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Trauma Training
Students in the Special Operations Combat Medic Course work
in urban areas and hospitals to learn trauma management
firsthand.
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Departments
4
Update
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Career Notes
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Book Reviews
ON THE COVER
Civil Affairs Soldiers
conduct decisive
military-to-civilian
engagements in the
CENTCOM AOR.
U.S. Army photo
Special Warfare
Commander & Commandant
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor
Janice Burton
Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin
Webmaster
Eva Herrera
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SUBMISSIONS
Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent
research from members of the armed
forces, security policy-makers and
-shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the
United States and abroad.
Manuscripts should be 2,500 to
3,000 words in length. Include a cover
letter. Submit a complete biography
with author contact information (i.e.,
complete mailing address, telephone,
fax, e-mail address).
Manuscripts should be submitted in
plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany
works in lieu of embedded footnotes.
Please consult The Chicago Manual of
Style, 15th Edition, for footnote style.
Submit graphics, tables and charts
with source references in separate
files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). Special Warfare may
accept high-resolution (300 dpi or
greater) digital photos; be sure to
include a caption and photographers
credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will
be returned, if possible.
All submissions will be reviewed
Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1010203
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Special Warfare
U P D A T E
writing of a thesis, students will develop strategies for working with other agencies and with
members of the international coalition. Through
a combination of academic and practical learning, the program will prepare professionals to
develop and implement national and international security strategies for conditions of peace,
crisis and war.
Students who complete the MASSS degree
should be able to meet the following learning
objectives:
(1) Analyze the 21st-century geopolitical environment characterized by the rise of nonstate
armed groups and the uneven erosion of state
sovereignty;
(2) Evaluate the roles of power and ideology,
the rise of newly empowered and politicized
ideological movements and the bases for authority and legitimacy;
(3) Understand the relationship between
political objectives, strategy and all instruments
of national power;
(4) Develop skills needed for thinking critically and strategically and for differentiating
between policy and analysis. Put knowledge into
practice in complex circumstances involving
May-June 2010
TRAUMA TRAINING:
by Lieutenant Colonel LoryKay Wheeler, Hospital Corpsman Senior Chief Petty Officer Mark E. McNeil,
Sergeant First Class Matthew D. Campbell, Michael J. Lasko and Danny J. Yakel
Special Warfare
Trauma training
Special Warfare
We are one of the few civilian medical centers who can say we
are truly contributing to the war effort. We try to constantly
remember that because of what the SOCM students will be doing,
we can continue to do what we do without fear.
clinical maneuvers a mere six months into their rigorous
program, particularly considering that a significant number of them had no prior medical education. I am confident
that I was nowhere near the SOCMs level of proficiency
after medical school and even several years into my surgical residency. As for the SOCMs performance during their
rotation with us, it is a testament to their training that
they integrate well with the trauma resuscitation team. I
have found the SOCMs to be always ready, motivated and
professional in conduct. I only wish that they rotated with
us for a longer period of time.
Site visits also provide preceptors with a better understanding of the combat medics typical work environment and available equipment. Tracy Brown, a registered
nurse and a preceptor at Tampa General, said, I have
all the most advanced equipment and unlimited access
to many specialty services, and yet these boys go out
with a backpack and save many lives. That understanding allows preceptors to ask students thought-provoking
questions, such as, How would your treatment of this
patient differ if you were in an austere location with limited resources?, further expanding the development of
students critical reasoning.
Dr. Kevin Ward, the program director at Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center, noted, Even the
challenges that exist in an inner-city, level-one trauma cen-
May-June 2010
case study American citizens trapped in Lebanon are evacuated by the U.S. Navy. The 2nd Lebanon War is a perfect case study on dealing with hybrid threats. U.S. Navy photo.
Note: Observations expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect official positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Quotations are not attributed to avoid risk of compromise.
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Special Warfare
warfare with Israel, they also put at risk the support of the
population on which their continued legitimacy depended.5
By not exploiting that weakness, the IDF enabled the international press and biased information outlets to praise Hezbollah for standing up to Israel, while locally, Hezbollah
was able to win hearts and minds through the distribution
of humanitarian aid, gaining a victory by information.6
During a rigorous self-examination following the war,
the Israelis noted their unpreparedness for that kind of
conflict. They recognized that military power alone is insufficient for dealing with the complex problem sets posed
by the geopolitical situation unfolding during the summer
of 2006.7 The IDFs military-heavy approach left it unable to capitalize on the inherent contradictions between
Hezbollahs hybrid nature (a terrorist organization with
conventional capabilities masquerading as a humanitarian
governing agent), and thus the IDF lost the strategic narrative, both at home and abroad.
Conversely, in 2008 the IDF successfully adapted and
exploited the contradictions and friction between the various factions within Hamas, achieving a favorable strategic
outcome. IDF operations against Hamas were characterized
by precision air strikes, a skillful combination of ground
maneuver and special operations synchronized with the
delivery of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population
and homeland defense measures, all reinforced by an
active information campaign. In short, the IDF successfully
applied the lessons of 2006 to achieve victory.8
This is useful information for the theorist and the strategist, but it does not provide any actionable conclusions
or templates that can be used to prepare the joint force to
deal with hybrid threats. There were no templates generated from the 2nd Lebanon War, because the adversary also
adapted after the conflict. That the IDF learned and adapted from its 2006 experiences was obvious by the results of
the 2008 conflict. In the case of our current hybrid adversaries, they also learn from their mistakes and successes,
and they adapt. In preparing for the next hybrid conflict,
teaching U.S. and partner-nation organizations how to deal
with complex problems and to find unique, adaptive and
innovative solutions is as important as teaching them to
perform tasks to doctrinally acceptable standards during a
training exercise.
All that leads to the second insight, namely, that preparation for hybrid warfare necessitates that we teach staffs
and leaders how to think, not what to think. Prior to 2006,
the IDF had been immersed in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, or COIN, including an 18-year occupation of
southern Lebanon. During that time, the IDF lost much of
its proficiency in high-end joint operations of the type that
characterized its rapid victories in the Yom Kippur and Six
Day wars. It was essentially not prepared for a new emerging scenario in 2006.9
Engagement in long-term COIN did not prepare the
IDF for the incursion into Lebanon, leading to the concluMay-June 2010
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Special Warfare
a trend in the SOF community similar to one the IDF experienced leading up to 2006: specifically, viewing operational
activity as a substitute for training and wargaming against
future scenarios. At the same time, that operational activity
constrains SOF from participating in training exercises.
Given the cycle times between deployments to Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is no room for new training programs.
Also, programs like joint mission-readiness exercises do
not provide optimum training experiences for SOF leaders
and staff teams. SOF presence in those programs normally
consists of response cells focused on the integration of
SOF and conventional forces. A force-preparation experience that builds staff proficiency in complex problemsolving is missing. Finally, exercising SOF as a supported
command may sound like a minor consideration, but if
in future conflicts SOF are called into a lead role, they
may be poorly prepared to employ the wide array of joint
enablers available and needed for victory. That will likely
require cultural as well as operational innovation. Whos
in charge makes a difference.
While this problem is in itself complex, the following
recommended actions could be undertaken now to help
improve force preparation for hybrid threats.
The first recommendation is that we develop a jointtraining working group as part of the Global Synchroniza-
tion Conference, or GSC, hosted by the U.S. Special Operations Command approximately every six months. It is a
true global forum, during which participants discuss strategies for dealing with current problem areas and formulate
solutions. The GSC audience includes combatant commands, or COCOMs; theater special-operations commands,
or TSOCs; other government agencies; and allied partners.
A GSC joint-training working group could be focused on
identifying best training practices and opportunities, and
on developing a broad community approach to training.
A second recommendation is to add wargaming to the
force-preparation toolbox, particularly for the TSOCs. As
the operational SOF entity in each COCOM, TSOCs have
an inordinately high operational tempo. While training exercises provide some means for gaining proficiency in problem-solving, rarely do TSOCs have the ability to wargame
their potential strategies and test assumptions about their
own theater and operational plans. As we move into the
realm of steady-state irregular warfare, TSOC theater plans
need to be wargamed to determine a potential steady-state
demand signal for both SOF and conventional forces. In
recognition of the fact that conventional-force capabilities
are needed for steady-state IW, TSOC wargames would
be better identified as subordinate unified command
wargames. The intent would be to provide the TSOCs with
a forum, prepared and executed by an outside supporting
agency, in which they could build proficiency in complex
problem-solving while also building an understanding of
the joint functional requirements necessary for addressing
hybrid-warfare contingencies.
A related recommendation would be to pursue development of immersive training simulations that would enable
TSOC and SOF-unit staffs to take advantage of available
training time in small blocks in order to build proficiency.
These simulations could be configured to push staffs to
the limit against virtual adversaries, providing the kind
of stresses that are not practical in larger exercises. This
capability would be intended to provide training capabilities to the edge, for use when and where unit leaders
find time available. The U.S. Joint Forces Commands
Small Group Scenario Trainer is an example of this kind of
emerging technology.
We know that we are engaged in a protracted conflict
and that our adversaries will continue to adapt and find new
ways of exploiting our weaknesses. The experiences of the
IDF in Lebanon are an instructive example of the challenges
of dealing with a hybrid or irregular enemy. What is perhaps more instructive are the improvements the IDF made
between Lebanon and Gaza to institutionalize advancements
in its capabilities: rigorous analysis, application of lessons
learned, wargaming of new approaches and the addition of
new training programs. As a result, they out-adapted Hamas
in Gaza. Making institutional changes to force-preparation
turns out to be one of the key ways to out-think, out-adapt
and out-fight our hybrid adversaries.
Notes:
1
Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 8.
3
Frank Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue
52, 1st Quarter 2009, 34, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/
i52/9.pdf.
4
Hoffman, 34.
5
The initial IDF incursion into Lebanon was in retaliation for the ambushing and
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. See 2nd Lebanon War: http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/
Second_Lebanon_war.htm.
6
Max Boot, The Second Lebanon War, Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.cfr.
org/publication/11363/second_lebanon_war.html.
7
Haartz Staff: The main findings of the Winograd report on the 2nd Lebanon War, at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html.
8
Toni OLaughlin, Israel mounts PR campaign to blame Hamas for Gaza destruction,
in The Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/28/israel-gaza-hamas.
9
Boot and Haartz Staff.
10
Author interview with IDF officer, 12 October 2006.
2
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PersistEnt
Engagement
Civil Military Support Elements Operating in CENTCOM
by Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr.
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Special Warfare
May-June 2010
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PERsistent engagement
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Special Warfare
CMSE concept
The CMSE concept is a nondoctrinal approach for addressing
a nondoctrinal enemy. Irregular
warfare, or IW,1 calls for a systematic process that includes efforts
throughout the DoD; DoS; United
States Agency for International
Development, or USAID; NGOs and
partner nations. The CMSE concept
is simple: SOF engage high-priority
countries separately, but collectively,
they conduct multiple security-andsupport engagement initiatives; such
as infrastructural assessments, humanitarian assistance, educational
programs and health programs.
Working with embassy country
teams and TSOCs, CMSE teams
assess and analyze civic infrastructures, identify critical requirements
for governance, determine critical civil
capabilities and examine targeted
countries overall vulnerabilities. As
the common link to all these entities,
the CMSE seeks to combine their efforts into a universal strategy and
to mitigate redundancy and overlapping of projects and initiatives.
To accomplish its mission, a CMSE
needs to have extensive training and
experience,2 including:
Cross-cultural experience and
training.
Foreign-language training.
Dialogue, mediation and negotiations training.
Joint-interagency [NGO, DoS,
DoD] operational experience.
GROUND TRUTH Civil Affairs Soldiers talk with Tajik villagers about improvements to infrastructure. U.S. Army photo.
CMSE mission
The CMSE mission is to provide
civil-military planning and execution
as part of a larger spectrum of joint or
country-team operations. The CMSE
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PERsistent engagement
STRAIGHT TALK A Civil Affairs Soldier talks with a construction worker about ongoing work at a facility. U.S. Army photo.
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Special Warfare
Nonkinetic strategy
In a 2009 article in Foreign Affairs,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
said, Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should
be subordinate to measures aimed at
promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development,
and efforts to address the grievances
among the disconnected, from whom
the terrorists recruit.6
His statement represents the
purpose of the CA methodology to
engage the populace and determine
the populations needs first, much like
the MPP. A CMSE takes this approach
and applies nonkinetic, or nonlethal,
strategies that are developed at the
TSOC level. There will always be a
need for direct combat operations;
will ignore, malign or abuse, resulting in the likely collapse of the state.
We cannot always force the carrot
onto one of the rogue countries that
is not aligned with normal economic
prosperity, way-of-life fundamentals
and human-rights awareness. There
are a handful of countries that neither
respect nor desire a more pleasant approach to international diplomacy
they react more to the stick aspect of
diplomacy.
Regardless, when nation-states
accept U.S. governmental and military
efforts, we can measure the benefits
of employing CMSE, USAID and other
aid organizations. If the populace has
a distinct infrastructural requirement,
then lets address what is needed.
That is not to say that we are engaged
in winning hearts and minds. A strategy of winning the hearts and minds
of the people in contentious regions
does not work for we will never win
their hearts or their minds but we
can gain their trust and confidence
that the U.S. government will do the
right thing at the right time.
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PERsistent engagement
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Special Warfare
RIGHT DIRECTION A Civil Affairs Soldier conducts a needs assessment at a Tajik Hospital. U.S. Army photo.
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PERsistent engagement
grand opening The U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan (in blue scarf) is on hand for the opening of a new orphanage. U.S. Army photo.
Human terrain
It is crucial that CMSE teams, as
well as the company-level civil-military operations center, conduct an
analysis of the human terrain prior
to deploying to areas such as the
Middle East. Knowing the intended
audience in Pakistan and the way
the tribal community is organized,
for example, is critical to overall
mission success.
Power in central Asia and the
Middle East moves through interpersonal relationships. We have a similar
system, sometimes called the good
ole boy system. Regardless of how
we view the system, we still must accept the fact that it is the way certain
societies operate. And if we dont build
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Special Warfare
Conclusion
Franklin D. Roosevelt said, True
individual freedom cannot exist
without economic security and independence. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of
which dictatorships are made. With
that said, if al-Qaeda and Taliban
Notes:
Irregular Warfare, http://www.
dtic.mil/whs/directiyes/corres/
pdf/300007p.pdf.
2
Also refer to Civil Affairs Qualification Course curriculum, JFK
Special Warfare Center and School,
1st Special Warfare Training Group,
Fort Bragg, N.C., 2007.
3
Major Force Program-11, SOF
Programming, Special Operations
Command.
4
Robert B. Oakley and Michael
Casey, Jr., The Country Team:
Restructuring Americas First Line of
Engagement, Joint Forces Quarterly,
issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007.
5
See USAID Mission Performance Plan, FY 2004-2009, <http://
www.usaid.gov/policy/par05/highlights_052.html>.
6
Robert Gates, A Balanced
Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Foreign Affairs,
January-February 2009.
7
General David Petreaus, Report to Congress on the Situation in
Iraq, 10-11 September 2007.
8
CBS news, 60 Minutes interview
of General Stanley McChrystal by
David Martin, 27 September 2009.
9
Ethiopian Famine, 1984-1985,
Wikipedia.org.
10
JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7,
Instrument of Power. All ways and
means diplomacy, informational,
military, economic (DIME).
1
HOSPITAL CALL A Civil Affairs team inspects a local hospital during a needs assessment.
U.S. Army photo.
and adaptability to the civic leadership. If fully supported with appropriate funding and resources,
CMSEs will continue to be successful in providing face-to-face
dialogue and providing a strategic
foothold in any country.
Finally, we must ensure that we
approach these nonkinetic measures
with a process-orientated as opposed to a results-oriented mind-
Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr., is assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and
Schools 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Formerly assigned to the 96th CA
Battalion, he has served assignments in Infantry, Special Forces and Civil Affairs.
He has served multiple combat tours in the CENTCOM area of operations, as well
as numerous operational deployments. His most recent tour was to Qatar as commander of a CMSE that had elements across Pakistan, Tajikistan and Yemen.
May-June 2010
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Back to his
Roots
case study Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi observes a class at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. U.S. Army photo.
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Special Warfare
lost and found Lieutenant General John Mulholland presents Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi with diplomas from Ranger School and the Special Forces Qualification Course. U.S. Army
photo.
May-June 2010
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Career nOTES
cAREER
Notes
Education Opportunity
Board to consider applicants for NPS, ISP
The board to consider Soldiers
in Army special-operations forces for
attendance at the Naval Postgraduate
School, or NPS, and the Interagency
Studies Program, or ISP, will convene
the week of July 12.
NPS is an 18-month program open
to ARSOF officers, warrant officers
and NCOs. The school conducts two
cycles: winter (January start) and
summer (June start). Applicants must
specify whether they are applying for a
winter or summer start.
ISP is open to commissioned officers
in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations
and Special Forces. The program, taught
at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., runs concurrently with Intermediate Level Education
and ends in late July or early August so
that personnel will arrive at their new assignments in late summer.
Target groups this year for both
programs are CA and PSYOP officers
in year groups 1999, 2000 and 2001;
SF officers in YGs 1998, 1999 and
2000; SF warrant officers in grades
CWO 3 and CWO 4; and CA, PSYOP
and SF NCOs in the grade of master
sergeant and sergeant major, or sergeant first class with a waiver.
There are some additional considerations for ARSOF NCOs:
Must be on active duty.
Must have completed the NCO
educational programs appropriate for
grade and years of service.
Must not have more than 22 years
of active federal service, as of the report date to the academic institution.
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Special Warfare
Details
Victor Hanson
New York: Anchor, 2002.
ISBN: 978-0385720380 (Paper)
544 pages. $16.95.
Reviewed by:
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Petersen
U.S. Air Force
Air Land Sea Applications Center
wrong war at the wrong time. But
their armies, for the cultural reasons
this book has outlined, fought with a
much greater margin of error than did
their adversaries. He further contends
Western armies enjoyed innate advantages that over the long duration could
offset the terrible effects of imbecilic
generalship, flawed tactics, strained
supply lines, difficult terrain and inferior numbers. Hanson submits that
these advantages were immediate and
entirely cultural, and that they were
not the product of the genes, germs or
geography of a distant past.
Even if you end up questioning
some of Hansons conclusions, you will
not easily dismiss the strength of his
ideas. Overall, the book is a worthwhile
read, and the points it makes are informative and thought-provoking.
May-June 2010
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This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army PB 80-10-3
PIN: 086267-000
U.S Army Photo