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SYLLABUS
The Part IA logic course is in two parts, one on formal logic and one on philosophical
logic.
Section A: Formal Logic
employ the symbols of truth-functional and first-order logic. Students will be introduced to
the idea of formal derivations using natural deduction. They will also study the elements
of probability theory, a part of mathematics that creates almost as many philosophical
problems as it solves.
The notion of meaning is central to the philosophy of logic and to the philosophy of
language in general. The course covers the relationships between meaning and intention.
Is there a stable distinction to be drawn between analytic truths, which are true solely in
virtue of their meaning (e.g. All bachelors are unmarried) and synthetic truths, which
require the world to be a certain way (e.g. Most people die before the age of 80)? How is
this related to two others, that between necessary and contingent truths and that between
a priori and a posteriori truths?
Objectives
Students will be expected to:
1. Acquire a broad understanding of the scope and purpose of logic.
2. Learn how to symbolize natural language arguments using formal languages, and
how to test the resulting formalizations for correctness.
3. Begin studying philosophical issues in logic.
4. Develop their powers of philosophical analysis and argument through study of what
constitutes a valid argument.
Prerequisites
None
Preliminary Reading
For the idea of a formal logic:
Course Outline
GUTTENPLAN, Samuel, The Languages of Logic. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
This compulsory course aims to introduce students to some basic issues in the
philosophy of logic and language and to the idea of a formal logic. There is a complex
interplay between these informal and formal elements of the course. The key notion is the
idea of a valid argument (e.g. All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; so, Socrates is
mortal). Arguments can be constructed in English and in the various formal languages
which the logician invents, and formalised arguments are supposed to tell us something
about the corresponding English arguments. Hence we need to know what validity is and
why it is significant: are all good arguments valid? Are all valid arguments good? Validity
of English arguments is an imprecise and intuitive notion, but validity of arguments framed
in a formal language can be made precise.
For some philosophical reflection on logic-related matters, dip into the opening chapters
of :
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, Logical Forms (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
For a brisk overview of some issues both formal and philosophical see:
PRIEST, Graham, Logic: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000). Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192893208.001.0001.
Students will be introduced to two simple formal languages, those of truth-functional and
first-order logic, and shown how validity is defined for each. They will practise moving
between English and these languages, and they will reflect on the problems this
generates. This task will assist the understanding of philosophical writings, many of which
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BEALL, J., and Greg RESTALL, 'Logical Consequence', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition) [Online]. Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence (Accessed: 29 June 2015).
The following offer some alternative approaches to paraphrasing between formal and
natural languages:
FORBES, Graeme, Modern Logic: A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), chs. 2, 5 & 7.
GOLDFARB, Warren, Deductive Logic (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2003), sects. 1-8, 18-22
& 28-29.
SMITH, Peter, An Introduction to Formal Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), chs. 23-24 & 33-34.
TELLER, Paul, A Modern Formal Logic Primer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1989), vol. 1; ch. 2 & vol. 2; ch. 4. Also available online at:
http://tellerprimer.ucdavis.edu.
At the risk of repetition, the official textbook for this part of the course is forallx:
Cambridge 2014-15. This is what you will be taught from, and it is what you will be
examined on. If in doubt, ask the lecturer, your supervisor, or your logic class tutor.
(B) Further Reading
With the Important Warning in mind, students may sometimes wish to read beyond the
textbook. This article discusses the idea of logical consequence, going into a bit more
detail than sections 1-4 of forallx:
HODGES, Wilfrid, Logic (London: Penguin, 1977), sects. 30-33. [Another introductory
treatment of relations]
POLLOCK, John L., Technical Methods in Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1990), ch. 1, sects. 1-3. [An alternative to Steinhart]
SMITH, Peter, An Introduction to Formal Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), ch. 32. [Helpful introduction to relations]
Mathematically-inclined might prefer some brisker introduction to core concepts and
notation of set theory. Try:
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DEVLIN, Keith, The Joy of Sets. 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Springer, 1993), ch. 1, 'Naive
set theory'.
HALMOS, P., Nave Set Story (New York, NY: Springer, 1974).
GRICE, H. P., Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1989), ch. 2 'Logic and conversation'. Also available on Moodle. Reprinted in F.
Jackson, ed., Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
And here are some useful surveys:
LEPORE, Ernest, Meaning and Argument (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), chs. 3, 4, 6 & 7.
JACKSON, Frank, 'Indicative Conditionals', in E. Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [Online]. Available at: www.rep.routledge.com/article/X017 (Accessed:
29 June 2015).
WOODS, Michael J., Conditionals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chs. 1, 2 & 4.
Jackson's views are further developed in:
PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION BETWEEN NATURAL AND FORMAL LANGUAGES
Our main focus in part IA is the question about the relationship between the ordinary
language propositional connectives and their formal logic counterparts. We are
particularly interested in the relationship between the English if then, and the
material conditional . (NB some texts use rather than )
(A) Basic reading
MAGNUS, P.D., and Tim BUTTON, Forallx: Cambridge 2014-15, sects. 9 & 11.5.
[Online]. Available at: www.nottub.com/forallx.shtml (Accessed: 29 June 2015).
PRIEST, Graham, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. 2nd rev. ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), sects. 1.6-1.10.
Finally, look at this excellent (advanced) discussion of some attacks on Grice's notion of
implicature, which helps clarify exactly what his notion should be (it also ties together
themes from this topic, and the topic of Meaning, Intention and Convention):
The absolute must read article is by Grice, in which he introduces the idea of a
controversial implicature:
SAUL, Jennifer M., 'Wayne A. Davis, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in
the Failure of Gricean Theory', Nos, 35 (2001): 630-41.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671866
The debate surrounding Russell's Theory continues, with the following landmarks:
DONNELLAN, Keith, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', Philosophical Review, 75
(1966): 281-304. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143 Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed.,
Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); also
in G. Ostertag, ed., Definite Descriptions: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998); and in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
KRIPKE, Saul, 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 2 (1977): 255-76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14754975.1977.tb00045.x. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of
Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); and in G. Ostertag, ed., Definite
Descriptions: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
For commentary on these, and for further assessment, look at:
LUDLOW, Peter, 'Descriptions', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2013 Edition) [Online]. Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/ (Accessed: 29 June 2015).
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, 'Philosophical Logic', in A. Grayling, ed., Philosophy 1: A Guide
through the Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), sects. 2.4.
The next stage in the discussion of variables and quantifiers considers how we should
understand quantification. This is a difficult topic, and before going in, you need to make
sure you really understand the semantics for quantifiers presented in forallx. One of the
foremost defenders of substitutional quantification was Ruth Barcan Marcus, and this is a
clear introduction to her reasons for favouring it.
MARCUS, Ruth Barcan, 'Interpreting Quantification', Inquiry, 5 (1962): 252-59.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201746208601353
After reading this, take a look at two fairly light surveys of the options:
ENGEL, Pascal, The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 76-86.
HAACK, Susan, Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
ch. 4, sects. 1 & 3. Also available online at:
http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812866.
CASULLO, Albert, 'Kripke on the a Priori and the Necessary', Analysis, 37 (1977): 15259. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327344
PAPINEAU, David, Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 6 'Naming and necessity'.
The classic empiricist view is that necessity, analyticity and a priori come as a single
package. For a defense of this view, see:
AYER, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. (London: Gollancz, 1946), ch. 4, 'The a
priori'. Reprinted in P.K. Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987).
HUME, David, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by P.H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), sect. 12, part 3. Also available online at:
http://pm.nlx.com.
But there have been two prominent sorts of attack on this view. The first was from Kant,
who claimed that there are synthetic a priori truths. See:
WALKER, Ralph, ed., Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
[Essays by Parsons and Hopkins]
VAN CLEVE, James, Problems from Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 2
'Necessity, analyticity, and the a priori'. Also available online at:
www.dawsonera.com.
KRIPKE, Saul, 'A Priori Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency', in P.K. Moser, ed., A
Priori Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), ch. 7. [Excerpt of his
Naming and Necessity]
For discussion, try:
MILLER, Alexander, Philosophy of Language (London: UCL Press, 1998), ch. 7, 'Sense,
intention, and speech acts'. Also available online at:
http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=97109.
PLATTS, M., Ways of Meaning. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), ch. 3
'Shades of Meaning'.
AHMED, Arif, Saul Kripke (London: Continuum, 2007), ch. 3 'Necessity'. Also available
online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=327232.
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