Title

Author(s)

Intercultural education for the freedom from socio-political terror

Wang, Hui-yu, Terence.; .

Citation

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2012

http://hdl.handle.net/10722/173835

The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights)

and the right to use in future works.

Abstract of thesis entitled

Intercultural Education for the Freedom from

Socio-political Terror
Submitted by

Terence H.-Y. Wang

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
in August 2012

Post-9/11, terrorism is an increasingly common spectacle. Daily, its news

has become embedded into the fabric of contemporary life. But as wars fighting
terrorism fail to cease the reproduction of such extraordinary violence, what role
should education play to expand the freedom from terror? Mired in a perpetual
terrorist dialectic, how should citizens of an interdependent world be cultivated?
Particularly novel is the emergence of a pedagogical discourse that holds
education as both a cause of and cure for terrorism. Presupposing poverty a main
source of discontent and schooling a crucial vehicle to social mobility,
governments increasingly employ education to counter terrorism. Growing
numbers of terrorists are being re-educated for de-radicalization and social
reintegration. Few studies have focused on the interrelations between education
and terrorism; of those that have, the deeper theoretical questions have gone
largely unasked. Problematizing the dominant discourses of terrorism and the use
of education to combat the hearts and minds of terrorists, this thesis seeks to
ground the pedagogical expansion of the freedom from terror on a more robust
conceptual framework.
With the aim to reexamine the interrelationship between terrorism and
education, and conceptualize how the latter expands the freedom from the former,
the methodology is interdisciplinary and ultimately philosophical. Each approach
to understanding terrorism, from political economy to history to sociology, is
briefly adopted before being undermined by the next. Through such a Socratic
method, each discourse is betrayed by the exposition of internal contradictions
and conceptual inadequacies. Because the scientific method fails to address
questions concerning what terrorism is, who terrorists are, why the freedom from
terror is justifiable, and how education can expand such freedom, the use of

philosophical critique and reasoning is essential to conceptualizing pedagogical

answers to the problem of terror.
Paradoxical and insufficient, conventional discourses of terrorism and
counterterrorism fail to address the fundamental problem in such misrecognitions
and miscommunications. Found crucial to the perpetuation of the cycle of terror
are the monological formulations of absolute moral principles and the sociological
reproduction of fundamentalist attitudes and behaviors. Such a conceptual
framework implicates the recognition of terror in human interactions ranging from
the social to the political. To transform such terroristic dispositions requires
meaningful interchange between those with different mentalities and practices.
Through sharing narratives and not only criticism, interlocutors can enhance their
epistemological and moral capabilities to imagine and pursue different beings and
doings. Thus, fostering intercultural dialogue and building interdependency are
essential to cultivating the freedom from terror through pedagogical means.
From studies on homeland security to re-education programs for
captured enemy combatants, the governmental deployment of education to
counter terrorism warrants more thought and research. Reinterpreting the
discourse of terrorism provides a substantively new framework for educational
research and imperatives, particularly the cultivation of intercultural learning.
This thesis provides justification for such an intercultural education, an
emancipating process that cultivates visions of a different world, one free of
terror.

Intercultural Education for the

Freedom from Socio-political Terror
by

Terence Hui-Yu Wang

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
August 2012

To Mom

Declaration

I declare that the thesis and the research work thereof represents my own work,
except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously
included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any
other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

Signed: ______________________________________________________
Terence Hui-Yu Wang

Acknowledgements

There were many highs and lows throughout my PhD study. But each
time when the challenge seemed too overwhelming, the support and
encouragement of the following people helped me to believe, persevere, and
overcome.
I am deeply grateful to my insightful and helpful supervisors: Professor
Colin Evers for always taking an interest in and encouraging the pursuit of my
research; Professor Mark Mason for constantly supporting and believing in me,
even when I doubted myself; and Professor Li-Fang Zhang for always coming to
my aid in times of distress. A special thanks goes to Professor Shirley Grundy;
her warm, welcoming smile will always be remembered.
I would also like to thank my exceptional examiners Professor Cheng Kai
Ming, Professor Fazal Rizvi, and Professor Yusef Waghid for providing not only
their thoughtful and perceptive commentary, but also for stimulating a most
fascinating discussion.
I am also indebted to Ms. Jenny Wong for reading through my drafts so
meticulously and providing so many thoughtful commentaries and discussions.
Finally, my most heartfelt appreciation goes to my wife Christine and
children Charis and Nathaniel. Without their love and faith in me, the
accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible or as much fun.

ii

Table of Contents
Declaration

Acknowledgements

ii

Table of Contents

iii

List of Tables and Figures

vii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Chapter 1: Dawn Rising on a Different World

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Relevance and significance

1.1.1 Problematizing education and terrorism

1.1.2 Identifying the research gap

1.2 Research aims and questions

1.3 Methodology and ethics

1.3.1 Methods and scope

1.3.2 Ethical considerations

11

1.4 Organization and key concepts

13

Chapter 2: Contemporary Terrorism Discourses

2.0 Introduction

17

2.1 The political economy of terrorism

18

2.1.1 Assessing the statistical significance of terrorism

19

2.1.2 The political economy approach to terrorism research

22

2.1.2.1 Problematizing domestic and international terrorism

23

2.1.2.2 Critique of the major terrorism databases

25

2.2 Defining the contemporary discourse of terrorism

27

2.2.1 Contrasting terrorism from other military strategies

28

2.2.2 A typology of terrorism

29

2.3 Contextualizing the history of terror

31

2.3.1 Premodern revolutionary terrorism

31

2.3.2 Modern oppressive terrorism

32

2.3.3 Modern revolutionary terrorism

36

iii

2.3.3.1 Pre-WWII: The Russian Revolution

36

2.3.3.2 Post-WWII: Anti-colonial liberation movements

39

2.4 Conclusion

42

Chapter 3: Globalized Terrorism

3.0 Introduction

45

3.1 The modern evolution of terrorism

46

3.1.1 Islamism, fundamentalism, and extremism

47

3.1.2 1968: Terrorism for publicity

50

3.1.3 1979: The reincarnation of religious-political extremism

51

3.1.4 1983: Anti-neocolonial suicide terrorism

54

3.1.5 1991-2001: Globalized jihadism

57

3.2 Globalized terrorism

59

3.2.1 Organization

59

3.2.2 Modus operandi

64

3.2.3 Victimization and targeting

68

3.3 Conclusion

72

Chapter 4: The Essence of Terrorism

4.0 Introduction

75

4.1 Reconsidering the essence of terrorism

76

4.1.1 Core definitional elements of terrorism

4.2 War may not be just war

77
79

4.2.1 The just war theory

80

4.2.2 International law: The UN conventions on terrorism

81

4.2.2.1 The limits of legitimacy

4.2.3 Distinguishing war from terror
4.3 The ethics of terrorism

82
83
85

4.3.1 The moral essence of terrorism

86

4.3.1.1 The deontological argument

86

4.3.1.2 The consequentialist argument

88

4.3.2 Morality in intercultural conflicts

4.3.2.1 An evolutionary theory of morality

iv

90
91

4.3.2.2 The principle of reciprocity

4.3.3 Expanding the freedom from terror

92
93

4.3.3.1 Intercultural evaluation of the morality of terrorism

93

4.3.3.2 Sharing an ethos, expanding our horizons

97

4.4 Conclusion

99

Chapter 5: Where Education Meets Socio-political Terror

5.0 Introduction

101

5.1 A socio-political theory of terrorism

102

5.1.1 Reconstructing the terrorist identity

102

5.1.2 The socio-political scale of terrorism

104

5.1.2.1 Family terrorism

105

5.1.3 The sociological roots of terrorism

108

5.1.3.1 Intergenerational transmission of violence

109

5.1.3.2 The habitus of terror: A Bourdieusian perspective

111

5.2 Education for the freedom from socio-political terror

113

5.2.1 Implications for a democratic education

114

5.2.1.1 Democratic deliberation

114

5.2.1.2 Cosmopolitanism: Cultivating moral sensitivity

117

5.2.2 Habitus for the freedom from terror

119

5.2.2.1 Perpetuation and perturbations of fundamentalism

120

5.2.2.2 Schools: A microcosm of a plural world

122

5.3 Conclusion

125

Chapter 6: Intercultural Learning in a Post-terror World

6.0 Introduction

129

6.1 Intercultural dialogue

131

6.1.1 Problematizing terrorism in a post-terror world

131

6.1.2 The limits of toleration

134

6.1.2.1 The threshold of tolerance

134

6.1.2.2 The silence of tolerance

135

6.1.3 A dialogical golden rule

138

6.2 Intercultural learning

140

6.2.1 Preserving the mosaic?

142

6.2.1.1 The politics of misrecognition

143

6.2.1.2 The value of cultural freedom

145

6.2.2 Expanding horizons

148

6.2.2.1 What is interculturalism?

149

6.2.2.2 Why share narratives?

152

6.3 Conclusion

155

Chapter 7: Envisioning a New Horizon

7.0 Introduction

160

7.1 Addressing the central arguments

160

7.1.1 What is terrorism?

160

7.1.2 Defending the freedom from terror

162

7.1.3 What does education have to do with terror?

164

7.2 Challenges and responses

166

7.2.1 Mere philosophy?

167

7.2.2 The relativity-universality dispute

169

7.2.3 Watering-down the notion of terrorism?

171

7.3 Conclusion: A new horizon?

173

7.3.1 Implications for education

174

7.3.2 Dawning on a new horizon

177

Tables and Figures

180

References

198

vi

List of Tables and Figures

List of Tables
Table 2.1.1

Comparison of the Major Terrorism Databases

186

Table 2.2.1

Comparison of Terrorism, Guerilla Warfare, and

Conventional Warfare

187

Table 2.2.2

A Typology of Terrorism

188

Table 3.3.1

Comparison of Terrorism Practices from Premodernity to

Postmodernity

191

Table 4.1.1

The Seven Core Definitional Elements of Terrorism

195

Table 4.1.2

UN Legal Conventions on Terrorism

196

List of Figures
Figure 1.4.1

A Roadmap of the Thesis

Figure 2.1.1

International Terrorism Incidents 1968 2004 (USDOS) 181

Figure 2.1.2

International Terrorism Incidents 1968 2006 (RWTID) 181

Figure 2.1.3

International Terrorism Incidents 1985 2004 (USDOS) 182

Figure 2.1.4

International Terrorism Incidents 1985 2006 (RWTID) 182

Figure 2.1.5

Fatalities from International Terrorism 1968 2004

(USDOS)

vii

180

183

Figure 2.1.6

Fatalities from International Terrorism 1968 2006

(RWTID)

183

Figure 2.1.7

Injuries from International Terrorism 1968 2004

(USDOS)

184

Figure 2.1.8

Injuries from International Terrorism 1968 2006

(RWTID)

184

Figure 2.1.9

International Terrorism Incidents, Fatalities, and Injuries 185

1968 2004(USDOS)

Figure 2.1.10

International Terrorism Incidents, Fatalities, and Injuries 185

1968 2006 (RWTID)

Figure 3.1.1

A Conceptual Framework of Fundamentalism and

Extremism

189

Figure 3.2.1

Annual Incidents of Worldwide Suicide Attacks by

Decade

190

Figure 3.2.2

Incidents of Suicide Attacks Worldwide 2001 2005

190

Figure 3.3.1

A Historical Taxonomy of Terrorism

192

Figure 4.1.1

Frequency of Definitional Elements of Terrorism

193

Figure 4.1.2

Core Definitional Elements of Terrorism

194

Figure 4.3.1

Walzers Moral Scale of Assassinability

196

Figure 5.1.1

The Socio-political Scale of Terrorism

197

Figure 6.1.2

The Magnetization of Magnetic Domains

197

Figure 6.2.1

The Importance of Reflexivity

197

viii

List of Abbreviations
ANC

African National Congress

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

ETM

Evolutionary Theory of Morality

FLN

National Liberation Front

GWOT

Global War on Terrorism

IMRO

International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization

IRA

Irish Republican Army

ITERATE

International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events

JWT

Just War Theory

LET

Legal Essence of Terrorism

LTTE

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MET

Methodological Essence of Terrorism

MIPT

National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

MNC

Multinational Corporation

MOT

Moral Essence of Terrorism

NCTC

National Counterterrorism Center

NGO

Non-governmental Organization

PEA

Political Economy Approach

PFLP

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization

POR

Principle of Reciprocity

RAND

Research and Development Corporation

ix

RWTID

RAND Corporation Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database

UN

United Nations

UNODC

United Nations Office on Drug and Crime

UK

United Kingdom

US

United States of America

USDOS

United States Department of State

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WWI

The First World War

WWII

The Second World War

CHAPTER 1
DAWN RISING ON A DIFFERENT WORLD

Fear is the main source of superstition, and one of the main sources of
cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the pursuit of
truth as in the endeavour after a worthy manner of life (Russell, 2009,
p. 103).

1.0 Introduction
Terrorism is the weapon of the terrified. It is founded on the
fundamentalist beliefs that justify extremist acts of coercive violence. If a life
lived under terror is not worth living, then the pursuit of wisdom both
epistemological (of knowing what one does not know) and practical (of
moderation), may be an essential pedagogical endeavor. This thesis argues that an
education that emphasizes mutual learning across cultures may substantively
cultivate a dialogical understanding of our moralities and histories, indeed, of our
very hermeneutics of the world itself. Becoming aware of the tentativeness of our
knowledge and appreciative of the necessary contribution of others towards
developing our freedom as moral beings may be the least paradoxical remedy to
our terrorist condition. In other words, through intercultural learning we can
expand our freedom from terror by softening the fundamentalism that lays the
groundwork of such extremist waysways that violate the norms of others
without regard to their vantage points.
In a world where our primal fears are constantly exploited by others to
control our decisionsfrom consumption to politicsthere is growing
desensitivity and criticism towards these methods. In such a post-terror world,
we all claim to combat terrorists in our own ways: some with guns, others with
money, and some still with books. This thesis investigates what terrorism is and
how it can be mitigated in a non-paradoxical way. Found particularly crucial is
the role of education in the perpetuation and mitigation of the terrorist condition.
Towards the vision of new horizons free of terror, this first chapter maps out the
entire thesis by: first, highlighting the pertinence of the issue of terrorism in our
present moment and problematizing its interrelations with counter-terrorist uses
of education; second, articulating the purpose of and questions asked in this
project; third, establishing the approaches taken towards responding to this
enquiry and the clarification of any ethical concerns about the research method;
and lastly, tracing the rationale behind the organization of this thesis, as well as
defining its conceptual scope.
1

1.1 Relevance and significance

The attacks on the symbolic capitals of America on the morning of
September 11, 2001, shocked and shook the world in what Habermas calls the
first ever historic world event (Borradori, 2003, p. 28).1 As cataclysmic as the
quantitative consequences of the attacks were in terms of lives and economic
lossesnearly 3,000 casualties and over $80 billion USD in damagesone
cannot help but recognize a problem deeper and impact more profound than what
only the numbers reveal (Enders & Sandler, 2006). As Held (2006) points out,
the world after 9/11 is extraordinarily different:

Fundamentalism is on the rise and not just Islam. The incidents of political
violence and terrorist acts have increased across the world. Far from being at the
end of history, we could be at the start of another beginning (p. 224).

Given the escalating reciprocation of terror, the focus on terrorism in politics,

academia, and the media has intensified post-9/11, not only in the US but
internationally. Night did indeed fall on a different world on September 11 (Bush,
2001); however, dawn brings a new horizon. This thesis critically rethinks the
dominant discourses of terrorism to envision a different world, one free of terror.
The importance of studying terrorism transcends that of expanding
national security, or defending economic development, or seeking the
destruction of the enemies of freedom. Terrorism research is of greater
significance than predicting its future patterns or finding the most efficient
instruments of counterterrorism. At the heart of the problem of terror is the
concept itself: as misunderstandings fuel the miscommunication between
misrecognized peoples (Sen, 2006). The conception of and consequent responses
toward terrorism warrant much reflective criticism. As Giroux (2006) notes:

The emergence of the spectacle of terrorism as a new form of public pedagogy raises
serious questions about how fear and anxiety can be marketed, how terrorism can be
used to recruit people in support of authoritarian causes, how it is being produced in
a vast array of pedagogical sites created by the new media, how the state uses
mediated images of violence to justify its monopoly of power over the means of
coercion, and how the spectacle of terrorism works in an age of enormous injustices,
deep insecurities, disembodied social relations, fragmented communities, and a
growing militarization of everyday life (p. 12).

Throughout this thesis, double quotation marks will be reserved solely for direct quotes while
single quotation marks will be used to highlight the meaning of the word itself. Special emphasis
and words that are not common to the English language will be italicized.

Deconstructing the concept of terrorism can ease the paradoxical tensions between
the terrorist and the counterterrorist. After all, any superficial interpretation
and fearful overreaction can in fact serve to perpetuate a mutual cycle of terrorist
feedback rather than its mitigation. To fight something one must first
understand what it is; gaining a critical understanding of terrorism is thus of
particular pertinence in our post-terror world.

1.1.1 Problematizing education and terrorism

In the global discourse of the war on terror, education is increasingly
pertinent. The interrelations between terrorism and education are one of the focal
points and addressed throughout the last half of this thesis. Here, I will only
problematize the dominant discourse connecting education and terrorism: the
political economy approach to development. Growing numbers of governmental
and academic voices are insisting that the solution to terrorism is to be found in
economic development. In this dominant discourse, education is the cause and
cure of terrorism because schooling is the primary vehicle to social mobility and
economic development. Drawing on the intergenerational model of poverty, the
poor children of uneducated parents grow to become the anti-social, disenchanted
youths who are the ideal recruits of terrorists. The rationale is that once those
trapped in the poverty cycle can become educated, employed, prosperous, and
hence, developed, they will forsake their terrorist ways and embrace that of the
citizen. Many adhere to this discourse: From the republican President George W.
Bush to democrat Vice President Al Gore (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003); from the
Commander of the War in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal (Evans,
2009) to Pulitzer-Prize-winning journalist Thomas Friedman (2009); the provision
of education and employment opportunities would effectively eradicate the
preconditions for terrorism. Beyond America, multinational organizations like the
World Bank (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003) and the United Nations concur that
development is the most effective strategy (Human Development Report,
2005, p. 168) in preventing political conflict. And in academia, macroeconomists
like Jean-Paul Azam, for example, call for more educational aid to reduce
terrorism on the donor state (Azam & Thelen, 2008).2 In this dominant view,
educational development is central to the roots of terrorism (Burgoon 2006;
Johnson, 2003; Sosis & Alcorta 2008).
2

According to Azam and Delacroix (2006), this relationship is statistically significant, as the
amount of aid received by the source country directly decreases the number of terrorist attacks
originating from it (p. 331). However, from a microeconomics perspective, Krueger and
Maleckova (2003) provide a Robin Hood model of terrorism: that higher educational attainment
and greater wealth actually increases the participation rate in terrorism. Finding suicide bombers
tending to be more educated, younger and wealthier that the general population, they agree with
Laqueur (2003) that to remedy terrorism requires more sophisticated solutions than just increasing
wealth and employment in poor countries. As Kofi Annan, secretary general of the United
Nations, put it: The poor of this world suffer enough; one should not in addition brand them as
potential terrorists (Laqueur, 2003, p. 18). Nevertheless, the macroeconomic argument is the
more common account advocated by policy-makers.

Based on the view that terrorism will decline with economic growth, more
governments are trying to combat terrorism through soft power. While
conventional counterterrorism entails hard measures that enhance security and
proactively attack terrorists, their assets, and their supporters (Enders & Sandler,
2006), soft counterterrorism involves combating the hearts and minds of
terrorists through the provision of education and aid (Chertoff, 2008). In fact,
various governments have been implementing re-education programs to deradicalize and re-integrate terrorists. Too dangerous to be released and too
controversial to be executed or detained without trial, captured terrorists pose a
delicate problem for governments. With many of those detained in Guantanamo
Bay being Saudis, the Saudi government initiated an educational program in 2003
to: (1) deter potential participation in terrorism, (2) rehabilitate terrorist detainees,
(3) reintegrate them back into society, and (4) prevent the re-educated from
recidivism (Boucek, 2008). First, psychotherapy is employed to de-radicalize
detainees of their extremist beliefs and violent behaviors. They then attend
religious classes that teach the state-endorsed version of Islam: Wahhabism,
which emphasizes loyalty, honor, recognition of authority, and obedience to
leadership. Once extremism is renounced and orthodoxy embraced, these reeducated detainees are then reintegrated by being subjected to a powerful set of
socioeconomic incentives. Early release, a car, a home, employment, and even
marriage subsidies are offered (60 Minutes, 2009). State surveillance of the reeducated continues thereafter, ready to deal out punishment should they show
signs of recidivism. Socio-cultural forces like honor, familial hierarchies, and
social traditions are also harnessed to keep those released inline. The Saudi
program has become the de facto model for a growing list of states including:
the US, UK, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia
(Boucek, 2008, pp. 64, 68).3
Founded on the dominant discourse, such emergent uses of education truly
are novel developments in counterterrorism. However, there are areas of concern:
First, the scientific approach to terrorism and counterterrorism presupposes that
terrorist incidents and their identities can be easily and objectively recognized free

The Saudi program is particularly pertinent as it is gaining international esteem and increasingly
modeled by other governments in Asia, Europe, and North America (Boucek, 2008). Not only are
terrorist detainees deprogrammed through Religious Rehabilitation Groups in Singapore
(Dobson, 2009), according to Major General Douglas Stone, the commander of the US detention
facilities in Iraq, the American military has introduced a religious enlightenment education
program in 2007 for Iraq detainees (Pincus, 2007). Enlisting the help of moderate Muslim clerics,
the religious courses aim to bend them [Iraqi detainees] back to our will by waging war on the
battlefield of the mind against the ideology of al-Qaeda (Pincus, 2007). Given the apparent
effectiveness of the American program with curbing the recidivism of Iraqi detainees, General
Stanley McChrystal fully supported attempts to reintegrate Taleban members into the rest of the
population in Afghanistan (Evans, 2009). And in the UK, Members of Parliament have initiated
discussions on a reintegration programme to find a way out of violence for Afghans who had
joined the Taliban to find a way for them to return to civilian life (Norton-Taylor, 2010).

of the values of the scientist.4 But who has made the right exegesis and by what
authority are such interpretations binding upon others? After all, disregarding the
norms of others marks the essence of terrorisms atrocity. Second, because the
recognition of terrorism and terrorists warrants more scrutiny, the practice of
indoctrinating terrorists with state orthodoxy appears paradoxically problematic.
The crucial role of education in the cultivation of terrorists is justly highlighted;
but what is often taken for granted is the consideration of what education and its
purpose are. To impose ones hermeneutics upon others is to fight terror with
terror, dogma with dogma; doing so merely perpetuates the cycle of physical and
symbolic violence. The point is, despite the objective veneer of scientific
approaches to terrorism and its pedagogical remedy, such a discourse is riddled
with controversy and inconsistency upon deeper scrutiny.
The critical
examination of the dominant discourse and re-education programs thus raises
questions of what terrorism and education are, and how can the latter be
conceptualized to mitigate, rather than perpetuate, the former.

1.1.2 Identifying the research gap

Fundamental to the debate over the interrelations between education and
terrorism is not only the issue of what terrorism entails, but also what constitutes
as education. What is education and what is its purpose? Is it a tool for social
reproduction, a force for social change, or both? Where does the equilibrium lie
and where should it lie? Even while these questions are being raised and
discussed, an entire international industry of homeland security has developed
from the dominant discourse of counter-terrorist education (Nelles, 2003, p. 12).
Yes, terrorism is an urgent problem that requires swift action, but there is a danger
that ones presumptuous reactions may in fact fuel the cycle of terror. Without
substantive understanding of what terrorism is, who terrorists are, and how
education reproduces or transforms terroristic dispositions, the deployment of
education to counter terrorism may be a dangerous idea that warrants more
thought and research.
Reviewing the literature suggests that the dominant discourse of education
and political violence focuses on post-conflict redevelopment in conflict zones,
where education is an essential element in reconstruction or aid programs to help
create long-term security and stability in new or reformed states (Nelles, 2003, p.
14). And of those rare studies that do focus on education and terrorism, the
approach is predominantly political economic, as argued above. As Nelles (2003)
points out, while there are many different accounts of the roots of terror, formal
education and social learning processes that lead to terrorism... are an explanatory
subset not well studied (p. 12).

Refuting the fact-value dichotomy, Putnam (2002) points out that evaluation and description are
interwoven and interdependent (p. 3).

The implications for understanding education and terrorism relationships have not
been well researched. Study of educations role in violent conflict has been limited,
and not well integrated in human security literature (Nelles, 2003, p. 13).

This thesis seeks to address the fundamental questions underlying the

interrelations between education and terrorism by focusing on how the former can
expand the freedom from the latter. Fostering intercultural dialogue, building
interdependency, fusing horizons, and affecting the very sociological processes
that shape our mental and behavioral dispositions, are all fundamental to
cultivating the freedom from terror through pedagogical means.
After all, if doctors should be consulted for medical diagnoses and
treatments, and lawyers for legal advice and lawsuits, then perhaps educators can
contribute to pedagogical projectsparticularly their purpose, design, and
assessment. Educators should surely be consulted for critical analyses on issues
pertaining to the theory and practice of education. In using education to counter
terror, what may be more important than the amount of education delivered (as
often as such indicators appear in the focus of studies) are the quality and content
of the education, both formal and informal. In many nation-states, and
particularly in counter-terrorist re-education programs, youth are being socialized
(often without their awareness, consent, or choice) into instrumental citizens
patriotic to their imagined community. Such citizens are trained with an arsenal
of knowledge and skills useful in international economic competition. By
problematizing this evident yet profound interrelationship, new areas worthy of
investigationnot only by economists and political scientists, but also by
educators, social scientists, philosophers, and other specialistsare revealed.
Given such complex and problematic issues, this thesis challenges the dominant
discourse and ultimately reconstructs the interrelations between education and
terrorism. In short, studying education and terrorism is extremely relevant not
only to the development of pragmatic responses to counter terrorists, but also to
critically reconsider the discourse itself. Reconceptualizing terrorism holds
significant implications for its mitigation, which I hold in this thesis to be
justifiable and sustainable by socially emancipative processes such as education.
The aim of this thesis is thus to impact and alter the future conceptions and
responses to terrorism by changing how it is thought, taught, and perpetuated.

1.2 Research aims and questions

The public discourse of terrorism trickles down into the private
preoccupation with the xenophobic fear of terrorists. The domination of the
global media both formulates and perpetuates the current conceptions of

terrorism, its discourse influencing the pragmatic responses military, political,

legal, and economic. The general tendency in the field of terrorism research in
recent decades has been to constrict its definition, arguing for a more pragmatic
and objective approach. But with most political definitions externalizing the roots
of terror upon the otherpredominately Islamistsscrutiny of the concept of
terrorism itself is often neglected. As the dominant discourse is reverberated in
the developed world through publications, the media, and the internet, the
voiceless poor are stigmatized as terrorists in-the-making. New generations of
global Northerners are offered a view of terrorism as a problem caused by those
poor, uneducated, young men over there. However, the causes and cures of our
most salient problems in todays globalized world are rarely isolated but require
the contributions of many people transcending arbitrary borders.
The
presupposition that what one does locally has nothing to do with what goes on
globally needs to be demystified in our interconnected and interdependent world
(Beck, 2000). Consequently, this thesis thus has the central aims of:
(1) Framing and challenging the dominant discourse of terrorism in
international politics, academia, and the media.
(2) Rethinking terrorism to formulate a more robust sociological theory for the
role of education in affecting terroristic dispositions both cognitive and
behavioral.
(3) Conceptualizing a more sustainable and nonparadoxical methodology for
the mitigation of terroristic fundmentalities and behaviors through
education.
(4) Articulating some key pedagogical concepts that could assist in expanding
the freedom from terror.
To put it succinctly, the ultimate aim of this thesis is to consider educative
philosophies and practices that facilitate the sustainable mitigation of terrorism by
aiming to expand the freedom from terror in our post-terror world.
The aim of this thesis correlates with that of human security. The
concept of human security is founded upon a normative framework of human
rights and ethics as applied to international politics. And within the general
principles of human security is what the Human Development Reports articulate
as the freedom from fear, which is a major if not central theme behind the
human security discourse:

[To envision a] humane world where people can live in security and dignity.... In
such a world, every individual would be guaranteed freedom from fear and freedom
from want, with equal opportunity to develop fully their human potential. Building
human security is essential to achieving this goal. In essence, human security means
freedom from pervasive threats to peoples rights, their safety or even their lives.
Human Security has become both a new measure of global security and a new
agenda for global action. Safety is the hallmark of freedom from fear, while well-

being is the target of freedom from want. Human security and human development
are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive
environment for each other (Volleback, 1999).

While sharing similar ends, the means for pursuing human security in this thesis is
unlike the more political economic approaches of the UN or Human Security
Network. The freedom from fear is considered here more philosophically,
focusing on the controversial concept of terrorism: how it can be understood and
addressed. In terms of recognizing the pervasiveness of terroristic violence and
the human right to live in security and thus, decency, education (in the broadest
sense of the word) is taken to be central. If the purpose behind the aims to end
poverty and increase the provision of aid can be more broadly understood as for
the enhancement of the freedom of individuals to make life choices they find
reason to value, then education can play a pivotal role in developing freedom,
including that from terror (Sen, 1999). After all, terrorism is one form of violence
that oppresses by limiting the autonomy of the coerced, leading to human
insecurity and the violation of the right to be free from terror. In short, the
purpose of this thesis is to enhance the possibility of the freedom from fear
through educative means by rethinking the interrelationships between terrorism
and education.
For this purpose, the thesis asks and addresses the following questions:
(1) In conventional terms, what is the significance and relevance of terrorism?
How is the research of terrorism commonly approached? And what are the
advantages and limitations of such approaches?
(2) Within the dominant discourse, how has terrorism evolved and how does its
history contextualize the emergence of the contemporary phenomenon? In
general, how is terrorism currently conceptualized?
(3) What are the fundamental essences of the concept of terrorism and how do
they affect the understanding of its methodology, legality and morality?
How might a more transculturally coherent ethical framework of terrorism
be constructed?
(4) What are the conceptual implications extending from such a reconstruction
of terrorism? From a broader socio-political framework, how are terroristic
dispositionsboth cognitive and behavioralreproduced and what is the
role of education in such reproduction?
(5) Is the use of education as a soft counterterrorist tactic problematic to the
reproduction of terror? How can education be conceptualized to be
conducive to not only social reproduction but also to social change? What
are the implications for rethinking educational theory and practice for the
expansion of the freedom from terror?
(6) What pedagogical discourses are central to resolving the miscommunication
and misrecognition across cultures? How can educational principles and
8

philosophies promoting intercultural dialogue enhance the freedom from the

reciprocation and reproduction of terror?
No one person may possess the answers to all these questions (nor should one be
believed if so claimed), but humanity would most definitely be more
impoverished if such questions go unasked or, worse, asked without substantive
hope for change. Towards expanding the freedom from terror, this thesis perhaps
raises more questions than provides answers. But the hope is that at least it will
elicit the vision of a new dawn.

1.3 Methodology and ethics

Because this thesis aims to critically examine the interrelationship between
the essence of terrorism and education, and the potential mitigation of the former
by the latter, the methodology is necessarily interdisciplinary and philosophical:
drawing on political science, history, sociology, ethics, epistemology, and
educational philosophy. Like education, terrorism is an innately interdisciplinary
subject, its discourse having been dominated by contributions from scholars and
researchers from the fields of political science (Schmid & Jongman, 2005;
Laqueur, 2003; Hoffman, 2006), political economy (Pape, 2003; Enders &
Sandler, 2006), history (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Ternon, 2007), psychology
(Robins & Post, 1997; Merari, 2007), and international lawparticularly the just
war theory (Walzer, 2004). Needless to say, there are significant tensions
between the various disciplinary frameworks of terrorism, all of which have
pertinent consequences for counterterrorism. But by working within and
deconstructing the dominant discourses of terrorism, it can be conceptualized with
greater clarity. By rethinking the role of education in the mitigation of terrorism,
the conventional narratives can be challenged and at the same time elucidated. In
this section, then, I will first justify such a Socratic method that reveals internal
contradictions before taking up ethical issues pertinent to this piece of research.

1.3.1 Methods and scope

Finding that most research on terrorism and education have neglected to
ask deeper questions about the dominant discourse, usually citing pragmatic
reasons, this thesis investigates the understanding and rationale concerning the
role of education in terroristic reproduction and mitigation. As such, it needs to
use a philosophical method, by which I mean the use of logic and reason that
transcends mere conjecture or dogma but lays down the framework for examining
the evidence. Philosophy is understood here as what Russell (2009) calls the
pursuit of wisdom, that is, a reasoned mode of moderate examination that moves
as far away as possible from both the omnipotence of absolute certainty and the

debilitation of radical skepticism.5 A philosophical approach, one that looks

beyond what science can tell us but based on reason than mere conjecture, is
warranted when approaching the issue of terrorism and educationespecially
when both are ambiguous and interdisciplinary. The intent here is not to theorize
simply for the sake of being theoretical; but rather, the methodology underlying
the deconstruction of the essences of terrorism and education are essentially
philosophical endeavors that cannot be adequately addressed empirically. After
all, as I will argue more fully in Chapter 2, the political economic analysis of
terrorism presupposes that one already knows who the terrorists are. Mathematics
may model natural phenomena particularly well, but relatively less so when it
comes to the behaviors and mentalities of people.6 Economics is but one set of
rational forces acting on people. Cultureincluding notions of justicealso
affects our moral decisions and actions.7 In short, because acts of terror are
justified according to reasons that are uncompromisable, thinking critically about
those knowledge and rationales that are held fundamentally, including terrorism
and its pedagogical counters, is of utmost importance. And doing so is to take a
philosophical stance towards the scientific accounts of a non-scientific subject
matter.
One may wonder whether education shares any conceptual connections
with terrorism. While this thesis holds that it does, and in a profound manner, this
assertion can only be defended by thinking critically about the essences of
terrorism and education. Particularly pertinent to the methodology of this thesis
then are the sociological and ethical theories that challenge the dominance of the
discourse of globalized terrorism and the pedagogical cultivation of liberal
notions of tolerance.8 The sociological basis is crucial in conceptualizing the
interrelationship between terrorism (as the manifestations of terroristic
dispositions in cognition and behavior) and education (as the formal and informal
social processes that both reproduce and change individual dispositions). Given
that education can serve as both a mode of domination and emancipation, it is the
crux to the perpetuation and mitigation of terroristic dispositions. And like
terrorism, the concept of education itself is highly political given its various
pedagogical visions of the ideal citizen and the good life. To think critically
5

Hence, I see science as an applied philosophy of an empirical method, but one that, nevertheless,
is founded on certain reasons and values that are not themselves particularly scientific.
6
As Emanuel Derman puts it, when imposing human beings into economic models, we are
trying to force the ugly stepsisters foot into Cinderellas pretty glass slipper. It doesnt fit without
cutting off some of the essential parts (Malkiel, 2011).
7
As Ariely (2010) concludes from his experiments, social norms can lead to behaviors extraneous
to, perhaps even counter to, those presupposed by the rational choice model. For example, in one
of his experiments, students passing by different booths on campus were found to take about three
times less candy per person on average when they were offered for free than when the candy were
charged at a penny a piece.
8
Globalized terrorism is the contemporary understanding of terrorism as a practice novel in
terms of its organization, modus operandi, and selection of victims. As the dominant discourse of
terrorism, it is constructed in Chapter 3; the liberal principle of toleration will be evaluated in
Chapter 6.

10

about the dominant discourses of contemporary education (such as nationalism

and neoliberalism) is thus warranted in order to assess how such approaches are
conducive to sustainable human development and security. Because human
development entails not only economic growth but also the capability to develop
and exercise freedom in substantive ways meaningful to people, imagining an
education that is conducive to the development of the freedom from terror is of
utmost importance in our post-terror world (Sen, 1999). The purpose and role of
education needs to be re-examined. Challenging the dominant discourses of
neoliberalism and nationalism pervading the administration of formal education
then is important: to reveal any contradictions and inadequacies of these
discourses of education and to illuminate different philosophical approaches to
education that may be more conducive to the freedom from terror.
Because the methodology of this thesis is essentially interdisciplinary and
philosophical, its scope is centered on critical arguments that challenge the
governing conceptions that define the prevalent discourses of terrorism and
education. In other words, this project can hopefully change, through the Socratic
method, the preconceptions that have largely been taken-for-granted within the
dominant discourse. With the theoretical link between terroristic dispositions and
education both novel and controversial, the sociological role of educationas
formal and informal modes of teaching and learning that underlie both the
reproduction and mitigation of terroristic behaviorsis thus a major conceptual
focus. The potentialities held by this thesis, then, stems from the recognition of
the common misrecognition of terrorism in interactions from the social to the
political. This reinterpretation holds new imperatives for education in terms of its
practice and purpose. And although only theoretical principles are defined and
defended, through the consideration and debates raised among politicians,
researchers, and educators this thesis can indirectly influence changes that will
bring about a new dawn free of terror.

1.3.2 Ethical considerations

Because no piece of research, however theoretical, is not infused with
observations that are taken from a particular perspective (Putnam, 2002), every
account (especially on an issue as controversial as terrorism) is a hermeneutical
act from somewhere. Without claiming a view from nowhere or everywhere, my
particular stance should be made explicit; doing so is justifiable ethically. After
all, in the interpretation of any speech act, understanding the authorial intention is
of utmost importance (Skinner, 2002). Thus, in the remainder of this section, I
will focus on three ethical issues pertaining to the reading of this thesis: First is a
brief explication of the moral motivation underlying this thesis. Second is a
clarification of the ethical concerns in regards to the research process. Third is a
succinct contextualization of my hermeneutical stancenamely, my particular
history and views that may bias this thesis.
11

Just as moral concerns are fundamental to the motivation of terrorism and

education, so it is with this thesis. Based on a Kantian notion of humanity, my
thesis presumes that all peoplesirrespective of class, gender, culture,
nationality, ethnicity, age, (dis)abilityhave the same dignity as free beings for
their capacities for moral reasoning. And because such capabilities for the
autonomous exercise of will can be hindered through terroristic forces both
symbolic and physical, each and every persons development should be
cultivatedeven if it requires challenging the dominant discourse. As Sen (2010)
argues, freedom is valuable both as a means and as an end-in-itself. Therefore,
the freedom from terror is not only a moral goal, but coercion should be
minimized in the decision-making processes of moral agents. More specifically, in
terms of the research process, the data in the form of the political commentary,
publications, and statistics are all freely accessible to the public, either through
government websites, media sources, the internet, or research publications.
However, it is important to note that the selection and critique of these sources are
necessarily refracted by my lenses that have formed over the course of my
experiences. Elaborating on my experiences (however brief) helps to situate my
frame of reference. After all, the context of the researcher in such a hermeneutical
project may be as important as the interpretation itself.
Embedded in this critique of discourse, then, is also a struggle against
surrendering to my personal biases (against market fundamentalism, oppression,
discrimination, and other unfreedoms) that keep me from providing a more
balanced analysis (Greenbank, 2003). My interest in this research topic, the
methodology, and selection and interpretation of the evidence, are all imbued with
my subjective experiences and values (May, 2001). While such partialities are
unavoidable, owed to the reader is the provision of some authorial context for the
interpretation of this thesis. After all the recognition of researcher reflexivity is
important morally and hermeneutically. If authors are obligated to write
understandably, then being open about their inescapable conditions at least
attempts to fulfill this obligation. Born and raised in Vancouver, BC, I
experienced much freedom both politically and socially. And having lived in
Hong Kong for substantial periods, I also experienced life in the hustle bustle of
an economic centre.9 Pointing out my upbringing helps to locate my perspective.
After all, during my confirmation seminar conducted in February 2010, I was
criticized by one examiner for taking an American view of terrorism, a
presumption derived from my negative view of Mao. While walking with
Shirley Grundy (my then supervisor) back to our offices, I commented that
actually, if you read my thesis carefully, I step on everybodys toesnot just of
the Chinese, but also the American governments (among others). In fact, my
charge is that we may all have deliberately or unwittingly experienced and
9

I have spent approximately 12 years in total living in Hong Kong thus far, most of it as a teacher
and PhD student. A little more detail about some of my experiences during the thesis-writing
process has been provided in the preface.

12

exercised terrorist tactics in our socio-political contexts. Perhaps knowing a little

about my identity and history helps in the reading of my account of what terrorism
is and who are the terrorists.

1.4 Organization and key concepts

In the course of this thesis, I will raise and discuss some fundamental
questions pertaining to terrorism and education, the focus gradually shifting from
the former to the latter with the chapters. With the primary concern focusing on
what terrorism is and how education should be to mitigate the former, the
methodology involves examining conceptual contradictions and redrawing preestablished distinctions. Re-examining the dominant discourse of terrorism
necessarily raises some philosophical issues concerning definitions, normativity,
morality, and epistemology. But because studying how things are helps to
explain how they ought to be, this thesis initially adopts a more or less
conventional approach in accord with the dominant discourse (Wolff, 2006, p.
3). As the thesis progresses, the chapters not only outline a chain of arguments,
but also embody my disenchantments with those arguments. Reflective of my
learning process during the formulation of this thesis, each chapter leads to a
subsequent tentative position. In this section, I will provide a roadmap of the path
that this thesis takes as well as highlight some of the key concepts particularly
pertinent to its understanding.10
Towards the aim of expanding the freedom from terror, this thesis
conceptualizes whether and how education can be a site for meaningful and
sustainable responses to terrorism. For this purpose, the task at hand is to first
enquire into the traditional understanding of terrorism and its distinction from
other acts of violence, before critically reflecting on how the habitus of terrorists
are affected by education.11 This thesis can be roughly considered in two halves:
the first constructs the contemporary discourse of terror as globalized terrorism
and its discontents, and the last formulates a theoretical account for how
intercultural education may expand the freedom from socio-political terror.
Excluding the introductory and concluding chapters, the two parts are organized
into five chapters of comparable length: Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the discourse
of globalized terrorism, Chapter 4 on deconstructing the dominant discourse, and
Chapters 5 and 6 on developing a sociological theory that accounts for how
intercultural education may be conducive to the mitigation of terror. Each chapter
both builds upon and yet betrays the concepts in previous chapters: sometimes by
arguing against it, at other times by transcending it. But always unabandoned is
the endeavor to envision new horizons free of terror.
10

See Figure 1.4.1 for an outline of the central enquiry pursued in this thesis.
Habitus is defined by Bourdieu (1979) as a system of durable, transposable dispositions both
mental (doxa) and physical (practice) (p. vii).
11

13

To have meaningful discussion on terrorism first requires the controversial

task of defining it. Such is the theme underlying the second and third chapters,
Contemporary Terrorism Discourses and Globalized Terrorism respectively,
and the entire thesis. Although the political economic approach to terrorism is
particularly influential and offers a convenient entry point, its critique reveals
arbitrary limitations that leave the statistical analysis of terrorism in want. And
while historical analyses may contextualize the evolution of terrorist practices,
historical approaches are constrained by the historians conception of terrorism.
Deconstructing the history of terrorism is thus enlightening: not only in providing
a genealogical account of the phenomenon but in revealing its current discourse.
Etymologically derived from the Reign of Terror during the 18th century French
Revolution, one current definition of terrorism is particularly influential. Used by
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is Schmid and Jongmans (2005)
definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by

(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or
political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threatand violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization),
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily
sought (p. 28).

This academic consensus definition has been proposed to the UN; and despite
not being formally adopted, it is one of the more widely acknowledged stances on
terrorism currently in international politics (Definitions of Terrorism, 2007).
Moreover, Schmid and Jongmans (2005) definition is widely referenced by
academics and politicians touching on the subject. Such a notion of terrorism,
then, forms the basis for the initial chapters of this thesis, allowing for the
construction of a typology of terrorism that ranges from the interstate, oppressive,
revolutionary, to globalized forms. The construction of globalized terrorism as
the contemporary discourse forms the basis for its critique in Chapter 4.
Crucial to the two halves of this thesis is the fourth chapter, entitled The
Essence of Terrorism. By deconstructing the discourse of globalized terrorism,
this chapter reconstructs the core elements of terrorism into methodological, legal,
and moral essences. Doing so allows the clarification of a number of crucial
complications: First, the terrorist practice can be more objectively described
while separated from the common ethical controversy. Second, the legal
distinction between the justifiability of war versus the indefensibility of
14

terrorism can be challenged. Third, an evolutionary theory of morality (ETM)

can lend itself to clarifying moral evaluations of terroristic violence between
people with different ethical norms. Thus, the common presuppositions that
terrorism is somehow more condemnable than war and that counterterrorism must
necessarily be just (given the culpability of what is countered) are challenged.
Here, the normative reach of liberal principles of human rights and tolerance may
be particularly pertinent pedagogical aims: Expanding a shared ethos of
reciprocity may provide a consistent diagnosis, and hence coherent response, to
both the just use of force in war and the unjust use of violence in terrorism.
Democratic and human rights education thus becomes an imperative means to
enhancing a shared, intercultural ethos that can at least coherently recognize
terroristic violence and its paradoxical counters.
Reconstructing the essence of terrorism has further conceptual
implications: namely that terroristic mentalities and behaviors may be more
deeply and widely embedded across many socio-political contexts. Taken up in
the fifth chapter Where Education Meets Socio-political Terror is the
formulation of a socio-political theory of terrorism and a sociological framework
that more firmly places education in a non-paradoxical role in the perpetuation of
such terror. Stripped of the conventions that (often for the sake of practicality)
absolutize a particular exegesis of terror, terrorism re-examined can be found in a
much wider scope of human interactions from the social to the political. From
family terrorism to globalized terrorism, terror is less alien and externalized,
implicating a need for greater self-criticism and reflection on the social
reproduction of terror.
Social and political, education is both a force for both reproduction and
change in dispositions, terroristic or otherwise. Intercultural learning experiences
is defended as providing conditions conducive to emancipative transformations of
our fundamentalities, whereas education that merely serves as training entails
the reproduction of traditional beliefs and practices of those in power. In other
words, education denotes the (formal and informal) processes of learning and
trainingwith the former enhancing the capability to consciously evolve ones
mentality and behavior. As processes of teaching and learning both formal and
informal, education is political because it is purposed, designed, implemented, and
monopolized by the authorities. At the same time education is sociological
because it is a process by which dispositions are reproduced and capital
transferred (Grenfell, 2007). As coercive methods of physical and symbolic
violence, socio-political terror is inculcated through terroristic habitus. In other
words, the politics of terror is socially reproduced through dispositions of
fundamentalist doxa and extremist practices. With ones doxa inviolable, it
becomes the touchstone for the hermeneutics of all else and the justification for
the extremism of terrorists. Education, then, can perpetuate and undermine such

15

habitus. Therefore, the purpose and constitution of education are fundamental

questions that warrant consideration.
Probing further into the reconstructed essence of terrorism reveals,
however, that there lingers discontent with any fundamentalismincluding that of
the principle of toleration in multicultural societies. After problematizing the
muting effect that the threshold of tolerance may hold for intercultural dialogue,
Chapter 6 Intercultural Learning in a Post-terror World, focuses on:
(1) clarifying the moral ambiguities in our post-terror world by defending a
dialogical formulation of the golden rule and
(2) expanding the freedom from terror by defending an intercultural education
built on learning as opposed to mere training.
Rethinking the essence of terror has significant implications for the discourse and
practice of counterterrorism, pointing to a shift in focus from the common
political, military, and economic responses to the oft-neglected sociological
processes of education. Because moral discrepancies can only be justifiably
resolved through dialogue, an intercultural education that cultivates the dialogical
formulation of moral maxims and the sharing of narratives may best expand the
freedom from terror. Transcending the paradoxical re-education programs that
seek to counter terrorism softly by fighting dogma with dogma, an intercultural
education upholds as central reflexive dialogue that brings to our forefront our
taken-for-granted beliefs and practices.
Through mutual critique and
understanding, an intercultural education not only cultivates mutual change but
also interdependency.
Because the problem of terror is rooted in the
misrecognition of and miscommunication with others, breaking the habitual cycle
of terror requires establishing meaningful interchange with them. Such education
is therefore emancipatory, enhancing the freedom of different individuals from the
coercive violence during their mutual exchanges. Intercultural dialogue is
therefore crucial to an education aimed at the expanding the freedom from terror.
This thesis, in short, is a series of disenchantments. But perhaps through
the careful contemplation and articulation of such discontents, more attention and
discussion can be dedicated towards the dawning of a different world, one whose
horizons is free from terror.

16

CHAPTER 2
CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM
DISCOURSES

To be governed is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, lawdriven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at,
controlled, checked, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by
creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom nor the virtue to
do so. To be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction
noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered,
assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, prevented, forbidden,
reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility,
and in the name of the general interest, to be place[d] under
contribution, drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted from,
squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first
word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, vilified, harassed, hunted
down, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged,
condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and to crown
all, mocked, ridiculed, derided, outraged, dishonored. That is
government; that is its justice; that is its morality (Proudhon, 1923,
pp. 293-294).

2.0 Introduction
The anarchistic apology captures the mentality underlying terrorism, the
discourse of which at the moment focuses on the revolutionary. The broader
concept of human security centers on the concrete measures that can make
manifest the vision of allowing all to live in security and dignity. Freedom from
the fear of terrorism is one important dimension within the project of human
security and the central theme of this thesis. But to take up such an emancipatory
task first requires careful thinking about the notion of terrorism. There are many
variant definitions of terrorismnone of which are uncontestedbut one is
particularly influential in terms of its formulation, guiding political and academic
debates. This definition is from Schmid and Jongman (2005) which states that:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by

(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or
political reasons, whereby... the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target
population, and serve as message generators.
Threat- and violence-based

17

communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and

main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (p. 28).

The strength of this definition is mainly twofold: First, it is not a partial

conjecture but is rather the abridgement of over 100 definitions often applied in
politics and academia. It is thus highly representative of how terrorism is defined
by most regional and international institutions. Second, Schmid and Jongmans
(2005) definition is growing in influence. Although it has not been adopted by all
member states of the United Nations (UN), it is accepted as the academic
consensus definition by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2007). This
definition has been pivotal to the academic discourse of terrorism, with many
publications making reference to some version of it. When I generally refer to
terrorism, Schmid and Jongmans (2005) denotation is tentatively implied.
Further commentary on this definition is made throughout the thesis, where the
concept of terrorism is constructed, criticized, and redefined.
This chapter is essentially descriptive, working within the salient
discourses of terrorism in contemporary politics and academia. It begins with an
analysis of the significance of terrorism from the political economists
perspective. This emerging academic field is characterized by positivism and can
be described as the empirical science of terrorism. But by taking up this approach
also betrays its severe limitationsparticularly the negligence of the concept of
terrorism itself. How does one go about making policy recommendations based
on statistical inferences when terrorism itself is not clearly but arbitrarily defined?
Subsequent to the critique of this contemporary field of terrorism research, the
historical analysis of terrorism is then problematized. A brief analysis of the
history of terrorism (in this chapter and the next) not only contextualizes its
evolution from antiquity but, perhaps more importantly, reveals how terrorism is
being narrowly conceived in contemporary discourses. This disenchantment with
the dominant discourse of terrorism serves as the critical basis for reconsidering
the essence of terrorism and its interrelations with education (carried out in
Chapters 4 and 5).

2.1 The political economy of terrorism

Intermittently, the media, through modes of information communication
and entertainment, publicizes certain terrorist acts whichdepending on the
purpose, targets, location and scale of the attackwould heighten the fear of
certain populations (Wilkinson, 1997). Ever since the hijacked commercial planes
were turned into suicide missiles on September 11, 2001, terrorism has yet to be
fully relegated from the forefront of public consciousness, spurring much research
18

and debate. This thesis, differing from most terrorism research, aims to critique
the concept of terrorism itself as it appears in academia and politics. But one must
first ask whether terrorism warrants the amount of attention, effort, and resources
that have been dedicated to it post-9/11. For if it is not, one ought to question the
necessity of the growing industry of national security and counterterrorism,
within which education is a key sector (Nelles, 2003, p. 12).

2.1.1 Assessing the statistical significance of terrorism

Because sub-national terrorists often lack the capacity to engage their
enemies in outright combat, they need to rely upon the media to propagandize
their deeds. Alternatively, state terrorists commonly employ terror tactics to
coerce potential rebels from displaying or organizing dissent. Thus, like the
decapitated heads displayed on castle walls in medieval times, state terror could
also be considered a form of demonstrative propaganda. Terroristic propaganda
not only promotes the justification of the terrorists positions and actions but also
seeks to inculcate fear and paranoia in the target audiences by demonstrating to
them the powerful reach and resolve of the terrorists. In other words, the strategic
intent of terrorism is to hyperbolize fear: its fearsomeness sometimes more of a
display of power and an exploitation of paranoia than a legitimate threat (Robins
& Post, 1997). Perhaps with the exception of state actors, the questionable
discrepancy between the subjective fear and the realistic probability of the threat
is facilitated by the fact that terrorists access to media technologies for
propagandizing outpaces their access to state-of-the-art weaponry. Given
terrorism emphasizes fear, how is it possible then to rationally assess its threat?
One approach that seeks to objectify terrorism research is the empirical
study of its political economy. Enders and Sandler (2006) describe the political
economy approach (PEA) to terrorism as one that combines economic and
political analyses into a statistical investigation backed by qualitative and
quantitative data. Within this methodology, terrorism tends to be defined more
narrowly than the definition of Schmid and Jongman (2005). Most often, the PEA
applies the definition held by the US State Department (USDOS), which only
includes non-state actors, political motives, and noncombatant victimsthat is,
civilians and off-duty military and state officers.12 Increasingly influential, the
PEA can be essentially described as the empirical science of terrorism. And
fundamental to it are the various statistical analyses drawn from databases such as
the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), the
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), and the
Research and Development Corporation (RAND). These databases generally
12

The definition in major terrorism databases usually follows that of the USDOS, which defines
terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.... (United States Department of State, 2004,
p. xii)

19

focus on international terrorist incidents, having only begun recording

domestic terrorist incidents more recently.13 The former involves peoples and
territory of more than one country while the latter involves only those of the host
country (Enders & Sandler, 2006).
Drawing on the USDOS and the RAND Corporation Worldwide
Terrorism Incident Database (RWTID), which incorporates two earlier RAND
databases, the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database and the RAND-MIPT
Terrorism Incident Database, there is statistical evidence that, since 1968 (the
start of the data collection by the databases), the linear average of incidents of
international terrorism, as defined by their respective organizations, is growing
but only very slightly (The RAND Corporation, 2009).14 From the previous
graphs, one can observe the cyclical pattern of terrorism incidents over periods of
roughly seven years and a significant decline in the overall trend since the mid1980s. This general decline is even more evident when graphically represented.15
Because of the symbiotic relationship between the fear of terrorism and its
mediagenic spectacle, there is an inescapable tendency to (over)emphasize the
significance of terrorist threats.16 Yet contrary to the increasing salience of
terrorism incidents publicized in the media, all the major databases
aforementioned reveal a general decline in the number of terrorism incidents since
the 1980s. While there always remains the possible threat of terrorism, actual
incidents appear to be gradually but consistently declining. To draw on a candid
remark made by Carl Sagan: Every generation thinks its problems are unique
and potentially fatal. And yet every generation has survived to the next. Chicken
Little is alive and well (1997, p. 86). And in terms of the sheer number of
victims, transnational terrorists (excluding state actors) have claimed at least
15,000 victims since 1968 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 246). Although 15,000plus victims is an enormous atrocity, to put the figure into perspective: Nearly
17,000 have died in the US as a result from driving under the influence of alcohol
in 2004 alone (Berning, 2005). Similarly arguing its overinflated significance,
economists Levitt and Dubner (2006) explain the general psychological tendency
of being paranoid about terrorism.

The likelihood of any given person being killed in a terrorist attack is far smaller
than the likelihood that the same person will clog up his arteries with fatty food and
die of heart disease. But a terrorist attack happens now; death by heart disease is
some distant, quiet catastrophe. Terrorist acts lie beyond our control; french fries do
13

The MIPT-RAND began recording domestic terrorist incidents since 1998 while the US
database since 2004.
14
See Figure 2.1.1 and Figure 2.1.2.
15
See Figure 2.1.3 and Figure 2.1.4.
16
These tendencies are also arguably beneficial to the argumentative cause of both policy advisers
and policy makers. Although I also emphasize its significance, I hold that it is not the threat, but
the troubling concept of terrorism that is significant.

20

not Death by terrorist attack is considered wholly dreadful; death by heart

disease is, for some reason, not (Levitt & Dubner, 2006, p. 137).

Such statistical correlations seem to provide an empirical approach to the

speculative fear of terrorism that so strongly influences national and international
politics.
Although I concur that the fear and lethality of terrorism tends to be
overinflated in comparison to more mundane modes of death, it nevertheless
warrants thoughtful attention for at least three reasons: First, the statistical
downturn fails to refute the persistent history of terrorism given its practice since
antiquity. Second, terrorist incidents appear to be increasingly lethal. Third, and
most importantly, such trends are based on incidents that are arbitrarilyperhaps
even ambiguouslydefined.17 Being lulled into presuming that, left on its own,
terrorism will simply decline into nonexistence in the future is dangerous. As the
most economic military strategy, terrorism can exploit and wear down open
targets over extended periods with only occasional threats or actions. Even with
the apparent decline in terrorism incidents since peaking in the mid-1980s, the
cyclical pattern waxes and wanes over time. As Enders and Sandler (2006)
predict, both domestic and transnational terrorism will remain cyclical in nature,
so that a downturn should not necessarily be projected into the future (p. 256).
While the realistic threat of terrorism is arguably small for the majority of the
worlds population, there is also much discussion of high impact, low probability
events which Taleb (2007) calls black swans. There always remains the
possibility that a single act by a small group of individuals with access to
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear, substances (CBRN) or technology
can use them as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cause enormous
casualties and damaging repercussions. While still hypothetical, the reality of
terrorists attempting to gain access to WMD is well noted as a major concern in
international politics18 and academic circles19, even percolating into the media. Its
potential reality, as depicted in films such as the Die Hard series and The Rock or
the popular television series 24, is what engages with the fears of their audiences.
Because the probability of a massively destructive terrorist event involving some
form of CBRN is difficult to predict and has little (if any) statistical precedence, a
discussion of the statistics of conventional terrorist events would be more
17

The historical evolution of terrorism will be further elaborated in Chapter 2.3 while a critique of
the databases will be carried out in Chapter 2.1.2, the next section. If one reconsiders the practice
of terror beyond the acts perpetrated only by non-state actors, or only in political contexts, then the
practice may indeed be much more pervasive.
18
This is made evident by the signing of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism by the UN member states in New York on April 13, 2005.
19
The more moderate concerns vary from the relatively pessimistic (such as Lia, 2005 and
Laqueur, 1999, 2003) to the more optimistic (such as Hoffman, 2006 and Enders and Sandler,
2006).

21

informative and pragmatic at this point.20 The PEA can thus assist in dispelling
some of the relatively unsubstantiated speculations.
Sandler and Enders (2007) corroborate Hoffmans (2006) theory that the
decline of terrorism incidents from the 1990s to 2002 is primarily attributable to
fact that fewer states have been sponsoring terrorism since the end of the Cold
War. With the fall of Communist states and increasingly efficient security
operations, many leftist groups lost momentum and faded into obscurity (Sandler
& Enders, 2007). Drawing on statistics from the USDOS between 1980 and 2001,
and excluding 9/11, Pape (2003) estimates that on average less than one person is
killed per terrorist incident. While the escalating preoccupation with terrorism
post-9/11 may play into the hands of the terrorists (and some politicians), there is
some cause for concern given the increasing lethality of international terrorism.
Again drawing from the two established databases, there is significant increases in
both fatalities and injuries caused by international terrorism despite the general
decline in incidents since the mid-1980s.21 This inverse relationship between the
decline of international terrorism incidents and the increase in casualties, while
counterintuitive, can be explained by the fact that terrorists have become more
effective at causing casualties. The disparity between the rate of change of the
frequency of international terrorism incidents and its resulting casualties can be
better represented by comparing their linear averages since 1968.22 The evidential
change in the lethality of terrorist incidents marks its contemporary evolution. Lia
(2005) predicts that the lethality of transnational terrorism will remain high due
to globalization, which leads to the internationalization of an increasing number of
conflicts (p. 17). Sandler and Enders (2007) similarly argue that while domestic
incidents outnumber transnational incidents almost eight to one, the latter poses
the greatest risks to the developed world, whose assets (people and property) are
vulnerable worldwide (p. 289). And Hoffman (2006) had argued pre-9/11 that
religion-motivated terrorism was increasing in frequency and lethality. 23 In short,
the PEA to terrorism reveals that such practices are evolving to become less
frequent but more lethal. But as scientific as the PEA is to terrorism, it is still
founded on a problematic framework marred by arbitrariness.

2.1.2 The political economy approach to terrorism research

Having taken up the PEA to terrorism, a critical reconsideration of this
framework is warranted: Firstly there is the common distinction between
domestic versus international terrorism, and secondly there is the reliability of
the terrorism databases themselves which underlies the entire methodology.
20

The issue of the modus operandi of contemporary terrorists is further elaborated in Chapter
3.2.1.
21
See Figure 2.1.5, Figure 2.1.6, Figure 2.1.7, and Figure 2.1.8.
22
See Figure 2.1.9 and Figure 2.1.10.
23
The issue of religiously motivated terrorism will be furthered discussed in Chapter 3.

22

Although I am still tentatively working within the political economy conception

of terrorism as political violence premeditated by subnational groups, a broader
typology of terrorism will be developed in Chapter 2.2 (at least, until this too is
problematized and transcended by a reconstruction of the essence and scale of
terrorism in Chapters 4 and 5).
2.1.2.1 Problematizing domestic and international terrorism
The first critique of the political economy methodology concerns
clarifying the common differentiation between domestic and international
terrorism. Despite minor variations of wording, the two forms of terrorism are
generally defined in policy and research in similar ways: Domestic terrorism is
the category of terrorist incidents sponsored, organized, and enacted by
subnational revolutionaries within the same national boundaries as the target,
resulting in consequences for just the host country, its institutions, citizens,
property, and policies (Sandler & Enders, 2007, p. 289). Such domestic, or
homegrown, forms of terrorism, originate, operate, and impact within the
confines of a single state border (Hoffman, 2007). Conversely, transnational or
international terrorism includes terrorist incidents sponsored, organized, and
enacted by subnational perpetrators against targets across one or more national
boundaries. In other words, international terrorism and transnational terrorism are
essentially the same phenomenon: they originate, operate, and impact victims or
audiences of one or more states (Bellany, 2007).24
Despite the apparent objectivity to the PEA, the dichotomous classification
of terrorism as determined by its geographical impact is increasingly problematic.
With globalization, the consequences of terrorism reverberate in the social
worldthat is, politically, economically, and culturallybeyond the arbitrary
confines of the domestic, local event. The increasing fluidity and speed of
information and communication mediated through the internet and multimedia,
the increasing ease and feasibility of international travel via transportation
technologies and changes in state policies, and the increasing interdependence and
integration of national economies and corporations, all contribute to the difficulty
in segregating the transnational from the domestic. If an incident is considered
domestic because the terrorists are citizens of the target country, their beliefs,
motives, and organization may not be neatly confined within state borders: Their
religious-political ideology, education, culture, skills, information, financing
should all have reciprocated influence with foreign sources. Falkenrath (2001)
justly summarizes that the artificial practice of distinguishing the domestic from
the international in regards to terrorism is an artifact of a simpler, less globally
interconnected era (p. 164). Moreover, the many repercussions of domestic
terrorist events are bound to diffuse beyond state borders. If Tamil separatists
24

Occasionally, international terrorism may be associated with state-sponsored terror in foreign

countries while transnational terrorism may not; but there is no definitive convention currently
(Lia, 2005).

23

commit a suicide bombing within a local region of Sri Lanka, a multinational

corporation may no longer invest or establish a corporate base in the region. Or
with news of the attack, some may no longer plan to vacation there while others
may seek to provide humanitarian aid. To further cite the case of the Mumbai
terrorists and of the al-Qaeda network, contemporary structures of terrorist
organizations are becoming more multinational and globalized in communication,
training, planning, and operation (Hoffman, 2007). A growing number of terrorist
groups in recent history, such as the Abu Nidal Organization, Aum Shinrikyo,
Kurdistan Workers Party, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
or Mujahedin-E-Khalq among others, have increasingly global activities,
operating in multiple states and engaging in both domestic and transnational
terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2006; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, & Scott, 2006). The
organization of contemporary globalized terrorist networks (further discussed in
Chapter 3.2.4) thus poses a challenge to the objectivity of terrorism statistics.
The fact is that under globalizing forces, the impact of terrorism
domestic or internationalis bound to ripple beyond the local. Todays
globalized terrorism is both domestic and international. The recognition of a
globalized framework of terrorism makes the objective analysis of terrorism
statistics more problematic, shattering the arbitrary convenience found in the
objectivity of empirical data. For example, when a group of Russian nationals
bombed a plane carrying 46 other Russian travelers in August 2004, it was
considered purely domestic. A near simultaneous attack on another plane, also
perpetrated by Russians, happened to carry one Israeli citizen and was called
international (Rheinheimer, 2006). 9/11 is another prime example of terrorism
globalized: involving perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments, citizens,
and ideologies from multiple countriesand all made possible by the
interconnectivity of the local with the global.
Political economists nevertheless tend to tolerate the conceptual
arbitrariness of the data for the sake of pragmatism. Despite the differences in
definition and data collection, they argue that the main databases essentially tell
the same story.

For instance, over the 27 years between 1977 and 2003 where direct comparison is
possible for incidents of international terrorism reported by the State Department
and the RAND/MIPT consortium, the two sets of data... track one another
reasonably closely, or more formally speaking, they are positively correlated
statistically with a less than 1% probability that the correlation observed arises by
chance (p<0.01).... [There is]... confirmation that the ITERATE data-set is also
essentially in line with RAND/MIPT... (Bellany, 2007, p. 103).

But the reason for the coherence between the databases may largely be due to
their subscription to the same general conception of terrorismechoing the
24

interrelated discourses of academia, politics, and the media. In short, under

globalization, classifying terrorism into the domestic or the international is moot
and the empiricism of the PEA to terrorism research is faulty.
2.1.2.2 Critique of the major terrorism databases
Even more fundamental to the debate over the domestic-international
distinction is the very recognition and selection of terrorism events into the
databases. Any recognition of an event itself and the subsequent decisions that
lead to its inclusion into the databaseand thus contemporary discourse and
historyare hardly objective practices.
The recognition, selection, and
documentation of each event are founded on its perceived and interpreted
significance. Thus when one reads the news to find that a certain authority
condemns a particular terrorist event, one should recognize that the very news that
is influencing its readers discourse is manufactured through a hermeneutical
process of recognition, selection, formulation, presentation, and dissemination.
While the event may be spectacular, there may have been many other events that
were altered or excluded under the historical weight of political, economic, and
cultural forces. And this collimation of something as politically charged and
morally controversial as terrorism is reinforced by, and in turn reinforces, the
discourse of terrorism in politics, the media, the public, and even academia. For
example, political economists Enders and Sandler (2006) formulate their
conclusions based on the analysis of data drawn from ITERATE, which is biased
in its recording of only newsworthy transnational terrorism incidents. Giroux
(2006) is thus justified in considering the spectacle of terrorism in the media as a
form of public pedagogy. Therefore, it is all the more important for academics to
develop diverse views and critical debates on terrorism. But given its underlying
conceptual complications, why is there an apparently increasing reliance on such
databases?
Firstly, the major databases are often cited for pragmatic reasons within
the modern climate of empiricism: for the ease of data accessibility, for the
consistency and transparency in the data selection criteria and process, and for the
lengthy duration and continuity over which the data is collected. Secondly, all the
databases use a narrow definition of terrorism that includes only subnational or
what will be later defined as revolutionary terrorism (in Chapter 2.2.1). While a
narrow definition is generally defended by political economists to be necessary
for the meaningful quantification and documentation of terrorist incidents, overly
specific definitions of terrorism also arbitrarily constrain the selective criteria.
For example... the State Department definition of terrorism is limited to
politically motivated violence and thus excludes terrorist acts that are instead
motivated by religious, economic, or social goals (LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, &
Scott, 2006, p. 5). Therefore the incidents recorded only reflect those events
which fall within the definitions employed by the particular databases. As
LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, and Scott (2006) justifiably point out:
25

[Because] much of the data on terrorism is collected by government entities,

definitions and counting rules are inevitably influenced by political considerations.
Thus, the U.S. State Department did not count as terrorism actions taken by the
Contras in Nicaragua (p. 5).

Rheinheimer (2006) similarly holds the definition of terrorism to be inherently

and necessarily informed by political fashion; it is therefore constituted not of
impartial facts but political partialities. Thirdly, the open-source terrorism
databases (e.g., ITERATE or RWTID) rely on data culled from news sources,
thus these databases may be biased in favor of the most newsworthy forms of
terrorism (LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, & Scott, 2006, p. 24). In other words, each data
point only represents the most spectacular of terrorist events of the day. Anything
less mediagenic or not given access to the news media are therefore excluded.
Fourthly, the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism, which has been discontinued
since its final publication in 2004, incorporated only terrorist events deemed
significant by the USDOS. Terrorist incidents were only judged to be
significant if it caused death or serious injury to noncombatants or amounted to
more than $10,000 in property damage (Rheinheimer, 2006). In other words, a
suicide bombing of a military vehicle that resulted in minor injuries to its
passengers and resulted in only $9,000 USD of damages would not be considered
terrorism. Although the annual US Report on Terrorism by the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) replaced the Patterns of Global Terrorism by
the USDOS in 2004, the NCTC does not distinguish between significant and
non-significant international terrorism, examining instead only incidents it
considers significant (Rheinheimer, 2006).25 The political, arbitrary, and partial
nature of the seemingly objective statistics in the empirical study of terrorism
highlights a need for other disciplinessuch as history, sociology, and
philosophyto complement the conceptual basis of terrorism. After such a
critique of the conceptual validity of the data, can they still be of any value?
Despite the arguable incompatibility of the databases on definitional
reasons, the statistical comparison of the USDOS and RWTID databases can
nevertheless provide some useful information: (Bellany, 2007)
(1) Although the definition and selection of incidents constituting terrorism
are subjective and political, the databases have been internally consistent
throughout the years.
(2) By comparing two types of databases (one government and one opensource) which use slightly different definitions and approaches on
recording data, the consistency in the trends are relatively reliable through
the minimization of some biases.
25

See Table 2.1.1 for a comparison of the oft-cited databases in terrorism research.

26

By comparing the USDOS and RWTID26 data for international terrorism, I have
suggested that globalized terrorism, while generally decreasing in frequency since
the mid-1980s, has been increasingly effective in causing casualties. Though my
arguments generally corroborate some impactful research analyzing the political
economy of terrorism,27 I am also somewhat skeptical of a purely empirical
approach to the study of terrorism. In other words, statistical analyses using such
databases can provide some useful insights into the phenomenon of terrorism, but
they should hardly be taken as objective facts in the scientific research of
terrorism. Furthermore, there are other dimensions of terrorism beyond statistical
patterns of incidents and casualties which are pertinent to terrorism discourse.
Benjamin (2008) argues that examining only terrorism-related deaths does not
help explain the geopolitics of the threats and dangers. Statistics only indicate the
plots that succeeded and not the terrorists grievances or ideological ambitions. It
is thus necessary to further develop the significance of terrorism beyond the
confines of statistical analyses, some issues being: the evolving understanding of
the nature of terrorism, its fundamental conception, and the role of education in its
social reproduction and change. Such a project warrants further analysis of the
essence of the phenomenon of globalized terrorism. And any investigation of its
evolution warrants a discussion, however brief, on the premodern and modern
history of terrorism (in Chapter 2.2) and the major traits marking the postmodern
species of terrorism at its current evolutionary stage (in Chapter 3).

2.2 Defining the contemporary discourse of terrorism

Refocusing on Schmid and Jongmans (2005) conception of terrorism
(which transcends that of the PEA) as a methodology for inspiring fear amongst
target audiences through exercising violence upon chosen victims by sub-state or
state actors for their own economic or political purposes, such practices are more
prevalent in human history across wider socio-political contexts. Here, examining
the history of terrorism may help to substantiate its broader conceptualization.
Particularly, how some scholars describe a history of terrorism also reveals its
discourse. Therefore, I will first emphasize that a historical review of the
phenomenon of terrorism not only contextualizes its evolution but also its
contemporary discourse. Then, to better consolidate and define the nature of
contemporary terrorismthat is, terrorism in its globalized formits ancestral
evolution is briefly highlighted. The genealogy of terrorism is divided into
premodern, modern, and postmodern phases, of which the first two will be the
focus of the remainder of this chapter while the third will be discussed in Chapter
3. Through such an evolutionary view of the practice of terrorism, it may be
regarded as both new and old, and as both political and social acts.
26

The RWTID is often cited due to its unparalleled accessibility online and unbroken length of
data run (Bellany, 2007, p. 103).
27
See Pape (2003) and Enders & Sandler (2006).

27

While its contemporary conceptualization originated from the Reign of

Terror during the French Revolution in the 1790s, the socio-political use of
terrorism has been integral to the organization of society since the very birth of
civilization (Nelles, 2003). Historians Chaliand and Blin (2007b) hold that
terrorism, from the Latin word terrere meaning to make tremble, was
foundational to the empires of antiquity: from the first Mesopotamian Empire of
Sargon of Akkad, to the first military empire of the Assyrians, to the Mongols and
Tamerlane. Intended as a political method of enforcing civil order through
authoritative power, such forms of top-down terrorism (or state terror) have been
historically common. But when some scholars (e.g., political economists),
government departments (e.g., USDOS), or public media refer to terrorism, the
implication is often of the bottom-up political conflict: involving the
premeditated use of violence and threats by clandestine groups upon
noncombatant victims in order to affect the psyche and behavior of a wider target
audience (Merari, 2007). Thus a number of conceptual stumbling blocks require
clarification: Firstly, bottom-up terrorism needs to be distinguished from other
military tacticssuch as guerrilla warfare. Secondly, there exists different
subspecies of terrorism classifiable by its dynamics and which can be better
clarified through a historical analysis.

2.2.1 Contrasting terrorism from other military strategies

The fact that terrorism emphasizes psychological impact while warfare
emphasizes physical coercion is a commonly accepted, albeit artificial,
demarcation (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a). Yet in between this conventional
dichotomy lies guerrilla warfare which in physical tactics appears very similar to
those of terrorism. Here Chaliand and Blin (2007a) contrasts guerrilla warfare
with terrorism, which they describe as more of a negation of combat (p. 227).
Along these lines, terrorism entails attacks on unarmed noncombatants whereas
guerrilla wars describe clandestine attacks on elements of a regular army. Merari
(2007) alternatively but compatibly distinguishes terrorism from guerrilla and
other forms of warfare primarily on the establishment of physical control over
territories.

Terrorism as a strategy does not rely on liberated zones as staging areas for
consolidating the struggle and carrying it further. As a strategy, terrorism remains in
the domain of psychological influence and lacks the material elements of guerrilla
warfare (Merari, 2007, p. 25).

Similar to Merari (2007), Laqueur (2003) views guerrilla warfare as not only the
liberation of territories but also having the intent to establish an alternative

28

leadership.28 Despite the variance in demarcating terrorism from guerrilla

warfare, the constant lies in perceiving terrorism as violence that primarily
impacts the psychologicaland not the territorialrealm. Summarizing Meraris
(2007) comparison of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare is
illustrative of the common (though arbitrary) distinctions.29
Although all forms of military tactics from terrorism to warfare involve, to
different degrees, some element of psychological intimidation, terrorisms
effective reliance upon the instillation and mediation of fear is disproportionately
large. In other words, the subspecies of terrorism which some specialists call...
bottom-up are political-military mimicrieswhere terrorists without the political
or military capabilities to legitimately declare or wage war hyperbolize their
power to intimidate and coerce (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 6). Like biological
mimics, the aggressive displays of such disempowered terrorists betray their need
to imitate the powerful in order to balance political disparities. Being
fundamentally violent, political, psychological, and coercive, terrorism can be
further characterized by distinguishing the dynamics of its initiators and targets
by highlighting their tendencies to be either top-down or bottom-up.

2.2.2 A typology of terrorism

Inspired by Meraris (2007) classification of political violence, a typology
of its subspecies can facilitate the clarification of the oft-confused dimensions of
terrorism.30 The typology is arranged into a two by two matrix of the dynamics of
violence exercised during the process of the terrorist act. The four types of
terrorism thus characterize the various dynamics of the general phenomena. They
are each what Weber calls an ideal type, that is, an analytical construct that
merely helps the theorization of a complex phenomenon and do not represent real
or perfect categories (Kim, 2008).
Driven by ideologyusually nationalism or some religious-political
extremismrevolutionary terrorism is characterized by its employment by the
disempowered members of a society against the existing political or symbolic
leaders.31 In the opposite direction are those authorities in positions of power
practicing oppressive terrorism as a means of maintaining legitimacy and
accumulating power. And as a means of war between nations, interstate
28

On this issue, Habermas identifies a third strategy intermediate to guerrilla and terrorist tactics:
namely the territorially-anchored, yet indiscriminate forms of terrorism employed by Palestinian
guerrillas (Borradori, 2003).
29
See Table 2.2.1 for a comparison of the common characteristics of common forms of military
tactics. However it does not offer definitive demarcations between the different forms of political
violence. The legality distinguishing terrorism from war will be further discussed in Chapter 4.1.
30
See Table 2.2.2 for a two by two matrix summarizing the typology of terrorism according to the
dynamics of violence.
31
The issue of fundamentalism in extremist practices, including terrorism, will be further
elaborated in Chapter 3.1.

29

terrorism has been foundational to the building of empires. It entails the fearinspiring method of coercive violence employed by the authorities in order to win
a war.32 Revolutionary, oppressive, and interstate terrorism have all been
practiced since antiquity, wherever there are people governed and governing. And
fundamental to these subspecies of terrorism is the coercive incitation of
insecurity by exploiting the fear of its potential targets (Robins & Post, 1997).

Whether he holds power or is fighting it, the terrorist seeks to broadcast that
psychosis. The only difference between them is that anti-state terrorism seeks to
destabilize authority, while state terrorism seeks conversely to stabilize it and to
destabilize the population at large (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p. 203).

Consequently, the terrorism-terror distinction problematically neglects the

interstate and globalized subspecies of terror(ism). Therefore, I will henceforth
use terrorism and terror interchangeably to refer the broad phenomenon,
qualified (only when necessary) as being interstate, oppressive, revolutionary, or
globalized.
Most recent and increasingly salient, postmodern terror is often recognized
as being distinct from the more historically prevalent and lethal forms of terrorism
(Mythen, 2007). But if postmodern terror is relatively more rare and benign (in
the sense that it has historically amassed fewer victims) as compared to
oppressiveor even revolutionaryterrorism, why has so much attention been
devoted to it in the past decade, not to mention being an underlying theme in this
thesis? The purpose of highlighting postmodern terrorwhich can be more aptly
described as globalized terrorismare fourfold: First, globalized terrorism is a
form of political violence and social condition that is markedly different from its
precursors. Second, upon the back of globalization, such terrorism is increasingly
relevant in terms of global socio-political impacts. Third, it is the form of
terrorism that is fundamentally transmitted through the inculcation of
fundamentalist mentalities and extremist practices which are mostly neglected in
traditional counterterrorism discourses. And fourth, globalized terrorism is
instigating the most disconcerting responses by some targeted democratic
governments, all of which consequently require a critical role for education.
Thus, globalized terrorism will be more fully explicated in Chapter 3 to denote
the pertinent form of contemporary terrorism. Furthermore, because the history of
the evolution of terrorism is essential to understanding its contemporary species,
historical examples of revolutionary and oppressive terrorism will be selected to
clarify the similarities and differences between globalized terrorism and its
antecedents.
32

The problematic distinction (or rather indistinguishability) between war and terrorism will be
the focus of Chapter 4.2 and 4.3.

30

2.3 Contextualizing the history of terror

As with all other human practices, terrorism has contingently evolved with
the social changesthat is, the changing political, economic, and cultural
contextsfrom which it arises. Yet remaining unchanged since antiquity is the
resilience of terrorism as a method of power struggle, whether by the powerful to
maintain it or by the disempowered to attain it. Symbiotic with globalization,
globalized terrorism is both empowered by and resentful of the consequences of
globalizations evolutionary forces. Being premodern in its fundamentalism,
modern in its modus operandi, and postmodern in its extremist methodology, one
must contextualize globalized terrorism amongst its evolutionary history in order
to appreciate its antiquity yet originality. I agree with Laqueur (2003) that the
history of terrorism is essential to understanding and contextualizing a rigorous
analysis of the phenomenon. The four ideal types of terrorism (the interstate,
oppressive, revolutionary, and globalized) thus help this conceptual process of
relating and situating its evolutionary history. This section first focuses on the
premodern and modern phenomena before analyzing further the postmodern
phenomenon of globalized terrorism (in Chapter 3) and the terror of interstate war
(in Chapter 4).

2.3.1 Premodern revolutionary terrorism

Chaliand and Blin (2007h) ascribes the first historical documentation of
revolutionary terrorism to Flavius Josephus (70 90 A.D.), who described the
covert actions carried out by Jewish Zealots, or the sicarii, meaning dagger-man
(p. 55). Carrying religious and political objectives, the Zealots sought to impose
a degree of rigor in religious practice (Chaliand & Blin, 2007h, p. 57). They
took up terror as an instrument to attack fellow Jews whom they regarded to be
insufficiently scrupulous in their piety (Chaliand & Blin, 2007h, p. 57).
Politically, they attempted to seize state independence from Rome.

In the year 66, for instance, the Zealots assassinated a number of political and
religious figures. They also attacked buildings used to store archives, including loan
documents, with the aim of winning the support of a working class crushed by debt.
We know that the sicarii used daggers to cut their victims throats and that they
often acted in the midst of a crowd, for instance, in marketplaces. Such operations
reveal their desire to foment a sense of vulnerability within the population at large, a
classic tactic of terrorists to this day (Chaliand & Blin, 2007h, p. 58).

The Zealots sought political change by instilling fear in the authorities while
coercing public support through an ultraorthodox piety. Similar synergetic
fusions of religious-political ideals with coercive fear are exemplified by the
Islamic Assassins, or Hashshashin. During the eighth to thirteenth centuries the
31

Assassins murdered prominent religious-political leaders, though they were

careful not to harm innocents for the sake of their reputation. Meticulously
selected as propaganda by deed, the victims of the Assassins included prominent
Muslims like Nizam al-Mulk, the grand vizier of the Seljuk emperor, to enemy
Crusaders like Prince Edward, who managed to survive his assassination
attempt (Chaliand & Blin, 2007h, p. 75). Like Osama bin Laden, Hassan i
Sabbah, the leader of the Assassins, was attacking the hegemonic power at the
timethe Seljuk Empire:

From that standpoint, the case of the Assassins is not fundamentally different from
that of al Qaeda today. From his sanctuary in the mountains of Afghanistan, Osama
bin Laden led a campaign against the West similar to that of Hasan against the
Seljuks, with sometimes very similar tactics.... The propaganda drives and
recruitment and training of terrorists in both cases were very much alike, often
undertaken among the same social classes and in similar topographies (rural or
mountainous regions with populations hardened by warfare). Like Hasan, bin Laden
could not hope to topple his adversaryin his case, the West or the United States
with a simple terrorist attack, whatever its nature. Nevertheless, like al Qaeda today,
Hasans organization knew how to exploit the Achilles heel of the governing
(Seljuk) powerunrest linked to succession disputes and power strugglesto
weaken his adversary and benefit his own movement. Today, al Qaeda exploits
certain weaknesses of the Western democratic system, as well as the mentality of the
massesin particular the desire of Westerners to live in absolute security
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007h, p. 69).

Despite the resemblances, two particular differences distinguish them: First, alQaeda justifies through fatwas the targeting of all their enemies, which basically
blankets all Americans and their allies (Blanchard, 2004). Second, al-Qaeda
inhabits a world globalized by unprecedented technological advancement and
proliferationwhich potentially grants destructive capabilities far grander than
what the Assassins could have imagined or intended.33 In a sense, contemporary
globalized terrorists are genocidal in (and only in) victimizationjustifying the
targeting of an entire nation. In short, the examples of the Zealots and Assassins
have highlighted the historical tradition of religious-political fundamentalism in
fuelling extremist actions. Terror has remained faithful to a discrete selection of
victims for propaganda by deed in both premodern and modern times.

2.3.2 Modern oppressive terrorism

I have highlighted two historically prominent examples of revolutionary
terrorists in premodern times. But as long as there have been governments and
revolutionary terrorism, there has also been oppressive terror as a political tactic
of control. Reborn in the French Revolution of 1789, oppressive terrorism was no
longer a minor military instrument as in premodern times but became a basic
33

Both differences will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

32

tool of the modern states political apparatus (Chaliand & Blin, 2007d, pp. 9192).

The French Terror prefigured a system to be found in all the great revolutions,
especially the Bolshevik Revolution: the exploitation of ideological fanaticism, the
manipulation of social tensions, and extermination campaigns against rebellious
sectors (Chaliand & Blin, 2007g, p. 102).

The Terror under the incorruptible Robespierres Jacobin utopia of virtue,

claimed 200,000 to 300,000 victims out of a population of 28 milliona
modest number when compared to the cold, machine-like efficiency of the
oppressive terrorists in the twentieth century, including the many totalitarian
regimes in the modern era (Chaliand & Blin, 2007g, pp. 99, 102).
It is necessary at this point to clarify two manifestations of oppressive
terrorism: state terror and genocide. Both forms of oppressive terrorism are
exacted by the authorities upon the powerless and have historically lead to
enormous death tolls cumulatively numbering into the tens of millions. However,
Chaliand and Blin (2007g) argue that state terror seeks not to amass victims but
to be selective whereas genocides aim for wholesale extermination (p. 102).
Here, I diverge from this distinction, as both state terror and genocides are
selective of their victims and need not be mutually exclusive. Authors of
genocides do aim to exterminate an entire group of people, but their victims are
selected based on the (mis)recognition of some fundamental trait: from familial
ties, race, ethnicity, social class, nationality, religious or political affiliation, to
sexual orientationthat is, any heterodoxy, deviant behavior, or physical
difference. The artificial distinction between state terror and genocides lies in
the (mis)recognition of victims, a differentiation that merely reflects variance in
the level of selectivitya matter of the pickiness of the oppressive terrorist.
State terrorists tend to pick targets regarded as being threatening to their
sovereignty or helpful as propaganda to suppress dissent and coerce submission.
Such violence is essentially aimed at establishing, maintaining, and strengthening
control. Resembling the Foucauldian framework of power through discipline,
state terror involves hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and
exemplary punishment (Foucault, 2006). It thus has been commonly utilized in
the suppression of revolutionaries real and imagined. Likewise, genocides are
usually aimed at maintaining and increasing the ruling power of the authorities by
consolidating a collective identity through the extermination of the other
recognized through difference. This identity of self-supremacy is only possible
through [the] annihilation or emptying out of the other, as epitomized by the
genocides under Nazi Germany (McCathy & Dimitriadis, 2006, p. 201). The
ideological foundations of genocides can thus be understood through the
33

Kierkegaard-Nietzschean concept of ressentiment, where one becomes good

by constructing the other as eviland thereby defining the self while
externalizing the cause of all failures (McCathy & Dimitriadis, 2006, p. 201).
Therefore, both genocidal and terroristic practices by the authorities are unified in
their ressentimental struggles for power. Victims of genocides are merely
symbolically and opportunistically selected according to criteria that are generally
broader and more inherent than those in the more narrowly selected victims of
state terror. Furthermore state terror and genocides are not mutually exclusive:
Take the infamous case of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Lenin and
Stalin.
The Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Lenin, came to power
consummated by the assassination of the symbolic remnants of the former
monarchical powers, namely the abdicated tsar Nicholas II, his family, and his
close personal staffin 1918. But to coerce more practicable authority, Lenin
shortly thereafter directed the elimination of all potential aspirants to power and
all its opponents.... Lenin drew on the lesson of Robespierres downfall by
mastering the instrument of terrorism and got right down to the work of
eliminating his political or ideological adversaries, starting with the anarchists...
the earliest victims of the Red terror (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p. 204). The antianarchist Red Terror led by Trotsky through the Cheka, the agency combating
counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs, eventually extended to those who were
only vaguely associated with the anarchists, such as distant relatives (Chaliand &
Blin, 2007c, p. 204). Subsequently, massive suppressions of dissent through
terror were also leveled against workers, peasants, and inevitably all real and
perceived threats to the Bolsheviks. But the hybridization of state terror and
genocide came towards the last years of the ailing Lenin when the systematic
suppression of the Cossackswhich led to the death or displacement of 300,000
to 500,000 Cossacksshowed an increasing generalization of victim selection:
from those specifically perceived to be political threats to entire ethnic groups
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007c).
The blur of state terror and genocide is most evident under Stalin, Lenins
successor following his death in 1924. As Chaliand and Blin (2007c) argue:

Stalin drew on his policys sole means of enforcement: terror. Under Lenin, the
apparatus of repression had served the party; under Stalin, it was the party that
served the apparatus of repression (p. 206).

Stalin initially experimented with terrorism in his dekulakization campaign

against the peasantry in the early 1930s. Holodomor, or murder by hunger, was
his subsequent, full-scale attempt to coerce the Ukrainian peasantry into joining

34

collective farms. The resulting famine from Stalins collectivization was so

severe and widespread that between 1932 to1933 an estimated six to ten million
Ukrainian peasants (approximately one-quarter of the Ukrainian population)
starved to death despite many having resorted to cannibalism (Chaliand & Blin,
2007c). Although scholarly debate remains over whether the tragic incident
settles within the definition of genocide, recently released KGB archives in Kiev
reveal that the role of Stalins regime in assisting the engineering of the
Holodomor famine is genocidal in nature.

The harvest was confiscated and people starved to death.... One document is an
order from Moscow to shoot people who steal food. It is signed by Stalin in red ink
(Fawkes, 2006).

The Russian government, some scholars such as Mark Tauger,34 and ironically the
Ukrainian parliament argue that the famine was naturally caused by a poor harvest
and that Stalin was only partially responsible, but the Stalinist regimes
responsibility for not only failing to alleviate but exacerbating the tragedy of an
entire population under their rule is undeniable (Coplon, 1988).
Oppressive terrorism in modernity, if one collectively sums up all global
victims resulting from state terror and genocides since the Russian Revolution,
has quite literally exterminated lives on the order of hundreds of millions.
Documented examples of oppressive terrorism are many, testifying to its
unprecedented scale and modern efficiency: Leninist-Stalinist Soviet Union,
Hitlers Germany, Maos China, Pol Pots Cambodia, the Ottoman Empire in the
Balkans, Yahya Khans East Pakistan, Macias Nguemas Equitorial Guinea,
Mengistus Ethiopia, Saddam Husseins Iraq, the Kims North Korea, Suhartos
Indonesia, Krstics Bosnia, Amins Uganda, Akayesus Rwanda, al-Bashirs
Dafur, and many others less infamous. While such astronomical numbers of
engineered deaths are difficult to grasp and contrasts sharply with the mere
hundreds of thousands of victims at the hands of revolutionary terrorists during
the same period, the quantitative difference is nevertheless besides the point
concerning the freedom from terrorin any direction. Whether due to oppressive
or revolutionary terrorism, fear, violence, coercion, and death mark the
experience. Furthermore, revolutionary terror has been evolving rapidly in recent
decades to exploit the insecurities of liberalization in a globalized world with
increasing effectiveness. Such globalized terrorism will be more deeply explored
in Chapter 3 after examining the revolutionary terrorism in the modern era.

34

Mark Tauger is currently an associate professor in history at UCLA and his commentary on the
Ukrainian
Famine
can
be
viewed
on
his
website:
http://www.as.wvu.edu/history/Faculty/Tauger/soviet.htm

35

2.3.3 Modern revolutionary terrorism

The rise of modern revolutionary terrorism can also be traced back to the
turn of the twentieth century in Tsarist Russia, which contingently transformed
into the oppressive terrorism led by the Bolshevik regime. As with oppressive
terrorism, an analysis of the Russian Revolution is essential to understanding
modern revolutionary terrorism. The escalation of state terror and genocides is
inextricably intertwined with the proliferation of revolutionary movements
especially in the twentieth century. Revolutionary terrorism, characterized by
nationalistic imperatives for political independence, is primarily driven by two
underlying forces: One is the political extremism reminiscent of that of the
religious beliefs of old. The other is the nationalistic liberation movements under
the waning of the European colonial powers following the World Wars. And in
contrast to oppressive terrorists, modern revolutionary terrorists are more
clandestine, restricted in network, selective of victims, and mediagenic
publicizing their violent propaganda by deed in search for political change above
and support below. Once again, revolutionary terrorism can be generally
bracketed into two overlapping forms: the anti-state (particularly prevalent preWWII) and the nationalistic (most predominant in the post-WWII era). I will
highlight some of these exemplary traits of terrorist movements before and after
the World Wars to better illustrate the historical practices at the times, and thus set
the contextual stage for the newest species of terror that has risen to prominence:
globalized terrorism, a phenomenon that has characteristics of both its
revolutionary and oppressive cousins.35
2.3.3.1 Pre-WWII: The Russian Revolution
The Russian Revolution is pivotal to the common interpretation of modern
terrorism as it marked the secularization of fundamentalist beliefs, the
modernization of extremist actions, and the justification of propaganda by deed.
At the turn of the twentieth century, modern revolutionary terrorists became more
secularized but were no less extreme in fervor than their premodern counterparts,
often becoming willing martyrs for their cause. For example, the Russian
revolutionary terrorists from 1878 to 1913, despite being atheists, sacrificed their
lives for others, with no expectation of any reward in the next world (Ternon,
2007, p. 133). Members of the Russian terrorist group Narodnaya Volya knew
they were destined for death and accepted that fate as part of the price to be paid
for the liberation of humankind (Ternon, 2007, p. 147). The Russian
revolutionaries, in their readiness to sacrifice themselves and others for an
ideological vision, are similar to the terrorists before and after them.
However, the nineteenth century revolutionary terrorists were not only
ideologically armed with immoderate attitudes, but also technologically with the
35

Globalized terrorism will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

36

products of industrialization. Though initially amateurishwith many terrorists

being injured or killed in premature, accidental explosions while making,
handling, or using the bombsthe incorporation of explosives into the arsenal of
the Russian anarchists inspired a practice that has become nearly synonymous
with terrorism itself. Necessitated by industrialization and driven by economic
incentives, explosives were continuously researched and improved upon to
become lightweight, safer to handle, and more effective. As Chaliand and Blin
(2007f) argue:

From the terrorist perspective, the great technological breakthrough was the
invention of dynamite.... Dynamite radically changed terrorist technology and was a
major factor in the rise of anarchist and populist movements in France, Russia, and
elsewhere, including the United States (p. 180).

Fuelled by a fundamental belief that justifies extreme practices, guns and

explosives became the new teeth and claws of the modern revolutionary terrorists.
Their effectiveness was further synergized with the printed news media, which
devoted extensive coverage to anarchist terrorism (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p.
130). Consequently, the early anarchists received a disproportionate amount of
publicityconsidering the relatively few victims they claimed.
But why did these early modern revolutionary terrorists kill so frugally,
especially in comparison to their oppressive counterparts? Ternon (2007), Merari
(2007), and Chaliand and Blin (2007f) all concur that the meager killings were
not entirely because of their inability to do otherwise, but rather due to a concern
for their noble reputation. The majority of the modern anarchists preached a
respect for life. And while recognizing the immoral and illegal nature of their
actions, the Russian anarchists and populists broadcasted their justifications
through printed media and through speeches at their trials.

They were murderers motivated by an ideal. They believed themselves entitled to

kill because those they executed had themselves killed or ordered others to kill.
They were righters of wrongs rather than avengers. They could not tolerate a oneway justice.... Yes, the terrorists were murderers, but they had ethical principles:
they had crossed a threshold, but they had not torn down their moral barriers. Their
choice remained an ethical one (Ternon, 2007, pp. 172-173).

Nechayevs principle that everything was permitted facilitated the totalitarian

revolutions of the twentieth century, in which certain individuals would introduce
state terrorism and use ideas to justify millions of crimes (Ternon, 2007, p.

37

140).36 After all, self-justification is imperative for taking such necessary, or

even noble, actions. Russian revolutionaries commonly vindicated themselves
by arguing that, under the harsh government repression, the oppressed had no
other option but to employ terror as a last resort. As Ternon (2007) notes:

[T]he central theme of Russian terrorism remains the struggle against tsarist
despotism.... In opposition to state terrorism that enjoyed total impunity, they
offered true, immanent justice, which they proposed to deploy against those who
embodied such terrorism, whom they condemned as the hangmen of the people.
Legitimate questions can be raised about their moral right to take such action, but
they cannot be condemned as indiscriminate murderers (p. 134).

Thus, terrorists could be characterized by their ideological aim to overthrow other

terrorists: for the sake of liberation and through justification of needing to resort
to terroristic propaganda by deed. As Camus extols, these delicate murderers,
these doers of deeds who so completely put their lives at risk, would involve
the lives of others only with the greatest fastidiousness of conscience (Ternon,
2007, pp. 158, 161).
A final, and perhaps most notable, example of the tension between the
beliefs and actions of the romantic Russian revolutionary terrorism involves Ivan
Kalyayev. Kalyayev, a member of the Social Revolutionary Party which
assassinated prominent political officials of the tsarist regime, was selected to
assassinate Grand Duke Sergei.

On February 2, 1905, Kalyayev waited, a bomb under his coat, for the arrival of the
Grand Duke. When the latters carriage approached, however, Kalyayev noticed
that the intended victim was accompanied by his wife and two young boys, his
nephews, the children of Grand Duke Pavel. In a spur-of-the-moment decision,
Kalyayev refrained from throwing the bomb so as not to hurt Sergeis innocent
brood (Merari, 2007, pp. 27-28).

His comrades approved Kalyayevs just inaction despite the failure of the mission.

On February 4, running, Kalyayev threw his bomb straight at Grand Duke Sergei
from a distance of four paces; Sergei was killed. Kalyayev was arrested and taken to
the Butyrki prison. A few days later he was visited by Sergeis widow, Grand
Duchess Elizabeth, who gave him an icon and told him that she would pray for him.

36

Nechayev is often considered a founding father of modern terrorism, both revolutionary and
oppressive, for his doctrine advocating its use. Proudhon (the apologist for anarchism) and
Kalyayev (a celebrated revolutionary terrorist) were his disciples.

38

The lengthy statement Kalyayev made at his trial, on April 5, 1905, explained the
position of revolutionaries who sought vengeance for state terrorism:
We are separated by mountains of corpses, by hundreds of thousands of broken
lives, by an ocean of tears and blood that is flooding the entire country in a torrent of
outrage and horror. You have declared war on the people. We have taken up the
challenge.... You are prepared to say that there are two moralities, one for mere
mortals, stating, Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal, and another, political,
morality for the rulers, for whom it permits everything.
Kalyayev was sentenced to death... and was hanged on May 10 (Ternon, 2007, p.
161).

Kalyayev gained the status of a saint in the gospel of moralistic analysts of

terrorism with his strict ideals and discriminate violence (Merari, 2007, p. 28).
He embodies the rationale behind the doctrine of propaganda by deed: Where, by
making an example of the symbolic figures killed, the terrorists own noble
cause can catalyze a spontaneous revolution by the masses and thereby concession
by the state. In short, the revolutionary terrorism pre-WWII can be regarded as:
secularized but no less extreme, increasingly dangerous due to the synergy of
immoderate attitudes with technological development, but yet highly discriminate
as romanticized propaganda.
One final noteworthy characteristic of the revolutionary terrorists of the
early twentieth century is their clandestine organization within small localized
groups. Residing within an autocratic society under relatively weak forces of
globalization, the revolutionary terrorists operated primarily at the individual
level and their logistical requirements, in terms of financing and training, were
minimal. No networks existed to devise a strategy of terror at the national or
international levels, so terrorists acted on the basis of their personal feelings
(Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 130). Despite being highly varied in ideology
anarchism, populism, Marxism, communism, socialism, fascism, racism, and the
many nationalismsthe new breed of secular revolutionaries were united in their
extremist justifications for using the terrorist methodology. Embodying the nature
of revolutionary terrorism is the psychological role of propaganda by deed,
conjoined with the fundamental adherence to political idealism (to the level of
conviction that demands self-sacrifice and careful selection of victims), and
synergized with the accessibility of state-of-the-art weaponry. While such
movements have existed since antiquity, they blossomed during the turn of the
twentieth century. Thus, the Russian Revolution is essential to the historical
analysis of terrorism as it revolutionized the traditional practice.
2.3.3.2 Post-WWII: Anti-colonial liberation movements
The World Wars marked the spike of massive global warfare and interstate
terror, following which modern revolutionary terrorism evolved yet again. This
time, terrorism was largely driven by nationalism and employed as an instrument
39

of attrition in the guerrilla struggles for liberation. In hindsight, the anti-colonial

revolutions against the European powers post-WWII have been relatively
successful, witnessing the liberation of colonies, notably Ireland and India from
Britain, and Algeria from France. The many and complex causes for the
deterioration of European empires in the twentieth century are beyond the scope
of this thesis, thus only the evolution of terroristic strategies in liberation
movements will be highlighted: namely anti-colonialism and propaganda.
Anti-colonialism culminated during the historical turning point of WWII,
although such sentiments had been festering for decades. In the growing
disenchantment with colonialism, the new war against foreign occupation was
one in which political victory was no longer linked to military victory, at least
when the conflict involved a democratic state (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 210).
As political victory became dependent on psychological warfare as much as on
military supremacy, terrorism became one of the keys to such ascendancy
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 210). Postwar decolonization, then, was carried out
through the guerrilla and terror tactics adopted by national movements for
independence.
Perhaps the two most significant forces in leading to the reliance on
asymmetric warfare by national revolutionaries are their extremist ideologies and
their lack of capabilities (military, political, legal, and economic) to wage a
conventional war. Isolating the role of terrorism in the context of liberation
movements reveals that it is only one of the strategic practices used by guerrillas.
During the period between WWII and the general success of decolonization
movements, terroristic practices were recognized as a minute specialism within
the many paramilitary operations (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e).

It should be stressed that most of the liberation movements born during or

immediately after World War II were, first and foremost, guerrilla operations....
Terrorism was generally used in only a marginal way, either as a trigger for taking
action or to send the message that the adversary was vulnerable.... Until 1968,
movements that relied almost exclusively on terrorist tactics were relatively rare
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 214).

As with all historical generalizations, there are notable exceptions: the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agnoiston (EOKA, or
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) were liberation groups that relied more
extensively on terrorism.37 The pioneering feat of the IRA inspired the
subsequent adoptions of terrorist practices by guerrilla movements for national
37

Chaliand and Blin (2007f) highlights the IRAs exceptionality for being one of the earliest
success stories of modern revolutionary terrorists and an inspirational blueprint for the subsequent
national liberation movements erupting among the European colonies following WWII.

40

liberation including those in India, the Balkans, and Algeria. While the Indian
liberation movement also led to its eventual freedom from British colonialism, it
was relatively benign when compared to the terroristic practices in the Balkans or
Algeria. The International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)
committed the most deadly terrorist attack of the first half of the twentieth
century by bombing the Sveta Nedelia cathedral in Sofia that killed over one
hundred people (Chaliand & Blin, 2007f, p. 191). And similar to the IMRO but
unlike the IRA, the Croatian resistance, the Ustase:

...were committed to attacking civilian targets.... Foreshadowing the hijackings of

the 1970s and 1980s, they attacked trains, including the prestigious Orient Express,
with the aim of bringing their cause to the worlds attention. This was one of the
first manifestations of the kind of publicity-minded terrorism that came to the fore in
the late 1960s (Chaliand & Blin, 2007f, p. 191).

The evolution of terroristic methodology and effect is inextricably

intertwined with the evolution of propaganda dissemination. Conditioned upon
substantive popular support, the success of revolutionary movements hung on the
effectivity of propaganda. The success of revolutionary movements of liberation
during this period may be attributable as much to the role of propaganda as to that
of the military. Propaganda by deed became more specifically engineered for
anti-colonial terrorism as civilian populations became the decisive targets to be
won over. Since a large base of social support was necessary to overturn
governments and establish alternate regimes, globalization of the media facilitated
the propaganda dissemination indispensable to political victory. Two factors were
particularly pertinent to increasing the potency of propaganda in post-WWII
independence movements: (1) The advancement of technology in terms of
transportation (railways, vessels, and airplanes) and communication (radio,
telegraph, telephone, and television); and (2) the exploitation of the freedoms to
information and rights to free speech by citizens of democratic societies.
Contingent on the democratization of the majority of the European colonial
powers was the spread of anti-colonial propaganda. The resulting violent
protestations were founded on the ideological, nationalistic, and ethical
justifications for revolutionary movements (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e). Moreover,
the then newly founded UN had proclaimed the right of people to selfdetermination, offering corroborative justification for liberation movements
(Deen, 2005). Thus, the years 1945 to 1965 saw most liberation movements
make good on their political aspirations (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 215). The
overall success of liberation movements, then, could be primarily attributed to
propaganda, guerrilla and terroristic tactics, and the political exploitations of
democratic systems.

41

Neglected thus far in the discussion is that of the interstate.38 Particularly

evident since WWII are the terror tactics such as strategic bombings and foreign
covert operations used between states. Caught in the balance of terror of the
Cold Warwhen both invasive and nuclear warfare were untenablethe US and
the former Soviet Union were drawn into an arms and intelligence race primarily
fought through indirect, covert conflicts (Wallerstein, 2002). Consequently, postcolonial liberation movements were often knowingly or unknowingly exploited by
either superpower: by offering the revolutionaries assistance to oppose their
mutual enemy. Chaliand and Blin (2007e) consequently ascribes the surfacing of
new forms of terrorism to this period of decolonization: As the European
colonizers were no longer the supreme powers, superceded by the US and the
Soviet Union.
While the US was successful in eventually weakening the Soviets with
the overeager hands of the Islamic jihadists by providing financing, logistical
support, safe havens, and training centersfull comprehensive supportto the
Afghan resistance forces, their empowerment of extremist Islamists have
contingently weakened American hegemony as well (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p.
221). In fact Wallerstein (2002) proposes that the crucial debate is not whether
American hegemony will deteriorate but how it will deteriorate. By highlighting
the comparatively large proportion of transnational terrorist incidents directed
against the US, Enders and Sandler (2006) illustrate the prominence of antiAmericanism in the modern epoch of terrorismwhich they attribute to the
period from 1968 to the present. Anti-American sentiments are becoming more
impactful since the anti-colonial movements in the 1960s. While I am not up to
the challenge of predicting the future of American politics, let alone the global
order, the current geopolitical landscapeparticularly with the contemporary role
of terrorismcertainly seems to be corroborating Wallersteins (2002) theory.
This chapter thus leads to the concept of globalized terrorism, a postmodern
phenomenon which is commonly held to have arisen since the 1960s, and which
will be elaborated in the third chapter.

2.4 Conclusion
The PEA to terrorism research, while objective methodologically, is
subjective conceptually. To inform political decisions that seek support from
empirical evidence, it remains a salient approach to a phenomenon that is not so
easily recognized, let alone quantified. Nevertheless, I begin this enquiry with
this very methodology, arguing that terrorismas defined by the political
economists and the USDOSis increasingly lethal despite its gradual decline in
frequency since the 1980s. The hermeneutical art of recognizing terrorist events
38

The methodological, legal, and moral distinction between war and terror will be more fully
problematized in Chapter 4.

42

is therefore fundamental to what statistics one gets. Hence, a typology of terror

was constructed to encompass the entire species, which consists of the interstate,
oppressive, revolutionary, and globalized. To contextualize these ideal types
required a survey of its history, which traced the genealogy of such methods from
the premodern to the modern era. By reviewing historical manifestations of
terrorism, particularly in its revolutionary and oppressive forms, the history of
terrorism further reveals what statistical data cannot: That firstly, terrorism is a
violent politics that has been practiced since antiquity. And even though the
methodology continuously evolves to adapt to the terrorists contemporary
conditions, the core methodof justifying from a fundamental rationale the
extreme actions of coercive violence against certain targets recognized as fair
gameremains unchanged in the evolutionary history of terrorism. Secondly,
both state terror and genocides occupy different ends of the spectrum of
oppressive terrorism, and are distinguishable by the specificity of the criteria in
victim selection. And thirdly, as a self-justified act for attaining more sociopolitical power through coercive fear and propaganda by deed, terrorism is
founded on a self-defined set of immutable principles, be it religious or political,
oppressive or revolutionary. In other words, despite becoming more secular in
nature, terrorism remains ideologically founded: as a spectacular method of
extreme violence that is justified by a fundamental belief in a principle or cause.
However, such historical analyses also betray the expanse and limits of the
very discourse of terrorism by revealing how it is interpreted. Granted, the
historians approach appears to interpret terror less rigidly than the politicians and
economists by including the possibility of other forms of terrorism such as state
terror and terrorism in warfare, and contesting the boundaries demarcating the
nature of terrorism from other military strategies. The historical approach
construes the contemporary discourse of terrorism as a political strategy: as a
tactic for accruing power that exploits fear propagandized by violent spectacles to
coerce others for the terrorists own purpose. But do the ideal types of interstate,
oppressive, revolutionary, and globalized terror provide a good enough lens
through which to survey the history of terrorism? After all, to recognize a
historical event as terroristic requires a certain hermeneutical stance. Who has the
right vantage point? Before tackling these issues in Chapters 5 and 6, I need to
complete my survey of interstate terror by re-examining the conventional
distinctions between war and terrorism (in Chapter 4), and globalized terrorism (in
the next chapter). The latter is increasingly relevant in a world experiencing
intense forces of globalization: not only for politicians, soldiers, journalists, law
enforcers, or economists but for every person. If terrorism is fundamentally
founded on extremist ideologies, then its inculcation is of pivotal consideration.
In other words, there is a logical and ethical imperative to reconsider the critical
role of education. Therefore, to corroborate my argument that terrorism is a
freedom-restricting form of socio-political practice, a review of the contemporary

43

discourse of globalized terrorism and its distinction from war are of immediate
concern.

44

CHAPTER 3
GLOBALIZED TERRORISM

This is a new type of war (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Upon the United States, 2004, p. 46).
Remark made by the assistant to the NORAD mission crew
commander in New York at 10:02 am, September 11, 2001

Our methods of waging terrorist war must rise to contemporary

techniques of war.... Terror will be terror in the true sense of the
word only if it equals the revolutionary application of the highest
scientific technology at any given time (Ternon, 2007, p. 171).
Speech on The technique of terrorist war by the Russian
revolutionary Chernov in 1909

3.0 Introduction
There is something profoundly novel about the terror that we witness and
experience today. And yet, it remains essentially faithful to the tradition of
fomenting fear and unfreedom. This thesis premises that the aims of human
security and development, summarized as the freedom from fear and freedom
from want, are justifiable. Without food, water, shelter, or health care, the
impoverishedthat is, those deprived of the freedom to develop the capabilities
they find valuablestruggle daily on the brink of survival. Meeting such
essential goals of human development provide the means for expanding the
freedom of agents beyond the constraints of meeting basic needs. Yet at the same
time, lifeeven a longer lifewithout human security is to live a life of
uncertainty, fear, oppression, disempowerment, and injustice. Thus, human
freedom is constrained not only by a poverty of human development but also the
lack of human security. Interdependent and inseparable, human development and
security can be significantly hindered by coercive exercises of power such as
terrorism. It is being argued in this thesis that education is not only important for
economic development but also plays a profound and pivotal role in human
freedom by affecting the dispositions for terroristic practices. From Chapter 2,
what I am claiming is that the PEA to terrorism should be complemented by
historical and philosophical analyses. However, the reverse is also true:
Historical and philosophical theories of terrorism ought to be grounded in critical
observations, observations that are not robotically and arbitrarily restricted to a

45

mere statistical data.

Thus, the economic, historical, and philosophical
approaches to terrorism research are mutually beneficial and complementary.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, terrorism is historically prevalent. And still
tentatively employing Schmid and Jongmans (2005) definition of terrorism
(which was used to challenge the arbitrary domestic/international and state
terror/genocide divides, demarcate terrorism from other military tactics, and
organize terrorism according to the dynamics of violence), this chapter continues
the historical survey of terrorism by focusing on the subspecies that is dominating
the contemporary discourse. As political economists Enders and Sandler (2006)
and Pape (2003); theorists Hoffman (2006), Atran (2006), and Laqueur (2003);
and historians Chaliand and Blin (2007a) have noted; terrorism has evolved
dramatically since the 1960s. To understand the contemporary subspecies
requires the context of its evolutionary history. It is through such a historical
approach that the novelty of globalized terrorism can be better appreciated. This
chapter, then, continues the discussion of terrorism within its recent context: from
the 1960s to the 2000s. The influential role of Islamism in orienting
contemporary discourses of terrorism is analyzed and four keynote traits marking
its recent evolution are highlighted: publicity, religious-political extremism, antineocolonialism, and jihadism. By noting the key traits of its evolutionary phases,
the concept of globalized terrorism is formulated. Globalized terrorism
denotes the contemporary understanding of terrorism as a practice different from
previous manifestations in terms of organization, modus operandi, and
victimization. The concept is thus important for framing the contemporary
terrorism discourse. It not only challenges some common conceptual dividers
such as the domestic/transnational and religious/secular distinctions, but also
denotes the popular notion of terrorism as being increasingly lethal, spectacular,
postmodern, and extreme. It is within this discourse of globalized terrorism that
the sociological process of reproducing (or altering) the fundamental mentalities
that drive the practice of terror begins to emerge.

3.1 The modern evolution of terrorism

The definition of terrorism as necessitated by the PEA is disconcertingly
narrow. While Schmid and Jongmans (2005) definition is more encompassing, it
should be further expanded conceptuallyas I had suggested and will defend in
subsequently.39 But before that philosophical project can begin, the recent and
controversial discourse of terrorism requires some foundational consolidation.
The contemporary recognition of terrorism by the public, media, governments,
and academics has been evolving with the practice itself. Particularly, some
scholars studying terrorism have noted significant changes in the phenomenon
39

Chapters 4 and 5 will mainly focus on the deconstruction of the essence of terror in an attempt to
establish a more coherent and less arbitrary theory of socio-political terrorism.

46

within the latter half of the twentieth century. Laqueur (2003) suggests that
terrorism has become indiscriminate after WWII and now global since the 1990s.
Meanwhile, Chaliand and Blin (2007b) argue that contemporary terrorism has
evolved in staggered increments following the Six-Day War in 1967.
Contemporary terrorism, to which I refer to as globalized terrorism,
share similar fundamentals with its other subspecies: the self-justifying struggle
for power, mediagenic propaganda hyperbolizing fear, and practice of extremism
driven by fundamentalist ideologies. However, globalized terrorism can also be
distinguished from its predecessors: notably by being increasingly indiscriminate
in victim selection, destructive in methodology, religiously fundamental (once
again) in ideological motivation, transnationally decentralized in structure, and
globally funded through financial networks. The history of globalized terrorism
correlates to recent developments in terrorism that are inextricablybut not
exclusivelyintertwined with the re-emergence of religious, anti-neocolonial
politics (commonly depicted as Islamism), and the coincidental developments in
transportation, communication, and weaponry. I should stress that while Islamism
is the most salient representation of terrorism post-9/11, there is a plurality of
extremist ideologies both religious and secular that have fuelled and legitimized
terrorist motivations. Thus this chapter begins with a brief but much warranted
elaboration of Islamism before highlighting four keynote developments within the
narrative of globalized terrorism: the demonstrative terrorism for the liberation of
Palestine in the late 1960s, the reincarnation of religious extremism in the Iranian
Revolution in the late 1970s, the anti-neocolonial suicide attacks in Beirut in the
early 1980s, and the international terrorism by jihadists since the 1990s.

3.1.1 Islamism, fundamentalism, and extremism

One pertinent conceptual issue concerns the terms that denote the minority
of Muslims who are disposed to a religious-political vision of establishing a
theocratic Islamic empire. Nomenclature such as radicals, fanatics, extremists,
militants, fundamentalists, Islamists, jihadists, mujahedins, Wahhabis, Salafis,
Islamofascists, neo-Islamists, and post-Islamists, are all contested terms
characterizing their assertion that the literal exegesis of both oral and scriptural
Islamic teachings are the only legitimate guidelines for the self, society, and law
(Atran, 2006). Intolerant of heterodoxy, they seek the replacement of existing
political regimes by a caliphate run on Islamist dogma. This divine mission is of
such primacy for some that it transcends organic life and can sanctify the use of
nearly any methodologyincluding suicide terrorism by men, women, and
children, upon likewise.
From the time of Voltaire (who coined the term) to WWI, Islamism was
synonymous with the Islamic faith (Kramer, 2003). But since the 1970s,
Islamism has come to denote a new postmodern Islam that encapsulates a
religious-political ideologyone that prescribes the way of life not only on the
47

personal level, but also for society, the political state, and the world order
(Kramer, 2003). Contemporary Islamism is postmodern in the sense of being
critical of Western modernity while retaining a fundamentalist belief attitude.
As Habermas points out, a fundamentalist belief attitude addresses not the
content but the manner of belief (Borradori, 2003, p. 18). Here, I call this
uncompromising belief attitude fundamentalism, to distinguish it from
extremism which embodies the excessive practices that may or may not result
from such rationalizations. Although Islam is commonly highlighted to be
inextricably intertwined with fundamentalism, all ideologies could in fact be held
with such a fundamentalist belief attitude (Robins & Post, 1997). As Barber
(2003) argues, the claim that radical Islam is a form of totalitarianism is a
dangerous distortion that singles out Islamic fundamentalism for problems
endemic to all religions, and indeed, to all beliefs (p. 188). While Islamists may
be denoted as fundamentalist Muslims, fundamentalism is an uncompromising
belief attitude that can be found in all sorts of ideological beliefsbe it modern,
premodern, or postmodern; religious or secular.
Fundamentalists hold a belief attitude that ignores the epistemic situation
of a pluralistic society and insist on the universally binding character and
political acceptance of their doctrine (Borradori, 2003, p. 31). Thus, Islamists
belong to but one set of fundamentalist denominations within the diverse
population of Muslims worldwide marked by a vast range of hermeneutics. The
Foucauldian concept of political spirituality is central to Islamism: as the set of
ideological beliefs and rationale that places Islamic texts and teachings as the only
and ultimate reference by which to guide personal, social, political, and legal
changes (Afary & Anderson, 2005). In other words, Islamism is marked by an
uncritical and uncompromising hermeneutic of spiritual-political dogma that is
intolerant of difference. As Robins and Post (1997) point out, the essence of
Islam is to govern all aspects of lifelife in a unified sense that is without the
demarcations of politics, religion, law, and society derived from Western
traditions. For Islamists, there is only Islam.
While such a denotation of Islamism necessitates a fundamentalist belief
attitude, it does not necessarily implicate the use of physical violence in the
pursuit of such radical changes. Therefore it is necessary to distinguish moderate
fundamentalists from those who uphold their fundamentalism in extreme ways.
Here, I call those who put their fundamentalism into forms of radical practice as
extremists. In other words, while fundamentalists may hold onto their beliefs with
an excessively uncompromising attitude, extremists defend and promote their
fundamentalism in extreme ways that breach socio-cultural norms.
Fundamentalism is the essential, underlying belief attitude that rationalizes and
motivates extremist practices.40 As a socially constituted and transferable set of
40

See Figure 3.1.1 for a framework illustrating extremism as the set of immoderate practices that
necessitates a fundamentalist belief attitude. There are far too many examples of potentially

48

mental and behavioral dispositions, extremism is embodied by the excessive, nondeliberative actions taken from an uncompromising rationale and infallible
attitude. The majority of Islamists is thus separable from the minority (who
promote and impose such ideological changes violently) according to their
extremism. The actions that distinguish extremists from mere fundamentalists
entail the willingness to extend a mentality into the realm of practiceone
marked by an excessive, fanatical fervor. In short, while fundamentalism
merely describes an uncompromising attitude towards all sorts of beliefs,
extremism describes the extension of such belief attitudes into practice. 41 Such
extremism must transcend the conventional practices that are normatively
tolerable within a particular culture. In the case of human rights discourse, an
action could be considered extremist, or too excessive, when human security
yields to the defense or imposition of a preferred belief.42
Not only then does extremism refer to the coercive violence exerted for the
sake of an ideology and its power, but it also denotes the deliberate inactions that
fail to prevent violations of human security because of such beliefs (such as the
denial of potentially life-saving medical treatment for children due to their
guardians religious beliefs).43 On this view of extremism as both the actions and
inactions founded on a fundamentalist belief attitude, Derrida thus challenges that
terrorism may not be necessarily be voluntary, conscious, organized, deliberate,
intentionally calculated but may also be passive (Borradori, 2003, p. 108). After
all, the majority of modern worlds population is oppressed by structural violence
or suffers from the terror of poverty, starvation, or preventable diseases on a daily
basis. Can such passive negligence to intervene, and thereby consent to such
imminent consequences, also be terrorism? Central to the problem of terrorism
and its perpetuation therefore is the recognition of terror and terrorists.44
In sum, jihadists are those Muslims so fundamentalist in belief attitude
that they sanctify violence, or jihad, as a justifiable way to impose Islamic law
as the blueprint for the self, society, state, and world (Laqueur, 2003). Jihadism
is thus representative of the extremist violence justified by a fundamentalist belief
attitude towards a version of Islamic political-spirituality. However, I want to
reiterate that jihadism is only one extremist version of Islam. More generally,
extremism can be the means for pursuing both religious and political goals by all
fundamentalist beliefs and the consequent extremist actions to be listed in the diagram. In other
words, any belief can be believed with a fundamentalist attitude, one that is unscrutinizable and
uncompromisable. However, all extremist acts are founded on a fundamental rationale, whatever
its causematerial or abstract, secular or religious.
41
Extremism, like fundamentalism and terrorism, tends to carry negative connotations crossculturally, which may hinder the application of the qualifier.
42
The common contention that terrorism is necessarily extremist, that is, defined by the violation
of conventional norms will be critically examined in Chapter 4.
43
See Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Religious exemptions from
child abuse statutes, Pediatrics, 1988, 81(1):169-71.
44
The recognition of terrorism and terrorists is further discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

49

kinds of fundamentalists. In other words, extremism can manifest in many

beliefsboth religious and secular, and not only in Islam. Such a clarification of
Islamism, fundamentalism, and extremism is thus useful for further analyzing
their salience in the contemporary discourse of terrorism.

3.1.2 1968: Terrorism for publicity

Chaliand and Blin (2007a) cites the 1967 defeat of the Arab states by the
Israelis in merely six days as the contextual rise of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO)a wealthy group of paramilitaries. However, the PLOs
inability to defeat Israel eventually led to its fragmented employment of terrorism
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007a). The PLO thus initiated the tactic of what was then
widely called publicity terrorism, or what Pape (2003) now calls demonstrative
terrorism (p. 345). In July 1968, PLOs second-largest factionthe PFLP
hijacked an El Al flight from Rome to Israel and diverted it to Athens (Pape,
2003). After the thirty-nine-day spectacle, the PFLP continued a series of similar
terrorist operations against civil aviation until 1976, during which ten aircrafts
were affected and emphatically brought media attention to the Palestinian cause
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007a).45 Perhaps the most spectacular Palestinian operation
during this period was the Munich Massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics.
Members of the terrorist group Black September took eleven Israeli members of
the Olympic team hostage and demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in
Israeli jails, plus, in a gesture to win leftist European sympathy, Andreas Baader
and Ulrike Meinhof, Germanys most notorious urban guerrillas (Wolff, 2002, p.
3). If the prisoners were not released, the terrorists threatened to execute one
hostage every hour.
In terms of characterizing terrorism evolution, the Munich Massacre is
particularly notable for the terrorists pure focus on maximizing publicity
through propaganda by deed. So intent on eliciting sympathy and demonstrating
integrity, the terrorists rejected offers of an unlimited amount of money and an
exchange of the hostages for a number of German officials including Genscher
(the future foreign minister), Schreiber (the Munich police chief), Merk (interior
minister), and Trger (the ceremonial mayor of the Olympic village) (Wolff,
45

In fact, Enders and Sandlers (2006) spectral analysis of terrorism incidents led to their
conclusion that the cyclical pattern in the data (see Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) was primarily
attributable to the copycat effect: where a successful terrorist strategy reveals a weak spot in
security defenses and thereby showing the way for more copycat attacks. And as a cluster of
successful copycat attacks pressure governments to devise more effective counterterrorism
measures, subsequent attacks will be increasingly inhibited. News of foiled attacks will prevent
other copycats by forcing them to reconsider their strategythereby initiating a hiatus. During
such times terrorists can devise new plans, recruit new members, and acquire new weapons and
funding. This rebuilding of the terrorists resources can occur until an event occurs that
precipitates another round of attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2006, p. 69). Only this time around, the
strategy will have evolved to exploit new weaknesses in the counterterrorism measures in an
unceasing, cyclical game of cat and mouse.

50

2002). According to journalist Cooley (1973), the kidnappers proclaimed that

both money and even their own lives meant nothing to them. And when Genscher
protested to Issa, the leader of the kidnappers, that the hostages were innocent,
Issa replied: I am a soldier. We are at war (Wolff, 2002, p. 4).
Not only did these extremists extend the concept of war beyond the
conventional discourse of many peoples, they were also incessantly mediagenic.

The terrorists pushed back their deadline twice more..., knowing that each delay
only redoubled the TV audience. The demand to free our imprisoned brothers had
only symbolic value, Al-Gashey would say later. The only aim of the action was
to scare the world public during their happy Olympic Games and make them aware
of the fate of the Palestinians (Wolff, 2002, p. 4).

Despite the fact that all eleven Israeli hostages and five of the eight terrorists were
killed during the crisis, such forms of demonstrative terrorism aim to gain
publicity, for any or all of three reasons: to recruit more activists, to gain
attention to grievances from softliners on the other side, and to gain attention from
third parties who might exert pressure on the other side (Pape, 2003, p. 345).
With the waning of the mediagenic skyjackings as the terrorist strategy, a more
extreme form of destructive terrorism arose. Still, the demonstrative strategies
of the 1960s-1970s left in its wake a symbiosis between the spectacle of terror and
the modern mediaa relationship that would only grow more interdependent in a
globalizing world.

3.1.3 1979: The reincarnation of religious-political extremism

Having emphasized the secularization of ideological motivations behind
modern terrorism in Chapter 2, the premodern religious motivation has reemerged in the contemporary subspecies of terrorism. One prominent example
for Habermas is Ayatollah Khomeinis ideological vision of an Islamic caliphate:
a mission that is intolerant of the evil infidels who dominate the world and
contaminate the purity of Islamism. Habermas thus considers the theocratic state
of Iran as embodying fundamentalismexemplifying a return to the exclusivity
of premodern belief attitudes despite the cognitive conditions of scientific
knowledge and religious pluralism (Borradori, 2003, p. 32). Such reincarnation
of extreme religious-political fundamentalism became prominent after the
widespread decolonization movements post-WWII and is epitomized by the
successful establishment of a political spiritualitythe Islamic Republic of Iran
in 1979.
The Iranian revolution initiated terrorist strategies that reached beyond
national borders, blending a revolutionary policy of terror with the practice of
51

religious terrorism that can be traced all the way back to the Assassins (Chaliand
& Blin, 2007g, p. 99). As Chaliand and Blin (2007a) argue, the Iranian revolution
marked the striking success of radical Shiite Islamism as it inspired Hezbollah,
Hamas, al-Qaeda, and many others, in a tradition that sanctified martyrdom even
by means of suicide bombings against civilians (p. 221). Gr (2007) also
specifies Irans 1979 creation of the bassidje, or organized volunteers of youths
roughly fifteen years old for suicide attacks, as evidence of such religious-political
extremism. According to Gr (2007), youths under the age of 18 were enlisted
because they were enthusiastic, more manipulable, and too young to join the
army. Khomeinis political propaganda phrased in theological terms glorified
martyrdom to the extent that it was able to overcome the opposition of the
bassidjes families to their enrolment.

Previously, such themes [of martyrdom] had never been the subject of systematic
preaching. Religion... was strategically oriented to meet newly decreed political
needs.
The recently installed religious leadership adapted religion to the
circumstances with genuinely revolutionary and patriotic opportunism.... [O]ne
might wonder whether the development of suicide volunteers as a weapon could
have been an instrument of control for the leader and the governmental system....
(Gr, 2007, p. 376)

Grs (2007) example thus serves to illustrate the political nature of religious
extremism (or religious nature of political extremism).
Pape (2003) alternatively suggests that suicide terrorism is not limited to
extreme Islamists:
suicide tactics also figure prominently in nationalist
movements aiming at self-determination. He rightly points that although jihadists
receive the most Western publicity, statistically, the worlds leader in suicide
terrorism is actually the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the guerrilla
separatists in northeast Sri Lanka holding a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Pape,
2003, p. 343).

The LTTE alone accounts for 75 of the 186 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to
2001. Even among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account
for about a third of these attacks... (Pape, 2003, p. 343).

However, there is a need to clarify the relation between the re-emergence

of religiously motivated terrorism and the new emergence of the methodology of
suicide terrorism. Laqueur (2003) sees the Islamic factor as being prominently
involved in the rise of religious fanaticism in contemporary terrorism, by citing
that almost 90 percent of the recent religious conflicts appear in Muslim

52

countries and societies (p. 19). However, the historical evidence fails to show
that the rise of suicide tactics is predominantly and directly due to the rise of
jihadism. As Laqueur (2003) also points out, the secular Tamil Tigers...
produced more suicide bombers in the 1990s than any other terrorist movement...
(p. 26). In other words, extremism can arise from secular, political ideology
including nationalismjust as it can arise from religious doctrine. Alcorta and
Sosis (2005) emphasize that the adoption of communal rituals and initiation rites
by nominally secular terrorists groups, such as the LTTE, and their quasideification of Marxist-Leninist ideals, blurs the line between what is secular and
what is religious (p. 110). In terms of extremism then, one wonders whether a
secular/religious distinction is even necessary.
Another issue is the suicide qualifier of terrorism. According to Pape
(2003):

What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is that the attacker does not expect to survive a
mission and often employs a method of attack that requires the attackers death in
order to succeed (such as planting a car bomb, wearing a suicide vest, or ramming
an airplane into a building). In essence, a suicide terrorist kills others at the same
time that he kills himself.... In practice, however, suicide terrorists often seek
simply to kill the largest number of people (p. 345).

Although suicide terrorism does appear to be a new methodology that entails the
killing of the terrorist during the act in order to maximize casualties, a suicide
terrorist may not be so easily distinguishable from a non-suicide terrorist on the
basis of the terrorists expectation to survive the attack. As Ternon (2007) points
out, perhaps with the exception of oppressive terrorists, most revolutionary
terrorists since antiquity knew that they were taking great risk and that death was
the most likely outcome of their terrorist action (p. 132). The expectation of
deathwhether in the preparation of the bombs, carrying out of the mission,
consequence of being captured, or affiliation with an outlawed groupmust
figure prominently in the mind of any calculating terrorist. Such presuppositions
of death are succinctly captured in Issas exhortations to his fellow non-suicide
terrorists on the eve of the 1972 Munich Massacre:

From now on, consider yourself dead. As killed in action for the Palestinian cause...
(Wolff, 2002, p. 3).

53

Like modern revolutionary terrorists, anyone choosing terrorism has likely

forfeited the dream of a long and prosperous life for a cause that is more
important than self-preservation and longevity.46
The controversial salience of Islamism in the recent re-awakening of
religion-motivated terrorism is partially skewed by its biased publicity in the
Western media, which tends to identify suicide bombers as being mostly jihadists
from the Middle East. As Laqueur (2003) notes, suicide bombings have also been
applied in various places (such as Southeast Asia and the Balkans) by Islamic,
non-Muslim, and atheist groups. Literally, thousands of journalists wrote about
the suicide bombers of the Palestinian Hamas... whereas the Tamil Tigers (LTTE)
in Sri Lanka were virtually ignored due to its perception as being a domestic
affair without international repercussions (Laqueur, 2003, pp. 78-79).
Consequently, the common assertion that the fundamentalism fuelling suicide
terrorism is inevitably religious is disputableparticularly if one challenges the
non-mutually exclusive manifestations of extremism from both secular and
religious fundamentalism. The secular/religious divide in describing rationale of
terrorist practice is therefore unnecessary and arguable. What I am proposing is
that extremism (which puts into practice religious/secular fundamentalism) is the
keynote trait marking the evolution of globalized terrorism since the 1980s. It is
the media that has facilitated the intertwining of Islamism with suicide attacks into
the spectacle that dominates the contemporary discourse of terrorism.

3.1.4 1983: Anti-neocolonial suicide terrorism

As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of bombs and the suicidal nature of
terrorism have been evident for over a century. But the synergetic fusion of
fundamentalism with extremist tactics into a fear-inspiring methodologyaptly
known as suicide terrorismonly rose to prominence in the 1980s. Suicide
terrorism supposedly diverges from its predecessors in methodology by
maximizing casualties through killing oneself in the process of the attack. But do
suicide tactics statistically effectuate more casualties than that of the nonsuicidal? What, if any, are the underlying motives behind suicide tactics, which
have become the strategy of choice of contemporary terrorists?
On analyzing the effectiveness of suicide terrorism, Papes (2003)
seminal paper argues that suicide tactics tend to be more destructive than other
terroristic strategies because an attacker can more easily conceal weapons, make
last-minute adjustments, and infiltrate protected targets. Using USDOS data,
Pape (2003) estimates that an average of 13 people were killed in each of the 188
46

This is one possible correlation between the rise of extremist fundamentalism and suicide
terrorism: Promises of a glorious and eternal afterlife post-martyrdom can provide the incentive
for rational terrorists to choose the more effective suicide tactics. Consequently, any PEA to
terrorism founded on a theory of rational choice may neglect other important rationales in the mind
of terrorists.

54

suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001, whereas less than one person was
killed on average in each of the 4,155 terrorist incidents worldwide during the
same periodif the unusually large number of fatalities from 9/11 are excluded
from the calculations (p. 346). Excluding 9/11, suicide attacks from 1980 to 2001
accounted for only three percent of all terrorist attacks but 48 percent of all
terrorism-related deaths (Pape, 2003). This finding then suggests one factor that
accounts for the increase in casualties from terrorism despite the decrease in
incidents as illustrated in Figures 2.1.9 and 2.1.10. Enders and Sandlers (2006)
copycat theory offers a corroborative account for the growth of suicide tactics.
Tending to be harder to deter, causing more casualties, generating more publicity,
instilling more fear, and being more coercive, each successful suicide attack
becomes an inspirational model for subsequent copycat attackseven if terrorist
motivations and goals are different. In other words, the perceived effectiveness of
the strategy makes its adoption by other potential terrorists more appealing. But
this theory only explains its propagation and not its cause.
In accounting for the motivation of suicide terrorists, Papes (2003) thesis
is that the resentment of a foreign occupier in a home territory is the central
motive for all suicide terrorist campaigns.

From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide terrorist
campaign from 1980 to 2001 has been waged by terrorist groups whose main goal
has been to establish or maintain self determination for their communitys homeland
by compelling an enemy to withdraw (Pape, 2003, p. 344).

Atran (2006) rejects Papes (2005) attribution of suicide terrorism to the political
goal of self-determination by arguing that religion, especially extremist Islamism,
is now more than ever at the heart of suicide terrorist motivation. Atran (2006)
cites that the LTTE have carried out only two confirmed suicide attacks since
2002 while various Iraqi groups in 2005 alone carried out more than 400 suicide
attacks killing more than 2,000 peopleclaiming more victims than in the entire
history of the LTTE. Rather than taking on either side of this common,
dichotomous debate, Alcorta and Sosis (2005) and Laqueur (2003) reasonably
view the phenomenon of suicide terrorism as being founded on pseudo-religious
ideology. The blur between religious and political ideologies in terrorism is
especially problematic with the evident spirituality in the secular and the secular
in the religious.47 In other words, suicide terrorists can be regarded as highly
determined individuals whose rationale for self-sacrifice is framed within some
communal cause. Such ideological motivations are not well described as being
either religious or secular: They are instead unified in a fundamentalist belief
47

Consider for example the many factions of the PLO, the LTTE, Aum Shinrikyo, and the many
Zionist and jihadist groups.

55

attitude that makes extremist actions an ethical imperative. This is why

contemporary terrorists are increasingly commonly labeled as being
postmodern: their extremism driven is by a fundamentalist ressentiment of the
cultural, economic, and political ways of modern society.
This discourse of terrorism fuses suicidal tactics with anti-neocolonial
sentiments. The negative effects of globalization are leading to grievances which
are sometimes vented through terrorism both suicidal and conventional
(Savelsberg, 2006). If Chaliand and Blin (2007a) and Lia (2005) are right in
arguing that a radical critique of socio-economic, political, and cultural
domination is central to the spirit of contemporary terrorism, then this
phenomenon (which is increasingly suicidal) can been described as being antineocolonial in rationale. The coercive power of suicide terrorism, then, is
synergized with anti-neocolonialism.
While colonialism refers to the processes by which territories became
legally controlled by foreign political powers, neocolonialism denotes the
processes that subordinate developing countries to the political, economic, and
socio-cultural powers of the developed countries in the postcolonial era (Willis,
2005). Although formal colonies are no longer legally occupied in a post-colonial
era, our globalized world remains riddled with power disparities between nations
such that new neocolonies have arisen. The exploitation of the Majority through
the imposition of foreign capitals (socio-economic, political, and cultural) by the
Minorityincluding their developmental regimes and multinational corporations
(MNCs)have continued the domination of the subaltern by their former colonial
masters.48 As Nkrumah (1965) argues, Majority neocolonies only appear
autonomous but its political and economic systems are substantively influenced
by Minority powers. Foreign aid, commonly entailing a form of investment by
the Minority, could be completely neocolonial or nationalistic in intention, and
thus, be potentially disadvantageous to the dependent state.49

The question is one of power. A State in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of
its own destiny. It is this factor which makes neo-colonialism such a serious threat
to world peace.... Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those
who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from
48

In light of the binaries common in the discourse of development theories (i.e.,

developed/developing, first/third world, north/south, etc.), I will use the Minority World to
denote the countries of North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; and the
Majority World to refer to the countries in the (economically) poorer regions of the world (e.g.,
Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia, and the Caribbean). The Majority/Minority binary
emphasizes that fact that over 79 percent of the worlds population lives in what the UN would
categorize as developing countries while the minority lives in developed countries (Willis,
2005). The Majority/Minority distinction also betrays some of the Western-centric power relations
embedded in the language and discourse of development.
49
See Arturo Escobars post-development theory in his 1995 book, Encountering Development:
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, published by Princeton University Press.

56

it, it means exploitation without redress.... Foremost among the neo-colonialists is

the United States... (Nkrumah, 1965).

While the US has participated minimally in colonialism (unlike the European

powers), America has used as leverage its capitals to establish cultural, economic,
and political (including military) presence in nearly every continent in the
postcolonial world.50 Thus, instead of Papes (2003) insistence on the centrality
of anti-colonialism in todays terror, anti-neocolonialism marks its theme: as
extremist reactions against oppressive powers, both real and symbolic, to resist
their exploitive intrusion into the socio-economic, political, and cultural fields of
the Majority.
Enders and Sandler (2006) thus argue that from 1968-2003, 40% of all
transnational terrorist attacks were against US citizens or property (p. 41). Such
anti-neocolonial ressentiment (within which anti-Americanism is most prominent)
is central to the discourse of globalized terrorism. Its motivation is exemplified
by the suicide bombings of the US Embassy and the French and American
Barracks in Beirut in 1983. Chaliand and Blin (2007a) regard the Beirut attacks
that killed 241 American Marines and 53 French paratroopers as the single
most significant development for international terrorism (pp. 222-223). Laqueur
(2003) similarly traces the regular use of suicide terrorism to the 1983 Beirut
bombings. In short, it is commonly recognized as a watershed event that ushered
in a wave of anti-neocolonial, suicidal attacks by extreme Islamists (Robins &
Post, 1997).
Without a society from the effects of neocolonialism, anti-neocolonialism
is regarded as a pervasive ressentiment that motivates a resistant terror. Within
this discourse, suicide terroristsespecially jihadists have become the icon of
todays terrorist. And as the global audience becomes desensitized to violence
the virtual in the Minority and the real in the Majorityincreasingly spectacular
forms of terrorism such as suicide attacks are needed to generate enough fear to be
coercive. If the effectiveness of suicide tactics can be measured by the average
casualties inflicted and concessions made in response, then suicide terrorism
during the 1980s truly inspired much copycats all over world.

3.1.5 1991-2001: Globalized jihadism

The unmistakable evolution of globalized terrorism in the decade prior to
2001 primarily corresponded to the geopolitical changes of extreme Islamism in
Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 coalesced international
Islamist guerrillas (commonly called the mujahedin) into the jihad. Jihadism
50

There are many publications on the issue of anti-Americanism. In the confines of this thesis,
anti-Americanism is one central dimension of anti-neocolonialismwith America being a
neocolonial power in a postcolonial world.

57

embodies extremist Islamism as the extension of fundamentalist mentalities into

extremist methodologies framed as a holy war. The anti-Soviet jihad became a
global call to defend Islam. But not wanting the mujahedin to simply dissolve
following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam
founded al-Qaeda for future jihad. The jihadist coalition thus dispersed and
evolved into a many-headed, independent political-military movement found in
virtually every Muslim country (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, pp. 223, 229).

In Sudan, he [Osama bin Laden] established an Islamic Army Shura that was to
serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he
was forging alliances.... In building this Islamic army, he enlisted groups from
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia,
Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea. Al Qaeda also established cooperative but less
formal relationships with other extremist groups from these same countries; from the
African states of Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda; and from the Southeast
Asian states of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Bin Ladin maintained
connections in the Bosnian conflict as well. The groundwork for a true global
terrorist network was being laid (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, 2004, p. 58).

With their military training, experience, and resources in asymmetric warfare and
their validated victory over the Soviet superpower, the jihadist movement became
international, lending their support to extreme Islamist movements around the
world. Because global jihadis... fought against perceived global domination,
their enemies were primarily neocolonial state powers (Atran, 2006, p. 131).
Without any legal legitimacy in engaging and realistic hope of defeating through
conventional war the focal point of their ressentimentwhich is primarily the
Israelis and Americans after the collapse of the Soviet Unionjihadism from
1991 to 2001 is predominantly terroristic in strategy. The car-bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York in 1993, the Khobar Towers truck-bombing in
Saudi Arabia in 1996, the suicide truck-bombings of the US embassies in East
Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) in 1998, the suicide boat-bombings of the American
warship the USS Cole in 2000, and the infamous 9/11 suicide attacks on America
in 2001; are the anti-American examples illustrating how the anti-neocolonial yet
globalizing jihad has evolved from being regional guerrillas into globalized
terrorists. This loose federation of terrorist groupsunited by jihadismis
thus central to the new globalization of terrorism (Laqueur, 2003, p. 50).
A brief historical overview of recent manifestations of terrorism has
highlighted that:
(1) Terrorism, though always publicity-minded, has become increasingly
destructive.
(2) Though the religious/secular dichotomy of extremism is problematic in
concept, it is prominent in contemporary terrorism discourses.
58

(3) As a form of extremism, suicide terror is regarded as being essentially

motivated by the ressentiment of neocolonialism, an oppressive aspect of
globalization.
Given that Islamism entails a fundamentalist belief attitude, some Islamists take
their anti-neocolonialism and politico-religious vision to extreme ends by
justifying the use of suicide terrorism in jihad. And as the symbiotic media
projects jihadism into a global spectacle, it both: advertises its cause and modus
operandi to sympathizers everywhere and at the same time, demonizes jihadists to
the Minority and the moderates in the Majority. Through such historical
contingencies and in such geopolitical contexts, jihadism has come to epitomize
globalized terrorism.

3.2 Globalized terrorism

While I have emphasized the importance of historical context in
understanding the evolution of terrorism, Laqueur (2003) contends that the roots
of terrorism at the beginning of the twenty-first century cannot be based
exclusively on the experience of earlier phases (2003, p. 29). He argues that as
terrorist groups become smaller and more autonomous, they not only become
harder to survey and infiltrate, but their ideologies are likely to be more eccentric.

Very small groups of people do not aim at conducting propaganda, building up

political mass movements, and seizing power; they aim at destruction in the hope
that... a better world will emerge... more in line with their ideology (Laqueur, 2003,
p. 209).

I partially agree with Laqueur (2003) that todays terrorism is, to a significant
degree, unprecedented primarily in methodology. However, delineating from the
common new versus old dichotomy, terrorism as a practice can be better
understood by analyzing its morphology within its evolutionary ancestry.
Contemporary manifestations of terror cannot be completely distinguished from
that practiced in the pasteven if it has been evolving particularly rapidly with
globalization. The traits marking globalized terrorism can be better understood
when compared to its antecedents in three major respects: organization, modus
operandi, and victim targeting.

3.2.1 Organization
The official end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989 marked the beginning
of jihadism as a global movement, as discussed in Chapter 3.1.5. But a
subsequent war in Afghanistan, part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
59

declared by the US-led coalition in response to 9/11, has accelerated the evolution
of the already globalizing jihad. The perceived success of 9/11 by the jihadists
facilitated the identification of al-Qaeda as the nemesis of American hegemony.
While there are other transnational terrorist organizations that subscribe to various
fundamentalist ideologies endorsing extremism, the GWOT has made Osama bin
Laden, al-Qaeda, and jihadists in general the icons of contemporary terrorists.
Because war is a convention between legitimate political authorities, the legal and
political status of al-Qaeda was further legitimized when America declared war
on the non-state organization (Feiser, 2004). Paradoxically then, the GWOT has
made these globalized terrorists both weaker and stronger at the same time. While
al-Qaeda may have been singled-out and physically disrupted by the many facets
of counterterrorism,51 they are symbolically stronger as its consequence.

...[I]t has morphed and widely proliferated into something far more difficult, if not
impossible, to destroy, because there now exists no corporal centralized command
structure to attack. Physical attacks against it have become much more difficult,
therefore. And the ideological attacks and measures required to discredit, delegitimize and dissolve the trademark have barely been mounted (Feiser, 2004).

Al-Qaedas symbolic power has attracted global fans to its brand name. Thus by
highlighting al-Qaeda as Americas foremost public enemy, it increasingly
embodies anti-Americanism, a favorable and attractive quality with some
populations in certain parts of the world. In other words, the GWOT
simultaneously advertises an al-Qaeda brand name that fills certain transnational,
cultural niches. To identify with al-Qaeda is to be an anti-American rebel,
thereby imbued with the symbolic capital that comes with such branding in
particular societies. The contingent development of a global al-Qaeda network as
being the brand of jihadismand terrorism in generalis made manifest in its
organization and operations.
Not only did the GWOT help define and advertise al-Qaeda as the global
brand of jihadism, it forced local jihadist groups to further disperse
decentralizing its leadership into autonomous cells networked through a unified
ideology. The elimination of the physical al-Qaeda nexus resulted in the
decentralization of its regional elements into like-minded, local leadership
groups (Feiser, 2004). Hoffman (2007) distinguishes the al-Qaeda locals from
those in the network: the former being directly trained, funded, and organized
by al-Qaeda while the latter are often homegrown cells that claim al-Qaeda
membership and subscribe to their ideological brand of jihadism. Known as
sleeper cells, these indigenous terrorists usually inhabit the targeted
51

Counterterrorism includes the offensive measures that attack terrorists, assets (including
resources and infrastructure), and their supporters (including safe havens and sponsors); and the
defensive measures that preemptively deters future attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2006).

60

geographical region (Hoffman, 2007). They are in short, glocal al-Qaeda

members: globally networked to jihadism but locally based in operations.
Furthermore, the process of radicalization is being harnessed by al-Qaeda
agents... that seek to exploit radical converts for terrorist purposes (Hoffman,
2007, p. 94). In terms of management philosophy then, the ideological authority
is centralized while the execution of their orders is decentralized among
sympathetic followers in the diaspora. Such dispersed terrorist cells in the global
network draw on the symbolic power and legitimacy of the brand while at the
same time remain autonomous in localized missions.
Referring to the operational plans of al-Qaeda members to release cyanide
gas in the New York City subways in 2002 (which was reportedly called off by alZawahiri), a Pakistani human intelligence, or humint asset referred to as Ali,
provided an illustration of the inner workings of the jihadist networks (Suskind,
2006, p. 6). According to Ali, the Saudi members who travelled to the US were
only loosely managed by al-Qaeda (Suskind, 2006, p. 7).

They were part of a wider array of self-activated cells across Europe and the gulf,
linked by an ideology of radicalism and violence, and by affection for bin Laden.
They were affiliates, not tightly tied to a broader al-Qaeda structure, but still
attentive to the wishes of bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. Al-Ayeri passed al-Zawahiris
message to the terror cell in the U.S. They backed off (Suskind, 2006, p. 7).

In other words, the cellular networks that have come to define the structure of
globalized terrorists are franchises of the organization. And while their evolution
was accelerated by the GWOT, it is facilitated by the instruments of
globalization.
One inherent and constant trait of revolutionary terrorist organizations is
their need to remain clandestine in operation. Because such asymmetric strategies
are practiced by those unable to engage in open war, secrecy is needed to
effectively foment paranoid fear. Globalization is thus instrumental for the
dispersions of clandestine groups. Given that internal communication is
necessary to consolidate unity and coordinate operations, information and
communication technologies provide the efficiency and anonymity needed for
globalized terrorists. While transportation technologies facilitate the ease of
international travel, the internet in particular facilitates the geographical dispersal
and networking of memberships: providing sites for propaganda, recruitment, and
instruction.52 Not only have globalizing technologies facilitated the evolution of
terrorist organizations into global networks, but policies conducive to
globalization have also been instrumental. Democratization promotes the right for
52

The role of the internet in globalized terrorist groups is further discussed in Chapter 3.2.2.

61

citizens to leave or enter their country, thereby enhancing the ease of transnational
movements.53
Furthermore, economic globalization also facilitates the financing of
terrorist organizations.
With the capitalist movement, wealth is increasingly
accumulated individually and controlled privately. Moreover, the policies and
technologies that promote free and unregulated flows of capital in neoliberal
economics have led to a dizzying, global maze of virtual trades and transactions
(Beck, 2000). Affluent sympathizers can more efficiently and anonymously
provide monetary support to preferred groups. According to the 9/11 Commission
Report (2004), there is a global financial network known as the Golden Chain
that channels donations between primarily Saudi and other Persian Gulf
financiers, charities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private
groupsincluding al-Qaeda (p. 55).

Bin Ladin and the Afghan Arabs drew largely on funds raised by this network,
whose agents roamed world markets to buy arms and supplies for the mujahideen, or
holy warriors (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
2004, p. 55).

The origins of this well-established chain is ironically linked once again to the
Soviet-Afghan War, during which Saudi Arabia and the United States supplied
billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to rebel groups in Afghanistan
fighting the Soviet occupation (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, 2004, p. 55).54 And because this funding was secretive, the
Pakistani military intelligence service was employed to train the rebels in covert
methods for channeling these resources. According to the 9/11 Commission
Report (2004), Osama bin Laden both raised financial support for and sponsored
terrorist activities given his affluent background and familial connections:

The network included a major business enterprise in Cyprus; a services branch in

Zagreb; an office of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo, which
supported the Bosnian Muslims in their conflict with Serbia and Croatia; and an
NGO in Baku, Azerbaijan, that was employed as well by Egyptian Islamic Jihad
both as a source and conduit for finances and as a support center for the Muslim
rebels in Chechnya. He also made use of the already-established Third World Relief
Agency (TWRA) headquartered in Vienna, whose branch office locations included
Zagreb and Budapest (Bin Ladin later set up an NGO in Nairobi as a cover for
operatives there) (p. 58).

53

See Chapter 3.2.3 for the relation between democratic rights and terrorist targeting.
According to Barber (2003), the Soviets were defeated by the jihadists partly due to the secret
support from the US, who counted as friends all who pretended not to be its enemies (p. 21).
54

62

Because of the salience and thus extensive research on al-Qaeda and its
operations, its example is important in understanding how globalized terrorists are
organized and how such organizations are changing.

This organizations structure included as its operating arms an intelligence

component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and
a committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory
Council (Shura) made up of Bin Ladins inner circle.... He soon made clear his
desire for unchallenged control and for preparing the mujahideen to fight anywhere
in the world (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
2004, p. 55).

Though they oppose the worldly materialism represented by the MNCs,

globalized terrorist organizations not only rely on the instruments of economic
globalization for financing, but they are increasingly organized like MNCswith
its international division of labor. As Nef (2003) argues, al-Qaeda is truly
transnational, in the mold of a corporation, and effectively equipped to function in
a global society. Most important, they operated from the perverse logic of
the pedagogy of violence (p. 58).
Whether framed as anti-Americanism or religious extremism, jihadism is
widely representative of the discourse of terror today.55 The GWOT is an
important historical moment marking the geopolitical changes shaping the
morphology of terrorist organizations. From a traditional, centralized leadership
pre-GWOT, globalized terrorists have been decentralizing into many regionally
autonomous franchises. These cells mimic those institutions imbued with
legitimate political power by disproportionately relying on their symbolic power:
defined by the spectacularization of their extremism and anti-neocolonialism.
Their ultimate power soughtthat is legitimate political poweris coerced by
manipulating symbolic power. Globalized terrorism can thus be regarded as a
coercive process to trade symbolic power, with which globalized terrorists are
well-endowed, for legitimate political power. And al-Qaeda is increasingly
ideological rather than physical, being less susceptible to traditional offensives.
In fact, each incident of collateral damage as a consequence of the GWOT
seems to further corroborate the jihadists positions, strengthening rather than
weakening their justification. Despite the many international conventions
condemning the financing of terrorism post-9/11, the instruments of economic
globalization have sustained the efficient and largely anonymous funding of

55

While I agree that jihadism, or extremist Islamism, is the most prominent in terrorism discourse
post-9/11, a reassessment of the essence of terrorism in Chapters 4 and 5 suggests that jihadism is
merely one narrow representation of terrorism within a vast socio-political spectrum. In other
words, globalized terrorists do not only include jihadists, but also many other extremists.

63

global terrorist networks. Thus, the main battle now is as much over ideological
legitimacy in the eyes of the global public as it is on the physical aspects of war.

3.2.2 Modus Operandi

The modus operandi of globalized terrorists is characterized by their
utilization of globalizing instruments and their intent on maximizing casualties.
These exploited instruments facilitate globalizationprimarily through
technologies and policies facilitating transportation, communication, and
exchange. And because terrorism requires intelligence, military operation, and the
dissemination of propaganda, the effect of globalization on these areas is most
relevant to this analysis. One prime example embodying the modus operandi of
globalized terrorists in these three respects is the Mumbai Attacks of 2008.
In terms of intelligence, the terrorists navigated with Global Positioning
Systems while traveling by boat to Mumbai.

They carried BlackBerrys, CDs holding high-resolution satellite images like those
used for Google Earth maps, and multiple cellphones with switchable SIM cards that
would be hard to track. They spoke by satellite telephone. And as television
channels broadcast live coverage of the young men carrying out the terrorist attack,
TV sets were turned on in the hotel rooms occupied by the gunmen.... This is
terrorism in the digital age (Wax, 2008).

The terrorists had in fact been through virtual rehearsals, created by satellite
images and videos of their target sites. In terms of the assault, the terrorists
communicated with each other on mobile phones and used information on the
internet to strategically counter the tactics of the Black Cat commandos, whose
every move was unwittingly broadcasted by the swarm of television media and
exploited by the terrorists.56

When TV stations showed every twist and turn of the masked Black Cat commandos
sliding down ropes from helicopters to rooftops near a Jewish center called the
Chabad House... [s]everal TV stations... told their anchors to stop reporting on the
positions of commandos (Wax, 2008).

Despite ceasing the television broadcasts, online sources such as YouTube and
Twitter continued to update information as eye witnesses and even hostages near
the attack sites exchanged information with the outside world. The terrorists also
56

The Black September members similarly foiled rescue attempts by German police forces during
the hostage crisis in the Munich Olympic village in 1972 when the terrorists were able to watch the
policemens covert rescue live on television.

64

robbed hostages of their mobile devices, using them for intelligence. And with
respect to the dissemination of propaganda, beyond the obvious media and
political attention attained just from the act itself, the terrorist group Deccan
Mujaheddin claimed responsibility for the attacks through an e-mail sent by a
computer traced to Moscow.

The message, it was later discovered, originated in Lahore, Pakistan. Investigators

have said the e-mail was produced using Urdu-language voice-recognition software
to anonymatize regional spellings and accents so police would be unable to
identify their ethnic or geographic origins (Wax, 2008).

When the gunmen communicated, they used satellite telephones and called
voice-over-Internet-protocol phone numbers to conceal their trail (Wax, 2008).
In fact, just one month prior to the Mumbai Attacks, American intelligence
agencies had reported worrying signs of terrorists exploiting communication
technologies, such as the blogging sites of Twitter, claiming it was already being
used to post and support extremist ideologies and perspectives and as social
networks for operations within the US (Reed, 2008).

The report also claims that satellite navigation and mapping tools have been
discussed in al-Qaeda forums. One discussion post is said to have examined the use
of Nokia's mobile phone navigation tool for Specialist use in Marksmanship,
Border Crossings and in Concealment of Supplies. A member of another forum
suggested internet or VOIP technology could be used alongside voice changing
software to disguise a users identity (Reed, 2008).

As Weimann (2006) emphasizes, the internet is essential to the communication

and instrumentation of new generations of terrorists. Journalist Robert Worth
(2006) testifies that while only a handful of email statements claiming
responsibility for terrorist acts would surface each week, increasing numbers of
videos of conflict, executions, testimonials from suicide bombers, and fatwas
from radical clerics are being posted on a daily basis on the internet.
Contemporary terrorists employ the internet not only to recruit and communicate
with volunteers, but also as a virtual training camp (Worth, 2006).

No more need for Afghanistan: would-be terrorists can download manuals and
videotapes that show them how to make explosive vests, car bombs, chemical
weapons and poisons, and a library of tips on how to use them all effectively. The
danger is not just theoretical. There is evidence that some of the newest terrorists
were recruited and sometimes trained this way (Worth, 2006).

65

Atran (2006) further adds that, between 2001 and 2006, pro-Islamist websites
have increased from less than 20 to over 3,000including roughly 70 militant
sites that have formed a collective virtual jihadi university (p. 135).57 The
Global Islamic Media Front describes the Al Qaeda University of Jihad
Studies [as] a decentralized university without geographical borders where
graduates learn to advance the cause of a global caliphate through morale
boosting and bombings by specializing in electronic jihad, media jihad, spiritual
and financial jihad (Atran, 2006, p. 135).

Web sites such as that of the Global Islamic Media Front... have become the new
organizational agents in jihadi networks, replacing physical agents such as bin
Laden.... [M]edia sites... increasingly control the distribution of knowledge and
resources (Atran, 2006, p. 136).

Thus, not only is the mediagenic spectacle of terrorism contagious in encouraging

imitatorsas Enders and Sandler (2006) and Chaliand and Blin (2007a) have
highlightedbut the:

...edited snippets and sound bites favored by todays mass media have been used
with consummate skill by jihadi leaders and ideologues.... As a result, deeply local
and historically nuanced interpretations of religious canon have been flattened and
homogenized across the Muslim world and beyond, in ways that have nothing in
particular to do with actual Islamic tradition but everything to do with a polar
reaction to perceived injustice in the prevailing unipolar world. At the same time,
the historical narrative, however stilted or fictitious, translates personal and local ties
within and across small groups into a profound connection with the wider Muslim
community... (Atran, 2006, p. 136).

Although the history of adopting innovative technologies is rooted in the

methodology of terrorism, the accelerating development of globalizing
instruments in recent decades has greatly facilitated the evolution of the very
modus operandi of globalized terrorists. The media, the internet, and the practice
of globalized terror have formed a profoundly inextricable relationship.
Since the Russian revolutionary terrorists, explosives began to replace
melee weapons and firearms as the weapon of choice. Drawing on ITERATE
data, Sandler and Enders (2007) note that bombings still remain the favorite
57

Atran (2006) cites Luis Miguel Ariza, Virtual Jihad: The Internet as the Ideal Terrorism
Recruiting
Tool,
Scientific
American,
January
2006,
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000B5155-2077-13A8-9E4D83414B7F0101 and AlFarouq jihadi forum, October 7, 2005, http://www.Al-farouq.com/vb/.

66

mode of attack for terrorists, accounting for roughly half of all transnational
terrorist incidents. However, the exploitation of contemporary technologies has
been incrementally modified towards effectuating maximal casualties. To
reiterate the discussion in Chapter 3.1, the adoption of suicide terrorism as the
modus operandi of globalized terrorists is significant because:
(1) The technique aims and tends to maximize casualties (Pape, 2003).58
(2) It is the strategy of globalized terroristspracticed across countries and
culturesand is nearly synonymous with the contemporary notion of
terror itself (Laqueur, 2003).
Suicide attacks are currently the most terrifying form of terrorism and their
frequency is accelerating worldwide.59
As Atran (2006) argues, suicide tactics are responsible for a majority of
all terrorism-related casualties and serve as banner actions for a thoroughly
modern, global vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational political
awakening (pp. 127-128). While extremism fosters the growth of increasingly
destructive forms of terrorism, the novelty of suicide terrorism is primarily
methodological: The self-destruction of the terrorist is not merely an incidental
cost, but an essential part of a strategy to maximize casualties, fear, and publicity.
It is here that the suicide terrorism of today differs from that practiced by the
premodern and modern revolutionary terrorists.
Though also presuming
martyrdom they were specific in victimization in order to win support. In fact,
some Russian anarchists did not attempt to escape in order to have the opportunity
to deliver swaying political speeches at their trials before being executed (HubacOcchipinti, 2007). Globalized terrorists synergistically harness modern constructs
to turn themselves into organic smart bombs. Exploiting mundane civil
insecuritiesthrough parked cars and trucks, airplanes, backpacks, articles of
clothing on men, women, and even childrena more powerful sense of paranoid
fear can be coerced. Such propaganda-by-carnage is highly mediagenic and
fearsome.
In sum, suicide terrorism is effective from the terrorists standpoint: for
pragmatic, ideological, and economic reasons. Pragmatically, suicide terrorism
tends to lead to more casualties, attract greater media attention, generate more
fear, be easier to plan without the intent of escape, and be difficult to deter once
the terrorist is armed and has initiated action (Laqueur, 2003). Ideologically,
suicide terrorists of any era are motivated by a fundamentalist attitude towards a
certain uncompromisable belief, a cause worthy of martyrdom. Economically,
families of Islamist martyrs are commonly provided with housing benefits, free
trips to Mecca, financial compensation of roughly $25,000 USDwhereas the
58

In Papes (2003) seminal paper, suicide terrorism inflicts 13 casualties per incident while
conventional terrorists have inflicted less than one casualty per incident on average.
59
See Figure 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.2.

67

families of those killed in open combat with the Israelis were paid merely two
thousand [US] dollars (Laqueur, 2003, p. 92). Built on the earlier arguments
made for the pertinence of extremism, anti-neocolonialism, and the media, the
modus operandi of globalized terrorists embodies the exploitation of instruments
of globalization in order to maximize casualties, and thereby, publicity, fear, and
coercive power.

3.2.3 Victimization and targeting

As previously argued, terrorist strategies aiming at maximizing casualties
has led to unprecedented forms of suicide terrorisman increasingly frequent and
prominent modus operandi that creates more casualties than the earlier benign
forms of revolutionary terrorism (Pape, 2003). Analyzing the world data from
RAND-MIPT between 1997 and 2004, Bravo and Dias (2006) describes this
tendency for an increase in the number of casualties to consist mainly of death
among citizens (p. 337). Such statistically significant increases in noncombatant
victims are attributable to the evolution of terrorist methodologies in legitimating
and selecting victims.60 Perhaps with the exceptions of interstate and oppressive
terror, civilian populations have usually not been the targeted victims of
revolutionary terrorists, that is, until recently. As Merari (2007) points out,
propaganda by deed was more discriminate pre-WWIIwhere victims (often
political leaders) were symbolically chosen.

... [In] order to draw attention to the justification of their cause, the more recent
brand has turned to indiscriminate attacks aiming to cause multiple casualties. In
doing so, they have exchanged the propaganda value of justification for greater
shock value, ensuring massive media coverage. This change seems to reflect the
adaptation of the strategy to the age of television (Merari, 2007, p. 33).

Laqueur (2003) concludes similarly from a comparison between

contemporary terrorists and the Russian revolutionaries who went out of their
way not to hurt innocent people (pp. 11-12).61 He asserts that pre-WWII
terrorists discriminately selected prominent political figures as victims of
propaganda by deed.

Contemporary terrorism has increasingly become indiscriminate in the choice of its

victims. Its aim is no longer to conduct propaganda but to effect maximum
destruction (Laqueur, 2003, p. 9).

60

Noncombatant is defined in Chapter 2.1.1 as referring to civilians and off-duty military and
state officers.
61
See Chapter 2.3.3.

68

But while globalized terrorism increasingly victimizes noncombatants, the

terrorists are hardly indiscriminate when it comes to the selection of targets.
The current paradigm seems to imbue globalized terrorists (such as al-Qaeda)
with random and limitless destructive potential when in fact they are limited by
finite resources. Consequently, terrorists have to be selective of their victims and
resource expenditure. Osama bin Laden deliberately targeted the symbols of
American imperialism, not specific individuals. Although there was no checklist
of victims names for the perpetrators of 9/11, implicating the irrelevance of the
would-be victims identities, the terrorists focused on the symbolic impact of its
targets. Laqueurs (2003) description of terrorists as being indiscriminate
connotes a false sense of random thoughtlessness in their victim selection when in
fact their methodologies are merely indifferent to the conventional boundaries that
demarcate the legitimacy of a victim for symbolic and mediagenic purposes.
One differentiation warranting elaboration at this point is between the
targets and victims of terrorism. A victim of terrorism is one who is killed or
injured from a terrorist attack while a target is the audience that is to be coerced
or propagandizedwhich can be a government or its citizens. In other words, the
victims serve as the spectacle while the targets are the intended spectators.
The methodological changes of globalized terrorism towards the deliberate
victimization of noncombatants are founded on the growth of extremism and its
ressentiment of neocolonialism, which not only justifies but makes the eradication
of heterodoxy an imperativeeven if the victims are noncombatants and many.
Thus, the instruments of globalization facilitating societal changes have also
allowed terrorists to turn such technologies and policies against the very structures
sustaining globalization itself.
While the German radical Karl Heinzen was one of the founding
philosophical fathers who justified the victimization of an entire population, and
not only representatives of the state, the pioneers of the genocidal indifference of
revolutionary terror are perhaps the National Liberation Front (FLN), which
compelled the British to withdraw from Yemen and subsequently the French from
Algeria (Chaliand & Blin, 2007f, p. 176).62 In 1956, during the Battle of Algiers,
the FLN sought to radicalize the situation with blind attacks, such as that on the
Milk Bar, to send the message that it considered all piedsnoirs to be the enemy,
and to demoralize the Europeans of Algeria (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 216).
As Sandler and Enders (2007) argue, 1979 marks not only the start of
fundamentalist terrorism63 but also a significant rise in casualties from
transnational terrorism (p. 292).
62

As argued in Chapter 2.3.2, oppressive terror varies in the degree of victim selectivity: from the
stringent to the genocidal. Revolutionary terrorism also demonstrates such variance.
63
See Chapter 3.1.3.

69

The fundamentalist impact is unmistakable as the proportion of casualty incidents

trends upward from the 1990s once the fundamentalist terrorists became the
dominant influence.... Todays terrorists mean businessincidents with casualties
almost always now involve deaths (Sandler & Enders, 2007, p. 292).

The growth of extremism motivated by fundamentalism offers a powerful

explanation for why terrorists now aim not to propagate an idea but to destroy
an entire enemy society that has become a legitimate target (Laqueur, 2003, p.
13).
Revolutionary terrorism has gradually shifted from specific selection of
victims towards genocidal indifference. Globalized terrorism can thus be
regarded as being genocidal metaphorically: in the indifference towards the
legitimization of victims (but not in the effective capacity to exterminate large
groups of people sharing some fundamental traits).64 Though eminently
symbolic, terrorist deeds imply utmost destructive force, not necessarily in its
amount, but in intensity and intent (Nef, 2003). This expansion of the
conventional boundaries that mark a victims legitimacy can be understood in
terms of the reincarnation of the religious in the politics of contemporary
extremism, which provides both the ideological and ethical framework for
genocidal selectivity. Thus, out of ressentiment, extremists generalize their
legitimization of victimsbecoming indifferent to their conventionsand
thereby justify the development of strategies to maximize casualties. This new
postmodern ressentiment then allows globalized terrorists to transcend the
conventions that bound traditional methods of terror.
While there is increasingly less distinction between combatants and
noncombatants, adults and children, and men and women when extremists select
victims, all civilians of a population can become the targets when their fear can
influence the decisions made by their leaders (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b). The
targets of suicidal terrorism have thus been commonly asserted to be democracies,
government systems guided by its citizens and are thus held responsible for
protecting their well-being, properties, and rights (Enders & Sandler, 2006).
Drawing on data between 1954 and 1987, Eubank and Weinberg (1994) suggest
that democracies are 3.5 times more likely to contain active terrorist groups than
autocratic states. More recently, Pape (2003), in a potentially overstated
generalization, claim that all suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades
have been aimed at democracies (p. 345). He argues that terrorism against
authoritarian governments is much more unlikely because: First, democracies are
64

Though failing to cause mass destruction, a counter example is the unsuccessful truckbombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 which, according to the 9/11
Commission Report (2004), was intended to kill 250,000 people (p. 72).

70

expected to concede to terrorist demands most readily. Second, democratic states

are expected to be more restrained in retaliation. Third, attacks are easier to
organize and propagandize under the freedoms and rights constituting a
democracy. And fourth, attacks upon citizens of an autocracy will hold less
political leverage. Enders and Sandler (2006) similarly reason that suicide
terrorism is almost exclusively associated with liberal democracies given its
effective exploitation of the governments responsibilities towards its citizens (p.
5).

To date, evidence indicates that liberal democracies are more plagued by terrorism
that their autocratic counterparts, even though grievances may be greater in
autocracies... (Enders & Sandler, 2006, p. 25).

To illustrate this differential feasibility of suicide terrorism between democratic

and authoritarian targets, Pape (2003) highlights the Kurdish terrorist groups
which straddled both Turkey and Iraq.

Although Iraq has been far more brutal toward its Kurdish population than has
Turkey, violent Kurdish groups have used suicide attacks exclusively against
democratic Turkey and not against the authoritarian regime in Iraq. There are plenty
of national groups living under authoritarian regimes with grievances that could
possibly inspire suicide terrorism, but none have (Pape, 2003, p. 350).

More specifically, Li (2005) isolated two aspects of democracies that

positively correlated to increased transnational terrorism: the freedom of the press
and political constraints. Liberal democracies may be more susceptible to
revolutionary terrorism due to the civil and political freedoms and rights that
constitute democratic practice (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Pape, 2003).
(1) The freedom of association protects the right to recruit and form
autonomous groups.
(2) The freedom of speech protects the right to openly criticize authorities and
spread political propaganda.
(3) The freedom of movement protects the right to travel across international
borders.
(4) The right to privacy protects against government surveillance.
(5) The right to a habeas corpus protects against pre-emptive detainment by
the state.
Because the method of revolutionary terror entails coercing a paranoid public
capable of pressuring their government to concede to the terrorists demands, the
71

profound role of the media cannot be ignored. As Chaliand and Blin (2007b)
argue, terrorism may be more effective against democratic countries than against
dictatorships not because dictatorships are more efficient at finding and
punishing terroristsalthough they do have greater leeway than democracies in
doing sobut because the impact of an attack is broader in a free country than in
one whose people have no voice in government and the media serve or are
controlled by the state (p. 8). This complex tension yet symbiotic relationship
between democratic freedom, the media, and terrorism mark a crucial debate in
the discourse of globalized terrorism today.65
If democracies constitute the liberties and rights that protect all citizens
(including clandestine terrorists) in its society, then any counterterrorist measures
would also constrain the liberties and rights of the general population. Terrorism
in democratic societies is like a tumor that grows in and yet feeds off of its host
using up its biochemical and metabolic resources, and fanatically unwilling to
communicate with and consider other cellular messengers. And when treated by
radio-chemical means, both the tumor and healthy cells in the host inevitably
weaken. Thus, if revolutionary terrorism is like cancer, then globalized terrorism
is its metastasis. But one important clarification is that while there may be some
conceptual and statistical correlations between democracy and terrorism, there is
the dangerous and arguably false implication that democracy is a cause of
terrorism. After all, the practice of terrorism precedes the existence of modern
democratic societies. Rather, globalized terrorism is especially effective in a free
society with the mass media, which developed in tandem with the rise of modern
democratic institutions during the late 18th century. In other words, the
development of democratic systems that protect the civil freedoms and political
rights of its citizens and institutionsincluding the mediacreates an
autonomous society more easily exploited by terrorists. But most importantly,
such statistical arguments linking terrorism with democracy not only neglects the
occurrence of the other subspecies of terror, but dichotomizes the diversity of
governance that exists (as being either democratic or autocratic). Thus further
examination of the roots of all four ideal types of terrorism is warranted and will
be explored in subsequent chapters.

3.3 Conclusion
The globalizing society prepares the ground for new and multifaceted
conflicts, ideologies and alliances, which go beyond all hitherto existing
schematizations (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2006, pp. 150-151). With the
changing world, the morphological variations of globalized terrorism are evident:
marked by increasingly globalized terrorists that exploit the instruments of
65

The liberal principle of toleration in multicultural democracies will be further discussed in

Chapter 6.1.

72

globalization to maximize casualties out of neocolonial ressentiment. While

neither revolutionary terrorism nor genocides has been historically unprecedented,
their fusionevident in disempowered terrorists indifferently legitimizing victims
for propaganda-by-carnageis an arguably recent and unique development.
Consequently, the allusion to the potential threat of terrorists accessing WMD
developed from CBRN sources is the new nightmare scenario for many in the
Minority (Jenkins, 2007, p. 5).66 Yet ironically, globalized terrorist organizations
increasingly resemble MNCs in operationeven dividing labor into branches that
focus on public relations, military, finance, and social services (including
education). The decentralized manner in which globalized terrorists fight
(without territorial claim, legal legitimacy, political authority, and a centralized
organization), but scattered around the globe in small, autonomous units,
networked through globalization, subscribing to the same brand name, and unified
under the same anti-neocolonial banner espousing extremismsuch intangibles,
for Habermas, are what lends contemporary terrorist organizations a new
quality (Borradori, 2003, p. 28).67 Premodern in fundamentalism, modern in
practice, and postmodern in motivation, the concept of globalized terrorism is
helpful in typifying the emergence of a discourse of extremism (particularly
jihadism), suicide tactics, genocidal victimization, and spectacular propagandaby-carnage.
Terrorism has undoubtedly evolved with geopolitical and socio-cultural
changes, economic development, and technological progress. However, the
contemporary species of terrorism also shares essential roots common to terrorist
practices since antiquity: being an ideologically self-justified struggle for power
that relies upon their contemporary media to disseminate propaganda and
hyperbolize fear. Even the earliest historical records of terrorism appear to show
that the psychological element of maximizing fear in coercion and the ideological
motivation framed in religious-political dogma are consistently significant forces
in terrorism.68 Furthermore, all terrorism revolves around power struggles.
Whether in its interstate, oppressive, revolutionary, or globalized forms, terrorism
remains the strategic use of violence upon victims to coerce power out of targets.

66

While varying in primacy, many authors have noted the concern of indifferent terrorists armed
with WMD: including Enders & Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Jenkins, 2007; Laqueur, 2003;
Lia, 2005; and Peters, 2005a. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) further suggests evidence that
terrorists groups such as al-Qaeda have actively sought to gain access to resources that could be
used in nuclear or radiological weapons. The theoretical and statistical assessments of such threats
vary widely and will be beyond the scope of this thesis.
67
Even during the writing process of this very chapter there have been notable examples of such
novel developments of globalized terrorists such as the London plane bombers, the New York
synagogue bombers, the Colorado subway bombers, the Detroit Islamists, or the Nigerian plane
bomber. See Chu and Rotella (2009); Daly, Gendar, and Kennedy (2009); Cruickshank (2009);
Bunkley (2009); and Eggen, DeYoung, and Hsu (2009) respectively.
68
See Chapter 2.3.1.

73

A table summarizing the traits of terrorism through the ages is helpful as a

comparison despite its oversimplification of some of the complex tensions.69
This ancestry of terrorism illustrates that the Russian Revolution,
Islamism, and neo-colonialism are not the origins of terrorism but are pivotal
periods during which it underwent adaptive changes.70 Yet despite the evolving
contextual variables, certain attributes of terrorism have apparently remained
constant historically. In fact, it may even be a practice that predates recorded
history itself. This constancy not only bares the roots that typify the essence of
terrorism, but also shows the limits of the current terrorism discourse. One may
even argue that the constant roots of terrorism over the ages merely reflect how
terrorism is understood at this contemporary moment in history. That is, should
the hermeneutics of terrorism evolve over time (as it inevitably will) its history
will also need to be rewritten. As such, the contemporary discourse of globalized
terrorism includes only those historical examples that are held to be consistent
within itself. It is this lack of a skeptical stance in the critical appropriation of the
very discourse of terrorism that requires more thought. Consequently, the notion
of globalized terrorismas salient as it is in international politics, academia,
media, and the publicis a dominant discourse of the Minority that tends to focus
on the other: on jihadism as being (only) operated by suicidal Islamists. Not only
does the discourse of globalized terrorism often exclude the role of the Minority,
but it neglects the even more fundamental practices of terror in diverse sociopolitical contexts. The next chapter thus aims to examine the nature of
terrorismpushing the boundaries of its discourse. Only after re-examining its
essence can there be meaningful discussion on the responses to terrorism.

69
70

See Table 3.3.1.

See Figure 3.3.1 for a diagram illustrating the evolutionary history of terrorism.

74

CHAPTER 4
THE ESSENCE OF TERRORISM

...politics is the continuation of war by other means (Walzer, 2004, p.

ix).

4.0 Introduction:
If politics is the continuation of war by other means, or vice versa as
Clausewitz (2006) argues, then terrorism is merely the continuation of the politics
of war by other means. But how are these means different? Before reconsidering
the notion of terror, I have argued in the previous chapters that:
1) While the PEA empirically grounds terrorism research, it is also
necessarily narrow and arbitrarily constrained in theory.
2) While a historical approach helps to contextualize the evolution of terror,
such a genealogy is largely defined by the discourse of terrorism itself.
In other words, how terrorism is defined dictates what incidents are
recognized as such.
3) The salient discourse of terrorism at the moment can be generally typified
as globalized terrorism.
Because this thesis ultimately contends for the expansion of human freedom
through the cultivation of an intercultural ethos, the discourse of globalized
terrorism not only needs to be constructed (as I have done in previous chapters)
but deconstructed to uncover its limitations. Prerequisite to being able to
conceptualize a nontrivial response to terrorism is a careful rethinking about what
terrorism constitutes. As Habermas argues, history needs to be appropriated
critically (Borradori, 2003, p. 13). Therefore this chapter is necessarily
philosophical: to critically deconstruct the essence of terrorism previously
constructed in hopes of arriving at a less arbitrary and paradoxical position.
The undermining and transcending of the discourse of globalized terrorism
ultimately betrays the necessity for a more coherent framework. Through an
evolutionary perspective of the socio-politics of the human animal, not only can
the moral controversy of terrorism but of all forms of violencefrom legitimate
wars to illegitimate terrorismcan be evaluated more coherently. This consistent
yet adaptive approach to the moral evaluation of violent conflicts offers a more
transcultural framework for analysis. The imperative for expanding a shared
ethos that values the freedom from fear can serve to mitigate the reciprocation and

75

perpetuation of terroristic violence. Here, the critical examination of educations

role in such sociological processes is warranted and will be examined in
subsequent chapters. In short, probing the essence of terrorism suggests the
possibility for (1) the development of intercultural perspectives of terroristic
methods and (2) sustainable means of mitigating terrorist dispositions, thereby
enhancing human security and development through the freedom from fear.
I have argued in the previous chapters that globalized terrorism describes
an emerging species of terrorism. However, I have also noted some common
essences that have remained unchanged: namely being a struggle for sociopolitical power; reliant on hyperbolizing fear through propaganda; ideologically
self-justifying; and widely held to be illegal and immoral.71 This chapter thus
begins with re-examining the concept of terrorism that is foundational to the
globalized terrorism discoursein particular, that of Schmid and Jongmans
(2005)before continuing to examine the legal and ethical dimensions of
terrorism.

4.1 Reconsidering the essence of terrorism

One impact of 9/11 is the increase in the debate over terrorism in many
fields including academia and politics. The various denotations of terrorism are
as diverse as the disciplines of the academics and the affiliations of politicians that
employ them. Yet within this thesis, justifying a defensible notion of terrorism is
prerequisite to being able to argue a meaningful response. Here, the discourse of
globalized terrorism offers a preliminary keystone, embedded in which are two
particularly salient definitions: that of the USDOS and the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC). As aforementioned in Chapter 2, the USDOS definition is
particularly influential in governments and international organizationsdespite
being American-centric. In contrast, the UNODC definition is more academic in
origin. Drawn from Schmid and Jongman (2005), it is particularly descriptive
because it normalizes the definitional elements that are commonly considered
terrorism in over 100 academic and political definitions. The normative reach of
this academic consensus definition is relatively extensive as it abridges the
commonly accepted essences of terrorism (Definitions of Terrorism, 2007). In
short, the UNODCs definition of terrorism is conceptually more encompassing
than that of the USDOS.
Highly controversial, the question of what terrorism constitutes can be
more coherently asked by isolating three dimensions of its denotation: the
methodological, legal, and moral. Thus, in Chapter 4.1.1, I will further condense
Schmid and Jongmans (2005) definitional elements to reconsider these essences

71

See Table 3.3.1.

76

of terrorism. The logical consequence is a wider and more coherent theory of

terrorism and conflict in general that traverses cultural divides.

4.1.1 Core definitional elements of terrorism

Through extensive research, Schmid and Jongman (2005) tabulated 109 of
the most frequently applied definitions in academic and political discourses of
terrorism to identify some twenty-two definitional elements.72 Laqueur (1999)
similarly analyzed over 100 definitions of terrorism to conclude that violence
and the threat of violence are its only common characteristics.73 Yet such a
conclusion, while more rudimentary and less contestable, describes all sorts of
conflicts from wars to coercive diplomacy to barroom brawls. As Record (2003)
points out, terrorism is hardly the only enterprise involving violence and the
threat of violence (p. 6). Yet between Laqueurs (1999) more general yet generic
framework and Schmid and Jongmans (2005) more specific yet cumbersome
definitional elements, a more wieldy conception of the substance of terror can be
moderately derived.
Schmid and Jongmans (2005) 22 definitional elements could be
condensed by grouping similar elements according to their underlying
synonymity.74 Seven distinctive core elements can be condensed from these
definitional elements. Of these seven core definitional elements of terrorism, only
aberrance and group perpetration have less than 50 percent occurrence among
Schmid and Jongmans (2005) 109 definitions.75 However, the aberrant nature of
terrorism is conceptually related to the violation of laws (both legal and moral)
that condemn victimizing individuals indifferentlythat is, independent of their
innocence. As Pape (2003) points out, terrorists deliberately violate norms in the
use of violence by breaching taboos concerning legitimate targets (p. 347). The
most negligible of the core elements is the seventh: not just because it is the least
common, but primarily due to a lack of grounds to justify why terrorism cannot be
perpetrated by individuals and only by groups.76 Just consider the (foiled) case of
the Manhattan pipe bomber, Jose Pimentel (Feyerick, 2011). As the mayor of
New York City Michael Bloomberg described, Pimentel was lone wolf who
acted alone, learning how to make the pipe bomb from Inspire (al-Qaedas
English online magazine) and assembling it by himself (Susman, 2011).
72

See Figure 4.1.1 for a graphical summary of the distribution of the definitional elements of
terrorism.
73
In fact Laqueur, a respondent to the survey in Schmid and Jongmans (2005) research,
commented that: Ten years of debates on typologies and definitions have not enhanced our
knowledge of the subject to a significant degree. [T]he study of terrorism can manage with a
minimum of theory (p. 3).
74
See Figure 4.1.2 showing the condensation of the definitional elements into seven core
elements.
75
See Table 4.1.1 for a list of the seven core definitional elements of terrorism.
76
The issue of whether terrorism can be practiced by individuals on the social scale will be the
focus of the next chapter.

77

Using the core definitional elements, terrorism can be articulated as a

strategy of political coercion through indifferent violence. The strategy involves
the systematic organization and rationalized plan of action intended to achieve a
certain goal. Terrorism, then, is an organizational project, a strategic choice, a
conspiracy to murder and intimidate... (Walzer, 2004, p. 51). The strategic
component of terrorism is in fact a central premise of all rational choice models of
terrorist behavior, such as that necessitated by the PEA.77 The key tactic of such
strategies is coercion: forceful acts that deprive targets of their autonomy
through propagandizing threats and exploiting fear. Such intentional intimidation
is therefore necessarily political, used in the broadest sense, as it not only
pertains to manipulating the administration of governmental structures and
policies but also to the social relations of power. The political nature of terrorism
therefore implicates the necessity of an underlying fundamentalitythat is,
some uncompromisable ideologythat motivates and frames the immoderate
pursuit or reinforcement of certain relations of power. Thus, political coercion
is commonly regarded as involving violencethat is, the illegitimate use of
physical forceto spread fear.
However, the violence inherent to political coercion can also be structural
and symbolic. As a strategy of political coercion, terrorism does not even
necessitate the exertion of physical violence but only the communication of
threats and intimidation by projecting power through languages written, spoken,
body, symbolic, or multimedia in order to alter the equilibrium of power in sociopolitical relationships. Discriminatory laws and norms can and do passively
coerce away the freedom of certain (mis)recognized deviants. In other words,
political coercion can be exerted through both hard and soft power, through
physical as well as cultural and economic forces. After all, the reinforcement of
asymmetric power relations are systemically exercised in ways that are often
imperceptible and not restricted to the physical (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 1). Not all
physical, symbolic, and structural violence is terrorism. But to distinguish
between the sanctioned use of force by authorities and the unauthorized exertion
of violence is difficult to justify.78 In short, political coercion denotes the
violent compulsion of frightened individuals towards some action or inaction
through physical and symbolic forces.

77

The presumption that all terrorist acts are necessarily committed according to a purely rational
choice will be challenged in greater depth in Chapter 5, where the sociological dispositions
inculcated in ones social field is also taken into consideration.
78
Derrida therefore refers to such violenceboth legitimate and illegitimateas gewalt, drawn
from Walter Benjamins essay Critique of Violence (Borradori, 2003). I will retain the usage of
the word violence (as opposed to gewalt) to not only refer to both authorized and unauthorized
uses of physical and symbolic forces. Symbolic violence is the often taken-for-granted modes of
domination that, through soft power, are subsumed within the mundane beliefs, practices, and
structures of social life (Bourdieu, 2001). The problematic conventions distinguishing legitimate
and illegitimate forms of violence will be further highlighted in Chapter 4.2.

78

Finally, the actuation of such coercive violence is leveled indifferently.

Such indifference marks the disregard or ignorance of the socio-cultural
conventions of the other. Specifically, it entails the aberrant breach of the moral
and legal norms that condemn the exercise of certain forms of coercive violence
upon victims (especially if they are regarded as morally innocent) for political
purposes. In fact, it may be the very employment of violent methods that are
indifferent to the moral and legal conventions of the victims that enhances the
fomentation of anxiety and coercive fearthe central tactic of terrorism, and at
the same time, the cause of its condemnable aberrance. Terrorism, in a nutshell, is
essentially the intentional organization of physically and symbolically violent acts
that coerce others through the fear of its aberrant indifference towards the others
legal and moral conventions for the sake of controlling power relations.
I will simply refer to the core definitional elements as the essence of
terrorism, which can be organized into three dimensions: the methodological, the
legal, and the moral. This breakdown of terrorism into its essences is necessary
for clarifying the sites of contestation. The methodological dimension is the most
objective and least contested, primarily denoted as a strategy of political
coercion through propagandizing violence both legitimate and illegitimate and
both physical and symbolic. This methodological essence of terrorism (MET) is
amorally descriptive of the terrorist methodology. After all, even for a cultural
relativist, the chemistry of explosives, the physics for modifying mobile phones
and timing devices, and even the sociology which estimates the reliability of
airline and train schedules and the numbers of passengers to be expected at
particular times, all are non-evaluative, and all hold transculturally (Mackenzie,
2007, p. 658) Terrorism, then, is primarily an extremism of means, not one of
ends (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 14). By distinguishing the MET from the
more controversial legal and moral essences, the immoral connotation inherent to
the word terrorism can be conceptually segregated and thereby potentially offer
a more coherent basis for the consideration of the phenomenon. This chapter will
thus continue with the critical examination of the commonly highlighted
indifference of terror to legal and moral conventions.

4.2 War may not be just war

Because secular laws tend to adjust to reflect the mean of the ethical
positions of the citizenry within a political community, the common view of the
MET as being illegal is interrelated with its widespread consideration as being
immoral. That is not to say that what is legal is necessarily moral (unlike
religious laws), but morality is inextricable from legal considerations. Moral laws
are normative, that is, they make it imperative how things should be a priori,
whereas political laws are a posteriori, that is, they are conventions based on the
empirical experience of human actions (Kant, 2005). The primary source of

79

controversy over the normative reach of legal conventions on terrorism is its

moral essence (MOT). What makes terrorism immoral then is the fact that
terrorists pursue their goals through means that are indifferent towards the legal
conventions (be it local or international) that condemn such methods. It is the
violation of laws that makes the terrorist culpable: Such is the legal essence of
terrorism (LET). But what conventions, and conventions prescribed by what
authority, are terrorists in violation?
One influential legal convention
distinguishing the legitimate use of political violenceoften characterized as
warand the illegitimate use of violencespecifically terrorismis the just
war theory. Another important set of conventions is that of the UN. Both of these
legal definitions will be examined in this section before considering the MOT.

4.2.1 The just war theory

Central to the LET is the terrorists indifferent violation of international
laws that attempt to embody universal moral principles on political violence. The
dominant discourse on the ethics of political violence is prescribed by the just war
theory (JWT): a rational attempt to establish a civil culture of how wars ought to
be waged for it to be legallyand hence, supposedly morallyjustifiable
(Walzer, 2004). Acts of political violence (be it interstate, oppressive,
revolutionary, or globalized) that are not justifiable according to the JWT are
therefore considered to be illegitimate.79 Wars, then, are necessarily just, for
otherwise it would be an act of terror. Such is how terrorism is defined by its
legality. For Walzer (2004), the judgment contains three parts, all of which must
be satisfied for an act of political violence to be legitimated. First, jus ad bellum
decrees that defensive acts of violence declared by recognized governments in
response to aggression are justifiable while aggressive acts of violence exercised
by political bodies without legitimate authority are not. In cases of blatant
violation of human rights, military intervention (even by foreign forces) is
justifiable, indeed, to be expected. In other words, violence that is instigative or
exerted by groups without legitimate political authority cannot claim jus ad
bellum. For wars to be waged there must be a just cause; such is the necessity of
jus ad bellum. Second, jus en bello requires those using violence to do so in
proportion to the cause jus ad bellum while minimizing harm to the innocent.
As Walzer (2004) points out, it holds political and military leaders responsible,
first of all, for the well-being of their own people, but also for the wellbeing of
innocent men and women on the other side (p. 14). Specifically, then, the
collateral damage should never be disproportionately greater than what is
necessary to achieve the military goal.80 Therefore, civilians cannot be the
intentional targets of the violence, doing so would violate jus en bello. Finally
and perhaps least emphasized is jus post bellum, which holds the violent
79

See Table 2.2.1.

This aspect of jus en bello is often articulated as the principle of proportionality and will be
further explored in Chapter 4.2.3.
80

80

participants responsible for the contractual restoration and reparation of damages,

and peaceful resolution post-conflict. Failure to satisfy any of these three
mandates of the JWT is to lack the legitimacy to uphold the act of political
violence as a just war. The JWT thus seems to clearly demarcate war from
terror in terms of the LET.

4.2.2 International law: The UN conventions on terrorism

If international conventions are not accepted by all states, then national
laws have even less grounds for transnational legitimacy. Consequently, I will
focus on what is arguably the most legitimate set of international laws on unjust
political violence: the UN conventions on terrorism. Despite repeated attempts
since 1937 under the League of Nations, the UN still has no consensual definition
of terrorismhaving developed thirteen international conventions illegalizing
terrorism as criminal offences (Definitions of Terrorism, 2007).81
By
illegalizing specific acts of political violence as terrorism, an objective and
standardized checklist of common symptoms of terrorism is provided for local
diagnosis and response. Under the legal authority of the UN, all parties locally
convicted to be in violation of any of these conventions are terrorists. In other
words, the LET dictated by the conventions attempt to diagnose and condemn
terrorism strictly according to specific practices.
Merari (2007) is one scholar among others who contends that terrorism
can only be defensibly distinguished from war legally (but not morally), whereas
others like Enders and Sandler (2006) are more pessimistic.82 The optimistic
contention is that laws may provide the only possibility of transcultural
consistency, perhaps even objectivity, in the diagnosis and treatment of terrorism.
But one crucial issue of an approach to terrorism that is dominated by its legal
essence is the extent to which such laws are recognized, implemented, and
enforced. After all, it is the imposition of arbitrarily legitimate meanings upon
others that marks the perpetrators of symbolic violence. For the UN to impose
their own definitions of what counts as legitimate may thus face resistance that
requires engaging in deliberation with those unwilling to deliberate, tolerating
those who are intolerant (Grenfell, 2007, p. 102). After all, who has the authority
to monopolize the LET? Is not the imposition of this discourse (without
substantive dialogue) an act of symbolic violence that can and should be justly
resisted? Constantly undermining the transnational tenability of both the UN
conventions and the JWT is the issue of legitimacy.

81

See Table 4.1.2 for a summary of the current UN legal conventions on terrorism.
Although Enders and Sandler (2006) see the international conventions of the UN as being
effectively futile, they problematically recommend proactive counterterrorist measures based on
what is a national (arguably American) discourse.
82

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4.2.2.1 The limits of legitimacy

The UN conventions provide a moderate legal framework (for many),
legitimized by its dialectical formulation through international and democratic
deliberation. But even so, points of contestation exist. First, central to the
normative reach of the multilateral conventions is the legitimacy of the UNs
authority itself. Not all recognized nations are member states and even member
states do not always acknowledge the legitimacy of the UN or adopt its
resolutions.83 As the moderator of international grievances, the UNs mission to
promote international laws was further undermined in the 2003 Iraq War: the
pre-emptive invasion of Iraq led by the US despite the lack of authorization by
the UN (Peters, 2005b). Moreover, subnational groups who do not recognize the
authority of their local state government may have even less reason to
acknowledge the international authority of the UN. This non-recognition (or
misrecognition) of the political authority of the UN is one central explanation for
why some parties (be they national or subnational) tend to be indifferent towards
certain unfavorable UN conventions. Different cultures have different legal
customs. Even the international, democratic, and representative institutions like
the UN find the legitimacy of their political authority constrained by sociocultural relativism.
Second, the UN has no direct means of enforcing its conventions.
Consequently, member states respond to political violence subjectively. Enders
and Sandler (2006) argue that UN conventions do little in reducing terrorist
motivations and resources, offering statistical evidence to conclude that they
have no effect on the level of terrorism (pp. 79, 133). However, the fact that the
UN cannot forcefully impose its mandates may be appreciated by those societies
that reject the traditions, laws, and legitimacy of the UN. This lack of forceful
intervention, whether out of inability or unwillingness, is what absolves the UN
from the accusation of being an oppressive regime. However, whether the UN is
a structural oppressor that exercises symbolic violence through the imposition of
what war (and hence terror) is and how it can be legitimately waged is an issue
that is much more complex and ambiguous.
Third, despite the specificity of the conventions (which facilitates their
legal application), most have been formulated retrospectively. By comparing the
date of the conventions signed with the history of spectacular terrorist events,
there is a general correlation: most conventions are ratified in response to novel

83

Some citizens do not recognize the authority of the state when dealing with interpersonal
disputes. Even less would acknowledge the authority of a fellow citizen, one without state
authority. Similarly, on the international level, not every state recognizes the authority of a
government of governments such as the UN and its policieslet alone those mandated by a
particular nation-state. Thus, the problem of legitimate authority is central to contemplating the
transnational reach of international law and institutions.

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developments in the evolution of terrorist methodologies.84 As Enders and

Sandler (2006) point out: the UN conventions have been reactive, responding
only after a spate of attacks (p. 151). Consequently, should unforeseen terrorist
strategies lying outside of the specified conventions arise, the international
responses could be even more mixed, delayed, and inconsistent.
In short, then, the UNs discourse of the LETfor the terroristentails
the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power (Bourdieu &
Passeron, 1977, p. 5). After all, the conventions on the LET legitimated by the
UN leads to a reproduction of the very power relations that the terrorists seek to
change and may be perceived by them as symbolic violence. In other words, from
the terrorists standpoint, if we wanted to wage a just war legitimated by their
rules (that is, the conventions of the UN)given that they couldthey would
have done so. For some terrorists, then, the excuse for their method is that they
have no political and military means to engage in a war as defined by the UN
conventions. For others who do not even recognize the legitimacy of the UNs
authority, they just make up their own rules of war. Thus, one mans war
remains anothers terrorism.

4.2.3 Distinguishing war from terror

In terms of legally distinguishing war from terrorism, the superficial
diagnosis according to the LET is that the MET violates JWT while the method of
war does not. More specifically, the LET disregards jus en bello by
indifferently victimizing noncombatants and combatants, whereas the conventions
within the discourse of just war supposedly condemn unnecessary harm to
innocents. Here, several UN conventions in the 20th century outline the justifiable
use of political violence: namely the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1923 Hague
Rules of Air Warfare, the 1947 Geneva Convention, and the UN Charter
(DeForrest, 1997-1998). But the UN conventions on war face very similar
challenges as those on terrorism: All conventions rely on the ratifying countries
to implement the stipulated prohibition or institute the required action using its
own laws and resources (Enders & Sandler, 2006, p. 151). Consequently, not
every government will comply with the conventions. And those that do comply
do so to varying degrees depending on their position on the UN and its laws.
Moreover, not all societies hold the same cultural understanding of the identity of
innocents and thus might not consider noncombatants necessarily exempt from
being targeted by political violence.85 The ressentiment in extremism tends to
84

The arguable exception is the 2005 convention against nuclear terrorism, which is anticipatory
(if one does not consider the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in WWII by the US as
terrorism).
85
As I will highlight in Chapter 4.3.3.1, some people may be so accustomed to terror that they
have normalized it into part of their socio-political experience. Consequently, the education of
human rightsnamely the right to be free from want and fearis crucial to expanding the
recognition, condemnation, and mitigation of terror.

83

frame a Manichean worldview in its ideologues, collectively demonizing all

others without regard to their right to immunity from violence by virtue of their
innocence as noncombatants. Finally, there is the underlying debate over
whether war is somehow intrinsically more ethical than terrorism.
The legitimacy of an act of political violence depends on its satisfaction of
the mandates of JWT. Yet underlying this legal distinction is a moral assessment
of the cause, means, and intent of such violence. Here I draw on McPherson
(2007) to challenge the dominant discourse that the cause of widespread fear
and death to noncombatants is the site distinguishing the LET from war (p. 528).
First, violence against noncombatants is justifiable under JWT provided that the
collateral damage is proportional to the military goals. In other words, the
proportionality principle in the ethics of war only reduces the number of
unnecessary noncombatant casualties. Second, according to the limited
noncombatant immunity principle, noncombatants are only rightfully immune
to being deliberately subjected to violence (McPherson, 2007, p. 533).
Noncombatants are therefore not entirely exempt from the violence of war, but
only from being the primary target. Azam (2006) estimates that in modern
warfare 84% of the war-related casualties are civilians (p. 53). Thus once
violence begins, warfare and widespread harm to noncombatants are virtually
inextricable, and morality provides little bearing on... the conduct of
combatants (McPherson, 2007, pp. 529, 534).
One salient example in problematizing the distinction between war and
terror is that of strategic bombing, which in principle is reliant on the terror
incited by the mass bombing of civilian populations to compel governments to
surrender (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 7). These are clearly acts of violence,
committed in the service of political ends, with the intent of spreading fear
among target populationsincluding non-combatants (Merari, 2007, p. 15). Such
terrorist methods were applied in the strategic bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima,
and Nagasaki during WWII. And while the Japanese has contended its
victimhood by nuclear terror from the American retaliation for Pearl Harbor,
during the same war, the Japanese had Pacification Campaigns in China and
Southeast Asia under the Three All Policy: Take All, Burn All, and Kill All
(Kalyvas, 2004, p. 108). Particularly cruel was the interstate terror carried out by
the Japanese Imperial Army in Nankingwhich Chang (1997) calls the Rape of
Nanking (p. 4). Or to take the more recent example of the War in Afghanistan
(part of the GWOT): The terror under the Taliban has merely been replaced by
the terror of waras some 96% of Afghans have been negatively affected by the
direct or secondary effects of the conflict (Ipsos, 2009). Legality and morality are
thus left to fate, which makes justice hostage to the superior fighting force
(McPherson, 2007, p. 534). The JWT remains ambiguous in terms of the
subjective need to cause collateral damage and whether such violence was
indeed intentional. In short, terrorism can occur within the contexts of war and
84

revolution: within all armed conflicts where the basic human rights are grossly
violated (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 18).
In response to this moral ambiguity, Rodin (2004) draws on the doctrine
of double effect to overhaul the JWT (p. 762). He asserts that intentional harm
to noncombatants is unconditionally immoral. Emphasizing the fundamental right
of noncombatants to be immune from deliberate or reckless violence, Rodin
(2004) concludes that the unintentional killing of some noncombatants in the
course of military operations is morally culpable to the same degree and for the
same reasons that typical acts of terrorism are culpable (p. 769). Consequently,
noncombatants possess the stringent right of immunity from violence that cannot
be traded for collectivized interests of a greater number of noncombatants or...
some other greater good (Rodin, 2004, p. 755). For McPherson (2007)and
even more so for Rodin (2004)the morality of war and terrorism are as
distinguishable within the spectrum of political violence as yellow is from orange
in the visible spectrum. Given the indistinguishability between the moral essences
of war and terror, their legal distinction becomes arbitrary and moot. Moreover,
as Seto (2002) points out, it is often the powerful that make the laws and the
powerless that lack political legitimacy.
Thus if terrorism is legally
distinguished from war, many of the most powerful belligerents would be selfbestowed with a license to monopolize violence and be insulated from its legal
and moralresponsibilities (Seto, 2002). The imperative then is to consider
war and terrorism as indistinguishable on moral grounds but merely differing
in convention.

4.3 The ethics of terrorism

Laws are cultural conventions mandated by authoritative political
structures to mediate social relations. From economic to political rights, laws
prescribe socio-political behaviors by standardizing the consequences of its
violationthereby providing predictability and acting as an economic deterrence.
Hence legal discourses tend to reciprocally reflect the local ethical norms.
Conceptually, legality is inextricably intertwined with morality.
But if
international laws face national challenges to its legitimate authority, moral laws
face even greater disputes. The primary debate here is between deontological and
consequentialist arguments over the possibility of justifying violence against
noncombatants.
While this ethical controversy is commonly posed in
international politics and academia as distinguishing self-determination from
terrorism, an evolutionary theory of morality may offer a potential outlet from
the conceptual deadlock. Here, evolution refers to not only (1) the role of
morality in human survival but also to (2) the adaptability of the theory to

85

different conflicting moral frameworks and (3) the imperative for cultural change
through interculturalism.86

4.3.1 The moral essence of terrorism

Terrorism by definition carries a moral dimension. One cannot use the
word without taking on a moral position, for to ascribe an act the terrorist
qualifier is to effectively condemn it as immoral. Even among the Islamic
nations, where much of the disputation over the UN definitions of terrorism
originates, similar condemnations of terrorism are pervasive. In the Fifth Islamic
Summit,87 terrorism was declared to be humanly reprehensible..., and no one in
his senses would accept any threat to human dignity, freedom, property, honour,
security, work.... This feeling is instinctive, genuine and incontestable (Taskhiri,
1987). Because of its strong, transcultural derogatory connotation, the terrorist
label is almost never taken up willingly, more often used instead to delegitimize
opponents. Consequently, only violent acts (often committed by others) will be
considered immoral and may be labeled as terrorism. The history of such
political name-callings is one major inhibitor to the possibility of a coherent
discourse of terrorism and is why I have examined the definition of terrorism
according to its methodological, legal, and now moral essences. Given the
cultural diversity of moral positions, the ethical deadlock in defining the MOT has
led to many of its thinkers to abandon the tenability of a universal moral principle.
But to neglect the MOToften claiming to be out of pragmatic reasonsis to
ignore the very reality and crux of the ethical debate, particularly that which
underlies counterterrorism. Moreover, the more transcultural weight carried by
a particular position on the MOT, the more likely it will dissuade potential
terrorists by augmenting its coherent recognition and condemnation. It is my
contention that this common immorality inherent to the discourse of terror might
in fact facilitate a more transculturally normative consideration of the MOT.
4.3.1.1 The deontological argument
Before considering the MOT from an evolutionary perspective, the ethical
debate of terrorism demands clarification. Given that the crux of the debate is
primarily between deontological and consequentialist positions, can the MET be
morally justifiable? Colloquially, the paradox is phrased as whether ones
terrorist can be anothers freedom fighter. For example, former UN secretarygeneral Kofi Annan argues that to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never
becomes a reality... will require a new global strategy, which begins with Member
States agreeing on a definition of terrorism and including it in a comprehensive
convention (Annan, 2005).
Consequently, he suggested a morally
86

The concept of interculturalism will be developed further in Chapter 6.

The 1987 international conference was convened under the aegis of the United Nations to
discuss international terrorism (Taskhiri, 1987).
87

86

unambiguous definition of terrorism as any act intended to intimidate a

population or to compel a government or an international body to act through the
targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants and that such
actions cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance (BBC
News, 2005). However, it was ultimately rejected in the subsequent UN world
summit primarily on the grounds that it failed to distinguish terrorism from the
violent resistance of foreign occupationwhich is justifiable according to jus ad
bellum. This lack of moral consensus, this irreconcilable division between
deontological and consequentialist standpoints, is the crucial site debilitating the
coherence of international discourses of terrorism (Deen, 2005).
The deontological approach, as exemplified by Annans unaccepted
proposal, is to universally condemn, without any conditions, any political violence
that intentionally targets noncombatants.88 Accordingly, acts of war would be
distinguishable from that of terror depending on whether the violence
indifferently victimized noncombatants (even if the act was warranted jus ad
bellum). For deontologists, the MOT must be a universal touchstone by which
such incidents are defined and judged. Thus, all terrorist acts identifiable
according to its methodology are condemnable unconditionally for the immoral
harm caused to innocents, and punishable by law. But as I have argued in Chapter
4.2.2, the legitimacy of legal conventionseven if internationalare not
necessarily universal. Moreover, the transcultural derogation of the terrorist
identity causes those so labeled to reject it. As Seto (2002) points out,
deontology... lacks any culturally neutral foundation for its conclusions and is
thus ultimately unsatisfactory as a moral theory of terrorism (p. 1232).

The problem is particularly acute in the case of terrorism, since terrorism commonly
involves violence between different moral cultures. Terrorists typically believe that
they are engaged in a righteous cause; they believe their acts are moral and
justified.... But if terrorists believe that they are right, and we believe they are
wrong, who then is correct (Seto, 2002, p. 1244)?

Moreover, the MOT may not only be diagnosed deontologically but also
consequentiallythat is, by considering its cause. For example, after defending
at length why governments should deontologically abide by the JWT, Walzer
(2004) consequentially argues that the JWT may be overridden in supreme
emergenciesduring moments when our deepest values and our collective
survival are in imminent danger.... (pp. 33-34).89 Thus for the consequentialist,

88

Noncombatant is defined in Chapter 2.1.1 as referring to any civilian or off-duty military and
state officer.
89
Walzers (2004) arguments on political violence are neither completely deontological nor
consequentialist. He instead contends that the strict application of either ethical position is

87

violence against innocents is not always unconditionally condemnable. The crux

of the moral debate is therefore hangs not so much on what the MET entails as it
is on whether one is willing to accept a definition that possibly brands their own
actions as terroristicand hence to be deemed immoral.
4.3.1.2 The consequentialist apology
The principal apology for the use of the MET is that of the last resort.
The consequentialist rationale generally has three components:
(1) Every legitimate political and military option has been tried without
leading to the desired result observable within the tolerated time.
(2) Having exhausted all other viable alternatives, the terrorist methodology
even if regarded as the least moralis the only option remaining.
(3) In light of the expected consequences, the MET option becomes the lesser
eviljustifiable for the greater good.
This common apology usually takes two forms: One posed as a rhetorical
question and the other drawing on historical justification. Laqueur (1999) poses
the typical consequentialist challenge: If the MET is the only feasible means of
overthrowing a cruel dictatorship, the last resort of free men and women facing
intolerable persecution, then in such contexts, would the method not be a moral
imperative rather than a crime (p. 8)? In other words, might not the lesser evil be
justified for the greater good? In attempting to answer this moral enquiry,
consequentialists often draw on historical examples as proof of the tenability of
their position. One commonly cited case is that of the Mandela-led African
National Congress (ANC) and its struggle against apartheid. According to
Mandela (1991), the ANC is a nonviolent political organization that only
employed violence, including the MET, when all else had failed, when all
channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us..., [and] when the government
met our peaceful demands with force (p. 120 cited in McPherson, 2007, pp. 532533). In this view, Mandelathe anti-apartheid terrorist and the post-apartheid,
Nobel Peace Prize-winning presidentcorroborates the validity of the last resort
apology (Peters, 2005a). A similar example is Menachem Begin leader of the
Zionist Jewish Irgunswho led an attack in 1946 on King David Hotel killing
ninety-one and wounding many others, mostly civilians, and who later became the
prime minister of Israel from 1977 to 1983 and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007e).
While consequentialists challenge the deontological position by arguing
that political violence against noncombatants are justifiable as a last resort for the
greater good, it also raises the disconcerting issue of the justifiability to terrorize

untenable. Without providing a resolution, Walzer (2004) asserts that one can only hold such
paradoxical tensions as a feature of our moral reality (p. 40).

88

by popular cause and the universality of human rights as argued by Rodin (2004).
The consequentialist position is untenable because:
(1) To exhaust every alternative is theoretically impossible. Given the
uniqueness of each temporal moment, contingent changes do not
necessitate that past failures will always continue to fail in the future.
Other than the limits of ones mentality and attitude, there are no definitive
indications when subsequent (non-terroristic) attempts will no longer have
the potential to yield meaningful changes (or that subsequent terroristic
methods necessarily will lead to the desired progress).
(2) Nonviolent options may be eliminated not in practice but in principle.
Fundamentality allows the conclusion, that the MET is the only means
feasible, to be drawn a priori. In other words, the failure of legitimate
options (such as debate, protests, demonstrations, or even warfare) may in
fact be a belief not based on experiments and observations.
(3) The attainment of the terrorists aims may not be clearly observable or
tenable. Their failure to see results depends on their hermeneutical
horizonthat is, their rational expectations, dedication to observation,
methodology of measurement, and time frame allotted to allow for change.
As Walzer (2004) points out, politics is an art of repetition and a
persevering science (p. 53).
(4) The consequences of the terrorist act are uncertain. The contingent results
are not easily predictable according to simplistic, causal rationales
especially when applied to phenomena as complex as political violence
and change. And the retrospective justification of terrorists (such as
Mandela and Begin) does not conclusively demonstrate that the terrorist
acts were the cause of the good outcome. One therefore cannot be
certain that the desired end (such as the ending of apartheid) would not
have contingently occurred in an alternate history without resorting to the
MET.
(5) The intended good is relative. Only those concurring with the
goodness of the intent and outcome justify the terrorist act. This
goodness must be universal for the consequentialist if it should be
imposedeven violently. Yet the argument is paradoxical: The intended
good must be deontologically defensible in order to consequentially
justify the MET. Because the very premise of consequentialism is that
the ends justifies the means, the consequentialists apology for the MET
paradoxically asserts that the ends of the means is unconditionally good.
Whether a cause or consequence is good for one cultural group may not
be likewise for others. It is in fact this lack of a supra-cultural position
that undermines deontology. Such intercultural conflict thereby fuels the
unceasing perpetuation of terrorism/counterterrorism.

89

For deontologists, consequential positions lead to a subjective slippery

slope. But for consequentialists, deontological positions may in effect condemn
acts that could be deemed justifiable by some. Lacking a supra-cultural system of
ethics to consider the MOT, debaters fall back to a defensive discourse: with
victims tending to condemn the acts deontologically and belligerents tending to
justify them consequentially (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e).90 Ethical norms become
oriented by cultural compasses justifying/condemning specific incidents.
Consequently, neither a deontological nor consequentialist position significantly
improves the clarity of transcultural conceptions and responses to the MET. An
ethical framework is therefore necessary to provide coherence to the debate and
can find assistance from an evolutionary discourse of morality.

4.3.2 Morality in intercultural conflicts

The ethical crux lies in whether noncombatants are morally immune from
political violence: all such forms of political violence may then be universally
condemnable or conditionally justifiable. But because of the vast diversity of
cultures, that is, trans-generational systems of beliefs, values, and practicesand
hence moral vantage points (Parekh, 2005), who noncombatants are and whether
they are innocent or rightfully immune from being victimized may vary. For
those who do not consider noncombatants utterly clear of their moral
responsibilities for perceived grievances, these innocents may be deemed
morally legitimate targets of violence. Walzer (1992), for example, describes a
moral scale of assassinable victims accountable to the terrorists grievances
(cited in Merari, 2007, p. 28).91
How one assesses the degree to which certain people are morally
accountable for ones grievances is highly subjective. For example, in a
democracywhere policy and decision-makers are often elected, endorsed, and
hence empowered by the citizenscivilians may be held accountable for their
governments policies and actions. Such is the rationale of Osama bin Laden:
American society was morally corrupt and that American civilians should be
held accountable for the policies of their democratically elected government
(Blanchard, 2004, p. 4).92 Or more recently, when a Pakistani-born American
citizen Faisal Shahzad was questioned for attempting to car bomb Times Square
in New York, he identified himself as a Muslim soldier (Susman, 2010). But
when the District Judge Cedarbaum protested that his intended victims were
90

There are many historical examples of such moral contentions: Take the case of the freedomfighting mujahedin and the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Or consider the actions (or rather inaction)
of the Pakistani government in response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. See Rondeaux and Whitlock
(2008), and Warrick and Lakshmi (2008).
91
See Figure 4.3.1 for a moral scale of assassinable victims represented as the visible spectrum
(Merari, 2007, p. 28).
92
Most crucial is whether the belligerent group has taken into consideration the moral viewpoints
of their targets before conducting their attacks. This moral system for the consideration of
transcultural conflicts will be the main focus of the next Chapter 4.3.3.

90

civilians, Shahzad responded that: If people select the government, we consider

them all the same (Susman, 2010).

When Cedarbaum asked whether that included children, Shahzad said women and
children had died in U.S. strikes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its a war, he
said, describing himself as part of the answer for Muslims fighting that war
(Susman, 2010).

Not only did Shahzad not consider his actions unjust, but he did not even consider
them criminal.
Therefore, despite the paradoxical tension between the
deontological and consequential approaches, the consideration of the morality of
transcultural conflicts may find more coherence from an evolutionary theory of
morality (ETM). Advantageous to the ETM is that by construing moral systems
as adaptations for survival, moral conflicts may be seen more coherently across
cultures, allowing for intercultural evolution.
4.3.2.1 An evolutionary theory of morality
Drawn from Seto (2002), the premises are that:
(1) Human psychology and behaviors are selected through evolutionary
forces.
(2) Because individuals exhibiting particular attitudes and behaviors are more
likely to survive and reproduce, these will, after generations, become more
common within the local population.
(3) Thus adaptive reproduction underlies the evolution of moral behaviors,
including terrorism.
The ETM is not genetic determinism but rather assumes that environmental input
during ontogeny and social input during maturation are critical for the
expression and adaptive functioning of many traitsincluding that of morality
(Sosis & Alcorta, 2008, p. 109). Morality may thus be understood as an evolved
complex (including cognitive, affective, behavioral, and developmental traits) that
facilitates social cohesion. As human societies become increasingly large and
complex, the need for moral systems to regulate social stability likewise increases:
Being good (or at least appearing to be good) then is an adaptive survival skill
(Seto, 2002). Requiring complex mental and linguistic capacities for abstract
thought and communication, moral faculties may thus be a defining evolutionary
feature of humanity. While the morality of individuals may not directly relate to
their physical fitness, Roughgarden (2009) argues that some traits evolve not only
through sexual selection but also through social selection. These socially-selected
traits are sought out by potential mates and are beneficial for the species in the

91

long run by fostering social cohesion.93 But violence, according to Roughgarden

(2009), arises when social negotiations break down. Therefore moral rules can
help foster social cooperation to minimize conflicts within cultural groups. Rather
than framing morality as some abstract and absolute principle, the moral
controversy on terrorism can be reconsidered in light of evolutionary forces that
tend to maximize the survival of the group. In other words, people of all cultures
have some generic, innate moral sense that enhances their groups survival, and
not that they all have (or should have) the same set of moral values.
4.3.2.2 The principle of reciprocity
Seto (2002) goes further to identify three universal features in the
evolutionary strategy of cooperation common in a wide variety of human
interactions and cultures, which he collectively calls the principle of
reciprocity (POR): the golden rule, punishment, and forgiveness (pp. 1249,
1252). Should one party defect from cooperation according to the golden rule
(treating others as you would yourself), the defector should be reciprocally
punished (tit-for-tat) until the defector returns to cooperation and is thereby
forgiven (no longer treated as a defector). Seto (2002) contends that abiding by
the POR is not only regarded as moral in many cultures, but also evolutionarily
successful.

Just as a species consists of a group of individuals with common

genes, so a culture consists of a group with common learned
behaviors. Each human culture has evolved its own implementation
of the principle of reciprocity. I call any such implementation an
ethos of reciprocity (Seto, 2002, p. 1252).

An ethos of reciprocity thus consists of a culturally-adapted variant of the POR,

which helps to explain why morality varies across cultures. As Jonathan Haidt
explains, people are naturally imbued with a certain degree of moral sensitivity:
Just as a few universally rudimentary senses of taste can lead to the development
of many different cuisines, a few shared moral senses can evolve into a variety of
moral cultures (Brooks, 2010). Akin to Dawkins (1976) notion of memes,

93

This evolutionary theorythat individuals may prefer the good more than simply the fit
modifies classical Darwinian sexual selection. This evolutionary principle runs counter to the
conventional wisdom that nice guys finish last. See Roughgarden (2004) and Roughgarden
(2009). Both drawing on game theory, Roughgarden (2009) and Seto (2002) see cooperation as an
innate tendency in human nature that is mathematically beneficial. However, I will limit the
supposed reproductive benefits of exhibiting moral goodness to only those of the in-group rather
than the entire human species. After all, different groups of people often compete and attack one
another due to differences in moral frameworks.

92

moral characters are inherited through cultural reproduction.94 However, in this

framework, morality is not simply a cultural arbitrary either because of its
mathematical optimization under evolutionary forces. For this reason all major
moral codesChristian, Buddhist, Jewish, Hindu, Muslim, Confucian, and
Zoroastrianresemble each other at their core (Seto, 2002, p. 1252).95
Consequently, the POR is a common algorithm for determining different moral
systems. Whether a terrorist act is morally culpable as a defection from the
POR is therefore culturally-relative, and can potentially lead into a feedback cycle
of repeated mutual defections (Seto, 2002, p. 1255). The mitigation of this
violent perpetuation of terror would require a return to cooperation, or least a
shared recognition of and sensitivity to different ethe. After all, justice can only
be justice if its application is just for both sides of a conflict. Being able to see
things from the vantage points of others is a crucial hermeneutic to being able to
see and respond to terror justly.

4.3.3 Expanding the freedom from terror

The fact that practitioners of the MET commonly excuse their actions as
the last resort in response to previous defections from their POR by members of
other groups demonstrates the need for a shared ethos: the only viable long-term
solution to cycle of terror (Seto, 2002, p. 1260). Freedom from terror, then,
requires the expansion of a shared ethos, a process which is not imposablelest it
become terroristicbut most possible through the pedagogical means of open
dialogue. To expand a shared ethos, I first need to borrow (1) the methodology of
Siegels (2002) and Masons (2005) defense of the universality of multicultural
principles; (2) the relatively expansive reach of the concept of human rights; and
(3) the transcultural derogation inherent to the MOT (discussed previously in
Chapter 4.3.1) to formulate an interculturally coherent evaluation of terrorism.
4.3.3.1 Intercultural evaluation of the morality of terrorism
The first postulate:

Evolutionary forces select for a complex of traits that

constitutes the moral dispositions in every person and an
ethos that maximizes the reproductive success of the
cultural group.

The second postulate: The MET can be clearly observed irrespective of the
moral frame of reference of the hermeneut.

94

However, I do not believe that the transmission of moral memes is as calculable and organized
a process as biological inheritance. See Atran (2001).
95
See Seto (2002) for his references to many authoritative scriptural passages that uphold the
primacy of the golden rule.

93

Given the tenability of the two postulates,96 the LET can first be argued as
violating human rights:
(1) People who legally justify their employment of the MET as selfdetermination are maintaining their collective right to use the
methodology against those of an oppressive group.
(2) Yet noncombatants within both groups commonly self-impart the right to
be free from being victimized by the MET and would therefore consider
the practice (when employed against them) as oppressive by virtue of
violating such rights.
(3) Since there is no absolute authority (one universally legitimate) by which
members of one group can monopolize the LET such that the common
right to be immune from the MET can be overridden,
(4) Therefore the legal justification for the right to employ the METeven
out of self-determinationcontradicts their self-given right to be free from
oppression (should they hold it) and is revoked by the shared right to be
free from terror.
Secondly, the MOT can be argued to be conditionally immoral:
(1) People justifying their use of the MET are asserting the universality of
their ideals upon differing ideologues of a condemnable culture (such that
they can defend the utilization of such methods).
(2) Yet there is no absolute frame of reference, one embraced by all, through
which these ideologies could be supra-culturally and impartially assessed;
therefore the applicability of one groups ideals is restricted to the local,
not universal level.
(3) Therefore to impose the use of the MET upon members of other groups
holding alternate ideologies cannot be justified.
(4) The conclusion is that people of a particular culture cannot rationally
justify the moral use of the MET against members of another ethos.
Hence, members of different groups should mutually allow coexistence
without utilizing the MET.
Although Siegel (2002) and Mason (2005) are defending the applicability of the
principle of multiculturalism to all cultures, my defenses of the immorality of
terrorism and its violation of human rights are not universal but only aims to
expand this ethos by defending the widespread condemnation of the MET as a
defection from the POR through the limited power of rational argumentation. The
first justification only holds for those who appeal to human rights (which
implicate an important role for human rights education) and the second for those
who are convinced by the limited force of abstract reasoning. I thus argue that in
any conflict between groups, a violent act should be deemed morally
96

The first and second postulates were articulated in Chapter 4.3.2 and Chapter 4.1.1 respectively.

94

condemnable (hence refrained) even if only one side considers it a moral

defection, that is, from what is acceptable in reciprocity.
The MET is therefore only immoral under most conditions. Consider, for
example, two differing etheX and Ywhere members of X apply the MET to
members of Y.
(1) If the MET was employed without regard to Xs own moral norms that
condemn such methodologies, then the act would be a defection by virtue
of violating the ethos of X and hence, should be refrained.
(2) Alternatively, if the MET was employed without regard to Ys moral
norms that condemn such methodologies, then the act would also be a
defection by virtue of violating the ethos of Y and hence, should be
refrained.
(3) And if X and Y both condemn the MET, then any such acts which violate
the moral norms of both X and Y would most definitely be a defection and
hence, should be refrained.
(4) However, if X and Y both tolerate the MET as within their moral norms, as
a conventional part of their respective ethe, then the act would be moral
and not a defection from their respective PORs, and hence, need not be
refrained.
It is easy to imagine the victims of terror calling for the moral condemnation of
the act. But the first argument is an appeal to conscience: to terrorize the
terrorists is immoral if the retaliating party considers the instigative method as
wrong. Even threatening with terror would be immoral for it is wrong to
threaten to do what it would be wrong to do (Walzer, 2004, p. 48). As Russell
(2009) argues: We suffer not only the evils that actually befall us, but all those
that we have reason to fear (p. 122). Thus, Walzer (2004) insists that it is
essential that we recognize as the same the evil we oppose and the evil we do,
and that we set ourselves, so far as possible, against both (p. 49). However, the
MET is moral if and only if both the sponsoring and targeted societies consider
the act justifiable. The possible justification for the MET would therefore depend
on the existence of any cultures that uphold within its moral ethos such
conventional methods. And if such societies with a culture of violence were to
employ the MET against one another, these acts would not be immoral: given
their rejection or ignorance of the concepts of human rights, the freedom from
fear, and noncombatant immunity in their moral discourse and conventional
practices. Within such cultures, certain violent acts are tolerableeven
laudablesuch as the death penalty, war, or physically disciplining a child or
spouse.
Social Darwinism provides one framework for such societies. For
example, the Nazis hold that one should respect only those cultures that have
earned the right to be respected by violent self-assertion (Mackenzie, 2007, p.
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661). They therefore practiced violence that was not morally condemnable
according to their POR: For they accept, indeed, expect, similar retaliations from
others, regarding such violent reciprocations as normal.97 It is also possible to
imagine some societies (especially in the past) that would not have considered
their civilians as noncombatants (an identity by virtue of which supposedly
provides immunity from political violence in many ethe). One contemporary
example of some individuals who acceptindeed, expectsuch indifferent
violence as part of the normal social experience is Hussein Abu Ali, who serves
tea to pilgrims along the roadside during Ashura each year in Baghdad. Ali
considers a suicide bombing carried out by a woman at the Shiite shrine that
resulted in over 40 deaths and many more injuries as just another mundane event
(Shadid, 2009). The tea server reopened his stall just two hours after the blast
following the collection of body parts in plastic bags, the loading of dead bodies
onto trucks, and the rinsing of blood off the streets. Weve grown accustomed to
it.... Explosions, blasts, shootings and rockets, we dont have any fear anymore
(Shadid, 2009).98 Even in one of the most developed countries in the world,
some American neighborhoods may have grown normalized the regular
experience of violent shootings as part of a youth culture:

killing somebody who ticks you off is normal. Its something that is only to be
expected, like eating when youre hungry. If a stranger or someone from a rival
clique steps on your clean, white sneakers, or makes a crack about your manhood, or
laughs at you, putting a bullet in his heart or his head is seen by an awful lot of
young people as an appropriate response. The main problem is the acceptance of
murder as normal behavior by so many inner-city young people (Herbert, 2010).

Once these violent behaviors are learned through the almost unconscious
copying of one another, social pressure among peers renders it normal to reach
for a gun to settle grievances (Herbert, 2010).

What happens is these guys have a grievance, just like everybody has a grievance.
Theyre shooting each other over things like, He looked at my girl, He
disrespected me, He cut in front of me in line, He owed me money. And then, of
course, there is the retaliation: He shot my brother or my friend (Herbert, 2010).

97

However under the ETM the Holocaust is still immoral. Despite not violating the first
condition, the oppressive terrorism violates the second.
98
Given an alternative however, I suspect that most peopleeven those living in a culture that has
incorporated extremism as part of the normal discoursewould at least prefer not having to
experience violence and death. I also suspect that Ali and his people are not without fear, but
rather that they have grown numb to that fear in a post-terror world. The condition of the postterror world will be discussed in Chapter 6.

96

This ethos perpetuates the expectation and acceptance of modes of violence that
becomes the norm. Education thus plays a crucial role in the transformation of
such violent normsfrom interpersonal shootings to international warsby
subjecting such mentalities, attitudes, and behaviors to more diverse moral
critique.
4.3.3.2 Sharing an ethos, expanding our horizons
Because states, through a monopoly of their laws, self-legitimize their preemptive or retaliatory violence, most governments define terrorism so as to
exclude the possibility of their own condemnation by it. Here, the ETM can be
applied to the entire spectrum of political violence. Even if the aggressors
consider their attack wholly justifiable and their citizens would morally accept
similar actions by their enemies, the act remains immoral if the target finds it
morally objectionable.99 As McPherson (2007) notes, political violence
committed by nonstate actors are not intrinsically worse than otherwise
indistinguishable acts of political violence committed by states (p. 539). Such an
ethical analysis of political violence upon an evolutionary theory of reciprocity
provides a more coherent basis for escaping the imposition of deontological
absolutes or the subjective mire of consequentialism. Within this dynamic
framework, the JWT is but one cultural discourse that dictates what acts are
morally tolerable in the reciprocation of violence.
The ETM does not presuppose that people should have a particular system
of values or rationality that is somehow superior to others (though there is the
possibility that certain systems may be better suited for particular contexts).
Rather, the assumption is that the capability for moral thought and sensitivity is an
evolutionary trait of humanity. As Paul Bloom notes:

people have a rudimentary sense of justice from a very early age. This doesnt
make people naturally good. But it does mean that social norms fall upon
prepared ground (Brooks, 2010).

99

Consider the example of fighting in ice hockey. When players from different teams fight on the
ice, they share a common ethos that is not specifically dictated by the league rules: Players fight
one-to-one with only fists; they drop their sticks and gloves as a sign of their readiness to fight;
and the grabbing of jerseys are tolerated (even pulling their opponents jersey over their heads).
For those who share this ethos, fighting in such a manner during hockey games (though illegal and
penalized by referees) is deemed moralby both teams, coaches, referees, and the league officials.
The unwritten etiquette of how scores are settled makes the reciprocation of such violence
unquestionably moral. However, if a hockey player were to breach such a shared ethossay by
using a hockey stick during a fight (which has happened before)their action would not only be
illegal but would also be deemed immoral. Alternatively, if a hockey player fights with another
player according to the hockey ethos while playing, say, a football game; it would also be
immoral as the football players culture does not morally tolerate the same style of violence as in
hockey games.

97

Our moral faculties, then, provide a natural groundwork for developing moral
dialogue on how we perceive and respond to the world. More importantly, the
ETM recognizes the unavoidable differences in moral systems that guide the
reciprocation of all types of violenceincluding terrorismand is reflexively
adaptive to such differences. Specifically, the ETM points to a couple of
approaches to enhancing the moral responsibilities to noncombatants: Through
expanding a shared ethos that reciprocates human rights (which I hold to be most
tenable through pedagogical means), and through intercultural dialogue over the
morality of acts of violence. Enhancing the awareness and appreciation of the
right of noncombatants to be free from terror is one method for slowing the
perpetual cycle of defection and punishment. Such mutual terror can only be
sustainably mitigated through non-paradoxical means such as dialogical forms of
intercultural education. Only acceptable and not imposable, critical methods of
pedagogy can help soften the fundamentalism that grounds extremist
ressentiment. The fact that the POR underlies the moral discourse of many
cultures, and that globalization creates greater opportunities for intercultural
dialogue, enhances the possibility for sharing our ethos.
Through such sharing, observers become aware of the similarities and
differences of their frames of reference. Comparable to relative motion in
physics, the truth of any empirical claims can be coherently regarded once the
parameters have been specified. As Flew (1971) argues, relative to the actual
specifications of all the variables on some given occasion, it may become
unambiguously and absolutely right to act [or, in the case of terrorism, not act] in
this one particular way (p. 82). Therefore, moral judgments are likely to be more
consistent when one anothers frames of reference have been taken into account.
Through sharing our ethos, we expand our horizons. By sharing our ethos, we see
beyond what was once unperceived. Our ethos can now take into account (or at
least recognize) the different POR of others. If our ethos that respects the
freedom from fear of every person can be shared with others, not through coercive
enforcement or by appealing to a particular divine or governmental authority but
solely through intercultural dialogue as moral agents, then many acts of
violencebe it war or terrorismcan be more coherently evaluated and
mitigated. The development of a shared ethos free from the unfreedom of terror is
not a utopian vision of homogeneity but rather a continuously evolving dialogical
process that recognizes difference and the need for such differences to be
recognized. Through intercultural learning, our moral presumptions become
challenged and refined. Being less certain that we are always right, by testing our
moral evaluations in intercultural dialogue, we will be more hesitant to assert our
positions through extreme ways (Russell, 2009). The promotion of intercultural
dialogue is more than simply a culturally-based discourse (which it is) but is also
transculturally valuable: Such dialogue suggests a pedagogical framework for
mutual learning, reflection, and criticism conducive to the freedom from terror.
And it is to the issue of intercultural learning that the thesis next turns.
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4.4 Conclusion
While terrorism is a strategy hinging on asymmetric power relations, such
asymmetry is also reflected by the technocratic definition and diagnosis of terror.
This hermeneutical process has been monopolized by those authorized with the
power of legitimacy and imposed upon others through symbolic violence.
Deconstructing its essence, then, reveals that terrorismas a strategy of political
coercion through indifferent violencecan be considered in three dimensions:
the methodological, legal, and moral. Clausewitz (2006) summarized war to be
an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will (Chapter
One, No. 2). Thus, the similarities between war (as Clausewitz defines it) and
terror (as I have defined it in Chapter 4.1.1) are profound, and their legal and
moral distinctions contestable. International conventions embodying the JWT
only hold for those who accept its legitimate authority or fear the consequences of
its violation. Moreover, some violent acts which are not conventionally defined
as terrorism may entail very similar effects. Both war and terrorism may be
waged for just or unjust causes; use force against noncombatants, with
conventional war usually causing... many more casualties; and produce fear
widely among noncombatants (McPherson, 2007, p. 546).

Further, states do not necessarily have and nonstate groups do not necessarily lack
an adequate kind of authority that is a condition for permissible resort to political
violence. If we believe that terrorism is an evil because of the harm it does to
ordinary noncombatants, we should be prepared to accept that the brute reality of
war for noncombatants is an evil that is at least on par.... If we believe that war can
be justifiable on grounds of just cause and the unavailability of less harmful means,
despite the harm it does to noncombatants, we must take seriously whether these
same grounds could ever justify terrorism. The failures of the dominant view of
terrorism should lead us to adopt either a more critical attitude toward conventional
war or a less condemnatory attitude toward terrorism (McPherson, 2007, p. 546).

As a power struggle that is reliant upon a self-justifying ideology and

propagandistic fear, the legal distinction of terrorism from war becomes moot
when their moral distinction is clearly ambiguous. Along the spectrum of
political violence, war and terrorism is difficult to separate. After all, how does
one condemn or justify one without doing likewise to the other without appealing
to some cultural arbitrary? And because the deontological and consequential
approaches to the ethics of violence may not be particularly illuminating, the
moral examination of transcultural conflicts may benefit from a more flexible and
adaptive framework. Upon the postulates that: (1) the evolutionary selection and
adaptation of the POR is statistically advantageous for human societies, and that
(2) the terrorist methodology can be self-evident when independently considered
from its legal and moral essences; an ethos that values the freedom from terror can
be shared interculturally through the dialogical education of human rights. By
99

expanding an ethos that recognizes the others parameters structuring their moral
framework, there is the potential for a more coherent recognition of terroristic
methods. This shared recognition thereby offers the possibility of morally
consistent responses that will not only not perpetuate, but perhaps mitigate, the
cycle of mutual terror.
As with any proposed solutions to real life problems, especially one as
complex as terrorism, a number of conceptual stumbling blocks remain. Firstly,
the golden rule of treating others as you would yourself that is fundamental to
the POR needs to be revised to be more dialogical rather than monological. The
monological form of the golden rule is problematic for it imposes upon others
what one presupposes to be good. However, a dialogical form of the golden rule
would instead necessitate deliberation with others over how they would like to be
treated according to their terms. After all, according to the ETM, an act dealt to
others is only morally consistent if both parties find the reciprocity acceptable.
Secondly, the ETM is overly simplistic in how people are identified and organized
into groups. Given the complexity of a globalizing world, the freedom to
develop our own affiliations and identities is of great importance. After all, many
of those victimized by 9/11 may not agree with how al-Qaeda recognized them,
just as many of the civilians who died in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the war
may not concur with being affiliated with al-Qaeda. Central to the problem of
terror is the misrecognition of identities in an increasingly small yet
heterogeneous world. Thirdly, even within a single cultural group, there are
certainly different moral views when evaluating a particular act of violence. As
stake-holding citizens of the decisions made by their leaders, there is the necessity
for a justifiable representation in governing bodies and institutions. Therefore, to
continue with the consideration of the mitigation of the cycle of terror, the crucial
role of democratic and intercultural education (in terms of dialogue and learning
from difference) warrants exploration.

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CHAPTER 5
WHERE EDUCATION MEETS
SOCIO-POLITICAL TERROR

Hence it is evident that... man is naturally a political animal...

(Aristotle, 1912, p. 11).

5.0 Introduction
At the outset of this thesis, I had problematized the interrelations between
terrorism and education according to a discourse dominated by a political
economy paradigm. But a mere critique has neglected to respond to one of the
central questions driving this research: On what basis does education connect
with terrorism? Beyond being merely a form of developmental aid to combat the
hearts and minds of potential terrorists among the poor, uneducated children of
others, or a historical metanarrative that inculcates our youth with a selfjustifying national citizenship, education meets terror at three levels. First,
terrorism is ultimately learned. Conceptualized as a habitus rather than a rational
act of pure calculus, terrorist dispositions may fundamentally be reproduced
sociologically. As such, the mentality and practice of terror may need to be
addressed through educationhere, conceptualized broadly as both formal and
informal processes of teaching and learning. Second, education is required in the
sustainable cultivation of political sensitivity and accountability to not only
compatriots but also the citizens of other states. Without a politics that can
legitimately represent the voices of the people through deliberation, authorities
cannot claim moral justification in taking action in transcultural conflicts. Third,
on a more interpersonal level, education should cultivate a habitus necessary for
addressing the misrecognition and miscommunication that problematizes terror.
Transcending the toleration of people according to presumptuous identities, an
intercultural education points to the imperative of dialogue with unique others.
The development of a more qualified understanding of others and oneself can help
remedy the misrecognition that underlies the miscommunication of terror.
Without making sweeping generalizations or seeking a consensus,
interculturalism upholds as crucial dialogue across differences and thereby the
potential for reflexive change and interdependency. Here, I will develop further
the first two interrelations between terrorism and education before focusing on the
third issue in the next chapter.

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5.1 A socio-political theory of terrorism

Secure within the calculus of the PEA, the modern paradigm of terrorism
research seeks to provide technocratic measurements and solutions to a profound
problem that is not easily resolved scientifically. Different disciplines hold the
roots of terrorism to grow from a different soil: for economists, poverty;
psychologists, mental disorders; for political scientists, national and territorial
grievances. But from a sociological perspective, the roots of terroristic behavior
may be regarded as being acquired through social reproduction, which then
becomes essential to the comprehension, analysis, and potential mitigation of
terrorism. Therefore the reconception of terrorism from a sociological basis may
be an important discourse that challenges the dominant paradigm in terrorism
research. Here, I integrate the sociological basis of terrorism and the dominant
discourse of globalized terrorism within a single socio-political theory. First,
referring back to the essences of terrorism conceptualized in Chapter 4, the highly
controversial terrorist identity is reconstructed more broadly. The terrorist
identity can then be more coherently applied according to methodology. Second,
this methodological essence of terrorism conceptually implicates a wide range of
human behaviors from the political realm down to the social. From the familial to
the workplace to the international, terror can and is a political practice of the
social animal that is human being. Even on the micro level of social interactions,
the ETM remains relevant in moral considerations. And third, the sociological
roots of terrorism can be conceptualized within an intergenerational transmission
of violence model, leading to profound implications of a pedagogical
interrelationship. Although some of the tensions underlying the conflicting
conceptions of terrorism are eased in this framework, such a rethinking of terror
suggests pertinent ramifications in the field of education, particularly for
cultivating an intercultural habitus.

5.1.1 Reconstructing the terrorist identity

In an internationally televised address, then President George W. Bush
offered an ultimatum: Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists (Bush, 2001).
Evidently, the terrorist identity may be politically employed to create a
Manichean dichotomyin both self-justification and condemnation of others.
Because of the transcultural derogation inherent to the terrorist label,
practitioners of MET often legitimize their methods under a different namebe it
war or self-determinationto vindicate their own actions from culpability.
Thus in practice, the issue of terrorism is often not one of justice, but one of
taking sides. However, as I had argued in Chapter 4, violence both legal and
illegal, both conventional and unconventional should be subject to the same
standard of moral scrutiny. Legitimate violence may not necessarily be moral; the
hands of soldiers sometimes may not be morally cleaner than those of
102

terrorists. Conversely, violence that is illegitimate may not necessarily be

immoral. Thus, the separate consideration of the methodological, legal, and moral
essences of terrorism is conducive for clarifying the terrorist identity: as any
person engaging in the terrorist method. Terrorists are simply people who
practice the political strategy of violent coercion. The morality of the specific
method, then, must be subject to the dialogical consideration of the people on both
sides of the conflictthat is through the ETM as I had argued in Chapter 4. The
moral judgment of the MET will thus depend on the threshold of tolerance
dialogically determined by the people involved in and affected by the conflict.
Consider the morality of the Japanese-American conflict during WWII: If
the Japanese people held bombings of noncombatants to be morally justifiable
within their ethos (such as Pearl Harbor), then the equally terroristic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (an act popularly supported by democratic Americans)
should also be judged to be moral (Merari, 2007). In other words, the
reciprocation of terrorist methods would be moral and not a defection from a
shared ethos if they are found justifiable by all sides. As Seto (2002) clearly
explains:

The principle of reciprocity applies to princes and paupers alike. This means that if
we are going to condemn a particular type of politically motivated violence when
undertaken by terrorists, we must equally condemn the same type of violence when
undertaken by the U.S. Army or the CIA. If we are going to permit the justification
of politically motivated violence undertaken by the U.S. Army or the CIA, we must
similarly admit the possibility that similar violence undertaken by Al Qaeda may be
equally justified. The fact that the U.S. Army and the CIA are agents of a state does
not make their actions any more or less moral (p. 1259).100

Those with the power of legitimacy are quick to identify and condemn others
while legitimizing their own use and sponsorship of the same methods. Justified
retrospectively by history, victors are vindicated through the national education.
But perhaps what is most often neglected in the POR is the moral obligation to
forgive once the defector has returned to cooperation. The ETM would hold that
the terrorist label be removed from those who have forsaken and amended for
practicing what was dialogically determined to be intolerable.
If one impartially identifies a terrorist as simply someone who puts the
MET into practiceindependent of their cause, socioeconomic background,
affiliations, beliefs, age, gender, or ethnicitythen there may be many more
terrorists than only those appearing on government lists and in the media. After
all, terrorism is above all a tool or, if you will, a technique (Chaliand & Blin,
100

See Barlett and Steele (2003) for an account of the CIAs terrorist operations in the SovietAfghan War and the Iran-Iraq War.

103

2007b, p. 5). To use such a technique is to be a terrorist. Furthermore, required

behind the scenes are sympathetic financiers, trainers, recruiters, technicians,
propagandists, and teachers to inspire the spectacular narrative. Just as all the
stagehands, directors, advertisers, choreographers, composers, managers, prop
designers, and cast directors take credit for a production, so all those involved
behind-the-scenes in terror are morally accountable for the act. Given the
increasingly common stereotype of terrorists as Islamic, Arab men sporting a
curly beard and a turban, the coherent consideration and application of the
terrorist identity requires a social solution.101 The essence of terrorism thus
warrants critical consideration beyond the paradigmatic discourse.

5.1.2 The socio-political scale of terrorism

The essence of terror entails an intentional practice that is coercive through
physical and symbolic violence that can be legitimate or illegitimate. Although
the moral essence of specific acts can be more coherently considered through the
ETM, the MET is inherently political in terms of the involvement of power in
social relations. Whether oppressive or revolutionary, taken up by the powerful or
the powerless, terrorism is fundamentally a struggle for power built on the backs
of a self-justifying ideology. Communicated through propagandistic displays of
violence, the exploitation of fear and intimidation is the hallmark of such
methods. If all these traits mark the MET, then the logical implication is that any
practice constituted of all of these same essencesirrespective of its legality or
morality, or the scale of its impactsshould also be deemed terroristic. In this
view, the practice of terrorism has been historically pervasive, found not only in
the domain of international relations but also in social relations. The discourse of
globalized terrorism, as grand media spectacles of international violence, is but
one extremity within the vast spectrum of practices that are terroristic. From the
smallest social units of the personal family and the domestic workplace to the
national family and international corporations, such coercive violence have been
practiced physically and symbolically in the struggle for powerfor the
accruement of diverse forms of capital.102
One way of locating the socio-political scale of a terrorist act is by
referring to the intended target of the terrorist. The coercive threats made by
familial terrorists would usually be limited to a close circle of family and friends
while those made by international terrorists would often be intended for the
governments and citizens of multiple nations. Moreover, terrorists and terrorist
organizations can shift in socio-political reach along the scale. For example, some
101

See Robbins (2009) for one example that occurred on New Years Day, 2009, when nine
American Muslims in traditional attire were taken off an AirTran domestic flight and questioned
by the FBI after they were overheard by fellow passengers discussing the location of the safest seat
on the plane.
102
See Figure 5.1.1 for the scales to which terrorism has been applied.

104

oppressive terrorists (such as Lenin and Stalin) began as small-scale revolutionary

terrorists. And al-Qaeda originated from an Afghan-based resistance force before
evolving into a globalized organization. As Nelles (2003) argues:

Violent behavior may be learned in families, schools or in social and religious

groups, then institutionalized among adultstranslated into behaviors, government
policies, international disputes or military actions and war. Violence may be
normalized or systemic through administrative, institutional, military training,
media, cultural, family and gender or racially biased means (p. 22).

There may thus be many more terroriststhat is, those practicing the METthan
strictly those conventionally labeled as such towards the international end of the
scale.103 Family terrorism particularly warrants elaboration: not only because it is
situated at the smallest pole along the scale of terror, and is perhaps the least
salient in dominant terrorism discourses, but also because it may play a significant
role within the intergenerational transmission of such behaviors. How terror is
learned, transmitted, and practiced in mundane ways may be the root to
addressing the full bloom of such displays when it becomes spectacular.
5.1.2.1 Family terrorism
Neglected from most terrorism discourses is what Hammer (2005) refers
to as family terrorism (p. 99). Hammers (2005) conceptual basis stems from
her critical feminists framework that violence is systemic and hierarchical and
mediated by patriarchalism (p. 100). Such physical and psychological
patriarchal abuse in the familial context is reinforced by the masculine authority
over females, children, and the elderlyin their economic, political, and social
interrelations (Hammer, 2005, p. 101). For Hammer (2005), whether nominally
classified as domestic violence or political violence, terrorism should be
understood as a systemic, familial mediated process, from the biological
family, to racial neighbourhoods, to the nation-state as a national family
(Hammer, 2005, pp. 101, 105). Palestinian feminist Nasser similarly argues that
the rise of suicide bombings in Palestine is reflective of the general brutalization
of the Palestinian societymade manifest in the violence within families
[and] aggressivity in schools (Laqueur, 2003, p. 88). Consider the practice of socalled honor killings (Chesler, 2009). Dishonored by the immoral ways of
ones family member, families threaten and eventually kill the victims, who are
often young girls.

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To reiterate, according to the ETM, the terrorist method is not necessarily immoral even at the
extent of social terrorism. Furthermore the terrorist identity is conditional, temporally bound until
a return to shared ethos of reciprocity.

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Families that kill for honor will threaten girls and women if they refuse to cover
their hair, their faces, or their bodies or act as their family's domestic servant; wear
makeup or Western clothing; choose friends from another religion; date; seek to
obtain an advanced education; refuse an arranged marriage; seek a divorce from a
violent husband; marry against their parents wishes; or behave in ways that are
considered too independent, which might mean anything from driving a car to
spending time or living away from home or family (Chesler, 2009).

As critical feminist Heidi Ross (2003) argues:

From this perspective, we might envision a war on terrorism as a continuum of

preventing (or engendering) violence from household to street to battlefield to
refugee camp. Women in domestic shelters have a particular view, indeed, on
homeland security (p. 34).

While some feminists regard terrorism (on the political scale) as the set of
violent practices arising from the underlying patriarchal oppression (on the social
scale), Pizzey (1998) also refers to family terrorism but with one key exception:
that women also tend to reciprocate and instigate emotional terrorism. Pizzey
(1998) observes that while men are capable of behaving as family terrorists...
male violence tends to be more physical and explosive, whereas family
terrorism is a tactic largely used by women, who emphasize emotional, rather
than physical, abuse (The Emotional Terrorist). Reiterating that both men and
women are capable of terrorism, Pizzey (1998) contends that women tend to use
such violence more subtly than men. Her claim that females tend to be more
terroristic emotionally does moderate the hermeneutical of the critical feminists
who argue that the mediation of terror is purely and entirely patriarchal. Thus, a
family terrorist may be any person, of any gender and age, who employs
physical and symbolic coercion to intentionally affect the power equilibrium in
terms of the distribution of capital.104 Various forms of social violence,
including that in the family, could be considered terroristic if its method bears the
essence of terror. Even on the social level, family terrorism is inherently political
because it intentionally aims to influence human behavior through physical and
symbolic coercion.

Intent only to achieve the goal... the terrorist will take such measures as: stalking a
spouse or ex-spouse, physically assaulting the spouse or the spouses new partners,
telephoning all mutual friends and business associates of the spouse in an effort to
ruin the spouses reputation, pressing fabricated criminal charges against the spouse
(including alleged battery and child molestation), staging intentionally unsuccessful
suicide attempts for the purpose of manipulation, snatching children from the
104

Capital refers to the Bourdieusian concept of economic, cultural, and social capital (Bourdieu,
2006).

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spouses care and custody, vandalizing the spouses property, murdering the spouse
and/or the children as an act of revenge (Pizzey, 1998).

Akin to other terrorists, the family terrorist coerces emotionally and physically,
often in response to perceived grievances. The victims of family terrorism often
serve as a propagandistic hostage for the manipulation of an intended target.
Thus, in the process of exacting physical violence upon the immediate victim,
symbolic violence may be exerted upon the target of coercion.
As Pizzey (1998) argues, an essential first step towards limiting the
destructive potential of familial terrorism is to understand the terrorist to be a
terrorist. To this end, it requires not only the recognition of the terrorists to see
themselves as having practiced terrorism, but also the terrorized to see their
experiences as such. The recognition of the discrepancy in their POR is thus
crucial to re-establishing non-terroristic communication.105

In a recent case, a Mr. Roberts described to me how, during his marriage, he and his
children faced a daily onslaught of verbal abuse from his wife. Mrs. Roberts was
also physically violent to the children. Now that he has asked for a divorce, she is
making use of every weapon in her arsenal. In the childrens presence, she has used
drugs and drank alcohol to the point of extreme intoxication. She has staged several
unsuccessful suicide attempts in front of the children, threatened over the telephone
to do something stupid, promised to kill Mr. Roberts new partner, and assured
Mr. Roberts that when she has finished with him he will not have a penny to his
name. To Mr. Roberts, all of this behaviour seemed perfectly usual. After all, he
had witnessed this sort of commotion for thirteen years of their marriage. When I
suggested to him [that] What you endured is emotional terrorism, he suddenly,
and for the first time, was able to see his situation clearly. Now, he realized, his
wifes behavior was neither appropriate nor acceptable... (Pizzey, 1998).

But as natural as it seems to condemn all terrorism, the ETM again serves
as a reminder that such behaviors may not always be regarded as immoral.
Manifesting even in familial contexts, such social terrorism are often addressed
through therapeutic means of psychiatry, social work, or counseling. After all,
some forms of familial terrorism may be regarded as an evolutionary selection of
social behavior. For example, threatening children in order to control their
behavior, whether with a raised hand or the denial of sweets, may be considered
morally acceptable by many parents or teachers. The socialization of behavioral
norms may after all enhance the survival of adolescents amidst the dangers of
their natural surroundings and the reproduction of social stability through the
reiteration of the power of the pre-existing authorities. Such moral ambiguity
105

Here the monologue in the traditional golden rule needs to be revamped to take into account
the difference of others. I focus on this issue in Chapter 6.1.3.

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reiterates the importance for the recognition and discussion of one anothers
taken-for-granted rationales and practices. But before I focus on the implication
of dialogue with others, both Hammers (2005) patriarchal family terrorists and
Pizzeys (1998) matriarchal emotional terrorists serve to illustrate the extent of
terrorist practices in social dynamics, particularly on the familial end of the sociopolitical scale.
The recognition that all persons have the capacity to act as terrorists under
particular circumstanceseven if only on a small scaleis noteworthy at least
for its potential mitigation (should such methods be found immoral) and selfreflection (by questioning whether one has used such methods). And there is a
fallacy in presuming that the traumatic impact on targets decreases with the
reduction in the scale of the violence. In other words, there may be a tendency to
regard spectacular events of globalized terrorism as being more traumatic for
targets than the hidden terrorism experienced in the workplace or in the family.
Even mundane family terroristswho terrorize relatively few peoplecan
cause profound harm upon their domestic targets, particularly when the violence
may be more specialized to and drawn out over the targets life. In other words,
the frightening coercion instilled by globalized terrorists may be even less
tangible for some than that by an abusive parent, teacher, or spouse. Moreover,
the extensive research on the intergenerational transmission of violence (ITV)
predominantly suggests that the experience of domestic abuse (which could
include some instances of familial terrorism) socializes individuals into
perpetuating similar forms of violence as a viable modus operandi in future
conflicts. Thus the perpetuation of terroristic behaviors on any scale may be at
least partially attributable to the history of social experiences of individuals. The
crux when reconsidering the roots of terrorism and its mitigation may thus lie with
this sociological basis for the intergenerational perpetuation of terroristic
behaviors.

5.1.3 The sociological roots of terrorism

Our teacher is very good. He only hits us if we dont learn explain some
students from Angola, in praise of their teacher (Davies, 2011). As Davies (2011)
suggests, physical violence and coercion are so socially embedded in Angolan
schools that even legal reforms often fail to change such practices. The childs
statement further implicates that Angolan students have indeed accepted such
violence as the social norm. How will these Angolan children approach the
politics of education when they reach adulthood or become parents or teachers?
And describing it as pervasive, and almost a normal part of the school day,
researcher Catherine Hill found that nearly half of all American secondary
students have experienced sexual harassment by their peers in the 2010-2011
school year (Anderson, 2011). Be it done in person, through social networks,
online, through emails, or text messages, such harassment and bullying often
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involve misrecognizing the sexual identity ofand hence, terrifyingthe targets,

leading some to even contemplate suicide (Crary, 2011). As Crary (2011) argues,
the kids who are harassers are part of a vicious cycle, for they often have
been harassed themselves (p. 1). Meanwhile in Cambodia, Heng Bun Theng, a
grade 12 student, explains how during the exams, teachers [would] design
difficult questions which only those who attended [their] private tutoring class
would be able to answer (Chandara, 2011). A fuller extent of Hengs experience
of social terror can be felt when his family struggles to pay for his private
tutorials, so much so that all his sisters have had to quit school in order to help pay
for his schooling. Hengs tutors, who are also his teachers, can double their
regular teacher salary through private tuitions. Withholding essential knowledge
students need to succeed is thus essential to how Cambodian teachers can make
money. Faced with the prevalence of such symbolic coercion and unable to fail
his familys sacrifices, Heng has now come to accept the fact that: You cannot
graduate [from] public education in Cambodia if you dont take private
tutoring from your teacher (Chandara, 2011). The terrorist method is embedded
daily within the horizons of these adolescents. But luckily, not all those who have
been terrorized terrorize in turn: How then does one stop playing the terrorist
game (Walzer, 2004, p. 66)?
5.1.3.1 Intergenerational transmission of violence
Terrorism, from the social to the political, is fundamentally socialized
through the mental and behavioral dispositions perpetuated within the terrorists
milieu. Often neglected from the discourse of terrorism, that of the social can and
is exercised by both genders to varying degrees and in different contexts. While
feminists generally condemn this controversial view and insist that only males are
capable of perpetrating such methods, there is empirical evidence that may refute
the feminists claim. Therefore to strengthen this socio-political theory of terror, I
first draw on some recent research on ITV and then Bourdieus theory for social
reproduction and change: the former to demonstrate that terrorist violence of
many forms are perpetuated as part of a systemic experience, and the latter to
conceptualize how terrorism as a habitus (that is, an interrelated set of both mental
and behavioral dispositions) may be learned and altered. Grounding a theory of
terroristic practices upon notions of habitus, capital, and fields provides a more
powerful account than that based only and entirely on rational choices,
territoriality, psychology, or poverty. Through a critique of social structures and
dominant discourses, there is a basis for rethinking ones identities, loyalties,
responsibilities, and relationships. To enhance freedom thus necessitates
enhancing the possibility for agency and, indeed, social change.
There is one resounding conclusion from recent ITV research, whether in
gender-based analyses (Fox, Robson, & Gover, 2005), longitudinal studies
(Erhensaft, Cohen, Brown, Smailes, Chen, & Johnson, 2003), community surveys
(Kwong, Bartholomew, Henderson, & Trinke, 2003), or early development
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research (Bogat, Levendosky, & Davidson II, 2002): All forms of family-oforigin violence between parents or parent-child not only negatively affect the
prenatal health of both the expectant mother and fetus, and significantly increases
the chances of health problems for the postnatal infant, but also increases the
likelihood of the child engaging in future relational violence and abuse. While
the predominant discourse tends to treat women and children solely as the victims
of physical violence, gender and age do not delimit, conceptually or in practice,
who can perpetrate such violencenot only physically and sexually, but also
emotionally and verbally. Carney, Buttell, and Dutton (2007) point out that the
conceptualization of domestic violence as exclusively male initiated is a false
cultural discourse (p. 108). Males in fact tend to underreport their own
victimization by females, often not considering female violence against them as a
crime (Dutton & Nicholls, 2005, p. 680). The tendency for the abuser and
abused, both physically and mentally, to end up in such perpetually violent
relationships would suggest that both the terrorist and the terrorized may have
affinities for reproducing such experiences.
Pizzey and Shapiro (1982)
distinguish between two general types of battered spouses: those who
unknowingly married someone who turned out to be violent and others who are
addicted to violent relationships (p. 39). The majority of the latter, they argue,
had been abused as children. This argument, unpopular with some feminists, is
corroborated by Chus (1992) findings, which suggests that those abused in
childhood are especially vulnerable to revictimization as adults (p. 259). How
frequently which gender employs family terrorism upon one another is a subject
matter for future empirical research, the findings of which will largely depend on
the definitions and methods employed, and the cultural context studied. But
familial terrorism, as a particular form of domestic violence which may be
perpetrated and perpetuated by both genders, implies that terrorism may be
pervasive across vast socio-political contexts from families to nations. The
terrorist and the terrorized, then, may be both actors and victims, having learned
to become predisposed to such violent experiences.
Obviously, not all those who experience terror become terrorists, or must
all those who practice terrorism have necessarily been terrorized themselves. But
also obvious is that no one, even those who use the terrorist method, grow up ex
nihilo. Any social actfrom shaking hands to sending an email to playing a
basketball game to buying a beeris learned through socialization. We never
develop outside of a social field, without carers, teachers, peers, and their laws,
customs, and beliefs. Our very identities and recognition of others are necessarily
derived socially. Given, then, that our beliefs and practices are socially
inculcated, how is agency possible? How can those of us who have experienced
and perpetuated terrorism, even without recognizing it, be free to change our
attitudes, rationales, and behaviors? After all, for one to be justifiably held
accountablethat is, to be morally responsiblefor the consequences of ones
actions, one must have acted according to ones freewill (Sider, 2007). In other
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words, terrorism (or any other wrongdoing for that matter) cannot be culpable if
terrorists have no choice in their actions. Here, Bourdieus sociological theory
provides a conceptual bridge across the structure-agency divide. Describing his
own theory as constructivist structuralism (or structuralist constructivism),
Bourdieu (1989) takes on a twofold social genesis: On the one hand, there are
schemes of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call
habitus and on the other are social structures particularly of what I call fields
(p. 14, italics added). Together, they provide a compatibilist account for
conceptualizing both structure and agency as an interdependent dynamic.
5.1.3.2 The habitus of terror: A Bourdieusian perspective
For Bourdieu (1979), habitus embodies the system of durable,
transposable dispositions both mental (doxa) and physical (practice) (p. vii). As
the objective order and mental structures of habitus, doxa are the beliefs,
values, and attitudes of a society that orient the practice of its inhabitants (Krais,
1993, p. 167). Often taken-for-granted, habitus embodies and sustains how one
thinks, acts, and speaks in certain ways because they have always been done
that way in this field (Grenfell, 2007, p. 55, italics original). Structuration of the
habitus of agents occurs within their social field, which influences their thoughts
and actions. But why do people conform to social norms in the first place? For
Bourdieu (2006), the accruement of the different forms of symbolic capital
provides a powerful incentive for conforming to the doxa and customs of a social
field. This often subconscious conformity to the recognition of the arbitrary
power of various forms of symbolic capital is what Bourdieu calls illusio
(Grenfell, 2007, p. 56). Bourdieu thus provides a coherent and pivotal theory for
both social reproduction (of practices and power recognized as forms of social,
cultural, and economic capital), and social change (through agency, and the power
to resist and critique). In such a view, individuals are neither (or both) animals
that necessarily behave in a scientifically predictable manner according to their
social conditions, nor are they spirits that are completely free of the influence of
the social matrix in which they have always been immersed. In short, habitus at
once accounts for both social reproduction and change.
Reconciling the paradox of the inviolable power of social structures and
the illimitable freedom of agents, Bourdieus theory explains how the social
world is determined by and reciprocally determines practice (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1993, p. 38).

Bourdieu offers a specific account of how the social field works. It is a competition,
not just for life and security as in Hobbes, but for advantage, and not just material
advantage as in Marx, but more general symbolic advantage. Bourdieus
powerful analyses have revealed to us a world permeated by strategies and
strategists of symbolic capital and a social field that motivates and produces such
strategies and strategists (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1993, pp. 40, 42).

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Within the social field are structures that guide and constrain the practices and
will of agents. And while a particular field may embody the habitus of agents
operating within that field, the agents habitus in turn produces their capital, that
is, social, economic, and cultural power (Postone, LiPuma, & Calhoun, 1993).
Being self-reflexive, an agents critical awareness of their own habitus can
unveil the conditions of domination through the social and cultural reproduction
of inequality (Postone, LiPuma, & Calhoun, 1993, p. 6). It is the objectively
unified practices of habitus that are at once both structured by and sustains the
social field (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1993, p. 37). Here, the analogy of a magnetic
field may help illustrate how habitus and fields are being conceptualized.106
A social field exerts forces upon the individuals within it. These social
forces orientate the doxic and behavioral dispositions of agents to various
magnitudes. As a result, inhabitants of a social field will, over time and without
disruptions, tend to align with the field (as in diagram (c) in Figure 6.1.2). And
deviance is merely the display of an orientation different in the direction of the
general field. The habitus of individuals in turn contribute to the orientation and
strength of their social field. Thus, the more uniform the orientations of the
inhabitants of a field, the stronger the field when exerting its social forces upon its
inhabitants and ironically, the less they may recognize this normalizing force. In
other words, a metal that becomes magnetized within a magnetic field will in turn
emit a corresponding magnetic field. But just as a magnet can become
demagnetized through agitations (externally by colliding with other objects or
internally through an increase in temperature), which disorient the constituent
magnetic domains, a social field can likewise become demagnetized through
shocks or conflicts from sources both external and internal. Sudden political,
economic, migrational, social, cultural, and environmental changes can and do
disrupt the uniformity of a social field by disorienting the individual habitus of
which it is constituted. The taken-for-granted doxa and practice of agents may
then be recognized, reflected upon, criticized, challenged, and reoriented. It is
through such a process of disenchantment with ones illusio that habitus can
change and entire fields disrupted.
Applying Bourdieus theory to the context of socio-political terrorism,
terrorists can be understood as agents socialized with the doxa and practice of
their social field. Such a terrorist habitus is both learned through socialization and
in turn taught to others when put into practice. Comprising the learned, taken-forgranted beliefs and attitudes of a culture that uncritically guides the sentiments
and practices of the individuals within that social field, doxa are the
106

See Figure 6.1.2 for a diagram that illustrates the processes of magnetization and
demagnetization as an analogy for the normalization of social fields (structuration) and the
disorientation of social fields (agency) respectively.

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presuppositions that agents accept as part of the background of their activity

(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 269). Consequently, terrorists always act in situ, according to
a habitus that is structured by and in turn reproduces the socio-political practice of
terrorism. As Krais (1993) argues: Every mode of domination, even if it uses
physical violence, presupposes a doxic order that is shared by both the
terrorizing and the terrorized (p. 169). The sanctity of the force of waras
opposed to the iniquity of the violence of terrorismcould then be regarded as
but one doxa accepted by a dominant social field. If ones habitus for war can be
interpreted as terror by another, then to cease the reproduction of socio-political
terrorism requires knowledge gained through intercultural dialogue with others.
Only then may we recognize the possibility that we may have all been terrorized
and terrorists. From this recognition, we can defuse the potentiality of terrorist
doxa by exposing children and adolescents to alternate belief schemas and by
refusing to perpetuate the terrorist practice (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008, p. 113). The
education of interculturalism, as a dialogical practice that expands our horizons
and a doxa that recognizes our malleability and fallibility, may thus play a crucial
role in the social mitigation of the terrorist habitus.107

5.2 Education for the freedom from socio-political terror

Given that terrorism, like most other habitus, involves doxa and practices
learned in situ, its social reproduction is also the crux to its mitigation. Ceasing
the perpetuation of terrorism by unlearning its ways and the enhancement of
freedom are flip sides of the same coin. The mitigation of a habitus of terror
therefore rests upon the shoulder of educationparticularly if governments bear
the primary responsibility for enhancing the well-being and freedom of its
citizens. More than just a foreign aid to develop others, buy peace, and battle
heterodoxic hearts and minds, education is a potent and valuable instrument for
not only the reproduction of power but also for cultivating political and social
change. Here, the implications from the ETM are twofold: The sustainable
cultivation of political sensitivity for, recognition of, accountability to, and
deliberation with both compatriots and non-compatriots; and the socialization of a
habitus of interculturalism that, through dialogue with others, enhances the
freedom of agents from the limits of their horizons. The former is necessary for
increasing the moral coherence in intercultural conflicts by providing legitimate
representation of the peoples (and not only the authorities) of both sides (and will
be the discussed in the remainder of this section), while the latter enhances the
107

Prof. Yusef Waghid raised an important question during my oral examination: that terrorism is
often regarded as a form of political violence not caused by education. In response, I would point
to the importance of questioning and rethinking this common understanding of terrorism. If one
become open to broader and alternate views of terror, then how such conceptions became
inculcated within us becomes essential. Thus experiencing different discourses is one important
dimension in the meaningful mitigation of terror. The role of dialogue in intercultural education
will be the focus of Chapter 6 Intercultural Learning in a Post-terror World.

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freedom from the communicative and identity problems that reproduces terror by
helping to dispel the baggage of historicity, immutability, and orthodoxy (and will
be the focus of the next chapter). Furthering these two pedagogical significances,
the remainder of this thesis endeavors to imagine in greater detail what the formal
cultivation of a democratic and intercultural habitus entails.

5.2.1 Implications for a democratic education

The conventional impression of terrorism as being spectacular acts of
political violence is skewed towards but one end of a vast spectrum of terroristic
phenomena. Some forms of violence within the family, workplace, and nation are
methodologically indistinguishable (other than perhaps its contextual scale) from
that of globalized terrorism. Any act that, through the fear of violence, coerces
others for ones own purposeindependent of the scale of its application, be it
from families to statesshould be considered an act of terrorism. But the moral
assessment of the particular methods will require dialogue between the parties
involved in the conflict. Such an impartial yet contextual, flexible yet coherent
application of the ETM would certainly be defensible under an impartial veil of
ignorance (Rawls, 1971). How, then, are the people involved in a transcultural
conflict to be organized and represented? Given the heterogeneity within social
groups (be it defined by political or cultural borders), and the value of the freedom
to develop ones identity and affiliations, the people need to be consulted
particularly in regards to what methods they are willing to endure and hence
exercise. Parekh (2005) therefore upholds the institutionalization of democratic
dialogue in social life (p. 20).
In other words, before the belligerent
representatives decide on behalf of their people to attack others, there needs to be
dialogue between the people and not just their political representatives. And
crucial to this dialogue is not only the political task of legitimate representation,
but also the social task of moral exegesis. I will thus contend for the pertinence of
a democratic education that is deliberative and morally sensitive before summing
up how freedom can be enhanced by seeking a change in the habitus of terror.
5.2.1.1 Democratic deliberation
Assessing the moral coherence of intercultural conflicts through the ETM
requires a politics that legitimately involves the deliberation of its stakeholders.
Justification, in other words, requires dialogical formulation by the participants in
a conflict. Should any group of people hold a particular method to be immoral,
then this method should not be applied by either side. It provides a transcultural
reference frame within which morality can be regarded with greater coherence; it
does not lay claim to a supra-cultural moral view (should one exist) from which
all else can be objectively judged. Only when the moral parameters have been
defined by both sides should those modes mutually deemed morally acceptable be
employed in a conflict. But the setting of these parameters requires political input

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from all stakeholdersincluding the civilians who are often most vulnerable and
disempowered in such conflicts. Usually those most affected by conflicts but
having the least say in the decisions, civilians on all sides of a conflict need to be
consulted on what they find to be morally tolerable within their threshold. In the
case of the War on Iraq, even if the Bush administration justifies pre-emptive
war, the invasion should have ceased if the American and/or Iraqi people found
the proposed military action unjustified. Here, the reciprocation of violence
may be condemned, even mitigated, by expanding a human rights discourse that
educates the freedom from want and fear. Perhaps by arousing the critical
recognition of our conventionally accepted modes of violence and moral
sensitivity for those different than us, increasing groups of people will object to
the exchange of violent practices that coercively constrain one anothers freedom.
To expand the vision of human security, not only is the expansion of
human rights education important for disapproving violence, but the enhancement
of political freedom and democratic governance at least as crucial for the
legitimate construction of a shared ethos. Democratic representation, according to
Rawls (1999), has legitimate authority because it is derived from the interests of
those governed. Governments are not free to pursue their own bureaucratic
ambitions but is instead effectively under political and electoral control
(Rawls, 1999, p. 24).108 Thus for the ETM to be applicable, the moral stance of a
shared ethos needs to be as representative of the people as possiblewhich, at the
moment, is best exemplified by deliberative forms of democracy. In other words,
in a society where its inhabitants can democratically voice moral positions, choose
leadership, and participate in political discussions, the collective ethos is more
representative and legitimate. For an act of violence (including terrorism) to be
deemed moral then, it must be reciprocated between groups that have respectively
legitimized their collective moral justifications for the methodology by virtue of
democratic representation. Representation of morally contentious issues thus
requires conditions for more informed understanding and enlightened public
discussion (Sen, 1999, pp. 280-281).
Because democratic politics is necessary for the legitimate representation
of the voices of the people on whose behalf battles are fought, the cultivation of a
deliberative habitus across cultures is essential. As Held (2006) argues:

Political legitimacy does not turn on the ballot box or on majority rule per se but,
rather, on the giving of defensible reasons, explanations and accounts for public
decisions. The key objective is the transformation of private preferences via a
process of deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test (p.
237).
108

Although Rawls (1999) contends that such representative authority still existsalbeit restricted
to a consultation hierarchyin undemocratic regimes, the legitimacy of representative
governments remains relatively greater in democratic forms of political representation (p. 71).

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Deliberative democracy is marked by not only the equal and impartial right of
individuals to participate by voting with a ballot, but also by discussing the issues
at hand in the decision-making process (Christiano, 2006). Given our diverse
moral values, deliberative democracy structures a way for their comparison while
leaving the resolution of value conflicts open to participants in a public process
(Held, 2006, p. 261). It is through democratic deliberation, argues Held (2006),
that the limits of individual horizons can be overcome to better inform public
decisions:
1) By sharing knowledge, public deliberation can transform and enhance the
understanding of complex issues by individuals.
2) By exposing sectional preferences, public deliberation can challenge and
expand the partial viewpoints held by individuals.
3) By testing particular arguments, public deliberation can enhance the
reasoning of individuals and collective judgment.
As a government by discussion (Sen, 2006, p. 53), deliberative democracy can
produce outcomes that are the most thoroughly examined, justified and, hence,
legitimate (Held, 2006, p. 238).
The cultivation of a habitus capable of participating in democratic
deliberation is important not only for the moral reasoning necessitated by the
ETM in the context of intercultural conflict, but it is also intrinsically valuable as
an educational aim. First, such deliberation is intrinsically valuable because it
recognizes the moral autonomy of people. As Sen (1999) argues: To insist
just one homogenous good thing would be to deny our humanity as reasoning
creatures (p. 77). Just as Sen (2006) argues that: Reason had to be supreme,
since even in disputing reason, we would have to give reasons; so deliberation is
fundamental, for we would have to discuss why there should not be discussion
when making collective decisions (p. 161). And although a democratic habitus
may not be culturally neutral, Sen (2006) finds that the tradition of public
discussion can be found across the world (p. 53). Given that democracy is not
just about ballots and votes, but also about public deliberation and reasoning,
cultivating a habitus for democratic deliberation does appear to respect the dignity
of people across many cultures as moral, autonomous persons (Sen, 2006, p. 53).
Second, democratic deliberation also requires a commitment to politics as an
open-ended and continuous learning process in which what is to be learnt has to
be settled in the process of learning itself (Held, 2006, p. 233). It is thus a
learning process in and through which people come to terms with the range of
issues they need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political
judgement (Held, 2006, p. 233). In other words, the constitution of deliberative
democracy is itself a learning opportunity to openly examine one anothers views.
Democratic deliberation provides a public process through which the tentative
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theories developed from a private hermeneutics can be tested, revised (if

necessary), and used to inform collective decisions (Popper, 1963). To cultivate a
transcultural habitus for deliberative democracy then is to learn how to learn. It is
therefore evident that the epistemological justification for intercultural dialogue
also applies to this political end of the socio-political spectrum.
Democratic deliberation, then, is necessarily intercultural: for people must
be willing to engage in dialogue with others to uncover any moral paradoxes in
their mutual practices. This willingness thus further implicates the need for
cultivating moral sensitivity. A cosmopolitan education that cultivates the moral
sensitivity towards others can serve to motivate participation in a democratic
intercultural dialogue. Perhaps through such deliberations, not only may
intercultural conflicts find moral coherence, but perhaps the very method of
terrorism itself may become redundant.
5.2.1.2 Cosmopolitanism: Cultivating moral sensitivity
Finding cultural diversity to increase distrust and social isolation, Putnam
(2007) argues that new forms of social solidarity should be created to dampen
the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing
identities (pp. 138-139).

Thus, the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new,
broader sense of we. [This] challenge is best met not by making them like
us, but rather by creating a new, more capacious sense of we, a reconstruction of
diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities, but creates overarching
identities that ensure that those specificities do not trigger the allergic, hunker
down reaction (Putnam, 2007, pp. 139, 163-164).

The concept of global citizenship may offer one discourse for creating such a
super-identity. However, instead of constructing a supranational identity for the
sake of creating some artificial sense of unity, I want to focus on the cosmopolitan
attitude that underlies the discourse of global citizenship. After all, the growing
managerialism and emphasis on standardized test scores as the primary measure
of successful schools has crowded out what should be an essential criterion for
well-educated students: a sense of responsibility for the well-being of others
(Engel & Sandstrom, 2010).
At the genealogical root of global citizenship is the Stoical account of
cosmopolitanism which conceptualizes the self as being surrounded by a series of
concentric circles extending from oneself, to ones family, neighbors, compatriots,
and ultimately, all of humanity (Nussbaum, 2008). Rather than focusing on the
giving up or taking on of identities, the essence of cosmopolitanism, then, is the
impartial gravitation of others closer towards the centre of our moral concern. It
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does not necessitate the impartial concern for everyone, which is neither
reasonable nor practicable. But by drawing those beyond the scope of our
concern within our horizons, our moral sensitivity for others can be enhanced and
our motivation to participate in democratic deliberation strengthened. This
cosmopolitan attitude is founded on the recognition of humanitythe
fundamental ingredients of which include the dignity of reason and moral
capacityand is an essential aim of education in a globalizing world
(Nussbaum, 2008, p. 308). Such a cosmopolitan education seeks to enhance: (1)
reflection on ones identity and fallibility; (2) recognition of the universality of
human needs and capabilities; and (3) learning about difference and its
engagement.
With the pedagogical goal to cultivate moral sensitivity,
cosmopolitanism aims to defeat the selfish and grasping passions through the
imagination of suffering, softheartedness, and a gradual broadening of
concern (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 368). To this end, mutual learning through
intercultural dialogue on the social level is necessary, which in turn, motivates
participation in democratic deliberation on the political level.109
Through education, a democratic practice of deliberation can be cultivated
upon a cosmopolitan doxa. And through participating in deliberative democracy,
learningthat is, the changing of ones habitus through the evolution of a
mentality or behaviorcan take place. Here, learning is taken to be a
transformative experience that allows for the freedom to change our presumptions
and practices, whereas training entails a reproductive reinforcement of a certain
belief, tradition, or practice. In other words, education denotes the (formal and
informal) processes of learning and trainingwith the former enhancing the
capability to consciously evolve ones mentality and behavior.110 And because
one needs to engage with others to appreciate deliberative democracy, the
initiation of such a reiterative learning experience will likely require not only the
political process of democratic deliberation but also the social process of
intercultural dialogue. But instead of building overlying, grand identities such as
the global citizen, interculturalism merely suggests a framework for the
dialogical interaction between interlocutors from where they are. Unlike global
citizenship, which, at best, adds but another veneer of identities and
responsibilities, and, at worst, imposes a single discourse upon the diverse values
of citizenships, interculturalism merely suggests how those carrying different
identities (national, political, cultural, social, and familial) can interact to
challenge, change, and broaden the scope of our hermeneutical situation
(Gadamer, 1979). As Held (2006) argues, all interpretations embody a particular
framework of concepts, beliefs, and standards (p. 7).

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Intercultural dialogue on the social level will be the focus of the next chapter.
As Prof. Cheng Kai Ming (one of my examiners) perceptively noted, education is a system of
manufacturing labour resources while learning may be regarded as a more empowering,
emancipating, and transformative experience.
110

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For the framework we bring to the process of interpretation determines what we

see, what we notice and register as important.
Accordingly, particular
interpretations cannot be regarded as the correct or final understanding of a
phenomenon; the meaning of a phenomenon is always open to future interpretations
and from new perspectives. Interpretations are, therefore, always open to challenge
(Held, 2006, p. 7).

Consequently, by being open and reflective, democratic deliberators can overturn

their partial concerns and visions. Motivated by a cosmopolitan doxa that morally
recognizes others, democratic deliberation may be a sustainable mode of politics
for the lubrication of intercultural conflicts. As such, a cosmopolitan doxa and a
deliberative practice warrant the consideration of todays educators.

5.2.2 Habitus for the freedom from terror

Education plays a crucial role in both the reproduction and change of
social fields (Grenfell, 2007). After all, if agents are socialized into recognizing
the symbolic power of the economic, social, and cultural capital within the field of
their experiences, they can (and should be able to) also choose to resist them
(Bourdieu, 2006). But before considering (in the next chapter) how the social
process of intercultural dialogue may transcend the political process of democratic
deliberation to mitigate the perpetuation of terrorism across the socio-political
scale, how ones doxa and practices can be affected needs elaboration. Orienting
how one interprets, approaches and interacts with the world, doxa, or what Robins
and Post (1997) call mentalitythat is, the beliefs and attitudes that nearly all
people of a time share uncritically, without realizing itis crucial if practices are
to be transformed, or at least, reflected upon (p. 41). To change the habitus of
terrorism, be it practiced from the social to the political scale, requires a change in
the doxic mentalities that takes for granted such behaviors as natural,
necessary, or moral. Here, education can and should foster learning
opportunities for transforming not only the content of ones beliefs, but also ones
belief attitude that may fuel terrorist practices.
An important implication from ITV research is that terroristic behaviors
are but one type of violent practices that are learned and reproduced socially. In
other words, successive perpetuations of terrorism are carried out by agents who
have become predisposed to a habitus consistent with the field of their
experiences. Adolescencethat is, the developmental period prior to reaching
maturitymay thus be a crucial moment for perturbing the perpetuation of
terrorism. It is a critical stage for the transmission and transformation of cultural
beliefs and attitudes, as well as the development and definition of identities. How,
then, should social forces be orientedor rather, disorientedso as to defuse the
fundamentalist doxa that rationalizes terrorist practices? In other words, as Prof.
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Fazal Rizvi (one of my examiners) perceptively noted, how could education

disrupt, let alone eradicate, the fundamentalism that underlie the perpetuation and
reciprocation of terror? By exposing adolescents to multiple belief schemas, a
fallible (rather than fundamental) belief attitude, and a more malleable (rather than
rigid) understanding of one anothers identities may be more readily cultivated.
By getting used to differences, adolescents may become less attached to one
metanarrative and super-identity. After all, being more aware of ones fallibility
and plurality of identities should decrease ones willingness to take up extremist
measures to assert fundamentalist beliefs according to uncompromising identities.
5.2.2.1 Perpetuation and perturbations of fundamentalism
If the pedagogies that train up fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes lay the
groundwork for extremist practices including terrorism, then perhaps by
pedagogies that foster learning experiences such a groundwork can be dismantled
or at least undermined. It is not that terrorists are uneducated as it may often be
presumed, but rather that they are educated in a certain way. As I had argued in
Chapter 3.1, fundamentalism is a belief attitude that can uphold any belief
content. One can be a fundamentalist not only in any religion, but also with all
types of ideologiesfrom communism to environmentalism. In other words,
what one believes, and more importantly, how one believes it are fundamental to
the doxic practice of terrorism. Underlying terrorism is a cause that is so
important and sacred that all else is to be judged and conformed accordingly.
How, then, does such fundamentalism arise? And more importantly, how can it
be changed or at least attenuated?
When education is applied as an instrument of training that reinforces a
certain habitus without reflection or a sense of fallibility, it can sometimes serve
to indoctrinate rather than to enlighten. One obvious example involves the
Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo, the headquarters of which, when raided by
the police, revealed that some eighty children between ages of three and
fourteen had been receiving no schooling other than immersion in the writings
of Asahara, the leader of Aum (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008, pp. 135-136). Another is
the fundamentalist madrasas in Pakistan [which] have become part of the
breeding ground for intolerance and violenceand often for terrorism (Sen,
2006, p. 118). However, jihadism is but one manifestation of religious terrorism
within the vast socio-political expanse of terroristic habitus. Fundamentalist
education is more common than that: What about the home-schooled Christian
children who are taught to believe that blood transfusions are a sin, and prefer the
laying on of hands even in the face of death? Or the neoliberal economist who,
believing in the certainty of mathematical models and statistical inferences after
decades of study, insists that the only way to eradicate poverty is for unregulated
tradeeven in the face of growing socio-economic disparity? Or consider the
case of Cyprus:

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A Greek child learns from what his mother says and does that the neighborhood
church is a good place; he unconsciously invests in it his unintegrated good aspects
and feels comfortable there. The same mechanism, fueled by his mother's influence,
makes him shun the Turkish mosque and minaret, in which he deposits the
unintegrated bad aspects of himself. Although the child would have his own
unique individualized psychological makeup, he would be allied to other children in
his group through the common suitable target of externalization... that affirms their
ethnic, cultural, and national identity (Robins & Post, 1997, p. 90).

The point is that fundamentalists may often not even recognize their own attitude
of immutability towards some of their beliefs and identities. Hence, without
sharing our narratives with others who see things differently and have an alternate
story to tell, we may never realize which of our beliefs are being held with an
uncompromising attitude. To segregate human institutions, such as schools,
strictly according to cultural dimensions (such as religion) is to deprive people of
their freedom and blind them with moral self-sufficiency.
However, when education promotes experiences that allows for the
transformation of ones presumptuous mentalities and practices, such learning can
moderate the fundamentalism that perpetuates the practice of terror. As Habermas
argues, fundamentalism entails a belief attitude towards a universal doctrine that
neglects the coexistential necessities of a pluralistic society (Borradori, 2003).111
Without the possibility of doubt, fundamentalism is marked by a certainty of
ones belief and identity so absolute that all other arguments and evidence have to
submit to the fundamentalists hermeneutical standpoint. As a type of doxa that
appeals to an immutable orthodoxy and informs the community-defining rituals
(Alcorta & Sosis, 2005), fundamentalism is a foundational to the extremist actions
that disregard all other challengers and skeptics of these beliefs and
(mis)recognitions. It informs extremism by simplifying ethics and identities into
simple dichotomies. Conflicts are construed into grand epics fought between
heroes and villains. With socio-cultural forces undeniable, terrorism cannot be
completely resolved through purely economic means and terrorists may not be
best modeled according to a self-serving calculus. The sharing of such cultural
narratives with others can challenge the symbols, rituals, and identities that
motivate and unify individuals. To create perturbations in the solidification of
fundamentalist doxa, meaningful interchange between those who are different is
requiredespecially during the relatively malleable period of adolescence. For it
is only through intercultural dialogue with others that we can gain alternate
perspectives that may challenge the taken-for-granted doxa and practices with
which we have been inculcated within our field of experiences. In other words,
we can only learn of ourselves in relations to others (Frankena, 1965). Through
111

I had briefly discussed the issue of fundamentalism in Chapter 3.1.

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the exchange of hermeneutical perspectives, ones blind spots and presumptions

may become critically revealedopening a window for freedom and change.
Given, then, that education can both reinforce fundamentalism and offer
transformative learning experiences, how should it be designed to enhance the
freedom of our beliefs (in both content and attitude), identities, and practices?
5.2.2.2 Schools: A microcosm of a plural world
Adolescence provides a crucial stage of development for being exposed to
alternate beliefs, values, and practices. After all, adolescents are particularly
delicate during the formulation of identitiespersonal and collectiveand
sensitive to the inculcation of habitus. To attenuate the consolidation of a
fundamentalist doxa, education should foster an open market of expression,
including that of the religious (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008, p. 118). But rather than
fighting fundamentalism by replacing its contents with another, or persecuting
the expressions of religionboth of which fail to respect the autonomy of
personsschools should actually promote the sharing and discussion of ones
belief contents in order to soften ones belief attitude.112 Rather than eradicate the
contents of the belief, which would limit freedom, the educational aim should be
to increase the flexibility of our attitude towards our beliefs. This can be
encouraged by sharing and questioning one anothers habitus through open
dialogue, which helps to cultivate a sense of fallibility rather than fundamentality.
Schools, then, should foster the open expression of diverse hermeneutical stances
in order to prepare more malleable belief attitudes and identities for life in a
globalizing, plural world.
Across many cultures, a doxic hermeneutics is taught and learned during
adolescence. Given the malleability of the mental and behavioral orientations,
adolescents may be particularly predisposed to the learning of moral discourses,
including the indoctrination of fundamentalism both secular and religious (Sosis
& Alcorta, 2008). After all, as Ariely (2010) argues, rigid and unyielding
ideologies often set in once we take ownership of an idea and have trouble
letting go of it (p. 178). If adolescence is a critical life phase in the social
reproduction of beliefs and values, then how learners are educated (or
indoctrinated) may substantively orient the future mentality and practices of
agents, including the exegesis of their field of experience. In other words, a
fundamental root of extremist practices, some of which manifest as terrorism
within the socio-political scale, may be how belief attitudes are formulated during
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In terms of religion, Sosis and Alcorta (2008) argue that it is pointless to try to eliminate it (p.
118). Evolutionary work not only affirms the empirical resilience of religion, it offers an
explanation for why religion endures even in the face of persecution and indicates that the
components of religion are highly effective human adaptations (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008, p. 118).
However, I find the cultural freedom to choose and practice (or not to practice) religion to be of
intrinsic importance and a better reason for promoting religious expression than the pragmatic
justification of its resilience.

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schooling. Because adolescents are taught the appropriate habitus when inducted
into a culture, ones actions and reactions have been trained to follow a set of
rulesor customswithout requiring a conscious hermeneutical effort (Taylor,
1993, p. 58). Rudimentary to these rules is a clinging to what is familiar and a
fear of that which is not (Robins & Post, 1997).

We are comforted by familiarity and by others like us. But to maintain the sense of
groupand selfcohesion we must differentiate ourselves from strangers.
Strangers, then, are necessary for our process of self-definition (Robins & Post,
1997, p. 91).

Nearly every culture demarcates an us from a them. But when such rules and
identities go unquestioned and, indeed, become inscrutinizable, there is the danger
of the consolidation of a fundamentalism that dehumanizes others as a mere
pseudospecies of humanity (Robins & Post, 1997, p. 104). The crux, then, lies
with the formational processes of our beliefs and identities. Having always been a
part of a culture, we are trained since birth to hold certain identities, and to think
and act in certain ways. But these customary beliefs need not be, nor have they
been pristine. Perhaps most terrifying is being misrecognized by others who
uncompromisingly and universally impose their monological account of justice.
To soften the concretion of fundamentalism, the learning practice of agents would
require a continual hermeneutical effort to interpret and reinterpret who they are
and what the rules of their social field means (Taylor, 1993).
With schools as the microcosm of the social field in which learners are
situated, education should cultivateespecially during adolescencethe
capability to dialogue on one anothers beliefs and identities if fundamentalism is
to become more fallible. Segregated from public education, ones beliefs
particularly religionbecomes privatized and rarely subjected to open discussion
and scrutiny. Setting religion as taboo in the secular, public classroom is not only
to deny the real presence of religions and the freedom for people to pursue their
spiritual needs, but also imposes an atheist fundamentality.
Instead of
secularizing all public schools, which demonstrates a fundamentalism in itself,
schools should foster open dialogue about all beliefs. Formal education, then,
should ensure that individual schools do not monopolize a particular belief.
Instead of catering to diversity by establishing Catholic, Jewish, Islamic,
Christian, Buddhist, or public (often synonymous with atheist) schools, which
each promote one metanarrative and super-identity, schools should facilitate the
teaching and learning of multiple beliefs (including atheism) through dialogue
among learners. Although dialogue across cultures may be an impossibility for
the pessimistic relativist, but the fact that fundamentalists interpret facts and
employ reasons to support what he already believes means that to challenge
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such fundamentalism requires not only the presence of alternative exegeses, but
different hermeneutics (Robins & Post, 1997, p. 180). If the possibility for
change indeed increases with immaturity, then schools should foster different
hermeneutical views. As Robins and Post (1997) argue, it is the defensive
aggression against ones self-sanctified exegesis and identity that frames the
terrorist mentality (p. 144). To remove the fundamentalist from their sealed
castle of invincible ignorance, schools should promote the opening of ideational
systems through the exposure to competing considerations, especially during
adolescence (Robins & Post, 1997, p. 174).
To learn how to learn through dialogue, from the social to the political,
will likely require more than knowledge but also praxis. Both Aristotle and
Dewey regarded practice as essential to learning (Frankena, 1965). Hence,
engagement with others in transcultural problems is essential to an emancipating
pedagogy. Schools should thus provide an open, secure climate in which to
cultivate the practice of dialogue and public deliberation. Providing the
opportunities to (1) dialogue over ones private beliefs, attitudes, and practices;
and (2) participate in public deliberation over collective matters are essential for
teaching learners how to learn throughout their life. As a microcosm of society,
schools, then, should model the normative society in which the future citizens are
to build and function. After all, softening our often unrecognized fundamentalism
undermines our faith in our extremist ways. And being more sensitive to the
fallibility of our knowledge and the malleability of our identities frees us from the
chains of a narrow hermeneutics. Fostering opportunities to dialogue, reason,
choose, and change, such an intercultural education is certainly valuable in itself.
Not only does the opportunity for intercultural dialogue make people
capable of criticism, capable of conflict without relying on an extremist habitus
of terror (Beck, 2000, p. 79), but it increases the substantive freedom of people to
express and choose their beliefs and identities. Fundamentalism of any belief
tends to comprehensively override most if not all aspects of social freedom from
economic to cultural to political life. To enhance our freedom, we need to engage
in dialogue with others to reveal and scrutinize our taken-for-granted
fundamentalist beliefs, attitudes, and customs. Perhaps after careful reflection, we
may decide not to change the contents of ones beliefs or practices. But what has
changed is that we have increased our freedom: By loosening the taken-forgranted restrictions of our fundamentalism, we are able to more consciously
choose what to believe and do what we have reason to value, and thereby expand
our horizons. Intercultural dialogue, then, cultivates a more fallible (or less
fundamental) belief attitude, a more malleable recognition of identities, and
ultimately provides a learning experience that enhances the freedom for choosing
the beliefs and practices that one finds valuable.

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Under globalization, the tradition of a monological pedagogy needs to

evolve towards a dialogical focus marked by the courage to disagree (Beck,
2000, p. 138). Only acceptable and not imposable, dialogical learning can
undermine the fundamentalism and misrecognition that fuels extremist practices.
After all, the reciprocation of terror cannot be ceased by the paradoxical means of
an oppressive pedagogy. But for educators to help mitigate the perpetuation of
terror, they must first recognize such subtle acts among the complex social
interactions of adolescents. Surely, not every act of conflict will necessitate the
terrorist method, but where it does, educators should intervene to facilitate its
mitigation. For this end, schools should foster not mere diversity and its
tolerance, but the intersubjective sharing and reflection that enhances the freedom
of learners to change, if they so choose. Such intercultural education implicates
an ongoing pedagogical process that evolves with the interlocutors and their
contextual experiences. Unlike multiculturalism, for whose adherents will have
fulfilled their duties by having tolerated others by withholding engagement,
interculturalism entails a continuous process built on a reflective reciprocity for
building interdependent relationships. After all, as Wolff (2006) points out, the
first virtue in a relationship is love, or at least affection, not justice (p. 196).
So while democratic deliberation, built on the back of a cosmopolitan concern,
can in principle facilitate the legitimacy and coherence of international relations,
the development of intercultural relationships necessitates an interdependency that
values others in mutual learning and expanding one anothers horizons. From the
social to the political, dialogue with different others help us to be more fallible
epistemologically and malleable in the recognition of identities.

5.3 Conclusion
The socially and historically pervasive practice of psycho-political terror
suggests its roots are embedded in human dispositions (developmental and sociocultural). Terrorism is often neglected as a social problem that is relevant to the
everyday choices and actions made by law-abiding citizens both in the country
where it occurs and elsewhere. Because social crises are no longer perceived in
terms of their rootedness in the social realm, terrorism becomes individualized as
the calculations of evil and desperate individuals in foreign lands (Beck & BeckGernsheim, 2006, p. 150). Terrorism is thus regarded as the actions taken by
black swans, peculiar outliers from our horizons. But as thoughtful, moral
beings, peoples behaviors cannot be seen simply as the output determined by
certain social conditions. Yet individual choices are never made entirely free of
the history of developmental and socio-cultural forces. My insistence is not that
individuals are free to choose their beliefs and identities ex nihilo, but rather that
this freedom can be enhanced through learning experiences that undermine the
fundamental logic of terror. After all, since birth we have all been brought up and
taught by the authorities (older siblings, parents, guardians, teachers, doctors,
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lawyers, politicians, priests, etc.) what we are to avoid and what we are to prefer.
We are never completely isolated from the reproductive forces exerted through
asymmetric relationships, especially during our adolescence. Consequently,
without the help of others to perturb our taken-for-granted doxa of what is vulgar,
sinful, or just, we have little hope of criticizing our very self-constitution.
Without someone waking us from our nightmare, warning us of a car we did not
see, or informing us that we have some broccoli stuck in our teeth, we may have
been unable to recognize the possibility that we were not just dreaming, crossing
the street, or displaying a charming smile at a dinner party.
The moral consideration of intercultural conflict through the ETM further
implicates the need to promote the recognition of human rights and democratic
deliberation on the political level, and dialogue on the social level. First, the
education of democratic human rights is imperative to increasing the shared
recognition, condemnation, and mitigation of terrorist methods. But the
willingness to participate in such democratic deliberation requires a moral
sensitivity for those on the other side. The task of education then is to envision
a world populated by people who care about one another (Wolff, 2006, p. 196).
Interlocutors must be able to draw those farthest from them, those who may not be
compatriots, into the horizon of their concern. Only when we can envision the
welfare of others (on their terms and not only according to our sense of justice)
will we be willing, indeed able, to learn of the thresholds of one another. Thus,
among the many forms of democracies, that of the deliberative is most pertinent.
Second, living in a plural world has not only implicated the need for building
multicultural citizenship on the political level but also that of intercultural
relationships on the social level. As Wolff (2006) argues, justice, or at least, too
rigid and exclusive a concern with it, undermines genuinely valuable human
relations (p. 196). It is perhaps through the everyday interactions that
interculturalism is most practicable. From the family to schools to the workplace
to civil society, the practice of interculturalism warrants more consideration.
Difference across the expanse of the socio-political spectrum must be overcome
without erasing or denying it. Through public deliberation and intercultural
dialogue, the habitus of interlocutors becomes exposed, allowing for a change in
hermeneutical stance which may not have been possible before. Disenchanting
the shroud of cultural orthodoxy makes the expansion of ones freedom possible.
The cultivation of an intercultural habitus is thus crucially important to the
mitigation and perpetuation of socio-political terror.
Freedom from terror means that one should not be subjected to political,
economic, and cultural coercion according to a single absolute identity. As a
habitus that is both learned and taught, terrorism consists of both beliefs and
behaviors which warrant reflection if its mitigation is sought. Certainly,
scrutinizinglet alone changingour most fundamental doxa and practices will
be neither quick nor simple. But one extraordinary capability of the human
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animal that has been continuously demonstrated is our adaptability to living in

pluralizing societies in a globalizing world.
Education, to mitigate the
coerciveness of terror, should enhance the freedom of future citizens in a
globalizing world. What is sought here is not a prescribed, utopian outcome, but
rather a justifiable mechanism for deliberation, intersubjectivity, mutual
reflection, the evolution of ideas, and interdependency. The pedagogical project
of interculturalism, which will be the focus of the next chapter, is not to create
unity, but merely to make the engagement with differenceand with oneselfthe
norm rather than the exception. The hope is that through the education of
interculturalism, the need to resort to toleration, let alone terror, will become less
necessary. Interculturalism may perhaps transform the political correctness of the
other into just another, someone whose beliefs may be just as fallible and
identities just as malleable as your own. To engage in interculturalism is to
promote development, for one is enhancing the chances of oneself and others to
break free from the hidden cultural forces that blind and bind us. In other words,
interculturalism enhances the possibility of freedom.
For the ETM to enhance coherence in the moral ambiguities that
perpetuate intercultural conflicts, dialogue between the parties would be needed.
As such, its application requires the legitimate representation of the individuals
within the groups (the process for which may take a form of democratic
deliberation) on the political scale, and an intercultural dialogue that transcends
mere toleration and debate (the process for which I will elaborate and defend in
the next chapter) on the social level. After all, the imposition of ones customary
morality fails to respect the moral worth of others who may or may not see
things differently (Wolff, 2006, p. 130). Instead of upholding the negative liberty
of liberalism that views freedom as leaving others alone, interculturalism
transcends such multicultural tolerance towards positive liberty. As Putnam
(2007) argues:

Tolerance for difference is but a first step. To strengthen shared identities, we need
more opportunities for meaningful interaction across ethnic lines enabling us all
to become comfortable with diversity (p. 164).

Neither occurring in a historical or cultural vacuum, dialogue requires the

interlocutors to be prepared to not only justify their views, but to enter into
each others world of thought and potentially change their views (Parekh,
2005, p. 20). Through mutual criticism of what may otherwise be our taken-forgranted beliefs, attitudes, and customs, our horizons may be shifted and
transformed. Only by recognizing ones inculcated habitus can one have any
basis of choice, which expands the capability for freedom. It is on this

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pedagogical role of the expansion of our horizons and, hence, our freedom from
terror, that will be the focus of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 6
INTERCULTURAL LEARNING IN A
POST-TERROR WORLD

The first line of UNESCOs Constitution states eloquently that since

wars begin in the minds of men [and women], it is in the minds of men
[and women] that the defences of peace must be constructed. No
defences are more secure than public attitudes grounded in tolerance,
mutual respect and commitment to dialogue. These attitudes should
be actively cultivated every day in every classroom across the world
(EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2011, p. ii).

6.0 Introduction
The consideration of terrorism in this thesis began from a politicoeconomic approach. Although the framework is scientific and the method
practical, the PEA fails to critically address the discourse of terrorism itself. Who
terrorists are and what incidents counts as terrorism remain largely taken for
granted in the statistical analyses, and policy recommendations. Shifting to a
historical focus, the analysis then widens the perspective of terrorism both
geographically and temporally. Constructing a typology of terror according to the
ideal types in its evolutionary history provides a framework for interpreting the
discourse of terrorism more broadly than that conventionally found in the PEA.
However, the dominant history of terrorism narrated remains problematic: The
exegesis of any eventterrorist or otherwise, both past and presentis
necessarily constituted of the context of the hermeneut and referential to the
salient impressions that occupy the hermeneuts mind. In other words, how one
interprets terrorism in history is necessarily bound by ones selective memory
within the contemporary discourse. Consequently, the myopic foci on globalized
terrorism and Islamism particularly warrant scrutiny.
Further probing the essence of terrorism suggests the possibility for (1) the
development of intercultural perspectives of terroristic methods and (2)
sustainable means of mitigating terrorist dispositionsthereby enhancing human
security and development through the freedom from fear. But perhaps most
problematic in the concept of terror is its moral essence. Rather than taking up
either side of the common deontological-consequential debate, I first drew on an
evolutionary framework as the organic basis of moral thinking and deliberation.
Arguing that while each society may have a different ethos of reciprocitythat is,
a cultural-adaptation of the PORthe golden rule, defection, and punishment
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remain common algorithms in many moral codes. The ETM is thus proposed as
an intercultural framework for the consideration of not only the morality of
terrorism but all transcultural conflicts. This coherent yet adaptive approach to
the moral evaluation of violence offers a more intercultural framework for the
analysis of terroristic methods. It also makes it imperative to: First, expand a
shared ethos (such as that of human rights) that values the freedom from fear,
should one seek to mitigate the reciprocation and perpetuation of terroristic
violence. And second, cultivate a habitus capable of participating in democratic
deliberation to enhance the moral coherence of intercultural conflicts. However,
the critical examination of educations role in the problem of socio-political
terrorism implicates more than just political education. Here, deliberative
democracy may be less applicable towards the familial end of social terrorism.
Consequently, an intersubjective mode of intercultural dialogue as a form of
mutual education that rectifies the terror of miscommunication and misrecognition
is warranted and will be the focus of this chapter.
As with any supposed solutions to real life problems, especially one as
complex as terrorism, a number of conceptual stumbling blocks remain in the
ETM. Firstly, the golden rule of treating others as you would yourself, which
is fundamental to the POR, needs to become more dialogical rather than
monological. The monological form of the golden rule is problematic for it
imposes upon others what one presupposes to be good. However, a dialogical
form of the golden rule would instead require discussion with others on how they
would like to be treated on their terms. After all, according to the ETM, an act
dealt to others is only morally consistent if both parties find the reciprocity
morally acceptable. Secondly, the ETM is overly simplistic in terms of how
people are identified and organized into groups. Given the complexity of a
globalizing world, the freedom to develop our own affiliations and identities is of
great importance. After all, many of those victimized by 9/11 may not agree with
how Bin Laden classified them, just as many of the civilians killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan as part of the GWOT may not agree with being affiliated with alQaeda. Central to the problem of terror is the misrecognition of identities in an
increasingly small yet heterogeneous world. Thirdly, even within a single cultural
group, there are certainly different moral views when evaluating a particular act of
violence. As stakeholders in governmental decisions, citizens need to be
justifiably represented and allowed substantive participation in the public sphere.
Therefore, to continue with the consideration of the mitigation of the cycle of
terror, the crucial role of intercultural education (in terms of dialogue and
learning) warrants exploration.

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6.1 Intercultural dialogue

In a world traumatized by pain, angered by atrocities, frightened by
terrorism, and confused by politics, there appears no utopian solution, one that
creates a peaceful homogeneity, for all citizens. In such a state, how are people of
different culturesthat is, those who construct their lives according to different
systems of beliefs and practicesto get along with one another as globalization
brings increased heterogeneity and change to societies around the world (Parekh,
2006, p. 143)? Is it through the cultivation of a multiculturalism that tolerates and
preserves the mosaic of cultures that constitute many of todays societies? Or
might we need to go beyond mere tolerance and actively engage with our
differences based on intercultural dialogue? Here, I argue that the POR
generally understood as the golden rule of treating others as you would
yourselfmay need to transcend the limits set by the politics of recognition, the
threshold of toleration, and cultural independency within a multicultural society.
The golden rule warrants revision from a monological to a dialogical constitution.
Presuming that people are reflective social beings, I am hopeful that through the
exchange of thoughtful words and actions we can and do change our lives and
perspectives. As Sen (1999) argues: It is not so much a matter of having exact
rules about how precisely we ought to behave, as of recognizing the relevance of
our shared humanity in making the choices we face (p. 283). Perhaps through a
dialogical application of the golden rule: moral conflicts can find intercultural
coherence, mutual learning and critical reflection can take place, and horizons can
be broadened.

6.1.1 Problematizing terrorism in a post-terror world

In an increasingly mobile, heterogeneous, and populous world, a world in
which different people have to literally live side-by-side, we are forced to
address the moral controversies surrounding transcultural conflicts. Eased by
globalization, the number of different cultures within the jurisdiction of particular
geopolitical institutions is growing. Consequently, multi-national states are what
governments now struggle to govern. Particularly problematic is the need for
governments to defend the security of their state on the one hand and the liberty of
their citizens on the other. Given the diversity of todays citizenry, balancing
individual freedoms and national security is crucially problematic. How much
freedom should one give up to in order to feel free of terror? Whatever the stance,
much more of the world is forced to face the spectacularized problem of terror in
the post-9/11 era.
Brewed within a complex of political, socio-economic, and cultural forces,
and rationalized according to a self-justifying morality, the practice of terror (and
counter-terror) is plagued by the ambiguities of presumptuous identities (Sen,
2006). The violent method is justified by both sides as rational and necessary; the
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possibility of mistaken identities nil. Without other means of communication, the

perpetuation of terror through cycles of retribution is essentially a dialectical
problem. After all, the terrorist identity when applied to ones enemies casts them
in a light of self-evident culpability. And to take action against such an evil is to
justify ones own methodology, even if it entails similar outcomes, such as the
death of innocents. The paradoxical war on terror thus provokes rather than
deters the hostility between adversaries (Barber, 2003).

These wars start the circle of terror and counterterror, which is

endlessly oppressive for the ordinary men and women. The only
way to break out of the circle is to refuse to play the terrorist game
(Walzer, 2004, pp. 65-66).

While terrorists cite oppression as an excuse for their methods, oppressors cite
terrorists as an excuse for theirs.
Reconsider the many historical acts of political violence cited in Chapters
2 and 3. Such conflicts almost always involve frightening entire communities and
result in civilian casualties for the political purposes of the belligerent. Even in a
war on terror, such as that in Afghanistan, it is often the powerless civilians who
die and the victorious leaders who stand vindicated (Azam, 2006; McPherson,
2007).113 Much of the history of political conflicts is marked by such tit-for-tat
violence. The cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism hinges on identities
painted through historicism, burdening contemporary conflicts with the baggage
of past grievances and valorizing them into epic battles of justice and destiny
(Sen, 2006). Ones terrorist is often just anothers terrorized. Consequently,
Habermas considers terror akin to a communicative pathology that distorts
communication, leading to cross-cultural violence and whose cure depends as
much on the improvement of material conditions as it does on the political culture
in which individuals find themselves interacting with each other (Borradori,
2003, p. 20). Derrida, meanwhile, sees terrorism as an autoimmune disorder that
threatens the life of participatory democracy for it leads to the spontaneous
suicide of the defensive mechanism that supposedly protects the organic system
(Borradori, 2003, p. 20). Alternatively, Barber (2003) views terrorists as mobile
parasites who live in host bodies but can move from host to host as they infect and
destroy the systems off which they live (p. 117). Or perhaps terrorists are like
cancers within the body of humanity, miscommunicating with other cells. As the
cancerous cells reproduce, the monological terror invades without the recognition
of, communication with, or concern for the presence of its neighbors, whose very
presence and function is vital to the health of the being of humanity. Whether
113

See Chapter 4.2.3.2.

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terrorism is a pathology, autoimmune disorder, parasite, or cancer of humanity,

the (mis)communication between (mis)recognized identities is crucial to the
problem of terror.
The recognition of this problem of terror marks the emergence of a postterror world. In a post-terror world, terrorism is widely condemned by many sides
but yet is rampantly practiced and justified by its practitioners around the world.
Like Ali the tea-server, inhabitants of a post-terror world have been terrorized so
often that they have become numb to fear.114 Terrorism is increasingly
condemned yet expected in a post-terror world. How often does news about a
militant attack or suicide bombing still surprise us? Since 9/11, the perpetual wars
on and of terror, the spectacle of terrorism relentlessly stalked by the media, and
the terrifying national security alerts, a culture of terror has been deepening and
expanding even while it faces increased criticism. Post-terrorism thus entails a
critical stance towards the project of terror. Like the postmodern critique marked
by a skepticism of the modern promises of progress, post-terrorism entails
skepticism towards the achievement of political progress through the terrorist
method. Disenchanted with the rationality of terror as an effective, legitimate, or
moral means of politics, a post-terrorist recognizes the paradox inherent to its
perpetuation. Post-terrorism thus entails the problematization of the paradoxical
identities and relationships between patriots and militants, revolutionaries and
tyrants, and terrorists and counter-terrorists. The history of terror is also a history
of political name-calling, a tit-for-tat succession of pre-emptive and retaliatory
violence. In short, post-terrorism: rejects terror and its rationale, is born of the
consequences of terrorism, and raises the possibility of a mindset that transcends
the problem of terror. In the decade post-9/11, there is an increasingly diverse and
critical awareness of the paradoxes of terror and its conventions that so arbitrarily
distinguishes combatants from noncombatants, and the culpable from the
innocent. Without hope of attaining human security through hard power, many
liberal democracies look to the ideal of toleration in governing multicultural
societies.
The problem of terror is particularly acute for liberal democracies. Not
only are democracies seen as being more likely to be infested with and targeted by
terrorists than more autocratic regimes (Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Pape, 2003),
but the freedoms of association, speech, movement, and ownership, and rights to
privacy and habeas corpus supposedly make democratic states more vulnerable to
terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Li, 2005).115 Furthermore, the balancing of
collective security and individual liberty is especially strained in a post-terror
world: After all, tolerance of diversity, privacy, and dissent are often embedded
in the very constitutional framework of liberal societies. It is, as Beck (2000)
describes, marked by the wish to be left, and to leave others, in peace justified
114
115

See the example of Hussein Abu Ali in Chapter 4.3.3.1.

See Chapter 3.2.3.

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by arguing that the trenches between cultures can never be crossed (p. 83). The
rise of Islamophobia post-9/11 further poses new challenges to the multicultural
ideals of recognition, toleration, and civic equality. While liberal societies may
esteem the ideal of multiculturalism, it has yet to overcome the problem of terror.
Without the imperative to communicate with others, mere toleration neglects the
dispelling of misconceived identities and independence that lie at the heart of the
intercultural conflicts. More robust is an interculturalism that transcends the
limits of mere tolerance, the rigidity of identities, and the artifact of
independency. As such, interculturalism may be of ever greater relevance in a
post-terror world.

6.1.2 The limits of toleration

In a globalized world where multiple groups inhabit single nation-states,
the problem of terror is a particularly worrisome affliction. In this post-terror
condition, how do states maintain a balance of national security with individual
liberty? If terror can be understood as the non- or miscommunication between
peoples across not only political but also socio-cultural boundaries, how does the
state cultivate communities in which people of different cultures live together?
There are many believers, including myself, who place hope that the multicultural
principle of toleration will mitigate, if not cease, the perpetuation of terror.
Observing that this is yet to be the case in the post-terror world, this belief
warrants further scrutiny. The liberal defense of toleration supposedly sustains
multicultural communities by upholding nonviolence. However, inherent to the
principle is a threshold of toleration, the limits of which is determined unilaterally
and thereby fails to substantively resolve the problem of terror. Furthermore, the
notion of tolerance is constituted of an intrinsic disapproval of what is
tolerated. After all, one would rarely have to tolerate what one welcomes in the
first place. Without any incentive to transcend such a silencing culture of
tolerance, different peoples are forced to be politically correct by abstaining from
intercultural dialogue. As Parekh (2005) points out, we are not [indeed, should
not be] determined by or are prisoners of our culture (p. 17). Through mutual
critique, we can and should be able to reflect and change even the most sacred of
our doxic practices. Therefore in order to better address the problem of terror,
there may be reason to reconsider the liberal account of multiculturalism based on
toleration as a more intercultural and dialogical process.
6.1.2.1 The threshold of tolerance
According to Gutmann (2004), civic equality in terms of the equal
treatment of individuals without regard to race, gender, or beliefs is made possible
by the democratic value of tolerating cultural differences (p. 71). This liberal
principle of toleration requires the state to tolerate and recognize those cultures
that are compatible with mutual toleration and recognition within and across

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cultural groups (Gutmann, 2004, p. 71). Although people are free to privately
practice their own culturesthat is, the patterns of thought, speech, and practices
associated with a human communitythe principle of toleration does not
entail treating all cultural practices as equally valuable (Gutmann, 2004, pp.
76-77). What a democracy cannot tolerate are those cultural practices that are
incompatible with the principle of toleration by not respecting the civic equality
of individuals (Gutmann, 2004, p. 78). The paradoxical crux of democracy is its
constitution of freedom, including that which allows dissent from its very ideals.
As one of the main sites of division among liberals, where to draw the line with
regards to the limits of tolerance is a crucial matter for multicultural societies in a
post-terror world (Ryan, 2007). Should the terrorist be terrorized? Should the
intolerant be tolerated?
Derrida traces the genealogy of tolerance to argue that it is a discourse
most:

often used on the side of those with power, always as a kind of condescending
concession... [a] form of charity.... Tolerance is always on the side of the reason of
the strongest, where might is right; it is... the good face of sovereignty, which
says to the other from its elevated position, I am letting you be, you are not
insufferable, I am leaving you a place in my home, but do not forget that this is my
home (Borradori, 2003, p. 127).

Although Derrida finds acts of tolerance preferable to acts of intolerance, he

regards the peace that is idealized in Gutmanns (2004) liberal society to be
nothing more than a tolerant cohabitation that is inadequate for use in secular
politics (Borradori, 2003, pp. 16, 127). The dominant, argues Derrida, relies on
tolerance when their threshold for the presence of the other is reached. Most
problematic is who gets to decide where this threshold lies. Certainly, the
foreigner has little say on this matter, but should it be so? Whether the alien is to
be tolerated will be conditional upon the limits pre-established by the host. In
other words, the tolerance of others is unilaterally constituted and violable
according to the threshold of toleration set by the existing authority. For the
guests who are invited, they are subject to surveillance; for those uninvited,
discipline awaits them.
6.1.2.2 The silence of tolerance
Not only is the liberal principle of toleration problematic in its unilateral
determination of the threshold of tolerance, but it can also impose a veil of silence
that smothers intercultural dialogue and learning. For Aristotle, the cultivation of
friendship is an excellence necessary not only forliving the good life, but also for
social cohesion (Frankena, 1965).
Applied to the post-terror condition,
transcultural friendships may thus seem to be an obvious solution to the problem
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of terror. However, the development of such genuinely valuable human

relations may be undermined by the very preoccupation with upholding tolerance
(Wolff, 2006, p. 196). Like a friend who justly calculates the precise share of the
bill at every meal, tolerance as the ends of justice may leave multicultural
communities in want of a deeper relationship. A purely tolerant society is coinhabited by individuals who peacefully leave one another alone, leaving little
room for interdependence. Often presupposing relativism, toleration holds
neighbors of different cultures incapable of communication and mutual learning.

People often recommend relativism because they think it will lead to tolerance. But
if we cannot learn from one another what it is right to think and feel and do, then
conversations between us will be pointless (Appiah, 2006, p. 31).

In fact, the problem of terror is fuelled by belief in our infallibility. As Parekh

(2005) points out, all cultural beliefs and practices, even those held by the
majority, are imperfect and hence deserve equal scrutiny but not equal respect.
Yes, culture constitutes an important dimension of human life, pursuits, and
identity, but that does not mean that all beliefs and practices are morally
worthy and immune to criticism (Parekh, 2005, p. 17). To view all cultures as
being equally good is to imply that we have a transcultural standard by which
all cultures can be judged equal (Parekh, 2005, p. 18). Thus, without the
possibility of an abstract and mechanically applied universal yardstick by which
to judge whole cultures and declare them equally good, and because cultures are
not entirely distinct and closed worlds with nothing in common, intercultural
dialogue is not only possible but valuable morally and epistemologically (Parekh,
2005, p. 17). It is precisely because of the different moral and epistemological
limitations (and advantages) of each culture that there is a need for self-reflection
and intercultural dialogue. Toleration as an ideal discourages conversation,
reinforcing silence instead.
When engaging with difference appears neither necessary nor politically
correct, toleration becomes not the last resort but all there is to uphold and aim
for. At its worse, tolerance contributes to an atomized mosaic of liberals who
respect the rights of others but not others. Neither is there the recognition of the
value of their presence, dialogue, or mutual understanding and concern. In other
words, a purely tolerant society emphasizes the development of political relations
rather than social relationships. Consider the analogy of a marriage:

if husband and wife insist on their rights, this would seem to undermine the
possibility of their treating each other with normal love and affection. A marriage in
which a couple insists on their rights is a marriage gone wrong. But it does not

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follow from this that we should abandon the concept of marital rights: after all,
marriages dorather oftengo wrong (Wolff, 2006, p. 197).

While toleration remains insufficient as the aim of a liberal multiculturalism, it

does provide a safety net to prevent the perpetuation of terror. After all, like
marriages, multicultural communities built on interculturalism will still
occasionally go wrong when interlocutors cannot overcome misunderstood
communications and identities. But that is not to say that the aims of education
should not focus beyond mere toleration. As an archer will and must aim for the
center of a circular target even though the arrow can never theoretically strike it,
what else do different people in a post-terror world hope for in a multicultural
society if not interdependency, communication, and mutual learning?
Tolerance may indeed mute dialogue. Granted, intercultural dialogue may
be in tension with toleration, but it is a necessary constituent of a society that
recognizes the value of freedom, security, and interdependence. Toleration only
provides the minimal structure against exhibitions of intoleranceespecially
violence. However, as an ideal, it remains insufficient for intercultural
understanding. It only requires the toleration of differences based on a superficial
knowledge of others without necessitating communicative exchanges that will
challenge the mutually presumptuous beliefs. As Appiah (2006) points out, the
whole strategy of arguing for the toleration of other cultures seems selfcontradictory; for to assert the objective value of toleration is to want everyone
to want it, rendering it naturally imperialist (p. 24).

How can you argue rationally that other peoples basic value choices should be
tolerated on the basis of a view that says there are no rational arguments for such
basic choices (Appiah, 2006, pp. 24-25)?

Here, interculturalism may contribute to the revision of the silver rule of mutual
non-intrusion into the golden rule of extending culturally-anchored hospitality
unto others. Such a welcoming interculturalism facilitates the coherent translation
of the private to the public sphere through exchange and mutual understanding
and reassured by a shared ethos of toleration. After all, developing interpersonal
relationships with different others may do more for social cohesion than the
political protection of a whole category of people who I may never meet.
Building more than just coexistence but also an ethos of reciprocity, trust, and
interdependence is what allows a multicultural social life to flourish. Intercultural
dialogue is thus both the means for setting the threshold of toleration and the ends
of tolerance.

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6.1.3 A dialogical golden rule

Overcoming ones arbitrary yet innate contempt for difference and looking
beyond the politically correct ideal of tolerance are necessary for intercultural
dialogue. The limits of toleration should not be monopolized by any one
privileged party. A society cannot one-sidedly determine the boundaries of what
is to be tolerated simply according to the dominant traditions, values, laws, or
rationale. Imposing values on people violates their moral integrity and might
subject them to moral and legal coercion (Parekh, 2005, p. 19). Therefore, no
single group in a multicultural community should be allowed to claim the
universality of a threshold of tolerance (Borradori, 2003). Any threshold ought to
face contestations from others; what is tolerable should be discursively
determined and subject to revision through constitutionalized political processes
that can account for socio-cultural changes over time. This dialogical formulation
of toleration is thus essential to the moral consideration of intercultural conflicts.
As a competence rather than an ideal, interculturalism might better address the
problem of terror through a dialogical expansion of an ethos of reciprocity.
Fundamental to any ethos of reciprocity is some variant of the golden
rule that assesses the moral treatment of others according to whether one finds
such treatments acceptable to oneself. Although this moral principle of
reciprocation is common to many cultural ideas, it manifests itself in practice in
many different variants (Seto, 2002). As I had pointed out in Chapter 4.3.3.1, the
Nazis found it morally necessary to earn respect from others through violent selfassertion and in turn paid respect to those people who acted similarly
(Mackenzie, 2007, p. 661). Or consider how a boxer may treat others as they
would have others treat themselves in the ring, which becomes especially
problematic if their opponent is a pacifist. I have argued that the treatment of
others is only morally consistent if both parties in a conflict find the reciprocity
morally acceptable, but such a monological form of the golden rule only demands
one to be accountable to oneself. It only requires one to ask oneself: How would
I like to be treated? In the context of a conflict, the question becomes the
contemplation of what method of violence one should exercise upon the other
given that one should expect similar forms of retaliation. Perhaps for some, all
forms of physical violence are to be rejected; for others, only uniformed soldiers
can be justifiably attacked; and for some still, any person is a legitimate target.
The moral crux in a conflict hinges on whether the belligerent parties have
discussed with their opponents and targets what they would find morally
acceptable. Neglecting the moral view of the other is what perpetuates the cycle
of terror, even if one justifies ones acts of violence as war. Thus according to
the ETM, if ones intended actions draw objections from the targets or comrades,
then the actors ought to refrain from that act.

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What is neglected and immensely crucial is the recognition of the other

and the question: How would you like to be treated? Grayling (2011),
paraphrasing George Bernard Shaw, argued that:

Under no circumstances should you do unto others as you would like them to do to
you because they might not like it.

Consider the example of the Homer gift. In the Simpsons episode Life on the
Fast Lane (season one, episode nine), Homer goes out to buy his wife Marge a
birthday gift. When the gift, a bowling ball, is opened, Homer looks admiringly at
it and asks: A beauty isnt she? Marge, having never bowled in her life,
becomes angry at Homers obviously selfish choice. In this case, Homer applied
the monological form of the golden rule by asking himself: If I was Marge,
what would I like to get for my birthday? Since he liked to bowl, Homer
naturally bought a bowling ball. To impose ones beliefs and values upon others
is definitely problematic. Now what appears obvious is that Homer may have
simply misapplied the golden rule: He should have gotten Marge a gift that she
would have liked, just as he would appreciate getting a gift that he would have
liked for his birthday. Homer should have tried to imagine himself in Marges
position, to see things her way. After all, the premise for action is based on the
precondition: If I was Marge. But this condition of the golden rule presupposes
that one knows the preferences, values, and interests of the other in the first place.
If one presumes such knowledge, one can always be mistaken; however, such a
mistake can be rectified through a dialogue that fuses one anothers different
fields of vision.116 As Grayling (2011) goes on to explain in his lecture:

You have to remember: peoples tastes differ; peoples interests differ. And if you
make yourself the benchmark, the standard, of how everybody else should be
treated then thats a very distorting view. If you respect plurality, diversity,
difference between people; [then] you respect their right to the endeavour to create
something good for themselves and those they care about. We need to talk to one
another, to negotiate, and have a conversation about what we can agree on and
accept. But that agreement should be a very generous one because we should
recognize that people are different.

But the differences between people are deeper than the mere preferences that
Grayling (2011) points out or the Homer gift illustrates. Social and cultural
differences between people lead to different moral vantage points. It is such
differences that lie at the crux of the problem of terror. Nevertheless, if one
116

This idea of the fusion of horizons, drawn from Gadamer (1979), will be developed more
fully in Chapter 6.2.2.

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believes as I do that people have the innate, autonomous capacity to engage in

dialogue (used in the broadest sense, which includes music, dance, poetry, art,
text, sports, as well as conversations) and to exercise freedom when making moral
decisions, then a dialogical revision of the golden rule may be particularly
pertinent in the moral consideration of intercultural conflict.
Imposing upon others ones values, or even presuming to know the values
of others, can in fact contribute to the problem of terror. How do I know that how
I want to be treated is also how you would want to be treated? Surely I cannot
make a legitimate claim to know without at least consulting your opinion. Even if
I think I know what you would like (based on my observations of your behavior,
appearance, etc.) I may be naively presupposing who you really are and what you
really prefer. For me to impose my preferences upon you without at least
consulting you and revising my own presumptions would hardly respect you as an
autonomous, thinking person. The dialogical golden rule, then, holds that the
moral treatment of others needs to take into account of not only how we would
like to be treated by others but also of how others would like to be treated by us.
This interchange may be morally consistent if and only if both parties find the
reciprocity acceptable. The golden rule, restated in its dialogical form, is: Do
unto others as they would like to have done unto them so long as what you would
like to do and what they would like to have done is accepted dialogically
beforehand. This revised golden rule is thus conditioned upon dialogue. And the
threshold of tolerance is a minimal yet necessary basis for an intercultural
discourse that may take foreign forms. The fact that the golden rule appears to be
a common algorithm found at the core of the ethos of reciprocity does not mean
that people of different cultures will or can share a common moral perspective.
Even if certain values are shared by different cultural communities, their relative
importance may differ. Thus, it is essential when considering the morality of
intercultural conflict that it is dialogical rather than monological. Applied to the
ETM, acts of transcultural violence are only morally consistent if all sides accept
the methodology used in the conflict beforehand. But intercultural dialogue is
important (and arguably more pragmatic) to the sustainable mitigation of morally
discrepant conflicts across cultures in more ways than just setting thresholds of
tolerance and establishing a dialogical golden rule: it is the means of learning
about others and of oneself. And this mutual understanding through the sharing of
one anothers impressions of the world may address the problem of terror even
more fundamentally than any coherent system of morality.

6.2 Intercultural learning

The practice of intercultural dialogue may be challenging for the very
reason that there will be differences in the contexts, histories, experiences, and
rationales between interlocutors. But herein lies the crux of intercultural learning:

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By engaging with difference, one is forced to reflect on the presupposed identities

with which others have been labeled and question the taken-for-granted
assumptions one holds, even those deeply embedded in ones own cultural frame
of reference. Such an interchange, though challenging, can also be enriching.
One gains knowledge not only of others, but also of oneself. Through such
knowledge, one can alter how one recognizes others, how one identifies with
others, and how one constructs ones own identities and relations. In terms of the
ETM, which simplistically identifies and organizes people into groups,
intercultural dialogue is particularly pertinent because: First, the threshold of
tolerance needs to be dialogically formulated for a coherent consideration of the
morality of actions taken by both sides in a conflict. Second, this shared threshold
can provide a basis for building an ethos of reciprocity through a dialogical
golden rule.117 Third and more importantly, such dialogue can lead to an
intercultural learning that may more fundamentally mitigate the need for violent,
morally violable modes of (mis)communication. In a globalizing world, people
are not so easily identified and grouped by nationality, race, or culture. Through
intercultural learning, the belligerent may become more skeptical and hesitant
when making sweeping generalizations that legitimate an attack on entire groups
of people. All of those killed in the 9/11 attacks were there at that moment for
different reasons, carrying different beliefs, holding different affiliations, related
to different peoples, and pursuing different goals. They, in short, carried a
plurality of identities and affiliations which have and would have continued to
evolve. To target all of them based on the singular, static, and sweeping
recognition of being American is a gross misrecognition by the terrorists of who
their victims are. Likewise, for many post-terror citizens in the global Minority to
generalize all Muslim- or Middle Eastern-looking men as terrorists, always
and forever, is an equally gross misidentification.118 Intercultural learning, then,
may serve to demythologize the narrative of cultural homogeneity, constancy, and
independence. Through such pedagogical processes, perhaps the misrecognition
of identities and the metanarrative of us versus them can be more easily
dispelled.
The ignorance of the cultural diversity and freedom that are inherent to
any group of persons is central to the misrecognition of identities that fuels the
problem of terror. Interculturalism points to a sub-political road: undermining
the need to collectivize people on the political level into discreet communities
(according to some static, homogenous cultural trait) by encouraging critical
dialogue on the social level between individuals. Furthermore, cultures evolve.
As Appiah (2006) points out, cultures are continuously contaminated when
people pick and choose from aspects of other cultures. This continuous
117

These two points have been made in the previous Chapter 5.1 Intercultural dialogue.
A recent Gallup poll shows that religious prejudice of Americans against Muslims is still the
strongest, even a decade after 9/11. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudicestronger-against-muslims.aspx.
118

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evolution of cultures, despite their purported purity and constancy, is valuable

argues Parekh (2005):

Since no culture is perfect and since each represents only a limited vision of the
good life, it needs others to complement and enrich it. Cultural diversity is therefore
an important constituent of human well-being. Since other cultures provide us with
vantage points from which to look at our own, they enable us to appreciate its
strengths and limitations and increase our capacity for self-consciousness, selfcriticism and self-regeneration (p. 15).

However, whereas Parekh (2005), like Habermas, insists that the purpose of the
dialogue is to resolve or minimize disagreements, and to arrive at a view that is
acceptable to all or at least most of the participants, I am less ambitious (p. 20). I
am only defending that the purpose of getting exposed and accustomed to
difference through dialogical engagement. Any higher purposes beyond that, such
as a formulation of a consensus, will also be a matter to be discussed by the
participants. After all, the hope of establishing such a consensus necessitates the
reciprocation of rights and respect that cannot be taken for granted.
Consequently, I argue for the necessity of intercultural dialogue as merely a
process, without presupposing the need to reach a consensus, which, even if
attainable, will only be tentative. Such dialogue may thus lead to, as Gadamer
(1979) puts it, a fusion of horizons, whereby people with different frames of
reference attain a glimpse of what may lie beyond their field of vision. The fused
horizon, as an expansion of ones imagination and concern, provides a
cornerstone upon which lies the possibility of building intercultural relationships.

6.2.1 Preserving the mosaic?

Communities around the world are growing, often not only in size but also
in heterogeneity. As the cultural and socioeconomic diversity in many countries
increases through the various forces of globalization, the crucial issue with which
the liberal societies in the West must struggle is that of preserving both social
solidarity and individual freedom (Putnam, 2007, p. 138). Multiculturalism not
only describes the contemporary condition marked by the diverse interactions
between people with different patterns of speech, thought, and practices
(Gutmann, 2004); but as a political philosophy, it also entails the recognition and
toleration of minority cultural identities and practices to various extents (Banting
& Kymlicka, 2006). Toleration, as a threshold imposed by the dominant culture,
mutes dialogue and denies dependency between diverse peoples. As such,
multiculturalism may merely implicate a conservation of diversity that renders
criticism across cultural divides a taboo. As Sen (2006) explains, such
multiculturalism merely asks people to stick to their own cultural background
and thereby potentially perpetuates the misrecognitions that keep people of
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seemingly different cultures separated (p. 116). Mere toleration upholds the
borders around the individual pieces of a mosaic. Lacking the imperative to
engage with difference across presumptuous cultural divides, such
multiculturalism may aggravate rather than soothe the problem of terror.
The recognition of difference is an essential prerequisite to multicultural
toleration. Otherwise, what is there to tolerate if others think and act in ways that
fall in line with ones expectations? But this recognition process is highly
problematic. It often presumes the primacy of cultural identities. And while
aware that there are differences between cultures, it takes for granted the
differences within cultures. Even more fundamental than tolerance, which
presupposes the recognition of difference, is the politics of identification and
labeling that often neglects cultural malleability and freedom. Misidentifying one
another is fundamental to the miscommunication inherent to the perpetuation of
terror.
6.2.1.1 The politics of misrecognition
Since 9/11, many liberals in multicultural societies have become critical of
multiculturalism as an effective policy for social cohesion. After declaring that
the multikulti approach has utterly failed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
insists that immigrants should speak German and suggests restricting Turkish and
Arabic immigration (Weaver, 2010). And arguing that the doctrine of state
multiculturalism has only encouraged different cultures to live separate lives,
British Prime Minister David Cameron suggests that: We need a lot less of the
passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism
(Wintour, 2011). How are different peoples to build interdependency and
relationships when even liberals abandon multiculturalism? Surely, it is not by
flexing a muscular liberalism that snuffs out differences in beliefs and practices,
and wipes out all other minority identities?
According to the constrict theory proposed by Putnam (2007), diversity
might actually reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity that is, both
bonding and bridging social capital (p. 144). By surveying people in various
cities across the US, Putnam (2007) finds that the more diverse the community,
the less people trust their neighborsincluding those of the same ethnicity.

Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social

isolation. Diversity does not produce bad race relations or ethnically-defined
group hostility, our findings suggest. Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities
tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the
colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from
their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on
community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform
more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle

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unhappily in front of the television. Diversity, at least in the short run, seems to
bring out the turtle in all of us (Putnam, 2007, pp. 149-151).

Disenchantment with multiculturalism for failing to build social solidarity across

cultural divides may thus appear justified. However, by pushing for a muscular
liberalism that imposes the mainstream culture and identity upon immigrants and
minorities is to take a step back towards a stagnant view of our identities in an
evolving and plural world.
A merely tolerant multiculturalism may not only limit intercultural
dialogue but may also misrecognize cultural categories. Multiculturalism can
hide the intrinsic malleability and internal diversity of cultures under the guise of
apparent homogeneity. Cultural identities are not uniform, static, or pristine.
First, those belonging to a particular culture are hardly uniform in values,
mentalities, and practices. Scrutinize any national culture and one will likely find
minority cultures and subcultures, some recognized and some not, within the
singularity of the nation. After all, any large cultural group, including the
nation or those formed on the internet, is an imagined community because:

members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellowmembers, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image
of their communion. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of
face-to-face contact are imagined (Anderson, 1991, p. 6).

Second, like people, cultures change. As Putnam (2007) argues:

Identity itself is socially constructed and can be socially de-constructed and reconstructed. Indeed, this sort of social change happens all the time in any dynamic
and evolving society (p. 159).

The reflexivity and flexibility of our identities can be associated with societal
changes in behavior. Because each member of a cultural group may adhere to the
traditional beliefs and practices to different extents, cultures are constantly
contested, subject to change, and does not form a coherent whole, its identity is
never settled, static and free of ambiguity (Parekh, 2006, p. 148).

Culture is, in other words, not a club, along with membership of which go certain
attributes of membership. Culture functions more as a productive force constituted
by a relatively amorphous aggregation of loosely bounded factors that both

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influence the lives of the individuals who share in it and are influenced by those
individuals (Mason, 2007, p. 172).

Third, cultures are contaminated (Appiah, 2006). Under the cross-fertilizing

forces of globalization, the hybridization of cultures is increasingly common. Art,
literature, music, film, the media are all forms of cultural capital that are adopted,
modified, or rejecteddepending on whether they draw admiration or ireby
other cultural groups. From the backwash of imperialism, Chicken Tikka
Massala has been claimed by some of the British as a national dish (Cook,
2001). Even the political philosophy of modern China, communism, is drawn and
adapted from the writings of a Russian revolutionary. Multiculturalism can be
problematic precisely for the fact that it often fails to recognize that cultures
evolve and take into account that its members hold a dynamic complex of
identities at any moment. Culture, in short, is not a homogenous attribute but
show great variations internally; not pristine but continuously contaminated;
and not uniquely significant in determining our lives and identities (Sen, 2006,
pp. 112-113).
6.2.1.2 The value of cultural freedom
The dogma of cultural orthodoxy is a myth: Cultures are internally diverse
and constantly evolve (Appiah, 2006; Sen, 2006). Furthermore, as Sen (2006)
points out, every person, whether belonging to the mainstream or minority, needs
to juggle in priority a complex of identities and values at different times and
places. Culture, then, is but one of many important associations we hold. Given
the liquidity and hybridization of cultures, cultural freedom, the freedom to
critically consider and choose cultural traditions and identities, is especially
pertinent for autonomous, thinking beings. Consequently, the freedom to
determine our loyalties and priorities between the different groups to all of which
we may belong is a peculiarly important liberty which we have reason to
recognize, value, and defend (Sen, 2006, p. 5). Both a muscular liberalism that
is imposed upon the intolerable and a rigid multiculturalism that creates
immutable cultural categories fail to recognize the evolution of cultures and the
value of cultural freedom.
Like political and economic freedom, cultural freedom is valuable both as
the ends and the means of development (Sen, 1999). As autonomous beings
capable of holding preferences and making choices, freedom is essential: (1) for
providing opportunities to pursue those objectives that we have reason to value,
and (2) during the process of our decision-making itself such that we are not
forced into some state because of constraints imposed by others (Sen, 2010, p.
228). In other words, the value of cultural freedom lies in the means through
which cultural choices are made (whether they were made autonomously), and the
outcomes of these cultural choices (whether they lead to substantive changes).
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Such cultural freedom does not equate to the unscrutinized celebration and
conservation of each and every identified culture. Recognizing the malleability of
cultural traditions, cultural freedom necessitates the autonomy to question and
change taken-for-granted traditions (Sen, 2006).
While it may be easy to challenge the beliefs and practices of others, to
exercise the freedom to reflect on our own customsespecially those taken-forgrantedoften requires others whose difference helps us to become more aware
of ourselves. We may be so intensely focused on the differences of others that we
are blinded to the conditions within which we are situated.119 As Parekh (2006)
points out:

Unless human beings are able to step out of their culture, they remain imprisoned
within it and tend to absolutize it, imagining it to be the only natural or self-evident
way to understand and organize human life. And they cannot step out of their
culture unless they have access to others (p. 167).

Given, then, the increasingly multilayered identities and transnational ties carried
by individuals in a globalizing world, the freedom and opportunities to make
cultural choices about ones identities, beliefs, and practices are ever more
pertinent. Consequently, the exercise of cultural freedom should be valued,
rather than negated by an imposed precedence of unquestioned conservation
(Sen, 2006, p. 114).
A multiculturalism that seeks the preservation of diversity for its own sake
is problematic because it confines people within rigid categories that should be
porous and flexible. Rather than encouraging and empowering citizens of
diverse backgrounds to interact with each other in civil society, they are invited
to act in their own cultural community (Sen, 2006, p. 163).
Such
multiculturalism, or what Sen (2006) aptly describes as plural monoculturalism,
merely celebrates cultural diversity without considering whether cultural choices
are and can be made by the members of the various cultural groups (p. 156).
Because people deserveindeed, needthe freedom to choose what they have
reason to value, what cultural identity one prefers and how much weight it carries
should be decided by the people and not imposed according to external
prescriptions. One should be free to take up, decline, or change languages,
religions, communities, or identities. In other words, cultural categorization
even in the name of diversityshould not trump cultural freedom. To impose a
presumptuous classification upon people according to imagined communities, and

119

See Figure 6.2.1 for an illustration depicting the difficulty of becoming aware of ones own
condition.

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to reprimand those who fail to uphold such binding identities, is to deny

autonomous beings their capacity for cultural freedom and change.
Moreover, such multiculturalism may be charged with being just another
set of beliefs, values, and practices belonging to one culture among the many.
The politics of cultural recognition and intolerance of the intolerant are the liberal
ideals for a diversifying world. But by what supra-cultural authority do
multiculturalists impose cultural categories upon immigrants and visible
minorities? After all, for people from societies with less cultural diversity,
multiculturalism may appear to be just another culture (Mackenzie, 2007). While
such a challenge can likewise be turned towards my defense of interculturalism, I
concur with the charge that interculturalism is but another culturally-anchored
discourse. However, its emphasis on the freedom to dialogue and criticism across
presumptuous cultural divides points to a process (not an ideal state) through
which it can reflexively subject itself. As a process of critical dialogue,
interculturalism transcends multiculturalism:
After all, to dispute the
appropriateness of such a methodology one needs to argue from different vantage
points. Moreover, for the interculturalist, one can invite even the intolerant into
ones cultural realm to partake in the sharing of narratives. In other words, it is
impossible to argue against the scope of interculturalism without engaging in
interculturalism itself. Interculturalists should, indeed must, subject their own
ideas, values, beliefs, narratives, and practices to critique through the very process
of intercultural dialogue and reconsider them accordingly. Only by subjecting
interculturalism to criticism from alternate cultural perspectives can such a
methodology be better evaluated, understood, and changed.
While multiculturalism may hold the tyrannical implications of putting
persons into rigid boxes, the muscular liberalism that Cameron and Merkel
proposes instead also neglects the cultural freedom valuable to every autonomous
person (Sen, 2006, p. 158). As Parekh (2006) challenges, liberals continue to
absolutize liberalism, make it their central frame of reference, divide all ways of
life into liberal and nonliberal, equate the latter with illiberal, and to talk of
tolerating and rarely of respecting or cherishing them (p. 110). To impose
liberalism upon migrants and minorities, then, is to impose the cultural capital of
the elite... that represents the norm, that constitutes what is to be emulated and
sought by all (Mason, 2007, pp. 176-177). Such an exercise of what Bourdieu
(1977, p. 196) calls symbolic violence imposes congruence upon a plurality of
identities, traditions, values, beliefs, histories, languages, and cultural symbols all
living under the same roof of the political state (Gellner 1983, Mason, 2007). The
active, muscular liberal, who confronts nonliberals by attacking them for their
failure to conform, makes the tolerance of nonliberal cultures conditional upon
their acceptance of it (Parekh, 2006, p. 111). It infringes on the cultural
autonomy of nonliberals. Within such liberalism, there is nothing particularly
liberal about it (Parekh, 2006, p. 111). The capability to exercise cultural
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freedom is thus essential for intercultural critique and appreciation between

interlocutors, not as objects of willing or grudging tolerance but as
conversational partners in a common search for a deeper understanding of the
nature, potentialities and grandeur of human life (Parekh, 2006, p. 111).
Given that theories can influence social thought, political action, and
public policies, the artificial diminution of human beings into singular identities
can have divisive effectsbe it a muscular liberalism or a plural
monoculturalism (Sen, 2006, p. 178). Cultures are valuable for what they are: as
evolving patterns of rationalities, values, and practices that help individuals
construct identities and identify with others. But to hold culture as an exclusive,
binding membership of a historical people is to mythologize what is but one
category of human identity and relations. The categorization of others according
to cultureor rather what we believe to be their cultureimprisons them to being
imaginary slaves of an illusory force (Sen, 2006, p. 103). If people are to have
greater freedom in choosing their identities, beliefs, and practices, then cultural
diversity cannot simply be conserved through a static, cohabiting multiculturalism
or homogenized through an assertive, muscular liberalism. The freedom to
construct our identities, form our affiliations, and revise our beliefs and practices;
and the freedom from the terror of being misrecognized and subjected to a
monological golden rule in conflict; should be of profound value to us living,
thinking beings. Intercultural dialogue holds the recognition of the value of
cultural freedom and the fluidity of identities, and the moral communication of an
acceptable mode of reciprocity, one that is dialogically formulated, as imperative.
Through an exchange of narratives and not only rational argumentation, people
with different perspectives and histories can gain access to a broader scope of
phenomenological vision. Such intercultural learning then offers the hope of a
fusion of horizons between otherwise potential terrorists/counter-terrorists.

6.2.2 Expanding horizons

Rather than idealizing the toleration of different cultural existences, which
are often misrecognized anyways, interculturalism suggests that we lead one
another into our private spheres to broaden our horizons by challenging our takenfor-granted beliefs and practices. Only by being made critically aware of our
presumptuous traditions and thresholds can we have any basis for choosing
alternate identities, changing our relations to others, and breaking the habitual
cycle of terror. Consequently, interculturalism points to a process of mutual
critique, mutual understanding, mutual evolution of beliefs and practices, and
mutual dependency. Valuing the moral dignity of autonomous individuals,
interculturalism acknowledges diversity without its unscrutinized preservation.
Particularly given that we can only learn more deeply about our own cultural
conditions from that of others, cultural diversity without preservation is a

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prerequisite for intercultural dialogue. The potential for learning through

intercultural dialogue addresses the problem of terror at its roots: the
misrecognition of and miscommunication with the other. In this section, I
substantiate what such interculturalism should entail, why such dialogues are
important, and how the resulting intersubjectivity may address the problem of
terror.
6.2.2.1 What is interculturalism?
Interculturalism is the dialogical process through which people with
different identities, beliefs, traditions, values, practices, rationalities, and
historiesin short, phenomenal constitutionslearn about one another and about
oneself. When applied to the ETM, interculturalism seeks to dialogically
establish an agreement of what methodologies are morally acceptable by the
people (not only the authorities) of the conflicting sides. If moral coherence over
a particular method is not found, as it sometimes will not, then such methods
should not be used in the intercultural conflicts. In other words, a shared ethos of
reciprocity is necessary for the moral integrity of a conflict. More generally,
given the complexity, fluidity, and freedom of cultural identities, interculturalism
merely entails a dialogical process for learning about oneself and others. This
dialogue is more narrative than strictly debatethough rational debate is certainly
welcome. It merely requires a willingness to learn and not the ends of winning an
argument or reaching a consensusthough these are possible outcomes. As such,
it transcends the idealization of toleration in multicultural societies, is broader
than mere rational debate, does not necessitate the seeking of a consensus, but
requires a willingness to participate and a sense of fallibility.
Interculturalism comprises a process of dialogue that is not restricted in
the narrow sense of a verbal discussion. After all, to accommodate a plurality of
preferences of how one engages in such dialogue, it must be open to
interpretation: as any means of attempted communication between different
peoples. Such dialogue includes, but is not restricted to visual and audio
communication through the media of verbal speech, written text, the arts (in the
broadest sense of the word), and modern technologies of multimedia. Articles,
movies, blogs, food, sports, could all thus be some manifestations of intercultural
dialogue. As Nussbaum (2001) argues, a shared sense of vulnerability and
empathy can be cultivated through drama, by situating oneself in each others
stories. Physical competitions are also not excluded as a form of intercultural
communication so long as the rules of which, to maintain moral integrity, are
found acceptable by competitors beforehand. Through such engagements,
participants can gain better understanding of others and oneself, and develop a
relationship with (and perhaps even respect for) others. In short, the essence of
interculturalism is the mutual sharing of the beliefs, narratives, and practices that
are of value to the interlocutors.

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Interculturalism can be further defined by contrasting it with a purely

tolerant multiculturalism that focuses on the power of rational debate. First, in a
multicultural society, one upholds the coexistence of neighbors, categorized by
cultural ideal types, and according to a strict threshold of what is tolerable. The
mere tolerance of the existence of superficially recognized cultural differences
neglects the value of challenging one anothers presumptuous identities and
traditionshowever intolerable. Although toleration may preserve human
diversity, it contributes little to the imperative for learning across difference. As
Gutmann (1994) argues, there is no valuable understanding to be gained directly
from the content of disrespectable speech (p. 23). But if only the respectable
are to be included in deliberation, and this respectability is predetermined
according to a unilateral threshold of toleration, how else might the disrespectful
reciprocate respect? If not through the act of intercultural dialogue that examines
both the self and others, how might the presumptuous possibly see things
differently? Even the racist or the sexist discriminate according to some rationale,
however objectionable, and express these prejudices through some
communicative means. Assuming then even the intolerant bigot has some
capacity for reasoning and communication, the untenability of such prejudices
should provide even more reason to engage in dialogue. Would it not be more
purposeful to debate with a sexist, whose beliefs may lead to unjust deeds and
should be easily falsifiable, than to merely dissociate from them? The outcome of
the dialogue will ultimately depend on the interlocutors, but intercultural
engagement surely cannot be less conducive to social cohesion and cultural
freedom than a merely tolerant multicultural society.
Second, in an intercultural community, individuals recognize their
neighbors according to their life stories, experiences, struggles, feelings, and
choices. It is a codependent community in which people can place themselves
within the narratives of others and not only regard one another as mere debaters to
be overcome by the power of rational argumentation. People, being necessarily
social, moral, emotional, and rational, may then see one another more fully and
not merely as a bundle of rights and justifications. Central to every persons
narrative, emotions should be also recognized, rather than denied, in intercultural
dialogue. As forms of intense attention and engagement, in which the world is
appraised in its relation to the self, emotions constitute our self-identity
(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 106). Here, emotions are not considered problematic to
rational debate but are instead recognized as essential to human reasoning and
dialogue. Rather than denouncing emotions as feminine objects of irrationality
that have no place in level-headed political discourse, interculturalism holds
emotions as inextricable, indeed, universal, to our identities, pursuits, and
reasoning. After all, given the different cultural variants of rationality, a superior
argument does not necessarily win over other interlocutors by the force of reason
alone. Through a narrative that reveals one anothers shared vulnerabilities, an
indispensable epistemological requirement for compassion in human beings can
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be satisfied (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 319). The suffering of distant people becomes

more than a mere factual statistic and less of an alien irrelevance.

I am urging that we should learn about people in other places, take an interest in
their civilizations, their arguments, their errors, their achievements, not because that
will bring us to agreement, but because it will help us get used to one another
(Appiah, 2006, p. 78).

In other words, political multiculturalism may structure equality and noninterference through laws which command citizens to respect the equal rights of
those different from themselves, but a social interculturalism could supplement it
by promoting a mutual education of the heart and the imagination through
placing interlocutors not in a debate but within the narratives of one another, in all
its humanness (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 443). People, and not only their rights, may
be more fully appreciated. In this regard, interculturalism diverges from a
Habermasian communicative ideal, where debates are undistorted by disparities in
power, purely grounded on the strength of impartial argumentation, and
completed with the establishment of a consensus (Bohman & Rehg, 2011). The
engagement in interculturalism, then, does not demand the symmetric
reciprocation of power, or even rights. Nor does it necessitate the establishment
of a consensus. For even the notion of power, represented as capital or rationality,
are refracted through different cultural lenses. As Parekh (2006) argues, because
society is marred by deep inequalities of economic, political and cultural power,
any theory of political deliberation cannot rely on the power of reason alone if it
is to be fair to the structurally disadvantaged (p. 306). After all, structural
asymmetries means that any consensus reached necessarily favors the
advantaged debater. In other words, interculturalism transcends knowledge of
others by pointing to the need to gain knowledge in others and ourselves. But if
interculturalism entails the sharing of narratives that do not require the
Habermasian conditions for an ideal speech situation, what does interculturalism
require?
Third, interculturalism requires a sense of fallibility and a willingness to
participate in dialogue in sometimes unconventional ways. A critical awareness
of our fallibility is crucial to intercultural dialogue. If we are aware that even our
scientific laws are never the last words in describing things as they are, but are
instead tentative theories upon which we construct our understanding of and
interactions with the world, then we must retain a sense of skepticism towards the
provisional nature of our knowledge (Popper, 1979). Hence, interculturalism
takes the rationality of arguments as being rooted in the values, beliefs, histories,
educations, emotions, and cultures of the interlocutors. From the awareness of the
limitations of our epistemological situatedness, we can engage dialogically as
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critics of the presumptions and identities of oneself and others. It is through such
hermeneutical efforts in wrestling with others that we gain alternate and wider
perspectives of reality. Interculturalism is thus conceived and practised in two
directions at once: reduction of ones own sovereign moral territory in order to
seek cross-cultural dialogue with others truths (Beck, 2000, p. 79). Hand in
hand with criticism, fallibility is both the cause and effect of the openness
necessary for intercultural learning. Such openness requires a readiness, indeed
expectation, for conflicting views, irresolvable ambiguities, and revising ones
own assumptions and practices. However, the awareness of the irreducible
complexity of many of our worlds problems does not mean we simply give up on
dialogue. Through intercultural dialogue: Truth must earn its quality of being
true (Beck, 2000, p. 81). Without thrusting the validity of ones singular reality
upon others, interculturalism recognizes our mutual fallibility, and the necessity
for both the differences and changes in our perspectives (Beck, 2000).
Interculturalism could, indeed should, remind us to function as autonomous
beings according to our knowledge without being certain of our justified beliefs to
the point of monologically imposing them upon others. In other words, fallibilism
breeds openness and keeps us from closing our horizons to others. What is
valuable and necessary for intercultural learning then is openness and dialogue.
Interculturalism is a pedagogical experience through multimodal dialogue.
The sharing of narratives between people with different frames of reference may
include argumentation or the attainment of a consensus, but it insists on the
willingness to be self-reflective and openness to being fallible. This intercultural
attitude draws on the awareness of the fallibility of ones knowledge as well as the
knowledge claims of others. It is not only built on a hospitable invitation
extended to others into ones own domain but also on a readiness to enter that of
the other. In short, it stems from the recognition of our epistemological
limitations and moral worth as autonomous, thinking beings.
6.2.2.2 Why share narratives?
There can be no prescribed outcome for interculturalism for it only seeks
to gain a more experiential and deeper understanding of others, and to become
more critically aware of the dispositions taken-for-granted in our beliefs and
practices. Such intercultural learning hangs on a dialogical process which does
not presume the universality of rationality but only in the possibility for some
sites of shared experience across cultures. The superior debater will thus not
necessarily win the dialogue. After all, interculturalism requires not a rational
consensus but seeks an expansion of horizons that houses others. But then why
share narratives if it likely will not lead to a consensus but will likely involve a
discomforting engagement with others holding different fields of view? Although
intercultural dialogue might not, indeed need not, lead to a rational consensus, the
process of dialogue is valuable in itself as a learning experience of autonomous,
moral beings. As Taylor (1993) argues, to transcend our monological
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consciousness, which obstructs a richer view of oneself and othersand hence

of a proper understanding of the real variety of human culture and so of a
knowledge of human beingsrequires a communicative process across cultural
horizons (p. 49). A conclusive consensus need not be reached for the
interlocutors in a dialogue to learn about one another. Indeed, perhaps through
the sharing of narratives, the awareness of our shared vulnerability and fallibility
may gain recognition. As the central dialogical process of interculturalism, the
sharing of narratives is valuable in itself, both epistemologically and morally, as
different horizons may become fused.
Epistemologically, the sharing of narratives between people with different
horizons is essential to the dialogical process of intercultural learning. Each and
every person is born and raised in situ. Our very thoughts are dependent on some
form of language that is socially constructed within our culture. Even our very
rationalities, including those notions of causation, temporality, and logic are
learned through our experiences within a particular socio-cultural context.
Although all human beings have the capacity to reason, being born into, raised
in and deeply shaped by their cultural communities has meant that different
people may cherish and cultivate different forms of it (Parekh, 2006, pp. 120121). Bearing an attitude ready for self-reflection and revision, interlocutors
should recognize that their hermeneutics is contextual and culturally embedded,
is never wholly cerebral or based on arguments alone (Parekh, 2006, p. 312). A
horizon, then, marks the limits of our vision, of what we can apprehend through
our sensory experience as refracted through our cultural lenses, and, ultimately,
what is imaginable. We cannot express (in words, art, or music) what transcends
our imagination of our possible experiences of the phenomenal world. As
Gadamer (1979) puts it:

Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of situation by
saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence an
essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of horizon. The horizon is
the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point (p. 269).

The limits of our phenomenal world, the experiences of which provide us with our
knowledge, rationality, objects of desire and contempt, and history, is bound by
our horizons. To see beyond our horizons, or to at least see some of our objects of
focus (including ourselves) from different angles, would require the contribution
of others with different fields of vision. One cannot shift their horizons on their
own simply by imagining themselves in the place of others, given that our horizon
delimits what is imaginable already, akin to the monological golden rule. The
attempt to place oneself in the situation of the other as Gadamer (1979) proposes
requires the presence of and dialogue with others. By sharing our narratives
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which are constituted of our passions and reasons, we gain different

interpretations of our phenomenal world and broaden our horizons. Such an
intersubjective sharing of narratives can thus lead to a fusion of horizons.
Not only can we learn more about one another by situating ourselves
within each others narratives, but interculturalism also appeals to the dignity of
each autonomous person to reflect and change. As creatures of narration, we
construct, understand, and project ourselves in terms of the temporality and
causality in our life story. It is through our histories that we give our lives
meaning. To restrict intercultural dialogue to the purely rational and abstract is to
deny the emotional and cultural freedom of our self-constitution. To confine
human understanding to only the logical is to delimit the scope of human
freedomthe freedom to value what one may have reason to value. With the
capacity to freely rationalize our moral thesis, our dignity as autonomous, moral
persons will be better recognized and respected in an intercultural process. The
dynamics of interculturalism observes the freedom of individuals to contest in
dialogue the very discourse (such as rights and laws) that structures
multiculturalism. The heteronomous compliance to a politics of tolerance
neglects to treat people as ends in themselves. It restrains the freedom of moral
agents to change through exploring the narratives of others. As Kant (2005)
argues, people have intrinsic value due to their inherent capacity to exercise the
freedom to think and act. To value the dignity of every autonomous person
requires respecting their freedom to formulate and modify their maxims. Unless
ones moral thesis is tested through intercultural dialogue then ones maxim
remains monological. The best hope, then, for deepening cross-cultural
understanding and dependency is found not only in the power of logical
argumentation but also the empathy that is afforded through the power of the
narrative. Without the narrative of the other, ones reality will be confined to only
personal experiencelike the terrorist whose reality consists only of a
monological system of morality.
Interculturalism, then, is valuable not only as a means for epistemological
evolution that caters to the diversity and dynamics of human discourse but also as
an ends that respects the dignity of the free will innate to every human being
that is, it values every persons moral worth. It follows therefore that people who
are different beyond ones monological threshold should not be made subject to
the contingent physical, structural, and symbolic violence; for every deviance can
be a valuable reminder of both the diversity and the freedom of individuals that
give them moral worth. To disrespect all speech acts that the dominant would
find intolerable is to deny the subaltern their human dignity to be free,
autonomous, and moral individuals. Because people, including their cultures,
change, intercultural understanding is never a finished process. Focal points
change and horizons shift. Consequently, the fusion of horizons is a continuous
process of lifelong learning that is never complete like the winning of a debate
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or argument or the satisfaction of a basic threshold of tolerance. In fusing

horizons, interlocutors act as both speaker and listener, wrestle with the
hermeneutical experiences of the other, compare and contrast it with that of the
self, and thereby expand the horizon of an intersubjective world (Borradori,
2003). Given that our behaviors are not immutable, our capacity as autonomous,
reflective beings can be developed and exercised through such expansions of
horizons (Sen, 1999). After all, the cultivation of intercultural dialogue can
contribute to the development of cultural freedom. As a dialectical force that can
both perpetuate or mitigate the problem of terror, education thus plays a crucial
role that requires greater exploration.

6.3 Conclusion
What role education plays in the cultivation of misrecognized identities
that lead to terroristic miscommunications, and an interculturalism that
epistemologically and morally recognizes the intrinsic worth of others is crucial to
this thesis. I conceptualized in the previous chapter where education meets the
phenomenon of terror on a more fundamental basis by pointing to their
sociological connection as the inculcation of habitus.
As a form of
miscommunication, terror is perpetuated from the misrecognition of human
identities as being singular, static, and universal. Strengthening free and plural
modes of dialogue may thus alleviate the terror of monological misidentification.
Interculturalism is the attempt to engage with difference without being bound to a
non-consensual threshold of what is tolerable or rational. It seeks to enhance the
capacity for mutual understanding through the exchange of narratives as
autonomous, moral beingsthereby, helping to develop the reciprocation of
interdependence rather than mere independence. But if individuals and cultures
are so diverse that even the consensus on a threshold of toleration may prove
problematic, how can an interculturalist be confident that meaningful
communication is even possible across cultures? Even if such dialogue is
practicable, is it not just another cultural discourse? Why should it be adopted by
those with other values and of other cultures?
The possibility for the fusion of horizons is founded on the safe
presumption that all persons, despite their differences, share certain
commonalities allowing for intercultural communication. Firstly, all peoples
share tangible scales of time and space in which we exist, live, and think. The
knowledge we learn, then, is defined by the relevant scale of our existence and
founded on an a priori conception of space and time (Flew, 1971). Aesthetics,
rites concerning stages of life, reciprocity, conflict resolution, morality, causality,
temporality all describe many of the traits we humans share (Appiah, 2006, p.
96). Although our hermeneutical experiences can differ (e.g., a sick dog
recovered because of the veterinarians antibiotics or because of the divine

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intervention of a good deity), we can share our differences in our phenomenal

worlds within our common scales of existence.

The conclusion is obvious enough:

the points of entry to cross-cultural
conversations are things that are shared by those who are in the conversation. They
do not need to be universal; all they need to be is what these particular people have
in common. We can learn from one another; or we can simply be intrigued by
alternative ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (Appiah, 2006, p. 97).

In other words, we live and can only live by constructing our lives according to a
narrative founded on causality and temporality. Unguided by our logic, our very
survival in this world would be in jeopardy. Without the necessary connection of
cause with effectof what was, is, and will bethe world will be unreadable and
life absurd. One would not eat to satisfy hunger, drink to quench thirst. The fact
that we may hold different interpretations of our world, according to our different
vantage points, necessitates that we at least share hermeneutical experiences
within the same world. Without a noumenal world in which to interact, we would
not even have a basis for disagreement; for to hold a different view of something
requires the recognition of that something. Likewise, the fact that we use
languageeven if differentin thought and discourse refutes the solipsistic
presumption that the existence of all others too may be but figments of ones
imagination (Putnam, 1982). If we live according to our best tentative theories of
our world, then any growth in new knowledgethat is, learningrequires the
experience of the unexpected, anomalies that lie beyond what was once observed
or predicted (Popper, 1963). The only way to expand our horizons, to see beyond
what is taken-for-granted as known, is to seek corroboration or falsification
through intersubjective discourse. The hybridization of cultures has demonstrated
that the gulf of incomparability between cultures is not unbridgeable (Beck,
2000, p. 84). Many forms of intercultural learning have thus already been
experienced, wherever different observations and interpretations of particular
events are shared to contribute to mutual changes in beliefs and practices. Upon
this ontological basis of a shared existence then, there is every possibility for
mutual learning, as well as the transformation, expansion, and fusion of horizons.
To the charge that interculturalism carries no more supra-cultural
authority than the liberal discourse of multiculturalism, I concur. Like
multiculturalism, interculturalism can, indeed should, be recognized as a
development from within Western liberal traditions. Interculturalism is not
culturally neutral. But as a dialogical process that is itself reflexively subject to
modification, it does not need to be. Unlike multiculturalism, which takes itself
for granted as imposable, including upon those undeserving of respect
(Gutmann, 2004, p. 22), interculturalism admits to being just another value that
can be freely adopted and modified by others (Appiah, 2006, p. 25). Participation
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in intercultural dialogue is therefore voluntary, its process not progress, and its
conclusions drawn by the interlocutors themselves. The value of interculturalism
lies not in its ends, for which none can be monologically prescribed, but as a
means in itself. Surely there will be awkward moments during intercultural
dialogue, but if one realizes that the value of engaging with difference is exactly
because one is ignorant of the others threshold, such awkwardness can in fact
be regarded as sites of critical understanding. After all, no one culture is justified
in claiming a monopoly of the good life.

However rich it might be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and
develops the full range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and
complement each other, expand each others horizon of thought and alert each other
to new forms of human fulfillment. The value of other cultures is independent of
whether or not they are options for us. Indeed they are often valuable precisely
because they are not (Parekh, 2006, p. 167).

The confidence in interculturalism over mere multiculturalism comes from

making the imaginary real. As Appiah (2006) promises:

when the stranger is no longer imaginary, but real and present, sharing a human
social life, you may like or dislike him, you may agree or disagree; but, if it is what
you both want, you can make sense of each other in the end (p. 99).

Interculturalism only requires one to be (1) willing to participate dialogically

when establishing moral thresholds, and (2) open to fallibility in the critical
exchange of narratives. It is thus of intrinsic value as part of an empowering
process that expands the horizons of autonomous persons. It provides the
essential conditions for freedom developed through self-knowledge, selftranscendence and self-criticism (Parekh, 2006, p. 167). As Held (2006) argues,
no set of values or particular perspectives can lay claim to being correct and
valid by themselves, but they are valid only in so far as they are justified through
deliberation (p. 233).
Without imposing a monological consensus,
interculturalism merely upholds the freedom of people to autonomously engage
with the experience and the ideas of others (Appiah, 2006, p. 85). As Appiah
(2006) points out: Conversation doesnt have to lead to consensus about
anything, especially not values; its enough that it helps people get used to each
other (p. 85).
Finally, an intercultural fusion of horizons may address the problem of
terror for at least these two reasons: by adjusting to diversity and building
interdependency. The misrecognition and miscommunication that are central to
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the problem of terror requires a process of mutual learning that expands our
horizons. Given our unique perspectives, any hope of seeing beyond ones
hermeneutical experience rests upon discourse with others. As Nussbaum (2001)
proposes, the ability to imagine the experiences of others can help us to
participate in their sufferings (p. 426). This appreciation of the diversity of
circumstances in which human beings struggle for flourishing thus entails being
drawn into those lives through the imagination, becoming a participant in those
struggles (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 432).

To promote empathy in this way does not commit us to cultural relativism, to the
view that every culture is equally good, or to any sort of hands-off attitude toward
cultural criticism. In fact, the compassionate spectator is always attempting to
compare what she sees with her own evolving conception of the good (Nussbaum,
2001, p. 432).

After all, what moves people is often not an argument from a principle but just
a gradually acquired new way of seeing things (Appiah, 2006, p. 73).

Relationships between people that are mediated only by rule and not by empathy
frequently prove more fragile in times of hostility, more prone to a dehumanizing
type of brutality (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 395).

Without the imaginative capacity to envision others within our horizons,

Nussbaum (2001) assures that the exchange of damages will perpetuate itself
without limit (p. 396). But through intercultural dialogue, one gains critical
appreciation of the similarities and differences between interlocutors. By creating
space for dialogue between cultures, interculturalism is a mutually enlightening
process which frees us from the limits of our horizons. A fusion of horizons, then,
results in an expansion of horizons that is conducive to the cultivation of
intersubjectivity, reflexivity, fallibility, and freedom. Such learning experiences
are essential to elucidating the inherent miscommunications and misidentifications
between people that perpetuate terror.
In a post-terror world traumatized by pain, angered by atrocities, and
confused by paradoxical discourses, fear and distrust mark the culture of many
multicultural societies. As Beck (2000) notes:

The community of national history was always raised in the dialectic of enemyimages. Threats create society, and global threats create global society (p. 38).

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But globalization also opens new possibilities for diverse ways for fusing horizons
by inviting intercultural dialogue, reflection, and change, and establishing a more
communicative and trusting ethos that remedies the problem of terror. By
appealing to the epistemological need for others and the moral value of
developing freedom, interculturalism may lead to a fusion of horizons that builds
interdependency rather than fear. After all, being able to see differently can
transform ones self-perception and thereby free oneself from imagined cultural
baggage. As reflective, autonomous beings, there is hope that, through thoughtful
words and acts, we can change our lives. As Sen (1999) reminds us: It is not so
much a matter of having exact rules about how precisely we ought to behave, as
of recognizing the relevance of our shared humanity in making the choices we
face (p. 283). Being able to touch deep moral and emotional nerves, evoke
unconscious collective memories, and mobilize the deepest self-understanding of
ones audience are therefore crucial in the dialogical process of building
intercultural dependency (Parekh, 2006, p. 310). The hope then is that the
interdependence necessary for expanding horizons may dissolve a culture of terror
and paranoia in a world risk society full of global citizens built on global threats
(Beck, 2000).
Viewed within the context of this thesis, interculturalism is a dialogical
process through which ones inherited identity, values, and beliefs may be
alteredthereby questioning the necessity of terrorism. And if a shared threshold
of tolerance can be derived from a dialogical golden rule, then the participants of
transcultural conflicts can coherently consider the morality of one anothers
actions according to a mutually accepted ethos of reciprocity. As a theory, the
ETM may offer little deterrence to would-be terrorists. But interculturalism, as a
sustainable process that may be cultivated, may offer more hope in addressing the
fundamental dispositions that perpetuate terror. After all, social change hangs
crucially on the changing of habits as much as on changing minds (Appiah, 2006).
The social reproduction of terroristic dispositions provides an important basis for
conceptualizing how such habitus may be understood, analyzed and mitigated. If
the freedom from terror is indeed valuable in a post-terror world, then there may
be reason to promote an intercultural pedagogy.

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CHAPTER 7
ENVISIONING A NEW HORIZON

An-eye-for-an-eye-for-an-eye-for-an-eye ends in making everybody

blind (Gandhi, 2006, p. 269).

7.0 Introduction
As our plural world grows denser, the compatibility of our different
identities, beliefs, practices, and pursuits is crucial to todays conflicts. New and
extraordinary ways are soughtindeed, requiredto coerce people increasingly
desensitized to the spectacle of terror. This thesis seeks to examine what
terrorism is and how it interconnects with education in our post-terror world. The
terrorist and counter-terrorist are caught in a perpetual dialectic: As an eye for an
eye marks the monological exchanges between those blind to the vantage points
of others. The (his)story of terror cannot be told impartially, nor can the science
of national security be practiced free of the scientists values. Consequently, both
warrant scrutiny. It is from this skeptical attitude towards the dominant
discourses of terrorism and education that the present enquiry is carried out. To
draw on Gaarders (1994) analogy of the world as a giant white rabbit being
pulled out of a top hat, I am trying to climb up one of its hairs and call into
contention that terror ought not and need not be a mundane part our experiences.
In this concluding chapter, after a brief defense of the central premises and
arguments in this thesis, I identify and respond to some of its crucial challenges. I
finally close with some potential implications for the future research and practice
of education.

7.1 Addressing the central arguments

The central enquiry is this: Does education share any conceptual basis
with terrorism? If so, how might education facilitate in the mitigation of terror?
And underlying these questions is the more fundamental issue of what terrorism is
and the premise that it should be mitigated in the first place. Therefore, to answer
the former set of questions requires some thought concerning that of the latter.

7.1.1 What is terrorism?

On the question concerning what constitutes terror, economists and
political scientists have often given up on or utterly denied the need for a
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defensible definition in such pragmatic matters. Through the lens of their own
discipline, positivists provide objective data on the roots of terrorismincome,
education, employment, religion, nationality, etc.without recognizing the valueladen presuppositions of their science (Putnam, 2002). I too began this thesis
without questioning the dominant discourse of terrorism. By imposing a rational
choice model, the narrow focus of the PEA may prove to be an oversimplification
for studying the diversity and complexity of such phenomena. The PEA to
terrorism is based on the Homo economicus paradigm, that is, individuals who
live and act according to a self-interested cost-benefit calculus. However, as
social animals with different concerns, we are neither identically nor entirely
governed by economic forces. Highly doubtful that the databases extensively
used in the PEA are impartial or comprehensive, I find that terrorism research is
often (falsely) enshrouded as an objective science. After all, what events should
the scientist quantify? Who should be the subject of terrorism research? Terror is
a value-laden subject. The PEA to terrorism does provide some statistical
information concerning certain forms of its manifestations, but it often fails: first
to account for the partiality of the scientist who holds but one value-laden vantage
point among many, and second to respect the moral dignity and diversity of
people who are able to imagine and pursue what they find reason to value.
Therefore, the study of the terrorist phenomenon requires the interdisciplinary
contributions from those who hold multiple perspectives.
Reviewing the historical manifestations of terror reveals what statistical
data cannot: That as a propagandistic act for attaining more socio-political power
through coercive fear, terrorism is founded on a self-justifying set of immutable
principles, be it religious or political. In other words, terrorism is essentially a
spectacular method of coercion which, despite the extremity of the violence, is
justified by a fundamental belief in a certain principle or cause. But like the PEA,
the exegesis of historyparticularly that of something as ambiguous and
controversial as terrorismis founded on the partial vantage point of the
historian. If history is the product of a shared culture, then the reading of terror
will be colored by ones finite and particular conditions. I am not asserting that
the PEA or historical analysis of terrorism is uninformative but rather that they
only provide partial accounts of the phenomenon. As such, the different
interpretations of terrorism warrant input from one another. After all, any
defensible science requires corroboration/refutation through critical examination
from others. While the contemporary discourse of terrorism is dominated by that
of transnational, non-governmental organizations that are increasingly extremist
in their modus operandi and fundamentalist in belief attitude; such globalized
terrorism is but the most spectacular tip of the iceberg of socio-political terror.
As Greene (2007) argues: While a linguistic community may insist on the
correctness of their definition, in doing this, they run the risk of missing the big
picture, of denying themselves a deeper understanding of whats going on around
them or even within themselves (p. 38). Consequently, I draw on Schmid and
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Jongmans (2005) generic definitional elements of terrorism to derive a more

transcultural basis for further analysis.
Conceptualizing terror according to its methodological, legal, and moral
essences has a number of important implications. First, as a method of coercive
violence to alter the politics of social relations, terrorism is a common activity that
is practiced interpersonally to internationallyfrom child abuse, to bullying, to
corporate sabotage, to the use of CBRN technologies as WMD against
noncombatants. When one critically reflects on how terror is distinguished by
convention, its arbitrariness becomes apparent and its extensive roots exposed.
As such, it entails actions of not only political revolution, but that embedded in a
much broader socio-historical context. This reconstruction of the essence of
terrorism concerns more than just a definitional technicality, but our very
understanding of and response to the phenomenon.
Second, the problematic perpetuation of this method hinges on its moral
evaluation. Because of the MOT, its judgments vary according to our culturally
partial vantage points. Merari (2007) thus argues that given the tremendous
diversity of cultures, moral evaluations of political violence cannot be
universally tenable (p. 29). Yes, having just two people share the same moral
view on an issue is often difficult enough, let alone cultural groups on
intercultural violence. Every culture tends to claim historical purity, despite the
fact that there are no clean hands in the terror of war. However, it is because of
the very fact that each person has the moral capacity to defend or alter their
vantage points that I insist on the ETM. The morality of intercultural violence can
be more coherently evaluated if and only if the stances of both the attackers and
the attacked are taken into serious consideration. Terrorism, to be considered as
such, is thus a coercive methodology that violently violates the thresholds of
others (or sometimes also of oneself) and can be applied by any person(s) from
the social to the political level. But what does such a broad notion of terror have
to do with education? And why should it be mitigated in the first place?

7.1.2 Defending the freedom from terror

The mitigation of terror is justifiable because doing so enhances our
freedom. Terrorism is a source of unfreedom that limits development, from the
personal to the national level. And because freedom is valuable not only as a
means to choose and attain what one finds reason to value but also as an end-initself, human development should be enhanced by the abatement of terror.
Freedom from terror is a goal instrumentally and intrinsically valuable to every
person, particularly given our different standpoints. But first, what is freedom and
does it have limits?
As conscious agents, every person has the moral capacity to think and act
autonomously; yet at the same, there are natural and social restrictions to our
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freedom. Because we have the capability to decide and act according to reasons
we value, and not only out of necessity, we can be considered moral agents. We
are beings that do not entirely abide by our inclinations or self-interests at every
moment (Kant, 2005). Otherwise, we would be but mere robots acting according
to a pre-programmed algorithm, incapable of making autonomous choices, and
hence exempt from the moral accountability of our activities (Sider, 2007).
Unless we are moral agents capable of exercising our free will, we cannot be held
culpable for ourwhat are ultimately predetermineddeeds, including terrorism.
Although our capacity to reason is essential to our dignity as moral agents, we are
not entirely autonomous. We are not free to fly around like superman or live
forever without aging, no matter how much we wish and how hard we try. There
are physical, chemical, and biological limits to our world, although technology
does help us enhance our freedom by helping us overcome some of our natural
constraints. Neither are we free to feed on human flesh, commit sexual acts with
family members, or rob another of their possessions, despite the fact that these
acts are naturally accomplishable. After all, there are further political, cultural,
and economic restraints that limit our social freedom. In other words, within the
physical, chemical, and biological laws that define what we can naturally
accomplish, there are further political, cultural, and economic laws that constrain
what we should socially practice. Given, then, that we are neither mere puppets
utterly and predictably controlled by forces beyond our will nor free spirits
entirely uninfluenced by our natural and social conditions; why expand the
freedom from terror?
Expanding our freedom from terror is justifiable both instrumentally, as a
means to pursue and attain what we find reason to value, and intrinsically, as an
end-in-itself. Terror is a source of unfreedom which, by transgressing the norms
of others, coerces autonomy away from them. It limits development by restricting
the expansion of freedom of persons and nations politically, culturally, and
economically. Through terror, we are compelled to see and do (or not do) things a
certain way without the possibility of scrutiny or dialogue. In order for us, who
all carry different histories and hold different vantage points, to be able to pursue
those visions that we find reason to value; freedom is instrumental. Mitigating the
practice of terror is justifiable because doing so enhances our capabilities to be
and do differently from that imposed by unscrutinized conventions. But not only
is the freedom from terror instrumental to the attainment of different visions of the
good life, but it is an intrinsically valuable goal in itself. The abatement of
terrorism is a defensible end-in-itself, irrespective of what we ultimately attain,
because even if we choose our pursuits no differently with or without the threat of
terror, the opportunity for making this choice respects our moral dignity as
autonomous, thinking persons. Suppose a communist dictator, through the
terrorist method, compels you to serve as a medical doctor because of your
outstanding results in biology examinations. It turns out that you are immensely
interested in medicine and would have strived to become a doctor even if you
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were not forced to do so by the state. In this case, freedom plays no instrumental
role in your pursuit and attainment of your good life, namely of practicing
medicine. However, you were denied the freedom to derive through reason this
choice of becoming a medical doctor. In other words, the opportunity for
decision-making on matters that significantly affect our lives is justifiable as a
goal-in-itself, irrespective of what our choice is.
Because terror denies people of their dignity, of their moral capacity to
think and choose those beings and doings that they find reason to value, the
freedom from terror is justifiable both as an instrumental means to attain what one
would like to pursue and as an intrinsically valuable opportunity for making
choices. To deny the value of freedom, even given its natural and social limits, is
to deny the human capacity to reflect and act upon those decisions and activities
that matter to peoples lives.

In assessing our lives, we have reason to be interested not only in the kind of lives
we manage to lead, but also in the freedom that we actually have to choose between
different styles and ways of living. Indeed, the freedom to determine the nature of
our lives is one of the valued aspects of living that we have reason to treasure (Sen,
2010, p. 227).

Given then that the freedom from terror should be enhanced for instrumental and
intrinsic reasons, what does terrorism have to do with education and how can
education expand this freedom?

7.1.3 What does education have to do with terror?

Education is essential to expanding the freedom from terror. The need to
re-examine the pedagogical reproduction of terror is exposed by the sociopolitical framework of terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the discourse
of terror has been anchored towards large-scale, cross-border attacks of mass
destruction. But it can be and is carried out across many socio-political contexts.
As the willed physical and symbolic coercion of targets held to be off-limits by
certain conventions, terroristic acts may not be recognized as such by those whose
cultural norms have not been violated. There are, thus, at least two significant
implications: First, there should be a greater emphasis on the cultivation of
intercultural understanding. Second, the phenomenon may not only be more
pervasive than presupposed but also more fundamentally rooted in our
uncompromising attitude towards our dearest beliefs and values. Founded on a
simplistic, morally-dichotomized worldview, fundamentalism is an essential part
of terrorism, for how can one expect militants to kill and to expect to be killed but
on the basis of a very strong, single-minded belief (Laqueur, 2003, p. 27)? Such
fundamentality is reinforced by a rigid education that puts the stress on the
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acceptance of established norms, and most certainly not on critical discussion

(Laqueur, 2003, p. 45). What identities, histories, and doxa are inculcated in a
given society is therefore crucial to the recognition and perpetuation of terror.
Broadly describable as the social (i.e., political, cultural, and economic) process of
learning and teaching, education shapes the very basis of not only the
fundamentality and practice of terrorists, but also its conception. Formal
education, when monopolized by the state for the nation, can perpetuate the
monological misrecognition that fuels the cycle of terror. Given todays
multinational states and national insecurity, the supposed merits of strengthening
the national identity of an imagined community through the state citizenship
education appears equally imaginary.
Likewise, the neoliberal discourse of development as the answer to terror
neglects the plural values of diverse peoples. People hold different visions of the
good life. Imposing every personespecially those in underdeveloped
countrieswith the identity of a rational, self-interested consumer, is as
problematic as that of the national patriot. As such, education devolves into mere
training for work, that is, for competition in the world market. It loses its intrinsic
value as a mere economic instrument. Or worse, education (or rather, reeducation) can be deployed as a form of soft-counterterrorism under the guise of
foreign developmental aid (Wang, 2010). According to this rationale, the poor,
uneducated children in foreign countries will grow up to be easy recruits for
terrorists. Consequently, providing these children with a proper education will
help them find employment, make money, start a family, and perhaps even come
to love the good life envisioned by the donor. Simply put, through educational
development, increases in wealth and consumption will supposedly cure terror.
But replacing one doxa with another fails to address the fundamental problem of
terrorism: The freedom to pursue the beings and doings one finds reason to value
remains constrained. If development is to be measured by the enhancement of the
substantive freedoms that people can enjoy, then re-educating ones terrorist in
ones own image is hardly emancipative.
Education is not only a process for social reproduction, but it can also be
conducive to social change. Education can enhance our freedom from the habitus
of terror by developing our capabilities to be and do what we have reason to
value. It should therefore cultivate the appreciation of our fallibility and, hence,
the contribution of others through intercultural dialogue. Only when we are made
aware that our identities, beliefs, and practices are imperfect and tentative can our
fundamentality be softened and extremism held in check. Modern education often
seeks to reproduce docile citizens who are best kept blissfully oblivious to the
structural forces that usher them along the conveyor belt of life: birth, grades,
employment, wealth, and death. But to foster human development and respect our
moral dignity as autonomous persons, education should also help to disenchant
the illusio that blinds us with the arbitrary and unchosen (Grenfell, 2007, p. 41).
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By sharing narratives interculturally, we are kept aware of our fallibility and

partiality.

If you know for certain what is the purpose of the universe in relation to human life,
what is going to happen, and what is good for people even if they do not think so
then you will feel that no degree of coercion is too great (Russell, 2009, p. 13).

Reminded that we can always be mistaken, we will find less reason to forcefully
assert our tentative theories, histories, and identities. For developing the freedom
from terror, education promotes the philosophical enquiry of our deepest beliefs,
values, and practices through intercultural dialogue. Education thus plays a
pivotal role in the reproduction and evolution of the terrorist habitus.
In sum, terrorism, as a normatively indifferent strategy of violent coercion
that can be learned and perpetuated across a socio-political scale, crucially
hinges on education. It is pivotal to the reproduction and change of the terrorist
habitus. To mitigate the former and cultivate the latter, we should learn to hold
one anothers beliefs and identities tentatively, aware that our horizons are always
finite and can be complemented by the visions of others. By coercing what and
how our activities should be, terror restricts our freedom to be and do what we
find reason to value. An emancipative education should thus develop in learners
the capability to engage in interculturalism, to appreciate the possibility of
changing the world by seeing and thinking about things differently.

7.2 Challenges and responses

While I have been defending my arguments as I have been making them
throughout the chapters, there are several key challenges to this thesis that
particularly warrant elaboration: First, how can the theories and arguments being
made here bear any substantive relevance to or effect on the very pragmatic issues
of terror and security? I will call this the mere philosophy challenge. Second,
for relativists, the ETM may seem to impose a single moral principle across
irreconcilable cultural differences; while for universalists, it may seem to imply
that there are no moral conclusions that are forever true from all vantage points. I
will call this the universality-relativity dispute. Third, does the socio-political
theory of terror not water-down the phenomenon of terrorism into such a diffuse
notion that any meaningful responses to it will be rendered impracticable? I will
call this the watered-down challenge. Here, I will address each of these crucial
issues before concluding with some implications for educational practice and
further research.

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7.2.1 Mere philosophy?

I initially approached the issue of terrorism by trying to formulate
generalizations based on its statistics. However, I increasingly realized that the
subject matter is not easily quantifiable given that the selection and evaluation of
such empirical facts are inherently value-laden (Putnam, 2002). After all, who
and what qualifies as terrorists and terrorism are founded on the a priori values
of the hermeneut. And it is the ignorance of and perhaps indifference to the
presence of values underlying the interpretation of facts which may contribute to
the misrecognitions and misguided certainties that fuel the perpetuation of terror.
Consequently, my disenchantment with the science of terrorism and the
metanarrative of modern development (which includes delivering educational
aid to foreigners and strengthening national citizenship education at home) led me
to question the very essence of this project. Becoming more philosophical, this
thesis must address a common challenge: How do mere philosophical arguments
hold any practical relevance to the life-and-death realities of terror and security?
Surely, the practical influence of my thesis on social change is most likely
minisculeperhaps (at best) only raising reflection and debate. But one thing is
certain. To not question our present condition, is to by default endorse our postterror world: For while we withhold our thoughts or voices, we will find many
political decisions being made on our behalf.
Philosophy is both theoretical and practical. It contributes to the
theoretical frameworks necessary for practice, be it for formulating hypotheses in
scientific experimentation or guiding the conduct of a moral person and just
government. The question concerning the relevance of philosophy in the
practicalities of politics is, ironically, philosophical in nature. After all, as Russell
(2009) points out, the systematic contempt for philosophy is itself a
philosophy (p. 1). In fact, we are all philosophers that vary in our extents of
what is open to questioning and constitutes as knowledge. Hence, the argument
that the philosopher has no place dabbling in issues for which they have not been
trainedparticularly in the real world of scienceis not only paradoxical, but
also holds a inviolable, narrow view of knowledge. How much credit do
modern-day scientists both physical and social owe Democritus, Aristotle, and
Hume for the development of their respective disciplines? Or to Bentham, Smith,
Kant, and Marx for the very societies they live in? Our philosophy forms the
basis of our practice.
However, for this thesis to contribute to furthering our understanding of
terror and education, it must not merely seek to disenchant but also balance the
aroused skepticism with the reason of empirical experience. I take philosophy,
then, as sitting between absolute certainty (whether scientific or religious) and
absolute skepticism. As Russell (2009) points out:

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Some men are so impressed by what science knows that they forget what it does not
know; others are so much more interested in what it does not know than in what it
does that they belittle its achievements. Those who think that science is everything
become complacent and cocksure, and decry all interest in problems not having the
circumscribed definiteness that is necessary for scientific treatment. In practical
matters they tend to think that skill can take the place of wisdom, and that to kill
each other by means of the latest technique is more progressive, and therefore
better, than to keep each other alive by old-fashioned methods. On the other hand,
those who pooh-pooh science revert, as a rule, to some ancient and pernicious
superstition, and refuse to admit the immense increase of human happiness which
scientific technique, if widely [and, I would add, wisely] used, would make possible
(p. 25).

Both theoretical and practical, philosophy not only contributes to what is known,
but also to the scope and limitations of what is knowable. After all, how one
defines knowledge and the manner by which such knowledge can be gained are
questions that shape the art of science but also lie beyond the scope of its enquiry.
Constituting of both reason and experience, philosophy can contribute much to
our discourses of terror and education.
The mere philosophy challenge is founded on a narrow epistemology,
one that neglects the contributions from different theories of knowledge and its
evolution. And it is the very certainties that we defend which lay the fundamental
groundwork for our potential extremism. If education is to be concerned with not
only the growth of skills but also wisdom, then educators must not only teach
the arts and science but also the knowledge of what we do not know. It must seek
to strike a moderate balance between absolute certainty and uncertainty. As
Russell (2009) argues:

if philosophy is to serve a positive purpose, it must not teach mere scepticism, for,
while the dogmatist is harmful, the sceptic is useless. Dogmatism and scepticism
are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of
not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge
or of ignorance (p. 27).

It is when we become firmly persuaded of the certainty of our particular

knowledge that we become divided into rival groups of fanatics (Russell, 2009,
p. 26). Having a deeper philosophical understanding of our knowledge and its
discontents would challenge any justification for taking extremist actions against
the other. Education for the freedom from terror cannot simply replace dogma
with dogma. Consequently, philosophy not only is allowed but has the
responsibility to contribute to the public discussion on the significance of 9/11,
which emerges as an event with an impact on our understanding of the world and
ourselves (Borradori, 2003, p. 4).

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My approach in this thesis is, in short, to undermine the certainty of the

scientific solution to terror while enhancing our tentative knowledge concerning
this ambiguous, complex issue. The analysis of terror cannot do without
empirical observations or a reasonable dose of skepticism. In other words, in the
study of terror and education, both philosophy and science are complementary and
necessary for moderating the certainty of doubt or dogma. Philosophy is
necessarily educative in that it challenges our unscrutinized convictions while
seeking more tenable knowledge. And by learning to both suspend our judgments
and pursue intercultural constructs of knowledge through dialogue, there is hope
that we can expand our horizons and freedom.

7.2.2 The relativity-universality dispute

The second dispute involves the challenges potentially posed by both
relativists and universalists concerning the ETM: The former to the imposition of
a single moral framework upon all transcultural conflicts and the latter to the
denial of the possibility of any absolute moral principles. Addressing the crux of
the moral controversy of terrorismnamely whether and how it can be justified
is the ETM, which holds moral systems as cultural adaptations of different groups.
In this sense, evolution refers not only to the cultural changes (including moral
codes) over time, but also to the adaptability of the theory according to the
particular ethical conditions of the conflicting parties. The ETM, in short, holds
that the moral coherence of any intercultural conflict, be it called war or terror
by a particular side, must be assessed by taking into account the ethical stances of
the people involved and affected by it. As long as the people (be they combatants
or noncombatants, government officials or citizens) of at least any one side find
the reciprocation of the specified method of conflict morally unacceptable, then
the insistence to continue doing so would be immoral, and hence, terroristic. Any
morally inconsistent act of conflict is terror. Put another way, once the different
moral frames of reference have been specified, it is possible to identify terrorist
acts. After all, the violence between two boxers engaged in a fight is hardly
terror, for both morally accept the delivery and reception of gloved punches to
certain areas of their bodies within the ring. They have chosen their course of
action (of punching) and experience (of being punched) autonomously and
consensually. But for the relativist, the ETM appears to stake claim as a
universally applicable moral framework. How can this be given the fundamental
and irreconcilable differences in moral systems across cultures?
Generally, relativists hold that cultural differences are so deep that there
are little or no grounds for cross-cultural agreementespecially on moral issues.
In this view, people of different cultures effectively live in different worlds,
incapable of communication, let alone share a moral consensus (Appiah, 2006).
After all, the argument goes, all knowledge are hermeneutical acts that are equally
valid within their cultural horizons (Olssen, Codd, & O'Neill, 2004). As Parekh
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(2006) explains, since moral values are culturally embedded and since each
culture is a self-contained whole, they are relative to each society and the search
for universal moral values is a logically incoherent enterprise (p. 126). Because
relativists hold the view that all moral judgements are relative to a culture, it
cannot be criticized from outside (Parekh, 2005, p. 17). The implication is that
moral consensuses, indeed intercultural dialogues, are not only futile but
impossible. But the ETM does not generate absolute moral laws. It does not
formulate claims like civilians should never be intentionally attacked or
surrendering enemies must not be executed without trial. Rather, it is highly
contextual: what moral judgments become passed through the ETM will depend
on the stances of the people affecting and affected by the conflict. Only those
methods which do not violate the norms accepted by the people of all sides in a
particular context will be moral; the very same methods may be judged immoral if
at least one group of people finds their norms violated by such acts. But then, is
not the ETM making the relativistic claim that there is no right or wrong?
In contrast, universalists hold that there are common values that are
essential to human nature, such that they are valid and defensible across all
cultureseven if they meet resistance from others. If everyone could simply
become convinced by the superior argument, then all would come to a rational
consensus. In this view, there are some values that are, and should be, universal
(Appiah, 2006, p. xxi). Universalists insist with reasons their claim that there are
facts which remain true independent of ones cultural beliefs, values, preferences,
morals, histories, or practices. Consequently, according to this account, there is
some good life that everyone should pursue or at least value, even if they do not
do so at the moment. To hold such a view requires the belief in some universal,
inviolable ethical system, one that insists on the possibility to judge in absolute
terms right from wrong, irrespective of vantage points and across time and
space. The crucial idea here is that there are certain moral responsibilities
prescribed by universal normative principles. In other words, there are certain
rules and principles that can [and should] be universally shared (Held, 2005, p.
22). For example, human rights and tolerance are some values that are held as
universal by many liberals among others. However, while the ETM does not
formulate any absolute, normative maxims; it does provide a coherent framework
that systematically takes into account the diversity and evolution of moral
reasoning. Given the freedom-fighterterrorist dialectic, the theory simply holds
that one cannot justify denying others the freedom from terror that is demanded
for oneself. Simply put, the possibility for any moral consensus rests on its
dialogical constitution.
In sum, the stance of the ETM can best be described as what Beck (2000)
calls contextual universalism, that is, the tenability of truths rather than just one
truth through mutual interference between exclusive certainties (p. 84). Such a
stance departs from the absolutist basis shared by both universalists and
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relativists. Both impose their singular viewpoint upon all others: the former of
the validity of a particular nature of reality and the latter of the impossibility of
dialogue or bridging across multiple realities. The crucial implication from
shifting towards the recognition of imperfect pluralities is that, the things we
hold most sacred must be opened to criticism by others (Beck, 2000, p. 86). The
ETM reflexively but systematically adapts to cultural diversity and evolution to
provide a finite but coherent moral stance when considering intercultural conflict.
Its claim, that it is possible to systematically assess the morality of any
intercultural conflict, appears universalistic. However, the outcome of each moral
evaluation will be dependent upon the particular conditions constituting each
conflict. The ETM holds no transcendental ethics. For example, if two tribes on
an isolated island were to engage in conflict and every single member of both
sides morally accepted, say, the eating of the bodies of their enemies; then such
actions would be as morally acceptable (or culpable) as uniformed soldiers
leaving their enemies bodies to rot in a war. In sum, the contextual
universalism of the ETM is moderate between the absolute certainty of
universalists or absolute incommensurability of relativists by holding there to be
phenomenal realities that: (1) can be naturally and socially shared by different
cultures, and (2) are tentative, heterogeneous, and ultimately fallible.

7.2.3 Watering-down the notion of terrorism?

The third challenge charges the socio-political theory of terror with
watering-down the definition of terrorism to the point that it impedes the
necessary practical and moral responses to terror. Authorized by those holding
legitimate power, legislations profile their typical terrorists as those who violently
resist the existing governmental authority. The socio-political theory of terror
does not deny the fact that these terrorists, conventionally understood, may
indeed be so; but it importantly points out that all practices that bear the essence
of the terrorist method should also be culpable. From the familial to the
workplace to the international, terror can and is a political practice of the human
animal. But this broad conception of terrorism faces some challenges: First, such
a generalization may provide an excuse for terror by decreasing its culpability.
Second, watered-down definitions of terrorism may obstruct governmental
responses to national security. Thus, how can the broad notion of terror
formulated in this thesis be justifiable?
Walzer (2004), for one, may consider the rendering of all politics as
essentially terroristic as offering a potential excuse of universal resort: After
all, terrorists are only doing openly what everyone else does secretly (p. 56).
This excuse does not morally justify terrorists, but why should they be punished if
we all act likewise? It is a case of let he who is without sin cast the first stone.

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Terrorism is the politics of state officials and movement militants alike. This
argument does not justify either the officials or the militants, but it does excuse them
all. We hardly can be harsh with people who act the way everyone else acts
(Walzer, 2004, p. 57).

Watering-down the notion of terror may seem to present an excuse for universal
resort: Yes, terrorism is wrong, but everybody does it. However, instead of
having everyone increasingly accept terror as the norm of human interaction, it is
possible that the inherent culpability of the terrorist label may help remind us to
reflect and change any of our terrorist ways. The supposed weakness of broader
notions of terror is also the source of its greatest hope. For through scrutinizing
and holding ourselves responsible for possibly robbing others of their freedom
from terror, we may become: (1) more sensitive to the mundane experiences of
terror in our families and societies, (2) more aware of our role in the systemic
perpetuation of terror from the social to the political contexts, and (3) more
willing to participate in expanding our freedom from terror by ceasing its
perpetuation.
Furthermore, broad notions of socio-political terror may implicate too
many terrorists to be practicable, for one cannot condemn terrorism without
condemning all violence of every stripe (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 10). After
all, governments have enough trouble dealing with political terrorists as it is; to
potentially admit many social practices into the problem of terror only
obfuscates an already complex and controversial issue. To broaden the stateauthorized discourse of terror would digress from the focus of policy-makers:
How to combat the threat to national security posed by subnational terrorists
(Pape, 2003). As Merari (2007) points out, broad definitions fail to distinguish
terrorism from other forms of violent conflicts, such as guerrilla or even
conventional war (p. 15).

If the definition of terrorism is equally applicable to nuclear war, conventional war,

and guerrilla warfare, the term loses any useful meaning. It simply becomes a
synonym for violent intimidation in a political context and is thus reduced to an
unflattering term, describing an ugly aspect of violent conflicts of all sizes and
shapes, conducted throughout human history by all kinds of regimes... (Merari,
2007, p. 16).

Yes, narrow and rigid definitions of terror make the life of policy-makers and
terrorism researchers much simpler. However, doing so neglects the sociological
experiences in which the fundamental roots of terror are embedded. The
practical acts of counterterrorism merely scratch the surface, if not problematize,
such socio-political issues.
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I concur with the charge that a broad conception of terror is not pragmatic
for governments and their advisors. However, there is a danger in not carefully
contemplating such complex issues. After all, it would have been more practical
for slave owners to not critically reflect on slavery nor change the existing
policies and practices. Likewise, the resistance to consider broad or diverse
understandings of terror simply out of their impracticality is a faulty and inverted
rationale. How terrorism is conceived profoundly shapes how one responds to
it.120 Thus the inertia against rethinking terror is particularly crucial to its
perpetuation. Given that soldiers are dispatched, armed, and poised to counter
any terrorists with legitimately lethal force, it is of grave importance to critique
and understand the concept of terrorism. Using singular, narrow, and hence
practical definitions to identify and respond to terror is problematic for at least
two reasons: First, they arbitrarily simplify what is otherwise a complex
phenomenon. Second, they are not dialogically formulated but monologically
imposed. To impose laws constituted of a particular interpretation of terrorism is
problematic. After all, the essence of terror is not the physical elimination of
whomever is perceived to be different but the eradication of difference in people,
namely of their individuality and capacity for autonomous action (Borradori,
2003, p. 7). To act upon an arbitrarily narrow definition of terror is to deny
diverse viewpoints on such controversial issues and thereby potentially perpetuate
it. Russell (2009) puts it well: Dogmatism is an enemy to peace (p. 26).
Reconceptualizing terror from a socio-political framework offers a new
perspective on the hermeneutics of terrorism. While recognizing the social
pervasiveness of such politics may be deemed impractical by many authorities,
the moral implication is that many of our hands may not be pristine of its
culpability. Perhaps more importantly, the recognition of socio-political terror
may promote wider self-reflection of and debate concerning terroristic behaviors.
After all, to monologically address what is a dialogical problem is inadequate.
Hence, this thesis defends a dialogical education that cultivates a skeptical
curiosity towards and an intercultural appreciation of diverse understandings of
terror, as well as one another.

7.3 Conclusion: A new horizon?

Although night fell on a different world on September 11 (Bush, 2001);
dawn brings a new horizon. In the struggle to maintain national security in a
globalizing world, education is an indispensable, governmental instrument by
which diverse citizens are surveyed, normalized, and disciplined (Olssen, Codd, &
O'Neill, 2004). But to fully address the perpetuation of terror, one cannot fight
120

Consider the strict definition of forcible rape that has recently been broadened in the US to
include male victims, as well as, among other things, forcible oral or anal penetration (Savage,
2012). The new definition, which includes a broader understanding of rape, will directly impact
the statistics and analyses of such incidents in the future.

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fundamentalism with fundamentalism. Learned through formal and informal

pedagogical processes, and reproduced through social experiences of politics; the
terrorist habitus is inculcated within a closed hermeneutical community that
resists different exegeses. Consequently, patriotism is not the antithesis of
terrorism, but its reflection. This thesis thus points to a number of implications
for both educational practice and research. The dawning of new horizons can be
encouraged through intercultural dialogue, mutual learning, and self-reflection.
Research into the theory and implementation of how such an intercultural
education manifests within the context of particular states, societies, and schools
is of particular pertinence. But most importantly, even more so perhaps than the
pedagogical implications, is that there remains the hope of envisioning new and
different horizons, one free of the terror that blinds us from being and doing what
we may find reason to value. Only with this hope can there be the will to strive
towards expanding horizons free of terror.

7.3.1 Implications for education

Given a dialogical hermeneutics of moral conflicts and socio-political
conception of terror, education is crucial to the development of new horizons free
of terror. As an assertion of economic, political, and cultural power, education
embodies the social reproduction of knowledge, skills, language, values, and
identity. Theoretically, education needs to rethink the goals of national
development and whether expertise in marketable skills suffices as the ends of
schooling. Pedagogically, intercultural education should cultivate the capabilities
to choose our identities and achieve the good life we find reason to value. To do
so requires the presence of valid alternatives. In other words, an intercultural
education should help promote meaningful interactions and collaborations among
different learners. Through intercultural dialogue, interlocutors can at least better
recognize their plural identities, fallible knowledge, and particular hermeneutics.
In order to better appreciate the different means and ends of pedagogy,
educational research must be increasingly comparative. After all, there is no
absolute criterion, one free of social context by which to evaluate educational
systems and structures. Comparative research can thus provide a better
understanding of the educational theories and practices necessary for enhancing
the beings and doings of future citizens in this post-terror world.
Towards a terror-free world, education must aim to become more
emancipativethat is, helpful to developing not only practical skills but also
wisdom. The industrialization of modern education has served to legitimate and
reproduce the power hierarchies of societies. Graduates, through their educational
rites of passage, are consecrated by their endowment of socio-cultural capital. In
turn, homo academicus empowers the system by promoting the recognition of its
symbolic authorityits credentials and distinctions (Grenfell, 2007). Through
exercising the monopolized power of inclusion and exclusion, education can
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perpetuate the pecking order within and between societies. As Russell (2009)
argues:

we were told in youth by parents and school-teachers, what powerful

organisations tell us in order to make us act as they wish.... If we are wise, we shall
apply solvent criticism especially to the beliefs that we find it most painful to doubt,
and to those most likely to involve us in violent conflict with men who hold opposite
but equally groundless beliefs. If this attitude could become common, the gain in
diminishing the acerbity of disputes would be incalculable (p. 30).

Because terror crowds out the freedom to think and the capability to compose
autonomous reasoning, to truly counter the heteronomy of terror would require the
learning of wisdom, that is, the knowledge of what one does not know (Sen, 2006,
p. 175). Merely exporting the training of skills to poor nation-states misses the
essential focus of development: the capabilities for freedom.
In todays post-terror world, educators must be more concerned not only
about what knowledge is held, but how it is held. If education is to be more than
the (re)production of docile, skilled workers, then it must encourage the freedom
to formulate and express critical thought, particularly on the social reproduction of
the terrorist habitusthat is, the intentional coercion of others through physical
and symbolic violence for ones own purpose. To enhance the freedom from
socio-political terror, education must be a force for emancipation (Grenfell,
2007, p. 78).

It will be found that increase of skill has not, of itself, insured any increase of human
happiness or well-being. Philosophy means love of wisdom, and philosophy
in this sense is what men must acquire if the new powers invented by technicians,
and handed over by them to be wielded by ordinary men and women, are not to
plunge mankind into an appalling cataclysm (Russell, 2009, p. 22).

Mere educational training fails to dispel the illusionary identities that divide
people into uniquely hardened categories which are easily exploited in support
of fomenting intergroup strife (Sen, 2006, p. 178). Liberation from the
misrecognition and symbolic violence present in our dispositions is therefore a
personal and social struggle for Bourdieu (Grenfell, 2007, p. 251). He thus seeks
to de-dogmatize education by uncovering its social function and thereby reappropriate the structures of our own thought (Grenfell, 2007, p. 162).
Comparing education across cultures provides novel perspectives for thinking
about these systems, and thereby offers a basis for critique. Education, then,
should seek to provide not only the training of practical skills but also a practical

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philosophy that is capable of criticizing and challenging one anothers

fundamentalities and potential extremism.
To enhance the freedom from terror by disrupting the formation of
fundamentalities, educational practice should be more dialogical, uncoercive, and
plural.
In practice, such pedagogy promotes intercultural discussions,
collaborations, and self-reflection among learners on issues that are of concern to
them. Although appearing to be increasingly less physical in many parts of the
world, discipline in schools can still be profoundly coercive. Academic capital
should not be used as symbolic power to coerce learners into becoming the ideal
citizens of the nation-state. The freedom to choose our identities, beliefs, and
practices according to our value judgments is crucial to mitigating the terrorist
violence built on the monological illusion of singularity and dogma of
fundamentalism. Ultimately, if education is to expand the freedom from terror, it
must not only reproduce the skills necessary for consumption or national security,
but also for reflective dialogue.

A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of dogmatism is to become aware

of opinions held in social circles different from your own. [S]eek out people with
whom you disagree. [And if they] seem mad, perverse, and wicked, remind
yourself that you seem so to them.... This reflection should generate a certain
caution (Russell, 2009, p. 101).

Formal education, therefore, must not be monopolized by a particular dogma such

that questioning it becomes out of the question. Schools would gain by not being
segregated according to beliefs (often into the atheist public or the mono-religious
private), but rather by becoming more plural in student body, pedagogy, and
curriculum. Promoting diversity in education does not value diversity for its own
sake but only as a basis for mutual learning. After all, each vantage point is
partial and finite, and could therefore gain from the critical contributions of
others. By helping one another envision being, knowing, and doing differently,
this expansion of horizons is both morally and epistemologically valuable.
Political, cultural, and economic biases intrinsic to the process of data
selection are often neglected not only in terrorism research but also in that of
education. Both can benefit from the moral and epistemological values of
comparative analyses: Morally, both fields of research are value-laden, founded
on certain political visions of social justice.
How one chooses the
informational focus of evaluationsuch as income, achievement, or genderis
dependent on what the analyst finds reason to value (Sen, 2010, p. 231).
Consequently, without a Gods-eye-view by which to assess competing visions
of the good life, we are forced to acknowledge our situatedness and expand our
horizons by being better able to envision different beings and doings.
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Epistemologically, comparative research helps us recognize our fallibility,

partialities, and fundamentalities. Comparing how different political bodies
classify, treat, and counter their respective terrorists is conducive to such
illuminating effects.
Much better developed with regards to education,
comparative research in this field of enquiry demonstrates the limits of our
beliefs, aims, and experiences. Comparative education enhances our appreciation
of the different pedagogical goals and practices, softening our fundamental grasp
on human nature and vision of social life. As Russell (2009) argues:

suppose you meet a Muggletonian, you will be justified in arguing with him,
because not much harm will have been done if Mr Muggleton was in fact as great a
man as his disciples suppose, but you will not be justified in burning him at the
stake, because the evil of being burnt alive is more certain than any proposition of
theology.... [T]he general principle remains, that an uncertain hypothesis cannot
justify a certain evil (pp. 28-29, italics added).121

Being less certain about what we know and appreciating how others can improve
our tentative knowledge, perhaps our freedom from terror can be better developed
in future generations.
Through intercultural comparisons of the theories and practices of
terrorism and education, researchers may substantively affect how terror is
understood and countered, and how interculturalism may be adapted in particular
educational contexts. The socio-political framework of terror points to potential
research on how such habitus and experiences may be perpetuated and understood
in the field of education: be it inter-institutional, inter-learner, oppressive
(teacher-student), or revolutionary (student-teacher). Comparing how the terrorist
identity and habitus may be inculcated among youths around the world today may
be particularly illuminating, indeed, pertinent, to the development of their postterror world, one inherited from us. Consequently, another relevant area of
research is how intercultural education, as a generic algorithm, may be viewed
and adapted by learners and educators in their particular contexts. After all,
influencing social thought, political action, and public policies, research (even if
philosophical) can substantively affect peoples lives and choices, be they
political leaders or future ones being socialized as schoolchildren (Sen, 2006, p.
178). And this thesis is one example of such philosophical research.

7.3.2 Dawning on a new horizon

This thesis aims to critically evaluate the conditions of our post-terror
world and offers to develop through intercultural education greater freedom from
121

Muggletonianism was a small Christian sect in England lead by Lodowicke Muggleton in the
17th century.

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terror. As such, it focuses on re-examining the terrorist phenomenon and the role
of education in its perpetuation. As a coercive method that, through physical and
symbolic violence, violates one anothers norms; terror is a dialectical problem
hinging on the misrecognition of identities and miscommunication across cultures.
To expand the freedom from terror, education should seek to enhance:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the recognition of and respect for the moral dignity of every person,
the malleability of our identities and relations,
the awareness of the fallibility of our tentative knowledge, and
the appreciation for the uniqueness and limitations of each persons
vantage point.

In regards to the first, some form of human rights education should be promoted
by every state, adapting its discourse into their particular contexts while valuing
the moral dignity of all persons. In terms of the second, learners should from a
young age, when their identities and loyalties are especially formative, be taught
to appreciate their freedom of association and plurality of identities. For the third,
educators should encourage diverse enquiries and discussions, particularly
concerning those issues that are too mundane or too fantastic for many adults
accustomed to their taken-for-granted conditions. Finally, and above all,
education should promote intercultural dialogue.
To develop new horizons free from terror, the will and ways to understand
those who are different warrant cultivation. Placing the hope of ceasing the cycle
of terror in the enhancing intercultural dialogue and freedom may seem like mere
fantasy. But without objective measures to define, let alone resolve, terror; the
cultivation of hope that we, through our personal and societal changes, can
meaningfully affect our shared world is at least the first essential step towards the
freedom from terror. Counterterrorism is hardly a natural science; neither are
terrorists necessarily strangers doing and believing strange things. Without the
hope of envisioning horizons free of terror, we will only fuel its perpetuation by
fighting it. The hope, indeed expectation, that our problem of terror can be
alleviated at least makes its realization more achievable. As Ariely (2010) argues,
not only do our beliefs and expectations affect how we perceive and interpret
sights, tastes, and other sensory phenomena but our expectations can [also]
affect us by altering our subjective and even objective experiences (p. 228).
Placing hope in the freedom from terror at least changes our expectations and
perceptions of such experiences. After all, where else do archers aim if not for the
infinitely small centre of their target? As moral agents, we have the capacity to
affect our beliefs and practices. We can, through intercultural dialogue, transform
ourselves and perhaps even our societies.
Through entering one anothers narratives, different horizons can crossfertilize, our partialities and fallibility appreciated, and the value and values of
others recognized. By building interdependencies that enhance our freedom both
178

morally and epistemologically, the narrow-mindedness, fundamentality, and

extremism of our habitus can be revealed and, if not remedied, at least be held in
check. And as guardians of civilisation of humanity, not just of a particular
nation-state, teachers bear responsibility for cultivating such interculturalism
(Russell, 2009, p. 114). Through such an intercultural education, not only may
our freedom from terror be expanded, but our horizons as well. If the seeds of
terror are sown by humanity, then we have the obligation to help envision a new
dawn, one free of its fruits.

179

Tables and Figures

Chapter One: Dawn Rising on a Different World
Of what pertinence is terrorism
research? How does education fit in?
Where is the research gap?

What are the research aims,

questions, and methodology?

What are the ethical considerations

for this thesis? How is this research
organized?

Chapter Two: Contemporary Terrorism Discourses

What is terrorism and how is its research commonly
approached?

What are the discontents with the contemporary

discourses of terrorism?

Chapter Three: Globalized Terrorism

Does examining the historical roots of terrorism help
overcome the shortcomings of conventional approaches to
terrorism?

How is terrorism broadly understood and how can this

contemporary discourse be contextualized?

Chapter Four: The Essence of Terrorism

What is the essence of terrorism? How is it distinguishable
from other forms of political violence? Where lies the crux
of controversy?

How can the ethics of terrorism be viewed coherently from

different vantage points?

Chapter Five: Where Education Meets Socio-political Terror

Rethinking terror across social to political contexts, what
role does education play in the perpetuation of terror?

How can education enhance the freedom from such sociopolitical terror?

Chapter Six: Intercultural Education in a Post-terror World

How can we learn to clarify the moral ambiguities in our
post-terror world?

What is intercultural learning and how does it remedy the

problem of terror?

Chapter Seven: Envisioning a New Horizon

What are my responses to some of the crucial challenges
to this thesis?

What are the central arguments in this thesis?

Figure 1.4.1 A roadmap of the central enquiry in this thesis by chapter.

180

Figure 2.1.1. International Terrorism Incidents

1968 - 2004 (USDOS)

Number of Incidents

700
600
500
400
300

Incidents

200

Linear (Incidents)

100
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004

Year

(United States Department of State, 1976-2004)

Number of Incidents

Figure 2.1.2. International Terrorism Incidents

1968 - 2006 (RWTID)
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Incidents
Linear (Incidents)

Year

(The RAND Corporation, 2009)

181

Figure 2.1.3. International Terrorism Incidents

1985 - 2004 (USDOS)
700

Number of Incidents

600
500
400
300

Incidents

200

Linear (Incidents)

100
0

Year

(United States Department of State, 1976-2004)

Figure 2.1.4. International Terrorism Incidents

1985 - 2006 (RWTID)
500

Number of Incidents

450
400
350
300
250
200

Incidents

150

Linear (Incidents)

100
50
0

Year

(The RAND Corporation, 2009)

182

Figure 2.1.5. Fatalities from International Terrorism

1968 - 2004 (USDOS)
3500

Number of Fatalities

3000
2500
2000
1500

Fatalities

1000

Linear (Fatalities)

500
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004

Year

(United States Department of State, 1976-2004)

Figure 2.1.6. Fatalities from International Terrorism

1968 - 2006 (RWTID)
3500

Number of Fatalities

3000
2500
2000
1500

Fatalities
Linear (Fatalities)

1000
500
0

Year

(The RAND Corporation, 2009)

183

Figure 2.1.7. Injuries from International Terrorism

1968 - 2004 (USDOS)
7000

Number of Injuries

6000
5000
4000
3000

Injuries

2000

Linear (Injuries)

1000
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004

Year

(United States Department of State, 1976-2004)

Figure 2.1.8. Injuries from International Terrorism

1968 - 2006 (RWTID)
7000

Number of Injuries

6000
5000
4000
3000

Injuries

2000

Linear (Injuries)

1000
0

Year

(The RAND Corporation, 2009)

184

3500
3000
2500
2000
Linear (Incidents)

1500

Linear (Fatalities)
1000

Linear (Injuries)

500
0
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004

Number of Incidents, Fatalities, or Injuries

Figure 2.1.9. International Terrorism Incidents, Fatalities,

and Injuries 1968 - 2004 (USDOS)

Year

(United States Department of State, 1976-2004)

2500
2000
1500
Linear (Incidents)
1000

Linear (Fatalities)
Linear (Injuries)

500

2004

2001

1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1971

0
1968

Number of Incidents, Fatalities, or Injuries

Figure 2.1.10. International Terrorism Incidents, Fatalities,

and Injuries 1968 - 2006 (RWTID)

Year

(The RAND Corporation, 2009)

185

Remarks

Access

Data

Description

Sources

Sponsor

Name

Table 2.1.1. Comparison of the Major Terrorism Databases

Patterns of Global
Terrorism

The US Department
of State (USDOS)

Reports from US
embassies worldwide
and the Central
Intelligence Agency
(CIA)
Includes only
incidents of
international
terrorism strictly
defined as
significant

1968 2004
(digitally published
from 1976 2004)

Data is published
annually in freely
accessible, digital
reports:
http://www.terrorismi
nfo.mipt.org/Patternsof-GlobalTerrorism.asp
Discontinued and
replaced by the
NCTCs Report on
Terrorism in 2004

International
Terrorism: Attributes
of Terrorist Events
(ITERATE)
US Office of Political
Research

RAND Worldwide
Terrorism Incident
Database (RWTID)

Report on
Terrorism

The RAND
Corporation

National
Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC)

The press and media

coverage

The press and

media coverage

Reports from all

US intelligence
agencies and
sources

Attempts to include
all international
terrorism incidents
covered by the press
and media but has
selectively included
some borderline
domestic terrorism
incidents
1968 present

Attempts to include
all international
terrorism incidents
covered by the
press and the media
and has included
domestic terrorism
since 1998

Attempts to
include all
incidents of
terrorism both
domestic and
international
deemed
significant

1968 present
(international
terrorism) 1998
present
(domestic
terrorism)
Database is only
accessible through
subscriptions as of
2008
http://www.rand.or
g/ise/projects/terrori
smdatabase/

2004 present

Data is no longer
freely accessible by
the public

Developed by former
CIA analyst Edward
F. Mickolus in
1975(United States
Central Intelligence
Agency, 1976)

Data is published
annually in freely
accessible, digital
reports:
http://www.terrori
sminfo.mipt.org/P
atterns-of-GlobalTerrorism.asp

Incorporates two
earlier RAND
databases: the
RAND Terrorism
Chronology
Database and the
RAND-MIPT
Terrorism Incident
Database

(Sandler & Enders, 2007; Bellany, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, & Scott, 2006)

186

Table 2.2.1. Comparison of Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and Conventional

Warfare
Characteristic

Terrorism
(bottom-up)

Guerrilla Warfare

Conventional
(legalized) War

Control of
Territory

Does not rely on

zones of control
(primarily
psychological)

Tries to hold territory

(territorial/material)

Control of territory and

resources

Unit size (in action

not membership)

Small (individual to
groups of 1 - 10s)

Medium
(units of 10 - 100s)

Large
(armies of 1000s or
more)

Weapons

Concealed arms
(explosives)

Rifles, grenades
(basic military arms)

Full range of military

arms

Uniform/Symbols

No uniforms

Uniforms / symbol of
identity or affiliation

Full uniform display

(with structured
hierarchy)

Victims

State symbols,
religious-political
figures, public at
large

Military and political

personnel

Military,
communication and
transportation facilities,
infrastructure

Primary intended
impact

Psychological
coercion

Attrition of enemy
forces

Physical
destruction/defeat of
enemy forces

Recognition of war
zones

No

Within country

Yes within geopolitical

borders

International
legality1

No

Yes

Yes

Domestic legality

No

No

Yes

(Merari, 2007)

The issue of the legality of war that demarcates it from the illegality of terrorism in international
law will be elaborated in Chapter 4.2.

187

Table 2.2.2. A Typology of Terrorism:

Based on the dynamics between state and non-state actors and targets
Target

State

State

Citizens

Names: Interstate Terrorism

(Strategies in warfare, Covert
operations)

Names: Oppressive (Top-down) Terrorism

Socio-political scale: Regional to

International

Definition: The terroristic oppression by

state military or law enforcement agents
upon members of the governed society in
order to maintain or consolidate ruling
power. It has claimed a relatively large
numbers of victims historically.

Socio-political scale: National

Definitions: Terroristic tactics

sponsored or employed in open or
covert military conflicts between
combatants, particularly when noncombatants are victimized and
considered collateral damage. It can
also apply to civil wars between groups
each controlling partial territories of a
region and vying for legal governance.

Citizens

Instigator

Examples: the strategic bombings of

Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki; the
American and Spanish Civil Wars;
some CIA operations (e.g., Operation
Cyclone)

Examples: State terror (Reign of Terror

under Robespierre, Leninist-Stalinist Soviet
Union, Maoist China); Genocides
(Armenian holocaust under the Ottoman
Empire, Jewish and Slavic holocaust under
Nazi Germany, Cambodia under Pol Pots
Khmer Rouge)

Names: Revolutionary (Bottom-up)

Terrorism

Names: Globalized (Postmodern)

Terrorism

Socio-political scale: National

Socio-political scale: National to

International

Definition: Terrorist tactics used

against specific religious-political
leadership in hopes to win political
support and regime change.

Definition: Terrorism used by nongovernmental organizations designed to

maximize fatalities and which indifferently
victimizes combatants and non-combatants
alike in order to terrorize a wider
population and (often democratic)
government.

Examples: The Jewish Zealots and

Islamic Assassins; anarchists and
populists of the Russian Revolution;
anti-colonial nationalists (e.g., the IRA
and ETA in Western Europe, IMRO and Examples: Extremist Islamists, Jihadists,
the Ustase in the Balkans, Intifada in
Suicide Terrorists (e.g., al-Qaeda,
the Middle East)2
Palestinian Liberation Organization)

The IRA stands for the Irish Republican Army, ETA for Euskadi ta Akatasuna or Basque
Homeland and Freedom, and IMRO for the Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization.

188

Extremism:
immoderate
actions based on a
fundamentalist
rationale

Fundamentalism:
an uncompromising
belief attitude

Some possible examples:

Genocide, ethnic cleansing
Jihadism
Terrorism
Suicide attacks
mass murders
mass suicides
pre-emptive, invasive wars
Some possible examples:
Racism
Nationalism
Islamism
Zionism
Christianity
Communism
Neoliberalism
Populism

Figure 3.1.1. A framework conceptualizing the fundamentalist mentality (or

fundamentality) that underlies extremist behaviours.

189

Figure 3.2.1. Annual incidents of Worldwide Suicide Attacks

by Decade
200
180
Incidents per Year

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1981-1990

1991-2000
Time Period

2001-2005

(Atran, 2006)

Figure 3.2.2. Incidents of Suicide Attacks Worldwide from

2001-2005
500
450
400
Incidents

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2001

2002

2003
Year

(Atran, 2006)

190

2004

2005

Table 3.3.1. Comparison of Terrorism Practices from Premodernity to

Postmodernity
Characteristic

Premodern
(Revolutionary)
Terrorism

Modern
(Oppressive)
Terrorism

Modern
(Revolutionary)
Terrorism

Selectivity of
Victims

Specific religiouspolitical figures

with minimal
collateral damage

Less specific and

even genocidal in
criteria resulting in
indifferent violence
against entire
peoples

Specific political or
military figures with
minimal collateral
damage

Religious

Ethno-political

Political

Religious-political

Self-preserving

Self-preserving but
suicidal in
expectation

Suicidal

Despotic hierarchies

Localized networks

Decentralized
international cells

Forthright

Clandestine

Clandestine

Ideological
Motivation
Methodology
Organization

Self-preserving
but suicidal in
expectation
Localized
networks

Mode of
Operation

Clandestine

Financing

Meagre, relied on
local financiers

Common
Essences

Postmodern
(Globalized)
Terrorism
Less specific and
even genocidal in
selectivity by
indifferently
legitimizing the
victimization of
entire civilian
communities

Often meagre,
Some relatively
relying on local
well-funded through
financiers
global networks
Struggle for socio-political power (by disempowering potential threats and/or
consolidating ones own power)
Reliance upon the psychological role of hyperbolizing fear and intimidation
Reliance upon the media of their times to disseminate propaganda
Motivated by ideological self-justification
Widely held to be illegal and immoral 3
Often monopolized
monetary resources

The legality and morality of terrorism will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

191

Figure 3.3.1. A historical taxonomy of terrorism

As defined by Schmid
and Jongman (2005)

Terrorism

Since antiquity

Premodern
Oppressive

Premodern
Revolutionary

The Russian
Revolution
Modern
Revolutionary

Interstate

The Second World

War

Modern
Oppressive

An emerging
species?

Globalized
Terrorism

192

(Schmid & Jongman, 2005)

193

Definitional Elements

Violence/force

Political

Fear/terror

Threats

Psychological effects

Victim/target differentiation

Systematic

Combat strategy/tactic

Breaching of norms/rules

Coercion/extortion

Publicity

Indiscriminate violence

Victimizing

Intimidation

Innocence of victims

Group perpetrator

Symbolic demonstration

Incalculability of violence

Clandestine/covert nature

Repeated violence

Criminal

Demands on third parties

Frequency (percentage)

Figure 4.1.1. Frequency of Definitional Elements of

Terrorism

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

Figure 4.1.2. Core Definitional Elements of Terrorism

Violence/Force
(83.5%)

Repeated
Violence (7%)

Fear/Terror
(51%)

Violence
(90.5%)

Fear (100%)
Psychological
Effects (41.5%)

Publicity
(21.5%)

Propaganda
(35%)

Symbolic
Demonstration
(13.5%)

Coercion
(100%)

Threats (47%)
Coercion/
Extortion (28%)

Threats (96%)
Intimidation
(17%)
Demands on Third
Parties (4%)

Victim/Target
Differentiation
(37.5%)
Indiscriminate
Violence (21%)
Victimizing Civilians/
Noncombatants
(17.5%)

Indifferent
Victimization
(100%)

Innocence of
Victims (15.5%)
Incalculability of
Violence (9%)
Breaching of
Norms/Rules
(30%)

Aberrant (36%)
Criminal (6%)

Systmatic Planning/
Organization (32%)

Combat
Strategy/Tactic
(30.5%)

Strategic
(71.5%)

Clandestine/
Covert Nature
(9%)

Political (65%)
Group
Perpetrator (14%)

(Schmid & Jongman, 2005)

194

Table 4.1.1. The Seven Core Definitional Elements of Terrorism

Rank

Core Definitional Elements

Frequency

Coercion

100%

Indifferent Victimization

100%

Violence

90.5%

Strategic

71.5%

Political

65%

Aberrant

36%

Group Perpetrator

14%

195

Table 4.1.2. UN Legal Conventions on Terrorism

Date signed
Signed at
Convention
April 13, 2005

New York

December 9,
1999
December 15,
1997
March 1, 1991

the General Assembly

of the United Nations
the General Assembly
of the United Nations
Montreal

March 10, 1988

Rome

March 10, 1988

Rome

February 24,
1988

Montreal

March 3, 1980

Vienna

December 17,
1979
December 14,
1973

the General Assembly

of the United Nations
the General Assembly
of the United Nations

September 23,
Montreal
1971
December 16,
Hague
1970
September 14,
Tokyo
1963
(United Nations Treaty Collections, 2005)

International Convention for the Suppression of

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism
International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material
International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft

Figure 4.3.1. Walzers Moral Scale of Assassinability

Least moral to assassinate

Private citizens
(all private and nongovernmental goods and
services providers)

Most moral to assassinate

Government service providers

(lawyers, teachers, lawenforcers, medical personnel,
etc.)

196

Government officials
(politicians, policy and
decision-makers)

Figure 5.1.1. The Socio-political Scale of Terrorism

Social

Familial

Political

Workplace

Corporate

National

International

(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.1.2. A diagram of the alignment of magnetic domains, or
magnetization [from (a) to (c)] and disorientation of magnetic domains, or
demagnetization [from (c) to (a)].

Figure 6.2.1. The Importance of Reflexivity

197

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