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Also, according to the vested rights theory, when a right of action accrues
in favor of a person, that right is enforceable in the courts of whatever state
or country provided that the proper law does not contravene the law or
public policy of the place where the case is being tried.
Mere absence of a similar law in the courts of the place where the tort case is
being tried does not mean that its public policy is being violated.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.
(A 1913 U.S. Case)
The Story:
Mr. Loucks a resident of New York was killed while travelling in a highway in
Massachusetts.
His surviving wife and two children (also residents of New York) sought to
recover indemnity and damages from the oil company, invoking a
Massachusetts tort law (which was the law of the place where the injury took
place), before a court in New York city (A city/state, which also observed the
place of wrong principle).
Decision:
The court held that it was correct for the New York Court to try and decide
the case instituted by the wife and kids of Mr. Loucks in order to attain relief,
even while invoking the laws of another state.
It further remarked that since a right of action has been vested by virtue of
another states law, there was no reason for the courts of New York to deny
enforcement of that right, even assuming that New York did not have an
exactly identical tort law as that of Massachusetts. The Court held that mere
absence or difference of tort laws does not permit denial of relief and that it
was enough that the laws of Massachusetts did not contravene New Yorks
laws and public policy.
II.
Modern Theories on Foreign Tort Liability
MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP
Considers the states contracts with the occurrence and the parties;
1. Contacts such as the place where the tortious conduct occurred, the
place where the injuries were sustained, the domicile, residence or
nationality of the victim and the tortfeasor and the place where the
relationship of the parties are centered serve a two-fold purpose of:
2. identifying the interested state; and
3. evaluating the relevance of these contacts to the issue in question.
BABCOCK VS JACKSON
Facts:
- The plaintiff and the defendant's testator (defendant) were both residents of
the City of Rochester, New York.
- The plaintiff and the defendant started from Rochester on a trip which took
them through the Province of Ontario. The defendant was the owner and
operator of the automobile used on the trip; the plaintiff was a passenger.
- While the automobile was being driven in Ontario on September 16, 1960,
the car went out of control, left the highway, and collided with a stone wall.
No collision with any other vehicle was involved. The plaintiff suffered serious
personal injuries as a result of the accident.
- Upon their return to New York State, the plaintiff instituted an action against
the defendant to recover for her injuries. The defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint upon the ground that the Ontario guest statute barred
recovery.
- The Ontario statute reads: "(2) Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, any person being carried in, or
upon, or entering or getting on to, or alighting from such motor vehicle.
Issue:
Whether New York laws may be applied to the case at bar notwithstanding
the fact that the accident occurred in
Ontario, Canada.
Ruling:
Yes. There may be multi-State contacts even though the tort was physically
committed in a single State. Thus, in a case like the present one, in which the
relationship of guest and host was created by an arrangement made in New
York between New York residents, New York clearly has a vital interest in the
determination of the incidents of the relationship. Under the modern view, in
a common-law tort action, the law of the State which has "the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute" and which has the dominant
interest in it is accepted as the governing law.
The question of whether a guest should be barred from recovering from his
host for the host's negligence in the operation of his automobile is a question
of policy to be decided by the appropriate legislative body. New York's policy
is in favor of allowing a recovery by the gratuitous passenger. On the other
hand, Ontario's policy, since 1935, has been contrary to that of New York,
denying recovery to a gratuitous passenger even for gross or wanton
negligence.
The primary purpose of the Ontario statute was stated by an academic
commentator, shortly after its enactment, as follows: "Undoubtedly the
object of this provision is to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by
passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies." In
the light of this purpose, it is apparent that the interest of Ontario in the
enforcement of its legislative policy is limited to accidents involving Ontario
residents. Ontario is concerned only with the adverse effect of guest-host
recoveries upon Ontario insurance premiums. Ontario insurance premiums
would not be affected by a recovery chargeable against an insurance policy
issued in a foreign jurisdiction covering a foreign car. At any rate, the interest
of Ontario in having its policy apply to nonresidents traveling through Ontario
is a minimal one.
The issue presented only a false conflict. Whether Canadian Policy behind its
guest statute was to protect the host from suits by ungrateful guests or
insurance companies from collusive suits, Canada had no interest in applying
its law when both victim and tortfeasor were non-domiciliaries and the car
was registered and insurance on it taken in New York. On the other hand,
New York policy allowing recovery to all persons injured extends to its
domiciliaries even when they act outside of the state. The court decided that
the application of New York statutes will advance the policy reflected in that
law without imparing the policy of Canada.
The interest of New York is obviously the dominant one as to this issue. New
York has a strong interest in the application of its policy allowing a recovery
by guest passengers, to an accident involving New York residents who were
injured while traveling in an automobile registered and insured in New York,
upon a trip originating and terminating in New York, under an arrangement
made in New York. It would be against the strong public policy of New York to
apply a foreign statute denying a guest the right to recover from his host to a
case in which New York plainly had the dominant interest.
CAVERS PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENCE
Cavers third principle of preference in torts deals with rules that sanction
some kinds of conduct engaged in by a defendant in one state and extends
the benefit of this higher standard of conduct and financial protection to the
plaintiff even if the state of injury does not create analogous liabilities.
SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL
Facts:
- Minor, plaintiff Herbert Schmidt, through his mother and guardian, sued
Driscoll Hotel, Inc., doing business as the Hook-Em-Cow bar and Caf in
South St. Paul, Minnesota, for damages alleged to have resulted from the
defendants illegal sale of liquor to Johnson Sorrensen.
- As a result, Sorrensen became intoxicated in defendants bar so that shortly
after, plaintiff sustained injuries when an automobile driven by Sorrensen, in
which plaintiff was a passenger, turned over near Prescott, Wisconsin.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the pleadings
failed to state a claim against the defendant and that the court lacked
jurisdiction.
- The trial court granted the defendants motion, having determined that no
penalty by way of collecting damages arose under the Minnesota Civil
Damage Act, unless the illegal sale in the state was followed by an injury in
the state because the law does not provide for extraterritorial effect.
Hence, the appeal.
- Defendants position is that the action is governed by the law of torts and
that, since the last act in the series of events for which plaintiff instituted his
action occurred in Wisconsin, which has no Civil Damage Act, the latter can
have no application in determining plaintiffs rights or defendants liability. In
support thereof defendant cites Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377 which
states that: The place of wrong is the state where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place and 378 which states
that: The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury.
Issue:
Whether Minnesota Laws may apply to the case at bar despite the
pronouncements in Restatement, Conflicts of Laws 377 and 378 that make
the law of the place of injury (the last event) or Wisconsin Laws applicable.
Ruling:
Yes. The allegations of the complaint make clear that plaintiffs damages are
the result of two distinct wrongs one committed by defendant in Minnesota
when it sold Sorrenson intoxicating liquors and one committed by Sorrenson
in Wisconsin when his negligence caused the car in which plaintiff was riding
to turn over.
From the foregoing, it would follow that, if the principles expressed in
Restatement, Conflict of Laws 377 and 378 are held to be applicable to
multistate fact situations like the present, then neither laws of the state
where the last event necessary to create tort liability took place nor the laws
of the state where the liquor dealers violations of the liquor statutes
occurred would afford an injured party any remedy against the offending
liquor dealer for the injuries which resulted from his statutory violations.
The result would be that here both the interest of Wisconsin in affording
whatever remedies it deems proper for those injured there as the result of
foreign violations of liquor laws and the interest of Minnesota in admonishing
a liquor dealer whose violations of its statutes was the cause of such injuries;
and in providing for the injured party a remedy therefore under the Civil
Damage Act would become ineffective.
The principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377 and 378, should not be
held applicable to fact situations such as the present to bring the result
described and that the determination to the opposite effect would be in
conformity with principles of equity and justice. Here, all parties involved
were residents of Minnesota. Defendant was licensed under its laws and
requires to operate its establishment in compliance within Minnesota when,
as a result thereof, Sorrenson became intoxicated before leaving its
establishment. The consequential harm to plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen,
Act of State non-justiciable: No. The acts fall under violation of laws
of nation
Acts in violation of the fundamental laws of the nation is not
considered as acts of the state;
Command responsibility rule;
Jurisdiction: US Court has jurisdiction since the acts complained of
constitute gross (inhumane conducts) violation of the fundamental
human rights under the laws of nation.
Statute of Limitation: Case filed within the period. Any action
against Marcos was tolled during the time Marcos was president.
Applicable law: Alien Tort Act and Torture Victim Protection Act not
the civil code of the Philippines. Feb. 1986/ March 1986.
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS:
TEL-OREN V. LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC:
INTERNATIONAL VIOLATIONS UNDER LAW OF NATIONS INCLUDE:
Genocide;
Slavery or slave trade;
Murder or causing disappearance of individuals;
Ruling:
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. DFAs determination is
only preliminary which has no binding effect on the courts.
Section 45 (a) provides immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by the officers in their official capacity.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE TERRITORIALITY RULE
LIANG HUEFENG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 125865
(2000)
Facts:
Petitioner is an economist working with ADB. Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the MeTC with 2 counts of grave oral defamation. The
MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that
petitioner is immune from suit by virtue of an Agreement between ADB and
the Philippine government.
Ruling:
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. DFAs determination is
only preliminary which has no binding effect on the courts.
Section 45 (a) provides immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by the officers in their official capacity.
3. Slandering is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of he crime in the name of official duty.
4. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations - a diplomatic agent enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE TERRITORIALITY RULE
Crimes committed on a foreign vessel even if it within the territorial waters
of the coastal state.
Philippine laws do not apply as long as the effect of such crime does not
disturb our peace and order.
Rule on the jurisdiction of a coastal state over crimes committed in a foreign
vessel are now contained in Article 27 of UNCLOS.