Impressions of Bangladesh The Rule of Arms and The Politics of Exhortation

Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of Arms and the Politics of Exhortation
Author(s): Robert S. Anderson

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 443-475
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2755498 .
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Impressionsof Bangladesh
The Rule ofArns and thePolitics
ofExhortation
RobertS. Anderson
has emergedin Bangladesh between

ambitiousnationalplans forsocial and economicdevelopment,
and the weakness of the local institutionsto implementthe programmes.Citizenshave been urgedto 'growmorefood,''controlthe
population'and 'servethe nation.'But theseexhortations
have come
froman Administration
governingby the rule ofarms.The problem
forthemartiallaw administrators
has been to securetheconsentand
participationof the people in order to promoterural development
whichwill,in turn,justifymartiallaw. This consentand participation
whichwould embodyinitiativeand enthurequiredlocal institutions
siasm,but the combinationofdiscreditedand weak local institutions
and militaryofficerswho declared themselvesas an 'interim'careoftheofficial
taker-government
cast doubton theachievement
goals of
nationaldevelopment.This articleexaminesthe effectsofthe coups
between November I975 and May i976, particularlythose which
influenceddevelopment
programmesin foodand agricultureproduction,populationcontrol,and naturalresourcesand industry.*
What can be called 'the politicsofexhortation'in Bangladeshwas
the attemptof the rulersto gain the participationof the ruled in
developmentprogrammesin the absence of stronglocal institutions
and mobilizingideas. The rulersweremengenerallyover40 yearsold
who had easy access to food,housingand healthcare,wereeducated
in English,could leave the countrywiththeirfundsintact,and were
in
backed by domesticand foreigngroups with major investments
CENTRAL CONTRADICTION
* An earlierversionof thisarticlewas presentedas a paper at the conference

on "Bangladesh-Anatomy of Development"at the Universityof Guelph, March 1976.I thank Peter
Bertocci,Rounaq Jahan, Barrie Morrison,and John Wood forcommentson the paper and
for help in its revision.The impressionscontained here result froma two-monthvisit to
Bangladesh (November 1975 to January 1976)and I am gratefulfordiscussionswith many
informed
people who cannot be identifiedhere.
443
PacificAffairs
Bangladesh.They appeared beforethe masses ofthe public in helicoptervisitsand radio speeches,revealinglittlebehinddark glasses
ofprotocoland protection.Thoughtherewereimportant
and a flurry
gradationsamongthem,themassestypicallylivedin thecountryside,
wereonlyslightlyeducatedand could almostneverleavethecountry.
Throughgenerationstheyhave evolveda tenacious 'cultureof survival.' The strengthof the national centralized developmentinstitutionscontrastedsharplywiththe weaknessof local institutions.
The officialgoal of swanirbar(self-reliance),individual,local and
whichdependedcritically
national,was to be pursuedby programmes
on voluntary
participation.Withoutsuchparticipationtheyremained
little more than a precarious technocraticframework.The technocraticapproach could be effective
in resourceextractionand industrial developmentbecause these programmesdid not require
stronglocal institutions
and involveddislocationsin marginalareas
whichdid notdemandmass consent.The newregimeproceededwith
theseprogrammesusing specially-created
nationalcorporationsand
institutions,
but the prospectsfor the two basic problemsof food
productionand populationcontrolremaineduncertain.Exhortations
to complywiththeseprogrammes,
reinforced
onlybytheruleofarms,
seemed counter-productive,
likelyto undermineboth local initiative
and nationalstability.
The causes ofthe coups in I975 have alreadybeen well analyzed
againstthe backgroundofchangingleadershipand politicalparties.'
In JanuarySheikMujiburRahman appointedhimselfas Presidentfor
a five-year
term,and thenthe 'Second Revolution'dissolvedall partiesexcepthis BAKSAL (BangladeshPeasants,Workersand Peoples'
was reorganized,includingthe appointLeague). Rural government
mentby BAKSAL ofdistrictgovernors
each commandinga regiment
of the partymilitia.2Anothercrackdownon smuggling(to be conductedby themilitary)was announcedin April,followedby surprise
' Similaritiesbetween 1975-76and the last days of East Pakistanhave been confirmedin
Rounaq Jahan, "The AugustCoup d'Etat and Its Aftermath,"
Report(Swedish International
DevelopmentAgency),January1976.See also Talukdar Maniruzzaman,"Bangladesh in 1975:
The Fall oftheMujib Regimeand Its Aftermath,"
AsianSurvey,
February1976,pp. 119-129. The
repetitionof patternsin the fall of Ayub and rise of Yahya is discussed by Wayne Wilcox,
"Pakistan in 1969:Once Again At the StartingPoint," AsianSurvey,
February1970,pp. 73-81;
and also HarryBlair,"SheikhMujib and Deja Vu in East Bengal,"Economic
andPoliticalWeekly,
25 December 1971, pp. 2555-2562,
whichshows how eventsof March 1971 resembledthoseof
March 1969.
2 Earlysuggestions
fordistrict"governors"and one-partyruleare containedin a supposedly
secretmemoby the then-Secretary
of the PlanningCommission,M.A. Sattar,"A Strategyfor
PoliticalPlanning,"13 January1973.Sattarwas Secretaryto the Presidentfollowing
thecoups.
For the structureof BAKSAL, see Zillur Khan, "Leadership, Partiesand Politicsin Bangladesh," The Western
PoliticalQuarterly,
March 1976,p. 122.
444
Impressions
of Bangladesh
ofthe ioo-takanote withthe aim ofundermining
the
demonetization
black market.In August,after3I monthsofvirtuallyone-manrule,
Mujib and his familywereassassinatedby a groupofmilitaryrebels.
A formerAwami League colleague of Mujib, Khondakar Mushtaq
Ahmed became President,backed by a groupof youngerArmyofficers. Mushtaq appointedZiaur Rahman as ChiefofStaffoftheArmy.
Eightydayslater,on November3, a groupofofficers
stageda countercoup whichlasted fourdays. Factionswithinthe militaryclashed in
open combat,fourofMujib's ex-Ministerswerekilledinjail, and the
who had killed Mujib were whiskedaway to Thailand and
officers
Libya. There werefearsofan invasionby India to supportthisproMujib group,but Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman,releasedfromhouse
arrestby a "Peoples' Revolutionary
Army"withinthe military,and
ridingon thesentiment
ofsoldiersagainstthissuddenreversal,swept
back to power,proclaiminghimselfDeputyMartial Law Administrator,witha civilianPresidentand Council ofAdvisors.
There was a strikingresemblancebetweenBangladeshafterthe
I975 coups and East Pakistanbeforeits collapse in i97i.
A similar
marriageofconvenienceexistedbetweenthemilitary
and civilservice,
a marriagearrangedby politicaland commercialgroupswhichhad
establishedtheir power before Pakistan disintegrated.There was
again a 'neutralgovernment'
actingas a mediatoramongfactionsof
unofficial
political'parties,'whilecarryingout a 'searchand destroy'
missionagainst major opponents.Some ofthe administrative
apparatus which existed in East Pakistan was resurrected,and the
judiciary and civil serviceregained the surpremacythey enjoyed
beforei97i. The gap betweenrulersand ruledwas the moststriking
featureof East Pakistan.The politicalexperimentunderMujib, and
hopesthatthestatewouldevolvea legitimatepoliticalsystemthrough
the rule of law, ended in his death. Bangladesh has to startthis
evolutionoveragain, and much timeand enthusiasmhas been lost.
Law and Order
Major-GeneralZia retainedJusticeSayem as President,and the
threearmedforceschiefsand sevenciviliansconstituteda Council of
Advisorsto the President,each of whom held responsibilitiesfor
certainministries.
Sayemwas an elderlyman withoutpoliticalgroupas
ings aroundhim, and the forceschiefsretainedthe keyportfolios
follows:
Law and ParPresident
Sayem:Establishment,
Defense,
ForeignAffairs,
Affairs.
liamentary
445
PacificAffairs
Ziaur Rahman (Army): Finance, Home, Information
and Broadcasting.
M.G. Tawab* (Airforce):Food, Petroleum,Civil Aviation,Tourism.
M.H. Khan (Navy): Power,Flood Control,Communications,
Transport.
(* resignedMay i, 1976and replacedby M. K. Bashar, who was succeeded
by A. G. Mahmood in September)
New laws were promulgated by Zia as Martial Law Regulations,

superseding the Constitution adopted in I972. The National Economic Council (an East Pakistan institution) was revived and made
responsible formajor budget allocations under advice fromthe Planning Commission. Implementation of policy was again firmlyin the
hands of civil servants who, like most of the senior militaryofficers,
were trained in the Pakistani traditionof martial law. The only threat
to the civil service was the establishment of another committee 'to
reviewpromotions resultingfromundue influence'in accordance with
Zia's emphasis on discipline and 'eliminating corruption.' There were
some dismissals and honourable reinstatements,but many undecided
cases remained fromMujib's regime. To increase coordination of civil
and militaryoperations in the rural areas, district-levelZonal Martial
Law Administratorswere appointed.
Much publicity surrounded apparently cosmetic changes imposed
by the new regime. For example, as in every change of regime in
Dacca in the past 20 years, slum dwellers were forciblyrelocated
about I 5 miles out ofDacca, and the main cityavenues were cleared of
unregistered shops and hawkers. A certain measure of approval resulted fromthese face-liftingmeasures, but many observersnoted that
the slums were also a prime source of criminal and political activities
in the cities, and that shops were removed because the militarywished
a clear line of firein case of streetfighting.Most of the government's
effortwas to control potential opposition, borders, crime, revenue,
and natural resources. The instrumentsof control were the armed
forces and a reorganized police. The infamous para-military Rakk/i
Bahini was disbanded and integratedwith the Army. The Army's size
was reported as 59,000 men.3 Two officerswho leftthe army and became leaders in the underground opposition, Col. Taher and Maj.
Ziauddin, were recaptured and jailed. Mutinies and discontent were
not stopped, however, even though Zia pardoned all the officers
involved in the November counter-coup.
3Total armedforcesin 1976were63,000, with3,000 Airforceand I,ooo Navy members;there
were in addition20,000 BangladeshRiflesgenerallydeployedas bordersecurityforces.Armamentincluded30 tanks,7 patrolboats, 9 MiG 2I's and I I helicopters.Defenceexpenditures
in 1973-74 wereTk 470 million($65 million),and in 1975-76wereTk 710 million($52 million).
MillitaryBalance,I976-77, London: InternationalInstituteof StrategicStudies, 1976.
446
Impressions
of Bangladesh
Using his Home Ministryportfolio,Zia createda special reserve
Armed Police battalion,and a metropolitanpolice forceforDacca.
One resultofthe controlsimposedafterMujib's death had been a 30
to 40 per cent decrease in reportedmurders,armed robberies,riots
and theftsin September-November
I975 as compared to the same
monthsin I974. Most reportsshowedthatthesereducedlevelswere
maintainedafterZia assumedpower.Therewas muchpublicitywhen
were subjectedto
river-pirates,
train-bandits,and blackmarketeers
rigorousimprisonment
and heavyfines.But unreportedmurderand
kidnappingforpoliticaland businessreasonscontinuedin the countryside.Members of Union Councils, following'uncontestedelections,'wereoftenthetargetsofshootings,and kidnappingwas admitted to be a seriousproblemwhen it was made an act punishableby
deathby Martial Law Regulation25.4 Spectaculardaylightrobberies
also occurred,and nighttravelon riverlauncheswas reportedunsafe
despitespecial police protection.Police conduct in Bangladeshhas
generallybeen beyondmostgovernmental
control,but tworarechallengesoccurredwhen in March a judge accused police in Dacca of
usingtortureto obtaina falseconfessionfroma suspect,and in May
two policemenwerejailed forabusingtheirpowerswhileon dutyat
Dacca airport.
A driveto recapture'illegal' armsreportedly
broughthundredsof
arrests during November and December, resultingin up to five
years imprisonment
by special districtmartiallaw courts.A street
poster,showinga long-haireddemon brandishinga Russian AK 47
sub-machinegun,announced that "he is afteryour life,property,
honour and chastity." But the governmentknew that undeclared
armswereeverywhere;
some armourieswerelootedduringthecoups
and freshammunitionwas arrivingfromabroad accordingto reliable
reports.Along withthe guerillaswho robbed banks and police stations,throughoutBangladesh gangs of professionalbandits (dacoits)
robbedhouses. Villagersin threedistricts,
who had propertyto lose
(rice,cookingpots,cattle,goats,clothes,etc.), said in interviews
they
did not feelmuch greatersecuritythan underMujib's regimewhen
thesegangsoftenhad partybackingand police cooperation.The will
to increasesavingsand investin propertyremaineddependenton the
confidencethattheseinvestments
would notbe carriedoffin thenight
at gunpoint.It appeared thatthepolice and thecourtswould protect
4Bangladesh Times,20 May 1976(the regulationrefersonly to kidnappingof personsunder
age 15).
447
PacificAffairs
the propertyonly of those able to pay considerablepolitical and
economic prices.
Tighteninglaw and ordermeasuresat portsand bordersenabled

Zia to continuethedrivebegunby Mujib to reducesmuggling;he also
threatenedthe deathpenaltyto thoseconvicted.A majorfraudoperated by officials
ofthe MinistryofFood was detectedin Khulna port,
involving62,000 tons of wheat worthTk 40 million.5In Chittagong
port,a Tk 750,000 whiskeyshipmentwas seized, and a Tk 8oo,ooo
customsdutyevasionschemeuncovered.But thesewereminorcompared to the over-invoicing
of exportsand other'irregularities'
conducted throughport offices;over 8,500 cases were pendingwiththe
Bureau of Anti-Corruption
in May i976. Smugglingbegan to attract
the attentionit deservedand an officialestimateof thetotalvalue of
goods smuggled out of Bangladesh between January 1972 and
August I175 was $4 billion (Tk 6o billion).6 Retrievingillegal arms
and reducing smugglingmeant controllingthe Burma and India
borders.'Mopping-upoperations'against guerrillaswere oftenconducted in difficultborder areas inhabited by non-Bengalitribal
people. Seniorofficers
flewto the Garo Hills to assuretribalsthereof
officialconcernfortheirsafetyand development.
The leader (Rajmata)
ofthe Chakma tribein the ChittagongHill Tracts was appointedto
the Council ofAdvisors,and a canningfactoryand textilemill were
promisedforthat area. But officialswere concernedmore forthe
ofthe frontier
insecurity
than fornativepeoples,who so farhad been
ignoredin developmentprogrammes.Eight new police posts were
constructed
in the hills;adjacent areas ofBurmaand India weresites
of combat betweenlocal dissidentsand nationalgovernment
forces.
Fightingalso took place betweenthe militaryand what the government continuedto call 'miscreants'or 'traitors'or 'anti-socialelements.'Many dissidentswho had opposed Mujib also opposed Zia;
villagersused thetermJashod(forJSD-National SocialistParty)for
groups that continuedto organize and hold meetingsin the rural
areas afterthe coups. A fewhiding-placesweresharedby ex-Awami
Leaguers and theirformeropponents,as well as by otherswhose
illegal workhad lost police protection.Even Kader (Tiger) Siddiqi
who gained fameas a guerillaleader in i97i, was reportedto have
5 Bangladesh
Observer,
23 December 1975.The exchangevalue ofthe taka following
the coups
was Tk 15 = US $1.
' W.B. Reddaway and Md. Mizanur Rahman, "The Scale of
SmugglingOut Bangladesh,"
Research ReportSeriesNo. 21, BangladeshInstituteof DevelopmentStudies,June I975,published in Economicand PoliticalWeekly,
5 June 1976,p. 843. The estimateappeared in the
BangladeshTimes,20 March I976.
448
Impressions
of Bangladesh
begun undergroundoperations against the new regime near the
northernborderwith India. In order to publicize the mopping-up
operations,the ailing politician,Maulana Bhashani, was givenan
official
tourto meetborderforces.He warnedagainstlargeamountsof
ricebeingstoredin theopen in theborderzone.
government-procured
It was thisricewhichwas previouslythebasis forsmugglingtransactionsand which,naturally,was vulnerableto armedattackforuse as
foodby the opponentsofthe government.
Law and ordercontrolswereexpectedto enablethestateto extract
the revenue,food and resourcesrequiredforits developmentprogrammes.Immediatelyfollowing
thecoups, PresidentSayemand Zia
explainedto seniorruralofficials
thata strongenforcement
ofcontrols
was the most importantprerequisiteto national economic development,in which officialsmust carryout theirdevelopmenttasks
'withno interference
fromany quarter.'7
PoliticalCompetition
andForeign
Relations
Though 'normal political activity'and all politicalpartieswere
suspendedafterthe coups, unofficial
politicalcompetitioncontinued
throughoutthe country.Mushtaq promisedthat political activity
would commencein August I976, and Zia repeatedthis promisea
numberof timesafterthe coups. On the nationallevel,mostofthe
withAwami League/BAKSAL excesseswereinjail,
people identified
on trial,or in hiding.8The rural familiesand groupswhich gained
power under Mujib were temporarilyneutralizedby their fear of
reprisalsforthe harshmeans by whichtheyacquired moreland and
capital. Powerfulfamilieshad to re-examineold antagonismsand new
alliances; withone set ofconnectionsin check,ambitiousgroupshad
to establishnew channelsofinfluence.9
It is on thesegroupsthatthe
"Order and Development"(editorial),Bangladesh
Observer,
4 December 1975.Zia and Sayem
were speaking to Divisional Commissioners,Deputy Inspectors-Generalof Police, Deputy
Commissionersand Superintendents
of Police.
8 Abdus Samad (former
Foreignand AgricultureMinister)receivedrigorouslifeimprisonmentforacquisitionofpropertiesvalued at Tk 350,000 morethanhis knownsourcesofincome.
SheikhAziz (formerMinister)was triedforacquiringland and property
Tk 224,000 in excessof
his knownincome.Zillur Rahman (Secretaryof BAKSAL) was triedforacquiringhouses and
cars Tk 450,000 in excess of his known income. Gazi Gulam Mustapha (Chairman of the
Bangladesh Red Cross) underwenta seriesof trialsformisappropriation,
nepotismand mismanagementof relief.The Red Cross had been a partof theAwami League, as Gazi was also
partychairmanin Dacca district.The elderlyPhani Majumdar and retiredGeneralOsmani
werenot tried,the latterbeingappointedby Mushtaq as DefenseAdvisorto the President.
9 For example,the grandsonofa Muslim saint in Faridpur,thoughhe bears the titlesaint
(pir)himself,
did notdare to remainat his grandfather's
shrineafterthecoups. He was a tough
competitorforAwami League positions,had much increasedhis land and power, and now
fearedenoughforhis lifeto staywithrelatives35 milesawvay.His nephew,however,decided to
leave studentpoliticsand go underground,
becomingtheleaderofthemilitantoppositionin the
countrysidesurrounding
the shrine.
449
PacificAffairs
governmenthas relied forcooperationin developmentefforts,
and
theirloyaltyand the complianceof theirown followerswas vitalto
the operationofon-goingprogrammes.
Ambassadors were exchanged in January with Pakistan and
China, and relationswerecarefullymaintainedwithIndia, theUSA,
and the USSR. Because ofitsvulnerability,
and because development
financedependedon it,Bangladeshwas 'pursuinga policyofequidistance.'10The new relationshipswithPakistanand China wereimportant.Politicianswho had sidedwiththepro-Pakistanresistanceto the
nationalistmovement
in I 97I weremorevisiblein publiclife,and were
referred
to by theirformer
titlesand affiliations
in Pakistan.Appointmentsto the Council ofAdvisorsreflectedthe wishesofthosepeople
who, forreligiousor commericalreasons, had been happier with
Pakistan.AfterMujib gave someofthesepeople (e.g., membersofthe
Muslim League, and of the ]amaat e Islam) amnestyfromprisonin
I974, theywaited untilafterthe coups to reclaimtheirinfluence
in
business and in public life. The CollaboratorsAct of I972, under
which some of them might have been prosecuted,was repealed.
and restoredto someprominent
Citizenshipwas offered
Bengaliswho
did not returnfromPakistanand othercountriesto Bangladeshafter
I971. The renewedlink with Pakistanoffered
anotherlinkwiththe
petro-dollarcountriesofthe Middle East. Though Mujib cultivated
these opportunities,the connectionwas now strengthenedby a
frankerstatementof Bangladesh's Islamic background.Zia himself
visitedRiyadhand Teheranen routeto attendtheIslamicconference
in Istanbulin May I976.
The importanceofrelationswithChina was less immediate.It had
a symboliceffectforyouth(about 40 per cent ofthe populationwas
between I5 and 24 years of age). The death of Chou En-lai evoked
front-page
eulogiesfromZia and Sayem.A smalljute sale to China in
Januarymarkedthebeginningofan attemptto correcttheimbalance
of a trade under which Bangladesh had come to depend on inexpensiveand reliablegoods fromChina, frombus tiresto surgical
instruments.In this context,Maulana Bhashani was givenprominence:" insiderssaid thathisgroupwas in disarray,and Bhashani,an
old and ill man, was probablyjudged politicallyharmless.Since he
10
Rounaq Jahan, "Bangabandhu and After-Conflictand Change in Bangladesh,"Round
Table,January1976,p. 8i.
" RegardingtheearlierroleofBhashani,see Talukdar Maniruzzaman,"Radical Politicsand
the EmergenceofBangladesh,"in Paul Brass and Marcus Franda (eds.), RadicalPolitics
inSouth
Asia (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1973),and in his "Bangladesh: An UnfinishedRevolution?"
JournalofAsianStudies,
August 1975,pp. 891-91l.
450
Impressions
of Bangladesh
had always emphasized what could be gained throughcloser relations
with China, and was critical of Mujib, his reappearance fulfilledboth
internationaland domestic needs afterthe coups.
Only a superficialanalysis would suggest that the new martial law
administrationwas necessarily 'anti-India, anti-USSR' because it was
'pro-Pakistan, pro-China.' Bangladesh had not had very good relations with India since I972 and did not seem likely to achieve them
soon. The two economies were interlocked through the problems of
water-sharing,trade and smuggling, and labour migration. Border
clashes, and high level meetings to discuss them, were used to focus
world attention on water-sharing problems caused by Indian use of
the Farakka barrage on the Ganges River. Under Maulana Bhashani
a march to the Indian border was organized in May to protest the
shortage of water flowing into Bangladesh. Justice Abu Sayeed
Chowdhury, a formerPresident under Mujib (having denied in February association with any 'fictitiousexile provisional government in
London) was brought to Bangladesh to witness the water situation.
He made a public statement against 'the decision of India to unilaterally withdraw Ganges water at Farakka. "2 Water levels were published daily in newspapers, along with photographs of ambassadors
and importantvisitorsin frontof the sand bars which emerged downstream fromthe barrage. This was part of the effortmounted internationally by Bangladesh to press India into signing an agreement
which guaranteed Bangladesh's right to a fixed portion of the water
during the dry season. Concurrent with these efforts,the Indo-Bangladesh technical committee met almost continuously, alternately in
Dacca and Calcutta. India offeredTk I53 m. in grants and loans to
Bangladesh followingthe coups, but the offerwas politely declined.
Meanwhile the Russian presence remained largely unchanged.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairsmade a special visit to Moscow in
December to explain the policies of the new government.Though the
USSR naval establishment (mostly salvage and fishingvessels) was
reduced in December, electrificationprojects and exploration forpetroleum continued. Pro-USSR communist groups who had formedan
alliance with Mujib kept a low profile afterthe coups; some opposition groups were referredto in the press as 'now defunct.' The coups
did not fundamentallyalter the relations between Bangladesh and the
United States either. The US supplied an estimated $8oo m. of the $3
12Bangladesh
(newsletter),Embassy of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh,Washington
D.C., X April 1976.
45'
PacificAffairs
billion in foreignaid to Bangladesh, fromJanuary I972 to June I975.
Financial dependence on the US beforethe coups was greaterthan on
any other country,though the Americans supported Pakistan's cause
in I97I. Anti-US attitudes found little opportunity for public expression afterthe coups beyond wall slogans in Bengali and English.
US Senator McGovern and Congressman Diggs both visited Dacca in
January i976, on the heels of senior USAID and World Bank officials.
Except forIndian nationals, the largest foreigncommunityin Bangladesh was American. A majorityof the 77 foreignvoluntaryagencies in
Bangladesh had a US base or branch-office.The country's problems
representedan importantarena forthe US 'development community'
such as foundationadvisors, and consultants. There were US interests
in oil-exploration,banking, pharmaceuticals, computers, electronics,
and automobile assembly. A thrivingAmerican School in Dacca served
this community. Renewed commitment of US aid at the same high
levels continued as before,though this seemed to have less to do with
development in Bangladesh than with the commercial needs and
strategicadvantage ofthe United States.'3 The US 7thFleet continued
to operate in the Indian Ocean immediately followingthe coups.
The governmentwas committed to positions and actions which
maintained it and the groups it represented in power. Its foreign
relations could best be understood in this light. Delhi or Moscow
could be a useful ally if other allies made uncomfortabledemands.
Moves by India in April i976 to normalize relations with China and
Pakistan did not simplifymatters for Bangladesh. The end of rhetorical statements about secularism should also be similarly understood: it did not mean that non-Muslims were nongrata,but it was an
attempt to inspire the confidence of anti-Mujib groups in the new
government.Conservative politicians were reportedlypleased that the
label 'secular' was being removed. While Mujib and his party had
also been pro-Islamic, the term 'secular' was used to thwart the
political ambitions of these parties.'4 Being 'secular' became construed as being too tolerant of Hindus, and hence of India, even
Service
List (Washington,D.C., August1975)the numberofUS officials
1 In the 1975 Foreign
Burma (55), whereUS
listedin Bangladesh (54) is equal to the numberlistedin neighbouring
visibilityis much lower. The real differencelies in the large number of non-government
personnelresidentin Bangladesh.
14 Some extraordinary
questionsresultedfromthekillingofMujib. One concernsthestatusof
his body (parallelto the case ofthebody ofU Thant in Rangoon a fewmonthsearlier).It was
buried in his village in Gopalganj, having been flownthereby helicopter.In
perfunctorily
December,therewas an unreportedattemptto have it buriedbeside his privatehouse (still
guarded) in Dacca. Even as a rumourthe incidentgeneratedstrongopinion,indicatingthat
eventuallysomediscreetbutsymbolicand properlyorthodoxMuslimarrangements
willhaveto
be made.
452
Impressions
ofBangladesh
thoughthis tolerancewas sometimesnon-existentin rural society.
The government
formalizedthischangeby deleting(by Martial Law
Regulation) Article38 of the Constitutionwhich had banned the
of religiously-biased
functioning
politicalassociationsand organizations.The shiftwas further
endorsedby restoring
citizenshipto some
Bengaliswho remainedoverseas,by repealingthe CollaboratorsAct,
and by prominentofficialparticipationin religiousevents(e.g., the
Seeratun Nabi conferenceon the lifeof the Prophetin March, addressedby Air Vice-MarshalTawab and theChiefJusticeand by the
Ambassadorof Libya who spoke in Arabic).
The strengthand sophisticatedorganizationofthepopular tabliqi
movement(in whichgroupsofpilgrimswalk voluntarily
throughthe
villagesleadingdiscussionsand prayers)was partlya resultofofficial
encouragement,
accordingto informedsources.A record3,000 pilgrimswent to Mecca on the Hajj, paying $3.5 m. forthe journey
managedby BangladeshBiman,thestateairline.Much publicitywas
givento grantsfromcountriesofthe Middle East forIslamic cultural
activitiesand foundationsin Bangladesh. The change was evident
even at the everydaylevel of the officialcheer,Bangladesh
Zindabad,
the Urdu replacingthe Bengali slogan made popular by Mujib, Joi
Bangla. But the attitudeto non-Muslimaffairsafterthe coups appearedto be a continuationofthepolicyunderPakistan.Festivalsfor
Tagore, Buddha and Jesus all receivedpublicityand 'protection.'
WinterfairswithHindu theatretroupesand heavygambling(anathema, in theory,to devoutMuslims) wereheavilyattendedbyMuslims
and Hindus. Some tolerancewas evenshownto theoccasionalexodus
ofHindus to India. The government
was aware thatabout I 5 million
non-MuslimswereBangladeshicitizens;in someregionstheyformed
a majorityand development
programmesdependedon theircooperation. Despite the popular attitude which characterizedIndia as
Hindu, and whichtherefore
affectedthe statusofHindus in Bangladesh,thegovernment
was also aware thatthereweremoreMuslimsin
India than in Bangladesh.
In thecontextofincreasedcontrolthroughlaw and ordermeasures,
the regime made a show of confidenceby releasingsome of the
political prisonersdetained afterthe coups under the Emergency
PowersAct."5Zia repeatedhis assurancethatrestrictions
on thepress
15
A reasonable estimatewas 62,000 political prisonersremaining(Far EasternEconomic
Review,30January1976).One subdivisionaljail witha capacityfori8o prisonershad over400
inJanuary.A seniorprisonofficialsaid ofDacca CentralJail inJanuarythat"thereare lotsof
PhDs, doctorsand poets in therealready."
453
PacificAffairs
would be relaxed; newspapers which had angered Mujib or which
stopped publication after the coups began to reappear. Perhaps because theywere a source ofopposition, Zia promised the universitiesa
betteracademic atmosphere, and new hostels and sports facilities.He
also stressed their 'sanctity' and warned non-students not to use the
universitiesas a base of operations for national politics. Eleven life
sentences were handed down to young men convicted in February of
the murder of seven others in the hostels of Dacca University. But
political competition in the Universitypersisted; two more students
were shot dead in the hostels by rival groups in May. Again President
Sayem came to the universityand spoke of its 'sanctity.' While there
was some tolerance, the limits on political competition were made
very clear immediately following the coups. New regulations made
criticismof martial law punishable by up to ten years rigorousimpris-
onment.16
It was within these unstable conditions that the probability of

elections in February I977, promised by Mushtaq and again by Zia,
had to be considered. Conservative politicians were reported to be
enthusiastic about elections, and were expected to tryto hold Zia to
the timetable of six months normal political activity followed by
elections. They had an 'above-ground' status fromwhich to work,and
current policies reflected most of their own interests. Socialist and
militant opponents of Mujib (including some Communist factions),
though they were were reported cautiously tolerant of Zia, were not
enthusiastic about elections; theiroperations had to be mainly underground. Elections would bring the unofficialcompetition into the
open, and the traditionsof electoral violence togetherwith easy access
to arms created the risk of widespread conflict,'7which could provide
the evidence Zia would need in order to justifyterminationof normal
political activityand a return to martial law, as was done earlier in
Pakistan. Political participation became something which could be
allowed, or not, depending on whether conditions were diagnosed as
'normal' by the Deputy Martial Law Administrators. The national
political spectrum ranged frompeople who were critical ofMujib, like
16 Martial Law Regulations15, i6 and 17 (excerpts)".
. . whoever. . . criticizesthe imposition,operationor continuanceof Martial Law, . . . attemptsto excitedisaffection,
. . . by any
means spreadsreportscalculatedto createfearor alarm or despondencyamongthepublic ...
does any prejudicialact or . .. spreadsany prejudicialreport. . ." Bangladesh
Times,9January,
1976.
ofMujib's Cabinet told thewriterinJanuaryin Dacca, "Though things
17 One ex-Minister
are muchbetternowforthepeople,theywillhave to allow politicalactivityagain. This political
vacuumcannotlast in the ruralareas."
454
Impressions
of Bangladesh
journalistEnayatullahKhan and Maulana Bashani, throughan undefinedmiddle including adherentsof the 'now-defunct'Awami
League, to the previouslyunrecognizedMuslim League and Jamaate
Islam.There had been militantopponentsof the status quo under
Mujib, under Pakistan,and under the British.Even in the villages
mostpeople probablyrealizedthatthe government
could notpermit
the participationof dissidents.Many villagersalso saw that they
were merelythe 'objects' of policyand fearedwhat the government
mightdo to themin thename ofdevelopment.
The lackofany ideas in
governmentwhich could motivatethem and the absence of strong
local institutions
leftexhortation
and law and ordercontrolsas inevitable alternatives.
Policies
Development
Three broad areas most affectdevelopmentin Bangladesh: agricultureand food supply,populationcontrol,and naturalresources
and industry.The spiritwhichinformed
ruraldevelopment
remained,
in theofficial
language,'ruraluplift'and 'social welfareapproachesto
rural development.'Agriculturalpolicy supporteda patternwhich
reinforced
theclass structureand further
consolidatedland and capital in fewerhands. But itwas resourceextractionand industrywhich
receivedmost attention,thoughthe combinationof large-scaleprojects,foreigndonorsand indifferent
led to theimposiimplementation
tionofinappropriatetechnologies,or to the substitution
ofimported
approachesforindigenousefforts.
On thewhole,development
policies
continuedthe exploitationof agricultureand ruraleconomy.They
promotedthe growthof cities,both by strengthening
theirservices
(particularlytheir food supplies), and by weakeningthe retentive
capacityofthe surroundingcountryside.
The dependenceofdevelopmentprogrammeson foreignfinancial
aid was unchangedfromMujib's regime,thoughstrenuousefforts
weremade to raise moredomesticrevenue.Multilateraland bilateral
teams fromeverymajor aid-donorvisitedBangladeshfollowingthe
coups to reassess theirroles, and each subsequentlyannouncedrenewedcommitment
to currentpolicies.Total foreignassistancefrom
I972 to mid-I976was $4.22 billion.Afterthe coups, the IMF establisheda special Trust forBangladesh,the World Bank arrangedan
aid-consortium
meetingin Paris forBangladesh,and the Islamic DevelopmentBank,the InternationalDevelopmentAssociation,and the
Asian DevelopmentBank all announced major credits.Policy was
oftenproposedby foreign
consultants
undercontractto foreign
donors,
455
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so thattheirproposalsenjoyeda favouredstatusin theeyesofofficials
and politicianswho wereto formulatepolicy.While thereweresome
integratedpolicy-makingbodies, each programmewas usually the
whichguardedagainstattemptsto copreserveofa separateministry
therebydilutingits power.Officialsfocussed
ordinateimplementation
on policieswhichaffectedtheirown immediateurban environments
and theirown futures,not on the rural sectorwhich theyhad left
forLocal Selfwhen theybegan theircareers.None ofthe portfolios
Rural Development,or Reliefand Rehabilitationwere
Government,
held by any of the militarychiefs,and theirofficialsremainedless
prestigiousand powerfulthan others.
forimplementing
development
The weaknessoflocal institutions
programmeswas due to theirorigins,compositionand relationto the
nationalgovernment.The thanaremainedthe major administrative
The Union
unit forrevenue,police and developmentprogrammes.'8
Councils continuedto be the focusof local attention,thoughMujib
cooperativeswhich
had plannedto replacethemwithmulti-purpose
wouldhavehad muchmorepower,includingthecollectiveownership
of some land. The Union Councils were discreditedunder Mujib
ofPakistan,and discreditedunder
because theyhad been instruments
martiallaw because Council membersmade privateprofitfromrelief
loans and contractsunderMujib. The
and government
distribution
in fourothers,was thatchairmen
patternin one thana,and confirmed
oftheUnion Councilswerelivingin the police stationforprotection,
goingto theirhomes onlyunder guard in the daytime,and running
theirofficesby carryingtheirseals and stampsin theirpockets.Some
Council Membersleftthe thanato hide elsewhere.A powfrightened
erfulgroup was temporarilyneutralized,and in the eight months
following
the coups at least eightmembersofUnion Councilsin this
thanawere reportedmurdered.
withthe
Whiletheywerethe finallinkofthe nationalgovernment
villages, these Councils had no real power in developmentpro8 The thana(oftenconsideredas equivalent to 'county',but literallypolice-station)was
composedofabout ten separateUnions,a clusterofvillageswithtotalpopulationup to 20,000.
Act of 1919, modifiedby AyubKhan's
Unionswereestablishedby theVillageSelf-Government
tax collectionand policing.
Basic DemocraciesAct of 1959,and weredesignedformoreeffective
onlyrecentlychallengedby new typesof
They became the preserveofstrongmen (matabaars)
leaders such as school-teachers.Elections to Union Councils continuedto be 'uncontested'
ruledand appointedotherMembersoftheCouncil. It was MembersofUnion
wherea matabaar
officialsat the thanalevel.
Councils who mediated forothervillagerswith most government
Village-Conflict
RegardingthepoliticsofUnionCouncils,see A.K.M. AminulIslam,A Bangladesh
andCohesion
(Cambridge SchenkmanPublishingCompany,1974);and PeterJ. Bertocci,Elusive
in RuralEast Pakistan(unpublisheddoctoral
Organization
and Community
VillagesSocialStructure
Michigan State University,1971).
thesis,Departmentof Anthropology,
456
Impressions
of Bangladesh
grammes. Minor policing and taxing powers could be superseded by
thanaor districtofficialsifnecessary. Council members looked to these
officialsforfavoursin carryingout theirresponsibilities,and cooperated with them in patronage and corruption.Districtgovernmentofficials
did not really identifywith Council members, and continued to wear
western-styledress, arrive at the villages in jeeps, and depart before
sunset. The martial law administration hoped to inspire dedication
among officials,and set a new office-openinghour of 7:30 a.m. But this
had been tried under Mujib, and then, as now, few officialschanged
their daily routine and most arrived at io a.m. At almost all levels of
society the conduct of governmentofficials,though disliked, remained
mostlyunchallenged.
The contradictions between development programmes at the national and the local levels were not reconciled. Both senior military
and civil officialswere trained in Pakistan to believe that deference
was the proper attitude of the people towards governmentauthority.
This continued in Bangladesh because therewere no sustained training programmes under Mujib's regime. Development programmes
needed, from their perspective, to be organized in tidy hierarchical
and specialized systems. The role of foreignaid-donors increased the
need they felt for separate accountability, in spite of the use of the
term 'integrated' in policies. Such needs were opposed to stronger
local institutionswhich could experiment and learn which kinds of
development would be effectivein their areas. The national government did not transferto the existing institutionsany major responsibilities in development, such as revenue investmentor resource control, because this would constitute a potential challenge to national
authority.The politics of exhortationthus substitutedforthe transfer
of real responsibilities and power in development programmes.
FoodSupplyandAgricultural
Development
While food supply and agricultural developmentprogrammeswere
ostensibly aimed at the rural sector, they actually had as much to do
with the growth of urban settlementsand the stabilityof the state in
Bangladesh. The real question in the rural development program
was not increases in yield or overall production, but distribution of
food, and the means to produce it. Administrations in Dacca have
consistentlychosen a food policy which supplied prioritygroups on
the officialStatutory Rationing list of civil servants, military,police,
industrial workers and hospitals. This policy guaranteed the health
and strengthof those urban-dwelling classes, or those on government
457
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salaries, and cementedthe alliances betweenthe bureaucracy,the
military,and the merchantswho operatedthe fooddistribution
system. While agriculturalpolicytendedto promotethe growthofthe
landlesslabourerclass, foodpolicydid notincludethemin theregular
rationsystem.Rural areas received,underModifiedRationing,only
grainswhichwerenotabsorbedbypriority
groups.Atthetimesofthe
year when foodwas in shortsupplyin the countryside,
thiswas an
exampleofpunishingagricultureand rewardingindustry.The same
foodpolicytendedto promotethegrowthofthebureaucracyand the
militarywhichwerestill,as in Wilcox'sterms,'the onlytwomanagementinstruments
the societypossesses.'9
There was a bumperharvestoftraditionalvarietiesofrice (aman)
in December,consistentwithgood harvestsin the restof South and
SoutheastAsia. The MinistryofFood began immediately
to procure
as muchofthisriceas possible,and was surprisedby thewillingness
of farmersto sell. Rice pricesdecreased by halfafterMujib's death
and, afterthe harvest,droppedto 25 per cent oftheirformerheight.
Procurementof almost 400,000 tons of rice and importationof 2
milliontonsofwheatand ricecreateda problemsincestoragecapacityin the countrywas only I milliontons. Canadian aid was sought
of 400temporary
forconstruction
warehouses.Whileit increasedrice
procurement
forits rationshops,the Ministryof Food raised ration
pricesby 30 per cent; that is, the government
reducedits subsidyon
rice,wheat and cookingoil when these were sold at fixedprices to
groupson its prioritylist. Extensionofrationedriceand wheatsales
to industrialworkersoutsidethe fourstatutory
urban centreswas an
importantnew concessionto industries.Though thesesales immedinew sourcesofrevenueto government,
atelyoffered
theyalso opened
anotheropportunity
fordecentralizedindustrialgrowth.The rationcard systemwas notoriouslymanipulatedby merchantsand the urban public and again, as underMujib, thousandsoffalsecards were
seized and invalidated.Moreover,'well-to-dopersons'wereurgedby
the Ministryto returntheircards because theycould affordto pay
open marketpriceswhichremainedsteadyat ioN per lb. ofrice.Most
ofthewheatsold throughtherationshops came fromforeigndonors.
In spiteofa good harvestand heavyprocurement,
ofrice
importation
and wheatwas expectedto reachabout 2 milliontonsin thefiscalyear
endingMay 31, i976; forexample,fromI5 Novemberto the end of
19Wilcox,op. Cit.,p. 76. Also see Charles Tilly "Food Supplyand Public Order in Modern
Europe," in C. Tilly (ed.), TheFormation
ofNationalStatesin Western
Europe(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress), 1975, pp. 380-455.
458
Impressions
of Bangladesh
January, 42,000 tons of rice were procured within the country,but in
the month ofJanuary alone over 40,000 tons of rice and 78,oootons of
wheat were imported fromthe United States.
The major donors were US Food forPeace and PL48o, the USAIDCARE Food forWork, the UN World Food Program, and the Canadian International Development Agency, but the list extended further
to an $8 million grant for rice fromJapan, and I2,000 tons of wheat
fromFrance channelled through the EEC. Sales of this food through
the ration system generated a great deal of revenue for the government: one recent estimate by a food specialist with a UN agency was
that it amounted to 55 per cent of the national budget.20 Wheat
became a daily part of almost everyone's diet, and formany it constituted their only daily meal. Slogans appeared on the frontpages of
Bengali and English newspapers saying 'Wheat Is More Nutritious
Than Rice' and 'Wheat Contains More Calories and Proteins Than
Rice.' Only I40,000 acres were planted under high-yieldingwheat in
i96i, but between 300,000and 400,000acres were under wheat in the
1975-76winterseason. Imported wheat was reportedmovingout ofthe
urban ration-areas for exchange with better rice in the countryside;
the differencein theirprice was consistently30 per cent. But in spite of
this movement and the bumper traditional harvest, reliable sample
surveysin three districtsshowed levels of malnutritionof 25 per cent
among rural children and their mothers. The customary feeding
centres were reopened in the hot scarce months of May and June."
Like the reliefoperations followingthe annual cyclones in April, these
were managed jointly by the Army and the Red Cross. The Army
was first involved in the movement and storage of food to limit
corruption at Mujib's request in 1973, and the Deputy Martial Law
Administratorsmade a number of surprise visits to food warehouses
belonging to the Ministry of Food. However, this reliance on the sale
of food forrevenue and distributionof food forsocial controlwas only
part of the broader problem of increasing agricultural production
through governmentdevelopment programmes.
The governmental structurewhich controlled agricultural policy
was highly centralized and remote from food producers, though its
institutionsdirected programmes which were, to some extent, com20 The Manchester
ii April 1976 For the political aspects of one food-aid
GuardzanWeekly,
shipment,see Bob Andersonand KathyMezei, "Welcome to the Party-Aid forBangladesh?"
CanadianForum,
June 1975.
21 For example,the Bangladesh
Timesreportedcentresat Chandpurfeeding17,000children
and mothers(May 2), and centresat Kishoreganjfeedingi6,ooo(May i8).
459
PacificAffairs
petingforrecognition
and scarceresources.The MinistryofAgricultureand the BangladeshAgricultural
DevelopmentCorporationwere
fromthe days of Pakistanjoined by two policybodies resurrected
theAgriculturalPolicyCouncil and the Rural DevelopmentCouncil.
These wereadditionsto the electric'political'agencyofofficialrural
Committee.Most ofthese
development
plans, the NationalSwanirbar
bodies had inter-locking
and represented
alternatearememberships,
nas forcareerbuildingby ambitiousmembers.These bodies became
more significantthan the IntegratedRural DevelopmentProgram
whichMujib and foreign
donorsused as a channelforruralfinance,in
whichtherewerereportsin Februaryof 'promotionirregularities'
at
movementwas administeredby
managementlevels. The Swanirbar
Mahbub Alam Chashi fromthe President'spalace in Dacca, and
involvedall district-level
officesin high-visibility
ruralworkprojects,
familyplanning,and model developmentvillages. It had to work
throughthe rural power-structure
and appeared to be a non-party
mechanismforprovidingrewardsor incentivesto powerfulvillagers
who were faithfulto the government.The coups in Dacca were
reflectedby changes in recipientsof rewards in the countryside.
theSwanirbar
Despite some admirableplans and rhetoric,
Committee
was notconstituted
to servetheruralpoor.DiscussionsoftheSwanirbar
movementat the Bangladesh EconomicsAssociationin March betweenChashi and othersincludedthe chargesthatit 'reinforced
the
relief-mentality'
and was just anothermethodof 'agriculturalinput
dumping'withoutaccountability.The dual needs forstablepolitical
relationsdown to the lowestlevels,and foraccountableimplementation of programmescould not always be reconciled.The undefined
term 'self-reliance'was contrastedwith the hierarchicalthough
equally ambiguousterm'rural uplift.'Such needs and incongruous
slogans were at the veryheart of the politicsof exhortation.The
Committeeforcooperationbetweencivil
enthusiasmofthe Swanirbar
servantsgeneratedresistanceamong those who were expectedto
share power and prestigewith people of a similar rank in other
agencies and departments.Nevertheless,forthe government's
purofdifferposes thismovementforcedclosercontactsbetweenofficials
ent ranks and departmentsand some powerfulvillagers,contacts
whichmightnot otherwisehave occurred.
The government
made unprecendented
revenuecollectionsfollowthe
Both
unofficial
and
official
ing
coups.
pressureswereapplied and
the national result was that in the firstthreequarters of I975-76
revenuewas Tk 4.7 billion,overdouble theTk 2. I billioncollectedin
460
Impressions
of Bangladesh
I974-75, and thricetheTk I.5 billioncollectedin I973-74. All Agriculturaland ReliefLoans contractedbeforei97i werecalled in,and rent
on government
equipmentlikedeep tubewellsforirrigation
was vigorously collected. In Faridpur district,where revenuewas Tk io. i
millionin arrearssince i97i, at leastTk 6.6 millionwas collectedin 2 1/2
months.In Dacca district,revenuetahsildars
who realizedmaximum
collectionswere awarded prizes by the highestdistrictgovernment
officer.Higher collectionsindicatedtightercontrol;lower previous
collectionsusuallymeantthatloans werenotrecalled,defaulters
were
not pursuedor prosecuted,or smallerpersonalpaymentsweremade
to corruptofficials.A special Departmentof Tax Intelligencewas
created in May to limitevasion. But surplus (cash-crop) farming
requiredmore capital forland and inputsthan everbefore,consideringthe fallin the priceofrice,and the government
wishedto avoid
increasingheavyindebtedness.Zia requestedthe nationalizedbanks
to extend credit to smaller farmers.The drive for more revenue
collectionsand lack ofbank creditkeptthesmallerfarmercloselytied
to the biggerfarmerswho were also money-lenders.
This is another
exampleoftheconcentration
ofthemeansofproductionand political
powerin fewerhands.
There was a widespreadassumptionthatland fragmentation
and
conflictin the transitionsbetweenEast Bengal, East Pakistanand
Bangladeshso disturbedrural social structurethatthereexistedno
large or effectivelandowningclass. This assumptionwas used to
supporttheargumentthatrapidapplicationofnewagriculturaltechnologieswould resultin immediateincreasesin foodsupplywithout
alteringthis 'egalitarianrural structure.'The rural realitywas far
fromthese assumptions.22
About io per centofthe farmerswerebig
producersorientedto the market,oftenowningland well in excessof
thelegal ceilingof33 acresand investing
in infrastructure
such as rice
millsand transportor storagefacilities.Theyworkedthroughlinksto
local government
officersand sometimesto the cities,and were in
continuouscompetitionwithone anotherforresources.Membersof
Union Councilsgenerallycame fromthisgroup.Another50 per cent
of farmershad about 2 acres on which theycould ordinarilyjust
subsist,thoughin therecentamanharvestsomeexpectedto marketio
per centoftheirrice.Thus theysharedsomeoftheinterests
ofthebig
22 The following
descriptionis confirmedby small unpublishedsample surveysin Comilla,
Faridpur,Chittagong,Dacca and Rangpur districts,and by discussionswithotherinformed
observers;naturallythe percentagesofthe subsistenceand landlessclasses varyfromplace to
place.
46i
PacificAffairs
surplus farmers,on whom they generally depended for credit.
Throughstrategyand luck,a fewsubsistencefarmersbecame bigger
farmers,thougheach season moresubsistencefarmersslippeddown
into the landless class which comprisedthe remaining40 per cent.
These weretiedby kinshipand neighbourhood
to bothofthefirsttwo
classes. They dependedsolelyon the 'labour market'createddirectly
or indirectlyby the big farmersby whom they had already been
householdswere also not includedin
expropriated.The food-deficit
the food-rationsystem.To assist this group in beginningto farm
again, and to strikeat those who gained more rural power under
Mujib, thegovernment
announcedthatall land transactionsbetween
April and December 1974 (nine monthsof floodsand famine)were
subjectto reversaland thatoriginalownerscouldgettheirland back.
The policiesregulatingreliefand food-for-work
projectsmost affectedthe relationships
betweensubsistence
and landlessclasses.These
projectsweregenerallymanaged by the Union Councils and governmentsofficials.Some subsistencefarmersused theseprojectsto prolong the time theycould retaintheirland beforeits inevitablesale.
Most oftheprojectson whichtheyand the landlessgroupworkedin
returnforwheatwerecanals, ponds and roads whichwould increase
ofagricultureand be ofmostbenefitto surplus
thecommercialization
farmers.Those who workedon themgenerallyhad no voicein planning or executingprojects.The bulk of the skilledcraftsmenand
tradesmenexist at this level, increasingthe competitionforscarce
opportunities.This competitionwas furtherintensifiedby average
I974 populationdensitiesof I,400 per square mile.Rural development
and agriculturalpolicyhas avoided dealing withmostofthesecomplexities,delaying until the futurethe inevitableincreased social
welfarecostsofthe necessaryfundamentalstructuralchanges.It was
in thiscontextthat'crime'and 'violence'wereto be understood;from
the illegalcuttingof farmers'cropsby armedrobbersat nightto the
murderof elected officials,it was relationshipsand strategiesfashioned by the rural social structurewhich were at the root of rural
conflict.
While it soughtmore control,the government
exhortedsurplus
farmersto greater productivity.Previouslyunused land around
and buildingswas sownwithvegetables,though
schools,government
therewas a poorreturnon mostoftheseefforts.
But itwas in thehigh
yielding(HYV) grainsthatgovernment
policyplaced mostconfidence
to achieve productionincreases. HYV rice which used fertilizers,
pesticidesand special irrigation,
stillaccountedforonly io percentof
462
Impressions
of Bangladesh
thetotal 55 millionacres undercultivation,
and yieldswererelatively
low, ifnot decreasing.23
This was theresultoftheuse oflargeforeign
exchangecreditforthese technicalinputssince the mid-ig6os.Rice
researchhas been conductedin this regionsince I917. The Bangladesh Rice Research Institute(in cooperationwithIRRI) put major
emphasison improvingdeep-waterrice, which accounted fortwice
thearea cultivatedby theHYV ground-sown
rice,or about io million
acres. The NEC grantedTk I40 millionforresearchto improveyields
ofdeep-waterriceand to increaseitsresistanceto salineconditionsin
the delta region.Though researchbegan on thistraditionalricecrop
in I938 in Sylhetdistrict,
it stoppedaround i960 because international
prioritiesand fundingwereall focussedon dwarfhigh-yielding
varieties, none of whichcould survivein floodconditionsin Bangladesh.
Afterthe coups, USAID granted$6.5 million to the Agricultural
Research Institutein Dacca forresearchon othercrops like wheat,
soya and sorghum.But the success ofthe traditionalamanrice crop,
good prospectsfortraditionaldeep-waterrice,and emphasison nonrice alternativesdid not stop the regimeand its foreignsupporters
fromunderwriting
a conceptionof agriculturein Bangladeshwhich
has alreadyhad deleteriousresultsbothin destabilizingtheecological
contextof food productionand in maintainingthe profoundinequalitiesofruralsociety.
High-yielding
varietiesand theirrequirements
wereplaced ahead
ofalmostall otherconsiderations
in ruraldevelopment
and theircosts
were extremelyhigh. Ammonialeaked fromthe Ghorasal fertilizer
factoryin Februaryand killed thousandsof riverfish,removinga
major source ofproteinforsurroundingpopulations.Studies of the
swamps(haors)ofSylhetdistrictshoweda sharpreductionofbothfish
and dairyproductiondue to the effectof chemicalswhichcollectin
the waterfollowingdrainagefromHYV rice fields.To controlnew
insects introducedinto the countrywith new seed varieties,and
perhapswithfoodshipments,aerial sprayingofpesticideswas carried
out on 'an emergency
basis,' killinglivestock,
fishand poultryin large
numbers.While more pesticidewas purchasedwithannual foreign
credits,therewerechargesofa 'procurement
spree' overtheprevious
23 Based on interviews
withagriculturalexpertsin Dacca. For pre-'971backgroundon land
tenure,administration
and ruraldevelopment,
see papers by Bertoccietal. in R.D. Stevens,H.
Alavi and P.J. Bertocci,RuralDevelopment
in Bangladesh
and Pakistan(Honolulu: University
of
Hawaii Press, 1976).On the pressingneed and bleak prospectforsignificant
land reform,
see
M.A. Zaman "Bangladesh: The Case For FurtherLand Reform,"SouthAsianReview,
January
1975,pp.97-I I5; also I.N. Mukherji"AgrarianReformsin Bangladesh,"AsianSurvey,
May 1976,
pp. 452-464.
463
PacificAffairs
fourteenyears which resultedin ii,ooo tons of stockpiledpesticide
in the open air. The grimfactwas thatit could cost as
deteriorating
much as Tk 5,000 per ton, or Tk 55 millionto destroythis deadly
accumulationsafely.24
But one agriculturaland environmental
concernovershadowedall
othersafterthecoups,and it notonlyaffected
theproductionofHYV
grains but altered the cultivationpotentialof 24 per cent of the
agriculturalland in thewholecountry.The decreaseofthewater-flow
throughthe Ganges Riversystemdue to theoperationoftheFarakka
barrageresultedin a declineoffreshwaterand an increasein salinity.
This and lower water-levelsdamaged crops already in the ground,
limitedfishand forestgrowth,and spoiledthiswaterforsuch industrial purposes as thermalpower generation,and pulp and paper
production.West Bengal (in India) gained good irrigationin thedry
Murshidabaddistrict,siltwas flushedfromthe PortofCalcutta,and
freshwater extendeddownstreamfromCalcutta, all of which improvedtheagriculturaland industrialpotentialofthatstate.The new
Bangladeshregimeinheriteda problemwhichcaused chronictension
betweenPakistanand India in the late i96os. The Farakkaissue was
almost the only developmentquestion over which there was any
seriouspublicdebatefollowing
thecoups. Demands in Bangladeshfor
settlementof water rightsshowed that the people recognizedtheir
precariouspositionin regardto the mostcrucialagriculturalinput.
The delicacy with which the government
officialshad to approach
negotiationswith India showed that theirpoliticalpositionwas almostequally unstable.
Control
Population
Four yearsof inactionin populationcontroland familyplanning
turnedto a senseof urgencyfollowingthecoups. In JanuaryI975 the
Chairman of the Family PlanningBoard said "We have been at a
standstillforfiveyears."25One year later Zia and Sayem declared
populationcontrolas firstpriority
on thegovernment
's programmeof
action. The 'facts,'though indefiniteand sometimesgeneratedby
different
kindsofresearch,weresufficiently
alarmingto arousepublic
anxiety;the UN PopulationDivision estimatesin mid-I975put the
populationat 73.7 millionwith46 per cent underthe age of I5 and
forecast144.3 million26forthe year 2,000. While populationexperts
24Bangladesh
Times,3 March I976.
KhushwantSingh,"The InternationalBasketCase," NewrorkTimesMagazine,26 January
1975, P. 44
26 "Food and Population"Asia I976 Yearbook.
Far EasternEconomicReview,December1975,
p. 62. Some expertsdoubted the statisticalaccuracy of the 1974census, thoughno current
populationestimatesexceed 8o million.
25
464
Impressions
of Bangladesh
and civilservantshave long adviseddrasticaction,therehad been no
politicalresolveunderMujib to implementany firmpolicies.Following the coups severemeasuresbecame mostattractiveto the martial
law administration,and possibilitieslong talked of now became
strongly-financed
programmes.A new Central CoordinatingComon the
mitteeon PopulationControlwas createdwithrepresentation
CouncilofAdvisorsto the President.The doctorwho heldthepostof
SecretaryofHealth since I972 and who wishedto controlbothhealth
and familyplanningby himselfwas dismissed,thusbreakinga longtermbureaucraticstalemateby givingpopulationofficialsseparate
prestigeand powerwithinthecivilservice.The SwanirbarCommittee
becamemuchinvolvedin theoperationofnewfamilyplanningexperithus linkingits politicalcontactsand the
mentsin the countryside,
thanasin
rewards it could offerwith the performanceof different
familyplanningactivities.Whilethecustomaryrangeofcontraceptive
devices was available to persons requestingthem,special political
emphasiswas givento vasectomiesand tubal ligations.In Januarythe
firstVasectomyFair (mela) was organizedby the SwanirbarCommitteeand the Bangladesh AssociationforVoluntarySterilization
about 20 milesfromDacca. Officialsfirstpredicted5,000 vasectomies,
and theatmosphereresembleda winterfairin orderto popularizethe
visitorscame, includingPresident
methods.A streamofdistinguished
Sayem. Yet, even by extendingthe fair an extra day, it actually
achievedonly 96i operationsusing heavypressureon ruralpolitical
mechanismslike Union Councils in the surroundingareas.27Meanwhilethe physicianin chargeofHealth, FamilyPlanningand Population Controlon the Council ofAdvisorscalled fordoctorsto assist
in the population controlprogramme.All salaried workersof the
Ministryof Health were expected to fulfillquotas, and therewas
inevitableduplicationof effortsin the competitionforclients.
There has been an indirectreturnto the economic incentives
previouslyused by Pakistanand abandoned by Bangladeshin I972.
Since that time $65.5 millionwas providedin foreignassistancefor
populationcontrol,mostofit fromUS-based agencies,thoughmany
The Coordinator
othernationsand multilateralagenciescontributed.
forPopulationAffairsin the US Departmentof State visitedDacca
afterthecoups and praised,and promisedsupportfor,boththefamily
27A close observerof familyplanningpractice and a memberof the National Swanlrbar

Committeedrewattentionto thecontradictions
in thisapproach,includingtheuse ofeconomic
incentives.See ZafrullahChowdhury,"Vasectomy Mela and Family Planning," Bangladesh
Times,25 February1976.
465
PacificAffairs
planningand Swanirbarmovements.Zia said thattherewould be no
financiallimitson programmesin population controlif theywere
effective.
Observersquestionedwhethermakingfundingcontingent
on performance(a welcome goal in other respects)would cause a
repetitionofthepreviouspracticeoffalsification
ofstatisticsin order
to maintainthe flowof US supportand financeforfamilyplanning.
The returnto relianceon economicincentivesinsteadof motivation
was expectedto resultagain in moreworkerconcernforthekick-back
fromclientsthanforproperperformance
ofduties.Withoutany local
institutionto set prioritiesand deal with inevitableoppositionin
meaningfulrural terms,population controlprogrammesand personnel continuedto be perceivedby many villagersas 'shameless'
and alien. There was no fundamental
(beyhaya)
changein the government'sindifference
to public healthin general,so thatthepopulation
controlcampaignremainedisolatedand biased towardsclinicsand
doctors.
The impact of all this was not at all clear, even to the most
informedobservers.Heavy dollar fundingcontinuedto resultin the
constructionof more buildings:the NEC announced that Tk 650
million,presumablyfromUSAID, would be spenton 45 buildingsfor
familyplanning.The buildingsabsorbed$43 millionofthetotal$65.5
milliongrantedand would have had moreimpacton theconstruction
industrythanon populationdynamics.Policiescontinuedto tie family planningto the government
and to the urban lifeit represented.
The 1974censusreportedan urbanpopulationof6 million,and thisin
itselfrepresenteda big market.A two-monthpill cycle (made in
India) cost ten cents (Tk I.40) in the cities. Quantities of foreign
condomsmarked'forfreedistribution'
in the ruralareas wereseized
on the black marketin Dacca. Articlesappeared in bothBengaliand
English newspapers on American or Britishreactionsto contraceptivesand baby foods.In the ruralareas the impactwas uneven,
but effective
workwas being done by projectssupportedby a few
voluntaryagencies and some isolated civil servants.Economic incentivesincluded'unofficial'promisesof freerationsand pressures
like withholdingagriculturalloans were confirmedby informedobservers.
These pressuresmost affectedmembersof the subsistenceand
landlessagriculturalclasses,wheremenappearedto be morecautious
than women in responding.Exhortationsto controlthe population
reachedthese womenat a time when theirown role was changing.
Rural womenwere competingwithotherwomenforincomesin the
466
Impressions
of Bangladesh
agriculturallabour-force,
notonlyin thetraditionalwomen'srolesof
processing,parboilingand cleaningtherice,but also in transplanting
it at theseedlingstage.28Womenfromprosperousruralfamilieswere
reportedto have increased their demand foremploymentin such
occupationsas thepolice and nursing.Untilmartiallaw, elitewomen
had a participationquota in electoral politics,but this controlled
situationwould notbe likelyto satisfyordinarywomen'sdemandsfor
participationin public life.This change of expectationand role will
affectfamilystructure,
wages, and educationpatterns,and willtend
to makesome womenmoreregularusersofcontraceptives.
But pressuretacticson clientsbroughtresistancein ruralsociety,particularly
among men,and mostparticipationbecame non-voluntary.
Workers
and investigators
in threeareas reportedthatvillagerssaid theywere
asked to undergovasectomiesand ligationswhichmostleaders and
officials
would avoid. Villagershave seen manyleaderswho exhorted
themto do this or warnedthemagainst doingthat,but did not set
examplesby theirown conduct.Each leaderoffered
'good reasons'for
cooperatingwith the government,but villagersknew the coercion
which could be used to enforcethese offers.There were animated
discussionsin at least threedistrictsofthe recentlegislatedsolutions
to populationproblemsin India, broadcastto Bangladeshby radio.
The mistrustamongmostruralpeople about themotivesor intention
of government
programmescomprisedpartof theresistanceto some
aspectsofthenew familyplanningefforts.
What seemedonlyvaguely
glimpsedbypolicy-makers
in Dacca was thatthewillto participatein
familyplanningwas contingenton the confidencefeltby couples in
theirown economicand politicalfuturewithinthe country.Policies
to securethatconfidence,
includingpublichealthmeasures,werenot
in evidence.
NaturalResources
andIndustrial
Development
Followingthe coups therewas an acknowledgement
that natural
resourceshad to be morecarefullyassessed and thatindustriesbased
on those resourcesshould grow logicallyfromthe assessment.Zia
himselfsuggestedin 1973 and 1975 thatremovingMujib and altering
foreign
policywouldensuregreatereconomicand technicalaid forfull
The rule of arms
developmentof Bangladesh's natural resources.29
28 The role of womenin agriculture
and othersectorsis well reviewedin Women
forWomen
(Dacca: University
PressLimited,fortheWomenforWomenResearchand StudyGroup, 1975).
withZia and othermilitarypersonnelquoted in Zillur Khan, op.cit.,pp.
29 Frominterviews
123-124.
467
PacificAffairs
was bettersuited for resource extractionand processingby new
technologiesthan for dealing with the complexitiesof the rural
allowances for,and forofferedsignificant
society.The government
eign exchange creditsto, those who would undertakethis kind of
cementingitsalliancewiththatclass ofindustrifurther
development,
alists which began to grow in the last years of Pakistanand with
technicallyskilledgroupsin the middleclass. This strategyenabled
some business familiesto re-establishan economicstatusmatching
the social and politicallegitimacytheyacquired throughthe change
in regimes.Problemsof the economicand industrialinfrastructure
continuedto preoccupyplannersand nationalpoliticians,and reorganizationwas quicklyimplementedfollowingthe coups.30But these
on thesuccessfuloutcomeofresourceexploplans wereall contingent
rationand assessment.
Jute remainedthe centreof the industrialand foreignexchange
earningswitha recordprofityearin I975. Juteproductionaccounted
200,000
exchange;itemployed
foreign
for85 percentofBangladesh's
industrialworkers,and providedindustrialinvestmentsin 77 jute

mills.But themeansofrawproductionremainedsquarelyin therural
sector,withmillionsofgrowersand thousandsoftraders.Land was
allocated to jute dependingon complexand oftenlocal factors,only
one of which was the price expected forfood crops and the price
guaranteedforjute by the government.Some initiativestaken to
improvejute's positiondid have an effect.In May I975 Mujib authorized a 58 per cent devaluationof the taka (US $i = Tk 13), and
exportearningsforthefirstquarterof 1975-76 (JunethroughAugust)
rose24 per centoverfiguresin the same periodin theprecedingyear.
Much ofthisincreasewas due tojute sales. Followingthe coupsjute
dealers were granted freedomto sell directlyto foreignbuyers,
corpowhereaspreviouslytheyhad been regulatedby a government
oftheindustryoftheinefficiencies
ration.Therewereinvestigations
fromlongstorageoffinishedgoods and rawjute, muchofwhichwas
destroyedin 'mysterious'annual fires,to slow supplyand lackoflocal
ofsmallparts.In 1970 East Pakistanaccountedfor35 per
manufacture
centofthetotalworldproductionofrawjute, comparedto 32 percent
forIndia.3"In 1975 Bangladesh regainedthat firstposition,though
jute goods fellin I974 due to massivesmugexportof manufactured
a?Not all the changes resultfrommartial law rethinking;see the "White Paper on the
Economic Situationin Bangladesh" whichwas preparedby PresidentMushtaq's Secretariat
21 September0975.
Observer,
(Economic Task Force), excerptedin Bangladesh
31 Data fromInterpares(voluntary
agency), Ottawa, included in Briefto theSub-committee
onExternal
Committee
andNationalDefence,
July1976.
Development
oftheStanding
onInternational
Affairs
468
Impressions
of Bangladesh
glingofrawjute to the millsofWest Bengal. It is easy to understand
thedesireofa government
concernedwithtechnicalefficiency
to move
away fromreliance on jute to 'modern' and less labour-intensive
industries.
Much ofthe hope forindustrialgrowthin Bangladeshdepended

on successfulexplorationforoil, whichrevealedpromisingindications
fromseismicsurveysin I 975. Though explorationin the deltas was
carriedout as earlyas 1946, onlyrecentlywas therea freshattempt.
The governmentallocated $i.7 millionforon-shoreexplorationin
1975-76 by Petro Bangla (the national oil corporation)froma 38
millionruble creditagreementwith the USSR. Off-shoredrilling
began in I975 throughconcessionsto sevenoil consortia(threeUSUnion, AtlanticRichfield,Ashland; one Canadian-Superior; one
Japanese-Bengal Oil Development; and one Yugoslavian-Inanaftaplin).These concessionswere based on the production-sharing
principle,each consortiuminvesting$io millionin Bangladeshbetween I974 and i980, and each spending $ioo,ooo for trainingof
Bangladeshipersonnel.This was in additionto 'handsomesignature
bonuses' to the Governmentof Bangladesh. This activityhad an
impacton the supplyofluxuryhousingin Dacca and Chittagong,on
wages connectedwith exploration,and on new Bangladesh Biman
to Bangkokand Singaporeforoil-workers
flights
directlyfromChittagong.
Disagreementwith India on the definitionof the borderin the
delta-offshore
regionaffectedthe securityof oil explorationin that
zone in I975, whereIndia reportedmakinga discovery.The importanceofthisexplorationwas relatedto theproblemsofenergysources
forBangladesh.Its annual crudeoil requirements
foritsrefinery
were
I.5 milliontons in I975-76. Followingthe coups, Iran announcedthe
sale of400,000 tons ofcrude oil, and a team wentto Abu-Dhabhito
negotiatethesale of I.2 milliontons (in I975 Bangladesh"was given"
about 6o per cent of its crude oil needs by the United Arab Emirates).32The retail price of gasoline remainedat $I.50 per gallon
followingthe coups. Four factoriesproduced urea and otherfertiltheirplantsto achieveself-sufficiency
izers,and were reconstructing
in I978. $6 millionwas earned by the exportof naptha througha
Norwegianfirm.Though it had a knownrecoverablecoal reserveof
152 milliontons,as yetuntouched,Bangladeshcontinuedto import
industrialcoal, including325,000 tons fromIndia in I975-76. Most
32"Commodities"
Asza 1976 Yearbook,

Far EasternEconomic
Revzew.December 1976,p. 82.
469
PacificAffairs
electricitywas produced fromthermaland diesel-generator
plants,
exceptforthe Kaptai hydro-electric
dam near Chittagong.
Offshoreexplorationsalso provideddiscoveriesof new food resources.A UNDP/FAO studyreleased in Februaryshoweda 6,ooo
square milefishinggroundon theupperBay ofBengal shelfwhichis
mostlyunexploited;productionthereamountsto 46,ooo tons offish
annually,while the studyestimatedthe potentialat I75,000 tons.
There was competitionfortheseresources;informed
observersspoke
of intensiveinternationaldeep-sea fishingoperationsoffthe Burma
and Bangladeshcoasts.33Bangladeshtookoverten deep-seatrawlers
whichoperateduntilDecember 1975withRussian crews,and longrange fishingfleetswere reportedactive in the same waters.The
Bangladesh Navy captured two modern"intrudingforeignfishing
trawlers"in the Bay of Bengal.34Long-termfishingagreementswere
concludedwithbothThailand and Japan in 1976, nationswhichwere
otherwiseextractinglarge amountsof fishfromwatersoffBangladesh.
The same waterswere shown by US satellitestudiesas offering
almost 4,000 square miles of submergednew land quite close to the
surface;thisincludedeightnew islandsemergingoffthedelta. Populationhas traditionally
movedonto such land (char)as soon as itwas
habitableor cultivable,withthe attendantproblemsofviolenceon a
new frontier.
The coastal stripbetweenChittagongand Cox Bazar
was determined
by surveyby theatomicenergyauthoritiesofBangladesh and Australiato have veryvaluable depositsofrare earthsand
radioactive materials, and planning forextractionof these commenced.Furtherinland,the forestsofthe Chittagongregionwereto
be managed with a Tk i8o million Swedish grant to Bangladesh
markedfortimberand bamboo extraction,
plantationoffast-growing
bamboo species,and a loggingtrainingcentre.Betweeni6 and 20 per
centofthesurfaceofBangladeshis coveredbyforest,
butdemandsfor
timber,fueland pulp made Bangladesha net importerof wood in
I975. Deforestationpresenteda severe problem,both in termsof
ecologyand flood-control,
and forgovernment
revenues.It was preciselyin such cases that martiallaw interestswere best servedby
greatercontrolof resources:revenuescould increasethroughmore
studieson
"BangladeshTimes,26 February1976.The USSR firstconductedcomprehensive
Infishoffthe Bangladesh-Burmacoast in 1965-66.Cf. A.S. Bogdanov (ed.), SovietFisheries
In theIndianOcean(Moscow, All Union Research Instituteof Marine Fisheriesand
vestigations
Oceanography,1971), publishedby Israel ProgramforScientificTranslationLtd. Thus they
werereadyto operateten deep-sea trawlersoffthe coast from1972-1975.
3Bangladesh Times,io December 1975.
470
Impressions
of Bangladesh
controlledextraction,and greatergovernment
penetrationoftheforests was a means of reducingpotentialhidingplaces formilitant
opponentsof the government.Forestsand rare earthsdeposits,for
example,were in areas withpredominantly
minorityand Buddhist
populations,thusgivinganysocial dislocationsa lowerpoliticalprice.
The industrialinfrastructure
continuedto be plagued withproblems typicalof many poor countries.Massive productivefacilities
remainedunutilizeddespitetheforeignexchangealreadyinvestedin
them (the heavy machine tools factoryran at io per cent of its
capacity,and onlyfiveofthe dozen importedcomputersin the countrywereoperating,with70 per centoftheirtimeunused). Therewas
no policyfordecentralizedrural-basedindustrialdevelopment.Massive unemployment
existed in both rural and urban life,including
trainedand potentiallyskilledpeople. Electricians,engineers,truckdriversand doctorsin Bangladeshwerebeingrecruitedto workin the
Middle East, and therewere additionalunofficialmovementsof the
same kindof people out of the country.In Januarytherewere I,250
applicantsforthreeminorclericaljobs advertisedforten days, then
the 'jobs' werediscoveredto be a fraudto obtainthe I5 centfeewith
each application;all applicantswere college graduates,some in the
sciences.
The educationsystemwas supposedto servicethe needs ofa new

industrialeconomy,but seemedmoresystematically
to inhibittalent
or cripple motives.Officialdecisions followingthe coups to raise
school and college standardsresultedin 6o to 70 per cent rates of
failurein examinations,and the revelationof exam-fraudsand mass
expulsionsforcheatingdemonstrated
thedesperationofstudentswho
could not seek employmentwithouta certificate
or degree (examinationhalls were guarded by police withmachine guns to ensure
normal procedures).Still the demand fortechnicaland university
trainingwas extreme;forthe I976 academicyearat Dacca University
therewere i9,000 applicantsfor2,000 openings,and foreignfoundationsreportedhundredsofapplicationsfromwell-qualifiedtechnical
and scientificpersonscompetingintenselyfora fewdozen scholarshipsoverseas.Many studentsremainedidle whentheirstudieswere
complete,and their families,to whom they representeda major
investment,struggledto find them a productiverole somewhere.
Continueddependenceon foreigncreditsin industryresultedin the
importationoftechnology,some ofwhichcould have been produced
in Bangladesh,and muchofwhichwas inappropriateto local conditions and requiredsophisticatedtraining.Some was bought,not on
47I
PacificAffairs
credits,but withforeignexchangeearned in the agriculturalsector
(mainlyjute, but also tea, fish,newsprint,and leatherexports).
The overall economic picture remained unbalanced with high
importsand low exports.In the firsthalfoffiscalyear I975-76exports
were valued at Tk 2,334.3 million while imports were valued twice as
much, Tk 5,782.8million3 (food,edible oil, cement,petroleumand

crude,raw cottonand yarn,fertilizer,
and equipment,
machinery
etc.).
Besides these importcosts, Bangladeshpaid debt-servicechargesof
$75 millionin scarce foreignexchangeduring1975-76.36
Effortsto develop this infrastructure
consisted largely of institutionalreorganization.Some of the state apparatus which'controlled'productionand tradewas dismantled,but therewas no move
to end controlofthecommandingheightsoftheeconomywhichmost
affectindustrialand resourcegrowth.The Chairman of the State
Trading Corporationwas dismissed,some directimportingand exportingcommenced,and all 350of the small industrialunitsnationalized in I972 were returnedto residentowners(150) or sold to the
private sector (200). Compensationwas offeredto foreignowners,
many of them Pakistanis,whose firmshad been nationalized,but
economistssaw littlechance of large-scalede-nationalization,
only
movesto reduceoverlappingresponsibilities
in statecorporationsand
controls.The NationalEconomicCouncil,ofwhichZia was
simplify
Chairman,becamethecentraldecision-making
bodyfortheeconomy
and continuedthose controlsand restrictions
which benefittedthe
government.There has been no sign of militaryparticipationin
privateor stateenterprise,
as has happenedin a numberofcountries
of SoutheastAsia. The privatesectorwas giventhe kindofstatusit
had enjoyed in Pakistan.The privateinvestment
ceilingwas raised
from$2.3 to $7.7 millionand significant
tax holidayswerepromised.
The Secretaryof Industriespromised'no lack of foreignexchange
creditforthe privateinvestor.'Internationalsupport(World Bank,
IDA, etc.) was givento the IndustrialCredit Bank, and the Small
IndustriesCorporation,and the nationalizedBangladeshbankswere
seekingnew industrialinvestmentsfollowingthe coups. When the
martiallaw administration
called forsuggestions
to utilizeundeclared
'black' moneywhichwas in unofficial
circulation,one public suggestion (not implemented)was to reopenthe stockexchange,closed for
fouryears,to absorb black money.One suggestionimplemented
was
themandatorydeclarationofall foreignexchangeholdingsand assets
35BangladeshTimes,7 February1976.
36
"Bangladesh," Asia I976 Yearbook,
op.cit., p. I 4
472
Impressions
of Bangladesh
in April.The evolutionofpolicyin resourceextractionand industrial
developmentcontinuedto includethose strategieswhichmaximized
the interactionof local private entrepreneurs
with foreigncorporations,whilestrengthening
theeconomicpositionofthegovernment.
Conclusion
Followingthe I975coups in Bangladesha new government
began
to show strengthof purpose in dealing withimmediateproblemsof
law and order.Yet it announcedthatitwas onlyan 'interim'governmentwhichwouldhand poweroverto electedrepresentatives
earlyin
I977. Each of these immediateproblemshad implicationswhichaffectedthe achievementof the long-termgoals of national develdid not appear committedto facopment.The 'interim'government
ing such implicationswithan equivalentstrength
ofpurpose.If longtermgoals were to be achieved,Bangladeshicitizenshad to particion the basis ofmorethan a vague loyaltyto the
pate in development
nation. Yet theywere offeredno legitimatemobilizingideologyto
inspiretheirparticipation.There was no consultationwiththemon
the methods,intent,or meaningof developmentprogrammes,and
thesecontinuedto be as specialized,hierarchical,and unchallenged
as before.Bangladeshneededan effective
decentralizedruralorganizain its own develtion whichcould accept non-trivial
responsibilities
This organizationrequiredthetransfer
ofpowersfrom
opmentefforts.
thenationalgovernment,
includingcontrolovermoretaxationand some
was committedto maximum
resources.But the militarygovernment
controland would notforegoclaimson taxesor resources.The goal of
'self-reliance'was pursued withprogrammeswhich were not separated fromthe strictlaw and ordermeasuresimposedfollowingthe
coups. The lack ofcleargovernment
commitment
and theweaknessof
local institutions
reinforced
thepoliticsofexhortation.
It is thiskindof
will have to transcendin orderto
politicswhichthe administration
achievebothdevelopmentand stabilityforBangladesh.
University
ofBritishColumbia,
June1976
POSTSCRIPT
Bangladeshexperiencedone ofitsworstcycloneand floodseasons

in June and July; standingcrops were ruined,hundredsdied, and
reliefand shelterhad to be providedforhundredsofthousands.Misappropriationofreliefgoods has been made an offenceundermartial
law. The government
has increasedits gripon law and order.The
473
PacificAffairs
search for illegal weapons continuesamidst reportsof continued
armed violencein the countryside.Well-knownpeople are stillthe
objectsof investigation;
the previousVice-Chancellorof Dacca Universityand the previousCabinet Secretarywere both arrestedon
chargesofcorruption.Lt. Colonel Taher was sentencedto deathand
Major Jalil to life imprisonmentfor their roles in the November
Armyagainst
attemptto inspirethe risingofa Peoples'Revolutionary
the traditionalmilitaryleadership. A new militarytribunalwith
includes
extraordinary
powerswas establishedby Zia; its constitution
theclause: (8) No appeal shall lie to anyauthoritywhateverfromany
decisionor judgementof the Tribunal.37Zia continuedto stressin
his speechesthat 'completelaw and orderis vital foreconomicdevelopment.'
To carryout thisdevelopment
theGovernment
announcedan ambitiousbudget for I976-77. It emphasizesnaturalresources,science
and technology,industry,transport,communicationand electrification (Tk 6,4I0 million),agriculturereceivingTk 3,630 million.Bangladesh requested$I,200 millionat the Aid Bangladesh Consortium
meetingin Paris,and the amountpledgedthisyearwas $950million
as comparedwith$8oo millionlast year. Zia declaredin the budget
The first
that 'the public sectorwill become commerciallyefficient.'
compensationof foreignfirmsoccurred in June, totallingTk 5.5
million; Bangladeshi shareholdersof these nationalizedindustries
were also promisedcompensation.The Government
opened up 3,200
square miles off-shoreand 40,000 square miles on-shorefor new
petroleumexploration,most of it by foreignfirmsin collaboration
withPetro-Bangla.
Two incidentsoccurredwhichtestedZia's politicaljudgement.38
In April,the colonel who had engineeredthe killingof Mujib returnedfromexile in Libya. Though refusedpermissionto remainin
thecountry,he managedto stayand triedto inciterebellion.Zia was
was sentto London.
and eventually
conciliatory
youngColonelFMrukh
The secondcase explainedthe suddenresignation
ofAir-ViceMarshall
Tawab. He had not only urged reunificationwith Pakistan too
in the purchaseof a
strongly,but was also named as a beneficiary
Boeingairlinerand in lettingthe contractforthe shipmentofcrude
oil to Bangladesh. Tawab was exiled to West Germanywhere his
German wifeand familywere living.
Doubts about electionshave been temporarilyresolvedby the
Political Parties Regulation.39It prohibitsany foreign-aidedparty
or any partyhavingthe aim ofengagingin any prejudicialor under3
38
3
Bangladesh
Times,15June1976.
Far EasternEconomic
Review,25 June 1976,p.21.
Bangladesh
Times,29 July 1976.
474
Impressions
of Bangladesh
groundactivity.Parties will each be evaluated forapprovalby the
Governmentand will be dissolved if they contraveneany of the
numerousregulations.PresidentSayem metwithleaders'withvarying shades of political opinion;' they all agreed to the concept of
limiteddemocracyregulatedcarefullyby the Martial Law Administrators.Electionsare stillplanned forFebruary1977.The only allpartyissues raisedwerethe securityofthebordersagainstIndia and
the Farakka dispute.
At firsta grouping of 'dedicated Awami Leaguers' included
Mushtaq's name but,whenit announcedsubmissionofitsmanifesto
forapproval,his name was not amongthoseofotherformerCabinet
Ministersand MPs. When Mushtaq later convenedthe 'proposed
DemocraticLeague' he said thathis old partyhad abandoneddemocraticprincipleswhenit was transformed
intoBAKSAL. There were
also announcementsby the 'proposed Muslim League' (but not by
Jamaate Islam),and by the 'proposedUnitedPeoplesParty'(convened
by GeneralOsmani, a formerCabinet Minister).When Bhashaniof
the 'proposed National Awami Party' requested a referendumto
allow the people to determinewhetheror not an electionshould be
held,otherpoliticiansrepliedthatthiswould lead to publicconfusion.
Meanwhile the voterslist was underpreparation,and the Government was acting on both all-partyissues. Followingpublicationof
the WhitePaper on Farakkain September,M.H. Khan heldmeetings
he then
(whichhe latertermed'futile')withthe Indian government;
wentto the UN and placed the Farakkaissue on the GeneralAssembly agenda. Zia said in Colombo that the non-alignedmovement
must protect smaller nations. PresidentSayem appealed for the
returnand rehabilitationof 'misguided youths' who crossed the
border to India followingthe coups, and newspapers regularly
printedthephotosofcorpsesof'miscreants'said to havebeen trained
and equipped by India. Zia proclaimed that 'formerfreedom
fighters'would be 'retrainedto foilexpansionistdesigns.'
September
I976
475

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Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of Arms and the Politics of Exhortation

Author(s): Robert S. Anderson

has emergedin Bangladesh between

* An earlierversionof thisarticlewas presentedas a paper at the conference

New laws were promulgated by Zia as Martial Law Regulations,

Tighteninglaw and ordermeasuresat portsand bordersenabled

It was within these unstable conditions that the probability of

27A close observerof familyplanningpractice and a memberof the National Swanlrbar

industrialworkers,and providedindustrialinvestmentsin 77 jute

Much ofthe hope forindustrialgrowthin Bangladeshdepended

Asza 1976 Yearbook,

The educationsystemwas supposedto servicethe needs ofa new

were valued at Tk 2,334.3 million while imports were valued twice as

much, Tk 5,782.8million3 (food,edible oil, cement,petroleumand

Bangladeshexperiencedone ofitsworstcycloneand floodseasons

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