Case :Davao Light vs CA

Date :December 29 1991

Topic: Writ of preliminary attachment
Facts: The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against
Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an
Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May
1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served upon
Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment
on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued,
the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of
the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.
Held: Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between
the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and
the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions
which the plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of
the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of
preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not
prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of
Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice
to the defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by affording him or her the
opportunity to dispose of his properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any
case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched by
the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a
showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary
attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is
at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not
binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.

Case:Estares vs CA

Date:June 8 2005
Topic: Non-Forum Shopping Certification Signature of both spouses
Facts: he spouses Estares secured a loan of P800k from Prominent Lending & Credit
Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They
however only received P637k as testified by Rosenda Estares in court. She did not however
question the discrepancy. At that time, her husband was in Algeria working. The loan
eventually went due and the spouses were unable to pay. So PLCC petitioned for an
extrajudicial foreclosure. The property was eventually foreclosed.
Now, the spouses are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged that they agreed to
an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now charging them 3.5% interest rate per
month; they also questioned the terms of the loan.
PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan. On the
procedural aspect, PLCC claims that the petition filed by the spouses is invalid because the
certification of non-forum shopping was only signed by Rosenda and her husband did not
sign.
Issue: Whether or not the petition filed by the spouses is valid.
Held: Yes, but their petition shall not prosper due to substantial grounds. The spouses were
properly apprised by the terms of the loan; they did not question the terms of the loan when
they had the opportunity when it did not yet mature. Rosenda even acknowledged the terms
of the loan in court.
On the procedural aspect, even though Eliseo did not sign the certification (because he was
in Algeria), there is still substantial compliance with the rules. After all they share a common
interest in the property involved since it is conjugal property, and the petition questioning
the propriety of the decision of the Court of Appeals originated from an action brought by
the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Considering
that the husband was at that time an overseas contract worker working in Algeria, whereas
the petition was prepared in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, a rigid application of the rules on
forumshopping that would disauthorize the wifes signing the certification in her behalf and
that of her husband is too harsh and clearly uncalled for.

Case: Mirriam College Foundation vs CA

Date:December 15 2000
Topic: prohibition with preliminary injunction
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper
were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of
complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that
contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to
the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints
against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to
the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction
over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the
court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.
Issue: was The exercise of jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for
certiorari filed by the students valid?
Held: DEFENDANT SCHOOLS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD DO
NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER AND, THEREFORE
THEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office, and not the
school, had jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the other hand, alleged lack of
impartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby deprive them of due
process. This contention, if true, would constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. These were the same grounds
invoked by the students in their refusal to answer the charges against them. The issues were
thus limited to the question of jurisdiction a question purely legal in nature and well within
the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is
an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in Phil. Global
Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.[37]

Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises
which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on
the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg
the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek
judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to
enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional
question thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the DECS
Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish
than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardly contain its glee over
the fact that "it will have one more case out of its docket." We remind the trial court that a
court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the power or authority, but also
the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted
to it.[38] Accordingly, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition without settling
the issues presented before it.

Case: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC.

Date: January 7, 2013
Topic: Injunctive relief
Facts: Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156)3, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo) on 12 December 2002, imposes a partial ban on the importation of used
motor vehicles.4 The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the
sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines."5 In Executive Secretary
v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions6 (collectively, Southwing), we
found EO 156 a valid executive issuance enforceable throughout the Philippine customs
territory, except in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic
Freeport) by virtue of its status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No.
72277
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the
importation of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La
Union, sued the government in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan (trial court) to
declare invalid EO 156, impleading petitioner public officials as respondents.8 Respondent
attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been
superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO 418),9 issued by President Arroyo on 4 April
2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent sought a
preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

Acting on respondents application for preliminary injunctive remedy, the trial court granted
relief, initially by issuing a temporary restraining order followed by a writ of preliminary
injunction granted in its Order of 27 November 2008.10 On petitioners motion, however, the
trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the injunctive writ on 7 July 2010. The trial court
grounded its ruling on Southwing which it considered as negating any "clear and
unmistakable legal right" on the part of respondent to receive the "protection of a writ of
preliminary injunction."11?r?l1
Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition.
Issue: WON Injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses
absque injuria?

are considered damnum

Held: Injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum absque injuria. In
arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the grave and irremediable
financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156s enforcement,
finding such prejudice inequitable. No doubt, by importing used vehicles in contravention
of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was selfimposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for an
injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque
injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage,
without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.

Case: equitable vs special steel

Date:
Topic:
Facts: SSPI sold welding electrodes to Interco, as evidenced by sales invoices. It is due on March
16 1991 (for thefirst sales invoice_ and May 11 1991 (for others). It also provided that Interco
would pay interest at the rate of 36% per annum in case of delay. In payment of for the products,
Interco issued 3 checks payable to the order of SSPI. Each check was crossed with the notation
account payee only and was drawn against Equitable. The records do not identify the signatory for
the checks, or explain how Uy came in possession of these checks. Heclaimed that he had good title
thereto. He demanded the deposits in his personal accounts in Equitable. The bank did so relying on
Uys status as a valued client and as son-in-law of Intercos majority stockholder.
SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes, explaining that its immediate need for
paymentas it was experiencing some financial crisis of its own. It replied that it has already issued
3 checks payable toSSPI and drawn against Equitable, which was denied by SSPI.Later on it was
discovered that it was Uy, not SSPI, who received the proceeds of 3 checks. Interco finally paidthe
value of 3 checks to SSPI plus portion of accrued interests. Interco refused to pay entire accrued

interest onthe ground that it was not responsible for the delay. Hence, Pardo filed a complaint for
damages against Uy and Equitable Bank alleging that the 3 crossed checks, all payable to order of
SSPI could be deposited and encashedby SSPI only. Trial Court rendered decision in favor of Pardo
which was affirmed by CA

Held:

Case:Peroxide vs CA
Date:July 31 1991
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