antiarmor
low

missile

profile

fires.

and

speed

As
make

an

it

difficult target.
& Tactics and Doctrine
The essence of speed dictates that the enemy forces
prefer to remain in
the

tank

eminent,

company

a column or march formation.

is

the

lead

element.

the tank company and its

laterally

on

line

doctrinally
Immediately

with

referred
before

its
as

combat,

the

the

Once

battle

in

column.

prebattle

company

further

This

is

formation.
disperses

into an attack formation with platoons on line or in

formation.

is

mechanized platoon deploy

platoons

to

Generally,

wedge

Once within small arms range of the objective,

the infantry squads dismount the BMP-2s and begin to conduct

a close combat assault.
their

dismounts

as they

their

objective

in

in

movement.

This

try to

order

through any weakness

discipline

As a unit,

in

to

the BMP-2s will support

fire

disrupt,

and

maneuver

expose,

the opposing defense.

formations
achieves

emphasizc:
a

swift

concentrated

and

effort

and

toward
break

The strict
efficient
to

punch

through front line defenses and shatter an opposing weaker

rear objective.

If

successful,

lead units break through and

create a safe passage for follow-on forces.

26

[Ref.

9)

A defense posture is
,continue

on the olfensive.

temporary until
continue.

When

plazoons

create

dispersed

in

terrain,

additional
it

assumed when enemy forces cannot

The defense is
resources

becomes

strongpoints

V-type

wedge

the defensive

al]ow the

inevitable
with

to

squads

formations.

positions

considered only

focus

defend,
and

Making
on

offense to

27

vehicles

use of

the

canalizing

the

attackers into fire sacks which are covered by all

weapons of the platoons and company.

the

organic

q,

Ii

28

UL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A.

JANUS(A) AS A HIGH RESOLUTION COMBAT MODEL

i. The Modd
Janus(A)

is

a stochastic,

land combat computer model.

interactive,

high resolution

Multiple players can utilize it

simultaneously as a training toc'

for tactics and co&.ined

arms warfare.

to the analyst, Janus(A)

More importantly,

provides a method of generating multiple simulation runs and

output data that model combined arms warfare.

Interactions

between opposing modeled forces apply stochastic processes

in detection,
the

model

Janus(A)

acquisition, and engagement algorithms, giving

a

is

realirtic

ability

in

determining

kills.

one of the primary high resolution models

for

the US Army and has gained acceptance by tle other Armed

Services.
Janua(A)

can

be

designed

several variable factors.

to

model

realism

Weapon systems

and terrain a-e

two of the most influential of these factors.

can randomly

These factors

and

systemically

scenario.

Other

factors

environment,

mines,

and smoke add even more realism vhen

brought

into play.

simulates

both

As

friendly

equipment as they

affect

such

as

the events
weather,

a high resolution model,

and

enemy

units,

are affected by these

29

through

of

chemical

Janus(A)

weapons,
fact -rs.

any

and
As a

point,
into
q

successful

missions

consideration

the

accomplished

effects

of

in

Janus(A)

these

take

factors

and

conditions.
The engagements in
by

detection,

acquisition

weapon systems.
of a force is

in

algorithms

of

An engagement occurs only when an element

direct

fire

exchanges.

The

fires,

all

direct

fire

a limitation which directly affects the accuracy

modeling

result,

engagement

With the exception of artillery

are

exchange is

and

within line of sight and range of an opposing

weapon system.
engagements

Janus(A) are calculated and resolved

all

the

Javelin's

Javelin

top

attack

are

simulated

fires

capability.
in

As

Janus(A)

a
as

direct fires upon the frontal slopes or flanks of targets.

The

outcome

catastrophic
probability
developed

from each engagement

kill.
of

kill,

through

The

probability

Pk,

data

tests

and

These

data,

inputs

for

former

Soviet/Warsaw

simulations
collection
equipment
(Ref.

numerous

with

Pact

this

on weapon
typically

(AMSAA)

allows

engagements

and

today's

10]

30

or

Ph,

and

Janus(A)

are

by

and its

including

in

by

and

weapons.

a miss

hit,

done

database

used

of

studies

unclassified
systems

either

utilized

Material Systems Analysis Agency

agencies.

is

the

Army

affiliated

classified,
typical

Conducting
for

are

NATO

and

Janus(A)

extensive

data

system detections
modern

by

battlefield.

. Temrrai
Terrain files in Janus(A) are derived primarily from the
These are digitayed images of

Defense Napping Agency data.

selected areas that are imported into scenarios built by the

modeler.

The images graphically illustrate vegetation, road

networks,

urban

elevation

areas,

and contour lines.

The

terrain in Janus(A) version 3.17 has 50 meter resolution and

designations

displayed. with grid

can be

[Ref.

actual military map.

of

map

10)

this analysis are developed using the

All scenarios in
terrain

to the

that correspond

the area of operations

represent

accurately

that

Hunter

Fort

location was selected because

Liggett,

The

California.

offers a wide variety of

it

terrain such as hills, valleys, open areas and a mix of low

to

upon

scenarios.

of the

representation

operation

combat

efficacy
increases

terrain

the

incorporate

impact

The

vegetation.

thick

in

Janus(A)

of

to

realistic

the

The effects of terrain

such

as

areas

weapons

line of sight, and rates of movement.

engagements,

3AUTOJAN
the

has

Janus (A)

capability

to

create

multiple

si,ulation runs with Independent results using the ALTOJAN

m4e.
recorded
-.

To

operate

run

of

an

In

this

original

performed Interactively.

mode

requires

simulation

which

Once the original

31

previously
has

been

simulation is

recorded, the AUTOJAN feature calls upon the record for the
history of all weapon systems movement routes,

Independent trials of the

and fields of view.

postures,

engagement

same mission are repeated in AUTOJAN by randomizing the seed

by

used

the

Each

algorithms.

and

acquisition,

detection,

[Ref.

postprocessed information of the results.

however,

The AUTOJAN feature does,

provides

likewise

repeated

run

engagement

10]

restrict the use of

the mount/dismount capabilities of an interactively played

In the original simulation,

scenario.

be dismounted
forces.
movement
before

immediately prior to

mounted forces must

contact with

opposing

This allow each dismounted element to have separate

routes,
its

engagement

carrier

catastrophic kill.

vehicle

postures,
is

fields

and

possibly

of view

eliminated

by

In the AUTOJAN run, the carrier may not

become a catastrophic kill,

in which case,

all techniques

and movement histories applied to the dismounted forces are

still
B.

a part of the original record.

METHODOLOGY
1. General
The Mechanized Infantry model testing is

varied across

two types of missions and the two weapon types,

Javelin.

Each scenario test includes eleven runs of each

mission per weapon type.

movement

Dragon and

The deliberate defense

to contact missions are both

32

and the

iterated usin% the

AUTOJAN

replay

postprocessed,

feature.
collected,

After
and

then

spreadsheet for further analysis.

testing is

each

run,

data

transferred

differences

caused

At this point, hypothesis

conducted for each HOE to investigate

significant

onto

is

by thb

effects

signs of

of

the two

antiarmor weapons systems.

2.Anuuptlous
Typical
assumes,
both

hypothesis testing using parametric

for example in

populations

are

variances are equal.

this

assumption.

a t-test

It

techniques

when comparing two means,

normally

distributed

and

Common parametric techniques

is,

however,

their
rely on

not uncommon for data not

to follow these assumptions and to bring the validity of the

parametric

procedure

into question.

In

order to circumvent

this difficulty, nonparanetric statistical procedures say be

used.

Mendenhall states:

Research
has
shown
that
nonparametric
statistical
tests
are almost as capa.le of detecting
differences
among populations as the parametric
methods (of preceding chapters) when normality and
other assumptions are satisfied.
They may be, and
often are, more powerful in detecting population
differences w.-en the assumptions are rot satisfied.
For this reason many statisticians advocate the use
of
nonparametric
statistical
procedures
in
preference to their parametric counterparts. [Ref.11l
The statistical

analysis

of Pate and McGuire

indicates

that the output from the Light Infantry simulation runs is

not entirely normally distributed.

33

From these findings,

It

is

that

assumed

the

the

from

output

mechanized

forces

scenarios will not necessarily provide evidence of normally

samples of data.

distributed

is,

It

however,

assumed

that

the data are independent random samples from two populations

with the same shape and a scale that is
it

assumption,

is

exist a shift in
is

On this

ordinal.

reasonable to hypothesize that there may

medians between these two populations.

It

acceptable then to choose the Mann-Whitney test [Ref.ll].

Mann-Whitney

The

for

test

provides

test

differences

significant

method

nonparametric
between

two

to

populations

medians of unknown distributions.

3. Mann-Whitney Nonparametric Test
Results of each mission are evaluated using quantifiable
measures of effectiveness.
is

to

determine

difference

if

the

The basic

analytical

objective

proposed

scenarios

reveal

between the two mechanized

unit configurations.

Hypothesis testing under the Mann-Whitney approach

pairwise

comparisons

between

the

medians

of each

involves
MOE

for

each different type of mechanized unit.

The Mann-Whitney method first
the

two

samples

observations
etc.,

are

of
given

data
rank

from

involves ranking together

each

1, second

until all observations are ranked.

MOE.
smallest,

rank

2,

Observations that

are tied are each assigned the average rank order.

of the ranks of the first

Smallest

The sum

sample are calculated arAO labeled

34

the test statistic, W. Small values for the test statistic,

V, indicate that the median for the first sample is smaller
than the median of the second sample.

Conversely,

large

values of W indicate that the median for the second sample

is smaller than the first.

(Ref. 12]

In each scenario, the Mann-Whitney tests will be:

Where:
Ti = the median of each MOE in an applied Dragon scenario
T12

= the median cf each MOE in an applied Javelin scenario i,

for i - I to 2 (deliberate defense, movemnt to contact)

C.

MEASURES OF EFFECTWENESS (MOE)

The purpose of an MOE Im to capture a specific data

element that best investigates the operational effectiveness
of

the

Dragon

and

Javelin

equipped

mechanized

scenarios.

The MOEs considered in this study are characteristic of the

NOEs

required

Criteria (COIC)

by

the

Critical

developed by OPTEC.

Operational
The critical

Issues

Issues and

their required data elements can be found explicitly in

Test and Evaluation Plan (TEP) that was used for the !OTE
the Javelin for Light Infantry

(Ref. 13].

and

the
of

Using this as a

quide, the NOEs established for thia study investigate four

35

IQ

areas:

range,

survivability,

and lethality.
I.

In detail,

dominating antiarmor

these MOEs are as follows:

MOE for range of engagement per unit type.

Data element :

Antiarmor engagement range of each t)pe unit.

2.

MOE for force survivability.

Datebe,
b tf !ue forces survived
SData element:
number of blue forces starting

3.

MOE for target stolen by antiarmor system.

Data element:

4.

systems,

# of threat vehicles destroyedby Dragon/Javelin

# of threat vehicles destroyed by M2 BFV

MOE for lethality (force exchange ratio).

Data element:

These

MOEs

are

Red losses!TotalRedforces
Blue losses/TotalBlue forces
selected because they

compare

and

contrast the issues of whether or not the Javelin enhances

the

operational

effectiveness

All MOEs are quantifiable

in

of

the Mechanized

Infantry.

terms of numeric values or as

ratios obtained from each simulation run's output.

36

IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The mission numbers used as labels in

numerically.

in this chapter are listed in Table 1.

there

are

missions

references

Janus(A)

simplicity,

For

conducted

runs

11

for

graphs

For each unit type

every

This

mission.

includes one original human interactive run and ten AUTOJAN

runs.

Collectively, the ten AUTOJAN runs save 60 man hours

of computer simulation time when each mission averages one

and a half hours real time.

Mission
Number
S(%
3
501
525
526

Mission

Unit Type

Deeme Defense
Deliberate Defense
Movement to Contact
Movement to Contact

Mechanized Platoon with Dragon

Mechanized Platoon with Javelin
Mechanized Company with Dragon
Mechanized Company with Javelin

Table 1.
A.

Numeric assignment of Janus(A) mission.

ANTIARMOR ENGAGEMENTS
The box plot analysis of the antiarmor engagement ranges

illustrated

in

Figure 4 indicates that there

is

a slight

difference in the median ranges between unit types for the

defensive mission.

The reason for this result is

that the

employmont of the Javelin is similar to the Dragon due to

the restrictive nature of the Fort Hunter Lig;ett terrain.
As a consequence,
with

the

engagement

intent
area

the defense missions 500/501 ar, developed

to

dray

the

500 to 1500 meters in

37

1'

threat

vehicles
depth.

into

an

The small

in

differences

also explained by the

engagement ranges is

number of TOW missile fires that tend to raise the averages

The effect of

of the unit's rande of antiarmor engagements.

the TOW missiles in raising the averages is
in
due

Thic is

the movement to contact mission.

to

missiles.

increase

signiticant

the

also noticeable

in

the

particularly

number

of

TOW

The basic load for missions 500/501 requires a

mix of 16 Dragon/Javelin missiles and 28 TOW missiles.

On

the other hand, the basic load for missions 525/526 requires
a mix of 24 Dragon/Javelin missiles and 84 TOW missiles.

Antiarmor Engagements
500/501 - Deliberate Defense

525/526 - Movenent to Contact

w) 2.5

1.5

M
1.0

500/Dragon 501/Javelin 525/Dragon 526/Javelin

Missions
Co

arison of MOE

for each mission/unit type

Box plot diagram of antiarmor engagements.

Figure 4.
Note: Engagements include mix of Dragon/Javelin and TOW.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Mann-Whitney tests
for mission pairs 500/501 and 525/526.
38

Despite the slight

in

similarities

for the defeneive

mediatns

missions,

Lt the

0.05 significance level, the null hypothesis that the wedian

range of engagements are equal is rejected.

Missions Pairs

Median

lest Statistic, W

500

1.2340
1.3408

91.0

501

v__ue
.0.0215

0.0006
74.0
2.1720
2.4793
Mann-Whitney test for antiarmor engagements.

525
526
Table 2.
B.

__

SURVIVABILnTY
survivability

Force
between

unit

In

types.

showe

significant

most

the

differences

significant

case,

the

Javelin equipped unit achieves an 85% survivability rate In

The Dragon equipped unit,

the deliberate defense.

on the

other hand, suffers the loss of almost half of its force.

In

the

both mis;ions,

primarily

to

the

armored threat,
As a result,
inflict

of unit survivability

level

dismounted

gunner.

Javelin

the Javelin gunner is

difficult

Given

due
an

to detect.

Javelin gunners survive longer and continue to

heavy losses on opposing forces.

The significant differences are illustrated in

Figure 5.

Fnr each mission pair box plots support rejection

null

is

hypothesis

Accordingly,

by

shoving

Kann-Whitney

no

test

overlapping
results

39

in

of the

distributions.
Table

3 clearly

indicate a significant difference between Dragon and Javelin

equipped units.

Survivability
500/501 - Dliberate D.fens

525/526 -

ovowsent to Contact

0.9g10.8

0.7

0o.6-

S500/Dragon

501/Javelin 525/Dragon 526/Javelin

Missions
lanparison of MOE 2 for each mssicn/unit type

Figure 5.

Missions Pairs

Median

Test Statistic, W

P-Value

500
501

0.5750
0.8500

85.0

0.0071

525
526

0.6143
0.7286

82.0

0.0039

Table 3.
C.

Box plot diagram of blue force survivability.

Mann-Whitney test for blue force survivability.

TARGET STEALING
The high survivability of the Javelin gunner contributes

to an unexpected rise
kills

in

in

the number of Javelin versus TOW

both missions 501 and

52A.

It

also explains how

the medians of each missic-'" w-th the same antiarmor weapon

systems are near equal.

The Javelin with its

40

in:rreasqd Ph

and

Pk

capability

antiarmcr

system

illustrates
between

is

highly

effective

and

dominating

on the modeled battlefield.

Figure

the difference in the medians of target stealing

weapon

systems.

In

both

missions,

the

results

demonstrate a relatively higher median of Javelin/Br-V Kills

than Dragon/BFV
indicate
mission

that

kills.
there

pairs.

The results
is

significant

Mann-Whitney

cases there is

in

tests

Table

similarly

difference

estimate

that

in
in

both

less than a two percent chance of committing

a type I error In

rejecting the null hypothesis.

Target Stealing
$00/501 - Dellkrat. Defenoe

!2515M

mspmentto Contact

S
2o-

5WA/keg.

50IJ~el.1a 525/L"- :;7;6/b113

Missions
Cworisao

Figure 6.

the

of PX 3 for *1e0 d.sion/unit type

Box plot diagram of armor target stealing.

41

Missions Pairs
Median
Test Statistic, W
P-Value
500
0.3333
71.5
0.0003
501
1.3333
525
0.5000
90.5
0.0197
526
1.1667
Table 4.
Mann-Whitney test for target stealing.
D.

LETHALrY
The analysis of missions 500/501 and 525/526 indicates

that

the

medians

of

lethality

different between each unit type.

enemy forces destroyed
Javelin

significantly

This is

evident in

exchange

in

also

significantly

Notably,

the number of

the deliberate defense with the

out

number

the graphical

ratios depicted

are

in

those

with

comparison

Figure 7.

the

Dragon.

of the

force

As another point,

similarities in results of each mission with Dragon indicate

that there is

only a linear increase in the force exchange

ratio between unit types.

Hence,

a blue force with Dragon

does not demonstrate an increase in lethality as it

gains an

increase in the number of Dragons.

Of the MOEs,

lethality is the strongest indicator of a

difference between blue forces with Javelin and blue forces

with Dragon.

Results of the Mann-Whitney tests in Table 5

show expected significant differences between medians.

importantly,

More

the test indicates a relatively small level in

P-values in rejecting the null hypothesis when it

42

is false.

A
Lethality
-

!00/

10-

Oiblrate Defmm

52U246 - N

..

nt to Contect

0-

4-

5O11Ig
o

elo

515/DrSqo

i2G1Js1Ln

Missions
C~AVison of MZ 4 tar eadh ussion/unjt tyM

Figure 7.

Box plot diagram of blue force lethality.

Missions Pairs
500
501
525
526
Table 5.

Median
1.7600
5.7020

Test Statistic, W
79.5

P-Value
0.0023

1.6780
79.0
0.0020
3.1510
Mann-Whitney test for lethality.

43

44

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

of

the purpose

While

Antitank

Javelin

the

of

potential

mechanized environment,

to examine

is

thesis

this

in

System

Weapon

the
a

also illustrates the utility of

it

Use of Janus(A)

Janus(A) zodel research for the US Army.

can support the research of past and present tactics and

may also be utilized to

Janus(A)

weapon systems design.

study the development of future tactics and weapon systems

design.

Janus(A) used in support of ths test and evaluation

process may also conserve resources.

thesis

This

examines

typical

The actual

Infantry.

Mechanized

two

of

missions

the

of the

field execution

deliberate defense and movement to contact in an operational

test requires months of effort just in the planning and
During the execution of these missions,

preparation phase.

In comparison,

data collection in most cases is difficult.

Janus(A)

simulatibns

provide multiple

executions

of these

missions in hours with accurate results from each employed

weapon system.
A.

CONCLUSIONS
This thesis shows that the operational effectiveness of

the mechanized infantry

Javelin.

is

enhanced when fielded with the

Examination of the two proposed missions provides

sufficient

and

differences

between

evidence

conclusive
the

unit

45

types

for
with

significant
Dragon

versus

Javelin antiarmor weapons.

Pate and McGuire.

Our results agree with those of

A summary of findings may be

found

in

Table 6.
In

both

scenarios,

the

Javelin

equipped

Mechanized

Infantry prove to be superior to the fzrrent Mechanized MTOE

with Dragon with respect to antiarmor engagement range,
force survivability,
four MOEs are

target stealing,

and lethality.

blue
These

statistically different to less than a

five

percent level of significance.

Mission:
Pairs:

Mission: Movement to
Deliberate
Defense
Contact
525/526
500/501
Pairs:
Does Javelin
Does Javelin
cause a
P-value
cause a
significant
significant
difference?
difference?

MOE

P-value

Antiarmor
Engagements

0.0215

YES

0.0006

YES

0.0071

YES

0.0039

YES

0.0003

YES

0.0197

YES

Survivability
Target
Stealing
Lethality
Table 6.

0.0023
YES
0.0020
YES
Summary of test levels of significance.

While the statistical

Javelin
may

still

defined
these

enhances
be

the unit's

difficult

terms

of

advantages

in

in

analysis certainly shows that the

to

MOEs.
terms

operational
measure
Many
of

46

effectiveness,

other

advantages

commanders

saving

may

lives,

it
not

describe

time,

and

flexibility

maintaining
commander,

on

For

battlefield.

the

each

are personally weighted by how

these advantages

much he values each contribution provided by the Javelin.

As

an

the

example,

of

results

the

fires

antiarmor

indicate that engagement ranges for the mechanized infantry

the defense extends hundreds of

platoon with the Javelin in

This same finding is

meters further than with the Dragon.

the movement to contact

true for the mechanized company in

In

mission.

cases,

both

To the military

standoff with longer distanced armor kills.

commander,

this standoff qives a

on the

to ward off the threat of close combat and slow the

the

commander

by delaying the

Additionally,

tempo of the enemy attack.

enemy,

tactical advantage

The more standoff he has, the more capable his

battlefield.
force is

better

provides

Javelin

the

gains

more

time

to

make

tactical

decisions.
Further,

when

standoff

longer exists,

no

fires expose the vulnerability of the BFV.

tank

enemy

When opposing

tanks penetrate the standoff range of the TOW missiles, blue

some cases,

forces lose a number of their BFVs.

In

with the Dragon suffer the loss of all

the BFVs.

units

The force

survivability at this point begins to decrease at a quicker

pace.

This

is

primarily

to the

due

lack

of support

Dragon provides outside a range of one kilometer.

range of two thousand meters,

the

With a

the Javelin reduces the number

47

of

enemy

tanks

closing

in

on

the

BFVs.

Thus,

the

observations of both the defensive and offensive operations

show that the Javelin helps sustains force survivability at
a much

higher level.

Particularly

survivability

is

than observed

with the Dragon.

this

improved almost

implies that

power,

Javelin,

thirty-three
To the

one

third

company

more

force

percent more

of

commander
his

the

fire

and

forget

cover.

Unlike

the

BFVs,

the

battlefield

and

continue

missions

both

vehicles

This peculiarity

company.

option for the commander

BFVs

but

rather

This

option

make

gives

the

to

that

show

ten

the

of

five

least

Javelin

less likely to be exposed to enemy

gives the Javelin gunner the ability

result,

capability

gives the gunner the potential to shoot,

therefore

the

the defense,

combat

namely a platoon, may survive.

Additionally,

seek

possibly

in

the

move,

and

gunner

is
This

longer on

targets.

Javelin

from

the

fires.

to survive

destroy

of

the

As

destroys

at

tank

opposing

of the Javelin brings

about an

not to expose and employ all his

use

better

commander

of

his

more

Javelin

gunners.
on

flexibility

the

battlefield when employing his soldiers and equipment.

With the addition of the Javelin,
commander's

forces

is

Javelin

individually

vehicles

than

the

increased.
destroys

Dragon.

At

48

In
three
this

the lethality of the

both scenarios,
times
rate,

more
four

the
eneoY

Javelins

employed at the platoon level have the potential to destroy

as many armor targetb as the twelve Dragons at the company

level for the same mission.
In

summary,

results

the

of

the

experimental

analysis indicate that the Javelin performs in

manner

to

the

effectiveness.

Dragon
These

across

results

Javelin equipped mechanized

enemy

forces

lethality,

fr6m

greater

while maintaining

all
support

four

data

a superior

measures

evidence

of

that

the

unit has the ability to kill

distances
improved

and

with

greater

survivability.

In

essence, two platoons with Javelim exhibit the combat power

in

terms

of

survivability

(three platoons)

and

lethality

of

one

similarly equipped with Dragon.

company
For the

military commander, the contributions of the Javelin make it

possible to increase the robustness of the mechanized force.

As a conclusion, the Javelin's qualities make it a favorable

alternative

for the

Dragon

and prove

it

to be

a worthy

combat multiplier to the Mechanized Infantry's arsenal.

B.

RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study;

to

be

deliberate

the Javelin weapon system is

in

the

and movement to contact missions.

In

replacement

favorable
defense

determined

for

the

Dragon

both scenarios the Javelin plays a supportive role.

provides a genuine representation

method of employment
how the Javelin is

This

primarily employed in

49

the field.

of
The

Javelin is
q

not a close combat assault weapon nor should it

be modeled as such.
top attack.

The Javelin's primary mode of fire is

Janus(A),

however,

models

direct fire (line of sight) weapon.

the Javelin

as a

The Javelin's ability

to fire above trees and other ground clutter,

deviations in

elevation of terrain, and dust and smoke close to the ground

allow it

to maintain a high probability,

Janus(A),

Ph is degraded based upon the number and level of

vegetation

cells

that

through to the target.

and the

advent

weapon's

line

Ph,

of

of hit.

sight

In

passes

Due to this present representation

of the Javelin's

top attack

mode,

it

is

recommended that the Janus(A) model be refined to represent

the high trajectory

firing which is

Javelin.

50

characteristic

of the

LIST OF REFERINCES
-1.

United States Army Infantry Center and School, Infantry

Programs and Projects, Infantry Blue Book, p. B-1, 3rd
Quarter FY 1993,
Government Printing Office,
Fort
Benning, GA, 31905.

2.

French, m. B.,
"Army Weaponry and Equipment",
1993-94 Green Book, pp. 239-314, October 1993.

3.

Pate,
Charles
A.,
"Javelin:
A Case
Study
in
Model-Test- 4odel", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, Decemb4 1992.

4.

McGuire,
Michael
J.,
"Javelin VS.
Dragon
Comparitive
Analysis",
Naval
Postgraduate
Monterey, CA, September 1993.

5.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 23-34,

"Dragon
Medium Antitank/Assault Weapon System M47", Department
of the Army, Washington, DC, April 90.

6.

Commandant, US Army Infantry School, "The Javelin White

Paper", Fort Benning, GA, 26 February 93.

7.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-7J, "Mechanized

infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley)", Department of the
Army, Washington, DC, 7 May 1993.

8.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, "Operation",

Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 14 June 1993.

9.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-2-1,

"The
Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics", Department of the
Army, Washington, DC, 16 July 1984.

Army:

II:
A
School,

10.

Department of Defense, "Janus(A) Analyst Workstation

User Guide, Version 3.17", US ARMY TRAC, White Sands
Missile Rangq, NM, 5 May 1993.

11.

Mendenhall, W., Wackerly, Dennis D., Scheaffer Richard

L., Mathematical Statistics with Applications, PWS-Kent
Publishing Co., 1990.

12.

Minitab Refererce Manual, Release 9 for Windows,

Minitab Inc., tate College, PA, 16801.

51

13.

"Test
(TEXCOM),
Training and Experimentation Command
1993.
March
Texas,
Hood,
Fort
and Evaluatin Plan",

52

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.

Defense Technical Information Center

Cameron Station
Alexandria, VIrginia 22304-6145

2.

Superintendent
Attn:Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Montery, California 94943-5000

3.

Director
US Army TRADOC Analysis Command - Fort Leavenworth
Attn: ATRC - eOQ (Technical Information Center)
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5200

4.

Professor So Young Sohn

Code OR/Sh
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000

5.

Professor Bard Mansager

Code MA/Ma
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000

6.

MA. Charles Pate

US Army TRADOC Analysis Command
Attn: A-TRC - RDM, P.O. Box 8692
Monterey, California 93943-0692

7.

CPT David A. Cannella

7464 Wood Duck Lane
Midland, Georgia 31820

4
-

Monterey

53